THE ART OF WAR

IN THE WESTERN WORLD

ARCHER JONES

Illustrations by Jerry A. Vanderlinde

HARRAP London

Scanned : Mr Blue Sky Proofed: Its Not Raining Version 4.2

CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION

Ancient Warfare
ncient !arfare

TACTICS
"and#to#"and $o%&at on 'oot $o%&at on 'oot (it) Missiles Mounted $o%&at 'ortification and Siegecraft *reek "ea+y Infantry against Persian ,ig)t Infantry and $a+alry *reek ,ig)t Infantry in $o%&at (it) *reek "ea+y Infantry le-anders $on.uests (it) a $o%/lete $o%&ined# i%s r%y 0)e Ro%an rt of !ar 0)e Ro%ans in $onfrontation (it) t)e le-andrian Syste% of Pyrr)us and "anni&al 0)e Ro%an Victories (it) t)e le-andrian Syste% 0)e Ro%an ,egion Perfected 0)e Ro%ans against t)e Mounted Part)ians Su%%ary of t)e $a/a&ilities of t)e 'our !ea/on Syste%s

LOGISTICS
0)e Pro+ision of Soldiers and Su//lies ,ogistics Illustrated &y le-anders Persian $a%/aign

STRATEGY
Persisting and Raiding Strategies 1istinguis)ed le-anders $a%/aign: n 2-e%/lification of $o%&at3 ,ogistic3 and Persisting Strategies le-anders 2ncounter (it) a Raiding Strategy Military Victories (it)out Political Su//ort: "anni&als 2-/erience (it) t)e 'a&ian Strategy Rare Instance of t)e 4se of Interior ,ines of 5/erations in ncient 0i%es $aesars Strategy in t)e $on.uest of *aul $aesars Ilerda $a%/aign: n 4nusual 5ccurrence of t)e 0urning Mo+e%ent $aesars $a%/aign against Po%/ey

SUMMARY OF WARFARE ON LAND

Su%%ary of !arfare on ,and

NAVAL WARFARE
Naval Warfare

THE DIVERSITY OF THE MEDIEVAL WAYS OF WAR, 200 !200

0)e 1issolution of t)e Ro%an 2%/ire $)anges in Military 5rganisation and 0actical 2%/)asis ,east 2ffort 2-e%/lified: By6antine 0actics and Strategy 0)e Stirru/s 2n)ance%ent of t)e 2ffecti+eness of $a+alry !estern 2uro/es Struggle against Raiders !illia%s $o%&ined# r%s r%y in t)e $on.uest of 2ngland ttack and 1efence of 'ortifications Medie+al 0actics Medie+al Strategy7 0)e 2+es)a% and Bou+ines $a%/aigns 2-a%/les of an 5ffensi+e Persisting Strategy against Raiders $o%&ined# r%s $o%&at in t)e $rusades 8eng)i6 9)an and Mongol !arfare Su%%ary of Medie+al 0actics and Strategy

THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW COM"INED ARMS TACTICAL SYNTHESIS, !200 !#00

0)e 'renc) Version of Medie+al !arfare $)anges in ,ogistics $)anges in !ea/ons Persisting Strategy and t)e $o%/letion of t)e 2nglis) $on.uest of !ales 0)e 2nglis) $o%&ined# r%s 0actical Syste% in Scotland 0)e Beginning of t)e "undred :ears !ar and t)e $r;cy $a%/aign 0)e "undred :ears !ar: 2nglis) Raids and 'renc) Persisting Strategy 2nglis) Persisting Strategy in t)e ,ast P)ase of t)e "undred :ears !ar 0)e 2-/erience of t)e 2nglis) 0actical Syste% in S/ain 0)e !agen&urg 0)e S(iss "ea+y Infantry 0)e ,east 2ffort !arfare of t)e Italian $ondottieri Regional 0actical Syste%s in $onflict: 0)e 'renc) In+asion of Italy 0)e Searc) for a $o%&ined# r%s Synt)esis: Italian Battles3 1<11#2< 0)e S/anis) $o%&ined# r%s 0actics 0)e Ne( 'ortifications not)er Influence of 0ec)nology on 0actics 0)e Man/o(er Syste% in 1=>> Si-teent)#$entury Battles3 $a%/aigns3 and Strategy Re+olution in Na+al 0actics and ,ogistics

THE NEW TACTICAL SYNTHESIS IN TRANSITION, !#00 !$00

0)e ,ogistics of t)e 0)irty :ears !ar *usta+us dol/)uss 1e+elo/%ent of t)e 1utc) 0actical Syste% *usta+uss Persisting Strategy and 2%/loy%ent of 1istraction *usta+uss 2-/loitation of t)e 0riu%/) of "is ,inear Syste% at Breitenfeld *usta+us against !allenstein: ,ogistic and $o%&at Strategies 0)e I%/act of *usta+uss 0actics 0)e ,ogistics of t)e ,ate Se+enteent) $entury Re/resentati+e ,ate Se+enteent)#$entury $a%/aigns and Battles 0)e 1e+elo/%ent of Missile !arfare at Sea

THE %RIMACY OF THE LINE OF "AYONETED MUS&ETS, !$00 !$'!

0)e Bayonet3 t)e 'lintlock3 and 'urt)er $)anges in 0actics 2ig)teent)#$entury ,ogistics 0)e Strategy and 0actics of Marl&oroug)s $a%/aigns Persisting Strategy in Nort) Italy 0)e 2+olution of t)e ,inear Syste% 0actics and Strategy as 2-e%/lified in t)e Silesian !ars of 'rederick t)e *reat 0)e Se+en :ears !ar: 0actics and Strategy in 1efence against t)e ,ogistic 2ffects of a Persisting Strategy $)anges in ttrition in Relation to t)e $o%/osition of r%ies Significant 1e+elo/%ents in 'renc) Military 0)oug)t !arfare in t)e !estern "e%is/)ere !arfare at Sea

TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC TRANSFORMATION IN THE ERA OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND NA%OLEON, !$'! !(!)
0)e 0actics and Strategy of t)e 5/ening $a%/aigns in t)e Nort) 0)e d+ent of *eneral Bona/arte 0)e Strategic 0urning Mo+e%ent of t)e Marengo $a%/aign Na/oleonic 5/erations on a ,arger Scale: 0)e Strategic 0urning Mo+e%ent of 4l% and 1istraction and $oncentration at usterlit6 So%e $)aracteristics of Na/oleons $a%/aigns 0)e ug%ented Significance of Nu%erical Su/eriority So%e ,ater Na/oleonic $a%/aigns 5/erations in S/ain: 0)e 'renc) 2ncounter t)e Raiding Strategy of *uerrilla !arfare 0)e 'oundations of t)e 'renc) $on.uests 0)e Military ,egacy of t)e Na/oleonic 2ra 0)e 0actics of !arfare at Sea 0)e Strategy of !arfare at Sea

TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND DOCTRINAL STA"ILITY !(!) !'!*

0)e $ontinuation of t)e Na/oleonic 0radition in Radet6kys Victories 0)e Mid#centurys Ne( Infantry !ea/ons 0)e Prussian Staff and Man/o(er Syste% 0)e Ne( Prussian r%y in ction against ustria 1ecisi+e 0urning Mo+e%ents in t)e 'ranco#Prussian !ar Su%%ary of t)e 0actics3 ,ogistics3 and Strategy of t)e 'ranco#Prussian !ar 0)e Strategy of t)e %erican $i+il !ar 0(o Instances of $o%&ating t)e Raiding Strategy of *uerrilla !arfare 2uro/ean !ea/ons3 r%ies3 and 1octrine on t)e 2+e of !orld !ar I 0)e Re+olution in Na+al Materiel and its 4se in t)e Russo#8a/anese !ar

THE A%OGEE OF THE DEFENCE+ WORLD WAR I, !'!* !(

0)e *er%an $oncentration on Interior ,ines and 2ffort to 0urn t)e 'renc) 0)e 0actical3 ,ogistical3 and Strategic $onditions of t)e !ar 0)e *er%an 2-/loitation of Interior ,ines and a 0urning Mo+e%ent to 1efeat t)e Russians 0)e 5/ening Na+al $a%/aigns llied Na+al Predo%inance $onfir%ed: 0)e Battle of 8utland 0)e Su&%arine as a $o%%erce Raider 0)e 1o%inance of rtillery in t)e Siege !arfare on ,and 0)e 1e+elo/%ent and 4tility of ir 'orces 0)e 0actics of 0renc) !arfare 0)e !ar in 1@1< and 1@1= 0)e Searc) for a 0ec)nological Solution to t)e 0actical 1eadlock 0)e *er%an Auest for Victory t)roug) a ,ogistic Strategy 4sing Su&%arines 0)e Ne( *er%an Met)od of 1efence 0)e Ne( *er%an 1octrine for ttack 0)e $a%/aigns of 1@1B on t)e !estern 'ront 0urning Mo+e%ent t)roug) Su/erior Mo&ility: 0)e Megiddo $a%/aign Su%%ary of t)e $)anges in !ea/ons3 0actics3 and ,ogistics

%RELUDE TO RENEWED CONFLICT, !'!' ,'

0)e 'ull 1e+elo/%ent of 'our Ne( !ea/on Syste%s 0)e 'renc) in Morocco: Ne( !ea/ons and 5ld Strategy 0actical and Strategic 4se of ircraft Russian $annae 0)e Na+ies Res/onse to t)e Ne( !ea/ons 1octrinal 1i+ersity

<

THE CLIMA- OF MODERN WARFARE+ WORLD WAR II, !',' *)

0)e *er%an Victory o+er Poland 0)e 'renc) and *er%an r%ies 'renc) and *er%an Plans 0)e Ne( *er%an 5ffensi+e Plan 0)e *er%an Breakt)roug) in May 1@4> 0)e $auses of t)e *er%an Breakt)roug) 0)e *er%an 0urning Mo+e%ent 0)e *er%an Victory: Na/oleonic !arfare (it) 'our !ea/on Syste%s ir Po(er in a 1ecisi+e Role: 0)e Battle of Britain 0)e Strategic and 0actical $onditions of t)e Russo#*er%an !ar 0)e Strategic 2n+elo/%ents of t)e 1@41 $a%/aign in Russia 0)e 1e&acle of t)e *er%an ,ogistic Strategy of 1@42 and t)e $onclusion of t)e Russo# *er%an !ar 1istraction3 $oncentration3 and 0urning Mo+e%ent gain: 0)e ,anding and $a%/aign in Nor%andy 0)e Britis) Inauguration of Mounted !arfare in Nort) frica and t)e 1efeat of t)e Italians 0)e !arfare of t)e Mounted Britis) and *er%an r%ies Ne( and I%/ro+ed !ea/ons 0)e Interaction of 0ec)nology (it) Strategy Strategic Bo%&ing $o%&at at Sea (it) 0(o 0y/es of $a/ital S)i/s 0)e *er%an Su&%arine $a%/aign

AFTER THE WORLD WARS+ CONSOLIDATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, !'*) !'()
$)anges in !ea/ons 0)e ll#Mounted r%y 0)e Israeli#2gy/tian !ar of 1@C? 0)e 0actical Mi-ture of 5ld and Ne(

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

$ontinuity and $)ange

SEA AND AIR WARFARE

$)ronological Sur+ey Reca/itulation of t)e $)aracteristics of Na+al !arfare Su%%ary of t)e ttri&utes of ircraft in !arfare

TACTICS
$)ronological Su%%ary

0ec)nology and t)e 'our Basic !ea/on Syste%s 0)e 2cono%ics of 'orce $o%/osition 0)e Role of rticulation and 5ffensi+e 0roo/s in $oncentrating against !eakness Battles and $asualties

LOGISTICS
$)ronological 5+er+ie( lternati+e Man/o(er Syste%s

STRATEGY
$)ronological Su%%ary 0)e $lassifications of Military Strategy 0)e Influence of t)e Ratio of 'orce to S/ace 0)e Su/re%acy of Retreat 5+er Pursuit $oncentration gainst !eakness3 1istraction3 and t)e Princi/les of !ar $o%/elling t)e 2ne%y to 'ig)t3 0urning Mo+e%ents3 and $oncentration in S/ace and 0i%e 0)e Nature and 5&Decti+es of a Raiding Strategy *uerrilla !arfare as an //lication of Raiding Strategy 1efence and 5ffence gainst *uerrilla !arfare Su%%ary of lternati+es $onfronting $o%%anders $)oice of Strategic 5&Decti+e 0)e $)oice Bet(een a $o%&at and ,ogistic Strategy I%/le%enting a ,ogistic Strategy &y a Persisting or Raiding Strategy $o%&at 1efence gainst Raiding Strategy ,ogistic 1efence gainst a Raiding Strategy lternati+es in Pursuit of a $o%&at Strategy 0)e Persisting and Raiding lternati+es for an 5ffensi+e $o%&at Strategy Varieties of a 1efence gainst a $o%&at Persisting Strategy 0)e $o%&at Persisting 1efence 0)e 5ffensi+e gainst *uerrilla 1efence $o%&at Persisting ttack and 1efence $ontinuity and $)ange

LIST OF SCHEMATICS
S/artans 'lanking Manoeu+re !ea/on Syste%s MatriStrategy Matri0actical $a/a&ilities of !ea/on Syste%s 0actical $a/a&ilities of !ea/on Syste%s (it)out Reiters 0actical $a/a&ilities of !ea/on Syste%s (it) Reiters Musketeers (it) Bayonets +ersus $a+alry

Prussian //roac) Marc) Processional Marc) $o%&at Relations)i/ &et(een Infantry and $a+alry 0)e 1o%inance of ,ig)t Infantry and t)e 1efence Su&stitution Relations)i/ &et(een Mo&ility and Po(er 0raditional !ea/on Syste%s Matri1@?>s !ea/on Syste%s Matri0raditional !ea/on Syste%s $a/a&ilities 1@?>s !ea/on Syste%s $a/a&ilities 0raditional 1@?>s !ea/on Syste%s $a/a&ilities 0ransitional 1@?>s !ea/on Syste%s $a/a&ilities Relation of !orld !ar I Infantry and rtillery to 1@?>s !ea/on Syste%s Marginal Rate of Su&stitution &et(een S/ear%en and 1is%ounted 9nig)ts3 2-)i&iting a $ur+e of 2.ual $o%&at 2ffecti+eness under $ertain $onditions 0)e Role of $ost in $)oosing t)e 5/ti%u% $o%&ination of S/ear%en and 1is%ounted 9nig)ts Strategy MatriMore *eneral Strategy Matri0)e Influence of t)e Ratio of 'orce to S/ace $o%/arison of t)e Strengt)s of Raiding and Persisting Strategies Su%%ary of lternati+es for $o%&ating a Raiding Strategy or *uerrilla !arfare $)oice &et(een Military Strategy and Military Means to ttain Non#%ilitary Results $)oice &et(een t)e 0(o Most Basic Means of ttacking t)e 2ne%y r%ed 'orces lternati+es in t)e 2%/loy%ent of a ,ogistic Strategy against 2ne%y r%ed 'orces lternati+es for a $o%&at 1efence against a ,ogistic Raiding Strategy lternati+e Means of 4sing a ,ogistic Strategy to 1efence against a ,ogistic Raiding Strategy 0)e 0(o 'unda%ental 5ffensi+e Possi&ilities in $o%&at Strategy lternati+es in Pursuing an 5ffensi+e $o%&at Strategy 1efenders lternati+es for Resisting a $o%&at Persisting Strategy 1efenders $o%&at Persisting lternati+es against t)e Sa%e 9ind of ttack lternati+es for ttacking against a *uerrilla Resistance lternati+es +aila&le !)en ttacker and 1efender Bot) 2%/loy a $o%&at Persisting Strategy Strategic lternati+es: Su%%ary

LIST OF TA"LES
Sources of Prussian Inco%e in t)e Se+en :ears !ar 0)e Initial Prussian $adre3 Reser+e3 and Militia 'orce 0)e Prussian $adre and Reser+e 'orce 0)e Strengt) of t)e *er%an3 'renc)3 and Russian r%ies in 1@14 $o%/arison of S)i/s at t)e Battle of t)e 'alkland Islands So%e !orld !ar I rtillery 0)e Su&%arine !ar3 1@1C#1B B

$o%/arison of 'renc) and *er%an ,ig)t 0anks $o%/arison of 'renc) and *er%an Mediu% 0anks $o%/arison of Russian and *er%an ,ig)t 0anks $o%/arison of Russian and *er%an Mediu% 0anks

LIST OF DIAGRAMS
Ro%an Interior ,ines 0urning Mo+e%ent Battle of $eresole *usta+uss 'irst 1istraction *usta+us 2-/loits Interior ,ines Second 1istraction 'ails 1iagra% of Positions and Mo+e%ents at Breitenfeld 1iagra% of 1is/ositions and ctions at ,Et6en ction at 'leurus Blen)ei%: 1istraction and $oncentration 2ugene 1istracts $atinat 2ugenes Interior ,ines 'redericks Interior ,ines $o&urgs tte%/ted 2n+elo/%ent Sou)a% cts on Interior ,ines Na/oleonic 1is/ersion $oncentration on Interior ,ines Interior ,ines 2-/loited Na/oleons Strategic 0urning Mo+e%ent Na/oleons 0urning Mo+e%ent at 4l% ction at usterlit6 Radet6kys 0urning Mo+e%ent Moltkes 0urning Mo+e%ent Interior ,ines and 0urning Mo+e%ent Na/oleons Situation &efore !Fr%sers 'irst Relief of Mantua nalogous Strategic Situation in Marc) 1B=2 Na/oleons $oncentration against Auasdono+ic) $onfederate $oncentration against *rant Na/oleon 1ri+es Back Auasdono+ic) and 0urns against !Fr%ser "y/ot)etical 5utco%e if $onfederates "ad 1efeated *rant &efore Buell Doined "i% *rant 0urns Vicks&urg $ontinuous 0urning Mo+e%ent Second Bull Run 0urning Mo+e%ent 'orces Po/e Back *ettys&urg 0urning Mo+e%ent 'orces "ooker Back 5/ening 0urning Mo+e%ent of !orld !ar I 8offre 2-/loits "is Strategic Mo&ility Battle of Marne and fter%at)

*er%an 4se of Interior ,ines and Rail(ay for 0urning Mo+e%ent llen&ys 1istraction3 Breakt)roug)3 and 0urning Mo+e%ent *er%an Strategic 2n+elo/%ent (it) Si%ultaneous d+ances 'irst 'renc) and *er%an Plans 'inal 'renc) and *er%an Plans *er%an d+ance into Belgiu% Pan6er 1i+isions Reac) t)e Meuse 'renc) 'all Back fro% 1inant Pan6er Breakt)roug) at Sedan *er%an Breakt)roug) Strategic 0urning Mo+e%ent 'inal *er%an 5ffensi+e in 'rance *er%an Successes at Minsk3 S%olensk3 and Vya6%a Montgo%erys 1istraction Breakouts and 0urning Mo+e%ent Britis) 0urn Sidi Barrani Israeli $ounterattack and 0urning Mo+e%ent

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
,ig)t Infantry Siege 0o(er Siege rtillery "ea+y $a+alry%an "ea+y $a+alry%an 1efeats ,ig)t Infantry%an $ata/ult Ra% Plate r%our Matc)lock "ea+y Infantry%an $ross#Section of Ne( 'ortifications 'lanking 'ire in a 1itc) 5utline of Ne( 'ortifications !)eel ,ock "andgun 'lintlock Mec)anis% ,ig)t $a+alry%an $annon 'iring 0(el+e#/ound Ball Stea% Railroad and 0elegra/) Ma-i%s *un 0)e ,arge Battle $ruiser H.M.S. Tiger Paris *un Pus)er ir/lane So/(it) $a%el3 0ractor (it) Sync)roni6ed Mac)ine *uns Prototy/e ,ands)i/

1>

S%all#Bore3 "ig)#Velocity *er%an ntitank *uns $)ar#B 0ank C<#%% Recoilless Rifle Rocket ,aunc)er 0or/edo Plane *er%an Su&%arine 8et ircraft ntiaircraft Rocket "elico/ter

LIST OF MA%S
0)e 5ld !orld G2uro/eH *reece Persian 2%/ire $art)aginian rea of Influence 2+es)a% rea !ales *er%any 0)eatre of 5/erations in t)e Russo#8a/anese !ar $entral and 2astern 2uro/e

INTRODUCTION
0)e rt of !ar in t)e !estern !orld is not a traditional )istory of (ar. Its /ur/ose is to trace and e-/lain3 at an introductory and so%e()at ad+anced le+el3 t)e c)anges in certain o/erational +aria&les o+er %ost of t)e s/an of !estern (arfare for ()ic) (e )a+e a record. 0)ese constitute t)e t)e%es of t)e (ork3 ()ic) t)us contains %ore e%/)asis on e-/lication t)an is usual in a narrati+e )istory. Ne+ert)eless3 %ost i%/ortant ca%/aigns and &attles recei+e t)e attention t)ey %erit3 t)oug) (it) econo%y of /)rase and accent on as/ects t)at su//ort and illustrate t)e inter/retations /resented. lt)oug) continuity /ro+ides a %aDor %otif3 t)e story necessarily stresses c)ange. 0)is ine+ita&ly leads to so%e distortions in e%/)asis ()en co%/ared to a (ork t)at )as narrati+e )istory as its /ri%ary goal. 'or e-a%/le3 t)e treat%ent of t)e Ro%an art of (ar recei+es &rief attention3 only enoug) to s)o( )o( it differed fro% t)e *reek and le-andrian %odels t)at /receded it and t)at are descri&ed in greater detail. 0)is &ook )as a narro( focus: it considers only selected o/erational +aria&les3 o%itting all non# cogniti+e as/ects of suc) )istory and lea+ing +irtually all of t)e affecti+e do%ain of (arfare3 suc) as %orale and %oti+ation3 to suc) e-/erts as 8o)n 9eegan in )istory and Morris 8ano(it6 in sociology. It ignores not only %ost /olitical factors &ut also t)e ne( %ilitary )istory of t)e en+iron%ent of ar%ed forces. It defines strategy narro(ly3 deleting %ost grand strategy and t)e integration of /olitical3 econo%ic3 %ilitary3 and na+al ends and %eans. 0)is results in understating t)e strategic role of sea#/o(er3 lea+ing %ost of its treat%ent se/arate and to an a//roac) analogous to t)at used for /resenting (arfare on land. By not including %uc) of &ot) t)e traditional and ne( content of %ilitary )istory3 I do not %ean to derogate t)e%. 5n t)e contrary3 all recei+e co%/etent attention fro% ot)ers. But today o/erational )istory see%s to suffer fro% neglect3 and I )o/e t)at

11

t)is (ork3 in restating and trying to gi+e s)a/e to %uc) of ()at (e kno( a&out t)is field3 is an assertion t)at t)e ne( %ilitary )istory s)ould also re+i+e and i%/ro+e analytical o/erational )istory. 5ne of t)e i%/licit t)e%es of t)is &ook is t)at %ilitary factors suffice to e-/lain %ost %ilitary e+ents. 0)e e-/osition of t)is t)esis does not intend to dis/arage t)e significance of ot)er causes3 nor to deny %ulti/le causation. Rat)er3 it (is)es to gi+e %ore3 and deser+ed3 /ro%inence to endogenous causes of %ilitary e+ents. In t)e /rocess I )a+e e-aggerated %y case in %aking t)is /oint as (ell as in gi+ing so %uc) salience and certainty to %y t)e%es. So%eti%es I did t)is &y design3 and often3 I a% sure3 &y too %uc) 6eal for an inter/retation. 0)e cases of intentional o+ere%/)asis o+erstate and re/eat t)e /oint to insure t)at it is fully understood. I ask your indulgence at t)ese ti%es. In offering t)e rational and logical in %ilitary &e)a+iour3 I do not %ean to deny t)e i%/ortance of t)e influence of t)e .uality of %ilitary leaders)i/3 good and &ad3 and of t)e only occasionally %entioned considerations t)at reduced %ilitary efficiency (it)out contri&uting to t)e attain%ent of /olitical or ot)er o&Decti+es. But Dust as t)e aggregate of all econo%ic &e)a+iour tends to(ard t)e rational satisfaction of needs3 so also )a+e %ost %ilitary %et)ods and organisation3 o+er ti%e tended to for(ard %ilitary goals. In /art3 t)is /resentation stresses t)e reasona&leness of t)e conduct of (ar3 to counter .uick Dudg%ents so%eti%es %ade a&out t)e /ast in t)e lig)t of /resent kno(ledge and conditions t)at are not ()olly a//lica&le to conditions and constraints e-isting earlier. 0)is &ook )as %uc) in co%%on (it) t)ose of $arl +on $lause(it6 and ntoine "enri 8o%ini3 ()o offered /o(erful inter/retations of t)e (arfare of t)e Na/oleonic era and t)e /eriod i%%ediately /receding it. It differs3 )o(e+er3 in a nu%&er of res/ects3 %ost cons/icuously In its /resentation of t)e )istory u/on ()ic) I &ase %y generalisations3 rat)er t)an3 as in On War and Summary of the Art of War3 a %ere reference to t)e ca%/aigns and &attles and a reliance on a readers fa%iliarity (it) t)e%. lt)oug) I do not kno( t)e s/ecific source of %any of t)e t)e%es in t)is &ook3 %ost I o(e to t)ese %asters and to ot)ers of %ore recent +intage. 'or e-a%/le3 for %y understanding of t)e difficulty of forcing &attle in (arfare &efore Na/oleon and for t)e significance of t)e ne( syste% of de/loy%ent3 I a% inde&ted to 8ean ,a%&ert l/)onse $olin. I a% o&ligated to 8. '. $. 'uller for t)e conce/t of logistic strategy and to B. ". ,iddell "art for t)e /ri%acy of t)e defence3 t)oug)3 I sus/ect3 I first learned t)is indirectly t)roug) )is influence as e-/ressed in t)e /o/ular /ress Dust &efore !orld !ar II. Mao 0se#tung contri&uted significantly to %y ideas on guerrilla (arfare. $lause(it6 and 8o%ini are so %uc) a /art of t)e culture of %ilitary (riters t)at I can attri&ute not)ing to t)e% directly3 ot)er t)an 8o%inis interior lines and $lause(it6s c)aracterisation of si%ultaneous ad+ances on e-terior lines as a concentration in ti%e. lt)oug) I intend for t)is &ook to &e understood &y readers (it) little or no kno(ledge of 2uro/ean (arfare or t)e funda%entals of o/erations3 &y co%&ining t)e insig)ts of so %any ackno(ledged %asters3 I )o/e also to a//eal to t)e %ore so/)isticated. But in stri+ing to reac) suc) a &road audience3 I ela&orate and reca/itulate ideas fa%iliar to suc) e-/erts. 0)ese readers %ig)t consider reading t)e last c)a/ter first and t)en using t)e contents and e-/ository sc)e%atics to read t)e /arts t)at t)en see% %ost rele+ant to t)eir needs. 1o re%e%&er3 )o(e+er3 t)at t)e narrati+e e-/lains t)e )istory t)at ga+e rise to t)e generalisations as (ell as illustrates t)eir a//lica&ility3 and for t)at reason alone s)ould interest all readers. 0)is account of !estern (arfare3 ()ic) %akes no /retence at originality3 ca%e fro% t)e standard secondary (orks. It )as no notes and )as no &i&liogra/)y ot)er t)an t)e (orks of t)e %asters of t)is kind of )istory already %entioned. 'or t)ose ()o (is) to /ursue t)e su&Dect of 2uro/ean (arfare3 !illia% ". McNeills The Pursuit of Power addresses t)e su&Dect at t)e )ig)est le+el of generalisation. Ric)ard . Preston and Sydney '. !ises Men in Arms /laces t)is (ork in conte-t 12

and 0)eodore Ro//s War in the Modern World offers a (ise and co%/re)ensi+e treat%ent of t)e %odern /eriod. ll of t)ese /ro+ide good &i&liogra/)ical references as does 8o)n 2. 8essu/3 8r.3 and Ro&ert !. $oakleys +alua&le Guide to the Study and Use of Military History. I dedicate t)is &ook to %y %ot)er3 ()o encouraged %y interests3 in s/ite of )er dis%ay at t)eir %ilitary &ent3 and sustained %e t)roug) an o+erlong /eriod as a student. 0)e dedication to %y (ife reflects %y gratitude for )er encourage%ent and )er i%/ortant )el/ (it) %y (riting3 &ot) as editor and teac)er. I a% inde&ted to Nort) 1akota State 4ni+ersity for a de+elo/%ent lea+e in 1@B2#B? to do t)e &ulk of t)e (riting and to t)e 4.S. r%y $o%%and and *eneral Staff $ollege for t)e sti%ulating o//ortunities /resented ()en I ser+ed as Morrison Professor in 1@C=#CC. My friend and colleague ndre( 9eog) )as o+er %any years /ro+ided indis/ensa&le criticis% and encourage%ent as I gradually e+ol+ed t)e inter/retations /resented )ere. I a% also inde&ted to ot)ers ()o read and criti.ued t)e %anuscri/t: Ro&ert . 1oug)ty3 8effery . *uns&urg3 Malcol% Mulr3 0)eodore Ro//3 and 0. R. :oung. I o(e %uc) to t)e faculty of t)e "istory $o%%ittee of t)e $o%%and and *eneral Staff $ollege in 1@C=#CC for teac)ing %e a great deal a&out (ar as (ell as %ilitary )istory. %ong t)ese3 in addition to $olonel 1oug)ty3 0)eodore $rackel3 ,. 1. '. 'rasc);3 and "arold !. Nelson eac) ga+e %e /articularly +alua&le )el/. I a% grateful to Susan ,. Patterson for )er su/er& editing. 5t)ers to ()o% I a% inde&ted include 8o)n !. lDets3 1. 9. $liff3 5(en S. $onnelly3 2. !. *ale3 8o)n "elgeland3 *all "okenson3 and Mic)ael ,yons. 0)e )el/ of all of t)ese3 and %any ot)ers3 reduced greatly t)e errors of inter/retation as (ell as of fact7 ()at re%ains are3 of course3 %y o(n res/onsi&ility. Back The Old World (Euro e! Back

ANCIENT WARFARE
study of t)e conduct of !estern %ilitary o/erations %ost easily &egins (it) t)e ancient *reeks as sc)olars )a+e learned a good deal concerning )o( t)e *reeks foug)t 13<>> years ago. 0)e *reeks also /resent a good starting /oint &ecause o/erational %et)ods %uc) like t)ose t)ey de+elo/ed long do%inated t)e Mediterranean &asin. 0)e *reeks also lend t)e%sel+es (ell to 1?

introducing t)e art of (ar &ecause t)eir %ilitary syste% e+ol+ed fro% t)e si%/le to t)e co%/le-. Initially t)ey relied al%ost e-clusi+ely on s)ock action3 fig)ting )and#to#)and (it) clu&s3 s(ords3 or s/ears. 5nly gradually did t)ey ado/t %issile (ea/ons suc) as t)e &o( and arro(3 and t)ey /ro+ed e.ually slo( in e%/loying t)ese t(o %odes of co%&at3 s)ock and %issile3 ()en %ounted on )orses. Since t)eir %et)ods of su//ly and strategy also /rogressed slo(ly fro% t)e ele%entary to t)e so/)isticated3 t)ey /ro+ide3 in t)ese &ranc)es of t)e %ilitary art as (ell3 a %odel t)at facilitates t)e study of t)e su&Dect. lt)oug) an analytical a//roac) )as o&+ious disad+antages3 including o&scuring a great deal a&out t)e course of ancient %ilitary )istory itself3 t)is ty/e of scrutiny facilitates attention to funda%ental +aria&les3 clarifies t)e /rocess of c)ange3 and3 &y %aking causation in (arfare %ore co%/re)ensi&le3 lays a &etter foundation for understanding su&se.uent eras. n analytical a//roac) to %ilitary o/erations /er%its one to di+ide t)e to/ic according to t)e t)ree %aDor co%/onents of t)e art of (ar: tactics3 logistics3 and strategy. 0actics deals (it) co%&at and (it) t)e (ea/ons3 %et)ods3 and %anoeu+res on t)e &attlefield. ,ogistics concerns t)e /ro+ision of t)e %en t)e%sel+es and t)e su//ort of %ilitary o/erations Gincluding t)e %o+e%ent of ar%ies and na+ies. 0)is also concerns t)e su//ly of (ea/ons3 food3 clot)ing3 and s)elter for t)ose soldiers and sailors. Strategy integrates tactics and logistics to deter%ine t)e %ilitary o&Decti+es and t)e %eans of carrying t)e% out. Na+al (arfare lends itself &est to a se/arate treat%ent. Back

TACTICS

Hand-to-Hand Combat on Foot

0)e early tactics of t)e ancient *reeks e-e%/lify t)e %ost &asic for% of co%&at. 0)e *reeks foug)t on foot3 )and#to#)and3 (it) s/ear and s(ord in a for% of fig)ting kno(n as s)ock action. 0)e *reek soldiers3 called )o/lites3 naturally /rotected t)e%sel+es (it) s)ields3 )el%ets3 and &reast/lates and co+ered ot)er /arts of t)eir &ody as (ell. 0)is usually %etal ar%our3 toget)er (it) s(ord and s/ear3 constituted a su&stantial &urden3 ()ic) %ade running difficult3 and ga+e t)ese soldiers t)eir na%e3 )ea+y infantry. 0)e co%/leteness and .uality of t)eir e.ui/%ent %ade u/ t)e only /rofessional attri&utes of t)e *reek )o/lites. Militia%en3 t)ey )ad full#ti%e occu/ations as far%ers3 artisans3 and trades%en3 furnis)ed t)eir o(n ar%our3 )ad engaged in so%e training3 and tried to kee/ in good /)ysical condition. 0)oug) t)is constituted t)e e-tent of t)eir /re/aration for (ar3 co%ing fro% t)e sa%e co%%unity and )a+ing /artici/ated in grou/ e-ercises /ro+ided t)e %en (it) so%e co)esion3 feelings of %utual interde/endence3 and grou/ es/rit. l&eit ar%ed (it) a s)ort s(ord3 t)e )o/lites relied %ainly on a s/ear a&out se+en feet long. 0)e tactical for%ation ado/ted &y t)e *reeks su//orted t)eir %orale in t)e frig)tening e-/erience of co%&at3 t)e s/ear%en standing s)oulder#to# s)oulder at least four and usually eig)t or e+en %ore ranks dee/. Suc) a for%ation3 called a /)alan-3 ad%ira&ly suited t)e %ilitia. 0)e ci+ilian soldiers3 ()o )ad little training3 could fig)t (it) courage &e)ind a (all of s)ields &ristling (it) s/ears. 0)e /resence of ot)ers3 often friends fro% ci+ilian life3 ga+e confidence to all3 and t)e dee/ array %eant t)at t)e %en in t)e front felt (ell su//orted. 0)e co%&atants t)us sustained t)eir %orale (it) t)e feeling of safety in nu%&ers. 0)eir /)ysical condition3 /ractice (it) (ea/ons3 and3 for so%e3 t)e e-/erience of a /re+ious co%&at &uttressed t)eir &ra+ery in &attle3 t)e outco%e of ()ic) usually decided t)e ca%/aign. But &efore t)e co%&at3 t)e )o/lite co%%ander usually addressed t)e% to raise t)eir confidence and courage. 0)e %en s)outed as t)ey c)arged to e%&olden one anot)er. 5nly t)e front rank foug)t7 t)e second rank (aited to fill t)e /laces of t)e fallen or fatigued. Because of t)e de/t) of t)e for%ation3 t)ose in t)e rear did not )a+e %uc) in+ol+e%ent and felt

14

little )esitation in leading a retreat if t)e front ranks s)o(ed signs of gi+ing (ay. lt)oug) t)ey often foug)t (it) skill and +alour3 t)e *reek %ilitia%en )ad no co%/unction a&out ackno(ledging defeat and trying to li+e to carry on t)eir ci+ilian occu/ations3 if not to fig)t anot)er day. 0)at t)e s%all city#states of *reece nor%ally foug)t (ars for li%ited o&Decti+es %ade it easy for t)e% to ad%it defeat7 t)e loss of a &attle )ad only li%ited conse.uences and3 t)oug) t)e causalities of t)e +an.uis)ed usually e-ceeded t)ose of t)e +ictor3 rarely did eit)er side suffer )ea+ily. 0)e co%/arati+e +alue of a dee/ for%ation as contrasted (it) a s)allo(er array is not clear. 'our ranks %ay )a+e sufficed for +eterans and eig)t see%ed a%/le for grou/ %ilitia7 &ut on occasion t)e troo/s for%ed t(el+e3 si-teen3 t)irty#t(o3 and e+en fifty ranks dee/. 5ne sc)ool of t)oug)t &elie+es t)at t)e dee/er t)e grou/3 t)e %ore /o(er it /ossessed3 t)e e-tra %en in t)e rear ranks su//lying an i%/etus t)at ena&led t)e dee/ array to o+er()el% a si%ilarly ar%ed &ut s)allo(er for%ation. 0)e o//onents of t)is +ie( insist t)at only t)e front rank foug)t. 0)e second rank constituted an i%%ediate reser+e to take t)e /lace of t)e %en in t)e front ()en t)ey (ere killed3 (ounded3 or e-)austed &y t)e )ard (ork of )and#to#)and fig)ting. dditional ranks ser+ed only as reser+es for t)e second3 and /ro/onents of a t)in line see a de/t) of %ore t)an four ranks as redundant. 0)e o//onents of t)e dee/ order also argue t)at t)e %en in t)e rear could %erely stand and (ait: any /us)ing fro% &e)ind (ould only Dostle t)e %en in t)e front3 )ardly a good (ay to )el/. Pro/onents argue t)at t)e large nu%&ers &e)ind /ro&a&ly strengt)ened t)e %orale of t)ose in front3 inti%idated t)e ene%y3 and /ro+ided a%/le re/lace%ents to feed t)e frontal fig)t. dee/er array also )ad an ad+antage if t)ere (as any t)inning of t)e ranks3 for e-a%/le3 to fill in ga/s created in %arc)ing t)e line for(ard in t)e ad+ance to co%&at. Since t)e %en could )a+e difficulty %aintaining a unifor% de/t) of t)e line &efore and during t)e co%&at3 t)e additional ranks /ro+ided insurance against a line too t)in at so%e locations and t)e conse.uent /otentially disastrous &reak in t)e continuous front. 0)e dee/er for%ation could also /ro+ide a /)ysical i%/etus3 es/ecially ()en /icked %en constituted t)e last rank. 0)ese rear#rank %en (ould not only /re+ent straggling and kee/ t)e %iddle ranks in t)eir /laces &ut also su//ly an i%/ulse t)at could &e trans%itted to t)e front ranks &y causing all %en to /us). If3 as so%eti%es )a//ened (it) t)e *reeks3 t)e front ranks faced eac) ot)er s)ield#to#s)ield3 s)o+ing3 t)is /us) fro% t)e rear could ena&le one side to force &ack t)e ot)er and /reci/itate a retreat. Still3 t)e soldier and )istorian Ieno/)on once asked: J!)en a /)alan- is too dee/ for t)e %en to reac) t)e ene%y (it) t)eir (ea/ons3 ()at )ar% do you t)ink t)ey do to t)e ene%y or good to t)eir friendsKL Ne+ert)eless3 t)e *reeks3 on at least so%e occasions3 found use for t)e rear ranks in dee/ array. Per)a/s t)e /ossi&ility of a /us)ing contest alone (arranted t)e e-tra de/t)3 in s/ite of its cost in ter%s of t)e &readt) of t)e line. In %ountainous *reece t)e o//osing s/ear%en soug)t le+el ground for t)eir &attles. Nor%ally t)e defender could )o/e to enDoy a significant &enefit &y3 for e-a%/le3 c)oosing a site on a slo/e so t)at t)e attackers (ould )a+e to ad+ance and fig)t u/)ill. But t)e u/)ill /osition )ad so great an ad+antage t)at attackers usually declined to engage3 a+oided t)e ene%ys ar%y3 and destroyed )is cro/s instead. 0)us defenders rarely enDoyed any do%inance3 &attles &eing foug)t &y %utual consent on o/en3 le+el ground. 0)e dee/3 co%/act for%ation )ad +irtually no /o(er to %anoeu+re7 it could only ad+ance to t)e front or flee to t)e rear. 0)e early /)alan- of )o/lites )ad no su&di+ision t)at (ould )a+e )el/ed to carry out ele%entary %o+e%ents &y /er%itting %en on a flank3 for e-a%/le3 to res/ond to an order to face in a different direction. Suc) deficiency in articulation in)ered in t)e nature of t)e for%ation and in t)e essentially a%ateur c)aracter of t)e %ilitia. Su&di+ision and /ractice &y su&units in e-ercises useful in &attle re.uired grou/s t)at constantly drilled toget)er under su&ordinate officers. *reek citi6en#soldiers lacked t)is /ractice.

1<

0)e )o/lite force of t)e city#state S/arta did )a+e a ca/acity for %anoeu+re &ased on su&di+ision of its /)alan-. s *reeces only /rofessional ar%y3 t)e S/artans %arc)ed to %usic and de+elo/ed a &attlefield drill &ased on t)e tendency of all /)alan-es to drift to t)e rig)t as t)ey ad+anced. 0)is /rocli+ity ste%%ed fro% t)e large s)ield carried on t)e left ar%3 ()ic)3 &ecause it safeguarded )is neig)&ours uns)ielded rig)t side3 caused eac) soldier unconsciously to %o+e to(ard )is rig)t. 0)is %eant t)at t)e rig)t (ing of eac) /)alan- usually o+erla//ed t)e o//osing left and (on t)e &attle on t)at side. 0)e S/artans e-/loited t)is &y turning t)eir rig)t side to t)e left and co%/leting t)e defeat of t)e ene%y &y attacking t)e o//osing /)alan-s un/rotected flank. 0)e S/artans t)us used t)eir li%ited3 &ut su/erior3 articulation to carry out t)e %ost &asic tactical %o+e%ent in (ar3 ca/italising on t)e (eakness of t)e flank. 0)is e-/loitation could take t)e for% used &y t)e S/artans3 assailing t)e ene%y soldiers +ulnera&le side3 or it could rely on going around t)e flank to reac) and assault t)e ene%ys rear3 a %o+e%ent called an en+elo/%ent. 2it)er of t)ese %anoeu+res conferred an o+er()el%ing ad+antage on t)e attacker &ecause3 alt)oug) )e could not e-/ect t)e defender la%ely to /resent )is side or &ack to )is assailant3 t)e defender &eset in flank or rear o&+iously )ad a serious )indrance in co%&at3 since )e )ad arrayed )i%self to fig)t in one direction and %ust suddenly fig)t in anot)er. 0)is disad+antage %ig)t not &e t)e greatest dra(&ack t)at t)e flanked or en+elo/ed ene%y faced7 )is confidence and %orale recei+ed ()at %ay )a+e /ro+ed a %ore serious &lo(3 and )e %ig)t not stay to fig)t in )is ne( /osition. 5f course3 disci/lined and e-/erienced troo/s did &etter3 as did a (ell#articulated force t)at )ad su&di+ision enoug) to turn and face a t)reat to flank or rear. But t)e /)alangeal for%ation )ad only li%ited ca/a&ility for flank attacks and none to %anoeu+re to reac) t)e ene%ys rear. 0)us t)e tactics of t)e day left little sco/e for generals)i/3 and &ecause t)e leader )ad no role once t)e &attle )ad &egun3 t)e general usually foug)t in t)e ranks to encourage )is %en. Inno+ations in tactics consisted of strengt)ening t)e usually o+erla//ed left of an ar%y ()ile )olding &ack t)e t)en#(eakened rig)t. But t)is res/onse did not re.uire %uc) a&ility to %anoeu+re &ecause t)e tactical inno+ation rested on t)e &attle /lan %ade in ad+ance3 one reflected in t)e initial array of t)e ar%y. 0)e /)alan-3 an ad%ira&le for%ation to defend against a frontal assault3 lacked any ca/acity for offensi+e action ot)er t)an to engage in a frontal fig)t. s t)e art of (ar &eca%e %ore so/)isticated and /rofessional soldiers &egan to re/lace %ilitia3 t)e /)alan- &eca%e &etter drilled and %ore a&le to %anoeu+re. 0)e S/artans %atured a tec)ni.ue t)at syste%ised t)e tendency of t)e rig)t to o+erla/ t)e )ostile left. Before t)e &attle &egan3 &ut after t)e co%&atants )ad for%ed t)eir line3 t)e rig)t#)and seg%ent of t)e (ell#drilled S/artan line (ould face to t)e rig)t and %arc) for(ard3 t)us detac)ing itself fro% t)e %ain force &ut re%aining an e-tension of t)e line of &attle. fter a s)ort %arc) to t)e rig)t as a colu%n3 t)e /ortion (ould turn left to(ard t)e ene%y and continue until t)ey )ad reac)ed t)e line along ()ic) t)e ene%y )ad arrayed its ar%y. 0)e S/artans se/arated detac)%ent t)en )alted3 faced to t)e left3 and ad+anced in line of &attle to attack t)e ene%ys flank G&elo(H.

S artans" #lan$ing Manoeu%re Back

In t)is geo%etrically correct flanking /osition3 t)e seg%ent t)en %o+ed for(ard and defeated t)e ene%ys less (ell#disci/lined /)alan-3 fully retrie+ing any re+erse suffered &y t)eir o(n 1=

o+erla//ed left flank. Mean()ile3 t)e often#defeated 0)e&ans )ad e+ol+ed t)eir o(n tactic of strengt)ening t)eir left (ing &y increasing its de/t). 0)e S/artan syste% )ad (on t(o significant &attles against less#disci/lined and so/)isticated o//onents3 and t)e 0)e&ans )ad enDoyed one %odest success. Mean()ile3 t)e 0)e&ans e%&ellis)ed t)eir ne( tactics &y creating t)e Sacred Band3 a /icked force 5f ?>> %en ()o could %anoeu+re se/arately fro% t)eir /)alan-. 0)e 0)e&an and S/artan syste%s %et in co%&at at t)e Battle of ,euctra in ?C1 B.$. 2ac) kne( t)e ot)ers %et)od3 t)e S/artans e-/ecting t)e dee/ 0)e&an for%ation and t)e 0)e&ans antici/ating t)e S/artans flank#attack %arc). 0)e S/artans relied on t)eir standard %anoeu+re3 &ut 2/a%inondas3 t)e &rilliant 0)e&an co%%ander3 )ad t)e /lans and t)e skill to counter it. "e )ad for%ed %ost of )is )o/lites fifty dee/3 creating a solid %ass (it) a de/t) )alf its &readt). !it) t)ese )e faced t)e S/artan rig)t3 )is rig)t and t)e S/artan left &ot) )anging &ack and )a+ing little /artici/ation in t)e &attle. In reser+e3 &e)ind )is %ain )o/lite force3 )e ke/t t)e elite Sacred Band. In /re/aring so (ell for t)e daunting task of fig)ting t)e a(eso%e S/artans3 2/a%inondas early dis/layed t)at J/articular co%&ination of /rudence and daringL t)at t)e )istorian Ieno/)on t)oug)t c)aracterised )is later ca%/aigns. !)en t)e S/artans &egan t)e e-ecution of t)eir %arc) to t)e rig)t and in for%ation at rig)t angles to t)e 0)e&an line3 2/a%inondas realised ()at t)ey (ere doing. "e t)en led )is dee/ )o/lite array diagonally across t)e field to attack t)e e-tre%e rig)t of t)e S/artan line3 and3 fro% t)e Sacred Bands /osition in t)e rear of )is /)alan-3 2/a%inondas sent t)ese /icked %en on a se/arate %anoeu+re on t)e field. 0)e Sacred Band carried out its /re#/lanned3 inde/endent action to assail t)e S/artan detac)%ent lining u/ to /re/are an attack on t)e flank of t)e 0)e&an )o/lites. 0)e co%&ined effect of t)ese %anoeu+res o+er()el%ed %uc) of t)e S/artan rig)t3 inflicting great casualties and (inning t)e &attle in ()ic) t)e S/artan 9ing died. 0)is contest &et(een t)ese t(o )o/lite ar%ies de%onstrates t)at t)e *reeks )ad gras/ed t)e +alue of concentration3 t)e 0)e&ans seeking t)is t)roug) de/t) in t)eir for%ation. Si%ilarly t)e *reeks sa( t)e +alue of attacking (eakness3 t)e S/artans using t)eir %anoeu+re to /lace /art of t)eir /)alan- at rig)t angles to t)e ene%ys line to assault t)e ene%ys +ulnera&le flank. But t)e %o+e%ents on t)e &attlefield also clearly e-)i&it t)e intrinsic difficulty of %anoeu+ring infantry e+en on t)e le+el3 treeless /lain3 ()ere t)e 0)e&ans and S/artans foug)t. !it)out an array3 infantry &eca%e a %o& t)at could neit)er %o+e nor fig)t in an organised (ay. But to %anoeu+re grou/s of %en3 es/ecially lines3 /resented enor%ous difficulties. 2+en a line ad+ancing on a le+el /lain )ad great trou&le kee/ing align%ent and /re+enting ga/s. !it) t)eir line e-tending fart)er to t)e rig)t t)an t)e 0)e&ans3 t)e S/artans could )a+e easily carried out t)eir en+elo/%ent &y ()eeling t)e end of t)eir line to t)e left until it for%ed t)e &ar of a 0 (it) t)e 0)e&an line # if a line of infantry could carry out a ()eeling %o+e%ent. But suc) a %o+e%ent re.uired t)e soldiers on t)e circu%ference of t)e ()eel to %arc) fart)er and faster t)an t)ose closer to t)e /i+ot. It is al%ost i%/ossi&le to carry t)is out and )a+e t)e troo/s arri+e /ro/erly aligned and for%ed for &attle. *a/s in a line of s/ear%en could )a+e %eant defeat &ecause t)ey e-/osed t)e %ens +ulnera&le sides to an ad+ersarys un&roken line. 2+en a diagonal %o+e across a &attlefield (as )ard3 t)e 0)e&ans e-ecuting it (it)out difficulty &ecause t)eir great de/t) %eant t)at t)ey )ad a +ery narro( front. 0)e 0)e&an Sacred Band could carry out t)eir se/arate %anoeu+re &ecause t)ey used only ?>> (ell#drilled3 /icked %en for an essentially /re#/lanned3 /er)a/s re)earsed3 task. 0)e /re#/lanned3 stilted c)aracter of t)e S/artan en+elo/ing %o+e%ent also dra%atises t)e difficulty of %anoeu+ring infantry in line on a &attlefield. ,eaders could desire en+elo/%ents and %ig)t (is) to c)ange dis/ositions or %anoeu+re during a &attle3 &ut infantry in /)alan- lacked t)e ca/acity to e-ecute t)e needed %o+e%ents. 2+en 2/a%inondas foug)t in t)e ranks to encourage )is %en7 )e )ad no &etter task3 since )e could not influence t)e course of t)e &attle after it )ad &egun. Back 1C

Combat on Foot with Missiles

0)e co%&at of )ea+y infantry arrayed in s%all co%/act for%ations ad%ira&ly fit t)e terrain of *reece3 a %ountainous country (it)out %any large le+el s/aces. Missile fig)ting re.uired %ore roo%. Ne+ert)eless3 t)e *reeks did use %en ar%ed (it) %issiles3 %ost often as au-iliaries to t)eir )ea+y infantry. 0)e *reeks e+ol+ed t)ree kinds of %issile infantry. 0)e arc)er3 t)e %ost effecti+e of t)ese3 could s)oot )is co%/le%ent of fifteen to t(enty arro(s eig)ty to a )undred yards. 0)e arro( lacked /enetrating /o(er against a )o/lites s)ield or &reast/late3 &ut t)e nu%&er of arro(s a+aila&le and t)e nasty (ounds t)ey could inflict on an un#ar%oured /ortion of a )o/lites &ody %ade t)e arc)er a /otentially for%ida&le (ea/on syste%. lt)oug) a good &o( and )and%ade arro(s re/resented a significant in+est%ent3 t)e arc)ers e.ui/%ent cost %uc) less t)an t)e )o/lites ar%our3 s/ear3 and s(ord. But t)e %an )i%self (as %ore e-/ensi+e3 if only &ecause of t)e longer training needed to ac.uire t)e skill needed to s)oot an arro( .uickly and accurately. In addition3 t)e arc)er )ad to fig)t as an indi+idual rat)er t)an as a %e%&er of a grou/3 a feat de%anding %ore skill3 initiati+e3 and %orale t)an t)at needed &y t)e )o/lite3 fig)ting s)oulder#to#s)oulder (it) )is fello( )o/lites. 0)e *reek econo%y of t)e si-t) century B.$.3 &arely a&o+e t)e su&sistence le+el3 %ade ti%e a scarce resource. 'or t)e sa%e reason t)at t)ey could afford fe( regular soldiers3 t)e *reeks did not )a+e as %any citi6ens ()o )ad t)e leisure to kee/ u/ t)e constant /ractice necessary to &eco%e good arc)ers. 0)ese effecti+e &ut relati+ely e-/ensi+e (ea/ons re%ained co%/arati+ely rare in *reece3 e-ce/t in co%&at at sea3 ()ere t)e range of t)e arro( ga+e it /ro%inence. 0)e arc)er foug)t indi+idually &ecause )e could not use t)e )ea+y infantrys tactical for%ation. "ad arc)ers ar%oured t)e%sel+es and for%ed a dense array3 t)e )o/lites could easily )a+e rendered t)e &o(s useless &y co%ing to close .uarters and .uite literally slaug)tering t)e arc)ers. 0)e &o(%en (ore no ar%our3 ena&ling t)e% easily to run a(ay fro% t)e )ea+ily &urdened )o/lites. By kee/ing t)eir distance3 arc)ers could a+oid s)ock action and use t)eir %issile (ea/ons. But since running and s)ooting is easier as an indi+idual t)an in a for%ation3 *reek arc)ers did not usually fig)t as a coordinated3 %utually de/endent grou/. Because t)ey lacked t)e (eig)t of ar%our3 t)ey (ere called lig)t infantry3 and t)ey )ad greater s/eed on t)e %arc) as (ell as in tactical situations. 0)eir %et)od of de/ending on %issiles and %ore on indi+idual t)an grou/ action )as e+er since &een called lig)t infantry tactics. not)er for% of lig)t infantry ar%ed t)e%sel+es (it) slings. 2+en (it) t)e s%all outlay for t)e sling and t)e fre.uent use of rocks for a%%unition3 t)e i%%ense difficulty in accurately using a sling resulted in a scarcity of co%/etent slingers. Releasing t)e %issile at t)e /recise %o%ent to insure /ro/elling it in t)e /ro/er direction re.uired3 .uite literally3 a lifeti%e of /ractice. Most slingers ca%e fro% t)e island of R)odes3 ()ere in)a&itants traditionally relied on t)e sling as a (ea/on3 e+en teac)ing c)ildren its use. 0)e sling )ad yet anot)er dra(&ack: slingers re.uired /lenty of s/ace &et(een eac) ot)er3 and it (as difficult to )a+e %any in one /lace and t)us to de+elo/ %uc) fire/o(er. 0)e sling )ad a slig)t ad+antage o+er t)e &o( in range3 and if t)e slingers used lead slugs instead of rocks3 t)ey could carry fifty of t)ese3 dou&le or tri/le t)e nu%&er of arro(s arc)ers carried. 0)e t)ird kind of lig)t infantry consisted of t)e %an e.ui//ed (it) a Da+elin. 0)ro(ing a s/ear re.uired far less skill t)an using a &o( or sling3 and se+eral Da+elins cost less t)an a &o( and a .ui+er of arro(s. Still3 t)e Da+elin )ad t)e dra(&acks of its s)ort effecti+e range3 rarely %ore t)an t(enty yards3 and t)e s%all nu%&er a %an could carry. But it (as /ossi&le for a soldier to reuse )is Da+elin3 t)e large3 dura&le (ea/on &eing %ore easily retrie+ed t)an t)e s%all3 fragile arro( or t)e tiny s)ot of t)e sling. Because of its ine-/ensi+e cost3 t)e relati+e case of learning to use it3 and its

1B

suita&ility in cra%/ed fig)ting areas3 %en ar%ed (it) t)e 8a+elin &eca%e t)e /redo%inant lig)t infantry (ea/on syste% in *reece.

&ight 'nfantry Back

In s/ite of its infle-i&ility and t)e +ulnera&ility of its flanks3 t)e )o/lite /)alan-3 ada/ted to *reeces terrain and social organisation3 /ro+ed to &e an efficient (ea/on syste%. 0)e e-/ensi+e e.ui/%ent /rotected t)e soldier in close co%&at3 an essential re.uire%ent against t)e t)rust of s/ear and s(ord and t)e cutting of a s(ord. 0)e costly e.ui/%ent3 a dura&le3 long#ter% in+est%ent3 co%&ined (it) t)e tactical syste% %ade /ossi&le t)e use of an ine-/ensi+e %ilitia%an. 0)e (ell# e.ui//ed a%ateur could fig)t effecti+ely in an array eig)t or e+en si-teen dee/3 ()ic) suited )is (ea/ons3 sustained )is %orale3 and re.uired a %ini%u% of skill. Back

Mounted Combat
*reeks also foug)t on )orse&ack3 &ut %ounted (arfare did not initially di+ide into t)e t(o distinct %et)ods of fig)ting c)aracteristic of t)e infantry#s)ock and %issile action # in /art &ecause %ounted co%&at suffered t)e serious )andica/ of )orse%en riding (it)out t)e aid of stirru/s. None of t)e ancient ci+ilisations3 $)inese3 Indian3 2gy/tian3 Meso/ota%ian3 *reek3 or Ro%an3 )ad in+ented stirru/s3 and (it)out t)e% a rider )ad to de/end on t)e /ressure of )is knees to )old )i%self on )is )orse. 0)is fee&le seat %ade it a(k(ard for a soldier3 es/ecially an un/ractised rider3 to fig)t %ounted. 2+en to t)ro( a Da+elin could /ro+e trying3 and to strike (it) a cutting s(ord and %iss %ig)t e+en cause t)e rider to lose )is seat. Ne+ert)eless3 *reek ca+alry foug)t in a +ariety of (ays: at a distance (it) Da+elins7 at close .uarters (it) s/ears7 or e+en dis%ounting and fig)ting on foot. 5ften t)e rider (ore ar%our and so%eti%es t)e )orse )ad /rotection. 0)e %en %ounted in t)is (ay %ade a (ea/on syste% distinctly inferior to infantry. 0)ey could not e-/ect to c)arge )ea+y infantry successfully &ecause t)e %en on foot )ad &etter (ea/ons for s)ock action and a %ore secure fig)ting /latfor%3 t)e ground. 2.ually3 t)e %ounted %en )ad a disad+antage in engaging lig)t infantry (it) %issiles. 0)e foot soldiers su/erior fig)ting /latfor% ga+e t)e% a distinct ad+antage. Men on foot could outfig)t t)ose %ounted &ecause t)ey )ad only one task # to fig)t. 0)e %en on )orse&ack )ad to control t)eir %ounts as (ell as fig)t. But t)e ca+alrys su/erior %o&ility ga+e it one for%ida&le ad+antage o+er t)e infantry. 0)oug) a grou/ of ca+alry %ig)t lack su&di+ision and any articulation3 it could use its %o&ility to attack t)e flank or rear of a /)alan-. 0)e (eakness of t)e stirru/#less ca+alry s)ould %ean t)at suc) an attack (it) s)ock action /resented little real t)reat to )ea+y infantry in &attle3 /ro+ided t)e %en on foot

1@

could face t)eir assailants. 2+en t)oug) t)e )ea+y infantry could not re/ly to an attack (it) Da+elins t)ro(n fro% )orse&ack3 t)e &attle of t)e )ea+y infantry (ould +ery likely end &efore t)e Da+elin attack on t)e rear could )a+e %uc) o//ortunity to affect t)e outco%e. But t)is calculation offered s%all consolation to soldiers ()o risked &eing struck &y a )orse%ans Da+elin. Suc) a flank or rear attack (ould )a+e a tre%endous /syc)ological effect3 co%ing as it did fro% an une-/ected direction against troo/s not arrayed to %eet it. 0)e )orses t)e%sel+es (ould add anot)er cause of de%oralisation3 for t)ey (ould look large and %enacing. *reek general soug)t to dis/el t)is fearful as/ect of ca+alry &y telling )is infantry t)at Jno %an e+er /eris)ed in &attle fro% &eing &itten or kicked &y a )orse. 0)e foot soldier can strike )arder and (it) truer ai% t)an t)e )orse%an3 ()o is /recariously /oised on )is steed3 and is as %uc) afraid of falling off as )e is afraid of t)e ene%y. Because of t)eir su/erior %o&ility and t)eir a&ility to go into action (it)out dis%ounting3 ca+alry3 co%/ared (it) t)e slo(#%o+ing infantry3 %ig)t (ell &e called offensi+e troo/s3 assailing t)e ene%ys +ulnera&le flank and rear. But &ecause t)e cost of )orses %ade %ounted %en an e-/ensi+e (ea/on syste%3 and since skill in riding re.uired %uc) /ractice3 t)e *reeks )ad little ca+alry. lso *reece offered fe( /astures3 and ca+alry )ad difficulty o/erating in %uc) of *reeces rugged terrain. Back

Fortification and Siegecraft

0)e *reeks /rotected t)eir cities (it) (alls3 fortified )ills3 and defiles. 're.uently &uilding (it) stone and taking ad+antage of ine.ualities in t)e terrain3 t)ey %ade fortifications difficult to assail. 'urt)er3 %ilitia ar%ies often lacked &ot) t)e skill needed to attack fortifications and soldiers ()o could stay a(ay fro% t)eir ci+ilian occu/ations to conduct a long &lockade. 0)e e%/ires of sia3 )o(e+er3 (it) t)eir /rofessional ar%ies3 de+elo/ed so/)isticated siege %et)ods against t)eir often %ore +ulnera&le (alls and to(ers3 %any ti%es &uilt on le+el terrain (it) %ud &ricks. 'ortifications effecti+ely took t)e /lace of %any soldiers on t)e defence and (ere in a sense a su&stitution of ca/ital for la&our3 a good re/lace%ent &ecause of t)eir efficiency. 4nlike t)e soldiers t)ey su//lanted3 fortifications re.uired neit)er food nor fodder3 +astly si%/lifying t)e defenders su//ly /ro&le%s. In addition3 t)ey efficiently co%&ined t)e defensi+e %erits of lig)t and )ea+y infantry. !alls and ditc)es /resented a %ore for%ida&le &arrier t)an a s)ield (all3 t)e defenders of t)e (all usually )a+ing an ad+antage in )and#to#)and fig)ting (it) t)e attackers. lso3 t)e defenders3 functioning as lig)t infantry in directing %issiles at t)e attackers3 enDoyed t)e /rotection against %issiles /ro+ided &y t)e (all as (ell as t)e ad+antage of range and +elocity t)e )eig)t of t)e (all ga+e to t)eir %issiles. 'ortifications3 )o(e+er3 (ere &y t)eir nature i%%o&ile3 and an e.ual in+est%ent in soldiers offered %ore +ersatility if less /o(er on t)e defence. 5f course3 fortifications could aid t)e offence &y so econo%ising soldiers defending one /lace as to allo( a su/erior concentration for offensi+e action else()ere. Because (alls (ere easy to defend3 t)e use of fortifications to /rotect cities (as (ides/read and sensi&le3 and t)e in)a&itants of t)e cities /ro+ided an i%%ediately a+aila&le reser+oir of unskilled &ut useful defenders. 'ortifications )a+e e-isted fro% /ri%iti+e ti%es3 and early on3 )ad t)e t(o essential c)aracteristics t)at t)ey )a+e retained until t)e /resent. G1H 0)ey s)ould /resent an o&stacle to attackers3 t)e si%/lest &arrier &eing a t)orn )edge. G2H 'ortifications s)ould also offer /rotection for defenders3 suc) as an eart)en &ank or &ul(ark &e)ind a ditc). /alisade in t)e ditc) or on t)e &ank strengt)ened t)e o&stacle. Since t)e eart) fro% t)e ditc) furnis)ed t)e %aterial for t)e &ank3 soldiers or la&ourers could construct suc) a fortification .uickly3 and &ecause soldiers could erect t)e% s/eedily3 t)ey (ere called field fortifications3 to distinguis) t)e% fro% carefully engineered3 /er%anent fortifications3 usually constructed of %asonry. 2>

0)e ancients )ad de+elo/ed /er%anent fortifications in t)e for% of t)e stone or &rick (all. In addition to )eig)t3 a (all needed enoug) t)ickness to resist &attering and to /ro+ide a fig)ting /latfor% for t)e defenders on to/. 0o reduce costs3 soldiers erected inner and outer (alls of %asonry3 ()ic) t)ey filled in (it) stones or eart)7 t)ey /a+ed t)e to/ to /ro+ide t)e fig)ting /latfor%. 0)ey &uilt t)e outer (all )ig)er t)an t)e fig)ting /latfor% and crenelated it to /ro+ide t)e defenders (it) /rotected /ositions for fig)ting3 s)ooting arro(s3 or t)ro(ing ot)er %issiles at attackers. Military engineers su//le%ented t)e (all (it) a ditc)3 t)e e-ca+ation of ()ic) su//lied filler for t)e (all. 0)e ditc) also increased t)e effecti+e )eig)t of t)e (all and )el/ed to for% a &arrier to efforts to &atter it do(n. Builders soon strengt)ened t)e (all &y &uilding in to(ers at inter+als3 ()ic) furnis)ed a significant addition to t)e defensi+e /o(er: Dutting out &eyond t)e face of t)e (all3 t)e to(ers /ro+ided a fig)ting /latfor% fro% ()ic) t)e defenders could direct enfilade fire against attackers3 and assaults on t)e to(er (ould face t)e sa%e enfilade fire fro% t)e defenders of t)e (all. Because of t)e )ig)er effecti+eness of s)ooting at a soldiers flank and t)e often greater ease and safety of disc)arging %issiles at soldiers attacking an adDacent to(er or (all t)an t)ro(ing /roDectiles do(n(ard at ones o(n attackers3 t)is /rinci/le of %utual su//ort )as re%ained funda%ental in t)e design and defence of fortifications since ancient ti%es. sians de+elo/ed ela&orate fortification long &efore t)e *reeks. s far &ack as 2>>> B.$.3 Nine+e) on t)e 0igris Ri+er is said3 dou&tless (it) %uc) e-aggeration3 to )a+e )ad a defended /eri%eter fifty %iles long (it) (alls 12> feet )ig) and ?> feet t)ick su//orted &y 13<>> to(ers. Suc) a stress on fortification naturally called fort) a so/)isticated syste% of attack3 ()ic) siatic ar%ies )ad also de+elo/ed to a )ig) state of /erfection. %ong t)eir siege %et)ods3 t)e siatics e%/loyed t(o (ays of co/ing (it) (alls. 0)e first3 a+oiding t)e (all3 consisted of going o+er t)e (all (it) ladders or %o+a&le to(ers3 ()ic) (orked (ell on le+el terrain. 'ar %ore effecti+e t)an ladders3 %o+a&le to(ers )ad to &e )ig)er t)an t)e (all attacked. 0)e largest suc) to(ers re.uired solid (ood ()eels as %uc) as 12 feet in dia%eter and 4 feet t)ick. 0o /rotect against efforts to set t)e% on fire3 to(ers )ad ra()ides as co+erings and e+en )ad t)eir o(n fire#fig)ting (ater su//ly. S)ooting do(n u/on t)e defenders3 arc)ers at t)e to/ of t)e to(er cleared t)e (all and lo(ered a dra(&ridge in t)e to(er7 t)e attackers rus)ed onto t)e (all to take /ossession. In reality3 t)e attackers )ad acco%/lis)ed little: t)ey controlled only t)e to/ of t)e (all &et(een t)e adDacent to(ers ()ose defenders s)ot at t)e% (it) arro(s fro% t)e crenelated defences t)at co%%anded t)e (all. 0)e attackers also lacked stair(ays to t)e ground3 for only t)e defenders to(ers )ad stairs. Mo+a&le to(ers )ad greater utility for do%inating t)e defenders of t)e (all3 so t)at ot)er %eans of attack could /roceed %ore readily. 0unnelling under t)e (all3 t)e second %et)od of a+oiding t)e (all3 also under%ined it3 one of t)e t(o &asic %et)ods of destroying a (all. 0)is tec)ni.ue in+ol+ed e-ca+ating galleries under t)e (all3 ()ic) t)e attackers su//orted (it) (ooden /ro/s. !)en t)e gallery or %ine )ad reac)ed t)e /ro/er si6e3 t)e attackers destroyed t)e (all &y &urning t)e /ro/s and t)e fall of t)e %ine caused t)e (all to colla/se. 1efenders counter%ined3 eit)er to ca+e in t)e attackers unfinis)ed galleries or to enter t)eir tunnels and dri+e out t)e (ork%en.

Siege Tower Back

21

0)e &attering ra% offered t)e ot)er %et)od of destroying t)e (all. 0)e attackers /laced t)e &attering ra% under a strong %o+a&le s)ed and &roug)t it u/ to t)e (all &y filling in t)e ditc). 0)en3 using slings or rollers to %o+e t)e ra%3 %en (orked it to knock do(n t)e (all3 a tec)ni.ue %ore effecti+e against &rick t)an stone. 0)is acti+ity3 like o/ening a %ine entrance close to t)e (all3 re.uired t)at t)e attackers )a+e co+er furnis)ed &y trenc)es3 ra%/arts3 and o+er)ead /rotection. 1o%ination of t)e adDacent (all &y a %o+a&le to(er facilitated t)e (ork of &attering or o/ening a %ine. less effecti+e and de%anding for% of attack consisted of /icking at a (all to dislodge stones or &ricks rat)er t)an &attering to s)ake do(n t)e ()ole structure. Bot) attackers and defenders )ad artillery ()ose %issiles de/ended on t)e t)rust /ro+ided &y counter(eig)ts3 tension on ani%al sine(3 or torsion on t(isted ro/es or ani%al sine(. Because of its range and /o(er3 artillery found %any uses in a siege. So%e %ac)ines could )url %issiles as far as =>> yards and literally &atter do(n a (all (it) /roDectiles as )ea+y as =>> /ounds. ttackers and defenders could also use artillery to t)ro( &urning su&stances or no-ious o&Dects suc) as dead ani%als or /eo/le.

Siege Artillery Back

22

0)ese are only so%e of t)e great +ariety of e.ui/%ent and %et)ods used in t)e attack and defence of fortified /laces. $learly3 in a siege t)e defender o&+iously enDoyed an ad+antage e+en against so/)isticated and (ell#e.ui//ed attackers. But3 gi+en enoug) ti%e3 a sufficient su/eriority in %en and %ateriel and ade.uate %eans to su//ly t)e &esiegers3 t)e attack (ould /re+ail. Besiegers so%eti%es &uilt t)eir o(n (alls3 usually eart)en field fortifications around t)e city. $alled lines of contra+allation3 t)ese )el/ed &esiegers resist t)e sorties of t)e &esieged as (ell as fully interdicting t)e citys co%%unication (it) t)e outside. 5ften &esiegers )ad to contend (it) an ar%y trying to rescue t)e city and so%eti%es /rotected t)e%sel+es (it) fortified ca%/s or e+en lines of circu%+allation3 a second ring of field fortification facing out(ard to (ard off t)e relie+ing ar%y. If t)e &esiegers could co%/letely &lockade t)e city3 t)ey could e+entually star+e it out if t)ey could su//ly t)eir o(n ar%y long enoug). 2+en for ar%ies (it) so/)isticated siege %et)ods3 a successful siege re.uired a great su/eriority3 one ade.uate to o+erco%e t)e defenders3 ensure an ade.uate flo( of su//lies and defeat or kee/ at &ay any relie+ing ar%y. Back

Greek Heavy nfantry against !ersian "ight nfantry and Cavalry

!)en t)e *reeks %et t)e +ast Persian 2%/ire3 t)ey faced not only e-/erts in fortification &ut also %asters of a (ell#de+elo/ed %ilitary syste% t)at )ad e+ol+ed o+er se+eral t)ousand years. 5riginally relying on s/ears3 a-es3 and %aces &ecause of a lack of ferrous %etals to fas)ion good s(ords3 t)e ar%ies of 2gy/t and (estern sia de+elo/ed differently fro% t)ose of t)e *reeks. 'or instance3 t)ey created a co%/osite &o( of suc) /o(er t)at it could s)oot effecti+ely to a distance of se+eral )undred yards. 0)is (ea/on ca%e to do%inate %uc) of t)eir (arfare3 gi+ing an ad+antage to states t)at )ad t)e tec)nical kno(ledge to /roduce it and t)e resources to %ake large nu%&ers and to /ro+ide %en (it) t)e skill and strengt) to use it. "a+ing %uc) le+el terrain3 /articularly in Meso/ota%ia3 t)e sians stressed %o&ility &ecause t)ey could )arness asses to c)ariots and use t)e% as fig)ting /latfor%s3 first for a %an (it) a Da+elin and later for a &o(%an. $)ariots carried a dri+er and at least one &o(%an. Because t)e dri+er usually )ad a s/ear and t)e c)ariot could carry at least one s/ear%an in addition to t)e &o(%an3 t)e c)ariot could also engage in co%&at at close .uarters (it) its s/ear%en fig)ting eit)er in t)e c)ariot or dis%ounted. s t)ey co%/leted t)e /rotracted task of %astering t)e )orse3 t)e sians not only )arnessed t(o of t)e% to t)eir c)ariots &ut also &egan to fig)t %ounted on t)e )orse itself. 2+entually3 (it) t)e de+elo/%ent of t)e saddle3 a skilled rider learned t)e difficult lesson of controlling )is )orse ()ile using &ot) )ands to s)oot a &o(. In /art &ecause a )orse%an cost far less t)an a c)ariot and could negotiate terrain i%/assa&le for a ()eeled +e)icle3 t)e ca+alry%an gradually su/erseded t)e c)arioteer. 0)e )orse%an also foug)t at close .uarters3 usually (it) a s/ear. Bo(%en continued to do%inate a%ong t)e Infantry3 t)oug) )ea+y infantry )ad an i%/ortant role in sieges.

2?

,ong engaged in al%ost continuous (arfare3 t)e siatic %onarc)ies )ad /er%anent ar%ies. S%all in relation to t)eir /o/ulations3 t)ese ar%ies consisted of e-/ert /rofessionals3 /roficient /arts of t)eir (ea/on syste%s3 ()o /racticed so/)isticated and (ell#integrated %odes of (arfare. 0)ese full#ti%e soldiers /ro+ided a foundation for t)e +ast e%/ires t)at c)aracterised t)e region. In esta&lis)ing t)e latest and largest of t)ese i%%ense %onarc)ies3 t)e Persians )ad e-tended t)eir rule o+er t)e entire region fro% India to t)e Mediterranean3 including 2gy/t and sia Minor. 0)ey also %aintained a /rofessional ar%y co%/osed largely of foot &o(%en and ca+alry and co%&ined t)ese &y de/loying t)eir lig)t infantry in t)e centre of t)eir line of &attle and t)eir ca+alry on eac) flank. Persian tactics de/ended less t)an did *reek on coordination (it)in t)e grou/ since s)ooting a &o( did not re.uire t)e )el/ of ot)ers. In fig)ting ot)er lig)t infantry3 t)e skilled Persian regular &o(%en arrayed t)e%sel+es se+eral ranks dee/ and relied on t)eir ra/id and accurate &arrage of arro(s to )alt attackers at &o( distance. "ere de/t) of for%ation conferred an ad+antage not found in s)ock action. !)en /)alan- foug)t /)alan-3 t)e rear ranks could not /artici/ate7 for t)e %ost /art t)ey /ro+ided %oral su//ort to t)e front rank and re/lace%ents for t)e fallen. But (it) o+er)ead fire &y arro(s3 t)e second ranks of t)e Persians could fire effecti+ely and at a distance: (it) a )ig) traDectory for t)e arro(s3 additional ranks could s)oot o+er t)e )eads of t)e ranks a)ead and direct t)eir arro(s do(n u/on t)e ene%y &eyond t)e front rank. So t)e Persians grou/ed t)eir lig)t infantry in a s)allo( line3 t)e %en e.ui//ed (it) a large (icker s)ield for /rotection against )ostile arro(s and so%eti%es (it) an assistant to carry and )old t)e s)ield. 0)ey (ore no ar%our and3 often ar%ed only (it) a dagger3 )ad no real e.ui/%ent for close co%&at. Standing at &o( distance3 t)e Persian infantry disorganised t)e ene%ys infantry (it) arro(s. 0)e Persian ca+alry3 ar%ed (it) s)ort s/ears3 daggers3 and &o(s or Da+elins3 t)en left its /osition3 /oised on t)e flanks3 and c)arged t)e ene%ys flank3 co%/leting its defeat. 0)e antit)esis of t)e *reek (ay of (ar3 t)e Persian tactical syste% relied on a co%&ination of t(o (ea/on syste%s3 t)e *reek on only one. 0)e Persians de/ended on ca+alry and lig)t infantry3 &ot) au-iliaries in t)e *reek syste%3 and %ade little use of t)e *reek %ainstay3 )ea+y infantry. In fig)ting )ea+y infantry t)e Persians did not rely on t)e tactic of kee/ing t)eir distance and destroying t)e ene%y (it) t)eir %issiles ()ile using t)e su/erior s/eed of t)eir lig)t infantry arc)ers to e+ade any c)arge &y t)e )ea+y infantry. Instead3 t)e Persians de/ended on a flank attack &y t)eir /rofessional ca+alry to )alt t)e )ea+y infantry. $)arged &y ca+alry3 t)e flanks of t)e )ea+y infantry for%ation (ould )alt to fend off t)e attack3 t)us &ringing t)e entire c)arge to a standstill (it)in range of t)e Persian &o(s. 0)e )ail of %issiles fro% t)e Persian infantry line and t)e ca+alry on t)e flanks (ould t)en defeat t)e %otionless )ea+y infantry. 0)e first clas) &et(een t)ese t(o radically distinct tactical syste%s occurred at Marat)on in 4@> B.$.3 under circu%stances t)at /laced t)e Persians at a considera&le disad+antage. "a+ing co%e to *reece &y sea3 t)e Persian ar%y lacked %any of t)eir decisi+e offensi+e ar%3 t)e )orse%en. 0)e conflict3 ()ic) took /lace on a /lain &eside t)e sea3 /itted t)e +irtually unaided Persian lig)t infantry against t)e *reek )ea+y infantry3 t)e *reek %ilitia )a+ing /rotected t)eir flanks &y )ills and artificial o&stacles against t)e s%all nu%&er of Persian ca+alry at )and. !)en t)e t(o lines of infantry ca%e (it)in &o(s)ot and t)e Persians &egan t)eir arro( &arrage3 t)e *reeks c)arged at a slo( run. 0)eir ar%our did not /re+ent t)eir running a s)ort distance ()ile it offered /rotection against Persian arro(s. 0)ey ran t)roug) t)e 6one in ()ic) t)e arro(s fell and engaged t)e stationary Persian arc)ers in )and#to#)and co%&at. "a+ing strengt)ened t)e flanks of t)eir /)alan-3 t)e %en on t)e ends of t)e *reek line reac)ed t)e Persians and engaged t)e% )and#to#)and7 t)e c)arge of t)e t)inner centre ranks did not (eat)er t)e )all of arro(s and could not reac) t)e Persian line. But once in close co%&at on t)e flanks3 t)e ar%oured *reeks (it) s/ear and s(ord defeated t)e Persians3 une.ui//ed and untrained for s)ock

24

action. 0)e Persians fled3 t)e *reeks /ursuing for a %ile. By t)e ti%e t)e +ictorious *reeks could reorganise t)e%sel+es and %arc) t)e t(o additional %iles to t)e Persian s)i/s3 t)e Persians )ad e%&arked %ost of t)eir %en3 and t)e *reeks ca/tured only se+en s)i/s. 0)e Battle of Marat)on (ell e-)i&ited t)e easily antici/ated ina&ility of lig)t infantry to )old its ground in a &attle against )ea+y infantry. "it#and#run tactics see%ed t)e only effecti+e %et)od for t)e &o(%en in t)e a&sence of ca+alry to )alt t)e c)arge of t)e )o/lites.

Gree(e Back

0)e su&se.uent *raeco#Persian (ar /ro+ided a &etter test &et(een t)e t(o syste%s. decade after t)e Battle of Marat)on3 t)e Persians ca%e to *reece (it) a /o(erful ar%y of infantry and ca+alry3 a force of regular troo/s t)at accurately reflected t)e %ilitary ca/a&ility of t)e )uge e%/ire. In addition to ca+alry and large nu%&ers of foot arc)ers3 t)e Persians )ad so%e )o/lites of t)eir *reek allies. But t)e distincti+e strengt) of t)e Persian ar%y lay in its nu%erous ca+alry e.ui//ed (it) &o(s3 Da+elins3 and s/ears. 0)e *reeks3 lacking any ca+alry3 de/ended on )ea+y infantry3 and so%e lig)t infantry. t Plataea t)e t(o forces %et in a fair trial of strengt). In t)e initial dis/osition of t)e t(o (ell# co%%anded ar%ies3 t)e ty/ically *reek roug) ground /rotected t)e flanks of t)e *reeks fro% t)e Persian ca+alry. But as eac) ar%y (aited for t)e ot)er to attack3 one e-/osed detac)%ent of )o/lites suffered fro% t)e %issiles of Persian ca+alry3 ()ic) like lig)t infantry could stand off at a distance and use &o(s and Da+elins. Since t)e *reek s/ear%en could not )o/e to c)arge t)e ca+alry successfully3 t)ey could offer no defence. So3 t)e *reeks t)en /osted in t)is e-/osed /osition ?>> t)enian )o/lites su//orted &y so%e arc)ers3 a ty/e of lig)t infantry fa+oured &y t)e seafaring t)enians. gainst t)is co%&ination of t(o *reek (ea/on syste%s3 t)e Persian ca+alry used )it# and#run tactics3 t)eir )orse%en riding u/ in grou/s and s)ooting t)eir arro(s or )urling t)eir Da+elins. 5ne grou/ t)en (it)dre( and anot)er took its /lace in rotation3 eac) conducting its %issile attack. 0)e )o/lites )eld t)eir ground against t)e ca+alry t)at did not c)arge3 ()ile t)e arro(s of t)e *reek &o(%en seriously )ar%ed t)e Persians. 0)e foot arc)ers )ad t)e ad+antage o+er t)e %ounted &o(%en3 &ecause3 a&le to concentrate ()olly on t)eir &o(s3 t)ey )ad su/eriority in t)e accuracy and nu%&er of t)eir arro(s.

2<

0)e e-/erience of a Persian ca+alry leader also s)o(ed t)e +ulnera&ility of t)e )orse. In front of t)e ot)er ca+alry3 )is )orse3 in t)e (ords of a )istorian of t)e ti%e3 Jrecei+ed an arro( in )is flank3 t)e /ain of ()ic) caused )i% to rear and t)ro( )is rider.L 0)e )o/lites t)en rus)ed for(ard and killed t)e Persian co%%ander. "is %en3 J(it) loud c)eers3L t)en c)arged (it) s)ock action to reco+er t)e &ody of t)eir leader3 &ut3 in s/ite of t)eir inferiority in nu%&ers3 t)e foot soldiers de%onstrated t)eir su/eriority to t)e %ounted %en &y successfully resisting t)e deter%ined )and# to#)and attack of t)e stirru/#less Persian regulars. !it) t)e a//roac) of )o/lite reinforce%ents3 t)e Persian ca+alry a&andoned t)e contest. 0)e *reeks t)en %o+ed for(ard until t)ey faced t)e Persians across a s%all strea%. 2ac) ar%y arrayed its infantry o//osite t)e ot)er3 &ut &ot) refused to risk an attack ()en crossing t)e strea% (ould disru/t t)eir for%ation. Pausanias3 t)e sagacious and circu%s/ect S/artan 9ing ()o co%%anded t)e *reeks3 )ad difficulty restraining )is allies3 ()o dis/layed great i%/atience to attack. Mardonius3 t)e s)re(d and e-/erienced co%%ander of t)e Persian regulars3 )ad less difficulty in a(aiting a %ore fa+oura&le %o%ent to assu%e t)e offensi+e. 2+en after t)ey %o+ed for(ard3 %ost of t)e *reek )o/lites still )ad t)e /rotection t)e terrain offered against a direct attack &y t)e %issiles of t)e Persian ca+alry. Ne+ert)eless3 in so%e /ositions ca+alry J(it) t)eir Da+elins and t)eir arro(s Gfor t)oug) )orse%en t)ey used t)e &o(H sorely distressed t)e *reek troo/s ()ic) could not &ring t)e% to close co%&at.L Soon after t)eir for(ard %o+e3 t)e *reeks decided to (it)dra( to a /osition t)at )ad access to (ater and fro% ()ic) t)ey could %ore effecti+ely co+er t)eir lines of co%%unication. 0)ey did t)is at nig)t to a+oid )arass%ent &y t)e ene%y ca+alry3 &ut one *reek co%%ander delayed &ecause )e t)oug)t it dis)onoura&le to retreat3 and so%e forces lost t)eir (ay. 0)is )ad t)e result t)at in t)e %orning t)e *reeks found t)eir ar%ys de/loy%ent &adly disarranged. 0)e Persian ca+alry /ro%/tly took ad+antage of t)e situation to )arry t)e S/artan contingent as it (it)dre(3 causing t)e *reeks to )alt to defend t)e%sel+es. 0)e success of t)e Persian co%%anders ca+alry con+inced )i% t)at t)e *reeks (ere fleeing3 and )e soug)t to e-/loit t)e ene%ys disorder &y sending )is infantry for(ard across t)e strea%. But t)e S/artans (ere neit)er retreating nor disordered3 and Persian lig)t infantry faced *reek )o/lites. $o%ing (it)in &o(s)ot3 t)e Persians3 led &y Mardonius on a ()ite )orse3 J%ade a ra%/art of t)eir (icker s)ields3 and s)ot fro% &e)ind t)e% suc) a cloud of arro(s3 t)at t)e S/artans (ere sorely distressed.L s t)e Persians dre( closer3 t)e S/artans c)arged. s at Marat)on3 t)e terrain /rotected t)e flanks of t)e )o/lites fro% attack &y t)e Persian ca+alry3 and3 (it)out t)e ca+alry attack to )alt t)eir c)arge3 t)e S/artans /ro%/tly closed (it) t)e Persians. 0)e lig)t infantry )ad su/erior %o&ility3 &ut t)e %ass of t)e Persians3 t)oug) strong in fire/o(er3 could not fall &ack .uickly: t)eir o(n nu%&ers )e%%ed t)e% in3 ot)er troo/s )a+ing co%e u/ in t)eir rear. 0)ey )ad no c)oice &ut to engage t)e S/artans3 and Jfirst t)e co%&at (as at t)e (icker s)ields. fter(ards3 ()en t)ese (ere s(e/t a(ay3L t)ere ensued a J)and#to#)and struggleL in ()ic) t)e Persians J%any ti%es sei6ed )old of t)e *reeks s/ears and &roke t)e%3 for in &oldness and (arlike s/irit t)e Persians (ere not a &it inferior to t)e *reeks7 &ut t)ey (ere (it)out &ucklers3 untrained3 and far &elo( t)e ene%y in res/ect to skillL in t)e s)ock co%&at for ()ic) t)e *reeks )ad instruction3 ar%s3 and ar%our. !it) t)e gallant and skilful Mardonius killed in co%&at3 t)e Persian infantry retreated. 0)is defeat at Plataea ended t)eir in+asion of *reece. lt)oug) t)e *reeks (on and t)e Persians t)ereafter incor/orated )ea+y infantry in t)eir ar%y3 t)e *reek tactical syste% )ad not dis/layed any intrinsic su/eriority. In s/ite of t)e failure of t)e Persian &o(%en3 clearly lig)t infantry could defeat )ea+y infantry if it could fully e-/loit its natural ad+antages3 &y a+oiding s)ock co%&at3 kee/ing its distance3 and using its %issiles. But t(o atte%/ts3 at Marat)on and Plataea3 to use lig)t infantry in a frontal fig)t (it) )ea+y infantry )ad

2=

e-)i&ited t)e +ulnera&ility of lig)t infantry ()en it lacked t)e aid of ca+alry and could not use its su/erior %o&ility to a+oid t)e c)arge of t)e )ea+y infantry. 0)e Persian ca+alry )ad e-)i&ited a&ility to use its greater %o&ility to kee/ a(ay fro% t)e )ea+y infantry and effecti+ely e%/loy %issile (ea/ons. 0o t)e degree t)at t)e ca+alry )ad tried s)ock action against t)e )ea+y infantry3 t)e infantry )ad s)o(n its su/eriority. 0)e %an on foot in for%ation )ad t)e ad+antage o+er t)e stirru/#less %ounted %an in )and#to#)and co%&at &ecause t)e ground /ro+ided a &etter fig)ting /latfor% and )e could gi+e )is undi+ided attention to co%&at. 0)e success of t)e *reek foot arc)ers against t)e %ounted Persian &o(%en also ga+e a strong indication t)at t)e lig)t infantry%an )ad a distinct ascendancy o+er a %ounted %an using t)e sa%e tactics. Back

Greek "ight nfantry in Combat with Greek Heavy nfantry

'or %ore t)an a century follo(ing t)e (ar (it) Persia3 t)e *reek syste% of (ar continued essentially unc)anged. 0)e )ea+y infantry /)alan- re%ained t)e /redo%inant (ea/on syste%3 e+en t)oug) on se+eral occasions lig)t and )ea+y infantry e-)i&ited t)eir relati+e %erits. In one instance t)enian )ea+y infantry in+aded t)e rugged country of t)e etolians3 ()ose %ilitia nor%ally ar%ed itself (it) Da+elins. Because t)e eolian Da+elin %en3 called /eltasts3 (ore no ar%our3 t)ey could outrun t)e t)enian )ea+y infantry and use t)eir faster s/eed to a+oid a contest. Instead of fig)ting a &attle as )ad t)e Persian arc)ers3 t)e etolians attacked (it) t)eir Da+elins and t)en /ro%/tly retreated to a+oid contact (it) t)e )ea+y infantry3 ()ic) naturally c)arged t)e Da+elin t)ro(ers. t first t)e t)enians3 acco%/anied &y a contingent of arc)ers3 easily )eld t)e etolians at &ay. But t)e +ulnera&le3 un#ar%oured eolian Da+elin %en ke/t t)eir distance fro% t)e longer ranged &o(s until t)e arc)ers )ad e-)austed t)eir arro(s. *reek )istorian descri&ed )o( t)e etolians t)en carried out t)eir Da+elin attack: J()en t)e t)enian ar%y ad+anced t)ey retired3 and ()en t)e t)enians retired t)ey /ressed u/on t)e%. 0)e &attle3 ()ic) lasted long3 (as not)ing &ut a series of /ursuits and retreats3 and in &ot) t)e t)enians (ere at a disad+antage.L 'inally t)e t)enians Jgre( (eary of t)e long and tedious struggle. 0)e etolians ca%e closer and closer3 ne+er ceased )urling darts at t)e%. t last t)ey turned and fled... 0)e etolians3 ()o (ere lig)t ar%ed and s(ift of foot3 follo(ed at t)eir )eels3 )urling darts3 and caug)t and sle( %any in t)eir flig)t. not)er )istorian e-/lained t)e effecti+eness of lig)t infantry against )ea+y infantry3 co%%enting t)at Jt)e )ea+y infantry of t)e rcadians /ositi+ely refused to face t)e% t)e field3 so /rofound (as t)e terror in ()ic) t)ey )eld t)ese lig)t troo/s. In co%/ensation3 t)e lig)t troo/s t)e%sel+es entertained a ()oleso%e dread of t)e ,acedae%onians and did not +enture to a//roac) (it)in Da+elin#range of t)eir )ea+y infantry. 0)ey )ad &een taug)t a lesson ()en3 (it)in t)at distance3 so%e of t)e younger )o/lites )ad %ade a das) at t)e%3 catc)ing and /utting so%e of t)e% to t)e s(ord.L 0)e ,acedae%onians3 con+inced of t)eir a&ility to deal (it) t)e lig)t infantry /eltasts3 dis/araged t)ose ()o feared t)e% as standing Jin as %uc) a(e of t)ese /eltasts as c)ildren of t)e )o&go&lins of t)eir nurses.L 0)ese confident ,acedae%onians soon %et Da+elin#ar%ed /eltasts ()o /lanned to catc) t)e ,acedae%onians on t)e %arc) ()ere t)ey J(ould &e cut u/ &y s)o(ers of Da+elins3L and3 if t)e ,acedae%onians (ere te%/ted to take t)e offensi+e3 t)ey (it) t)eir /eltasts3 t)e ni%&lest of all lig)t troo/s3 (ould easily sli/ out of t)eir gras/.L !)en t)e /eltasts carried out t)eir attack3 J)ere a %an (as (ounded3 and t)ere anot)er killed.L 0)en t)e S/artan co%%ander called a /ole%arc)3 # ordered t)e younger %en to c)arge and dri+e off t)eir assailants. $)arge3 )o(e+er3 as t)ey %ig)t3 t)ey took not)ing &y t)eir /ains # not a %an could t)ey co%e at (it)in Da+elin range. Being )ea+y infantry o//osed to lig)t troo/s3 &efore t)ey could get at close .uarters t)e ene%ys (ord of co%%and sounded3 MRetireN J'ailing to catc) any /eltasts3 t)e ,acedae%onian )ea+y infantry

2C

(ould fall &ack3 scattered &ecause of t)eir c)arge at full s/eed # ()ere eac) %ans indi+idual s/eed )ad told.L 0)e /eltasts t)en Jturned rig)t a&out and rene(ed t)e Da+elin attack.L In t)eir initial attack t)e Peltasts J)ad s)ot do(n nine or ten3 and3 encouraged &y t)is success3 /ressed on (it) increasing audacity. 0)ese attacks told so se+erely t)at t)e /ole%arc) a second ti%e ga+e t)e order Gand t)is ti%e for %ore of t)e younger %enH to c)arge. 0)e order (as /ro%/tly o&eyed3 &ut on retiring t)ey lost %ore %en t)an on t)e first occasion... gain and again t)e %onotonous tale of doing and suffering re/eated itself3 e-ce/t as t)eir o(n ranks gre( t)inner and t)eir courage e&&ed3 t)e courage of t)eir assailants gre( &older and t)eir nu%&ers increased.L ,ig)t infantry%en3 if t)ey can kee/ out of t)e (ay3 )a+e an o&+ious su/eriority o+er )ea+y infantry%en. 5n &illiard ta&le terrain of infinite e-tent3 lig)t infantry could defeat )ea+y infantry if it )ad enoug) %issiles and /atience and ad)ered to its lig)t infantry tactics of a+oiding s)ock co%&at in ()ic) t)e )ea+y infantry s/ecialised. Most *reek states continued to rely /ri%arily on )ea+y infantry3 &ut successes suc) as t)ose recounted a&o+e caused t)e )ea+y infantry to ackno(ledge t)e /resence of t)e lig)t infantry &y su&stituting leat)er or stiffened clot) for %etal ar%our and so%eti%es using felt instead %etal for t)eir )el%ets. In t)is (ay t)e )ea+y infantry reduced t)e ad+antage in s/eed enDoyed &y t)e lig)t infantry ()ile still re%aining (ell enoug) ar%oured to fig)t ot)er )ea+y infantry and3 of course3 a%/ly /rotected to defeat lig)t infantry in close co%&at. 0)e *reeks also de+elo/ed so%e ca+alry3 t)oug) t)is (ea/on syste%3 e-/ensi+e and li%ited &y t)e terrain3 ne+er &eca%e /redo%inant and re%ained essentially an au-iliary syste%. In &attle t)e %ain )o/lite forces tended to fig)t eac) ot)er3 and t)e au-iliary lig)t infantry and ca+alry eac) engaged t)e ot)er in t)eir o(n se/arate &attles. But ()en 2/a%inondas defeated t)e S/artans at t)e Battle of ,euctra3 )e co%&ined t)e action of )is &etter ca+alry force (it) )is dee/ array of infantry and t)e flank assault &y )is Sacred Band. 0)e ca+alry did not /ro+e t)e decisi+e ele%ent3 &ut3 after defeating t)e inferior S/artan ca+alry3 its attack )el/ed disru/t t)e S/artan flank %anoeu+re and t)e action of t)e ca+alry )el/ed t)e Sacred Bands flank attack against t)e S/artan flanking seg%ent. Back

#le$ander%s Con&uests with a Com'lete Combined-#rms #rmy

0)e *reeks did not de+elo/ furt)er eit)er t)e infantry %anoeu+res or t)e role of ca+alry e-e%/lified at ,euctra. 5t)ers did3 creating a %et)od of co%&ining ar%s t)at )ad t)eoretical as (ell as /ractical su/eriority o+er t)e old *reek as (ell as t)e initial Persian (ay of (ar. 9ing P)ili/ of t)e nort)ern *reek kingdo% of Macedon /erfected t)is syste%3 and )is son3 le-ander t)e *reat3 used it to con.uer *reece and t)e Persian 2%/ire. $once/tually t)e Macedonian tactical %et)od &lended t)e *reek and Persian syste%s &y de/ending )ea+ily on ca+alry &ut su&stituting in t)e line *reek )ea+y infantry for Persian lig)t infantry. 0)e reliance on ca+alry )ad its origin not only in t)e Persian /ractice &ut also in t)e traditional i%/ortance Macedonians )ad attac)ed to ca+alry in a country %ore suited to t)e )orse. P)ili/ &e.ueat)ed to le-ander a force of )ea+y ca+alry. !)ereas *reek and Persian ca+alry used t)e Da+elin or t)e &o( and (ere /re/ared to t)rust (it) a Da+elin or lig)t s/ear3 so%e Macedonian ca+alry relied /ri%arily on s)ock action. ,ike t)e )ea+y infantry3 t)ese %en (ore ar%our and carried s)ields and a s)ort lance3 a ca+alry s/ear. &out nine feet long and (eig)ing four /ounds3 t)e lance )ad an iron /oint on eac) end. 0)oug) t)e )orse%an lacked a stirru/3 training and /ractice ena&led )i% to kee/ )is seat reasona&ly (ell in co%&at at close .uarters. !)en )e t)rust (it) )is lance3 )e released it at or Dust &efore t)e %o%ent of i%/act to a+oid trans%itting to )i%self t)e s)ock of t)e &lo(. "e t)us esca/ed t)e danger of losing )is seat on )is %ount.

2B

Macedonian )orse%en also differed fro% *reek ca+alry in t)at t)ey (ere t)oroug)ly disci/lined and trained to (ork toget)er in grou/s and to res/ond to co%%ands. 0)ey t)us )ad &etter articulation3 training3 and skill in addition to t)eir /ri%ary reliance on s)ock action. 5+er ca+alry relying on Da+elins and rarely closing (it) t)e ene%y3 t)is doctrine ena&led t)e% to enDoy t)e sa%e ad+antage as *reek )ea+y infantry )eld o+er lig)t infantry in s)ock co%&at. $a+alry un/re/ared for deter%ined s)ock action could not resist t)eir c)arge. "ea+y ca+alry )ad t)e sa%e do%inance o+er lig)t infantry3 as did )ea+y infantry3 (it) an i%/ortant difference # lig)t infantry could not esca/e &y running a(ay. 5nly t)e )ea+y infantry3 a for%ation of ar%oured )o/lites (it) t)eir s/ears3 could resist t)e c)arge and &est t)e% in )and#to#)and co%&at. 0)is Macedonian )ea+y ca+alry3 a s%all elite grou/3 (as called $o%/anions of t)e 9ing. 0)e Macedonian ar%y also )ad far %ore of t)e traditional3 )y&rid3 or general#/ur/ose ca+alry3 ()ic) largely relied on %issile action3 /rinci/ally t)e Da+elin. nd t)e &ulk of t)e Macedonian ar%y re%ained infantry. ,ig)t infantry )ad an i%/ortant role: in &attle it de/loyed in front of t)e )ea+y infantry ()ere it could use its traditional tactics of slinging %issiles3 s)ooting arro(s3 or )urling Da+elins ()ile kee/ing a(ay fro% its )ea+y infantry o//onents. Before t)e lines of )o/lites clas)ed3 t)e lig)t infantry (it)dre( out of )ar%s (ay3 its usefulness ended. 0)us t)e tactics in+ol+ed an initial reliance on t)e intrinsic ascendancy of t)e lig)t o+er t)e )ea+y infantry.

Hea%y )a%alryman Back

0)e Macedonians c)anged t)e )ea+y infantry &y dou&ling t)e lengt) of t)e s/ear3 at least for t)e ranks &e)ind t)e first t(o. 0)e longer s/ear ena&led t)ose of se+eral ranks to /roDect &eyond t)e front3 utilising %ore rear#rank %en and %aking an ad+ance &y t)is /)alan- for%ida&le indeed. If t)e front ranks used t)e s)ort s/ear and rear ranks /rogressi+ely longer s/ears3 a si%ultaneous /us) &y se+eral ranks al%ost al(ays dro+e &ack t)e o//onents. 0)e longer s/ears also %ade &ody ar%our less i%/ortant3 t)e rear ranks re.uiring none at all3 a su&stantial sa+ing in e.ui/%ent costs. Relying %ore on t)e action of t)e grou/3 indi+idual soldiers needed less skill. Still t)e Macedonians %ade a +irtue of t)e tactical inno+ation of t)e long s/ear and drilled t)eir /)alan- of /rofessional soldiers so t)at it could function as a unit. In addition3 t)ey su&di+ided t)eir troo/s3 gi+ing so%e articulation and %anoeu+ra&ility to an in)erently un(ieldy for%ation. But t)e longer s/ear reflected a su&tle c)ange3 /lacing greater reliance on t)e ad+ance of a (all of s/ears and less on t)e indi+idual effort &y t)e %en in t)e front rank. 0)e creator of t)is ar%y3 t)e astute P)ili/ and )is son3 le-ander3 integrated t)ese four (ea/on syste%s into a %utually su//orting co%&at tea%. "ea+y and lig)t infantry eac) )ad its role as did t)e lig)t and )ea+y ca+alry3 (it) t)e s)ock action of t)e elite $o%/anions of t)e 9ing )eld for a

2@

decisi+e &lo(. No (ea/on syste% )ad /ri%acy3 and none a %erely au-iliary role7 all )ad a significant /art to /lay. !it) an essentially /rofessional ar%y organised on t)e ne( Macedonian %odel3 t)e *reeks under le-ander in+aded sia. 0)ey )ad a (ell#de+elo/ed tactical doctrine and in le-ander a leader of unsur/assed genius. 0o )is )ig) nati+e a&ility t)e young 9ing added3 t)roug) counsel3 t)e (isdo% of t)e talented and seasoned soldiers ()o )ad ser+ed under )is gifted fat)er. In &ringing )is &alanced3 co%&ined ar%s against t)e Persians3 le-ander faced an i%/ro+ed Persian tactical syste%. 0o t)eir co%&ination of ca+alry and lig)t infantry t)e Persians )ad added )ea+y infantry3 %ostly *reek %ercenaries. lt)oug) t)ey too used t)e %et)od of de/loying lig)t infantry in ad+ance of a solid line of )o/lites3 t)eir use of t)is stronger infantry &ase did not alter t)eir traditional reliance on a ca+alry attack to decide t)e &attle. But t)e Persians lacked any )ea+y ca+alry co%/ara&le to le-anders $o%/anions. lt)oug) Persian ca+alry (ore %ailed s)irts and carried s(ords3 it continued to rely /ri%arily on &o(s and Da+elins and )ad not /re/ared for t)e s)ock action of le-anders s/ear#(ielding $o%/anions. In t)e first &attle3 at t)e *ranicus Ri+er3 t)e decisi+e young 9ing3 undaunted &y t)e ene%ys for%ida&le /osition3 ordered )is $o%/anions to c)arge across t)e ri+er against t)e defending Persian ca+alry3 ()ic) %et t)e% J(it) a terri&le disc)arge of darts7 &ut t)e Macedonians foug)t (it) s/ears... 0)oug) t)ey foug)t on )orse&ack3 it see%ed %ore like an infantry t)an a ca+alry &attle7 for t)ey struggled for t)e %astery3 )orses &eing Da%%ed (it) )orses and %en (it) %en... t last le-anders %en &egan to gain t)e ad+antage3 &ot) t)roug) su/erior strengt) and %ilitary disci/line and &ecause t)ey foug)t (it) s/ears ()ose s)afts (ere %ade of cornel (ood3 ()ereas t)e Persians used onlyL Da+elins as lances. Ill#e.ui//ed and untrained for s)ock action3 t)e Persian ca+alry could not )old its ground against t)e c)arge of t)e Macedonians. 0)e J)urling of Da+elins or t)e de-trous de/loying of )orses3L ()ic) )ad &een Jt)e co%%on /ractice in ca+alry &attles3L a+ailed little against s)ock tactics. Since le-anders )ea+y ca+alry could rout t)e ene%ys ca+alry3 )e could count on using it to decide t)e &attle. t t)e Battle of t)e *ranicus3 le-ander /ro%/tly led )is +ictorious $o%/anions to t)e assistance of )is /)alan-3 ()ic) )ad attacked t)e Persian )ea+y infantry. "a+ing ordered Jt)e ca+alry to fall u/on t)e% fro% all sides3L le-ander )ad t)e satisfaction of seeing t)at )is )orse%en )ad Jsoon co%/letely surrounded t)e% and cut t)e% u/3 so t)at none of t)e% esca/ed e-ce/t suc) as %ig)t )a+e concealed t)e%sel+es a%ong t)e dead &odies.L 0)oug) )ea+y infantry could )a+e resisted t)e c)arge of )ea+y ca+alry directed at its front3 an attack on its un/rotected flanks and rear /roduced a slaug)ter as t)e %ailed co%/anion ca+alry closed in for )and#to#)and co%&at (it) t)eir s/ears. 0)e s/lendid +ictory s)o(ed t)e +alue of le-anders and )is fat)ers /re/aration for t)e kings)i/ and for (ar. 0utoring in )is yout) &y t)e great /)iloso/)er ristotle )ad s)ar/ened t)e 9ings intellect as (ell as fostered )is scientific and literary interests. In addition to )is %ental attri&utes and kingly &earing3 t)is )andso%e3 at)letic young %an )ad dis/layed at t)e Battle of t)e *ranicus keen Dudg%ent and /)ysical and %oral courage. 2.ually i%/ortant3 )is co%&ined#ar%s ar%y and )is )ea+y ca+alry $o%/anions )ad clearly e-)i&ited t)at t)ey /ro+ided t)e rig)t instru%ent to e-ecute )is a%&itious /lans of con.uest. t Issus3 le-ander faced t)e Persians co%%anded &y t)eir ca/a&le 9ing3 1arius III. 0)e Persians stood on t)e defensi+e in a strong /osition &e)ind a s)allo( ri+er ()ere it e%/tied into t)e sea. !it) its ca+alry de/loyed on eac) flank3 t)e Macedonian /)alan- (ent for(ard Jin close array (it) %easured ste/3L %o+ing slo(ly to(ard t)e ene%y3 Jlest &y a too )asty %arc) any /art of t)e /)alan- s)ould fluctuate fro% t)e line and get se/arated fro% t)e rest.L 5n reac)ing t)e Persian line3 t)e /)alan- attacked across t)e s)allo( ri+er against a &ank )eld &y *reek )o/lites e%/loyed &y t)e Persians. s one (ould e-/ect in a contest &et(een si%ilar (ea/on syste%s3 t)e defenders3 ?>

in t)eir (ell#c)osen /osition3 /re+ailed. J'inding %any /arts of t)e &ank stee/ and /reci/itousL or defended &y a Persian stockade3 t)e Macedonians J(ere una&le to /reser+e t)e front of t)e /)alanin t)e sa%e line. "ere t)e struggle (as des/erate3L and t)e disorganised attackers failed. But on t)e inland Gor leftH flank of t)e Persian ar%y le-ander )ad already led )is )ea+y ca+alry across t)e sa%e ri+er and3 )a+ing c)arged and routed t)e lig)t infantry )olding t)e &ank3 J()eeled round to(ards t)e *recian Mercenaries of 1arius.L Macedonian )ea+y infantry3 called )y/as/ists3 /ro&a&ly ar%ed (it) a s/ear of t)e traditional lengt) and (earing lig)t ar%our3 follo(ed t)e ca+alry and soon Doined it in an attack on t)e flank and rear of 1ariuss )o/lites3 ()ic) )ad successfully )eld t)e ri+er#&ank. 0)e Persian )o/lites retreated and3 seeing t)e &attle lost3 so also did t)e 9ing of Persia. 0)e %o&ility and articulation of )is elite ca+alry and t)e e-cellent training and good articulation of t)e )y/as/ists ena&led le-ander at Issus to carry out an en+elo/%ent (it)out )a+ing to rely on a /re#/lanned /arade ground %anoeu+re like t)at used &y t)e S/artans. 2n+elo/%ent re.uired o+er()el%ing or going around an ene%ys flank and attacking t)e re%ainder of )is line in flank and rear. 1ifficult to acco%/lis)3 it de%anded eit)er a successful frontal attack to &reak t)e line or a detour around t)e ene%ys flank. le-anders en+elo/%ent in+ol+ed &ot) %eans3 as )e /ierced a (eakly )eld e-tension of t)e Persian left. 4nless acco%/lis)ed &y ca+alry3 a detour around a flank could consu%e so %uc) ti%e t)at t)e &attle could &e decided &efore t)e en+elo/ing force arri+ed. 0)e ca+alrys su/erior s/eed %ade it ideal for suc) %o+e%ents. 2n+elo/%ents also re.uired t)e a&ility to de/loy ra/idly fro% %arc) to co%&at for%ation. $a+alry could do t)is easily &ecause3 no %atter )o( (ell organised3 ca+alry%en still foug)t as indi+iduals and relied less on t)e actions of t)eir fello(s t)an did for%ed infantry. !it) its greater s/eed3 ca+alry could de/loy ra/idly fro% colu%n of %arc) to line of &attle3 a task %ade easier as its co%&at for%ation (as less organised and integrated t)an (as infantrys. By its )ig)er %o&ility and its ca/acity for ra/id de/loy%ent3 ca+alry ca%e +ery close to fig)ting as it %arc)ed and so e-e%/lified offensi+e troo/s3 ()o found t)eir &est e%/loy%ent in carrying out en+elo/%ents. le-anders )y/as/ists re/resent a successful effort to ada/t )ea+y infantry to t)e role of an en+elo/ing force. ,ig)ter e.ui/%ent s/eeded u/ t)eir %arc)3 and (it) a )ig) degree of indi+idual skill t)ese (ell#trained regulars )ad less de/endence on t)eir for%ation. 1ou&tless also3 t)ey )ad su&di+ision into grou/s3 ()ic) (ere %ore res/onsi+e to orders and easier to de/loy. By di%inis)ing t)eir need for a carefully dra(n u/ for%ation and i%/ro+ing t)eir articulation and )ence t)eir a&ility to %anoeu+re3 t)e Macedonians )ad a ty/e of )ea+y infantry (ell suited to &attlefield %anoeu+re and to e-ecuting en+elo/%ents. 0)e art of (ar )ad already co%e a long (ay since t)e *reek /)alan- and 2/a%inondas clu%sy array of fifty ranks on one flank3 for le-anders )y/as/ists could en+elo/ a *reek /)alan- and3 closing (it) s)ock action3 )el/ t)e ca+alry guarantee t)e ene%ys defeat. t r&ela3 le-anders t)ird %aDor &attle against t)e Persians3 )e again %et 1arius3 ()o )ad asse%&led a large3 )eterogeneous ar%y t)at e+en included c)ariots and a fe( ele/)ants. 0o sa+e )is cru%&ling e%/ire3 1arius (aited to recei+e t)e *reek in+aders in &attle3 )a+ing (isely c)osen le+el ground suita&le for )is ca+alry and c)ariots. Since )is ar%y3 t)oug) /o(erful3 lacked %uc) )ea+y infantry3 )e )ad /laced )is %ounted troo/s in t)e forefront of )is array. le-ander %o+ed )is ar%y for(ard to attack t)e Persian ar%y3 leading t)e rig)t flank )i%self. "e could clearly see 1arius in t)e centre3 Jcons/icuous in t)e %idst of )is life#guard3 a tall and fine#looking %an3 dra(n in a lofty c)ariot3 defended &y an a&undance of t)e &est )orse3 ()o stood in close order a&out it3 ready to recei+e t)e ene%y.L s t)e ar%ies &eca%e closely engaged3 le-ander led )is $o%/anions and )ea+y infantry /)alanagainst t)e ene%y centre3 t)e $o%/anions defeating t)e Persian ca+alry &y Jt)rusting t)e%sel+es against t)e Persians and striking t)eir faces (it) t)eir s/ears # and routing t)eir centre. 1arius sa( ?1

t)at Jall (as lost3 t)at t)ose ()o (ere /laced in front to defend )i% (ere &roken and &eat &ack u/on )i%3 t)at )e could not turn or disengage )is c)ariot (it)out great difficulty3 t)e ()eels &eing clogged and entangled a%ong t)e dead &odies3 ()ic) lay in suc) )ea/s as not only sto//ed3 &ut al%ost co+ered t)e )orses3 and %ade t)e% rear and gro( so unruly3 t)at t)e frig)tened c)arioteer could go+ern t)e% no longer.L 0)e defeated Persian %onarc) did esca/e3 %ounted on a )orse. le-ander turned a(ay (it) )is %en to rescue )is )ard#/ressed left and (in a decisi+e +ictory. !it)out le-anders genius t)e *reeks could not )a+e con.uered t)e Persian 2%/ire3 &ut le-anders %asterful use of s)ock ca+alry contri&uted i%/ortantly3 /er)a/s decisi+ely3 to t)e tactical successes u/on ()ic) t)e con.uest de/ended. By a &rilliant use of t)e four &asic (ea/on syste%s3 le-ander defeated t)e for%ida&le Persians ()ose ot)er(ise so/)isticated tactical syste% did not include )ea+y ca+alry. 0)is significant Macedonian inno+ation co%/leted t)e de+elo/%ent of a &asic tactical syste% t)at endured for %any centuries. le-ander also ad+anced t)e art of (ar &y )is fle-i&ility: )e did not rely on a single dis/osition of )is ar%y for &attle nor on a set#/iece /lan &ut ada/ted &ot) /lans and dis/ositions to t)e circu%stances. lso3 in )is e%/loy%ent of &attering ra%s and %o+a&le to(ers and in )is %astery and effecti+e use of Siegecraft3 )e &roug)t t)e *reek art of (ar to t)e le+el of t)e sians in t)is essential res/ect. But in co%&at le-ander still follo(ed t)e /ractice of /ersonal /artici/ation3 leading )is ca+alry in &attle to co%%and at t)e critical /oint. 0)is decision +irtually /recluded )is control of t)e fig)t once it &egan. lt)oug) le-ander carried out a %o+e fro% t)e rig)t to left &y )is ca+alry at r&ela3 t)e initial dis/ositions usually go+erned t)e o+erall strategy of t)e &attle. Res/onses to t)e c)anging situation in an le-andrian &attle de/ended3 t)erefore3 on t)e initiati+e of su&ordinates rat)er t)an on le-anders o+erall direction. 0)us3 a co%%ander ()o could direct t)e &attle and rede/loy forces during t)e co%&at )ad yet to e%erge. 2+en (it) t)e fle-i&ility of four (ea/on syste%s and a far less stereoty/ed &attle3 t)e difficulties of control still /re+ented e+en as skilled a leader as le-ander fro% co%%anding t)e ()ole &attle. $o%%anders also lacked t)e conce/t of )olding &ack or su&tracting a /art of t)e ar%y for use later in t)e &attle to %eet e%ergencies or to e-/loit o//ortunities. 0roo/s not so fully engaged t)at t)ey can &e rede/loyed during a &attle also constitute a reser+e. co%%ander3 )o(e+er3 cannot kno( ()en3 ()ere3 or ()et)er )e (ill )a+e troo/s sufficiently unengaged to %eet an e%ergency or e-/loit an o//ortunity. But a su&tracted reser+e3 t)at is3 one esta&lis)ed &efore t)e &attle and )eld &ack for an uns/ecified co%%it%ent during t)e &attle /ro+ides a sure resource to ena&le a co%%ander to influence t)e outco%e. le-ander t)e *reat )ad not fully realised t)e +alue of suc) a force nor &een a&le to i%/le%ent3 or /er)a/s e+en co%/letely recognise3 t)e idea of a co%%ander ()o did not /ersonally in+ol+e )i%self in co%&at. Back

(he )oman #rt of War

!)ile t)e Macedonians (ere /erfecting t)e art of (ar in t)eir fas)ion3 t)e ar%y of Ro%e3 a s%all Italian city#state3 e+ol+ed in a different direction. ,ike t)e *reeks3 t)e Ro%ans foug)t (it) a /)alan- of )o/lites assisted &y lig)t infantry and a general#/ur/ose ca+alry. But t)e Ro%ans a&andoned t)e s/ear as t)eir /rinci/al (ea/on fairly early and ado/ted +ersatile offensi+e ar%s. 'or defence3 t)ey /laced )ea+y reliance on a large con+e- s)ield3 t(o and a )alf feet (ide and four feet )ig). 0)is (ooden s)ield3 co+ered (it) clot) and t)en (it) calf#skin and reinforced in t)e centre (it) iron3 could turn Jaside t)e %ore for%ida&le &lo(s of stones3 /ikes3 and )ea+y %issiles in general.L conte%/orary e-/lained t)at Jits u//er and lo(er ri%s are strengt)ened &y an iron edging ()ic) /rotects it fro% descending &lo(s and fro% inDury ()en resting on t)e ground.L Since t)e Ro%ans engaged in %any sieges3 faced t)e long /ikes or s/ears of t)e *reeks3 and foug)t t)e $elts ()o (ielded a t(o#)anded cutting s(ord3 t)ey e+entually de+ised a s)ield effecti+e against all o//onents. 0)ey co%/leted t)eir /rotection (it) a )el%et and a &rass &reast/late or3 for t)e (ealt)ier3 a coat of c)ain#%ail. ?2

'or attack t)e Ro%ans de/ended for s)ock co%&at on a s)ort s(ord3 Je-cellent for t)rusting3 and &ot) of its edges cut effectually3 as t)e &lade is +ery strong and fir%.L Suc) a s(ord (ould /ro+e its (ort) at close .uarters (it) an o//onent ()ose t(o#)anded s(ord or long /ike could &e turned aside &y t)e s)ield. 0)e &ulk of t)e infantry also carried t(o of a Da+elin called a /ilu%. 0)is )ad a /oint t)at &ent or &roke if it struck a )ard o&Dect so t)at Jt)e ene%y is una&le to return it. If t)is (ere not so3 t)e %issile (ould &e a+aila&le to &ot) sides.L 0)is suited Ro%an tactics3 ()ic) consisted of t)ro(ing t)e Da+elin and t)en closing .uickly to fig)t (it) s(ord and s)ield. 0)e distincti+e organisation %atured &y t)e Ro%ans /ro+ed %ore funda%ental t)an t)eir use of t)e s(ord. rraying t)eir ar%y in t)ree successi+e lines3 eac) si- ranks dee/3 t)ey su&di+ided t)ese lines into %ani/les3 eac) %ani/le )a+ing t(o centuries of si-ty %en eac). 0)is su&di+ision /ro+ided rudi%entary articulation and /ro%ised so%e %anoeu+ra&ility. 0)e Ro%ans e-/loited t)is organisation &y lea+ing ga/s &et(een eac) %ani/le in eac) line7 t)e %ani/les of t)e second line (ere staggered so t)at t)ey co+ered t)e ga/s in t)e first. 0)e t)ird line differed fro% t)e first t(o as its %ani/les )ad only )alf t)e front3 (it) si-ty rat)er t)an 12> %en. 0)e %en of t)e t)ird line (ere t)e older citi6ens and still used t)e s/ear as t)eir /rinci/al (ea/on. 0)e %ani/les of t)e t)ird line /ositioned t)e%sel+es &e)ind t)e )oles in t)e second line3 %aking t)e ()ole for%ation so%e()at like a c)ecker&oard. 0)is (as t)e &asic for%ation in ()ic) t)e Ro%ans ad+anced to t)e fig)t. Since ga/s (ould al%ost certainly for% in any line of &attle as it ad+anced3 t)e Ro%ans antici/ated t)is &y /ro+iding t)e inter+als syste%atically. Before t)e Ro%an line closed (it) t)e ene%y in co%&at3 t)e second line filled t)e &reaks in t)e first (it) eit)er a century or a full %ani/le /us)ing into t)e s/aces in t)e front line. 0)e t)ird line %o+ed u/ into t)e +acant /ositions in t)e second line and3 (it) t)e re%ainder of t)e second line3 constituted a reser+e if not needed to )el/ fill a large ga/ in t)e first line. 0)is organisation ga+e t)e Ro%an line of &attle a fle-i&ility and res/onsi+eness t)at t)e /)alan- lacked. 0)e ad%inistrati+e organisation /ro+ided anot)er ele%ent of strengt) in t)e Ro%an syste%. 0en of t)e first Gand secondH line %ani/les of 12> %en eac) and ten of t)e si-ty#%an t)ird#line %ani/les co%/rised an ad%inistrati+e organisation called a legion. !it) a /ro/ortion of orderlies3 clerks3 /orters3 etc.3 so%e of ()o% dou&led as lig)t infantry3 and a s%all a%ount of ca+alry3 t)e legion nu%&ered o+er 43>>> %en. !)en t)e Ro%ans e-/anded t)eir ar%y3 t)ey added legions3 t)us /ro+iding good ad%inistration and organisation for any large field ar%y. not)er significant attri&ute of t)e Ro%ans %ilitary /ractice (as t)eir /assion for entrenc)%ent. No Ro%an field force on t)e %arc) e+er ca%/ed (it)out first entrenc)ing according to a standard /lan. 2+ery nig)t t)e troo/s dug a trenc) and /iled u/ a ra%/art3 /rotected (it) a /alisade. ccusto%ed to t)is la&our &ecause of its regularity3 Ro%an ar%ies took for granted ()at (ould )a+e &een a de%oralising i%/osition in any ot)er %ilitary organisation. 0)is entrenc)%ent %eant t)at Ro%an ar%ies (ere /re/ared against sur/rise and )ad a fortified /lace of refuge in case of defeat in &attle. 0)e Ro%ans )ad learned a&out entrenc)%ent fro% t)e Macedonians3 ()o )ad3 in turn3 deri+ed t)eir /ractice fro% t)e *reeks3 ()o fortified t)eir ca%/s only ()en t)ey re%ained in /lace for a ti%e3 and t)e sians3 ()o %ore consistently entrenc)ed t)eir ca%/s. 0)e Persians3 for e-a%/le3 fell &ack to an ela&orately fortified ca%/ after t)eir defeat at Plataea. 0)e Ro%an inno+ation consisted of entrenc)ing t)eir ca%/s (it) relentless regularity and in )a+ing a standard /lan t)at insured t)at e+ery soldier and unit al(ays )ad t)e sa%e relati+e /osition in t)e ca%/. 0)e Ro%an soldier )ad to &e a seasoned %arc)er3 for3 in addition to )is ar%our3 s(ord3 and Da+elin3 )e carried s)o+els3 a-es3 and stakes to %ake t)e /alisade for t)e ca%/. But eac) days %arc) ended early to /ro+ide ti%e to entrenc) t)e ca%/.

??

,ike t)eir %arc)ing and ca%/ing3 t)e Ro%ans /racticed a slo( &ut sure strategy3 and gradually Ro%e do%inated %uc) of Italy. Since /olitical astuteness co%/le%ented %ilitary skill3 t)ey &ound to t)e%sel+es as fir% and (illing allies t)e areas t)ey controlled and e-tended to t)ese allies t)e Ro%an organisation and style of (arfare. By t)e ti%e of le-ander t)e *reat3 Ro%e )ad &eco%e a for%ida&le /o(er3 ready to co%e into %ilitary contact (it) ot)ers in t)e Mediterranean. Back

(he )omans in Confrontation with the #le$andrian System of !yrrhus and Hannibal
0)e Macedonian syste% as used &y le-ander &eca%e t)e standard for t)e eastern Mediterranean and %uc) of t)e 5ld Persian 2%/ire. 0)e difference &et(een t)e Macedonian and Ro%an syste%s lay not /ri%arily in t)e Ro%an use of s(ords and t)e Macedonian reliance on t)e s/ear7 t)e difference (as %ore su&tle. 0)e Ro%an ar%y de/ended on t)eir s(ord#(ielding3 /artially articulated )ea+y infantry (it) t)eir lig)t infantry and ca+alry filling t)e roles of au-iliaries. In t)eir e+olution fro% t)e /)alan- to t)e %ani/ular array3 t)ey )ad i%/ro+ed t)e infantry &ut )ad not de+elo/ed in t)e direction of t)e Macedonian syste% of le-ander3 ()ic) relied on t)e co%&ined effect of all ar%s3 including a ca+alry force trained for real s)ock co%&at. In t)e first %aDor Ro%an co%&at (it) t)e Macedonian or le-andrian syste% t)e co%&ined#ar%s force (on. 0)e /articulars of t)ese &attles (it) 9ing Pyrr)us of t)e *reek 9ingdo% of 2/irus are o&scure3 &ut3 in Pyrr)us3 t)e Ro%ans faced not only a relati+e and disci/le of le-ander t)e *reat &ut also a general ()ose %any ca%/aigns )ad earned for )i%3 a %ost e-alted re/utation. 0)e Ro%ans attri&uted %uc) of Pyrr)uss success to )is use of ele/)ants3 ()ic) le-anders successors )ad incor/orated into t)e Macedonian syste% after le-ander faced t)e% in India. 5ften unrelia&le3 occasionally sta%/eding t)roug) t)eir o(n infantry ()en attacked &y Da+elins and ot)er %issiles3 ele/)ants /ro+ed %ost effecti+e against ca+alry &ecause t)ey frig)tened t)e ene%ys )orses. Pyrr)us &ased )is successful &attles (it) t)e Ro%ans not on )is ele/)ants &ut on t)e success of )is ca+alry3 /resu%a&ly aided &y ele/)ants3 in defeating t)e Ro%an ca+alry and attacking t)e Ro%an infantry in flank and rear. But in defeat t)e Ro%ans inflicted suc) se+ere casualties on Pyrr)us t)at )e re%arked t)at %ore suc) +ictories (ould force )i% to return to *reece alone. In its first contest (it) t)e Ro%ans3 t)e frican /o(er $art)age co/ied t)e Macedonian syste% of (ar3 e+en retaining a *reek general to co%%and t)e ar%y in t)e ca%/aign to dri+e &ack t)e Ro%an in+asion of frica. Stationed3 as usual3 on t)e flanks3 t)e %ore /o(erful )ea+y ca+alry of t)e $art)aginians defeated t)e Ro%an ca+alry on t)e flanks and attacked t)e Ro%an infantry in t)e rear. 0)e articulation in)erent in t)e Ro%an t)ree#line syste% %eant t)at t)e rear %ani/les could turn a&out to fend off t)is assault3 &ut t)is effecti+e defensi+e tactic did not sa+e t)e Ro%ans: t)e $art)aginians (on t)e Battle of 0unis and ca/tured t)e Ro%an co%%ander. In t)eir second (ar (it) $art)age t)e Ro%ans faced "anni&al3 one of t)e greatest %ilitary geniuses of all ti%e. In in+ading Italy3 t)e yout)ful "anni&al3 &arely t)irty years of age3 relied on t)e Macedonian syste%7 t)e defending Ro%ans continued to gi+e t)eir infantry /ri%acy in t)eir co%&ined#ar%s ar%y. In )is first &attle3 at 0re&ia in 21B B.$.3 "anni&al inflicted a disastrous defeat on t)e Ro%ans. In nu%&ers3 t)e ar%ies differed little3 &ut "anni&al )ad a ca+alry su/eriority of fi+e to t(o3 a +ictorious force t)at s(e/t around t)e flanks of t)e Ro%an ar%y and3 aided &y t)e lig)t infantry3 attacked t)e Ro%an infantry in t)e rear. 2+en t)oug) t)e rear %ani/les turned to confront t)is assault3 "anni&al defeated t)e surrounded and i%%o&ilised Ro%an ar%y. 0)e Battle of $annae in 21= B.$.3 in addition to its fa%e as a %ilitary classic3 e-)i&its t)e final de+elo/%ent of t)e Macedonian art of (ar in t)e )ands of a %aster. !ary of "anni&al3 t)e Ro%ans foug)t (it) o+er B>3>>> %en to "anni&als <>3>>>. But "anni&al )ad 1>3>>> ca+alry to =3>>> for t)e Ro%ans. 0)e $art)aginians )ad anot)er ad+antage: t)e Ro%an co%%ander3 0arentius Varro3 ?4

not only lacked %ilitary e-/erience and skill &ut also )ad too %uc) self#confidence and /ugnacity. Varro /lanned to e-/loit )is great nu%erical /re/onderance &y increasing t)e de/t) of )is for%ation. "e retained t)e de/loy%ent in t)ree lines &ut )ad eac) %ani/le narro( its front until eac) line )ad t)ree or four ti%es its usual de/t)3 intending t)us to o+er()el% t)e $art)aginian infantry. 2.ually an-ious for a &attle3 "anni&al su//orted )is o(n assurance and aggressi+eness &y )is %astery of t)e use of t)e so/)isticated Macedonian co%&ined#ar%s tactical syste% to ()ic) )e )ad added significant i%/ro+e%ents. In addition to t)e usual array of )ea+y infantry in t)e centre and ca+alry on t)e flanks3 )e )eld &ack /art of )is )ea+y infantry3 ()ic) )e t)en /laced in colu%ns at t)e flank of )is line of )ea+y infantry. "ere t)ese forces3 su&tracted fro% t)e t)in line of )ea+y infantry o//osing t)e dee/ Ro%an for%ation3 could reinforce t)e centre s)ould it falter. "anni&al t)us )ad at )is dis/osal a true reser+e. But if )is infantry line )eld3 )e intended to use t)ese t(o colu%ns of )is &est infantry for an en+elo/%ent. "e reinforced )is (eak infantry line &y stationing )i%self (it) t)e %en ()o )ad to %eet t)e onset of t)e dee/ Ro%an for%ation. But3 unlike le-ander t)e *reat3 t)e /erce/ti+e "anni&al did not lead )is troo/s in &attle7 )is /resence strengt)ened t)e confidence of t)is t)in infantry line3 &ut fro% )is /osition )e could also o&ser+e t)e &attle and control )is reser+e. s in )is /re+ious &attles3 )is lig)t infantry )ad a role &eyond skir%is)ing in front of t)e )ea+y infantry &efore t)e lines %et. "anni&al /lanned for )is lig)t infantry to (it)dra( to t)e flanks ()ere it (ould re%ain a+aila&le to /artici/ate in )is /lanned en+elo/%ent. "e guaranteed success for )is )ea+y ca+alry &y concentrating all of it on one flank. !)en t)e ar%ies Doined &attle3 all (ent according to "anni&als /lan. 0)oug) t)e Ro%an )ea+y infantry /ressed &ack t)e s)allo( $art)aginian array of s(ords%en3 "anni&als )ea+y ca+alry enDoyed an i%%ediate3 decisi+e success and3 /ro%/tly riding around t)e Ro%an ar%y3 c)arged t)e rear of t)e Ro%an ca+alry on t)e o//osite flank. 0)en3 Doined &y t)e lig)t infantry fro% t)e flanks3 t)e $art)aginian lig)t and )ea+y ca+alry attacked t)e rear of t)e Ro%an infantry. Mean()ile3 according to t)e /lan3 "anni&al co%%itted )is reser+e infantry to co%/lete t)e en+elo/%ent of t)e Ro%an ar%y. In a colu%n on eac) end of )is line3 t)e reser+e %arc)ed /ast t)e Ro%an flank and t)en3 facing t)e ene%y3 assaulted t)e Ro%ans flanks. "is %et)od )ad so%e rese%&lance to t)at of t)e S/artans in &ringing a colu%n /er/endicular to t)e ene%ys line and t)en facing and attacking. Beset on all sides and /ressed toget)er ()ere t)eir nu%&ers a+ailed t)e% not)ing e-ce/t to assure t)at e+ery $art)aginian %issile found a target3 t)e Ro%an ar%y suffered one of t)e greatest %ilitary disasters of all ti%e O t)ree#fourt)s of t)e force (ere killed or ca/tured. 'orty /ercent of t)e $art)aginian ar%y (as killed or (ounded: inflicting a crus)ing defeat on a Ro%an ar%y did not conic c)ea/. 0)e Ro%ans a+oided &attle (it) "anni&al for fourteen years. !)en t)ey again %et )i%3 t)ey )ad in t)eir co%%ander3 Sci/io3 a &rilliant general ()o3 t)oug) in )is early t)irties3 )ad a%/le e-/erience. "a+ing foug)t at 0re&ia and $annae3 )e took co%%and in S/ain and &y +ictories in &attle and gaining t)e allegiance of %any S/anis) c)iefs3 con.uered S/ain fro% t)e $art)aginians in four years. Sci/io t)en co%%anded in Sicily ()ere )e &uilt u/ a fine ar%y. In s/ite of )is taste for lu-ury and )is *reek culture3 Sci/io easily instilled confidence in )is troo/s. "e t)en led )is ar%y into frica ()ile t)e steadfast "anni&al still re%ained in sout)ern Italy. By t)is ti%e t)e Ro%ans no longer fielded %ilitia3 and Sci/io co%%anded and ins/ired t)e de+otion of an ar%y largely co%/osed of (ell#trained and disci/lined +eterans of %any ca%/aigns. Sci/io and "anni&al %et in frica in 1>2 B.$. at t)e Battle of Pa%a3 ()ere eac) e-)i&ited )is genius. 0)e contest &et(een t)ese t(o %asters ad+anced t)e art of (ar.

?<

!it) t)eir allies3 t)e Nu%idians3 t)e Ro%an ar%y )ad decisi+e su/eriority in. ca+alry3 an ad+antage t)at usually &elonged to "anni&al. But Sci/io did not rely e-clusi+ely on )is ca+alry for success. "e de/loyed )is infantry in a %anner t)at )e )ad de+elo/ed S/ain. Instead of )a+ing t)e %ani/les of t)e second and t)ird lines close to and co+ering t)e inter+als in t)e first line3 )e ke/t t)e% &ack a distance of /ro&a&ly se+eral )undred feet. "e correctly &elie+ed t)at ()en t)e si-#dee/ first line engaged t)e ene%y infantry3 t)e +eterans (ould %anage (ell (it)out additional ranks &e)ind t)e%. 0)e rear ranks constituted Sci/ios reser+e3 ()ic) in S/ain )e )ad used to en+elo/ t)e flanks of t)e ene%y infantry. But Sci/io also )ad to co/e (it) t)e $art)aginian ar%ys eig)ty ele/)ants. 'or t)is reason )e a&andoned t)e usual Ro%an initial array in a c)ecker&oard for%ation and stationed t)e second and t)ird lines of %ani/les directly &e)ind t)ose of t)e first. 0)e inter+als of t)e first )e filled (it) t)e lig)t infantry3 Jordering t)e% to o/en t)e action3 and if t)ey (ere forced &ack &y t)e c)arge of t)e ele/)ants to retire3 t)ose ()o )ad ti%e to do so &y t)e straig)t /assages as far to t)e rear of t)e ()ole ar%y3 and t)ose ()o (ere o+ertaken to rig)t or left along t)e inter+als &et(een t)e lines.L "anni&al3 realising t)at )e could not rely on )is ca+alry for +ictory3 also )ad in a rear line of infantry a reser+e t)at )e could de/loy. s at $annae )is &est troo/s %ade u/ t)is reser+e3 &ut )e altered )is dis/osition of t)e%. t $annae )e )ad /laced t)e reser+e in a colu%n on eac) flank of )is infantry line3 ready to ad+ance3 face3 and attack t)e Ro%ans in t)eir flank. But3 since suc) a dis/osition (as too o&+ious against Sci/io3 )e ke/t t)is reser+e in line3 &e)ind and /arallel to )is %ain infantry line. Su/erior in infantry3 "anni&al counted on (inning &y using )is reser+e to en+elo/ t)e Ro%an infantry line. !)en t)e &attle o/ened and as t)e lig)t ca+alry skir%is)ed &et(een t)e lines3 J"anni&al ordered t)e dri+ers of t)e ele/)ants to c)arge t)e ene%y. !)en t)e tru%/ets and &ugles sounded s)rilly fro% all sides3 so%e of t)e ani%als took frig)t and at once turned tail and rus)ed &ackL u/on t)e $art)aginians. But so%e of t)e un/redicta&le and dangerous &easts did go for(ard against t)e Ro%an line3 faced t)e Da+elins of t)e courageous Ro%an lig)t infantry3 Jand finally in t)eir terror esca/ed t)roug) t)e ga/s in t)e Ro%an line ()ic) Sci/ios foresig)t )ad /ro+ided.L 5t)ers fled to t)e flanks3 clearing t)e field for t)e serious engage%ent of t)e infantry and ca+alry. 0)en t)e I%/osing lines of t)e Ro%an and $art)aginian )ea+y infantry Doined &attle. Mean()ile3 t)e Ro%an and Nu%idian ca+alry )ad dri+en "anni&als ca+alry fro% t)e field and3 as "anni&al dou&tless )ad antici/ated3 instead of attacking t)e $art)aginian infantry3 )ad /ursued t)e fleeing ene%y ca+alry far fro% t)e field of &attle. 0)is often )a//ened in &attle3 co%%anders &eing una&le to control t)eir ca+alry%en ()o naturally soug)t to follo( t)eir &eaten foes. t $annae "anni&als (ell#disci/lined and (ell#led /rofessional ca+alry )ad i%%ediately turned against t)e rear of t)e Ro%an infantry3 &ut at Pa%a t)e Ro%an and allied ca+alry lacked t)e disci/line3 restraint3 and leaders)i/ to ena&le t)e% to %ake t)is critical %anoeu+re. !it) all ca+alry off t)e field of &attle3 "anni&al )ad an infantry &attle alone and %o+ed /ro%/tly to e-/loit )is nu%erical su/eriority and t)e articulation /ro+ided &y )is reser+e of +eterans. "e %o+ed out )is rear infantry for%ation3 e-tending its line /re/aratory to en+elo/ing t)e flanks of t)e Ro%an infantry. But Sci/io sa( t)e %anoeu+re in ti%e to co%%it )is rear#line reser+e3 e-tending )is line e.ually3 and t)e infantry of t)e t(o ar%ies re%ained locked in a frontal &attle of dou&tful outco%e. 0)en3 &efore t)e infantry &attle reac)ed a decision3 t)e Ro%an and allied ca+alry returned to t)e &attlefield and carried out t)eir %ission of attacking t)e rear of t)e relati+ely t)in3 fully co%%itted line of $art)aginian infantry. 0)is decided t)e &attle3 t)e Ro%ans and Nu%idians +irtually anni)ilating t)e $art)aginian ar%y3 lea+ing a field co+ered (it) Jsli//ery cor/ses3 ()ic) (ere still soaked in &lood and )ad fallen in )ea/s.L

?=

0)e role of t)e ca+alry in t)e Ro%an +ictory at Pa%a re+ealed t)at t)e Ro%ans )ad ado/ted t)e Macedonian syste%. But t)e use of a reser+e &y &ot) co%&atants and t)e su/erior articulation t)at %ade t)is /ossi&le s)o(s t)at t)e art of (ar )ad sur/assed t)at of le-anders era. Neit)er "anni&al nor Sci/io )ad /artici/ated in t)e &attle3 &ot) re%aining ()ere t)ey could %anage t)e contest and co%%it t)eir reser+es at t)e critical ti%e and /lace. 0)is re/resented a %aDor ad+ance o+er le-anders /re#/lanned &attles3 as did t)e conce/t of t)e su&tracted or unco%%itted reser+e and t)e i%/ro+ed articulation of t)e infantry t)at ena&led t)e reser+es to %anoeu+re on t)e &attlefield. 0)e e-cellent articulation of t)e Ro%an ar%y )ad done %uc) to /er%it Sci/io to co%%and all of t)e ar%y in &attle rat)er t)an3 as )ad le-ander3 only a /art. :ears later3 ()en Sci/io +isited t)e court of an siatic %onarc) ()ere "anni&al li+ed in e-ile3 Sci/io asked "anni&al to rank t)e great generals. "anni&al /laced le-ander first3 Pyrr)us second3 and )i%self t)ird. 0o Sci/ios .uestion a&out t)e rating if "anni&al )ad (on at Pa%a3 t)e $art)aginian said )e (ould t)en rank )i%self a&o+e le-ander. "anni&als and Sci/ios greatness and t)eir contri&utions to i%/ro+ed articulation3 t)eir use of a su&tracted reser+e3 and t)eir /ositioning t)e%sel+es to %anage t)e &attle entitle &ot) to t)e /ositions assigned &y "anni&al eit)er e-/ressly or &y i%/lication. Back

(he )oman *ictories with the #le$andrian System

!)en t)e Ro%ans foug)t in *reece and sia3 t)ey again confronted t)e Macedonian syste% of (ar. lt)oug) t)e Ro%ans also used t)is co%&ined#ar%s %et)od3 t)ey still stressed t)eir )ea+y infantry and ne+er raised t)eir ca+alry to t)e .uality or t)e i%/ortance t)at it )ad (it) le-ander. But t)ey also ne+er )ad to %ake (ar (it) t)e united forces of le-anders &y#t)en di+ided e%/ire3 and t)ey al%ost al(ays foug)t (it) t)e aid of local allies. 0)e Ro%ans )ad critical )el/ fro% an ally in t)eir %aDor &attle against t)eir %ost#i%/osing o//onent3 ntioc)us t)e *reat3 ruler of Syria and %uc) of sia to t)e east. In t)e conflict in 1@> B.$. at Magnesia in sia Minor3 t)ey faced a for%ida&le ar%y under ntioc)us )i%self (it) t)e e-iled "anni&al as )is ad+isor. 0)e details of t)e &attle are +ague3 &ut clearly t)e /o(erful ca+alry of t)e Ro%an ally3 t)e 9ing of Perga%u%3 /layed an i%/ortant role in t)e Ro%an +ictory. Increasingly t)e Ro%ans relied on t)eir allies to /ro+ide ca+alry. 0)e a//arent c)allenge to t)e do%inance of t)e Ro%ans tactical syste% ca%e not fro% t)e /ossi&ility t)at t)eir o//onents %ig)t )a+e su/erior ca+alry &ut fro% a furt)er de+elo/%ent of t)e Macedonian /)alan-. !)en in 1@C B.$. t)e Ro%ans faced an ar%y of t)e Macedonian kingdo%3 t)ey found t)at t)e /)alan- )ad lengt)ened at least so%e of its s/ears to t(enty#one feet. //arently t)e front ranks )ad s)orter s/ears3 /ro&a&ly nine feet3 ()ic) t)ey )eld in one )and7 t)e fift) rank used &ot) )ands to carry t(enty#one#foot s/ears t)at /roDected &eyond t)e front rank7 t)e inter%ediate ranks see% to )a+e )ad s/ears of +arying lengt)s so t)at all t)e s/ear /oints /roDected a&out t)e sa%e distance &eyond t)e front rank. 0)e front ranks carried s)ields7 t)e rear rank3 using &ot) )ands to )old t)eir long s/ear3 )ad eit)er no s)ields or +ery s%all ones slung on a stra/ across t)eir c)ests. Be)ind t)e first fi+e ranks t)e /)alan- )ad an additional ele+en ranks3 t)e %en )olding t)eir s/ears ele+ated until needed. 0)is for%ation %arc)ed s)oulder#to#s)oulder and for its effecti+eness relied on t)e co%&ined effect of t)e s/ears7 t)e indi+idual )ad no role e-ce/t to )old )is s/ear and kee/ )is for%ation. Since t)e Ro%ans foug)t (it) s(ords and so needed %ore s/ace &et(een t)e% t)an t)e %en in t)e /)alan-3 t)e /)alan- &ad t(o %en in front rank for e+ery Ro%an. 2ac) Ro%an t)us faced ten s/ears. ccording to t)e )istorian Poly&ius3 JIt is &ot) i%/ossi&le for a single %an to cut t)roug) t)e% all in ti%e once t)ey are at close .uarters and &y no %eans easy to force t)eir /oints a(ay.L It see%ed3 t)erefore3 t)at t)is ne( /)alan- could &ear do(n all o//osition3 gi+ing t)e Macedonians +ictory &ecause of t)eir &etter infantry.

?C

But t)e articulated Ro%an infantry easily defeated t)is a//arently in+inci&le tactical inno+ation. In connection (it) t)eir success at t)e Battle of Pa%a3 Poly&ius )ad /ointed out t)at t)e su&di+ided Ro%an tactical organisation ena&led Je+ery %an indi+idually and in co%%on (it) )is fello(s to /resent a front in any direction3 t)e %ani/les ()ic) are nearest to t)e danger turning t)e%sel+es &y a single %o+e%ent to face it. 0)eir ar%s also gi+e t)e %en &ot) /rotection and confidence o(ing to t)e si6e of t)e s)ield and o(ing to t)e s(ord &eing strong enoug) to endure re/eated &lo(s.L 0)us t)e Ro%an could %anoeu+re3 and if )e could get /ast t)e )o/lites s/ear3 )e )ad o+er()el%ing su/eriority at close .uarters3 es/ecially against t)e s)ield#less %en (it) t)e t(o#)anded s/ears. In t)e first conflict t)e Ro%ans (on t)e infantry co%&at &ecause t)ey caug)t t)e /)alan- &efore it )ad for%ed and ()ile so%e of its %e%&ers (ere still %arc)ing to t)e /lace of &attle. But e+en under fa+oura&le conditions t)e /)alan- de/ended so %uc) u/on kee/ing its for%ation t)at it could ne+er )a+e succeeded against t)e Ro%an infantry. Poly&ius /ointed out3 J0)e /)alan- re.uires le+el and clear ground (it) no o&stacles suc) as ditc)es3 clefts3 clu%/s of trees3 ridges and (ater courses3 all of ()ic) are sufficient to i%/ede and &reak u/ suc) a for%ation.L 5f course3 ga/s in a /)alan- (ould ena&le t)e Ro%an s(ords%en to co%e to close .uarters (it) disastrous conse.uence for t)e )o/lites in t)e /)alan-. 2+en on le+el ground t)e /)alan- /ro+ed +ulnera&le3 for3 Poly&ius (rote3 Jt)e Ro%ans do not %ake t)eir line e.ual in force to t)e ene%y and e-/ose all of t)e legions to a frontal attack &y t)e /)alan-3 &ut /art of t)eir forces re%ain in reser+e and t)e rest engaged t)e ene%y. fter(ards ()et)er t)e /)alan- dri+es &ack &y its c)arge t)e force o//osed to it or is re/ulsed &y t)is force3L t)e /)alan- e-/oses itself eit)er Jin follo(ing u/ a retreating foe or in flying &efore an attacking foe.L !)en t)is )a//ens3 t)e /)alan- t)en lea+es J&e)ind t)e ot)er /arts of t)eir o(n ar%y3 u/on ()ic)L t)e Ro%an Jreser+e )a+e roo% enoug) in t)e s/ace for%erly )eld &y t)e /)alan- to attack no longer in frontL &ut a//ear J&y a lateral %o+e%ent on t)e flank and rear of t)e /)alan-L and so (it) s(ord and s)ield at close .uarters on t)e flank slaug)ter t)e )o/lites ()ose for%ation and (ea/ons %ade t)e% al%ost defenceless. 0)us t)e i%/ro+ed infantry of t)e Ro%ans )el/ed Ro%e esta&lis) its %astery o+er t)e Mediterranean &asin. 0)e Ro%ans )ad incor/orated all of t)e features of t)e Macedonian syste% and )ad learned fro% "anni&al t)e +alue of an infantry reser+e and t)e conce/t of a general ()o ke/t out of co%&at so t)at )e could control t)e reser+e and direct t)e &attle. Back

(he )oman "egion !erfected

0)e Ro%ans soon /erfected t)eir infantry &y a&olis)ing t)e +estiges of t)e old /)alangeal organisation and introducing a co%/letely rational /lan of articulation. 0)ey eli%inated t)e distinction &et(een t)e traditional t)ree lines3 a&olis)ing t)e s/ears and t)e s%aller for%ations of t)e t)ird line. 0)ey could de/loy t)e legions )o%ogeneous )ea+y infantry into as %any or as fe( lines as t)e circu%stances (arranted. 0)ey di+ided t)e legion into ten )ea+y infantry co)orts of =>> %en eac)7 a co)ort consisted of t)ree %ani/les of 2>> %en7 eac) %ani/le contained t(o centuries. 2+ery unit )ad a co%%ander (it) full aut)ority o+er )is su&ordinates. 0)is arrange%ent is su&stantially si%ilar to t)e co%/osition of t)e %odern di+ision (it) t)e co)orts corres/onding to &attalions and t)e %ani/les to co%/anies. 0)e c)ain of co%%and is also si%ilar3 (it) an ar%y co%/osed of se/arate legions and t)e co%%ander of eac) su&ordinate unit3 do(n to t)e century3 fir%ly under t)e aut)ority of t)e co%%ander a&o+e )i%. 0)e Ro%ans t)us created a fully articulated ar%y ca/a&le of %anoeu+ring and res/onding /ro%/tly to t)e orders of its leaders. :et it re%ained +ery difficult for co%%anders to understand ()at (as trans/iring on t)e &attlefield and e+en )arder to trans%it %essages to su&ordinates. Messengers3 )orns3 and dru%s /ro+ided uncertain %eans of co%%unication. Still3 t)e Ro%ans )ad i%/ro+ed t)e situation considera&ly3 not only &y su&di+iding t)eir ar%y &ut also &y e.ui//ing t)eir units (it)

?B

standards t)at /er%itted t)e soldiers to recognise t)eir /laces and ga+e co%%anders a &etter o//ortunity to kno( t)e location of t)eir units. 4ntil t)e /orta&le radio in t)e t(entiet) century3 tactical co%%and re%ained funda%entally as difficult as t)e Ro%ans found it and so %itigated t)e &enefits of articulation. Ro%an su&di+ision and su&ordination did )a+e anot)er ad+antage: it ga+e real sco/e for t)e initiati+e of su&ordinates in a &attle. nd t)e c)ange to a /rofessional ar%y %ade t)is organisation function in /ractice as (ell as it could in t)eory3 and fir% disci/line3 good training3 and constant e-/erience in (ar assured t)at t)e Ro%an ar%y could al(ays /erfor% as intended. 0)e legion also /ossessed so%e lig)t infantry3 arc)ers and slingers3 and a s%all /ro/ortion of ca+alry. But t)e skill and structure of t)e infantry reduced its +ulnera&ility to ca+alry &ecause e-cellent articulation ena&led /arts of an ar%y3 eit)er legion or co)ort3 to %anoeu+re to /rotect a flank3 and t)e good su&di+ision /er%itted t)e co%%ander to assign a unit or units to guard t)e flanks. Since for%ed )ea+y infantry could sto/ t)e c)arge of for%ed )ea+y ca+alry3 Ro%an co%%anders felt little an-iety a&out t)eir flanks. 0)e regularity of /rocedure t)at caused Ro%an forces to entrenc) at e+ery )alt carried o+er to /ro+iding good arrange%ents for su//ly and /ay%ent of t)eir troo/s. 0)e Ro%ans3 ()o ca%/aigned %et)odically and /ersistently3 co%/letely su//orted t)is kind of (arfare (it) t)eir /rofessional ar%y and its t)oroug)3 uni%/etuous (ay of (ar. Back

(he )omans against the Mounted !arthians

0)is /erfected Ro%an ar%y readily triu%/)ed o+er t)e *auls3 t)e in)a&itants of /resent#day 'rance. $alled &ar&arians &y t)e Ro%ans3 t)e *auls3 like t)e Ro%ans3 foug)t (it) )ea+y infantry and ca+alry &ut lacked t)e Ro%ans disci/lined and carefully articulated infantry. Nor did t)e *auls )a+e t)e Ro%ans addiction to3 %uc) less t)eir %astery of3 fortification and siegecraft7 furt)er3 *allic ar%ies lacked t)e finances and t)e su//ly organisation /ro+ided &y t)e fully de+elo/ed Ro%an state. In s/ite of t)e *auls /ersistent and ca/a&le resistance3 t)e Ro%ans3 )a+ing a great co%%ander in 8ulius $aesar3 con.uered *aul in se+en years. But t)e Ro%ans failed dra%atically against t)e Part)ians ()o ruled Meso/ota%ia and t)e region east(ard to India. 0)e Part)ians only foug)t %ounted3 a %et)od a%/ly suited to t)e le+el3 treeless terrain of Meso/ota%ia. 0)ey clearly distinguis)ed &et(een )ea+y and lig)t ca+alry3 t)e aristocracy /ro+iding t)e for%er ()ile training and e.ui//ing t)eir retainers as )orse arc)ers. 0)e )ea+y ca+alry (ore ar%our3 as did t)eir )orses3 and e.ui//ed t)e%sel+es (it) a lance so long and )ea+y t)at t)e Ro%ans nickna%ed it Jt)e &arge#/ole.L Since t)e ar%our and t)e )ea+y lance seriously aggra+ated t)e /ro&le% of fig)ting on )orse&ack (it)out stirru/s3 t)e Part)ian aristocracy see%ed to )a+e undertaken an al%ost i%/ossi&le task. But t)ey %astered it3 and t)e Part)ian )ea+y ca+alry /ro+ed for%ida&le indeed. 0)e inertia of t)e )ea+y lance not only contri&uted to t)e /o(er of its &lo( &ut also di%inis)ed t)e s)ock to t)e rider ()o3 /resu%a&ly3 )eld it loosely. 0)oug) s)ooting a &o( e-/ertly re.uires +ery great skill and is e+en %ore difficult ()en %ounted on )orse&ack (it)out stirru/s3 t)e lig)t ca+alry )ad a co%/arati+ely easy task in co%&at3 for t)eir tactics ke/t t)e% at a distance fro% t)e ene%y ()ile t)ey s)ot t)eir arro(s. !)ile $aesar con.uered *aul3 )is (ealt)y and a%&itious colleague $rassus in+aded Part)ia (it) a large Ro%an ar%y3 /er)a/s nu%&ering ?=3>>> %en3 including 43>>> ca+alry and 43>>> lig)t infantry. 0)e confident $rassus already kne( so%et)ing of t)e Part)ian art of (ar &ut t)oug)t t)at )is %ilitary /ro&le% Jconsisted only in t)e tediousness of t)e %arc) and t)e trou&le of c)asing %en ()o durst not co%e to &lo(s.L "e ignored t)e i%/lication of re/orts t)at J&y flig)t it is i%/ossi&le to esca/eL t)e Part)ians Jand as i%/ossi&le to o+ertake t)e% ()en t)eyL flee3 Dust as )e )ad naturally discounted re/orts of t)eir i%/enetra&le ar%our and of t)eir arro(s3 Ja ne( and strange sort of darts3 as s(ift as sig)t.L !it) arrogance and e+en less (isdo%3 $rassus3 according to t)e ?@

)istorian Plutarc)3 declined t)e in+itation of t)e 9ing of r%enia ()o3 kno(ing first)and t)e Part)ian (ay of (ar3 suggested t)e Ro%ans %arc) t)roug) )is kingdo% ()ose )ills and %ountains %ade it Jal%ost i%/assa&le to )orse.L 0)e Part)ians (aited to engage t)e Ro%ans until $rassus )ad %arc)ed far out on t)e le+el3 sandy terrain of Meso/ota%ia. !)en t)ey %et t)e Part)ian ar%y near $arr)ae3 t)e Ro%ans de/loyed in a s.uare3 full of confidence if only &ecause t)e Part)ian ar%y dra(n u/ &efore t)e% see%ed s%aller t)an t)ey e-/ected. 0)ey did outnu%&er t)e Part)ians t)ree to one3 &ut since t)e Part)ian co%%ander )ad )idden so%e of )is force &e)ind a rise in t)e ground3 t)e Ro%ans at first sa( only /art of t)e ar%oured Part)ian array. But t)en t)e Part)ians3 seeking to de%oralise t)e Ro%ans3 %ade Ja )ideous noise and terri&le cla%our. 'or t)e Part)ians do not encourage t)e%sel+es to (ar (it) cornets and tru%/ets &ut (it) a kind of kettle#dru%3 ()ic) t)ey strike all at once in +arious .uarters. !it) t)ese t)ey %ake a dead )ollo( noise like t)e &ello(ing of &easts %i-ed (it) sounds rese%&ling t)under... !)en t)ey )ad sufficiently terrified t)e Ro%ans (it) t)eir noise3L t)ey &roug)t t)eir ()ole ar%y into +ie( and Jt)re( off t)e co+ering of t)eir ar%our3 and s)one like lig)tning in t)eir &reast/lates and )el%ets of /olis)ed Margianian steel3 and (it) t)eir )orses co+ered (it) &rass and steel tra//ings.L Not only did t)e Ro%ans face a trained and ela&orately e.ui//ed )ost &ut also a for%ida&le and /rudently /re/ared o//onent in Surena3 t)e Part)ian co%%ander. J"e (as t)e tallest and finest looking %an )i%self3 &ut t)e delicacy of )is looks and t)e effe%inacy of )is dress did not /ro%ise so %uc) %an)ood as )e really (as %aster of7 for )is face (as /ainted3 and )is )air /arted ... ()ereas t)e ot)er Part)ians %ade a terri&le a//earance3 (it) t)eir s)aggy )air gat)ered in a %ass u/on t)eir fore)eads.L Seeing t)e de/t) and strengt) of t)e ranks of t)e Ro%an )ea+y infantry3 Surena (isely did not order )is )ea+y ca+alry to c)arge. Instead3 )e s/read out )is lig)t ca+alry3 ()ic) J&egan to s)oot fro% all sides3 not ai%ing at any /articular %ark Gfor3 indeed3 t)e order of t)e Ro%ans (as so close3 t)at t)ey could not %iss if t)ey (ouldH &ut si%/ly sent t)eir arro(s (it) great force out of strong &ent &o(s3 t)e strokes fro% ()ic) ca%e (it) e-tre%e +iolence. 0)e /osition of t)e Ro%ans (as a +ery &ad one fro% t)e first7 for if t)ey ke/t t)eir ranks3 t)ey (ere (ounded3 and if t)ey tried to c)arge3 t)ey )urt t)e ene%y none t)e %ore3 and t)e%sel+es suffered none t)e less. 'or t)e Part)ians t)re( t)eir darts as t)ey fled.L Since )is lig)t infantry3 lacking %any arc)ers or slingers3 failed to &e of %uc) use against t)e lig)t ca+alry3 $rassus (aited for t)e ene%y to e-)aust )is arro(s. But ()en )e learned t)at t)e ene%y )ad Jnu%erous ca%els loaded (it) arro(s3L $rassus sent )is son3 Pu&lius3 (it) a force of al%ost <3>>> )ea+y infantry3 13?>> ca+alry3 and <>> arc)ers to attack t)e ene%y. 0)e Part)ians fell &ack &efore t)is force until it )ad ad+anced far fro% t)e %ain &ody. 0)oug) outnu%&ered3 t)e Ro%an arc)ers in Pu&lius co%%and s)ould )a+e /layed a significant role &ecause on foot t)ey could s)oot (it) greater s/eed and accuracy t)an t)e %ounted Part)ians. But /itted against %ore nu%erous )orse arc)ers (it) dou&tless %ore /o(erful &o(s3 t)ey do not see% to )a+e affected t)e outco%e at all. Pu&lius ca+alry3 largely recruited in *aul3 suffered t)e fate of t)e Persian general#/ur/ose ca+alry nearly 2>> years &efore3 ()ic) )ad foug)t t)e )ea+y ca+alry of le-anders $o%/anions of t)e 9ing. 0)e Part)ians %et t)e c)arging *allic ca+alry (it) t)eir )ea+y ca+alry3 %eeting t)e J(eak and little Da+elinsL of Pu&lius *auls (it) &ody ar%our and s)ields Jof toug) ra( )ides and iron3 ()ereas t)e lig)tly clad &odies of )is *aulis) )orse%en (ere e-/osed to t)e strong s/ears of t)e ene%y.L But t)e courageous *allic ca+alry%en ga+e a good account of t)e%sel+es7 t)ey J(ould catc) )old of t)e great s/ears3 and close u/on t)e ene%y and so /ull t)e% fro% t)eir )orses3 ()ere t)ey could scarce stir &y reason of t)e )ea+iness of t)eir ar%our3 and %any of t)e $auls .uitting t)eir o(n )orses3 (ould cree/ under t)ose of t)e ene%y3 and stick t)e% in t)e &elly.L 4>

0)e un)orsed sur+i+ors of t)e *allic ca+alry Doined t)e Ro%an )ea+y infantry3 &eset on e+ery side &y t)e ene%y lig)t ca+alry ()ose +aunted darts rained u/on t)e close#/acked Ro%ans ()o (ere J)it and killed3 dying3 not &y a .uick and easy deat)3 &ut (it) %isera&le /ains and con+ulsions7 for (rit)ing u/on t)e darts in t)eir &odies3 t)ey &roke t)e% in t)eir (ounds3 and ()en t)ey (ould &y force /luck out t)e &ar&ed /oints3 t)ey caug)t t)e ner+es and +eins3 so t)at t)ey tore and tortured t)e%sel+es. Many of t)e% died t)us3 and t)ose t)at sur+i+ed (ere disa&led for any ser+ice3 and ()en Pu&lius e-)orted t)e% to c)arge t)e cuirassiers3 t)ey s)o(ed )i% t)eir )ands nailed to t)eir s)ields3 and t)eir feet stuck to t)e ground.L "a+ing defeated Pu&lius detac)%ent (it) t)eir %issiles3 t)e Part)ians closed in on t)e re%nant J(it) t)eir lances3 killed t)e% fig)ting3 nor (ere a&o+e fi+e )undred taken /risoners. $utting off t)e )ead of Pu&lius3 t)ey rode off directly to(ards $rassus.L $rassus /redica%ent differed little fro% )is sons3 for Jt)e %issiles falling t)ick and fast u/on t)e% fro% all sides at once struck do(n %any &y a %ortal &lo(3 rendering %any useless for &attle3 and caused distress to all. 0)ey fle( into t)eir eyes and /ierced t)eir )ands.L 0)us $rassus %en found t)at Jit (as i%/ractica&le to %o+e and i%/ractica&le to re%ain at rest.L 0)oug) t)e %issiles of t)e lig)t ca+alry carried t)e &urden of t)e Part)ian +ictory3 t)e )ea+y ca+alry did its /art ()en t)e %en J(it) t)eir s/ears dro+e t)e Ro%ans close toget)er3 e-ce/t t)ose ()o rus)ed u/on t)e%... Neit)er did t)ese do %uc) e-ecution3 &eing .uickly dis/atc)ed7 for t)e strong t)ick s/ears %ade large and %ortal (ounds3 and often run QsicR t)roug) t(o %en at once.L Not only did t)e )ea+y ca+alry kee/ t)e Ro%ans &unc)ed toget)er so e+ery arro( found its %ark3 &ut if t)e Ro%ans cro(ded u/on one anot)er too close to use t)eir (ea/ons &ut a&le to co+er eac) ot)er (it) locked s)ields3 t)ey %ade t)e%sel+es +ulnera&le to t)e )ea+y ca+alry3 ()ic) (ere Ju/on t)e% (it) a rus)3 striking do(n so%e and at least scattering t)e ot)ers7 and if t)ey e-tended t)eir ranks to a+oid t)is3 t)ey (ould &e struck (it) t)e arro(s.L It took longer t)an a single day to co%/lete t)e destruction of $rassus ar%y on t)e o/en /lain near $arr)ae. t t)e end of t)e day3 so%e of t)e Part)ians lances J(ere &ent and ot)ers (ere &roken3 ()ile t)e &o(string sna//ed under t)e constant s)ooting3 t)e %issiles (ere e-)austed3 t)e s(ords all &lunted and3 %ost of all... t)e %en t)e%sel+es gre( (eary of t)e slaug)ter.L 0)e struggle continued t)e follo(ing day3 and ulti%ately t)e Part)ians killed $rassus and %any ot)ers as (ell as ca/turing a large /ortion of )is ar%y. 0)e Part)ians atte%/ted to follo( t)eir success &y in+ading Syria. But t)oug) Jal%ost in+inci&le in t)eir o(n country and in any t)atL )ad Jsi%ilar c)aracteristics3L t)ey lacked t)e %eans of &esieging t)e cities and3 in one case3 e+en of a//roac)ing one &ecause Jt)e neig)&our)ood of t)is city (as o+ergro(n (it) ti%&er.L Since Jt)ey did not dare3 nay t)ey (ere not e+en a&le to /enetrate t)is (it) ca+alry3 t)ey for%ed a /lan to cut do(n t)e trees and lay &are t)e ()ole /lace3 so t)at t)ey %ig)t a//roac) t)e to(n (it) confidence and safety. But finding t)e%sel+es una&le to do t)is3 &ecause t)e task (as a great one3L t)ey c)anged t)eir o&Decti+e to anot)er to(n. Mean()ile3 t)e Ro%ans )ad J)arassed t)ose of t)e% ()o )ad scattered a&road3L and3 soon after losing %en in an a%&us)3 t)e Part)ians a&andoned t)eir ca%/aign in t)e uncongenial en+iron%ent of Syria. $rassus disastrous e-/erience clearly de%onstrated t)e su/eriority of t)e lig)t ca+alry (ea/on syste% o+er )ea+y infantry ()en ca%/aigning on terrain suita&le for )orses. 0)e )ea+y ca+alry aided t)e Part)ian +ictory7 &ut (it) sufficient arro(s3 ()ic) t)eir co%%ander )ad carefully /ro+ided3 t)eir lig)t ca+alry could )a+e (on t)e &attle unaided. *reek )ea+y infantry )ad so%eti%es found t)e Persian %ounted &o(%en dangerous3 &ut t)e rugged terrain of *reece )ad sa+ed t)e *reeks fro% disaster. But in t)e Part)ians o(n country3 Ro%an )ea+y infantry %et anni)ilating defeat. Back

41

Summary of the Ca'abilities of the Four Wea'on Systems

0)e four &asic (ea/on syste%s of t)e ancients are su%%arised in t)e follo(ing sc)e%atic. 2ac) of t)ese )as its o(n s/ecial ca/a&ility and relati+e do%inance. 0)e Part)ians dra%atically de%onstrated t)e /o(er of lig)t ca+alry against )ea+y infantry on terrain suita&le for ca+alry. 0)ey also e-)i&ited ()at le-ander )ad already s)o(n3 t)at neit)er lig)t ca+alry nor general#/ur/ose ca+alry not s/ecifically trained and e.ui//ed for s)ock action can resist )ea+y ca+alry. But t)e Part)ian )ea+y ca+alry did not c)arge t)e infantry ()en t)e Ro%ans )ad for%ed a s.uare to %eet t)e%. le-ander3 too3 ne+er used )is )ea+y ca+alry against t)e front of a /)alan-3 &ecause /ro/erly for%ed )ea+y infantry can resist t)e c)arge of )ea+y ca+alry.

Wea on Systems Matri* Back

In close co%&at (it) a %an on foot3 a %an on )orse&ack enDoyed a nu%&er of ad+antages3 including t)at of a )ig)er /osition3 and a conse.uent a&ility to strike do(n at )is o//onent. 0)e )orse itself (as often a +alua&le ally. 0)ese ad+antages3 cou/led (it) t)e initiati+e /ro+ided &y t)e ca+alry%ans greater %o&ility3 could %ake )i% an e-cellent s)ock (ea/on syste% if t)e ca+alry%an (ere (ell enoug) trained to o+erco%e t)e /recariousness of )is seat. 0o resist t)e s)ock ca+alry3 t)e )ea+y infantry )ad to for% a grou/. gainst skilful Ro%an soldiers3 t)oroug)ly ar%oured3 /rotected &y large3 strong s)ields3 and for%ed si- ranks dee/3 e+en t)e ar%oured Part)ian )ea+y ca+alry (it) t)eir long lances could not /re+ail. 1e/t)3 t)e &etter fig)ting /latfor% of t)e eart)3 and t)e a&ility to gi+e undi+ided attention to t)e co%&at3 toget)er (it) a s.uare for%ation t)at left no side +ulnera&le3 %eant t)at ca+alry could not %atc) t)e coordinated grou/ action of t)e foot soldiers. 0)oug) for%ed as a grou/ and (orking toget)er under a leader3 ca+alry%en still )ad to fig)t as indi+iduals. 0)is attri&ute %ade it easy for t)e% to go into action /ro%/tly G&ecause t)ey could fig)t ade.uately (it)out )a+ing to order t)eir arrayH &ut t)is c)aracteristic of indi+idual action reduced t)eir effecti+eness in frontal co%&at (it) a for%ed grou/ of foot soldiers. 0)e ca+alry (as3 )o(e+er3 t)e ideal (ea/on syste% for t)e offensi+e %ission of reac)ing and /ro%/tly attacking t)e infantrys (eak flanks and rear. 0)e )orse arc)er )ad a %uc) %ore /ronounced disad+antage in co%&at against t)e foot arc)er. By gi+ing )is undi+ided attention to )is s)ooting3 t)e foot arc)er )ad a greater rate of fire and3 e+en inde/endent of t)e &enefits of )is steady /latfor%3 greater accuracy. 0)e foot arc)er could3 as did t)e Persian arc)ers ()o faced t)e *reeks3 /rotect )i%self (it) a large3 lig)t(eig)t s)ield. 0)e )orse%an could not defend )i%self t)at (ay and still use )is &o( and %anage )is )orse. In addition3 as t)e Persian ca+alry sa( in its attack on t)e *reek arc)ers at Plataea3 t)e )orse /resented a large and +ulnera&le target. But t)e foot arc)er (ould )a+e no c)ance against )ea+y ca+alry. 8ust as t)e *reek )ea+y infantry defeated t)e Persian foot arc)ers at Marat)on and Plataea3 so could )ea+y ca+alry close .uickly t)roug) t)e 6one ()ere t)e arro(s fell and3 /rotected &y ar%our3 use lance and s(ord to defeat t)e lig)t infantry. 0)e lig)tness of t)e &o(%ens e.ui/%ent (ould not e+en a+ail t)e% of t)e o//ortunity to run a(ay &ecause t)e ca+alry could easily o+ertake t)e%.

Hea%y )a%alryman +efeats &ight 'nfantryman Back

42

So it is clear t)at if $rassus could )a+e organised a Ro%an ar%y of )alf )ea+y infantry and )alf old#%odel Persian arc)ers3 )e could )a+e readily resisted t)e Part)ian attack. 0)e )ea+y infantry could )a+e /rotected t)e arc)ers fro% t)e Part)ian lancers and t)e &o(%en could )a+e ke/t at &ay t)e Part)ian )orse arc)ers. Suc) a Ro%an ar%y (ould3 )o(e+er3 )a+e )ad only a defensi+e ca/a&ility: it could )a+e controlled only t)e ground u/on ()ic) it stood. But t)e terrain se+erely restrained t)e a//arent /redo%inance of t)e %ounted (ay of (ar. $a+alry could not function in forests3 and in dense (oods e+en foot &o(%en )ad a disad+antage &ecause of li%itations to t)eir +isi&ility and %o&ility. 0)is for%ida&le restriction ins/ired t)e Part)ians to consider cutting do(n a forest. Mountainous country in)i&ited ca+alry less &ut usually confined its action to t)e +alleys. 0)us t)e Part)ians re%ained in+inci&le in t)eir o(n country &ut ne+er (ere a&le to con.uer t)e Ro%an /ro+inces in Syria or sia Minor. *eogra/)y )ad %uc) to do (it) t)e de+elo/%ent of regional or national %odels of (arfare3 as seen (it) t)e *reeks3 t)e Persians3 and t)e Part)ians. le-ander and t)e $art)aginians and Ro%ans a%alga%ated t)ese %et)ods3 &ut t)eir terrain caused t)e Part)ians to recreate a national syste% t)at t)ey could use successfully against t)e Ro%ans. not)er disad+antage of t)e ca+alry (as its cost. In ancient ti%es a )orse cost as %uc) as a %an7 e.ui//ing t)e )orse (it) a /rotecti+e co+ering added to t)e e-/ense7 and carrying its ar%our in addition to an ar%oured %an re.uired a ro&ust steed. Breeding (ar#)orses strong enoug) for t)ese tasks raised t)e /rice of t)e )orse3 and e+en a lig)ter3 faster ani%al for t)e lig)t ca+alry re.uired a /articular &reed. In addition3 t)e %ounted %en t)e%sel+es cost %ore3 for t)ey re.uired %ore training t)an t)e foot arc)er to learn to s)oot (ell fro% )orse&ack and %ore skill to fig)t at close .uarters fro% )orse&ack t)an fro% t)e ground. 0)us3 t)oug) $rassuss Ro%an ar%y )ad tri/le t)e nu%&er of t)eir Part)ian o//onents3 it cost +ery little %ore. lt)oug) t)e outco%e of t)e ca%/aign a%/ly Dustified t)is +ariance in /rice /er %an for t)e Part)ian forces3 t)e difference in e-/ense also forcefully argued t)at t)e terrain and t)e tactical situation s)ould clearly (arrant t)e use of %ounted troo/s &efore go+ern%ents or co%%anders s)ould decide to gi+e u/ t(o or t)ree foot soldiers to )a+e one %ounted %an. 0)e %ounted (ay of (ar (as irrele+ant for sieges. Because )orses (ere useless against ditc)es and (alls3 infantry conducted sieges. 5f course3 t)e ca+alry%en could dis%ount3 &ut ser+ing as Infantry%en (asted t)eir training3 and t)ey %ay )a+e lacked so%e of t)e skills needed for fig)ting on foot. 0)eir &ackground as ca+alry%en %ig)t e+en /redis/ose t)e% against t)e digging and artisan (ork inse/ara&le fro% sieges.

4?

So3 in o/en country a Dust co%&ination of )ea+y and lig)t infantry could resist a %i-ture of lig)t and )ea+y ca+alry. In %ountainous3 forested3 or &roken terrain t)e ca+alry could not function effecti+ely3 and )ere t)e relati+ely ine-/ensi+e infantry reigned su/re%e and infantry )ad to fig)t infantry. 5n t)e defence3 infantry )ad t)e ad+antage against t)e o//onents infantry si%ilarly ar%ed. !it) arro(s or slings t)e %otionless %an could s)oot %ore accurately and could /ro+ide )i%self eit)er (it) natural co+er or (it) artificial /rotection suc) as t)e Persians s)ield. n u/)ill /osition (ould gi+e any of t)e defenders %issiles su/erior +elocity and range. "ea+y infantry3 on t)e ot)er )and3 o&tained little s/ecial facility fro% t)e defence in a conflict (it) ot)er )ea+y infantry3 and3 in fact3 t)e ancients t)oug)t it /oor tactics to recei+e a c)arge and a &enefit to rus) t)e o//osing line Dust &efore contact. But t)ey did +alue t)e u/)ill /osition for fig)ting at close .uarters. 1efenders early i%/ro+ised field fortifications &ecause of t)e /o(er t)ey conferred on t)e defence. 1arius III e%/loyed t)ese at Issus3 and t)e successors of le-ander used t)e% also7 &ut in a sense t)e Ro%ans started any o/eration (it) t)e defensi+e ()en t)ey entrenc)ed t)eir ca%/ e+ery nig)t. If t)ey foug)t a &attle t)e ne-t day3 t)ey )ad already /re/ared a /lace of retreat s)ould t)ey lose. !)ene+er t)ey occu/ied a /osition3 t)ey dug in if t)ey )ad t)e ti%e. 0)oug) )ea+y infantry did %ost of t)e digging3 t)e lig)t infantry &enefited fro% t)e field fortifications as (ell. $a+alry enDoyed fe( of infantrys ad+antages on t)e defensi+e. 0)e lig)t ca+alry could not take co+er3 t)oug) it %ig)t find t)e )alt )el/ful in using t)e &o(. 'or t)e )ea+y ca+alry defence (as a distinct lia&ility3 and )ea+y ca+alry on t)e defence )ad to retreat or c)arge. 0)is different &e)a+iour (as necessary &ecause t)e ca+alry%an3 t)oug) functioning as an indi+idual co%&atant3 )ad t(o &rains instead of one3 and t)e strongest co%/onent Gt)e )orseH usually )ad t)e least traina&le &rain. !)en t)e )orses &rain sensed a t)reat greater t)an t)e rider3 it said: Jrun3 stay (it) t)e )erd3L and did not sto/ until t)e t)reat &eca%e t)e rider again. No %atter ()at t)e rider directed3 t)e )alted3 frig)tened )orse (ould %ake agitated %o+e%ents3 /re+enting t)e rider fro% using any (ea/ons )e carried3 until it could run again. 5nce it ran3 it /ro+ided a fairly steady3 s)ort#range (ea/on /latfor%3 increased t)e +elocity of )and#)eld (ea/ons3 &eca%e a fleeting target3 and3 in t)e offence3 &eca%e a (ea/on itself3 to ()ic) any a&out#to#&e#tra%/led defender (ould )a+e agreed. !arfare a%ong t)e *reeks e-)i&ited t)e factors controlling co%&at &et(een t)e t(o ty/es of infantry. 0)e success of Da+elin#t)ro(ing /eltasts against )o/lites forecast t)e +ictory of t)e Part)ian )orse arc)ers o+er $rassuss legions. But3 &ecause of t)e only slig)t difference in %o&ility &et(een lig)t and )ea+y infantry3 /eltasts ran great )a6ards in a//lying t)is t)ro(#and#run tactic. 0)e defeats of t)e Persian foot arc)ers at Marat)on and Plataea s)o( t)e difficulty of using lig)t infantry against )ea+y infantry in a &attle7 t)e i%%o&ile %ass created &y t)e large nu%&ers of t)e Persian &o(%en destroyed t)eir lig)t infantrys slender %argin of %o&ility. But lessening t)e (eig)t of t)e )o/lites ar%our3 (it) a conse.uent increase in %o&ility3 dou&tless )ad %uc) to do (it) /re+enting t)e flo(ering of a full#fledged tactic &ased on t)e su/erior %o&ility of t)e Da+elin# t)ro(ing lig)t infantry%an. In t)e co%&at of )ea+y infantry (it) )ea+y infantry at t)e Battle of ,euctra3 2/a%inondas a//lied &ot) t)e ideas of concentration and en+elo/%ent. t $annae "anni&als t(o reser+e forces of )ea+y infantry ad+anced t)is notion as did )is and Sci/ios use of t)eir infantry at Pa%a. In articulation lay t)e key to a//lying (it) infantry t)e conce/ts of a reser+e3 concentration3 and en+elo/%ent. 0)e disci/lined /rofessional infantry of t)e Ro%ans3 di+ided into legions3 co)orts3 %ani/les3 and centuries3 /ro+ided an ar%y t)at )ad t)e articulation and res/onsi+eness to esta&lis) a reser+e t)at t)e co%%ander could %anoeu+re on t)e &attlefield and use to en+elo/ t)e ene%y &y striking at t)e flank3 a /oint of (eakness.

44

le-anders introduction of a co%&ined#ar%s ar%y o+ers)ado(ed t)e utility of t)is articulation in a &attle of )ea+y infantry against )ea+y infantry. In using eac) of t)e four (ea/on syste%s3 le-ander relied on )is )ea+y ca+alry to defeat t)e ene%ys ca+alry and attack t)e ene%ys infantry in t)e rear ()ile first )is skir%is)ing lig)t infantry3 and t)en )is )ea+y infantry3 engaged t)e ene%ys infantry in front and )is lig)t ca+alry engaged so%e of t)e ene%ys ca+alry. 2+en if le-ander )ad not introduced )ea+y ca+alry3 ()ic) )ad no trou&le dri+ing t)roug) t)e Persian general#/ur/ose ca+alry3 )e (ould )a+e )ad an ad+antage &ecause in s)ock action3 defence conferred no &enefit on ca+alry. gainst t)e ene%ys unarticulated )ea+y infantry3 t)e ca+alry attack in t)e flank and rear usually decided t)e &attle. 5ne e-ce/tion to t)is occurred at t)e Battle of r&ela3 ()ere le-anders ca+alry &roke t)roug) t)e (eak Persian centre. But t)e )ea+y infantry centre of *reek ar%ies usually /ro+ed i%/er+ious to /enetration. In t)e le-andrian syste%3 +ictory on uno&structed and unfortified terrain see%ed to go to t)e ar%y t)at )ad &etter ca+alry eit)er in .uality3 .uantity3 or a co%&ination of t)ese factors. $annae and Pa%a su//ort t)is generalisation3 in s/ite of t)e decisi+e role of "anni&als infantry at $annae and t)e role of e-cellent articulation of t)e infantry on &ot) sides at Pa%a. 0)e Ro%ans ne+er fully ado/ted t)e le-andrian reliance on ca+alry &ut (on t)eir key +ictories o+er le-andrian ar%ies &ecause t)eir allies /ro+ided critical su/re%acy in ca+alry. gainst t)e *auls3 t)eir o(n ca+alry and t)e a&ility of t)eir articulated infantry to co+er its flanks /ro+ed ade.uate to deal (it) t)e ene%ys ca+alry. But t)ey &ased t)eir *allic +ictories on t)e /redo%inance of t)eir infantry and t)eir reliance on t)e defensi+e /o(er of entrenc)%ents. 5n one %aDor occasion in a traditional le-andrian &attle a /re/onderance in ca+alry failed to ensure +ictory. 0)is occurred in a $i+il !ar &attle &et(een t(o fa%ous antagonists3 8ulius $aesar3 t)e %ilitary and /olitical genius ()o ca%e to rule Ro%e3 and Po%/ey3 a soldier ()o )ad (on reno(ned +ictories on t)ree continents &ut ()o s)o(ed less a/titude for /olitics. 0)e ar%ies of t)ese t(o su/er& leaders %et in 4B B.$. at t)e Battle of P)arsalus. s t)ey faced one anot)er3 eac) )ad one flank reac)ing t)e &ank of a ri+er. Po%/ey logically concentrated )is stronger ca+alry on t)e o/en flank along (it) all of )is slingers and arc)ers. Seeing t)is3 $aesar3 an e-/erienced and resourceful co%%ander3 not only /laced all of )is ca+alry t)ere &ut also for%ed as a reser+e a fourt) line of a&out 1> /ercent of )is )ea+y infantry. "e /laced t)is reser+e &e)ind )is o/en flank3 facing out(ard at rig)t angles to )is line. s &ot) $aesar and Po%/ey e-/ected3 Po%/eys ca+alry dro+e &ack $aesars and3 dis/laying good disci/line3 turned t)en against $aesars flank. $aesar t)en ordered for(ard )is reser+e co)orts ()o Jad+anced ra/idly (it) colours flyingL and Jattacked Po%/eys )orse (it) suc) fury t)at not one of t)e% stood t)eir ground.L "a+ing dri+en off t)e ca+alry3 t)e co)orts of $aesars )ea+y infantry reser+e %et t)e arc)ers and slingers ()o3 Jdefenceless3 (it)out su//ort3 (ere slain.L Pus)ing on and su//orted &y $aesars ca+alry3 ()ic) )ad returned to t)e field of &attle3 t)e reser+e attacked t)e flank of Po%/eys legions. 2it)er lacking a reser+e or una&le to de/loy it in ti%e3 Po%/ey3 a great general3 (ent do(n in defeat in s/ite of )is s/lendid ca+alry. But against a less articulated infantry t)an Ro%an legions3 t)e ca+alry al%ost surely %ust )a+e succeeded in (inning t)e &attle &y reac)ing t)e flank and rear of $aesars ar%y. lt)oug) t)e le-andrian &attle /itted lig)t infantry skir%is)ers against lig)t infantry skir%is)ers3 one line of )ea+y infantry against anot)er3 and t)e ca+alry on t)e flanks against t)e ene%ys ca+alry3 t)e ideal re%ained t)at of &ringing a stronger (ea/on syste% against an inferior one. 0)e triu%/) of *reek )ea+y infantry against i%%o&ilised Persian lig)t infantry3 t)e +ictory of Da+elin# t)ro(ing /eltasts o+er slo(er#%o+ing )o/lites3 and t)e success of t)e Part)ians against t)e Ro%ans re%ained t)e %odel for attaining tactical %astery (it) t)e least effort. But ()en o//onents /laced t)eir lig)t infantry a)ead as skir%is)ers to use t)eir %issiles against t)e )ea+y infantry3 identical (ea/on syste%s foug)t3 Dust as ca+alry foug)t ca+alry &ecause eac) general /laced it on t)e (ings

4<

()ere it could reac) t)e )ea+y infantrys +ulnera&le flank and rear. t P)arsalus3 $aesar enDoyed a rare co%&ined#ar%s &attle success in /itting one &etter (ea/on syste% against anot)er ()en )is )ea+y infantry defeated first Po%/eys ca+alry and t)en )is lig)t infantry3 o/ening t)e (ay for )is o(n lig)t infantry and ca+alry3 as (ell as )is )ea+y infantry flank force3 to attack t)e ene%ys flank and rear. 0o /ut t)e stronger (ea/on syste% against t)e (eaker re%ained t)e goal3 &ut one difficult to ac)ie+e ()en ar%ies )ad essentially t)e sa%e co%&ination of (ea/on syste%s. $aesars ra/id success3 like t)ose of t)e +ictors at $annae and Pa%a3 e-)i&its )o( %uc) .uicker a &attle (it) s)ock action %ay end ()en co%/ared (it) t)e slo( (ork of t)e /eltasts Da+elins or t)e Part)ian arro(s against $rassus at $arr)ae. But3 unlike $aesars at P)arsalus3 t)e Part)ians +ictory (as ine+ita&le3 founded as it (as on t)e e%/loy%ent of tactics and (ea/on syste%s t)at )ad an in+inci&le3 intrinsic ad+antage on t)e terrain of t)e &attle. 0)e certainty of success for a do%inant (ea/on syste% %ade it t)e c)oice of t)e ancients ()ene+er t)ey )ad t)e o//ortunity. 0)e )o/e t)at ele/)ants (ould constitute a su/erior (ea/on syste% dou&tless does %uc) to e-/lain t)eir /ersistent3 &ut usually futile3 e%/loy%ent in &attle. 0)e /ara%ount (ea/on syste% a&olis)es any distinction &et(een attack and defence. le-anders )ea+y ca+alry (on for )i% on t)e offensi+e3 &ut Part)ian ca+alry3 and t)e /eltasts ()o defeated )o/lites3 attacked to %ake use of t)eir su/re%acy3 e+en t)oug) t)ey )ad only defensi+e o&Decti+es. 'ortifications al%ost al(ays /ro+ided one sure resource for t)e defenders. $a+alry (as useless against (alls and ditc)es3 and against infantry t)e defenders of fortifications co%&ined t)e &enefits of &ot) lig)t and )ea+y infantry. So/)isticated siege (arfare redressed %uc) of t)e i%&alance &et(een t)e t(o3 &ut not enoug) to de/ri+e t)e defence of an ad+antage. 0)e co%%ander on t)e offensi+e ()o faced a /redo%inant (ea/on syste% s)ould3 if )e )ad learned anyt)ing fro% $rassuss disaster3 a&andon )is aggressi+e designs. If &ot) attackers and defenders )ad essentially t)e sa%e (ea/on syste%s3 and t)e defender did not take refuge &e)ind fortifications3 t)e ancients soug)t anot)er %eans of assailing t)eir o//onents (eakness. "ea+y infantry3 for%ida&le against a frontal assault of t)eir o(n kind and nearly in+inci&le against suc) a c)arge &y t)e )ea+y ca+alry3 /ro+ed to )a+e +ulnera&le flanks and rear3 e+en to t)e (eaker )ea+y ca+alry (ea/on syste%. In t)e en+elo/ing attack t)e ancients found anot)er %eans of striking at t)eir o//onents (eakness. !it) /)alan-es t)at drifted to t)e rig)t3 suc) en+elo/%ents occurred naturally3 t)e %odest degree of articulation /ossessed &y t)e S/artans gi+ing t)e% t)e a&ility to e-/loit t)is %ore effecti+ely t)an t)eir o//onents. 2/a%inondas at ,euctra carried out an en+elo/%ent not &ased on an initial o+erla//ing of t)e ene%y line. "e also )ad t)e aid of ca+alry t)at screened )is %o+e%ents and /re+ented t)e S/artans fro% seeing t)e Sacred Band3 facilitating )is en+elo/%ent. 0)e /)alan-s lack of articulation %ade its use for en+elo/%ent difficult3 and le-ander s)o(ed t)at t)e ca+alrys %o&ility and %odest re.uire%ent for a careful array %ade it &est suited for t)e offensi+e tactic of t)e en+elo/ing %o+e%ent. 0)is a&ility to %o+e %ore ra/idly t)an t)e infantry and to go into co%&at in essentially t)e sa%e for%ation in ()ic) t)ey %o+ed to &attle %ade )orse%en ideal offensi+e troo/s ()o )ad as t)eir %ost decisi+e %ission t)e attack on t)e ene%ys flanks and rear. !eaker t)an t)e )ea+y infantry in frontal co%&at3 t)e ca+alry )ad for%ida&le /o(ers ()en it struck t)e ene%ys un/rotected flank and rear. !)et)er in+ol+ing one or %ore (ea/on syste%s3 co%&at &et(een ar%ies (it) essentially t)e sa%e co%/osition re+ol+ed around en+elo/%ent. 'ro% t)is funda%ental tactic de+elo/ed &ot) t)e conce/t of t)e reser+e and t)e /ractice of generals ()o co%%anded3 rat)er t)an foug)t in t)e &attle. 0)e Ro%an i%/ro+e%ent in articulation %ade easier t)e creation of a reser+e as (ell as /ro+ided /rotection to t)e flank and rear and ena&led t)e% to use infantry for en+elo/%ents. Back

4=

LOGISTICS

(he !rovision of Soldiers and Su''lies

,ogistics e%&races t)e %et)ods of su//lying ar%ies and %o+ing t)e% fro% /lace to /lace7 &roadly construed3 it can e+en include t)eir initial creation. 5ften (ar )as su//orted (ar3 and +ictorious ar%ies )a+e %aintained t)e%sel+es at an ene%ys e-/ense. In t)e a&sence of t)is o//ortunity3 t)e si6e of a nations ar%ed forces de/ends on its /o/ulation and its /roducti+ity. In ancient ti%es %ost /eo/le engaged in far%ing3 sustaining t)e%sel+es and /roducing an e-cess sufficient to feed only .uite s%all /o/ulations of %erc)ants3 artisans3 /riests3 and officials. society of suc) lo( econo%ic /roducti+ity could kee/ under ar%s only a s%all /ro/ortion of its /o/ulace. 2+en ()en nations )ad a (ell#de+elo/ed %oney econo%y3 /ri%iti+e syste%s of ta-ation3 finance3 and &anking %ade raising %oney difficult. 5nly in co%/arati+ely %odern ti%es )a+e states )ad a+aila&le inco%e ta-es3 fractional reser+e &anking3 and de&t %onetisation to di+ert a large /ortion of national out/ut to su//ort (ar. In ancient ti%es e+en t)ese de+ices (ould )a+e /roduced little &ecause so %any of t)e /eo/le3 li+ing at su&sistence le+el3 )ad no sur/lus for (ar. 0)e Ro%an 2%/ire3 t)oug) a%/ly de+elo/ed /olitically and econo%ically3 still ke/t less t)an 1 /ercent of its /o/ulation in t)e ar%ed forces. ,ack of &ot) real and financial resources %ade t)e %ilitia a /o/ular %an/o(er syste%. 4nder t)e %ilitia syste% so%e or all free %ales )ad an o&ligation to ser+e in t)e ar%ed forces in ti%e of need. 4sually t)ey )ad to e.ui/ t)e%sel+es at t)eir o(n e-/ense3 t)oug) in consideration of t)is t)e state %ig)t e-cuse t)e% fro% certain ta-es. So%e %ilitias trained3 often s/ending significant a%ounts of ti%e /racticing essential skills. 5t)ers3 )o(e+er3 lacked co%&at skills and e+en s/ecialised ar%s3 co%ing to fig)t (it) agricultural tools as (ea/ons3 for e-a%/le. 0)oug) %ilitias so%eti%es su//le%ented /rofessional soldiers3 t)ey also often constituted t)e ()ole ar%ed forces of a state. 0)e %ilitia )ad an o&+ious ad+antage: it cost +ery little in /eaceti%e. 5ffsetting its lo(er cost (as its lo(er effecti+eness. 0)e *reeks long relied on a %ilitia and t)us (ere a&le to field as %any soldiers as t)e /rofessional ar%y of t)eir )uge Persian o//onent. 0)e Ro%ans3 too3 initially relied on %ilitia &ut3 like t)e *reeks3 found t)at continuous (arfare %ade t)e s/ecialist not only %ore effecti+e &ut also essential. 'urt)er3 a %ilitia could not fig)t a long (ar or e+en a long ca%/aign7 its %e%&ers )ad to return to ci+ilian occu/ations. Stated anot)er (ay3 a state could afford a large %ilitia &ut could only %o&ilise it for a &rief /eriod. 'or /rotracted (arfare3 /rofessionals3 ke/t under ar%s for an e-tended ti%e3 )ad o&+ious ad+antages. States not engaged in continuous (arfare could /refer a /rofessional ar%y3 a c)oice t)at &urdened its citi6ens (it) ta-es rat)er t)an t)e e-/ense3 incon+enience3 and /otential danger of %ilitary ser+ice. force co%/osed of e-/ensi+e career /rofessionals )ad t)e disad+antage of s%aller si6e &ut t)e &enefit of soldiers (it) a )ig)er le+el of /roficiency as co%/ared (it) t)e a%ateurs of a %ilitia. Su//lying an ar%y /resented no /articular difficulties in /eaceti%e. 0)e %ilitia forces /ro+ided for t)e%sel+es t)roug) t)eir nor%al ci+ilian /ursuits of agriculture3 co%%erce3 or industry. 0)e state easily %et t)e needs of t)e /rofessional soldiers &ecause t)ey (ere usually distri&uted t)roug)out t)e country and could readily o&tain t)eir %ost &asic need#for#food t)roug) t)e esta&lis)ed ci+ilian %arket organisation. 5nly t)e concentration of an ar%y3 ()et)er %ilitia or /rofessional3 created t)e /ro&le% of food su//ly. n ar%y gat)ered toget)er for a ca%/aign (as co%/ara&le to a to(n: it )ad a dense /o/ulation and did not /roduce its o(n /ro+isions. But3 unlike a to(n3 it )ad neit)er a /re#e-isting trans/ortation net(ork nor any esta&lis)ed /attern of local su//liers for its +arious needs. 0)e a&ility of an ar%y to &e furnis)ed (it) food in a gi+en +icinity de/ended in /art on t)e season of t)e year. If a region (as self#sufficient in food3 an ar%y could ac.uire &y /urc)ase or force ()at it needed fro% t)e stored food su//lies. I%%ediately after a )ar+est3 t)e ar%y (ould )a+e access to 4C

a years su//ly7 Dust &efore a )ar+est3 t)e ar%y (ould find t)e granaries e%/ty7 in t)e (inter3 )alf(ay &et(een )ar+ests3 t)e granaries (ould contain a si- %ont)s su//ly. 0)e ratio of t)e si6e of t)e ar%y to t)e /o/ulation of its area of concentration also affected t)e ar%ys a&ility to feed itself. If t)e ratio (ere one soldier /er ci+ilian3 t)en t)e soldiers could su&sist as long as t)e ci+ilians3 assu%ing t)e soldiers de/ri+ed t)e ci+ilians of e+eryt)ing. If t)ere (ere ten soldiers /er ci+ilian3 t)e soldiers could e-ist one#tent) as long as t)e ci+ilians. 'or e-a%/le3 if t)e ar%y reac)ed a region 1B> days /rior to )ar+est and it outnu%&ered t)e ci+ilians 1> to 13 it could re%ain for 1B days &efore it %ust %o+e3 assu%ing it found all of t)e a+aila&le food3 denied any of it to t)e ci+ilians3 and left t)e% destitute u/on de/arture. n ar%y t)at could s/read o+er a (ider area (ould3 of course3 effecti+ely reduce t)e ratio of soldiers to ci+ilians and so could su&sist longer. 'or a su&stantial ar%y to re%ain long in one /lace3 it usually )ad to )a+e access to (ater trans/ortation. Sailing +essels (ere usually s%all3 t)oug) lengt)s of u/ to 1B> feet (ere not unco%%on during t)e Ro%an 2%/ire7 t)eir &readt) (as one#fourt) to one#t)ird t)eir o+erall lengt)7 larger ones also )ad dee/3 decked#o+er )olds. 0)ese +essels %o+ed slo(ly3 due to t)eir stu&&y design and t)e use of only a single %ast. Pri%iti+e rigging li%ited t)eir a&ility to sail against t)e (ind3 and t)e lack of na+igational aids %eant t)at %ariners /referred to re%ain (it)in sig)t of land and to seek s)eltered /laces on s)ore to s/end t)e nig)t. t t)e sa%e ti%e3 e+en a s%all +essel could carry =>3>>> /ounds of /ro+isions3 a days rations for 2>3>>> %en. 0)e alternati+e # land trans/ortation %eant eit)er a slo(#%o+ing o- cart3 (it) an a+erage s/eed of t(o %iles /er )our3 or a donkey carrying a load of u/ to 1>> /ounds. 0)e lack of suita&le roads li%ited t)e use of carts3 and e+en after surfaced roads i%/ro+ed arterial trans/ortation3 t)e &est land trans/ortation cost at least t)irty ti%es t)at &y (ater. So ar%ies found great difficulty dra(ing su//lies any distance fro% t)eir i%%ediate area of concentration. 'or a su&stantial force to re%ain long in one /lace3 it usually )ad to )a+e access to (ater trans/ortation. n ar%y large in relation to t)e /o/ulation and resources of t)e region ()ere it .uartered itself (ould t)us )a+e to %o+e constantly to ne( areas unless it )ad con+enient (ater trans/ortation and )ad a&undant su//lies a+aila&le for t)e s)i/s to carry to it. 0)is logistic re.uire%ent to %o+e %ig)t (ell conflict (it) its need to resist or ad+ance against an ene%y. 0)e ca+alry /resented anot)er %aDor su//ly /ro&le%: t(enty /ounds a day constituting a fair allo(ance for a )orse on ca%/aign. If t)e nu%&er of )orses in t)e ar%y &ore t)e sa%e ratio to t)e nu%&er of )orses in t)e region of concentration3 as did t)e nu%&er of soldiers to ci+ilians3 t)en local su//lies could feed t)e )orses as (ell as t)e soldiers. If3 )o(e+er3 t)e ar%y )ad a larger /ro/ortion of )orses3 t)e a%ount of fodder (ould control )o( long an ar%y could re%ain in one /lace. n ar%y co%/osed entirely of ca+alry (ould )a+e to %o+e far %ore fre.uently t)an an ar%y co%/osed only of infantry. If t)e ar%y concentrated at so%e distance fro% t)e ene%y3 it could s/read out and dra( its su//lies fro% a greater area. If it )ad ca+alry3 t)e ca+alry could s/read itself e+en fart)er3 as its &etter %o&ility (ould /er%it it to regrou/ %ore .uickly t)an an e.ually dis/ersed infantry. In t)is (ay t)e greater %o&ility of ca+alry could often /er%it it to kee/ its need for fodder fro% forcing an ar%y to %o+e &efore t)e infantry )ad e-)austed t)e food resources of t)e region. Most of t)e ar%ys ot)er needs did not re.uire re/lenis)%ent during a ca%/aigning year. $lot)ing (ould last a season3 t)oug) s)oes3 if t)e ar%y )ad t)e%3 %ig)t need re/lace%ent. Since &attles occurred infre.uently3 t)e initial su//ly of %issiles (ould usually suffice. rtisans in an ar%y could re/air and e+en fa&ricate needed ite%s. $li%ate also affected %ilitary o/erations. $old (eat)er and t)e often#conco%itant lack of grass for ani%als seriously i%/eded3 t)oug) rarely /re+ented3 (inter ca%/aigning.

4B

0)e .uality of t)e roads controlled t)e ar%ys %o+e%ent &y dictating its rate of %arc)ing and its use of /ack ani%als or ()eeled trans/ort. Mountainous terrain i%/lied /oor roads e-ce/t in t)e +alleys. 0)e nu%&er of roads (ere i%/ortant3 /articularly if an ar%y (ere large in relation to t)e /o/ulation of t)e area t)roug) ()ic) it %arc)ed. Suc) an ar%y could find it necessary to s/read out and %arc) on se+eral roads to find enoug) for t)e %en and )orses to eat. 0)us t)e %o+e%ent of ar%ies de/ended on a nu%&er of +aria&les. S%all ar%ies (it) fe( )orses (ould find t)e%sel+es little tra%%elled &y logistical considerations and could o/erate fairly (ell concentrated3 re%aining in one /lace for a su&stantial lengt) of ti%e. large force3 strong in ca+alry3 )ad to dis/erse as %uc) as /ossi&le and %o+e fre.uently. 0)e *reek %ilitia%an /ro+ided )is o(n ar%s3 as did %ercenaries. In t)e &rief ca%/aigns ty/ical of t)e (arfare &et(een *reek city#states3 t)e soldiers carried on t)eir &acks t)e ()eat needed to %ake flour and &ake &read3 t)e sta/le of t)eir diet. 0)ey &roug)t ()eat3 and )and#%ills to grind it3 &ecause it ke/t &etter t)an flour. 0)e %any ser+ants and sla+es acco%/anying a )o/lite ar%y )el/ed (it) t)e carrying3 ground t)e flour3 and &aked t)e &read. 0)e soldiers su//le%ented t)eir &read diet (it) %eat3 c)eese3 and +egeta&les suc) as onions. Before t)e &eginning of t)e s)ort ca%/aign3 t)e state /ro+ided t)e soldiers (it) %oney to &uy su//lies3 s/ecifying )o( %any days t)e ca%/aign (ould last. But ot)er(ise t)e go+ern%ent rarely %ade any /ro+ision for su//lying t)e soldiers. 5n long ca%/aigns t)e soldiers (ere e-/ected to /urc)ase food and drink fro% t)eir /ay. !it) (ages co%/ara&le to t)ose of skilled crafts%en3 t)e soldiers could readily %eet t)eir needs unless a s)ortage forced u/ /rices. 0)e go+ern%ent rarely furnis)ed a su//ly de/ot e+en for long ca%/aigns3 antici/ating t)at its ar%ies (ould li+e on t)e country. In a ca%/aign in t)e territory of allies3 soldiers (ere e-/ected to /urc)ase su//lies3 &ut t)ey often follo(ed t)is /ractice e+en in ene%y territory3 ()ere t)e in+aders could li+e at t)e ene%ys e-/ense and use loot for /ay. In &ot) instances t)e ar%ies de/ended on t)e %erc)ants ()o acco%/anied t)e ar%y to offer t)eir goods for /urc)ase &y t)e soldiers. 0)us3 for its co%%issary3 t)e *reeks trusted to /ri+ate enter/rise3 e+en in ene%y territory. In a )ostile country3 t)e uncertain a&ility of t)e soldiers to find su//lies and t)e dis/ersal necessary ()ile t)ey looked %ade co%%anders rely on nati+e %erc)ants3 ()o (ere %ore likely to kno( t)e location of t)e su//lies t)at ene%y territory offered. 0)oug) de/ending on t)e acti+ities of /ri+ate entre/reneurs3 t)e *reek ar%ies really )ad a /ri%iti+e3 centralised co%%issary syste%. !)en3 for e-a%/le3 one *reek co%%ander ca/tured ene%y s)i/s laden (it) food su//lies3 )e sold t)e food and used t)e /roceeds to /ay t)e %en ()o3 in turn3 /urc)ased t)eir food fro% t)e %erc)ants. 0)is syste% also assured t)at /rofits %ade in t)e ene%ys country inured to t)e state or t)e general. Back

"ogistics llustrated by #le$ander%s !ersian Cam'aign

0)e Persian ca%/aign of le-ander t)e *reat /resents a ready illustration of an e-cellent ancient su//ly organisation at (ork. 4nlike t)e *reeks3 le-ander and )is fat)er did not trust t)e initiati+e of /ri+ate entre/reneurs for ()at t)ey needed &ut )ad an ar%y organisation t)at /ro+ided t)e su//lies for t)e )uge force asse%&led for t)e Persian ca%/aign. In addition3 le-anders fat)er )ad %ini%ised t)e logistical re.uire%ents of t)e ar%y &y reducing t)e nu%&er of ser+ants su//orting t)e soldiers. Since3 unlike t)e *reek )o/lite3 t)e Macedonian )ad to carry )is o(n ar%our and (ea/ons3 le-anders ar%y )ad only a&out one ser+ant to e+ery four soldiers. Because a %an can %arc) for long distances &earing eig)ty /ounds3 t)e ar%y %o+ed %uc) of its o(n &aggage &ut3 (it) fe(er ser+ants3 could carry less of its o(n food.

4@

'or t)e re%ainder of its trans/ort t)e ar%y de/ended on /ack#)orses and %ules3 eac) )a+ing a ca/acity of a&out 2>> /ounds. In s/ite of t)e trut) of t)e a/)oris% t)at an ani%al can /ull %ore t)an it can &ear on its &ack3 t)e Macedonian ar%y /referred /ack ani%als to (agons or carts. Not only could t)ese &easts %ore easily follo( t)e ar%y o+er difficult terrain3 &ut also t)e inefficient )arness used in ancient ti%es ga+e carts and (agons only a s%all %argin of ad+antage o+er /ack ani%als. :oked %uc) like an o-3 t)e )orse or %ule could not e-ert )is %a-i%u% strengt) /ulling &ecause t)e )arness /ressed on )is (ind/i/e. 0)e o- )ad %ore strengt) t)an a )orse and could /ull effecti+ely (it) )is neck3 &ut its te%/era%ent (as unrelia&le3 it )ad less endurance t)an t)e )orse3 and it %o+ed at t(o %iles /er )our co%/ared (it) t)e )orses four. 0)e o- could not e+en kee/ u/ (it) t)e infantrys a+erage %arc)ing rate of t(o and one )alf %iles an )our. 0)e ar%y also needed /ack ani%als to trans/ort suc) e.ui/%ent as tents3 siege a//aratus3 assorted tools3 %edical su//lies3 and ot)er ite%s3 at least one /ack ani%al for e+ery fifty %en in t)e force. 0)us3 ()en le-ander crossed into sia3 )is ar%y3 its ser+ants3 and ot)er /ersonnel /ro&a&ly nu%&ered =<3>>>7 )e (ould )a+e needed 13?>> /ack ani%als for t)e e.ui/%ent not &orne &y )u%an &eings. Persian Em ire (dotted line indi(ates Ale*ander"s mar(h! Back

le-ander ti%ed t)is ca%/aign to &egin Dust &efore t)e )ar+est. n earlier start (ould )a+e found )i% in a country of e-)austed granaries (it) so%e of t)e /o/ulation on t)e +erge of star+ation as t)ey a(aited t)e ri/ening of t)e cro/s. Starting at t)is ti%e also /rotected )is su//ly +essels fro% t)e stronger Persian na+y (it) its t)ousands of oars%en and sailors3 ()ic) could not take t)e sea until t)e ne( cro/ )ad furnis)ed t)e necessary stock to /ro+ision t)e fleet. 5n entering sia3 le-ander )ad a ten#day store of grain3 t)ree /ounds /er day /er %an and ten /ounds /er day for t)e ani%als. "e ke/t %ost of t)is on s)i/s &ecause for eac) days su//lies t)e ar%y carried )e (ould )a+e needed %ore t)an 131>> additional /ack ani%als to %o+e t)e 2=@3>>> /ounds of grain for =<3>>> /eo/le3 =31>> ca+alry )orses3 and 13?>> /ack ani%als. But suc) an initial in+entory ga+e )i% so%e freedo% fro% foraging ()ile )e %et t)e Persian ar%y on t)e *ranicus and esta&lis)ed )is control of nort)#(estern natolia. "a+ing defeated t)e Persian ar%y3 le-ander3 follo(ing in /art t)e dictates of logistics3 ad+anced along a coastal route ()ere )e found /roducti+e agriculture and to(ns (it) a sufficient trans/ortation net(ork for gat)ering in food. "e t)us su//lied )is ar%y &y re.uisitioning or &uying fro% to(ns ()ere food (ould &e a&undant at )ar+est. 0)e t)ickly settled coastal route also offered good roads for %arc)ing3 so t)e ar%y could %o+e as %uc) as fifteen %iles /er day (it) a day of <>

rest eac) (eek &ot) to refres) t)e %en and to allo( t)e /ack ani%als a day (it)out t)eir loads as (ell as ti%e for gra6ing to su//le%ent t)eir grain diet. 0)e route also )ad %aDor ri+ers3 funda%ental to t)e ar%ys daily re.uire%ent of o+er @>3>>> gallons of (ater to furnis) a )alf gallon a day for eac) )u%an and eig)t gallons for eac) ani%al. le-ander could de/end on s)i/s for carrying su//lies fro% /oint to /oint along t)e coast and e+en for &ringing (ater ()en )e &esieged a to(n on a (aterless /eninsula. large %erc)ant s)i/ of t)e day could carry 4>> tons3 t)e sa%e load as 43>>> /ack ani%als. 0)e Persians co%%anded t)e sea3 &ut le-ander could rely on )is cargo s)i/s %aintaining )is co%%unications along t)e natolian s)ore &ecause ancient (ars)i/s could re%ain at sea for only a li%ited ti%e. s%all3 lig)t (ars)i/ carried 2>> sailors and oars%en to /ro+ide t)e fig)ting /o(er as (ell as for /ro/ulsion inde/endent of t)e (ind. But t)e 2>> %en re.uired =>> /ounds of food and 1>> gallons GB>> /oundsH of (ater a day. 0)e s)i/ in ()ic) t)e design )ad dedicated e+eryt)ing to %ini%ising (eig)t and &ulk to en)ance its s/eed could carry only a circu%scri&ed a%ount of food and (ater. 0)e fleet lacked t)e a&ility to cruise far and counted on staying close to land for fre.uent re/lenis)%ent of su//lies. 5n one occasion3 Macedonian troo/s dro+e off t)e Persian fleet &y /atrolling t)e s)ores of a ri+er %out) and /re+enting a landing to restore t)e fleets (ater su//lies. fleet so tet)ered &y logistics )ad great difficulty %aintaining a tig)t &lockade. le-ander reac)ed sout)#(estern natolia &y autu%n3 su&duing t)e country as )e ad+anced. "e di+ided )is )uge ar%y during t)e (inter3 ()ic) &ot) facilitated su//ly and &roug)t %ore of t)e country under )is control. 0)e follo(ing year )e &egan )is %arc) in late 8uly3 in accord (it) t)e later )ar+est of t)e )ig)er ele+ations of central natolia. But )e )ad to %ake /re/arations a)ead of ti%e to /ass t)roug) desolate terrain t)at )ad +ery little (ater. Since t)e /ack ani%als alone drank eig)t gallons of (ater daily3 )e could not conte%/late carrying (ater. fter first securing t)e su&%ission of t)e /eo/le of t)e area and /ro&a&ly taking )ostages to ensure t)eir continued loyalty3 )e sent out ad+ance /arties along )is /roDected route. 0)ese &roug)t su//lies (it) t)e% and also &oug)t or re.uisitioned %ore locally to create de/ots. In addition3 &y da%%ing u/ t)e s%all strea%s t)ey tri/led t)eir yield of (ater3 &ecause t(o#t)irds of t)e (ater in a flo(ing strea% runs a(ay fro% soldiers trying to .uenc) t)eir t)irst. Because of t)ese /re/arations3 ()ic) de/ended on t)e coo/eration of t)e local go+ern%ent3 le-ander could %arc) eig)ty#t(o %iles t)roug) a region initially (it)out food or (ater. 'or )is %arc) along t)e eastern coast of t)e Mediterranean to 2gy/t3 sea trans/ort /ro+ed indis/ensa&le. 1uring t)e se+en#%ont) siege of t)e fortified /ort city of 0yre3 a ri+er near t)e city /ro+ided le-anders ar%y (it) an ade.uate su//ly of (ater3 &ut t)e adDacent agricultural area /roduced less t)an a tent) of t)e ar%ys grain needs. 0)oug) /ack ani%als could )aul in grain fro% a si-ty#%ile radius3 e+en (it)in t)is radius t)e area lacked sufficient /roducti+ity to sustain t)e &esiegers. 0rans/ort &y (ater %ade /ossi&le t)e siege. In its )ar+est ti%e %arc) sout) fro% 0yre to(ard 2gy/t t)e ar%y found a&undant grain su//lies &ut )ad to de/end on (ater trans/ort for t)e ar%ys drinking (ater. $on.uering 2gy/t in t)e late fall3 le-ander s/ent t)e (inter in t)e fertile Nile Valley. In t)is long (ar to con.uer t)e +ast Persian 2%/ire and in+ade India3 le-ander encountered logistical o&stacles greater t)an t)ose )e %et in )is %arc) fro% t)e "elles/ont to 2gy/t3 &ut e+en t)is /art of t)e ca%/aign s)o(s t)e i%/ortance of su//ly and t)e constraints logistics i%/osed not only on t)e %o+e%ent of ar%ies &ut also on t)eir re%aining in /lace. le-anders return fro% India e-)i&ited t)e e-tre%e of t)e )a6ards t)at %arc)es could /resent. le-ander /lanned to %arc) t)roug) t)e *edrosian 1esert on t)e nort) coast of t)e ra&ian Sea &y follo(ing t)e coast and dra(ing su//lies fro% t)e fleet. 0)e ar%y (ould control t)e coast and furnis) t)e fleet (it) (ater fro% t)e inter%ittently flo(ing ri+ers in t)e region3 ()ic) t)e su%%er

<1

%onsoon rains (ould fill. But t)e +ery %onsoon (inds t)at &roug)t t)e %oisture ke/t t)e fleet fro% sailing and forced le-ander and )is ar%y3 una&le to retrace its ste/s o+er a territory already &ot) foraged and de+astated to &ring t)e local rulers to ter%s3 to %arc) 1<> %iles t)roug) desert (it) little to eat and long distances &et(een t)e ri+ers. nd3 according to t)e )istorian of le-anders con.uests3 on its %arc) t)e ar%y J%et (it) lofty ridges of dee/ sand3 not closely /ressed and )ardened3 &ut suc) as recei+ed t)ose ()o ste//ed u/on it Dust as if t)ey (ere ste//ing into %ud3 or rat)er into un#trodden sno(.L 5nly le-anders c)aris%atic leaders)i/ carried t)e ar%y t)roug) suc) an ordeal. 0)at t)e soldiers Jslaug)tered %ost of t)e )orses and %ulesL for food %eant t)e ar%y )ad little %eans of carrying t)eir disa&led. J0)us so%e (ere left &e)ind along t)e roads on account of sickness3 ot)ers fro% fatigue or t)e effects of t)e )eat3 or fro% not &eing a&le to &ear u/ against t)e droug)t.L 0o a+oid t)e )eat3 t)e ar%y Jgenerally %ade t)e %arc)es &y nig)t3 so%e of t)e %en (ere o+erco%e &y slee/ on t)e road7 after(ards rousing u/ again3 t)ose ()o still )ad strengt) follo(ed u/on t)e tracks of t)e ar%y7 &ut only a fe( out of %any o+ertook t)e %ain &ody in safety. Most of t)e% /eris)ed in t)e sand3 like %en getting out of t)eir course at sea.L 2+en t)e rain3 ()ic) filled t)e ri+ers and ke/t t)e sur+i+ors fro% dying of t)irst3 also could /ro+e a dangerous ene%y. J5n one occasion3 ()en t)e ar%y &i+ouacked3 for t)e sake of (ater3 near a s%all &rook ()ic) (as a (inter torrent3 a&out t)e second (atc) of t)e nig)t t)e &rook ()ic) flo(ed t)ere (as suddenly s(elled &y t)e rains in t)e %ountains ()ic) )ad fallen un/ercei+ed &y t)e soldiers. 0)e torrent ad+anced (it) so great a flood as to destroy %ost of t)e (i+es and c)ildren of t)e %en ()o follo(ed t)e ar%y3 and to s(ee/ a(ay all of t)e royal &aggage as (ell as all t)e &easts of &urden still re%aining. 0)e soldiers3 after great e-ertions3 (ere )ardly a&le to sa+e t)e%sel+es.L 0ruly le-ander acco%/lis)ed a great feat to &ring a .uarter of )is ar%y t)roug) t)is %arc). 0)is e-/erience %ost dra%atically de%onstrates ()y ancient ar%ies )ad to /lan t)eir %arc)es to /ass t)roug) regions of ade.uate food and (ater at a ti%e to a+oid t)e /eriod &efore t)e )ar+est. 0)ey needed t)e good (ill of t)e local in)a&itants &ut could rely on coercion7 &ut force /roduced less food t)an coo/eration. 1is/ersing an ar%y in s%all grou/s and %arc)ing o+er different routes greatly facilitated t)e /ro+isioning of larger forces3 and scattering an ar%y during t)e (inter ena&led it to dra( on a %ore a%/le area of agricultural /roduction. Su//ly fro% a de/ot in t)e rear de/ended on trans/ort &y sea or ri+er &ecause /ack ani%als could carry useful a%ounts only fro% (it)in a radius of si-ty %iles. 0)e use of (ater trans/ort fro% a distance i%/lied of course3 a logistic organisation Gand t)e %oney or /o(erH to )a+e su//lies a+aila&le for t)e (ater trans/ort to con+ey to t)e distant ar%y. le-anders Persian ca%/aign s)o(ed t)at )is co%/etently organised kingdo% )ad all of t)ese logistic re.uisites7 e-ce/t for t)e one near#disaster in t)e desert3 le-ander and )is ar%y re%ained ade.uately /ro+ided for t)roug)out )is long Persian ca%/aign. le-anders efficient syste% also clearly e-e%/lifies t)e logistic organisation and %et)ods (it) ()ic) t)e Ro%an state %aintained its ar%ies. 0)e e-cellence of Ro%an logistics al(ays furnis)ed t)e% (it) /arity and usually su/eriority o+er t)eir ene%ies in t)is res/ect and so for%ed a funda%ental su//ort for t)e successful strategy of t)eir con.uest and conser+ation of t)eir e%/ire. Back

STRATEGY

!ersisting and )aiding Strategies +istinguished

Military strategy co%&ines tactics and logistics to s)a/e t)e conduct of o/erations. s traditionally defined3 strategy )as t)ree /arts. *rand strategy integrates /olitical o&Decti+es (it) %ilitary %eans

<2

to deter%ine t)e &road outlines of t)e /lan for t)e conduct of (ar. Strategy /ro/er )as to do (it) t)e concentration and %o+e%ent of ar%ies and na+ies. *rand tactics3 t)e lo(est &ranc) of strategy3 concerns t)e %anoeu+re of ar%ies3 usually t)e acti+ities t)at create t)e conditions for &attle. 0)is &ook uses t)e ter% strategy to designate strategy /ro/er and grand tactics. 0)is )as &een t)e traditional /ro+ince of t)e ter% strategy. 0)roug)out t)is (ork t)e ter% (ill )a+e a /urely %ilitary connotation3 and (ill not deal (it) /olitics or econo%ics or ot)er suc) factors affecting t)e relations &et(een /o(ers7 considerations %ore /ro/erly confined to t)e conce/t of grand strategy. 0)is definition differs little3 if at all3 fro% t)at &ranc) of t)e art of (ar t)at t)e 4.S. ar%y currently calls o/erations. 8ust as ancient (arfare e-)i&its %ost of t)e +aria&les t)at )a+e concerned tacticians in %odern ti%es3 so also does it offer e-a%/les of al%ost e+ery di%ension of strategy. 0)e great %asters of t)e art of (ar in ancient ti%es dis/layed a /erce/ti+eness and so/)istication in t)eir strategy t)at t)eir successors )a+e rarely sur/assed. !arfare in t)e ancient (orld %ade %uc) use of raids3 ()ic) (ere te%/orary intrusions into a )ostile country3 as (ell as in+asions3 ()ic) (ere te%/orary or /er%anent occu/ations of t)e territory in+aded. 0)oug) a for% of %ilitary action3 raids often )ad o&Decti+es t)at (ere not solely %ilitary. foray into foreign territory3 for e-a%/le3 %ig)t )a+e )ad t)e /urely econo%ic goal of carrying off &ooty3 t)e raiders seeking to a+oid any %ilitary conflict. Suc) an incursion %ig)t also )a+e )ad a /olitical /ur/ose3 and destruction of ()at t)e raiders did or could not carry off added to its effecti+eness. Suc) an inroad Gor t)e t)reat of suc) an inroadH soug)t to e-tract /olitical concessions fro% t)e raided country. If t)e raiders )ad ca+alry and t)eir o//onents did not3 t)ey %ig)t carry out t)e foray (it)out serious risk of co%&at. !it) a (ea/on syste% si%ilar to t)at of t)e defender3 a raider ran a )ig)er risk of conflict &ut could still de/end on t)e /ri%acy of retreat o+er /ursuit. Regardless of t)e o&Decti+e Gecono%ic3 /olitical3 or %ilitaryH raids /resented si%ilar /ro&le%s for t)e e-ecutants and defenders. nd t)e transitoriness of /resence did not necessarily %ean conflict (as to &e a+oided: a su/erior ar%y %ig)t actually seek &attle in ene%y territory (it)out intending to re%ain to control t)e country in+aded. 5ne %ay t)us distinguis) &et(een raids and a /ersisting strategy of in+asion. !)ereas t)e for%er used a te%/orary /resence in )ostile territory3 a /ersisting offensi+e strategy en+isioned a longer3 e+en /er%anent3 occu/ation of t)e territory of t)e ad+ersary or )is allies. /ersisting defensi+e strategy soug)t to /re+ent suc) an occu/ation. 5n &ot) t)e defensi+e and t)e offensi+e3 t)e /ersisting strategy en+isioned t)e /ossi&ility of conflict &et(een t)e /rinci/al )ostile forces7 raiders3 on t)e ot)er )and3 often could attain t)eir o&Decti+e (it)out significant %ilitary conflict and fre.uently soug)t to do so. 0)e ancient *reeks often used a raiding strategy. 0)ey )ad li%ited /olitical goals and rarely soug)t t)e o+ert)ro( of t)eir ene%y. 0)eir %et)od in+ol+ed %aking a foray into t)e neig)&ouring city# state Dust &efore )ar+est and destroying t)e cro/s &y %arc)ing t)roug) t)e fields. 0)ey could acco%/lis) %ore serious destruction &y &urning &uildings and cutting do(n oli+e trees and gra/e +ines. 0)e in+aded state )ad a c)oice: to yield3 to lose its agricultural resources3 or to call out its )o/lite %ilitia and fig)t. If t)e in+aded state resisted3 t)e &attle usually took /lace &y %utual consent on le+el ground. If t)e defenders )ad taken u/ a strong /osition on a )ill3 t)e raider could Jrefuse to %eet us on suc) ground &ut go around3L e-/lained t)e )istorian Poly&ius3 Jde+astating t)e territory.L 0)is (ould not Dust force t)e defender fro% )is strong /osition &ut te%/t )i% to strike t)e intruders3 dis/ersed to carry out t)e (ork of destruction. If t)e in+ader )ad in+ited attack fro% a strong /osition3 t)e defender could (ait )i% out &ecause )e could easily su//ly )i%self ()ile t)e attacker3 i%%o&ile in

<?

a )ostile country3 (ould )a+e to lea+e )is /osition to find food. 2+en if t)e intruder could %anage to (ait in )is strong /osition3 )e (ould lose %uc) of t)e le+erage of )is raid &ecause t)e defender (ould &e gat)ering in )is )ar+est. 0)e stronger contestant )ad to rely on t)ese de+astating raids &ecause )e could not co%/el t)e inferior &elligerent to face )i% in circu%stances t)at did not nullify )is greater strengt). 0)e (eaker ar%y could take refuge &e)ind city (alls3 offer &attle in a strong /osition3 or si%/ly take ad+antage of its a&ility to retreat faster t)an t)e %ore /o(erful force could /ursue. In fact3 t)e (eaker could si%/ly %o+e a&out erratically3 feeding off t)e country in ()ic) it %anoeu+red3 and fairly easily elude t)e stronger. $o%%anders in ancient (arfare )ad to contend (it) t)eir ina&ility to induce an un(illing o//onent to fig)t a &attle. 1estructi+e raids /ro+ided &ot) a su&stitute for a +ictory in t)e field and a %eans of coercing t)e inferior ar%y into fig)ting. gainst agricultural econo%ies t)e raiding strategy forced an ene%y eit)er to %ake t)e desired /olitical concessions or to fig)t to /rotect t)e cro/s. If t)e defender /ercei+ed t)e c)ances of defeat (ere greater t)an t)e &urden of /olitical concessions3 )e (ould yield7 if not3 )e (ould fig)t. But t)ere (as a t)ird alternati+e: if t)e defender t)oug)t t)e raiders /olitical de%ands too &urdenso%e and t)e c)ance of +ictory in &attle too slig)t3 )e %ig)t &ear t)e cost of t)e raid and kee/ )is ar%y in its strong /osition or (it)in t)e (alls of )is city. 0)e *reeks used a raid to /ursue si%ultaneously %ilitary and /olitical o&Decti+es. If t)e destruction of t)e ene%ys cro/s caused t)e concession3 t)e foray (ould )a+e attained its /olitical ai% directly. If it /ro+oked t)e (eaker ene%y ar%y to fig)t3 t)e incursion (ould )a+e attained a %ilitary goal3 and t)e +ictory in t)e resulting &attle could lead to t)e desired /olitical result. 0)is dual#/ur/ose raid re/resented only one ty/e of raid and (as fairly distincti+e in its co%&ination of %ilitary and /olitical o&Decti+es. 0)e +ictor in t)e )o/lite &attle usually (on t)e s)ort (ar3 e+en t)oug) t)e &attle %ig)t not &e +ery &loody3 nor t)e losses of t)e defeated +ery se+ere. But in +ie( of suc) a +ery li%ited /olitical o&Decti+e as t)e anne-ation of a s%all /iece of territory3 a single %ilitary action of %oderate conse.uences sufficed to attain or defeat t)e /ur/oses of t)e (ar. 4sually t)e energy e-/ended in a (ar (as /ro/ortional to t)e /olitical goal3 %odest ai%s eliciting a s%all effort3 great o&Decti+es %aDor and /erse+ering e-ertions. If t)e issue of t)e (ar %eant %ore to one side t)an to anot)er3 t)e contender t)at sa( t)e greater stake in t)e (ar (ould %ake /ro/ortionately greater endea+ours. 0)e &est of ancient soldiers and states%en sa( no reason to %ake unli%ited %ilitary efforts for li%ited o&Decti+es. 0)e *reeks raiding strategy (as a direct result of t)e *reeks de/endence on %ilitia forces: standing ar%ies %ig)t )a+e fortified strong /oints and contested t)e raiders at t)e &order. 0)e use of %ilitia also )ad %uc) to do (it) t)e &re+ity of (ars. Neit)er co%&atant could afford to kee/ )is forces %o&ilised for +ery long and so &e a(ay fro% ci+ilian occu/ations in a society close to t)e %argin of e-istence. 0)e raiding strategy also relied on t)e s%all geogra/)ical si6e of t)e contenders and t)e relati+ely large si6e of t)eir %ilitia in relation to t)e s/ace and cro/s to &e defended. 9ing of S/arta at (ar (it) Persia used raids to de+astate /art of sia Minor3 an area +astly larger t)an all of *reece. "is use of t)is strategy against a s%all /art of a distant /ro+ince co%/letely failed to coerce t)e 9ing of Persia residing far a(ay in Meso/ota%ia. Back

#le$ander%s Cam'aign, #n -$em'lification of Combat. "ogistic. and !ersisting Strategies

le-ander t)e *reats in+asion of t)e Persian 2%/ire of 1arius III /resents an e-cellent e-a%/le of t)e /ersisting strategy of ai%ing at occu/ation of t)e ene%ys territory. le-anders /olitical o&Decti+es (ere too a%&itious to attain e+en &y t)e +ery e-tensi+e and destructi+e raids )is )uge ar%y could )a+e carried out in Persian territory.

<4

!it) as %any as ?<3>>> and /er)a/s nearly <>3>>> infantry and ca+alry3 le-ander )ad a larger ar%y t)an t)e Persians forces in natolia and a for%ida&le (ea/on syste% essentially unkno(n to t)e ene%y in )is $o%/anion )ea+y ca+alry. lt)oug) t)e Persian ar%y )ad a strong force of )ired *reek )o/lites3 it recognised le-anders /re/onderance in infantry. In t)e a&sence of t)e 9ing3 t)is /ro+oked a de&ate a%ong t)e Persian generals as to ()et)er t)eir strategy s)ould e%&race co%&at against le-anders %en or ()et)er t)ey s)ould direct t)eir efforts to(ard defeating )is ar%y &y destroying its logistic &ase. 0)e leader of t)e *reek infantry ad+ised t)e council of generals and go+ernors Jnot to risk a conflict (it) t)e Macedonians3 since t)ey (ere far su/erior to t)e%sel+es in infantry3 and le-ander (as t)ere in /erson7 ()ereas 1arius (as not (it) t)e%. "e ad+ised t)e% to ad+ance and destroy t)e fodder3 &y tra%/ling it under t)eir )orses )oofs3 to &urn t)e cro/s in t)e country3 and not e+en to s/are t)e +ery cities. M'or t)en le-ander3 said )e3 M(ill not &e a&le to stay in t)e land fro% lack of /ro+isions.L Suc) a logistic strategy3 if rigorously a//lied3 (ould surely )a+e defeated le-anders in+asion in a country t)at )ad only inter%ittent areas of intensi+e culti+ation. nd Persian co%%and of t)e sea (ould )a+e /re+ented le-ander fro% carrying food fro% *reece across t)e egean to su//ly )is ar%y. In addition3 t)e Persians )ad used suc) a logistic strategy earlier during t)e Plataea ca%/aign. Instead of assaulting t)e ene%ys ar%y to defeat a *reek ad+ance3 Mardonius3 t)e s)re(d Persian co%%ander3 )ad used )is su/er& ca+alry to raid t)e *reek ar%ys su//ly lines to co%/el a retreat fro% its strong /osition at Plataea. 0)e ca+alry )ad interce/ted so%e su//lies3 &ut t)en a detac)%ent of ca+alry sent to t)e *reek rear Jca%e u/on a &ody 5f <>> /ack ani%als ()ic) (ere Dust entering t)e /lain3 &ringing /ro+isions to t)e *reek ca%/... Seeing t)is /rey in t)eir /o(er3 t)e Persians set u/on t)e% and slaug)tered t)e%3 s/aring none3 neit)er %an nor &east7 till at last3 ()en t)ey )ad )ad enoug) of slaying3 t)ey secured suc) as (ere left and &ore t)e% offL to t)e Persian ca%/. 0)is aug%ented an already /lentiful Persian su//ly3 for in near&y 0)e&es t)e Persians )ad Ja&undant stores of corn for t)e%sel+es3 and of fodder for t)eir &easts of &urden.L &le to interdict t)e su//ly line of t)e stationary *reek ar%y3 t)e Persian ca+alry also gained te%/orary control of t)e s/ring t)at furnis)ed (ater to %uc) of t)e *reek ar%y3 lea+ing it Jc)oked u/ and s/oiled.L 0)e *reek ar%y found t)eir su//ly situation des/erate3 for3 in addition to a lack of (ater3 Jall t)e /ro+isions t)ey )ad &roug)t (it) t)e% (ere gone7 and t)e attendants ()o )ad &een sent to fetc) su//lies ... (ere /re+ented fro% returning to ca%/ &y t)e Persian )orse3 ()ic) no( closed t)e /assage.L :et e+en (it) t)is &ackground and t)e ad+ice of t)e leader of t)e *reek infantry3 t)e Persian conference reDected a logistic strategy3 t)e go+ernor of t)e area closest to le-anders ar%y asserting t)at J)e (ould not allo( a single )ouse &elonging to t)e /eo/le /laced under )is rule to &e &urned.L So t)e Persian conference c)ose t)e co%&at strategy3 t)eir ar%y contesting le-anders ad+ance soon after )e crossed into sia. 0)ey lost t)eir defensi+e &attle on t)e *ranicus Ri+er ()en t)e $o%/anion ca+alry defeated t)e Persian general#/ur/ose ca+alry and t)en attacked t)eir *reek )ea+y infantry in t)e flank and rear7 t)e conflict cost t)e Persians )ea+ily3 in &ot) killed and /risoners a%ong t)eir infantry. 0)is attrition toget)er (it) t)e /syc)ological i%/act of t)e defeat %eant t)at no Persian field ar%y contested le-anders ad+ance t)roug) natolia. Mean()ile3 in Meso/ota%ia3 1arius III &egan creating a ne( ar%y. In carrying out )is in+asion3 le-ander )ad no c)oice &ut co%&at strategy3 for )e )ad no %eans of attacking t)e logistics of t)e Persian ar%y. But )e did )a+e an alternati+e in dealing (it) t)e s/lendid Persian fleet t)at effecti+ely interdicted %ost Macedonian trans# egean sea traffic. JNot(it)standing t)eir su/eriority3L le-anders /rinci/al su&ordinate3 t)e (ise and e-/erienced

<<

Par%enio3 Jad+ised le-ander to fig)t a sea#&attle3 e-/ecting t)e *reeks to &e +ictorious (it) t)eir fleet... "e also urged t)at if t)ey (on t)e &attle3 t)ey (ould rea/ a great ad+antage fro% it in regard to t)eir %ain o&Dect in t)e (ar7 and if t)ey (ere &eaten3 t)eir defeat (ould not &e of any great %o%ent7 for e+en as it (as3 t)e Persians )eld t)e so+ereignty of t)e sea.L le-ander argued t)at )e did not (ant to gi+e u/ on so Junsta&le an ele%entL as t)e sea Jt)e ad+antage ()ic) t)e Macedonians deri+ed fro% t)eir skill and courage.L But )e stressed t)e /olitical conse.uences of defeat in a na+al &attle t)at (ould do Jno s%all da%age to t)eir first /restige in t)e (ar3 &ot) for ot)er reasons3 and es/ecially &ecause t)e *reeks3 &eing ani%ated (it) courage at t)e ne(s of t)e na+al defeat3 (ould atte%/t to effect a re+olutionL against Macedonian do%inance of *reece. But le-ander )ad a logistic alternati+e to co%&at7 )e could Jget t)e %astery o+er t)e Persian fleet &y defeating t)eir ar%y on land.L le-ander e-/lained t)at )e (ould &e a&le to &reak u/ t)e Persian fleet Jif )e ca/tured t)eir %ariti%e cities7 since t)ey (ould neit)er )a+e any /orts fro% ()ic) t)ey could recruit t)eir cre(s3 nor any )ar&our in sia to ()ic) t)ey could &ring t)eir s)i/s.L Initially3 t)is strategy fitted )is o(n logistic need to follo( t)e fertile natolian coast and to kee/ in touc) (it) )is su//ly s)i/s %o+ing along t)e coast. 0)is line of ad+ance also )ad an i%/ortant /olitical ad+antage3 for t)e coast )ad a %ostly *reek /o/ulation3 one often in re+olt against Persian aut)ority. Since le-ander re/resented a federation of *reek states3 t)e *reek cities of natolia found it easy to yield to )i%. le-ander )ad counted on finding suc) a su&stantial /olitical &ase for )is con.uest3 kno(ing t)at t)is (as funda%ental to )is success. "ad le-ander faced t)e united /olitical o//osition of t)e su&Dects of t)e Persian 9ing3 )is %ilitary +ictory on t)e *ranicus (ould )a+e a+ailed )i% not)ing3 for3 in s/ite of t)e su&stantial si6e of )is ar%y3 )e could not /ossi&ly )a+e do%inated so large a )ostile country. But t)e *reek cities surrendered to )i% as )e ad+anced3 and )e3 acting as t)eir li&erator fro% Persian rule3 a//ointed /olitically acce/ta&le go+ernors3 usually fro% t)e cities and regions t)at surrendered to )i%. le-anders in+asion s)o(s t)e i%/ortance of t(o +aria&les in i%/le%enting t)e /ersisting strategy of territorial con.uest. If le-ander )ad &roug)t )is )uge ar%y into a s%all state3 suc) as one of t)ose in *reece3 )e (ould )a+e )ad suc) a )ig) ratio of force to s/ace as to render a /o/ular resistance i%/ossi&le. But e+en in t)e natolian /ro+inces of t)e Persian 2%/ire3 )e (ould )a+e lacked t)e %en to su&due and )old in su&Dection suc) a large country )ad )e faced real /olitical o//osition. "e succeeded &ecause of t)e /olitical su//ort )e found t)ere and t)at )e culti+ated carefully and s)re(dly. le-anders acco%/lis)%ent illustrates t)e i%/ortant role of /olitical attitudes and of fostering t)e%3 &ut t)e e-/erience of ntioc)us VII of Syria e-)i&its t)is factor e+en %ore gra/)ically. In 1?> B.$. ntioc)us %arc)ed into Meso/ota%ia to reco+er territory recently con.uered &y Part)ian in+aders fro% t)e 2ast. "a+ing defeated t)e Part)ians in t)e field and recei+ing a (elco%e fro% t)e cities *reek in culture and &y %any ot)ers dissatisfied (it) Part)ian rule3 ntioc)us con.uered Meso/ota%ia in a single ca%/aign and dro+e t)e Part)ian %onarc) &ack into )is o(n do%ains. 0o secure )is con.uest3 ntioc)us (intered in )is con.uered territories3 distri&uting )is ar%y and .uartering it in a nu%&er of cities. But t)e &urden of su//orting t)e troo/s and t)eir re/ellent &e)a+iour alienated t)ese cities fro% ntioc)us3 and t)ey &egan to yearn for a return of Part)ian rule. Mean()ile3 9ing ntioc)us a//arently s/ent t)e (inter +ery con+i+ially rat)er t)an attending to )is duties as co%%ander. Part)ian agents %anaged to arrange for t)e /eo/le of t)e cities ()ere ntioc)us )ad .uartered )is troo/s to %ake a si%ultaneous attack on t)e soldiers3 and at t)e sa%e ti%e t)e Part)ian ar%y took t)e field early3 finding su//lies and su//ort in a land t)at )ad recently (elco%ed ntioc)us. 0)e Part)ians killed ntioc)us3 and t)ey and t)e in)a&itants of t)e cities ca/tured %ost of )is sur/rised ar%y.

<=

Most of t)e non#*reek areas of t)e Persian 2%/ire also yielded to t)e fir% &ut %agnani%ous le-ander. But &ecause of t)e %oderation and /olitical astuteness of le-anders rule3 t)ey did not turn against )i%3 as did ntioc)us su//orters. 0)e Macedonian 9ing could take ad+antage of a fa+oura&le /olitical situation in t)at for %ore t)an )alf a century t)e Persian e%/ire )ad dis/layed %arked centri/etal tendencies (it) fre.uent re+olts led &y t)e local rulers3 called satra/s. 5nly (it) difficulty and fre.uent conflict )ad t)e 9ings %aintained t)eir aut)ority o+er t)e ()ole of t)e e%/ire. 1arius III )ad ruled for only t(o years and as yet lacked esta&lis)ed aut)ority and /restige3 if only &ecause )e ca%e fro% a distant &ranc) of t)e royal fa%ily and )ad co%e to t)e t)rone &y t)e assassination of )is t(o /redecessors. le-ander e-/loited t)is /olitical situation and usually secured t)e su&%ission of %ost satra/ies e+en &efore )e crossed t)eir &orders. !isely3 )e t)en carefully conser+ed +ested interests3 often confir%ing in /o(er t)e Persian satra/ ()o )ad yielded to )i%. 2+en (it)out t)is /olitical (eakness of t)e central go+ern%ent3 local aut)orities (ould )a+e found it difficult to %ake a strong resistance after le-ander )ad defeated t)e Persian ar%y. 4nlike t)e *reeks3 Persian cities and /ro+inces lacked a %ilitia. Most of t)e non#*reek citi6ens of t)e e%/ire )ad no tradition of or training for %ilitary ser+ice3 )a+ing long relied on t)e /rofessional forces of t)e 9ing and t)e satra/. If local aut)orities )ad strongly o//osed le-ander3 lacking a %ilitia to defend t)eir (alled cities t)ey (ould )a+e )ad to a&andon a defensi+e /ersisting strategy of seeking to kee/ le-ander out of t)eir do%ains. Instead3 t)ey (ould )a+e )ad to resort to a defensi+e raiding strategy of )arrying le-anders ar%y. le-ander (ould face t)is kind of o//osition later in t)e course of )is long con.uest. fter le-ander )ad con.uered (estern and central natolia3 )e ad+anced along t)e coast to(ard Syria. "ere in early fall 1arius III3 a ca/a&le soldier3 %arc)ed to %eet )i% and3 arri+ing fro% Ba&ylon (it) )is ar%y3 took u/ a /osition in nort)#(estern Syria on t)e flank of le-anders ad+ance do(n t)e Syrian coast. 0)e Persian ar%y occu/ied a (ell#(atered /osition in a fertile /lain ()ere t)e 9ing could easily su//ly )is ar%y and ()ere3 if a &attle de+elo/ed3 )e (ould )a+e a%/le s/ace for e%/loying )is nu%erically do%inant ca+alry. 1ariuss ar%y occu/ied a flank /osition3 one ()ere )e could reac) t)e ene%ys rear if le-ander %arc)ed /ast )i% do(n t)e Syrian coast. But instead of attacking3 le-ander (aited3 %o+ing )is ar%y &ack and fort) to find food and relying also on su//ly &y s)i/. s le-ander antici/ated3 1ariuss large ar%y ra/idly consu%ed t)e /ro+isions in )is +icinity3 forcing )i% eit)er to ad+ance or retreat. But Dust as le-anders delay )ad e-)austed 1ariuss su//lies and t)e 9ing %o+ed )is ar%y for(ard to t)e coast3 le-ander )eld a council of (ar and3 not kno(ing of 1ariuss %o+e3 decided to ad+ance (it) )is ar%y do(n t)e coast. 0)us it (orked out t)at in s/ite of le-anders astute delay3 1ariuss ar%y reac)ed t)e coast in le-anders rear ()ere t)e Persian ar%y )ad a line of retreat into Syria ()ile &locking t)e (it)dra(al of t)e Macedonians. 1ariuss ar%y )ad occu/ied ()at is called a flank /osition3 in ()ic) an ar%y &locks an ene%ys ad+ance &y its a&ility to %o+e into t)e rear of t)e ene%y ar%y s)ould it %arc) /ast. le-ander did not attack t)e Persian force in its flank /osition3 dis/osed on a /lain t)at /ro+ided ad%ira&le terrain for t)e action of t)e nu%erous and e-cellent Persian ca+alry. Instead3 )e resorted to t)e logistic strategy of delay3 so t)at a s)ortage of su//lies (ould force 1arius out of )is flank /osition. 0)oug) le-ander did not realise it3 )is logistic strategy (orked ()en 1arius )ad to %o+e )is ar%y for(ard. Preferring3 a//arently3 to fig)t 1arius on t)e coast rat)er t)an t)e /lain3 le-ander %arc)ed /ast ()ile 1ariuss %o+e for(ard e-ecuted t)e t)reat i%/licit in t)e flank /osition &y %o+ing into le-anders rear3 &locking )is route &ack to natolia. Since le-anders ar%y li+ed on t)e country and relied on coastal s)i//ing for so%e su//lies3 1ariuss /osition in Its rear did not cut its co%%unications. But t)is location did o/en natolia to <C

t)e Persians3 t)reatening t)e Macedonian con.uests already %ade and /resenting t)e /ossi&ility of turning le-anders in+asion into a raid in ()ic) )e /assed t)roug) t)e country &ut did not control it. So le-ander could not readily ignore 1arius and continue )is %arc) sout)3 and )e could acco%/lis) not)ing &y seeking to %arc) around t)e Persians &ack into natolia. 0)us3 le-ander )ad to face 1ariuss ar%y3 a confrontation )e )ardly dreaded. But t)e Persian %o+e to le-anders rear )ad gi+en 1arius t)e ad+antage of t)e tactical defensi+e in t)e &attle )e %ust fig)t to sa+e )is cru%&ling e%/ire. 0o atte%/t to deal (it) t)e ene%y ar%y &y a logistic strategy (ould (ork against le-anders large force in t)e narro( +alley Dust as effecti+ely as it (ould against t)e Persians. So le-ander i%%ediately c)ose t)e co%&at alternati+e and %arc)ed nort) to attack 1arius on constricted terrain t)at /ro+ided less sco/e for t)e action of t)e for%ida&le Persian ca+alry. But 1arius %ade t)e %ost of t)e ad+antages of t)e tactical defensi+e gi+en )i% &y )is %o+e fro% )is flank /osition into le-anders rear. 0)e Persian 9ing /laced )is ar%y &e)ind a strea%3 strengt)ening )is front (it) so%e field fortifications3 and concentrated )is ca+alry near t)e coast on t)e only o/en ground. But t)e tactical ascendancy of le-anders )ea+y ca+alry and )is so/)isticated co%&ination of t)e four (ea/on syste%s decided t)e &attle. 0)e Macedonian +ictory in t)e Battle of Issus3 inflicting )ea+y losses on t)e Persians in &ot) %an/o(er and /restige3 o/ened to le-ander t)e re%aining Mediterranean /ro+inces of t)e e%/ire3 including 2gy/t. 0)ese le-ander /roceeded to occu/y. In c)oosing to con.uer Persian territory instead of conducting a strategic /ursuit of 1arius into Meso/ota%ia3 le-ander re%ained true to )is logistic strategy of defeating t)e Persian fleet &y de/ri+ing it of its &ases. 'or t)is reason )e s/ent se+en %ont)s of t)e (inter and s/ring of t)e follo(ing year &esieging and finally ca/turing t)e i%/ortant city and na+al &ase of 0yre3 t)us striking successfully at t)e P)oenician coast and t)e )eart of Persian sea /o(er. By delaying until t)e follo(ing su%%er )is in+asion of Meso/ota%ia3 le-ander )ad fully con.uered and organised )is rear &efore )e %o+ed for(ard on t)e ne-t stage of )is con.uest during t)e &est ca%/aigning season. nd t)is ca%/aign follo(ed t)e %odel of its /redecessors3 le-ander (inning anot)er %aDor tactical +ictory at t)e Battle of r&ela3 con.uering Meso/ota%ia3 and sending 1arius fleeing into t)e eastern%ost /ortion of )is e%/ire. 0)e nig)t &efore t)e Battle of r&ela3 t)e confident le-ander sle/t so (ell t)at ()en )is generals )ad trou&le a(akening )i% in t)e %orning3 one Jasked )i% )o( it (as /ossi&le3 ()en )e (as to fig)t t)e %ost i%/ortant &attle of all3 )e could slee/ as if )e (ere already +ictorious. M nd are (e not so indeed3 re/lied le-ander3 s%iling3 Msince (e are at last relie+ed fro% t)e trou&le of (andering in /ursuit of 1arius t)roug) a (ide and (asted country3 )o/ing in +ain t)at )e (ould fig)t usL 5f course3 t)e 9ing o+eresti%ated 1ariuss /olitical strengt) and so t)e alternati+es o/en to t)e Persian3 &ut easily sa( t)e /ro&le%s /resented &y )is co%/arati+ely s%all force in t)e i%%ense s/ace still re%aining in t)e Persian e%/ire and t)e conse.uent difficulty of forcing &attle on an un(illing o//onent. fter defeating 1arius at r&ela3 le-ander again /us)ed east(ard3 recei+ing t)e su&%ission of %ost of t)e Persian /ro+incial satra/s. le-ander clai%ed3 &y )is defeat of 1arius3 t)e cro(n of t)e Persian 2%/ire for )i%self3 treated t)e defeated Persians (it) %ercy and res/ect3 and e+en &egan (earing clot)ing of t)e Persian style. 0)ese %easures )el/ed reconcile Persian officials to )is rule as did t)e %urder of t)e fleeing 1arius &y Bessus3 one of )is o(n su&ordinates3 ()o t)en /roclai%ed )i%self 9ing. le-anders ad+ance &roug)t t)e country under )is control3 and )e usually continued in office t)e satra/s ()o surrendered to )i%. "is con.uest )ad /aid for )is (ar and )ad /ro+ided a%/le resources to continue it &y t)e ca/ture of t)e Persian treasury3 C31@> tons of gold and sil+er. Back

<B

#le$ander%s -ncounter with a )aiding Strategy

0)e /attern of surrender &y satra/s did not a//ly in %ountainous Bactria or t)e near#desert Sogdiana G/resently nort)ern fg)anistan and t)e adDacent regions of So+iet RussiaH. ,ed &y local leaders3 t)e (arlike in)a&itants of t)ese t(o regions resisted le-anders rule. le-ander3 )a+ing %arc)ed t)roug) &ot) /ro+inces3 occu/ied t)e %aDor cities3 and ca/tured Bessus3 &elie+ed t)at )e )ad &roug)t t)e country under )is rule. But al%ost i%%ediately re&els attacked and ca/tured eig)t of )is fortified /osts in Sogdiana. le-ander sent a relief e-/edition to t)e %ost distant one3 Maracanda3 and /ersonally directed t)e forces t)at &esieged and ca/tured t)e se+en ot)er /osts. "e killed all of t)e in)a&itants of t)e garrisons3 &ut3 instead of inti%idating t)e re&els3 t)is a//lication of terror intensified resistance to )is rule. 0error can &e an effecti+e (ea/on only if its +icti%s3 as $lause(it6 /ointed out3 &elie+e t)at t)e terroris% can continue indefinitely. //arently t)e re&els did not &elie+e t)at le-ander could /re+ail3 and t)e fate of t)e Maracanda relief e-/edition %ust )a+e &olstered t)at idea. 4/on t)e a//roac) of t)e Macedonian force of a&out B>> lig)t ca+alry and 13<>> )ea+y infantry3 t)e re&els &esieging Maracanda retreated. 0)e relief e-/edition /ursued t)e%3 and t)e re&els3 ()o )ad %any lig)t ca+alry (it) &o(s3 %ade a stand in a le+el /lace near t)e desert. !)en t)e Macedonian infantry attacked3 t)e )istorian rrian recounts t)at t)e re&el ca+alry Jrode around and disc)arged arro(s at t)e /)alan- of infantry3L and t)e Macedonian ca+alry3 Je-)austed &y t)e incessant %arc)ing3 as (ell as &y a lack of fodder3L %ade no contri&ution to ()at )ad &eco%e a defensi+e &attle. 0)e )orse arc)ers /ressed u/on t)e Macedonians J()et)er t)ey )alted or retreated. Many of t)e% (ere (ounded &y t)e arro(s3 and so%e (ere killed. 0)e leaders t)erefore arranged t)e soldiers into t)e for% of a s.uare and retreated to t)e ri+er3L ()ere3 after so%e confusion3 t)ey ended u/ on an island in t)e s)allo( ri+er. "ere Jt)ey (ere entirely surrounded &yL t)e ca+alry3 Jand all killed (it) arro(s3 e-ce/t a fe( of t)e% ()o% t)ey reduced to sla+ery.L 0)is de%onstration of t)e tactical /o(er of lig)t ca+alry3 a forecast of ()at (ould later &efall $rassus at t)e )ands of t)e Part)ians3 dou&tless )eartened t)e re&els and )el/ed %ake le-anders terroris% ineffecti+e in su//ressing /olitical o//osition. le-ander3 of course3 %arc)ed to a+enge t)is defeat3 &ut e+en (it) fres) lig)t ca+alry could not o+ertake t)e %ounted re&els. 0)is (as a re/resentati+e situation u/on ()ic) ancient strategists )ad to &ase t)eir strategy. Bet(een si%ilar (ea/on syste%s3 retreat (as faster t)an /ursuit. "ea+y infantry could retreat faster t)an )ea+y infantry could /ursue7 lig)t infantry could (it)dra( faster t)an lig)t infantry could follo(7 t)e sa%e rule a//lies to t)e %ounted (ea/on syste%s. 0)is (as a strategic trut)3 t)oug) in tactics t)e situation could differ and terrain o&stacles suc) as ri+ers %ay %odify t)is for strategy. But forces in retreat could o&struct t)e (ay &y cutting do(n trees3 &urning &ridges3 sinking &oats3 and lea+ing a rear guard to delay t)e /ursuers ()ile t)e %ain &ody of t)e retreating force continued its %arc). 0)e tactical and strategic ad+antage of retreat o+er /ursuit %eant t)at le-anders use of lig)t ca+alry to /ursue re&el lig)t ca+alry failed. le-ander faced a situation in ()ic) nu%erous /arties of ar%ed and %ounted re&els dis/uted )is rule and controlled /oints not occu/ied &y )is forces. "is o//onents essentially follo(ed a raiding strategy3 attacking )is out/osts and3 e-ce/t for t)eir strong /oints3 a+oiding contact (it) large contingents of )is ar%y. le-ander reacted &y di+iding )is ar%y into fi+e /arts3 %arc)ing t)roug) t)e re&ellious country3 and su&duing ene%y strong)olds. "e )ad not)ing to fear fro% t)e ene%ys lig)t ca+alry3 for )e )ad great /re/onderance in t)e nu%&ers and t)e .uality of )is ar%y and an a%/le force of lig)t ca+alry as (ell of foot arc)ers and slingers. "e also increased )is o(n lig)t ca+alry &y local enlist%ent. "is o//onents %et le-anders /ersisting strategy (it) raids. Relying on t)e /ri%acy of retreat o+er /ursuit3 t)ey soug)t to a+oid strong Macedonian forces3 concentrating on o+er()el%ing (eak detac)%ents and t)en (it)dra(ing &efore le-anders %en could force &attle. 0)ese raids3 carried out &y t)e (eaker side3 differed %arkedly fro% t)ose e%/loyed &y t)e *reeks3 ()o3 as t)e stronger <@

side3 used raids to destroy cro/s to co%/el /olitical concessions or &ring t)e (eaker to &attle. 0)e *reek city#states3 una&le to fig)t t)eir elusi+e ene%y3 attacked t)eir resources7 t)e Bactrians and Sogdianians3 on t)e ot)er )and3 /ursued a co%&at strategy ()ile e+ading t)e %ain )ostile force. 0)is ty/e of raid )ad an analogy in tactics ()en /eltasts a//roac)ed )o/lites to )url t)eir Da+elins and t)en fled to a+oid s)ock co%&at. 0)is use of raids3 ()ic) de/ended on t)e a%&iguity of t)e raiders o&Decti+e and t)eir a&ility to kee/ a(ay fro% t)eir /ursuers3 constituted t)e funda%ental &asis of guerrilla (arfare. "a+ing o+erco%e t)e ene%y strong)olds3 le-ander t)en %o+ed to de/ri+e t)e guerrillas of one of t)eir re.uisites3 t)e untra%%elled %o&ility needed to a+oid /ursuers. "e esta&lis)ed and garrisoned a large nu%&er of fortified %ilitary /osts t)roug)out t)e settled /art of t)e country. 0)ese reduced t)e +ulnera&ility of )is forces to t)e attacks of t)e raiders and i%/eded t)eir %o+e%ents. 0)ese /osts controlled t)e co%%unication routes3 so t)at at one /oint rrian says t)at t)e re&el leader Jsa( t)at e+ery /lace (as occu/ied &y t)e Macedonians (it) garrisons3 and t)at t)ere (as no (ay of flig)t o/en to )i%.L *eogra/)y facilitated t)is task of interdicting re&el %o+e%ents and so %aking t)eir raids difficult and )a6ardous3 &ecause t)e %ountains in Bactria confined t)e roads to t)e settled +alleys3 and t)e arid nature of Sogdiana restricted %ost settle%ent to t)e irrigated areas near t)e ri+ers. 2ac) of le-anders fortified /osts )ad %ounted forces a+aila&le to /ursue raiders. rrian recounts )o( t)e re&el leader3 S/ita%enes3 and Scyt)ians fro% t)e Ste//es ca/tured one of t)e forts in Bactria3 &ut finding anot)er one too strong3 t)e re&els J%arc)ed a(ay after collecting a great .uantity of &ooty.L 0)e garrison of t)is second fort contained si-ty %e%&ers of t)e $o%/anion ca+alry3 recu/erating fro% illness3 and Jt)ese %en3 )earing of t)e incursion of t)e Scyt)ians3 and )a+ing no( reco+ered fro% t)eir illness3 took t)eir ar%s and %ounted t)eir )orses. 0)en3 collecting eig)ty %ercenary *recian )orse%enL fro% t)e garrison and Jso%e of t)e royal /ages3 t)ey sallied fort).L ttacking Jt)e Scyt)ians3 ()o )ad no sus/icion of suc) an e+ent3 t)ey de/ri+ed t)e% of all t)e &ooty at t)e first onset3 and killed %any of t)ose ()o (ere dri+ing it off. But as no one (as in co%%and3 t)ey returned (it)out any regard to order: and &eing dra(n into a%&us) &y S/ita%enes and ot)er Scyt)ians3 t)ey lost se+en of t)e $o%/anions and si-ty of t)e %ercenary ca+alry.L Suc) dou&le sur/rises certainly %ust )a+e &een ty/ical of t)e guerrilla (ar t)at occu/ied le-ander for t(o years. lt)oug) t)e %easures taken &y t)e Macedonians strengt)ened t)e defence against attack and in)i&ited t)e ene%ys %o+e%ents7 t)ey failed to /re+ent t)e guerrillas raids. 0)e in+aders )ad too fe( soldiers to sto/ t)e raids in a large country in ()ic) t)e guerrillas )ad /olitical su//ort a%ong t)e /o/ulation. So le-ander added a ne( /olitical a//roac): )e a&andoned terror and turned to conciliation. 0)e key to /lacating t)e o//osition lay in )is %arriage to Ro-ana3 daug)ter of 5-yartes3 one of t)e /rinci/al %agnates of Bactria. le-ander could not )a+e found t)is /olitical gesture too /ainful3 for )e (as said to lo+e Ro-ana3 ()o% t)e %en in le-anders ar%y t)oug)t Jt)e %ost &eautiful of all t)e siatic (o%en ()o% t)ey )ad seen3 (it) t)e single e-ce/tion of t)e (ife of 1arius.L 0)is reconciled 5-yartes to le-anders rule and in t)is J(ay could s)a%e &e taken fro% t)e con.uered and )aug)tiness fro% t)e +ictors.L 0)roug) ot)er co%/ara&le /olitical acts le-ander &uilt a /olitical &ase t)at co%/le%ented )is effecti+e %ilitary %easures and finally o+erca%e /o/ular resistance to )is rule. In Bactria and Sogdiana3 as in )is con.uest of t)e re%ainder of t)e Persian 2%/ire3 le-ander needed an ade.uate /olitical &ase to su//ort )is %ilitary success7 ot)er(ise3 (it) suc) a s%all force in relation to t)e +ast si6e of t)e do%inions of 1arius3 )e (ould surely )a+e failed3 Dust as t)e effects of ntioc)us VIIs later %ilitary success e+a/orated in t)e face of /o/ular /olitical o//osition. Back

=>

Military *ictories without !olitical Su''ort, Hannibal%s -$'erience with the Fabian Strategy
"anni&al and )is Macedonian syste% of co%&at /ossessed t)e sa%e tactical /redo%inance o+er t)e Ro%ans as did le-ander o+er t)e Persians and3 like le-ander3 t)e $art)aginian leader enDoyed a succession of tactical triu%/)s. But )e faced a co%/letely different /olitical situation. 0)oug) Italy (as %inute co%/ared to t)e +ast Persian 2%/ire3 it still )ad too large an area and /o/ulation for "anni&al to do%inate it (it) an ar%y t)at initially could not )a+e e-ceeded <>3>>> %en. 2+en after "anni&als o+er()el%ing +ictory at $annae3 %ost of t)e cities of Italy re%ained loyal to Ro%e3 Jsuc) (as t)e a(e and res/ect t)at t)e allies felt for t)e Ro%an state.L 'urt)er3 t)e Ro%ans t)e%sel+es3 /lus t)eir allies3 all )ad %ilitias3 ()ic) %eant t)at e+ery city could defend itself and t)e Ro%ans could create and re/lace3 if destroyed3 larger ar%ies t)an could t)e 9ing of Persia. lt)oug) t)e %o&ilised %ilitia infantry lacked t)e co%&at effecti+eness of "anni&als regular ar%y and could not du/licate )is Macedonian co%&ined#ar%s tactics3 it )ad t)e .ualities necessary to &uild and defend fortifications. "anni&al t)us faced ()at in t)e t(entiet) century (ould &e called national resistance in a country large and /o/ulous enoug) to /re+ent )is ar%y fro% controlling +ery %uc) of it at one ti%e.L 2+en &efore t)e Battle of $annae3 "anni&als initial +ictories in entering Italy )ad induced t)e Ro%ans3 under t)e leaders)i/ of 'a&ius3 to ado/t a %ore circu%s/ect strategy. 5n taking co%%and3 t)e /erce/ti+e and /rudent 'a&ius %o+ed to(ard "anni&al ()o3 J)a+ing /ossessed )i%self of so large an a%ount of &ooty t)at )is ar%y could not dri+e or carry it all off3L )ad )alted Jnear t)e driatic in a country a&ounding in all kinds of /roduce3L ()ere )e J/aid great attention to recruiting t)e )ealt) of )is %en as (ell as of )is )orses.L 'a&ius ca%/ed si- %iles fro% "anni&al3 ()o J(is)ing to strike suc) a &lo( as (ould effectually co( t)e ene%y3 led )is forces out and dre( t)e% u/ in order of &attle at a s)ort distance fro% t)e Ro%an ca%/3 &ut after (aiting so%e ti%e3 as no&ody ca%e out to %eet )i%3 )e retired again to )is o(n ca%/. 'or t)e astute 'a&ius3 )a+ing deter%ined not to e-/ose )i%self to any risk or to +enture on a &attle3 &ut to %ake t)e safety of t)e ar%y under )is co%%and )is first and c)ief ai%3 ad)ered steadfastly to t)is /ur/ose.L "anni&al3 t)e greatest soldier of )is age3 )ad naturally declined to attack 'a&ius Ro%an ar%y in its fortified ca%/ ()ere its defensi+e /o(er (ould )a+e readily o+er%astered t)e tactical skill of t)e $art)aginian +eterans. But 'a&ius strategy in+ol+ed %ore t)an %erely a+oiding defeat. !)ene+er t)e $art)aginians %o+ed t)eir ar%y3 Jt)e Ro%ans continued to )ang on t)eir rear at a distance of one or t(o days %arc)3 refusing to a//roac) nearer and engage t)e ene%y.L 5n ot)er occasions 'a&ius (ould J%o+e /arallel to t)e ene%y3 al(ays occu/ying in ad+ance t)e /ositions ()ic) )is kno(ledge of t)e country told )i% (ere t)e %ost ad+antageous.L In so tracking "anni&als ar%y3 t)e (ily 'a&ius co%/licated )is ene%ys logistics and (on so%e skir%is)es &ecause3 ()en "anni&al )ad to s/read out )is ar%y to find food and so%e of )is %en (ould Jstray far fro% t)eir o(n ca%/ in foraging3L t)e Ro%ans could Jtake or kill nu%&ers of t)e ene%y.L In t)is (ay 'a&ius could Jkee/ on reducing t)e strictly li%ited nu%&ers of t)e ene%yL and3 t)roug) raids against foragers3 also restore J&y /artial successes t)e s/irits of )is o(n troo/s.

)arthaginian Area of 'nfluen(e Back

=1

'a&ius &ased )is strategy on )is a&ility to refuse &attle3 on t)e tactical /o(er of t)e defence3 on )is control of t)e (alled cities3 and on )is e-cellent logistics. In /ouncing on foragers and stragglers )e used s%all raids to concentrate against (eakness7 in )is do%inance of t)e country and (illingness to acce/t &attle &e)ind entrenc)%ents )e e%/loyed a defensi+e /ersisting strategy7 and in )is fre.uent reliance on retreat )e also de/ended on a raiding strategy. "e could do t)is &ecause3 &et(een si%ilarly constituted ar%ies3 t)e /ursuing cannot o+ertake t)e retreating. 'a&ius could al(ays kee/ a(ay fro% "anni&al as long as )e could a+oid tra//ing )i%self against so%e o&stacle like a ri+er3 and )is kno(ledge of t)e terrain /rotected )i% against t)is &lunder. 5f course3 'a&ius (ould )a+e &een delig)ted to )a+e a &attle on )is o(n ter%s3 entrenc)ed in a fortified ca%/3 &ut "anni&al ne+er &eca%e so e-as/erated &y t)e ene%ys 'a&ian strategy as to %ake t)e %istake of fig)ting ()ere 'a&ius (is)ed. "anni&al did de+astate a /articularly fertile area3 )o/ing to Jco%/el t)e ene%y to fig)t3L &ut 'a&ius )ad too %uc) (isdo% to engage in &attle on t)e ene%ys ter%s ()ere )e &elie+ed )e faced al%ost certain defeat at t)e )ands of a great general using t)e do%inant le-andrian tactical syste%. Instead3 'a&ius e-/loited t)e strategic /o(er of t)e defence to retreat or its tactical ca/acity to defend a strong /osition against a frontal attack and took ad+antage of t)e ease (it) ()ic) )e could o&tain su//lies in )is o(n country. !it) t)e resources of t)e granaries of t)e cities readily a+aila&le to )i%3 'a&ius Jne+er allo(ed )is soldiers to forage or to straggle fro% t)e ca%/ on any /rete-t3 &ut kee/ing t)e% continually %assed toget)er (atc)ed for suc) o//ortunities as ti%e and /lace affordedL to catc) $art)aginian foragers or stragglers and t)en /ro%/tly to a+oid conflict (it) a large $art)aginian force. lt)oug) 'a&iuss %et)od of o/eration )ad so%e of t)e ele%ents of a logistic strategy3 its %ain offensi+e ele%ent consisted of concentration against (eakness in i%/le%enting a cautious raiding co%&at strategy.L 8ust as in offensi+e tactics3 co%%anders like 2/a%inondas soug)t to attack t)eir ene%ys (eak flank or rear or to &ring greater nu%&ers to &ear on /art of t)e ene%ys line3 so in strategy did 'a&ius do t)e sa%e ()en )e concentrated larger nu%&ers against $art)aginian foraging /arties. $oncentration against (eakness in raids /ro+ed as effecti+e in strategy as it did in tactics3 and3 as in tactics3 t)e defenders (eakness (as only relati+e to t)e attackers a&ility to concentrate %ore %en. But unlike tactics3 ()ere t)e ene%y )ad already co%%itted )i%self to co%&at3 t)e side on t)e

=2

strategic offensi+e t)at )ad su/erior nu%&ers %ust still force &attle on t)e (eaker. 0)is 'a&ius did &y sur/rising and &locking t)e retreat of $art)aginian foragers. "anni&als strategy e+entually succeeded. 1e+astating t)e countryside did not force 'a&ius into &attle3 &ut it finally co%/elled a c)ange in Ro%an co%%anders and strategy. 0)is led to t)e disaster of $annae3 ()ic) in turn caused t)e Ro%ans to return to 'a&iuss strategy and not again to s(er+e fro% it. "anni&al esta&lis)ed a &ase area for )i%self in sout)ern Italy3 still a&le to %o+e at (ill t)roug)out t)e /eninsula. "is strategy de/ended on t)e Ro%ans %odifying t)eir (ar ai%s and negotiating a /eace acce/ta&le to t)e $art)aginians. But if t)e Ro%ans so%eti%es dis/layed ine/titude3 t)ey al(ays /erse+ered3 e+en t)oug) "anni&al and )is ar%y re%ained in Italy for t)irteen years after $annae. In addition to t)ose ele%ents e-/loited &y 'a&ius3 Ro%an %ilitary /o(er lay in t)eir large forces3 &ased on a trained %ilitia in e+ery to(n. Ro%an /o(er also resided in control of t)e ur&an centres and in t)e defensi+e strengt) of t)e fortifications of t)ese to(ns. Since t)e roads (ent t)roug) t)e /o/ulation centres3 t)ese o&stacles )a%/ered "anni&als %o+e%ents as (ell as assured continued Ro%an control of t)e de/endent countryside and its su//lies. Because )is /re#e%inence de/ended on ca+alry3 against fortified cities "anni&al )ad no tactical ad+antage o+er t)e Ro%ans3 ()o )ad e.ual skill in siege (arfare. l%ost insu/era&le logistical /ro&le%s confronted "anni&al in any sustained attack on fortifications. Nor could )e count on su//lying any suc) /rolonged o/eration &y (ater3 for t)e /o(erful Ro%an na+y ruled t)e sea. 0o t)e usual difficulties of su//lying a large ar%y &y /ack %ule3 "anni&al (ould )a+e )ad to co/e (it) a Ro%an ar%y circu%scri&ing )is su//ly area and killing and ca/turing )is foragers. So "anni&al atte%/ted no sieges. 0)e defeat at $annae struck a se+ere &lo( at Ro%an /olitical strengt): a nu%&er of Ro%es allies defected and ot)ers &eca%e luke(ar%. 0)e Ro%ans /roceeded +igorously against t)e disloyal cities3 a&le to act &ecause Ro%an forces do%inated any area in t)e a&sence of "anni&als ar%y. "anni&al could not relie+e a &esieged city &ecause t)e Ro%ans &uilt lines of contra+allation to enclose t)e defenders and constructed a (ell#su//lied fortified ca%/ for t)eir ar%y. So%eti%es3 suc) as in t)e siege of t)e +ery i%/ortant city of $a/ua3 t)ey constructed a second line of fortifications3 lines of circu%+allation3 around t)eir siege#(orks3 ()ic) /rotected t)e &esieging ar%y fro% "anni&als ar%y. 5ne &y one t)e Ro%ans su&dued t)e defecting allies and /rogressi+ely reduced t)e area of Italy friendly to "anni&al. 0)e $art)aginian general )ad ne+er succeeded in &eco%ing %ore t)an a raider3 and t)e Ro%ans (ere e%/loying an al%ost e-clusi+ely /ersisting strategy against )i%3 gradually li%iting t)e region in ()ic) )e could %o+e freely. "anni&al failed to (ear t)e Ro%ans do(n7 instead3 Ro%an /erse+erance gradually destroyed )is strategy3 for t)e Ro%an ar%ies (ere not only succeeding in Italy &ut also slo(ly and surely su&duing $art)aginian S/ain. "anni&als success in %aintaining )i%self for so long in a )ostile country reflects not only )is tactical genius &ut also )is a&ility as an organiser. 'or e-a%/le3 )e )ad to recruit local troo/s and train t)e% in )is %et)ods of co%&at. But t)is )e did3 and &y )is leaders)i/ continued to &ind t)is )eterogeneous force to )i% and )is cause. In t)e end "anni&al /ro+ed to &e ne+er %uc) %ore t)an a raider3 lacking eit)er of t)e re.uisites for controlling Italy: an ade.uate ratio of force to s/ace or enoug) of t)e /olitical su//ort t)at le-ander found and fostered in t)e Persian 2%/ire. 0)e $art)aginians long ca%/aign fell into fi+e /)ases3 di+ided largely &y t)e Ro%an strategy e%/loyed against )i%. Initially t)e Ro%ans /layed into )is )ands (it) a defensi+e /ersisting strategy of offering &attle3 ()ic) "anni&al3 confident of )is tactical do%inance3 gladly acce/ted. 'a&ius introduced t)e second /)ase &y &asing )is defensi+e /ersisting strategy on t)e fortified c)aracter of t)e country and )is a&ility to refuse &attle e-ce/t in an entrenc)ed /osition of )is o(n

=?

c)oice. Still 'a&iuss strategy included a raiding ele%ent ()en )e follo(ed t)e $art)aginian ar%y and /ounced on its foragers. But &ecause 'a&ius re%ained in t)e field3 (illing to fig)t on )is o(n ter%s3 t)e Ro%ans did not (age guerrilla (arfare3 as did t)e Bactrians and Sogdianians3 ()o )ad lost control of t)eir country and could not face le-ander in &attle. In t)e t)ird /)ase3 ()en t)e Ro%ans %ade a &rief return to a /ersisting strategy &ased on &attles3 t)e defeat at $annae so aggra+ated t)e /ro&le% of defection of t)eir allies t)at t)ey (ere co%/elled to take t)e /ersisting offensi+e in t)e fourt) /)ase to su&due t)e defecting cities &y sieges. Si%ultaneously3 t)ey resu%ed 'a&iuss /ersisting defence against t)e $art)aginians. In t)e last /)ase "anni&al3 largely &affled &y t)e Ro%an strategy of fortified defence3 relied on )is &ase area in sout)ern Italy. t t)e sa%e ti%e t)e Ro%ans3 still una&le to %eet "anni&al in an offensi+e &attle3 could not effecti+ely /ursue an offensi+e /ersisting strategy against t)e $art)aginian &ase area. Instead3 t)ey (aged successful ca%/aigns outside of Italy3 con.uering S/ain and3 finally3 in+ading frica. "anni&als failure against /olitical o//osition in+ites co%/arison (it) le-anders success in Bactria and Sogdiana. In eac) case t)e great ca/tains faced for%ida&le /olitical o//osition &ut )ad %ilitary /redo%inance. le-ander3 )o(e+er3 )eld s(ay o+er ()at for%al aut)ority t)en e-isted and )ad a certain legiti%acy as t)e con.ueror of 1arius. 5n t)e ot)er )and3 t)e Ro%ans retained t)e /o(erful go+ern%ental %ac)inery t)at t)ey )ad created o+er se+eral centuries. !)ereas t)e Ro%ans controlled t)e cities and t)e focal /oints of co%%unications3 t)ese )ad &elonged to le-ander in Bactria and Sogdiana. 'inally3 le-ander (as a&le to &uttress )is already strong constitutional situation3 &ut "anni&als /olitical strengt)3 de/endent solely on )is initial %ilitary +ictories3 (it)ered a(ay. !it)out suc) local su//ort and (it) )is tactical su/re%acy in t)e field circu%scri&ed &y t)e tactical ad+antage of city (alls and Ro%an field fortifications3 "anni&al failed. "is c)ance of +ictory lay in Ro%es (illingness to %ake a co%/ro%ise /eace to rid itself of "anni&als ar%y3 &ut t)e Ro%ans /ro+ed too de+oted to t)eir goal of co%/lete destruction of $art)aginian /o(er. "anni&als failure clearly e-e%/lified t)e li%its t)at /olitical factors %ay /lace on %ilitary success. Back

# )are nstance of the /se of nterior "ines of 0'erations in #ncient (imes

5ne +ictorious ca%/aign of t)e Ro%ans against "anni&als forces e-)i&its t)e +alue of strategic concentration of force. 0)e Ro%ans triu%/)ed not o+er "anni&al &ut o+er )is &rot)er3 "asdru&al3 ()o in 2>C B.$. %arc)ed fro% S/ain to Doin "anni&al in Italy. 0)e Ro%ans )ad /osted one ar%y in nort) Italy to guard against t)is ()ile anot)er3 under $onsul Nero3 faced "anni&als near t)e old &attlefield of $annae. $a/turing t)e %essengers sent &y "asdru&al to "anni&al to ask t)at "anni&al %o+e nort) to Doin )i%3 t)e Ro%ans kne( of t)e t)reat /resented &y "asdru&al ()ile "anni&al re%ained ignorant of t)e arri+al of )is reinforce%ent. Nero res/onded /ro%/tly &y secretly %arc)ing 2<> %iles nort) (it) C3>>> /icked %en to Doin t)e ar%y o//osing "asdru&al. Realising )is o//onent )ad recei+ed reinforce%ents and not (is)ing to fig)t (it)out "anni&al3 "asdru&al declined &attle. But in t)e nig)t retreat )is forces lost t)eir (ay3 failed to find t)eir crossing o+er t)e Metaurus Ri+er3 and )ad to fig)t t)e ne-t day. 0)e Ro%ans (on a co%/lete +ictory3 killing "asdru&al3 inflicting serious causalities3 and scattering t)e re%ainder of )is %en. Nero t)en %arc)ed )is contingent sout) again3 reDoining )is ar%y (atc)ing "anni&als. "anni&al )ad re%ained ignorant of "asdru&als arri+al in Italy and Neros te%/orary de/arture fro% )is front until t)e Ro%ans t)re( "asdru&als )ead o+er t)e ra%/art into "anni&als ca%/. Neros %arc) /resents an e-cellent e-a%/le of strategic concentration3 %ade /ossi&le &y e-/loiting )is /osition &et(een t)e t(o $art)aginian ar%ies. In t)is situation3 one of interior lines of o/erations3 t)e Ro%an legions facing "asdru&al and "anni&al3 t)oug) 2<> %iles a/art3 )ad t)eir

=4

&acks to one anot)er and stood &et(een t)e $art)aginians. 2ac) Ro%an contingent )ad a line of o/erations3 its line of ad+ance or retreat against t)e o//onents3 and eac) $art)aginian ar%y also )ad its line of o/erations against t)e o//osing Ro%an ene%y. 0)e Ro%ans )ad t)e interior lines of o/erations3 t)e $art)aginian t)e e-terior. 0)is %ean t)at one Ro%an contingent could dis/atc) reinforce%ents directly to t)e ot)er &ut t)e t(o $art)aginian forces could send reser+es to eac) ot)er only if t)ey could in fact /ass around t)e o//osing Ro%an legions.

,oman 'nterior &ines Back

Suc) e%/loy%ent of interior lines /ro+ided one of t)e /rinci/al strategic %eans of concentrating against (eakness. 0)e use of interior lines to concentrate a su/erior force e-/loited t)e ene%ys (eakness &ecause (eakness in)eres in circu%stances ()ere one side can concentrate and t)e ot)er cannot. 0)e full realisation of t)e /otential of t)is situation de/ended on &ringing t)e ene%y to &attle. "ad "asdru&al not lost )is (ay and tra//ed )i%self against t)e ri+er3 t)e Ro%ans3 una&le to &ring )i% to &attle3 (ould /ro&a&ly )a+e %ade t)eir concentration in +ain. $oncentration on interior lines )ad only occasional use ()en t)e stronger could not co%/el t)e (eaker to fig)t. Interior lines of o/erations usually conferred an ad+antage on t)e forces t)at /ossessed t)e% &ecause of t)e o//ortunities t)at t)ey /resented for concentrating against first one )ostile force and t)en t)e ot)er. 0)is situation contrasted (it) t)at in tactics ()ere a /osition &et(een t(o o//onents3 called en+elo/%ent3 )ad serious disad+antages. Instead of )a+ing t)e c)oice of concentrating against one or t)e ot)er3 an enclosed ar%y )ad to fig)t all ene%y troo/s si%ultaneously. 0)e en+elo/ers3 front3 flank3 and rear3 /ressed t)eir %utually su//orting attacks against an o//onent de/ri+ed of t)e /o(er of %anoeu+re and rarely oriented to fig)t on all sides e.ually (ell. 0)e difference &et(een t)is tactical circu%stance and t)e strategic situation of interior and e-terior lines of o/erations lay in t)e distance and ()et)er t)e e-terior forces (ere close enoug) to one anot)er to afford eac) ot)er %utual su//ort. Back

Caesar%s Strategy in the Con&uest of Gaul

0)e Ro%an /olitician and soldier 8ulius $aesar de+oted se+en years to t)e con.uest of *aul3 roug)ly t)e sa%e area as /resent#day 'rance. "e con.uered suc) a large territory so ra/idly &ecause of )is consu%%ate %astery of t)e Ro%an art of (ar. "e co%&ined t)oroug) /re/aration3 /atient and /erce/ti+e strategy and a )ig) standard for engineering and logistics (it) su/erlati+e tactical skill. Nor did )e o+erlook t)e /olitical conciliation of )is o//onents3 a task for ()ic) )is %agnani%ous dis/osition as (ell as )is /olitical e-/erience and talents /erfectly fitted )i%. 0)oug) an e/ile/tic of uni%/osing /)ysi.ue3 )e e-/osed )i%self to danger and s)ared )is %ens )ards)i/s3 reinforcing )is &rilliant leaders)i/ of )ardened soldiers ()o res/onded to )is %agnetis% =<

and )is al%ost e-tra+agant recognition of t)eir acts of courage and skill. 0)e )istorian Plutarc) noted t)at )e ins/ired in )is soldiers a J/assion for distinction.L 0)ey %ust also )a+e )ad an a//reciation of )is use of t)e defence ()ene+er /ossi&le3 a strategy %ade %ore for%ida&le &y t)e Ro%ans skill in entrenc)ing t)e%sel+es and t)e regularity (it) ()ic) t)ey carried it out. $aesars ca%/aign continued centuries of conflict &et(een t)e *auls and t)e Ro%ans3 ()ic) )ad resulted in t)e Ro%ans con.uering t)e *allic /ortion of nort) Italy and e-tending t)eir control as far as t)e R)one Ri+er. 0)oug) $aesar faced a national resistance3 t)e *auls lacked /olitical unity &ot) a%ong t)e +arious tri&es and /er)a/s &et(een t)e aristocracy and t)e /easants ()o $aesar said (ere &ound to t)e no&ility +irtually as sla+es. In addition3 so%e *allic tri&es )ad friendly relations (it) t)e Ro%ans3 $aesar largely relying on t)e *auls for )is ca+alry. 0)us $aesar )ad ele%ents of significant strengt) in t)e /olitical situation. lt)oug) initially $aesar could engage one *allic tri&e at a ti%e3 )e finally faced a (inter rising of all of t)e tri&es3 ()ic) under t)e leaders)i/ of t)e /erce/ti+e Vercingetori- /ursued a logistic strategy. ccording to $aesar3 t)e *auls )ad as t)eir J/ri%e o&Decti+eL to JInterdict t)e Ro%ans fro% forage and su//lies3L an easy task gi+en t)eir strengt) in ca+alry and t)e season of t)e year. Since Jin t)e (inter t)ere (as no grass to cut3L t)e Ro%ans J%ust necessarily scatter to find fodder in &arns in s%all /arties3 ()ic) could &e /icked off &y t)e ca+alry day &y day.L Not only did t)e *auls use t)e raiding as/ect of 'a&ius strategy3 &ut t)ey relied on t)e %et)od t)at t)e Persians )ad refused to use against le-ander. 0)e deter%ined Vercingetori- s/ecified t)at J/ri+ate interests %ust &e sacrificed to t)e co%%on cause. 0o eit)er side of t)e road as far as foragers could reac)3 steadings and &arns %ust &e &urned do(n. 0)ey (ould t)e%sel+es &e ade.uately su//lied3 for t)ey (ould dra( on t)e resources of t)e /eo/les in t)e t)eatre of o/erations. 0)e Ro%ans %ust eit)er star+e or go far afield fro% t)eir ca%/ at great risk7 and it %ade no difference ()et)er t)ey killed t)e% or took t)eir &aggage3 for (it)out it t)ey could not %ake (ar.L Rut)less in )is a//lication of )is logistic strategy3 Vercingetori- e+en /lanned to &urn t)e to(ns t)at )e could not defend in order to eli%inate Jready stocksL of /ro+isions Jfor t)e Ro%ans to /illage and carry off.L Vercingetori- did not originate t)e use of logistic strategy in t)e *allic !ar. c)ieftain )ad earlier e%/loyed it against $aesar3 and $aesar )ad used it (it) effect )i%self. !)en one tri&e3 t)e Belgae3 )ad concentrated all of t)eir forces to fig)t )i%3 $aesar declined &attle e-ce/t on t)e ra%/arts of )is fortified ca%/. s )e e-/ected3 t)e Belgae /ro+ed (ise enoug) not to attack )i% in suc) a strong /osition. Instead t)ey (aited for $aesar to co%e out of )is a%/ly /ro+isioned ca%/7 $aesar3 in turn3 (aited for t)e Belgae to consu%e t)eir su//lies Dust as3 during t)e Issus ca%/aign3 le-ander )ad (aited for 1arius to e-)aust t)e /ro+isions in )is flank /osition. $aesar )ad %ore success t)an le-ander: t)e Belgae3 finding3 as $aesar e-/lained3 t)at Jt)eir o(n co%%issary (as &eginning to fail3L decided to dis/erse t)eir large concentration so it could return to t)eir J)o%e# gro(n su//lies.L $aesar t)en left )is fortifications to ca%/aign against t)e se/arated grou/s of t)e Belgae. 0)e su&tle and resourceful Vercingetori-3 a//lying )is strategy rigorously and effecti+ely3 a+oided &attle ()en $aesar %arc)ed against )i%. 9ee/ing )is distance and a+oiding t)e te%/tation to fig)t3 Vercingetori- stuck (it) )is logistic strategy not to Jte%/t 'ortune in a /itc)ed &attle &ut kee/ t)e ene%y fro% grain and forage.L $aesar t)en countered (it) a strategy Jeit)er of enticing )i% out of )is %ars)es and forests3 or of &lockading )i% into su&%ission.L "is initial effort in+ol+ed si%ultaneously &esieging t(o cities3 a difficult task (it) a *allic ar%y near&y. t t)e siege of Bourges3 $aesar descri&ed Vercingetori-s ar%y lurking near&y Jon t)e (atc) for our foraging and grain#gat)erer /arties3 and ()en necessarily scattered far afield )e attacked t)e% and inflicted serious losses.L 0)is Ji%/osed suc) scarcity u/on t)e ar%y t)at for se+eral days t)ey (ere (it)out grain and sta+ed off star+ation only &y dri+ing in cattle fro% re%ote +illages.L

==

lt)oug) )e %anaged to kee/ )is ar%y /ro+isioned3 $aesar realised t)at )e could no longer %aintain )is forces in central *aul. Not only could )e not continue to feed )is ar%y3 &ut in eastern *aul Vercingetori- carried 5ut raids against t)e territory of tri&es friendly to t)e Ro%ans. $aesar %arc)ed east3 follo(ed &y Vercingetori- (it) a large force. But realising t)at t)e JRo%ans (ould return ()en t)ey )ad enlarged t)eir ar%y and (ould ne+er /ut an end to t)e (ar3L t)e des/erate Vercingetori-3 /er)a/s o+erconfident or /ressed to action &y )is follo(ers3 turned to a co%&at /ersisting strategy and risked &attle. 1efeated3 t)e *allic leader fell &ack to t)e to(n of lesia3 ()ere $aesar &esieged )i% ()ile fending off a large relie+ing ar%y. Su//ly for t)e Ro%an ar%y /resented t)e usual difficulty3 &ut t)e Ro%an co%%issary o+erca%e t)e o&stacles and ke/t t)e ar%y /ro+isioned3 /ro&a&ly &y &ringing food and fodder fro% a na+iga&le ri+er forty#fi+e %iles a(ay. 0)e siege clearly e-)i&its t)e t)oroug)ness and effecti+eness of Ro%an engineering. 0o enclose t)e &esiegers3 $aesar &uilt a line of entrenc)%ents ten %iles long. 0)ese consisted of a trenc) t)at t)e troo/s dug =>> /aces fro% t)e %ain fortification. 0)e /ri%ary line of defence included3 $aesar e-/lained3 Jt(o trenc)es fifteen feet (ide and of t)e sa%e )eig)t3L t)e inner one filled3 J()ere it crossed t)e /lain or de/ressions3 (it) (ater dra(n front t)e ri+er.L Be)ind t)e ditc)es rose a Jra%/art and /alisade t(el+e feet )ig)L and around t)e Jentire circuitL t)e engineers Jerected to(ers at inter+als of eig)ty feet.L 0o render t)e fortifications Jdefensi&le &y a s%aller nu%&er of soldiers3L $aesar cut do(n trees and3 (it) t)e trunks and &ranc)es Jstri//ed and s)ar/ened at t)e end3L /laced t)ese in front of t)e ra%/art and ditc)es3 digging t)e% fi+e feet into t)e ground ()ere t)ey (ere Jfir%ly anc)ored so t)at t)ey could not &e torn loose3 (it) t)e &oug)s /roDecting a&o+eL ground. J0)ese (ere (o+en toget)er and interlaced in ro(s of fi+e3 and anyone t)at ste//ed in (ould i%/ale )i%self on +ery s)ar/ stakes. 0)ese3 t)e %en called gra+estones. In front of t)ese3 /its t)ree feet dee/ (ere dug3 gradually ta/ering to t)e &otto%.L Into t)ese /its Js%oot) logs of t)e t)ickness of a t)ig)3 (it) t)e to/s ta/ering and )ardened in fire3 (ere let do(n so t)at no %ore t)an four inc)es /roDected a&o+e ground. 0o fi- t)e stu%/s and %ake t)e% steady t)e eart) (as tra%/ed do(n for a foot front t)e &otto%7 t)e rest of t)e /it (as co+ered o+er (it) t(igs and &rus) to )ide t)e tra/.L Na%ed &y t)e %en lilies3 Jt)ere (ere eig)t ro(s of t)is kind3 at inter+als of t)ree feet.L In front of t)ese tra/s t)e %en /laced Jfoot#long &locks into ()ic) iron )ooks )ad &een sunk.L 0)ese s/urs J(ere ()olly &uried in t)e ground3 t)ickly scattered o+er t)e ()ole field.L $aesars ar%y t)en re/roduced t)is ()ole line of fortifications as a line of circu%+allation to resist t)e relie+ing ar%y. $oordinated attacks &y t)e &esiegers and t)e relie+ing ar%y failed against suc) t)oroug)ly /re/ared /ositions3 and t)e +aliant Vercingetori- finally surrendered. 0)is defeat ga+e %ilitary control of *aul to $aesar3 and (ise Ro%an ad%inistration ulti%ately not only reconciled t)e *auls to Ro%an rule &ut also e+entually %ade t)e% Ro%an in language3 culture3 and feeling. But &efore t)e defeat at lesia3 Vercingetori-s strategy )ad dri+en $aesar fro% central *aul. In addition to t)eir defensi+e logistic strategy of scorc)ing t)e eart)3 t)e *auls )ad relied on raids rat)er t)an on %eeting t)e Ro%an ar%y in &attle to kee/ it fro% t)eir territory. In t)is (ay t)ey /racticed a guerrilla (ar co%/ara&le to t)at (aged &y t)e Bactrians and Sogdianians. In a//lying t)eir guerrilla (arfare of raids t)ey could a+oid co%&at &ecause t)eir forces3 )a+ing an essentially si%ilar grou/ of (ea/on syste%s as t)e Ro%ans3 could e-/loit t)eir a&ility to retreat and a+oid &attle. Vercingetori- (ould )a+e failed )ad t)ey atte%/ted to (age t)is ca%/aign on t)e /lains and t)e Ro%ans )ad ar%ed t)e%sel+es in t)e %anner of t)e Part)ians. In finding and o+er()el%ing Ro%an foragers as 'a&ius )ad done to "anni&als %en3 t)e *auls concentrated against (eakness to (in %any s%all +ictories. 0)eir strengt) in ca+alry )el/ed t)e% concentrate ra/idly7 facilitating t)e a//lication of t)e co%&at ele%ent t)eir strategy3 t)oug) attacking foragers and grain#gat)erers (as also intrinsic to t)e logistic as/ect of t)eir ca%/aign. $aesar su%%ed u/ t)e /ro&le%s of dealing (it) suc) a strategy: JIf $aesar c)ose to finis) t)e &usiness and e-tir/ate =C

t)e ()ole scoundrelly cre( )e (ould )a+e to &reak u/ )is units and send out nu%erous s%all detac)%ents7 if )e c)ose to kee/ )is for%ations toget)er3 as re.uired &y t)e esta&lis)ed /ractice of t)e Ro%an ar%y3 t)e nati+es (ould )a+e t)e ad+antage of terrain3 and t)ey (ere &old enoug) to a%&us) scattered /arties and cut t)e% off. In t)is difficult situation e+ery /ossi&le care (as taken3 on t)e /rinci/le t)at it (as &etter to sacrifice an o//ortunity to inDure t)e ene%y if t)e inDury (ould in+ol+e a loss on our /art. Suc) guerrilla (arfare and t)e defensi+e logistic strategy a//lied conco%itantly )ad one ot)er re.uire%ent: it needed enoug) /olitical strengt) to kee/ t)e /o/ulation co%%itted to t)e (ar and t)e costly3 slo( %et)od of (aging it. 0)e *allic resistance %ay )a+e lacked enoug) suc) %oti+ation to /erse+ere7 certainly t)e *auls did not )a+e an a&undance of t)e /olitical unity and su//ort needed to defeat t)e Ro%ans. 0)e *auls foug)t on t)eir o(n territory3 de+astating t)eir o(n fields and &urning t)eir o(n far%steads7 t)e Ro%ans foug)t far fro% )o%e (it) a regular ar%y. 0)e tolerance and .uality of Ro%an rule3 de%onstrated in Ro%es adDacent *allic /ro+ince3 %ay not )a+e %ade t)e state of inde/endence (ort) t)e effort for enoug) *auls. Back

Caesar%s lerda Cam'aign, #n /nusual 0ccurrence of the (urning Movement

0)e Ro%an ci+il (ar t)at follo(ed $aesars con.uest of *aul /itted $aesar against Po%/ey3 a&le as a /olitician and outstanding as a general. In )is fine ar%y in no(#/acific *aul3 $aesar )ad t)e stronger land forces. But Po%/ey controlled t)e sea and all of t)e land e-ce/t *aul. $aesar3 situated &et(een S/ain and Italy and )a+ing interior lines of o/erations3 struck first at t)e +irtually defenceless Italian /eninsula. Po/ular in Italy and soon in control t)ere3 $aesar t)en %arc)ed against S/ain ()ile Po%/ey fled to *reece and &egan to organise and concentrate t)e troo/s t)ere and in Ro%es eastern Mediterranean /ro+inces. !)en $aesar turned against S/ain3 )e found a su&stantial ar%y loyal to Po%/ey garrisoning t)at /ro+ince3 ()ic) t)e Ro%ans )ad con.uered fro% $art)age a century and a )alf &efore. $aesars lieutenant ad+anced (est(ard along t)e Mediterranean coast of 'rance and in early s/ring crossed t)e Pyrenees (it)out %eeting resistance fro% t)e inferior forces of Po%/eys %en. $aesars nu%erical /re/onderance %ay )a+e &een on t)e order 5f ?<3>>> to 2<3>>> for )is o//onents in S/ain7 )is ar%y also )ad far greater strengt) in ca+alry7 and )is %en3 unlike t)e S/anis) garrisons of Po%/eys su//orters3 )ad recent co%&at e-/erience. franius and Petreius3 Po%/eys ca/a&le and loyal generals in S/ain3 (isely standing on t)e defensi+e3 took u/ a /osition at Ilerda on t)e Sicoris Ri+er in nort)ern S/ain3 a&out t(enty#fi+e %iles nort) of t)e /lace ()ere t)e Sicoris e%/ties into t)e 2&ro. 5n a )ill (est of Ilerda and t)e ri+er t)e Po%/eians &uilt a fortified ca%/3 ()ic) /rotected t)eir ar%y and co+ered t)e stone &ridge t)at connected t)e t(o sides of t)e ri+er. 0)oug) t)ey occu/ied a strong /osition3 t)ey +ie(ed it only as an out/ost3 for t)ey /lanned to %ake t)eir %ain resistance on t)e 2&ro. !)en t)ey (ere ready3 t)ey could easily retreat across t)e 2&ro &y %eans of a &ridge of &oats t)at t)ey /lanned to construct near t)e %out) of t)e Sicoris. 0)e Ilerda ca%/aign illustrates t)e /o(er of t)e defence (it) &ot) ar%ies si%ilarly constituted3 as (ere t)ese o//osing Ro%an ar%ies eac) of ()ic) relied /ri%arily on its )ea+y legionary infantry. 0)us t)e s)re(d defenders of S/ain3 careful to %ake t)e %ost of t)eir /osition3 succeeded in %aking t)eir inferior force too strong for $aesars ar%y to attack3 e+en after $aesar )i%self took co%%and. Nor could $aesars in+ading troo/s &y/ass t)e /osition3 for3 t)oug) t)is %o+e (ould o/en S/ain to in+asion3 t)e Po%/eian ar%y could t)en %arc) to(ard Italy ()ere t)ey could /otentially do %ore da%age to $aesars cause t)an $aesar could inflict on Po%/eys &y %o+ing a&out at (ill in S/ain. 0)e key to t)e strengt) of t)e Po%/eian /osition lay in t)e a%/le store of su//lies in Ilerda and in t)e Po%/eians control of t)e stone &ridge3 ()ic) ga+e t)e% secure and relia&le co%%unication o+er t)e Sicoris3 a ri+er lia&le to sudden rises in t)e s/ring Dust ()en $aesar in+aded S/ain. 0)e

=B

&ridge ena&led $aesars o//onents easily to concentrate t)eir troo/s on eit)er side of t)e ri+er and ga+e t)e% access to t)e foraging area east of t)e ri+er. $aesar &uilt a fortified ca%/ near t)at of t)e Po%/eians and soug)t to gain access to t)e east &ank of t)e Sicoris &y &uilding t(o &ridges u/strea%3 ()ic) )e used to send troo/s and foragers to t)e east &ank of t)e Sicoris. But floods /ro%/tly s(e/t a(ay one &ridge7 as soon as )e re&uilt it3 $aesar e-/lained3 un/recedented rainfall J(as)ed do(n t)e sno( fro% all t)e %ountains3 o+erto//ed t)e &anks of t)e ri+er3 and in one day &roke do(n &ot) t)e &ridges.L 0)is flood also detained a su//ly con+oy fro% *aul and de/ri+ed $aesars ar%y of /ro+isions during late s/ring3 logistically Jt)e %ost difficult season of t)e year3 ()en t)ere (as no corn in t)e (inter stores and t)e cro/s (ere not far fro% &eing ri/e ()ile t)e co%%unities (ere e-)austedL &ecause t)e Po%/eians )ad re%o+ed all re%aining su//lies in creating t)eir reser+e. 2+entually $aesar &ridged t)e Sicoris far u/strea% fro% Ilerda3 recei+ed )is su//ly con+oy3 and relie+ed )is logistical e%ergency. But )e still could do not)ing to dislodge )is o//onent. 0)us su//ly difficulties3 co%&ined (it) t)e defensi+e /o(er of a fortified ar%y in a /osition astride a key co%%unications link3 ena&led an e-/ertly co%%anded &ut inferior ar%y to &affle a greater force3 not(it)standing $aesars &rilliant and deter%ined leaders)i/. But in %id#8une3 (it) t)e end of t)e s/ring floods3 $aesar erected a &ridge eig)teen %iles u/strea% and succeeded in creating a ford in t)e ri+er near t)e city. 0)ese /ro+ided %ore secure co%%unication (it) t)e east &ank and ena&led )is stronger ca+alry to do%inate t)e foraging 6ones on ()ic) t)e ene%y de/ended. 0)is %enace and t)e /ossi&ility $aesar %ig)t no( &e a&le to &egin a siege caused Po%/eys generals to fall &ack to t)e 2&ro3 t)eir ne-t line of defence. 0)e kno(ledge t)at in t)eir rear so%e nati+es of S/ain )ad gone o+er to $aesar reinforced t)eir decision. 4sing t)e east &ank of t)e Sicoris in t)eir retreat to t)e 2&ro3 t(enty#fi+e %iles distant3 t)ey %o+ed out (ell &efore da(n3 getting a good start on $aesar ()o3 delayed &y t)e difficulty of crossing ra/idly &y t)e ford3 follo(ed se+eral )ours &e)ind )is retreating o//onents. But3 as $aesar e-/lained3 )e used )is &attle#seasoned lig)t ca+alry to Jannoy and )arass t)e ene%ys line of %arc)3L forcing t)e Po%/eian forces to retreat +ery slo(ly &ecause t)e ca+alry i%/eded Jt)eir %arc) &y /ouring a great nu%&er of %en around t)eir flanks.L t ti%es3 Jt)e end of t)e colu%n (as &eing )eld u/ and e+en &eing cut off fro% t)e rest3 ()ile at ot)er ti%es t)eir colours (ere /us)ed for(ardL and $aesars ca+alry J(ere dri+en &ack &y a c)arge of t)e co)orts in a &ody3 and t)en again ()eeled around and /ursed t)e foe.L 0)e ene%ys necessarily slo( /ace ena&led a forced %arc) &y $aesars +eterans to &ring )is ar%y u/on t)e rear of t)e retreating Po%/eians3 ()o /ro%/tly dre( u/ t)eir line of &attle on )ig) ground. 0)e location ga+e t)e legions suc) a defensi+e ad+antage t)at $aesar did not consider an attack (it) )is fatigued troo/s. 0)e Po%/eians3 )o(e+er3 (is)ed to reac) and cross t)e 2&ro if only &ecause t)ey could not long find food for t)eir %en and forage for t)eir )orses in t)e rugged3 %ountainous country3 ()ic) t)ey )ad reac)ed in t)eir retreat. But3 J(orn out &y a ()ole days fig)ting and t)e toll of t)eir %arc)3 t)eyL did not resu%e t)eir (it)dra(al t)e ne-t day3 s/ending t)e ti%e reconnoitring t)e country in t)eir rear and t)e nine %iles t)at se/arated t)e% fro% t)eir &ridge across t)e 2&ro. 0)eir o&ser+ations re+ealed t)at &e)ind t)e% stretc)ed Jfi+e %iles of le+el route3 t)en follo(s rugged and )illy ground3 t)at t)ere is no difficulty in t)e ene%y &eing sto//ed &y ()osoe+er first occu/ies t)ese defiles.L 0)ey /lanned Jto set out ne-t day at early da(n.L $aesar )ad also e-a%ined t)e route3 and at da(n t)e ne-t day )e &egan a %arc) in ()ic) )e e-ecuted a turning %o+e%ent3 one of t)e %ost difficult and /otentially decisi+e %anoeu+res in (arfare. !)en $aesar %o+ed )is ar%y Jat early da(n3L on a route t)at initially led &ack to(ard Ilerda3 t)e ene%y Jsoldiers Doyfully ran out of t)eir ca%/ to see t)e s/ectacle3L &elie+ing $aesars ar%y (as Jfleeing under t)e stress of lack of necessary food3 and (ere on t)eir (ay &ack to Ilerda.L

=@

But soon t)ey sa( t)at $aesars /lan took )is %en around t)e% in a J(ide circuit3L o+erco%ing Jlarge and difficult +alleys3 stee/ rocks3L and a lack of roads or /at)s. Belatedly realising $aesars o&Decti+e3 t)e ene%y /ro%/tly set out for t)e /asses fi+e %iles in t)eir rear3 and Jt)e ()ole contest turned on s/eed # ()ic) of t)e t(o (ould first sei6e t)e defiles and t)e )ills.L $aesar (ould surely )a+e lost t)e race )ad )is ca+alry not o/erated on t)e le+el ground of t)e ene%ys %arc) to delay t)e%. J$aesar co%/leted t)e distance firstL and3 (it) )is ar%y arrayed for &attle on le+el ground3 &locked t)e ene%ys retreat. Realising t)at t)e ad+antage of fig)ting on t)e tactical defensi+e no( &elonged to $aesar3 t)e astute franius and Petreius )ad no intention of %aking a frontal attack on $aesars larger and .ualitati+ely &etter ar%y. 0)e Po%/eians atte%/ted to %o+e sout) &y anot)er (ay3 &ut $aesar )ad little difficulty cutting off all routes of esca/e to t)e sout) &ecause t)e rugged terrain li%ited t)e nu%&er of lines of %arc) for t)e ene%y. In addition to t)e to/ogra/)y3 $aesar enDoyed t)e ad+antage t)at in relation to t)e s%all si6e of t)e area in ()ic) t)e t(o ar%ies &y t)en o/erated3 )e )ad a +ery large ar%y. !it) suc) a large ratio of force to s/ace3 $aesar could readily station troo/s to contest all /ossi&le routes and still )a+e t)e %ain &ody close enoug) to t)ese detac)%ents so t)at t)e ()ole ar%y could /ro%/tly aid any of t)e detac)%ents s)ould t)e ene%y %o+e in full force against one of t)e%. In a larger s/ace (it) %ore le+el terrain3 t)e Po%/eians (ould )a+e )ad a good c)ance of getting around $aesars ar%y.

Turning Mo%ement Back

2ffecti+ely &locked3 and un(illing to %ake a frontal attack on $aesar3 t)e Po%/eians could only atte%/t t)e logistic strategy of trying to star+e out $aesars ar%y and co%/el it to %o+e out of its &locking /osition in searc) of food. $aesar3 )o(e+er3 )ad t)e ad+antage3 for not only )ad )is %en &roug)t se+eral days rations (it) t)e% &ut also )is e-cellent ca+alry do%inated all of t)e le+el ground3 t)e only /lace ()ere t)e ene%y foragers could find food or fodder. So effecti+e (as $aesars ca+alry t)at )is o//onents e+en )ad difficulty in securing (ater and t)eir soldiers &egan to desert to $aesars ar%y.

C>

Blocked and star+ed out3 t)e Po%/eians t)en &egan to retreat nort) to(ard Ilerda (it) $aesars ar%y and ca+alry follo(ing. 5n t)e %arc) to Ilerda t)e Po%/eian force found itself cri//led &ecause t)eir &aggage ani%als3 J(it)out fodder for four days3L &roke do(n. !it)out J(ater3 fire(ood3 and forageL for t)eir ar%y3 franius and Petreius asked for a conference3 t)en surrendered t)eir ar%y ()en $aesar3 t)e +eteran /olitician3 offered to disc)arge all of t)eir %en rat)er t)an use t)e% against Po%/ey. !it)out a &attle $aesar destroyed an entire ene%y ar%y. "is strategic offensi+e turning %o+e%ent ga+e )i% t)e ad+antage of t)e tactical defensi+e. It )ad acco%/lis)ed for $aesar ()at t)e flank /osition )ad ac)ie+ed for 1arius &efore t)e Battle of Issus. 1ariuss flank /osition3 a defensi+e %anoeu+re3 )ad gi+en le-ander t)e c)oice of )alting )is ad+ance3 attacking 1arius to dri+e )i% fro% )is flank /osition3 or %arc)ing for(ard3 (it) t)e risk of )a+ing 1arius in )is rear. fter using a logistic strategy to try to dri+e 1arius fro% )is /osition3 le-ander c)ose t)e t)ird o/tion and soon found 1arius &e)ind )i%. le-ander t)en selected t)e co%&at alternati+e and attacked t)e Persian ar%y. 0)e turning %o+e%ent3 an offensi+e %anoeu+re3 ga+e $aesar t)e sa%e ad+antage3 t)at of /lacing )is ar%y in t)e ene%ys rear (it) t)e &enefit of t)e tactical defensi+e if t)e ene%y c)ose to attack. 0)e tactical defensi+e )ad %ore +alue for $aesar t)an for 1arius3 &ecause &ot) Ro%an ar%ies )ad &asically t)e sa%e constitution and &ot) )ad as t)eir /ri%ary (ea/on syste% t)e )ea+y infantry legion. 0)e defensi+e /ro+ided a %aDor tactical ad+antage and t)e turning %o+e%ent )ad conferred t)is on $aesars ar%y. 0)e terrain and t)e )ig) ratio of force to s/ace ena&led $aesar to kee/ franius and Petreius fro% %o+ing around )i% to resu%e t)eir retreat to t)eir su//lies3 t)e security of t)eir &ridge3 and t)e 2&ro &arrier. $aesars e-cellent ca+alry assured )is foraging and interdicted t)e ene%ys3 and )is &locking t)e Po%/eians (it)dra(al also cut off t)eir su//lies3 forcing t)e% to retreat nort)(ard into country still do%inated &y )is ca+alry. 'inally3 $aesars /olitically (ise offer to disc)arge t)e /risoners co%/leted t)e ca%/aign &y %aking it easy for t)e ene%y co%%anders to surrender instead of continuing t)eir retreat to Ilerda3 ()ic) t)ey still controlled and ()ere t)ey still )ad a s%all su//ly of food and fodder. $aesars success in reac)ing t)e ene%ys rear )ad o&+iated a &attle. si%ilar success &y 1arius III against le-ander )ad ena&led t)e Persians to fig)t a defensi+e &attle3 ()ic) t)e su/eriority of t)e Macedonians and t)eir leaders)i/ )ad (on. Before t)e Battle of Plataea3 t)e Persian co%%ander )ad a+oided a si%ilar situation3 (it)dra(ing ()en )e o&ser+ed t)e S/artan ar%y ad+ancing to(ard a /oint ()ere it could &lock )is retreat fro% t)e ttica /eninsula. 0)e Persian co%%ander )ad not (anted to fig)t3 kno(ing t)at J ttica (as not a country ()ere ca+alry could act (it) ad+antage7 and furt)er3 t)at if )e suffered defeat in a &attle3L (it) t)e ene%y &locking )is (it)dra(al route3 Jno (ay of esca/e (as o/en to )i%3 e-ce/t t)roug) defiles3 ()ere a )andful of troo/s %ig)t sto/ all )is ar%y.L $aesars ca%/aign also s)o(s t)e significant strategic utility of lig)t ca+alry. s t)e %ost %o&ile of t)e four &asic (ea/on syste%s3 lig)t ca+alry )ad great /o(er off t)e &attlefield if it could function in reasona&ly le+el3 un(ooded terrain suita&le for ca+alry. 0)e /re#e%inent tactical %o&ility of t)is ca+alry /er%itted it to a+oid any ot)er ty/e of (ea/on syste% and its a&ility to %arc) at dou&le t)e rate of infantry ena&led it to o/erate at a distance fro% t)e %ain force of t)e ar%y. $o%%anders could e%/loy t)e &etter strategic %o&ility of lig)t ca+alry to attack ene%y co%%unications and use it3 as )ad $aesar3 to do%inate areas fro% ()ic) &ot) ar%ies dre( su//lies. In t)e Plataea ca%/aign t)e Persians )ad %ade si%ilarly effecti+e strategic use of t)eir ca+alry to interdict *reek su//lies. 0)oug) tactically t)e lig)t ca+alry could not attack a force co%/osed of lig)t and )ea+y infantry3 it could easily e+ade t)e foot soldiers and control all of an area e-ce/t ()ere t)e infantry stood. Its greater %o&ility ena&led it to reconnoitre &etter t)an t)e ene%y and concentrate ra/idly against an C1

o&Decti+e suc) as a foraging /arty or a /ack train. 2+en if lig)t infantry /rotected t)e foragers or train3 t)e lig)t ca+alry could use its %o&ility to concentrate a force far too strong for t)e fe( lig)t infantry guards. Successful use of lig)t ca+alry in t)is i%/ortant strategic role de/ended on suita&le terrain: (oods or %ountains (ould nullify t)is ca/a&ility. But in terrain unsuita&le for ca+alry3 lig)t infantry could e%/loy its relati+ely &etter %o&ility to carry out t)e sa%e function3 controlling foraging areas and attacking ene%y su//ly trains. 5f course any kind of soldier could carry out t)is %ission &ut t)e greater %o&ility of ca+alry /articularly ada/ted it to t)is task. If t)e contesting ar%ies )ad lacked ca+alry3 lig)t infantry could )a+e used its +ery %odest &ut real degree of su/erior strategic %o&ility to carry out t)e lig)t ca+alrys functions as t)e instru%ent for t)e a//lication of a strategy ai%ed at cri//ling t)e ene%ys logistics. Back

Caesar%s Cam'aign against !om'ey

"a+ing con.uered S/ain3 $aesar %arc)ed east into sout)ern Italy ()ere )e /lanned to e%&ark )is ar%y to attack Po%/ey in *reece. "e dared atte%/t t)e crossing of t)e driatic in t)e face of )is for%ida&le o//onents %ore /o(erful fleet &ecause )ea+ily %anned (ars)i/s could not re%ain long at sea. Ne+ert)eless3 taking a serious risk3 $aesar crossed t)e (aters (it) as %any %en as )e could find s)i/s for and landed on t)e driatic coast of *reece3 ()ere a stale%ate resulted as $aesar faced Po%/ey ()ile (aiting for t)e re%ainder of )is ar%y to cross. 0)e &lockading s.uadron3 taking /ossession of a s%all island near t)e Italian /ort ()ere $aesars trans/orts (aited3 ke/t a %ore consistent &lockade3 e+en t)oug) t)e island could not su//ly all of t)e (ater needed &y t)e %en on t)e s)i/s. Since /atrols fro% t)e ar%y (aiting to cross ke/t t)e fleet fro% landing on t)e Italian coast to find (ater3 t)e trans/orts finally sli//ed t)roug)3 &ringing $aesars force to full strengt). s an indecisi+e (ar of /osition3 t)e ensuing ca%/aign )ad %uc) in co%%on (it) t)at around Ilerda in t)at neit)er of t)e e-/erienced and /rudent generals (ould attack t)e ot)er in t)eir strong /ositions. Po%/ey3 a fa%ous general (it) a&ility not inco%/ara&le to $aesars3 (aited for logistic difficulties to force $aesar a(ay3 ()ile $aesar /inned Po%/eys stronger ar%y against t)e coast to %ake it a//ear )e )ad t)e u//er )and and to kee/ Po%/eys %ore nu%erous ca+alry fro% interfering (it) )is su//lies. Since Po%/ey controlled t)e sea3 $aesar could not e%&arrass Po%/ey for food ()en )e )ad )is &ack to t)e coast. 'inally3 t)e resourceful Po%/ey concentrated against one end of $aesars fifteen#%ile fortified /eri%eter3 used )is fleet to land a force in $aesars rear at t)at /oint3 and forced )i% to retreat. $aesar t)en %arc)ed inland3 t)e s)re(d Po%/ey follo(ing3 &ut3 Jafraid to )a6ard a &attle on ()ic) so %uc) de/ended3 and &eing )i%self /ro+ided (it) all of t)e necessaries for any lengt) of ti%e3 t)oug)t to tire out and (aste t)e +igour of $aesars ar%y3 ()ic) could not last long.L Besides t)e fatigue of %any ca%/aigns3 an infectious disease (as /resent in $aesars ar%y3 and3 in territory friendly to Po%/ey3 t)e in+aders3 Po%/ey &elie+ed3 (ould )a+e to yield since t)ey )ad neit)er J%oney nor /ro+isions.L :et finally at P)arsalus3 &y %utual consent3 t)ey %et in &attle. 0)oug) $aesar )ad an ar%y inferior in &ot) infantry and ca+alry3 )e foug)t &ecause )e could see no ot)er o//ortunity to fig)t Po%/ey. !it) )is control of t)e sea3 Po%/ey )ad %any strategic alternati+es in addition to )is logistic strategy3 &ut3 under /ressure fro% )is /artisans3 )e yielded to t)e te%/tation to settle t)e (ar &y a &attle. "e lost at P)arsalus ()en $aesar counter&alanced )is inferiority in ca+alry &y using a )ea+y infantry detac)%ent on )is flank to defeat Po%/eys +ictorious ca+alry and lig)t infantry. Po%/eys )ea+y losses ga+e $aesar %astery in t)e east3 and t)e /ro+inces t)ere i%%ediately s(itc)ed t)eir allegiance fro% Po%/ey to $aesar. Back

C2

SUMMARY OF WARFARE ON LAND

0)ese generalisations fro% ancient (arfare rely %ore on t)e &est %odels G le-ander3 "anni&al3 and $aesarH t)an t)ey do on t)e re/resentati+e. 0)e &est are %ore a+aila&le3 as t)ey )a+e attracted t)e attention of ancient and %odern )istorians3 and t)ey are %ore +alua&le for understanding t)e de+elo/%ent of so/)istication in t)e art of (ar. t t)e sa%e ti%e3 )o(e+er3 tactical syste%s result fro% ada/tations to geogra/)ical3 /olitical3 social3 econo%ic3 and tec)nological conditions and only rarely reflect t)e genius of one %an. In tactics t)e ancients soug)t to attack t)e ene%ys (eakness. If t)ey could do t)is (it) a %ore /o(erful (ea/on syste%3 as e%/loying Da+elin#t)ro(ing lig)t infantry against )ea+y infantry3 t)ey a+ailed t)e%sel+es of t)e o//ortunity. But usually t)ey )ad to rely on %o+ing against t)e ene%ys flank or rear3 de/ending on t)e ina//ro/riateness of t)e o//osing dis/ositions rat)er t)an )a+ing a &etter (ea/on syste%. 0)e difficulty of %anoeu+ring )ea+y infantry %ade its use for flank or rear assaults an al%ost insu/era&le task. 0)e slo(ness (it) ()ic) t)e ancients de+elo/ed e+en /oorly articulated for%ations s)o(s not t)at t)ey lacked intellect &ut rat)er t)e difficulty of originating3 suc) si%/le &ut i%/ortant ideas. le-ander3 for e-a%/le3 ()o %astered +ery so/)isticated tactics3 strategy3 and logistics3 could neit)er articulate )is ar%y to a sufficient degree nor co%%unicate (it) its /arts (ell enoug) to function as an o+erall co%%ander. In /art for t)is reason3 )e only di%ly sa( t)at a su&tracted reser+e could gi+e )i% a c)oice during &attle of concentrating force eit)er to e-/loit an ene%ys +ulnera&ility or to counter an ene%ys strengt). $a+alry3 (eak in s)ock action3 /ro+ed to &e +alua&le as an offensi+e (ea/on t)at could attack an ene%ys flank or rear. Its greater %o&ility and t)e %odest re.uire%ents for fig)ting in carefully dra(n u/ for%ations %ade it ideal for t)is task3 in s/ite of its far )ig)er cost as co%/ared to infantry. Better %o&ility decided %ost &attles3 &ut $aesar defeated %o&ility at P)arsalus &y &ringing )is )ea+y infantry into an une-/ected )ead#on collision (it) t)e ene%ys ca+alry and lig)t infantry3 an instance of &ringing a su/erior (ea/on syste% against an inferior in a &attle (it) a %i-ture of (ea/on syste%s. In strategy t)e sa%e /rinci/le a//lied3 concisely stated &y t)e soldier and )istorian Ieno/)on: J!ise generals)i/ consists in attacking ()ere t)e ene%y is (eakest3 e+en if t)e /oint &e so%e (ay distant.L 0)e underlying assu%/tion G(in (it) %ini%u% effortH Ieno/)on only see%ed to .ualify ()en )e (rote: Jif you attack e-/ecting to /re+ail3 do it in full strengt)3 &ecause a sur/lus of +ictory ne+er caused any con.ueror one /ang of re%orse.L In strategy t)e %ost &asic a//lication of t)is /rinci/le of least effort (as found in a c)oice &et(een logistic and co%&at strategy. $aesar3 ()o said )e /referred logistic strategy Jcon.uering t)e foe &y )unger rat)er t)an &y steelL # I%/licitly assu%ed t)e a+aila&ility of a c)oice &et(een t)e t(o strategies and decided t)at )unger in+ol+ed t)e least effort. Neit)er of t)ese assu%/tions (as al(ays true. Before t)e Battle of Issus3 le-ander3 for e-a%/le3 faced (it) 1ariuss ar%y in a flank /osition on a /lain3 c)ose t)e logistic strategy of )unger to force 1arius fro% )is Position. "e selected t)is %et)od &ecause it in+ol+ed %ini%u% effort and t)e greatest c)ance of success ()en co%/ared (it) co%&at3 ()ic) )e (ould )a+e )ad to e%/loy on terrain t)at fa+oured t)e Persian /redo%inance in ca+alry. ,ater3 facing 1arius on t)e coast3 )e )ad no logistic strategy a+aila&le to )i% and used co%&at strategy on terrain less fa+oura&le for Persian ca+alry. 'urt)er3 %ilitary strategy (as t)e ser+ant of t)e /olitical o&Decti+e. 0)e Part)ians could )a+e dri+en $rassus &ack &y de/ri+ing )is ar%y of food and (ater3 a logistic strategy3 and dou&tless t)is &loodless +ictory (ould )a+e in+ol+ed less effort in ter%s of %en3 )orses3 and (ea/ons. 0)ey (ould )a+e used t)eir ca+alry strategically3 as did $aesar in t)e Ilerda ca%/aign3 to cut off t)e Ro%ans access to food and (ater. Instead3 t)e Part)ians used t)eir ca+alry tactically7 /ursuing a

C?

co%&at strategy3 for a +ictory t)roug) )unger (ould )a+e )ad significantly less /olitical i%/act t)an t)e +irtual anni)ilation of a Ro%an ar%y &y t)e use of t)eir %ounted (ea/on syste%s. In c)oosing t)e %ost /olitically effecti+e strategy3 t)e Part)ians found t)e%sel+es in t)e relati+ely rare situation of not risking defeat (it) eit)er %ilitary strategy. Political factors also gi+e significance to %ilitary Success. Not)ing &etter de%onstrates t)is trut) t)an t)e contrast &et(een t)e results of t)e +ictories of le-ander against 1arius and t)ose of "anni&al against t)e Ro%ans. 0)e .uick and i%/ressi+e success of ntioc)us VII in con.uering Meso/ota%ia3 follo(ed al%ost i%%ediately &y )is disastrous failure3 illustrates )o( %uc) i%/ortance t)e senti%ents of t)e /o/ulation %ay )a+e e+en in t)e a&sence of for%al /olitical organisation. ntioc)uss e-/erience also s)o(s )o( t)e &e)a+iour of soldiers can affect t)e attitude of t)e /o/ulation3 an alienation in t)is case t)at led to catastro/)ic conse.uences. In t)e a&sence of a Part)ian co%&at strategy &ased on /ossession of a su/erior (ea/on syste% on terrain suita&le for its use3 strategy )ad to co/e (it) t)e tactical /ri%acy of t)e defence. !it) ar%ies co%/osed of essentially t)e sa%e (ea/on syste% or )a+ing t)e sa%e Mi-ture of (ea/on syste%s3 t)e defender could usually take u/ a to/ogra/)ically strong /osition3 e+en &uttressing it3 as t)e Ro%ans al%ost unifor%ly did3 (it) entrenc)%ents. 0)e defender )ad t)e e.ually effecti+e alternati+e of retreat3 confident t)at a si%ilarly constituted ar% could not o+ertake )i%. 0)oug) t)e strategic use of lig)t ca+alry to delay t)e ene%ys %arc) %odified t)is generalisation3 $aesars stale%ated ca%/aigns a Ilerda and against Po%/ey a%/ly illustrated t)e /o(er of t)e defence and its ca/a&ility eit)er to resist frontal attacks fro% strong /ositions or to e-/loit t)e ascendancy of retreat o+er /ursuit. &attle could only occur ()en eac) contestant considered it &eneficial. $aesar s)o(ed t)e efficacy of t)e turning %o+e %erit in o+erco%ing t)e /o(er of t)e strategic defence &y gi+ing )i%self t)e ad+antage of t)e tactical defence. But successful turning %o+e%ents (ere necessarily rare3 re.uiring a )ig) ratio of force to s/ace3 ()ic) t)e ancients usually lacked3 as (ell as constraints suc) as t)ose i%/osed &y terrain or su//ly t)at in)i&ited t)e %o+e%ent of t)e turned force. 0)e a&ility of si%ilarly constituted ar%ies to a+oid &attle seriously li%ited t)e efficacy of using interior lines of o/erations to concentrate greater force 0)is t)e $onsul Nero )ad acco%/lis)ed ()en )e led C3>>> %en fro% )is ar%y facing "anni&al 2<> %iles nort) to attack "asdru&als $art)aginians3 ()o )ad Dust entered Italy. J0)us3L said t)e )istorian ,i+y3 Ja single consul in defence of &ot) regions of Italy )ad confronted t(o ar%ies and t(o generals3 )ere (it) )is strategy and t)ere in /erson.L But t)e concentration (ould )a+e a+ailed Nero not)ing )ad "asdru&al not &lundered &y &acking )is ar%y against a ri+er and )a+ing to acce/t &attle ()en3 (isely3 )e )ad soug)t retreat. Significant outco%es also de/ended on t)e relation of t)e success to t)e /olitical goal. fter )is defeat at Issus3 1arius offered le-ander t)e (estern /art of )is e%/ire7 le-ander3 relentlessly deter%ined to con.uer and ai%ing at control of t)e entire Persian 2%/ire3 declined. 0)e i%/ortance of t)e +ictory also de/ended on t)e ratio of t)e force of t)e +ictors to t)e si6e of t)e /otential t)eatre of o/erations. +ictorious ar%y t)at (as s%all in relation to t)e s/ace could usually only do%inate a relati+ely s%all area3 e+en in t)e a&sence of a )ostile ar%y contesting its %o+e%ents. defender#%ig)t use a /ersisting strategy3 as did 1arius3 %eeting t)e ene%y in &attle. If t)e defender felt too (eak to %eet t)e )ostile ar%y3 )e %ig)t3 like t)e *reeks3 a+oid co%&at &y retreating or taking refuge in a (alled city or fortress. But t)is defensi+e strategy (ould not succeed against an o//onent ()o could a//ly a /ersisting strategy of territorial occu/ation. gainst an in+ader like le-ander ()o could co%%and /olitical su//ort in t)e in+aded land3 t)e strategy of a+oiding &attle3 unless in /ursuit of a logistic strategy3 (ould fail.

C4

But if t)e defending regi%e )ad ade.uate /olitical strengt)3 t)e /eo/le as (ell as t)e s/ace constituted o&stacles. nation (it) a %ilitary tradition3 suc) as t)e Ro%an3 (alled cities3 and rugged terrain %ade a for%ida&le o//osition for a +ictorious force s%all in relation to t)e nu%&er of /eo/le3 t)e o&stacles3 and t)e area. 0)e /olitical and %ilitary strengt) of t)e Ro%ans in t)eir country ena&led t)e%3 (it) a 'a&ian strategy3 to a+oid t)e co%/arati+ely s%all $art)aginian ar%y yet /ursue (it) success a /ersisting strategy of defence t)at reduced "anni&al to conducting a raiding rat)er t)an a /ersisting offensi+e strategy. 4lti%ately "anni&al found )i%self al%ost i%/risoned in a s%all encla+e in sout)ern Italy. 1efenders3 lacking t)e Ro%an strengt) in fortifications3 s/ace3 and /eo/le3 still resisted (it)out &attle3 &ut t)ey )ad to resort to a raiding rat)er t)an a /ersisting strategy and acce/ted t)e occu/ation of t)eir country. 0)en3 like t)e Bactrians3 Sogdianians3 and *auls3 t)ey conducted raids against isolated detac)%ents of t)e in+ading force and t)eir su//lies. 0)ey concentrated against (eakness &y /icking s%all ene%y forces and3 ()en t)ey attacked su//ly con+oys or foragers3 t)ey /ursued a logistic as (ell as a co%&at strategy. 0)is kind of raiding strategy e%/loyed t)e tactical offensi+e in /ursuit of t)e strategic defensi+e and is usually called guerrilla (arfare. 1efenders too (eak to e%/loy a /ersisting strategy on t)e defence found a raiding strategy effecti+e &ecause a raiding offensi+e (as stronger t)an a defensi+e /ersisting strategy. !)ereas a /ersisting defence do%inated a /ersisting offensi+e3 it (as (eaker t)an a raiding offence &ecause a raider used retreat3 nor%ally t)e strategic resource of t)e defender. Because raiders )ad no settled line of o/erations and no territorial o&Decti+e3 t)ey %ig)t c)oose t)eir o&Decti+e al%ost at rando%7 and3 &ecause retreat /redo%inated o+er /ursuit3 t)ey could usually a+oid t)e /ersisting defenders strong forces and use t)eir in)erent a%&iguity of o&Decti+e to sur/rise (eakly defended co%&at or logistic o&Decti+es. 0)us3 raiders )a+e ad%ira&le o//ortunities to concentrate against (eakness and3 t)oug) on t)e offensi+e3 )a+e al%ost e-clusi+e /ossession of t)e source of t)e defences strategic /ri%acy3 retreat. !it)out t)is intrinsic su/eriority of t)e raiding offensi+e o+er t)e /ersisting defensi+e3 t)e Bactrians and Sogdianians could not /ossi&ly )a+e )ad so %uc) success against le-ander t)e *reat or Vercingetori- against $aesar. 0)us strategy falls into t)e four categories defined &y t)e %atri- &elo(. 0)is %atri- s)ould )a+e t)ree di%ensions to allo( for a di+ision into offensi+e and defensi+e3 &ecause t)e %easures often differ so%e()at de/ending on t)e o&Decti+e.

Strategy Matri* Back

le-anders in+asion and 1ariuss defence e-e%/lify /ersisting co%&at strategy. 0erritorial con.uest t)at de/ri+ed t)e defender of re+enues and recruits also i%/le%ented an offensi+e3 logistic3 /ersisting strategy as did le-anders successful ca%/aign to de/ri+e t)e Persian na+y of its &ases. In destroying cro/s and e+en +illages3 Vercingetori- e%/loyed a defensi+e logistic strategy of t)e sa%e scorc)ed#eart) kind t)e Persian co%%and conte%/lated3 &ut reDected3 to )alt le-ander. 0)e raid &y Persian ca+alry3 ()ic) killed or ca/tured *reek /ack %ules during t)e Plataea ca%/aign3 illustrates a raiding logistic strategy e.ually a//lica&le to defence and offence. 0)e Ro%ans against "anni&al and Vercingetori- against $aesar also a//lied suc) logistic raids. 0)e C<

*reeks used t)e raid to i%/le%ent a co%&at strategy ()en t)ey destroyed cro/s in an effort to induce t)e defender to fig)t and "anni&al ado/ted t)e sa%e %et)od against t)e Ro%ans. 0)e Bactrians3 Sogdianians3 and *auls also used t)ese raids in t)eir guerrilla resistance. lt)oug) t)ese guerrilla co%&at raids e%/loyed t)e tactical offensi+e3 t)ey relied e.ually on t)e defensi+es ca/a&ility of retreat. Because a raider ai%ed at only a transitory /resence in t)e raided territory3 (it)dra(al (as an essential ele%ent. 0)is raiding strategy /ro+ed an effecti+e %eans of defence3 /rolonging (ars ()en t)e defenders )ad ade.uate /olitical su//ort. 0)e Ro%ans e-/erience in e-/anding t)eir e%/ire s)o(s t)e difficulty of o+erco%ing suc) a guerrilla resistance. !)en t)ey in+aded Britain in 4? .1.3 t)ey found t)e lo(land sout)east already so%e()at Ro%anised &y its /ro-i%ity to *aul. Ne+ert)eless3 t)e Ro%ans re.uired four years to su&due t)is rece/ti+e3 le+el3 t)inly /o/ulated country in ()ic) t)ey initially esta&lis)ed t)eir rule /artly t)roug) de/endent nati+e Princes. 2-/anding nort)(ard to(ard t)e Scotc) &order and into !ales re.uired anot)er t)irty years. 0(o )undred years after t)e occu/ation of sout)# eastern 2ngland3 t)e con.uerors )ad Ro%anised its aristocracy in language and culture and secured full /o/ular ac.uiescence to t)eir rule. :et t)e fringe area in t)e nort) and also in !ales to t)e (est3 (it) it une+en and in /laces %ountainous terrain3 re%ained /artially )ostile. In t)ese regions t)e Ro%ans %aintained a&out se+enty fortified /osts t)at controlled t)e roads t)ey )ad &uilt. 0)ese o+era(ed t)e in)a&itants and in)i&ited raiders. $ontinued o//osition3 fa+oured &y t)e terrain3 ()ic) offered refuge to t)e guerrillas3 %ade t)ese %easures essential3 and t)e legions )ad to %aintain constant +igilance against raiders fro% areas still not do%inated &y t)e forts. It took t)e tactical su/re%acy of t)e Ro%an regular ar%y and its /o(erful co%&ination of four (ea/on syste%s3 t)e Ro%an /ractice of &uilding forts and roads3 Ro%an /atience and /erse+erance3 and Ro%an culture and /olitical skill and institutions to ac)ie+e con.uest )ere and in ot)er fringe areas of t)e 2uro/ean e%/ire. Back

NAVAL WARFARE
Na+al (arfare relied largely on t(o for%s of s)ock action. G1H !)en o//osing s)i/s touc)ed eac) ot)er3 soldiers on one atte%/ted to &oard t)e ot)er and fig)t (it) s/ear3 s(ord3 and s)ield. 0)e use of &o(s3 Da+elins3 and slings could /recede and su//le%ent t)is action3 &ut at suc) close .uarters s)ock action itself /redo%inated. G2H S)ock action &et(een t)e s)i/s t)e%sel+es constituted t)e first reliance of t)e ri+al forces3 and it (as t)is consideration t)at do%inated t)e design of t)e s)i/s. Since a .uick +ictory (it) negligi&le losses (ould re(ard t)e sinking of an o//osing +essel3 t)e design of (ars)i/s ai%ed at facilitating t)e ra%%ing of t)e o//osing s)i/ &elo( t)e (aterline and o/ening a large )ole to flood t)e ra%%ed s)i/. 'or t)is reason (ars)i/s differed %arkedly fro% %erc)ant s)i/s. Instead of stu&&y3 sturdy s)i/s relying on sail3 na+ies )ad narro(3 lig)tly &uilt s)i/s de/ending /ri%arily on oars. 0)ese )ad relati+ely )ig) s/eed &ecause of t)eir %any oars%en3 lig)t (eig)t3 and great lengt) in relation to &readt). In contrast to %erc)ant s)i/s3 na+al s)i/s )ad a ratio as )ig) as ten to one: ot)er t)ings &eing e.ual3 a narro(er s)i/ %o+es t)roug) t)e (ater %ore readily and can attain a )ig)er s/eed &efore it encounters a s)ar/ increase in t)e resistance offered &y t)e (ater. 0)is s/eed %ade t)e ra% at t)e &o( e+en %ore %enacing. By t)e ti%e of (arfare &et(een t)e *reeks and Persians3 (ars)i/s )ad reac)ed al%ost full de+elo/%ent. re/resentati+e +essel %ig)t )a+e )ad a lengt) of eig)ty feet and a &readt) of eig)t to ten feet. By seating oars%en /artially a&o+e as (ell as &e)ind one anot)er3 t)e s)i/ could acco%%odate t(enty#fi+e oars on eac) side. 0)is %any oars%en ga+e t)e s)i/ )ig) s/eed and its design /ro+ided for considera&le strengt) in resisting a &lo( against t)e &o(7 &ut t)e lig)t (eig)t /recluded any ot)er ele%ents of structural strengt). 0)e s)i/s3 &uilt (it) /lanks on (ooden ri&s attac)ed to a keel3 differed little in design fro% (ooden (ars)i/s &uilt e+er since.

C=

n oar#/ro/elled (ars)i/ could easily defeat a %erc)ant s)i/3 e+en t)oug) t)e %erc)ant s)i/ %ig)t carry %any %ore soldiers. &le to %o+e largely inde/endent of t)e (ind and )a+ing )ig)er s/eed and t)e greater %anoeu+ra&ility /ro+ided &y its disci/lined oars%en ro(ing under co%%and3 t)e (ars)i/ could o+ertake and ra% t)e %erc)ant +essel. Piercing t)e s)i/ under (ater3 t)e strong ra%3 attac)ed to a s)i/ designed to (it)stand t)e s)ock3 (ould o/en a large )ole t)at (ould /ro%/tly sink t)e %erc)ant s)i/. But ()en (ars)i/s foug)t eac) ot)er3 neit)er )ad an ad+antage. 0actics in+ol+ed s)i/s ad+ancing in line a&reast3 t)us /lacing o//osing s)i/s &o( to &o(3 ra% to ra%. In s/ite of t)e si%ilarity &et(een t)e /)alan- of s/ear%en and t)e line of s)i/s3 t)e oars ke/t t)e s)i/s a/art and allo(ed so%e %anoeu+ring and atte%/ts to reac) t)e o//osing s)i/s flanks to ra% t)eir sides. 0)e skill of indi+idual ca/tains and t)e .uality of t)e oars%en )ad %uc) to do (it) success in t)ese endea+ours. But ()en t)e s)i/s ca%e toget)er3 often using )ooks to %aintain t)eir /osition3 it (as soldiers ()o fre.uently settled t)e action &et(een s)i/s. Sea &attles in+ol+ed ele%ents si%ilar to land &attles3 including concentration of force3 flanking or en+elo/ing attacks3 and t)e e%/loy%ent of a reser+e. 'or e-a%/le3 ()en t)e Persians in+aded *reece in 4B> B.$.3 t)ey first %et t)e *reek fleet near $a/e rte%esiu% on t)e coast3 close to ()ere t)e Persian ar%y (as ad+ancing sout)(ard and seeking to enter *reece t)roug) t)e /ass of 0)er%o/ylae. 0)e *reeks took u/ a /osition in a narro( strait &et(een t)e %ainland and t)e large island of 2u&oea3 so t)at t)eir co%%ander could /rotect t)e flanks of )is fleet against t)e larger nu%&er of Persian s)i/s. 0)e Persians at first soug)t to reac) t)e rear of t)e *reek /osition &y sending so%e of t)eir s)i/s around t)e island of 2u&oea. But ()en a stor% arose and destroyed t)e fragile Persian (ars)i/s on t)eir s)ort +oyage3 t)e Persians launc)ed a frontal attack and t)e fleets %et &o( to &o(. So%e s)i/s &roke t)roug) t)e *reek line and /re/ared to use t)eir su/eriority in force to take *reek s)i/s in t)e rear and to use t(o Persian +essels against one *reek. But as t)ey /assed t)roug) t)e ga/ in t)e *reek line3 t)e %o%entarily +ictorious Persians recei+ed a counterattack fro% a second line of *reek s)i/s )eld in reser+e. s t)e Persians ca%e t)roug) t)e first line of *reek s)i/s3 t)e *reek reser+e attacked t)e sides of t)e )ostile s)i/s and sank se+eral. 1iscouraged &y t)ese re/ulses3 &y t)e stor%3 and &y t)e skill of t)e s%aller *reek fleet3 t)e Persians (it)dre(. ,ater3 ()en t)e *reek fleet %ade anot)er stand &et(een t)e s)ore and an island3 t)e Persians3 )a+ing &locked &ot) e-its of t)e strait &et(een t)e island of Sala%is and t)e s)ore3 attacked t)e *reek +essels )olding t)e eastern end of t)e strait. 0)e Persians e-/ected an easy +ictory &ecause t)ey kne( t)at t)e *reeks (ere di+ided o+er ()et)er to fig)t or retreat. s%all island in t)e strait di+ided t)e ad+ancing Persian &attle array and t)e narro( c)annel %ay e+en )a+e forced so%e of t)eir s)i/s to enter t)e strait in line a)ead instead of a&reast. 0)e *reeks e-/loited t)e ensuing Persian disarray and en+elo/ed t)e rig)t flank of t)e Persian fleet. &le to ra% t)e +ulnera&le sides of t)e ene%y +essels3 t)e *reeks /us)ed t)e Persian rig)t (ing &ack u/on its centre3 causing additional confusion3 ()ic) t)e *reeks again e-/loited3 dri+ing &ack t)e Persian s)i/s (it) )ea+y loss. 0)e Persian fleet3 )a+ing suffered /syc)ologically and %aterially in t(o defeats3 (it)dre( to sia Minor to /rotect t)e ar%ys co%%unications t)ere3 and t)e Persian 9ing reduced t)e si6e of )is ar%y in *reece to one s%all enoug) to li+e on t)e area of *reece it )ad con.uered. 0)us t)e critical success of t)e $reek fleet )alted t)e Persian ad+ance and de/ri+ed t)e Persian ar%y of t)e secure (ater co%%unications necessary to su//ly its full strengt). 0)e ne-t year3 at Plataea3 t)e $reek ar%ies defeated t)is di%inis)ed Persian force. Sea (arfare clearly e-)i&ited %any ele%ents in co%%on (it) co%&at on land. 0)e +ulnera&ility of t)e flank3 co%/ared (it) t)e front3 and t)e conse.uent i%/ortance of a flank attack stand out as does t)e +alue of a reser+e. !it) a t)in line of s)i/s rat)er t)an a dee/ line of )ea+y infantry%en3

CC

nu%erical su/eriority and concentration of force at one /oint in a line )ad greater significance3 e+en ()en fleets )ad t)eir flanks /rotected &y land %asses. S)i/s at sea dis/layed %any of t)e .ualities of %ounted (arfare on land. ,ike t)e ca+alry3 t)e s)i/s could go into action ra/idly3 and t)eir often relati+ely s%all nu%&ers3 co%/ared to t)e )orse%en of t)e ar%ies3 %ade it easy for t)e s)i/s to %aintain t)eir array3 so%et)ing %ore decisi+e for s)i/s t)an for ca+alry. But in t)eir reliance on a (ell#aligned for%ation3 t)e s)i/s )ad %ore in co%%on (it) infantry t)an (it) ca+alry for%ations. :et t)is si%ilarity (it) infantry did not do%inate (arfare &et(een s)i/s3 &ecause t)eir fe( nu%&ers3 t)e greater disci/line of t)e s)i/ ca/tains co%/ared (it) indi+idual ca+alry%en3 and t)e %anoeu+ra&ility conferred &y oars sufficiently offset t)e need to %aintain for%ation to %ake t)e tactical attri&utes of fleets %ore like t)at of ca+alry t)an infantry. In s/ite of t)e fleets /lacing little or no reliance on an i%/etuous c)arge3 (arfare at sea s)ared anot)er trait (it) %ounted s)ock action on land. 1efence )ad no su/eriority o+er attack3 e+en ()en t)e s)i/s on &ot) sides )ad identical features3 unless t)e (eat)er3 like t)e terrain3 fa+oured one ad+ersary o+er t)e ot)er. !it)out any /redo%inance conferred &y to/ogra/)y and neit)er contestant enDoying an ad+antage fro% re%aining %otionless3 neit)er offence nor defence )ad any /ri%acy in na+al co%&at. 5f course3 t)e outline of t)e land did gi+e &enefits3 as t)e *reeks skilfully e-)i&ited ()en t)ey /rotected t)eir flanks in t)e &attle at rte%esiu%3 &ut it conferred none in frontal attack. Nor could defenders at sea e%ulate t)e Ro%ans in entrenc)ing t)e%sel+es3 t)oug) &eac)ed fleets did fortify t)eir landing areas. So3 tactically3 t)e (arfare of sailors in s)i/s to a large degree rese%&led t)at of soldiers %ounted on )orses ()o engaged in s)ock3 rat)er t)an %issile3 co%&at. But na+al logistics differed %arkedly fro% t)at of land ar%ies in t)at na+ies could not li+e on t)e country t)e (ay ar%ies could. 5n t)e sea3 )o(e+er3 t)ey )ad t)e %ost efficient %eans of co%%unication and so could3 and found it necessary to3 de/end on &ases for su//ly3 a %et)od nearly i%/ossi&le for any ar%ies di+orced fro% (ater co%%unication. lt)oug) %erc)ant s)i/s could take ad+antage of t)eir efficiency as carriers to su//ly t)e%sel+es for long +oyages3 (ars)i/s could not do t)is. ,ig)t and narro( of &ea%3 t)ey lacked t)e carrying ca/acity of %erc)ant s)i/s and t)eir large co%/le%ents of oars%en and soldiers re.uired )uge .uantities of food and (ater. 0)e fragility of (ars)i/s %ade t)e%3 e+en %ore t)an %erc)ant s)i/s3 de/endent on t)e safety of staying close to s)ore3 and t)eir s)allo( draft and flat &otto%s %ade it easy for (ars)i/s to &eac) t)e%sel+es for t)e nig)t. Mo+ing along t)e coastline facilitated foraging for food and (ater. But3 unlike an ar%y on t)e %o+e3 t)e +essels lacked alternati+e routes3 and e+en ()en t)ey found a /ro%ising area to forage3 t)e sailors could searc) in only )alf t)e circu%ference a+aila&le to an ar%y and lacked /ack ani%als or carts to &ring in su//lies. In addition3 (it) sailors and so %any oars%en3 a fleet )ad a s%all %ilitary ca/a&ility in relation to t)eir de%and for )u%an food. 5nly t)e a&sence of ani%als %ade t)eir su&sistence /ro&le% si%/ler t)an an ar%ys. 'or t)ese reasons3 na+ies could not consistently rely on foraging along t)e s)ore3 and t)ey re%ained de/endent on &ases t)at offered a%/le (ater and fro% ()ic) t)ey could dra( food su//lies. 'unda%entally3 na+al strategy )ad a logistic o&Decti+e. It soug)t to control t)e sea to secure its o(n co%%erce3 to deny t)e use of t)e sea to t)e ene%ys traders3 to %o+e and /ro+ision its o(n ar%ies3 and to /re+ent t)e %o+e%ent and su//ort of ene%y forces. 0)e success of t)e *reek fleets in interdicting t)e su//ly lines of t)e Persian forces and so di%inis)ing t)eir nu%&ers e-e%/lified t)e crucial role t)at t)e na+ys logistic strategy could /lay. But to o&tain t)is do%inance of t)e sea3 t)e )ostile fleets )ad to ai% at one anot)er. 0)e +ictory at Sala%is3 an a//lication of co%&at strategy3 ga+e t)e *reeks t)e control necessary to e%/loy t)e na+ys logistic strategy against t)e co%%unications of t)e Persian ar%ies. le-anders strategy of

CB

using )is ar%y to ca/ture t)e &ases of t)e Persian fleet e-)i&its t)e use of a logistic strategy to defeat t)e ene%y fleet. But %uc) na+al (arfare took /lace (it)out a decisi+e co%%and of t)e sea on eit)er side. !eaker fleets a+oided &attle &y re%aining secure in t)eir &ase /orts. 0)e /ersisting strategy of a &lockade of t)e inferior fleet in its /ort (ould acco%/lis) t)e sa%e o&Decti+e as a +ictory3 &ut t)is task /ro+ed es/ecially difficult for t)e (ars)i/s of ancient ti%es. 4na&le to kee/ at sea for long3 s)i/s could not &lockade consistently. 2+en foraging on a )ostile s)ore )ad its dangers &ecause ar%ies found &eac)ed s)i/s a +ulnera&le and i%/ortant o&Decti+e. 0)e success of t)e su//ly s)i/s of le-ander t)e *reat in trans/orting /ro+isions along t)e coast of sia Minor a%/ly de%onstrates t)e difficulty of (ars)i/s in interdicting )ostile co%%erce3 /articularly along friendly s)ores. But e+en le-ander used t)is co%%erce only as a su//le%ent. 0)e lia&ility of Po%/eys fleet3 e+en (it) an island to /ro+ide %uc) of its needed (ater3 to /re+ent t)e /assage of $aesars ar%y across t)e driatic illustrates t)e )indrances to a &lockade (it) oar#dri+en s)i/s. But &lockade3 in ()ic) a stronger fleet used t)e t)reat of co%&at action to o&tain t)e sa%e results gi+en &y a +ictory in &attle3 ne+ert)eless re%ained an essential /art of t)e strategy of ai%ing at t)e ene%y fleet. &lockade also functioned as a %eans of interdicting co%%erce as (ell as troo/ %o+e%ents or t)e acti+ity of an ene%y fleet. But3 unlike t)e siege on land3 t)e inter%ittent &lockade )ad difficulty forestalling t)e )ostile force3 and t)e &lockaders )ad all of t)e land &esiegers su//ly /ro&le%s. In t)e a&sence of &lockade3 )ostile na+ies con+oyed troo/ trans/orts and e+en %erc)ant +essels. In t)e a&sence of con+oys3 raiding s)i/s3 indi+idually or in s%all flotillas3 /reyed on s)i/s carrying %en or co%%odities. 0)us t)e strategy of raids3 i%/ortant in land (arfare3 )ad a role on t)e sea. In raids against su//ly3 %erc)ant3 or troo/ s)i/s3 t)e raiders3 rat)er t)an relying on t)e co%&at action of &attle or its t)reat t)roug) a &lockade3 a//lied directly t)e na+ys logistic strategy of attacking t)e ene%ys su//lies. 0)e Persian co%%and of t)e sea in t)e Marat)on ca%/aign s)o(ed t)at t)e na+y could deli+er to t)e ar%y so%et)ing %ore t)an t)e %ost efficient %eans for %o+ing and su//lying troo/s. By trans/orting and escorting t)e in+ading ar%y3 t)e na+ys colla&oration ena&led t)e Persian co%%ander to /ursue a co%&at strategy. 0)e Persian fleet /rotected t)e s)i/#&orne soldiers fro% *reek (ars)i/s during t)e +oyage to Marat)on ()ile %aking it too dangerous for *reek land forces to +enture a crossing of t)e egean Sea to attack Persian territory. 'urt)er3 t)e Persian ar%y could land at any of %any different /laces in *reece3 a ca/a&ility en)anced &y t)e a&ility of ancient %ariners to &eac) t)eir s)i/s and not )a+e to rely solely on /orts. 0)us3 for t)e Persians t)e sea constituted &ot) a %oat to /rotect t)eir o(n country and a )ig)(ay o+er ()ic) to ad+ance to attack t)e *reeks. 0)is situation conferred on t)e Persians3 to an un/aralleled degree3 t)e /o(er to initiate action. 0)e initiati+e ga+e t)e% an o//ortunity for strategic sur/rise3 (it)out ()ic) t)e Persians (ould )a+e found t)e%sel+es at a distinct tactical disad+antage )ad t)ey dise%&arked on a defended &eac). So t)e co%%and of t)e sea assured t)e in+aders t)e a&ility t)at sur/rise i%/lies # to concentrate against (eakness. In any case3 t)e stronger Persian ar%y could )a+e taken t)e offensi+e3 and t)is (ould )a+e gi+en it t)e c)oice of o&Decti+es and routes of ad+ance. But co%%and of t)e sea %agnified t)e Persian ad+antage: &ecause t)e co%%ander )ad to %ake no strategic dis/ersal of )is troo/s since )e )ad no a//re)ension t)at t)e *reeks (ould attack )is territory. 0)e Persians used t)eir initiati+e3 ()ic)3 like sur/rise3 is not a t)e%e of t)is (ork3 to distract t)e *reeks. i%ing at t)ens3 ()ere )e e-/ected to find /olitical su//ort3 t)e Persian co%%ander did not land on t)e (est coast of t)e /eninsula3 near t)ens7 rat)er )e landed t(enty#si- %iles a(ay at Marat)on on t)e /eninsulas east s)ore. 0)is distraction dre( t)e t)enian ar%y to Marat)on at t)e sa%e ti%e t)at t)e Persians re#e%&arked )alf of t)eir ar%y and sailed around t)e /eninsula3

C@

intending to land near t)ens and ca/ture t)e city ()ile t)e t)enian )o/lites foug)t t)e ene%y at t)e original landing /lace. fter t)eir +ictory o+er t)e Persians at Marat)on3 t)e *reeks sent a %essenger on t)e no(#fa%ous run to t)ens (it) t)e ne(s ()ile t)e ar%y %arc)ed &ack3 arri+ing &efore t)e Persian ar%y )ad dise%&arked fro% t)eir s)i/s to assail t)ens. 0)(arted &y t)e successful t)enian use of its interior line of o/erations &et(een t)e t(o )ostile ar%ies3 t)e Persian fleet and ar%y (it)dre(. Ne+ert)eless3 a delayed *reek attack at Marat)on %ig)t )a+e caused t)e +ictorious ar%y to return only to find t)e Persians occu/ying t)ens. 0)e co%%and of t)e sea )ad gi+en t)e Persian general t)e o//ortunity to distract )is o//onent and create a (eakness at t)ens t)at )e +ery nearly )ad t)e o//ortunity to e-/loit. 0)e na+ys contri&ution to t)e ar%ys o/erations as (ell as its (arfare at sea dis/layed %any /arallels (it) t)at on land. It )ad its great effect on land (arfare &y its influence on strategy t)roug) logistics3 t)e sea /ro+iding t)e %ost efficient and often t)e only reasona&le co%%unication &et(een t(o /oints on land. 0)e effect of t)e *reek co%%and of t)e sea in (eakening t)e Persian ar%y /rior to t)e Battle of Plataea offers an illustration of t)e na+ys %ost ty/ical strategic significance for land (arfare3 Dust as t)e Marat)on ca%/aign de%onstrated t)e strategic &enefits sea /o(er could gi+e an in+ading ar%y. Back

THE DIVERSITY OF THE MEDIEVAL WAYS OF WAR, 200 !200

(he +issolution of the )oman -m'ire
ncient (arfare slo(ly &lended into %edie+al (arfare7 in /art &y (ay of t)e alterations t)at took /lace as t)e Ro%an ar%y faced t)e onslaug)t of &ar&arians on Ro%es 2uro/ean frontiers and foug)t its traditional ene%ies in t)e 2ast. 0)e gradual c)anges in t)e Ro%an ar%y /ri%arily centred on a strengt)ening of t)e ca+alry. 0)ese units3 recruited a%ong t)e *er%an &ar&arians3 reflected &ot) t)e i%/ortant role )ea+y ca+alry )ad a%ong t)e *er%an tri&es ()o su//lied so %any Ro%an soldiers and t)e utility of ca+alry in defending t)e frontiers against raiders. In addition3 Ro%an infantry3 )a+ing lost %uc) of its /re#e%inence as &ar&arian )ea+y infantry ac.uired ar%our and &etter (ea/ons3 needed t)e aid of ca+alry in attacking t)e ene%ys flank and rear. B: ?>> .1. t)e Ro%an art of (ar )ad e+ol+ed into an al%ost e-act re/lica of t)e MacedonianS le-andrian syste%3 a necessary c)ange in fig)ting &ar&arian ar%ies3 so%e of ()ic) relied &ot) on )ea+y infantry and )ea+y ca+alry. t t)e Battle of Stras&ourg in ?<C .1. su/erior Ro%an forces caug)t a &ar&arian ar%y crossing t)e R)ine and forced a &attle. 0)oug) inferior in nu%&ers and disci/line3 t)e &ar&arians /ossessed re%arka&le courage3 e+en ferocity3 and an ade.uate gras/ of tactics. Bot) ar%ies rested one flank against a terrain o&stacle and concentrated t)eir ca+alry on t)e o/en flank. 0)e infantry engaged and3 in t)e (ords of a conte%/orary )istorian3 t)e &ar&arian ca+alry c)arged3 Je-tending t)eir (ea/ons in t)eir rig)t )ands and %onstrously gnas)ing t)eir teet)L ()ile Jt)e flo(ing )air of t)ese e-traordinary %aniacs (as &ristling and a fren6y s)o(n fro% t)eir eyes.L 0)is c)arge3 if not Dust t)e inti%idating a//earance of t)ese )orse%en3 routed t)e Ro%an ca+alry. 0)e &ar&arian ca+alry3 dis/laying good leaders)i/ and disci/line3 did not /ursue &ut turned3 in t)e le-andrian %anner3 against t)e flank and rear of t)e Ro%an infantry. But t)e Ro%ans s/lendid articulation sa+ed t)e%3 t)e Ro%an co%%ander3 8ulian3 later 2%/eror and3 as a con+ert to /aganis%3 kno(n as 8ulian t)e /ostate3 /ro%/tly co+ered )is flank (it) a reser+e force of )ea+y infantry. Since t)e cultured 8ulian )ad undou&tedly read $aesar and kne( t)e Battle of P)arsalus3 it is likely t)at in ad+ance of t)e &eginning of t)e conflict3 )e )ad /laced a

B>

detac)%ent ()ere it could carry out t)is %o+e%ent. 0)oug) not a&le to e-ecute t)e re%ainder of t)e P)arsalus %anoeu+re &y en+elo/ing t)e ene%y3 t)e Ro%an co%%ander %ade decisi+e use of )is nu%erical ad+antage to (in t)e contest. 0)e Ro%ans ca/tured t)e &ar&arian co%%ander3 and a su&stantial /art of )is force dro(ned in t)e R)ine ()ile trying to esca/e. 0(enty#one years later t)e Ro%ans suffered3 at t)e Battle of driano/le3 a catastro/)e a//ro-i%ating $annae. !)en t)e nu%erous ca+alry of t)e &ar&arians routed t)e Ro%an ca+alry and en+elo/ed one flank of t)e Ro%an ar%y3 t)e )orse%en )eld t)e infantry +irtually i%/risoned in a dense %ass. "ere t)ey killed a large /ro/ortion of t)e%3 including t)e 2%/eror co%%anding t)e Ro%an ar%y. 2+en t)e legions could not count on /rotecting t)eir flanks against t)e fierce and deter%ined c)arge of &ar&arian ca+alry. 0)e lack of training and disci/line did not )andica/ t)e effecti+eness of t)e &ar&arian ca+alry3 since )ea+y ca+alry%en generally foug)t as indi+iduals3 de/ending on co)esion and %utual coo/eration3 as did )ea+y infantry. But t)is return to a %ore fait)ful re/lica of t)e Macedonian role for ca+alry and to a &attle c)aracteristic of le-ander and "anni&al /ro+ed a transitory de+elo/%ent. 1uring t)e fift) century t)e (estern /ortion of t)e e%/ire succu%&ed to t)e *er%an &ar&arians3 t)oug) for t)e %ost /art3 it re%ained t)eoretically in e-istence. lt)oug) t)e causes of t)e Ro%an failure in t)e !est are co%/le-3 t(o fa%iliar ele%ents contri&uted. Relying on t)eir /rofessional ar%y3 t)e Ro%ans no longer )ad any local %ilitary tradition or a %ilitia. Nor )ad t)ey %uc) local /atriotis%3 t)e allegiance of %ost of t)e /eo/le going to t)e distant 2%/eror and t)e conce/t of t)e e%/ire. Since %ost &ar&arian in+aders ackno(ledged t)e 2%/eror and often recei+ed grants of land and aut)ority fro% )i%3 t)ey )ad an ade.uate /olitical &ase for a con.uest3 t)e /rocess of ()ic) s/anned a century. 0)is di+ision of t)e e%/ire into ()at &eca%e3 in fact3 &ar&arian kingdo%s in Italy3 'rance3 S/ain3 and Nort) frica )el/ed to create a di+ersity in tactics3 es/ecially as t)e e%/ire continued in t)e 2ast. 'ro% t)e )o%ogeneity of t)e Macedonian#Ro%an %et)od3 ()ic) c)aracterised t)e &attles of Stras&ourg and driano/le3 t)e ancient (orld ca%e again to )a+e regional or national syste%s of (ar t)at reflected local geogra/)ical3 econo%ic3 social3 and /olitical conditions. Back

Changes in Military 0rganisation and (actical -m'hasis

!arfare in t)e !est reflected t)e disa//earance of t)e Ro%an /rofessional ar%y3 ()ic) )ad re%ained concentrated in ca%/s under disci/line and engaged in drill as (ell as (ea/ons /ractice. 0)e do%inant %ilitary syste% of t)e &ar&arians relied on a %ilitia t)at )ad %any3 &ut not all3 of t)e attri&utes of a /rofessional force. 0)e %en )unters and )erds%en3 )ad regarded t)e%sel+es as (arriors and )ad &een /leased to enter Ro%an ser+ice and de+ote full ti%e to ()at %any considered t)eir /ri%ary calling. In infantry co%&at t)ey relied on )ea+y infantry alone3 fre.uently arrayed in for%ations (it) as %any ranks as files. 0)ey rus)ed t)e ene%y3 counting on t)eir i%/etuosity and t)en on t)eir courage and de+otion to o+er()el% t)eir o//onents. 0)ey lacked training in fig)ting toget)er and su&stituted for disci/line t)eir long association as a fa%ily grou/ under a leader. !)en t)e &ar&arians esta&lis)ed t)e%sel+es in t)e Ro%an (estern /ro+inces3 t)ey often dis/ersed in s%all grou/s a%ong t)e Ro%an /o/ulation. 0)is settle%ent /attern often de/ri+ed t)e% of t)e co)esion /ro+ided &y t)eir old fa%ily grou/3 and t)eir s%all nu%&ers %eant t)at t)ey )ad no o//ortunity to /ractice Ro%an %et)ods of for%ation and drill. Not enoug) (arriors found t)e%sel+es toget)er to /er%it t)e de+elo/%ent of grou/s (it) t)e unit training of t)e *reek and Ro%an %ilitia. lt)oug) t)is generalisation o+ersi%/lifies3 it is fair to say t)at as t)e Ro%an 2%/ire lacked any %ilitia3 so initially did t)e &ar&arian kingdo%s. 0)ey relied on /rofessionals &ut scattered t)eirs and .uartered t)e% on t)e countryside3 rat)er t)an concentrating t)e%3 su//orted &y ta-es and /ro+ided (it) t)e occasion to learn to (ork toget)er in disci/lined3 co)esi+e grou/s.

B1

*radually t)e &ar&arian /rofessionals e+ol+ed into a rural %ilitia in ()ic) so%e )ad good e.ui/%ent and training and %any )ad little of eit)er. 4lti%ately t)is &eca%e a syste% of %ilitary o&ligation &ased on )olding land3 feudalis%3 in ()ic) a )ierarc)ical /attern de+elo/ed (it) %ilitary ser+ice o(ed to s%aller land)olders ()o in turn )ad duties to a )ig)er lord7 t)e /yra%id ended (it) t)e 9ing. 0)is c)ange ele+ated indi+idual /ro(ess3 and an infantry%ans strengt)3 skill3 and courage %eant %ore t)an t)e organisation and t)e le+el of training of )is grou/. But )ea+y infantrys strengt) lay in t)e grou/3 and t)e &ar&arians ty/ically relied on )ea+y infantry. 0)us t)e ne(3 dis/ersed arrange%ent of t)e /rofessionals significantly di%inis)ed t)e +alue of t)e )ea+y in t)e &ar&arian kingdo%s of t)e !est. 0)e reduction in t)e .uality of )ea+y infantry increased t)e relati+e %erit of )ea+y ca+alry. Bot) )ea+y and lig)t ca+alry toget)er )ad co%/osed less t)an 2> /ercent of Ro%an ar%ies3 le-ander t)e *reat )a+ing e%/loyed no )ig)er /ro/ortion. 0)e cost of ca+alry Gat least dou&le t)at of infantryH de/ended not only on t)e e-/ense of t)e )orse &ut also on t)e cost of training to ac)ie+e t)e greater skill re.uired to fig)t %ounted. 0)e ineffecti+eness of )ea+y ca+alry in frontal attacks against )ea+y infantry li%ited its +alue in t)e Macedonian syste%3 a dra(&ack accentuated &y t)e &etter articulation of Ro%an infantry3 ()ic) could often defend its o(n flanks and en+elo/ t)e flanks of t)e o//osing infantry. 0)e decline in t)e !est of not only (ell#articulated Ro%an infantry &ut also of )ea+y infantry trained to (ork toget)er in a /)alan- ele+ated t)e co%/arati+e effecti+eness of ca+alry (it)out raising its cost. 'urt)er3 t)e dis/ersal of t)e /rofessional soldiers and t)e loss of t)e o//ortunity to train toget)er affected ca+alry less &ecause )ea+y ca+alry co%&at )ad ne+er relied on grou/ action in t)e (ay )ea+y infantry )ad. Moreo+er3 t)e ne( stress on indi+idual /ro(ess and t)e dis/ersed /rofessionals o//ortunity for indi+idual training e%/)asised t)e .ualities needed in t)e )ea+y ca+alry. 0)e ca+alry%an also )ad t)e skill and inclination to fig)t on foot as (ell as %ounted. !)ere t)e terrain or t)e &esieging of fortifications3 for e-a%/le3 %ade infantry essential3 t)e !estern /rofessional soldier dis/layed a readiness and (illingness to fig)t skilfully on foot3 &ut )e foug)t in t)e sa%e (ay3 as an indi+idual rat)er t)an as /art of a for%ation. 0)e re+aluation of ca+alry %eant t)at t)e /ro/ortion of ca+alry rose in t)e ar%ies in t)e (estern kingdo%s of t)e Ro%an 2%/ire. But t)is increase re/resents only an a+erage7 indi+idual kingdo%s dis/layed great +ariations: t)e Vandals ()o con.uered frica3 for e-a%/le3 foug)t al%ost e-clusi+ely %ounted and t)e 'ranks in *aul /referred for t)e %ost /art to fig)t on foot. So ar%ies in t)e !est continued as s%all /rofessional forces su//le%ented &y untrained and ill# ar%ed %ilitia. 0)ey stressed s)ock action3 (it) neit)er lig)t ca+alry nor lig)t infantry /laying %uc) role. In t)is sense t)e &ar&arians follo(ed t)e *reek and Ro%an tradition. In t)e eastern Ro%an or By6antine 2%/ire3 t)e art of (ar also c)anged3 &ut for ot)er reasons. Back

"east -ffort -$em'lified, 1y2antine (actics and Strategy

0)e ar%y of t)e By6antine 2%/ire differed significantly front t)e old Ro%an ar%y and fro% /re+ious %odels in 2uro/e and t)e Near 2ast. Ro%an in its so/)isticated engineering and logistic organisation3 t)e By6antine ar%y relied on ca+alry and lig)t infantry to a %ost un#Ro%an degree. In /art t)is reflected t)e triu%/) of ca+alry at t)e Battle of driano/le Gto a degree t)e later Ro%an syste% for frontier defenceH and also t)e di+ersity of By6antiu%s ene%ies3 ()ic) included t)e successors of t)e Part)ians. fter initially relying on &uffer states and di/lo%acy3 t)e Ro%ans )ad gradually ado/ted a frontier garrisoned &y t)eir o(n forces. 0)e R)ine and 1anu&e ri+ers %arked t)ese &orders3 as did (alls of eart) and stone ()ere no ri+ers flo(ed. 0)e ar%y could not3 of

B2

course3 %an t)ese long defensi+e lines in strengt)3 nor could it /re+ent raiders or in+ading ar%ies fro% /iercing t)e%. But t)e defences did /ro+ide a line of /osts t)at (arned of a crossing of t)e &arrier and triggered a concentration of defenders to re/el and3 if /ossi&le3 ca/ture t)e %arauders. 0)e line of defence /ro+ided a +alua&le o&stacle to t)e retreat of an ene%y %aking a foray. In t)is (ay t)e Ro%ans organised a /ersisting defence3 &ot) to co/e (it) t)e offensi+ely stronger raiding strategy of t)e econo%ically %oti+ated &ar&arians and to resist or e-/el t)ose ()o /ersisted &y trying to con.uer Ro%an territory. 2+en t)oug) t)e /)ysical o&stacle of t)e &arrier often co%/elled t)e raiders to lea+e t)eir )orses &e)ind3 t)e Ro%an concentration necessary to deal (it) suc) a raid re.uired a s/eed in %arc)ing &eyond t)e ca/a&ility of t)e )ea+y infantry. 0)e Ro%an ca+alry %et t)e re.uire%ent3 as did lig)t infantry3 ()ic) could %arc) faster t)an &ooty#laden raiders on foot. Since %ost raiders (is)ed to a+oid co%&at and t)e defenders )ad t)e o&Decti+e of tra//ing t)e retreating intruders against t)e frontier o&stacle3 t)e s/eed of t)e ca+alry and lig)t infantry ga+e t)e% /recedence o+er t)e slo(# %o+ing legions /redo%inance in co%&at. 5nly in resisting a /ersisting in+asion did t)e legions co%e into /lay. 0)us3 t)e /ro/ortion of lig)t infantry and ca+alry gradually increased in t)e Ro%an ar%y. 'orces defending t)e &oundaries &eca%e a sort of %ilitia ()en t)e go+ern%ent ga+e t)e %en an allot%ent of far%land in lieu of /ay. In t)e fourt) century t)e Ro%ans a&andoned t)eir efforts to kee/ t)eir frontier in+iolate and ado/ted a defence in de/t) to resist t)e constant %aDor incursions along t)eir &orders. 0)is strategy in+ol+ed a reliance &e)ind t)e e%/ires &oundaries on fortifications ranging fro% far%)ouses to (alled cities. 0)e fortified /oints ser+ed as su//ly de/ots3 &locked %aDor routes of ingress3 o&structed t)e raiders %o+e%ents3 denied t)e% facility in retreat3 and /resented serious o&stacles to t)e ad+ance of in+aders intending to /ersist. 'urt)er3 t)ese strong /oints /ro+ided /laces of refuge for t)e defenders and t)e areas in)a&itants3 t)eir ani%als and /orta&le /ossessions. ny force t)at &y/assed t)ese strong /oints faced t)e t)reat of a rear attack &y t)e forts garrisons. But fortified /ositions in de/t) constituted only /art of t)e defence7 t)e defenders needed a %o&ile field ar%y to take ad+antage of t)e difficulties t)at t)e fortifications and o&structed co%%unications i%/osed on t)e ene%y. 0)e re.uire%ent for s/eed in reac)ing an in+aded area as (ell as ease in concentrating or in refusing &attle %ade a force stressing ca+alry and lig)t infantry ideal for t)e %o&ile field ar%y. But t)e %ost for%ida&le t)reat to t)e eastern /art of t)e e%/ire ca%e fro% t)e successors of t)e Part)ians3 t)e Persians3 ()o foug)t3 like t)eir /redecessors3 al%ost e-clusi+ely (it) lig)t and )ea+y ca+alry. 0)e fate of $rassus at $arr)ae dra%atically de%onstrated t)e inade.uacy of t)e Ro%an tactical syste% for dealing (it) Part)ian ca+alry on its o(n terrain. 'or t)is reason t)e By6antine )ea+y ca+alry carried &o(s. lt)oug) it is difficult to train and e-/ensi+e to e.ui/ a soldier to fig)t (it) &ot) (ea/on syste%s and it is likely t)at3 (it) )is )ea+y e.ui/%ent3 t)e By6antine )orse%an )ad )is greatest co%/etence in s)ock action3 t)e &o(s and t)e kno(ledge of t)eir use ga+e t)e By6antine ca+alry a +alua&le +ersatility. 'or s)ock co%&at and /rotection against ene%y arro(s eac) (ore a steel ca/3 a long %all s)irt t)at reac)ed to )is t)ig)s3 and steel s)oes. So%e )orses (ore ar%our also. In addition to a &o(3 t)e ca+alry%an carried a s(ord3 dagger3 and a long lance3 t)oug) )e %ust )a+e /ut aside t)e lance to use t)e &o(. lt)oug) t)e By6antine ar%ies )ad so%e lig)t ca+alry3 t)ese dual#/ur/ose &ut essentially )ea+y ca+alry constituted t)e &ulk of t)e %ounted forces and as %uc) as )alf of an ar%y. 0)e By6antine lig)t infantry%an carried a &o( (it) a .ui+er of forty arro(s3 a s%all s)ield3 and a (ea/on3 suc) as an a-e3 for close co%&at. fe( ()o lacked skill (it) t)e &o( ar%ed t)e%sel+es (it) Da+elins. So%e (ore a lig)t %ail s)irt. $o%&at e-/erience )ad de%onstrated t)e /redo%inance of t)ese foot &o(%en o+er ene%y )orse arc)ers. 0)e By6antines3 facing Persian and ot)er %ounted B?

&o(%en and3 according to a conte%/orary aut)ority3 kno(ing t)ese ene%ies )ad a Js/ecial dreadL of t)e foot arc)er3 %ade t)e lig)t infantry t)e %ost nu%erous &ranc) of t)eir foot soldiers. In addition to s)ield and &ody ar%our t)e By6antine )ea+y infantry carried a s/ear3 a s(ord3 and an a-e. 0)e s/ear (as consistent (it) late Ro%an /ractice ()en a decline in training and disci/line and t)e strengt) of t)e ene%ys ca+alry c)arges i%/elled t)e legions to strengt)en t)eir Da+elin enoug) so t)at t)ey could also use it as a s/ear. "ea+y infantry3 a relati+ely s%all /art of t)e ar%y3 /layed t)e sa%e role as )ea+y infantry in t)e Macedonian and Ro%an ar%ies. 0)e )ig) cost of so %any %ounted By6antine soldiers contri&uted to kee/ing By6antine ar%ies s%all3 &ut t)ey dis/layed great effecti+eness against t)e +ariety of national tactical syste%s t)at surrounded t)e e%/ire. !ell ada/ted to fig)t t)e %ounted Persian )orse arc)ers3 t)e By6antine forces /ro+ed e.ually ade/t in co%&at against t)e &ar&arian ar%ies of &ot) t)e *ot)s and 'ranks in t)e By6antine ca%/aign to recon.uer Italy during t)e si-t) century. 0)e sa%e factors t)at ena&led t)e &ar&arians to sei6e t)e (estern Ro%an /ro+inces %ade t)e% +ulnera&le to By6antine recon.uest. 0)e *ot)ic kingdo% of Italy )ad suc) s%all forces t)at to concentrate a field ar%y to resist t)e By6antine in+asion3 it )ad to gi+e u/ garrisoning t)e cities. 0)e *ot)s3 recognising t)at t)e in)a&itants of t)ese cities )ad no loyalty to t)e%3 destroyed t)e to(n (alls to de/ri+e t)e citi6ens of t)e /o(er to resist reoccu/ation. $o%/elled &y /olitical necessity to ado/t a /ersisting strategy3 t)ey t)en risked all in a &attle against t)e in+ading By6antines. Bot) ar%ies )ad %ercenaries. 0)e By6antines e%/loyed "uns3 r%enians3 Persians3 ra&s3 and Sla+s as (ell as %any *er%an &ar&arians. 0)e *ot)ic forces included %any ()o )ad /re+iously ser+ed in t)e ar%ies of t)e By6antine 2%/eror and t)e *ot)s )ad not considered it a&surd to offer t)eir electi+e kings)i/ to Belisarius3 a &rilliant By6antine general ()o )ad defeated t)e% in an earlier ca%/aign. In <<2 t)e By6antine 2%/eror 8ustinian t)e *reat sent a fine ar%y to recon.uer Italy. "e a//ointed Narses to co%%and3 rat)er t)an t)e often#+ictorious Belisarius. 0)e s)ort3 t)in Narses3 a se/tuagenarian eunuc) (it) little %ore t)an t(o years of acti+e %ilitary ser+ice3 a//arently )ad little to reco%%end )i% &eyond t)e trust 8ustinian )ad in )i%. :et t)e a&ilities t)at )ad &roug)t )i% to )ig) /ositions at court and t)e courage and resourcefulness )e )ad dis/layed in crises /ro+ed good gauges for )is %ilitary talents. 0)e t(o ar%ies %et at 0aginae3 in central Italy3 Narsess 1<3>>> By6antines slig)tly outnu%&ering t)e *ot)s3 co%%anded &y t)e ca/a&le 9ing 0otila. Bot) co%%anders desired &attle and for%ed t)eir forces across a narro(3 le+el +alley and (aited. Narses3 an-ious to /rotect )is flank3 sent fifty /icked )ea+y infantry to occu/y a s%all )ill on t)e left of )is line3 ()ere t)ey took u/ a /osition in a /at)3 Jstanding s)oulder to s)oulder and arrayed in t)e for% of a /)alan-.L !)en 0otila dis/atc)ed a &ody of )ea+y ca+alry to take t)e )ill3 t)e fifty &locked t)e (ay3 J%aking a &arrier (it) t)eir s)ields and t)rusting for(ard t)eir s/ears.L 0)e attackers3 trying to %anage e-cited )orses Jt)at did not in t)e least o&ey t)eir urging3L failed against J%en /acked so closely toget)er and not gi+ing an inc) of ground. 0)is skir%is) /ro+ed an accurate forecast of t)e outco%e of t)e &attle. 0)e *ot)s relied on t)eir )ea+y ca+alry3 and Narses3 arraying )is ar%y on t)is su//osition3 took ad+antage of t)e defensi+e /ri%acy of t)e soldier on foot o+er t)e )orse%an. 0o strengt)en )is )ea+y infantry3 t)e ine-/erienced By6antine general3 dis/laying a clear co%/re)ension of t)e co%/arati+e %erits of eac) (ea/on syste%3 )ad %uc) of )is )ea+y ca+alry dis%ount and Doin t)e infantry3 and at)(art t)e +alley t)e %en on foot for%ed a /)alan- (it) s/ears and lances. 5n eac) flank Narses /laced 43>>> arc)ers (it) )ea+y ca+alry &e)ind. "e (as eager to recei+e t)e ene%ys attack. 0)e follo(ing %orning t)e *ot)s for%ed t)eir )ea+y ca+alry in front of t)eir infantry3 only t(o &o( s)ots fro% t)e By6antine front. fter a delay3 t)e *ot)ic ca+alry %ade its fa%ous3 i%/etuous

B4

c)arge. But it failed to o+er()el% t)e /)alan-3 and3 )alted &efore t)e infantry3 t)e flanks of t)e *ot)ic ca+alry )ad to recei+e a rain of arro(s fro% t)e By6antine &o(%en. Seeing t)e ca+alry )alted3 una&le to o+ert)ro( t)e infantry3 and t)e arro(s (ounding )orses and %en3 Narses ordered )is )ea+y ca+alry to attack t)e flank as t)e infantry %o+ed for(ard. 0)e *ot)ic ca+alry fled3 &eco%ing entangled in t)eir o(n infantry in t)e /rocess3 and 9ing 0otila recei+ed a %ortal (ound during )is flig)t fro% t)e field. 0)is &attle o+ert)re( *ot)ic rule in Italy and returned Italy to t)e e%/ire. It is not clear ()y 0otila )ad )is ca+alry c)arge t)e By6antine centre rat)er t)an ride o+er t)e +ulnera&le arc)ers on t)e (ings. Since suc) ine/titude did not ordinarily c)aracterise )i%3 /er)a/s terrain o&stacles Gor e+en ditc)esH t)at t)e By6antines )ad used in earlier &attles %ay )a+e forced t)e attack into t)e centre. 0)e &attle again e-)i&ited t)e a&ility of )ea+y infantry to resist t)e c)arge of )ea+y ca+alry. 2+en t)oug) t)e %ercenary foot soldiers /ro&a&ly )ad )ad little drill toget)er3 t)eir s/ears and lances3 t)eir de/t)3 and t)eir skill as /rofessionals (ere a%/le to defeat t)e frontal c)arge of t)e for%ida&le *ot)ic ca+alry. "a+ing con.uered Italy fro% t)e *ot)s3 Narses faced a force of 'ranks raiding fro% t)e nort). In s/ite of a lack of any ar%our &ut s)ield and )el%et3 t)e 'rank %ade a for%ida&le )ea+y infantry%an. r%ed (it) a s)ort s(ord and an eig)teen#inc) dagger3 )e also carried an a-e and at least one lig)t s/ear. "e used &ot) t)e a-e and s/ear for t)ro(ing as (ell as in close co%&at3 and3 as a conte%/orary e-/lained3 a 'rank t)ro(ing )is s/ear3 Jif t)ey strike an ene%y t)e &ar&s are so fir%ly fi-ed in )is &ody t)at it is i%/ossi&le to dra( t)e (ea/on out. If it strikes a s)ield3 it is i%/ossi&le for t)e ene%y to get rid of it &y cutting off its )ead3 for t)e iron runs too far do(n t)e s)aft. t t)is %o%ent t)e 'rank rus)es in3 /laces )is foot on t)e &utt as it trails on t)e ground3 and so3 /ulling t)e s)ield do(n(ards3 clea+es )is unco+ered ad+ersary t)roug) t)e )ead3 or /ierces )is &reast (it) a second s/ear.L 0)e 'ranks foug)t in a )uge colu%n or s.uare fro% ()ic) t)ey could fig)t in any direction. 0)ey lacked drill or articulation &ut )ad great &ra+ery and co)esi+eness. In <<4 at $asilinu%3 &locking its route3 of retreat3 t)e astute Narses %et t)is redou&ta&le &ody of )ea+y infantry &y again dis%ounting so%e )ea+y ca+alry to strengt)en )is o(n )ea+y infantry. "e could )a+e so%e confidence t)at on t)e defensi+e )is ar%oured /rofessionals could resist t)e 'ranks. "e %ay also )a+e )ad so%e natural or artificial strengt) for t)eir defensi+e /osition. 5n )is flanks )e /osted t)e &ulk of )is ca+alry3 /ri%arily ar%oured lancers also e.ui//ed (it) &o(s. 0)e c)arge of t)e 'ranks &roke t)e first t(o lines of By6antine infantry and engaged t)e t)ird and last line ()en Narses ordered for(ard )is &o(#ar%ed )ea+y ca+alry on t)e flanks. 0)reatened &y t)is dou&le attack3 t)e 'rankis) infantry in t)eir dense for%ation )ad to )alt to resist t)e c)arge of t)e ca+alry. But t)e ca+alry did not c)arge7 instead t)ey &egan to s)o(er t)e 'ranks (it) arro(s. If t)e 'ranks )ad &roken t)eir for%ation3 t)ey (ould not )a+e %ade so easy a target for t)e %ounted &o(%en7 &ut t)ey ke/t t)eir close s.uare toget)er3 for t)ey realised t)at &reaking it %ade t)e% +ulnera&le to t)e c)arge of t)e ar%oured By6antine ca+alry3 ()o (ould i%%ediately /ut aside t)eir &o(s and use t)eir lances and s(ords. fter a ti%e3 i%%o&ilised under a s)o(er of arro(s3 t)e 'ranks &egan to (it)dra( to t)e rear. In t)eir retreat t)e for%ation &egan to lose so%e of its integrity3 and Narsess ca+alry finally c)arged and &roke into t)e for%ation3 inflicting )ideous casualties. 0)ese t(o &attles e-)i&it t)e +ersatility of t)e By6antine ar%y. Its +ariety of (ea/on syste%s ena&led a skilful general to confront )is ene%ys (eakness. t 0aginae Narses used )ea+y infantry to sto/ )ea+y ca+alry7 t(o years later at $asilinu% )e resisted )ea+y infantry (it) )ea+y infantry until )e &roug)t %issile (ea/ons into /lay against a +ulnera&le )ea+y infantry3 una&le to flee. In s/ite of defeats t)at de/ri+ed it of all of its siatic /ossessions e-ce/t sia Minor3 t)e By6antine 2%/ire %aintained itself for centuries as a for%ida&le 2astern /o(er. Its sur+i+al de/ended on its e-cellent ar%y3 one ani%ated &y /rofessionalis% and religious 6eal. 0)e By6antines codified t)eir B<

tactics and strategy into ()at today one (ould call doctrine3 ()ic) stressed t)e defensi+e and (inning at t)e %ini%u% cost. Vie(ing t)eir e-/ensi+ely e.ui//ed and (ell#trained /rofessional soldiers as a ca/ital asset3 t)ey /referred (inning (it)out a &attle and al(ays carefully %easured t)e &enefits of +ictory against t)e costs of defeat. 0)us3 arguing against follo(ing a retreating ene%y3 t)e fa%ous general Belisarius said: JSo if (e co%/el t)e% against t)eir (ill to a&andon t)eir /ur/ose of (it)dra(ing and co%e to &attle (it) us3 (e s)all (in no ad+antage ()atsoe+er if (e are +ictorious # for ()y s)ould one rout a fugiti+eK # ()ile if (e are unfortunate as %ay )a//en3 (e s)all &ot) &e de/ri+ed of t)e +ictory (e no( )a+e3... and also (e s)all a&andon t)e land of t)e 2%/eror to lie o/en to t)e attacks of t)e ene%y (it)out defenders.L Suc) a strategy assu%ed t)e status .uo as t)e only reasona&le /olitical and %ilitary o&Decti+e and i%/licitly /resu%ed t)at t)e By6antines occu/ied a %ore fragile /osition t)an t)e ene%y. 'or ?>> years t)e conser+ati+e3 careful strategy of li%ited %ilitary ai%s succeeded ad%ira&ly in /reser+ing t)e e%/ire intact. Because t)ey faced t)e sa%e difficulty as t)e Ro%ans in /rotecting t)eir do%ains fro% raiders3 t)e By6antines ad)ered to a doctrine t)at continued t)e Ro%an syste% of defence in de/t). !)en e%/loyed against ra& raiders fro% Syria3 for e-a%/le3 t)is syste% first /ro+ided for early (arning of t)e %o+e%ent of t)e %ounted %en t)roug) a /ass. 0)e local ca+alry force tracked t)e raiders3 kee/ing t)e %ilitary district )ead.uarters infor%ed of t)eir o(n route and location ()ile )arrying t)e raiders3 /icking off stragglers3 and retarding t)eir ad+ance. Mean()ile3 local infantry3 &ot) %ilitia and regular3 %o+ed to t)e /asses in t)e %ountains. t t)e sa%e ti%e t)e cities and fortresses closed t)eir gates after citi6ens )ad taken refuge (it)in t)e (alls. s t)e raiders %o+ed for(ard3 t)e co%%ander of t)e local %ilitary district3 reinforced fro% adDacent districts if )e faced a large raid3 %arc)ed out (it) a /urely ca+alry force. "e ai%ed at a &attle3 an a%&us) of t)e raiders on t)eir return3 or3 &est of all3 tra//ing t)e raiders in a /ass closed &y infantry t)at already occu/ied t)e likely routes of egress. 0)us t)e By6antines dealt (it) raiders &y in)i&iting t)eir %o+e%ents and denying t)e% t)eir %ost funda%ental re.uisite3 retreat. Per)a/s t)e Battle of Man6ikert in eastern sia Minor in 1>C1 confir%ed t)e (isdo% of t)e conser+atis% of By6antine strategy. 0)is defeat cost t)e By6antines t)e control of %ost of sia Minor3 t)e recruiting area for t)eir ar%y and source of %uc) of t)eir (ealt). 'e( &attles in )istory )a+e )ad suc) a significant result as t)e loss of %uc) of t)e By6antine /rofessional ar%y. 2%/eror Ro%anus IV (as deter%ined to /unis) t)e SelDuk 0urks3 ()o )ad raided )is territory and ca/tured se+eral i%/ortant cities. !anting a decisi+e ca%/aign3 Ro%anus3 an a&le general ()o )ad co%e to t)e t)rone &y %arrying t)e 2%/ress and ()o )ad already foug)t t)e 0urks (it) success3 asse%&led a )uge ar%y. 0)e 0urks3 )orse arc)ers fro% t)e ste//es3 )ad already con.uered t)e Mosle% states in ()at )ad &een t)e Persian and Part)ian e%/ires and )ad continued t)e tradition of raids into and (arfare (it) t)e By6antine 2%/ire. 0)e By6antines )ad long co/ed (it) t)e skilful tactics of t)e ste//e lig)t ca+alry. !it)out &ody ar%our and carrying only a s(ord and so%eti%es a Da+elin3 t)e 0urk relied on )is &o(3 a .ui+er of t)irty to fifty arro(s3 and t)e %o&ility /ro+ided &y )is )orse7 on ca%/aign )e &roug)t at least one s/are )orse. In t)eir &attle tactics3 according to a 2uro/ean o&ser+er3 t)e )orse arc)ers Jne+er %i(it) t)e ene%y3 &ut kee/ )o+ering a&out )i%3 disc)arging t)eir arro(s first fro% one side and t)en fro% t)e ot)er3 occasionally /retending to fly3 and during t)eir flig)t s)ooting arro(s &ack(ard at t)eir /ursuers3 killing %en and )orse3 as if t)ey (ere co%&ating face to face.L 0o co/e (it) t)ese tactics3 so like t)e Part)ian3 By6antine doctrine /rescri&ed al(ays kee/ing t)e foot &o(%en near t)e ca+alry3 ne+er fig)ting (it) unco+ered flanks or rear3 and ne+er /er%itting t)e ar%y to dis/erse. t t)e Battle of Man6ikert t)e 2%/eror Ro%anus )ad co%%itted all of )is infantry to a siege else()ere7 )e also +iolated ot)er canons deri+ed fro% )is ar%ys long e-/erience (it) lig)t ca+alry.

B=

0)e By6antines faced in t)e 0urkis) sultan a sagacious and deter%ined o//onent3 ()ose na%e3 l/ rslan3 %eant +aliant lion. But )e3 )a+ing t)ree ti%es suffered defeat at t)e )ands of t)e By6antines3 t(ice fro% Ro%anus3 and )a+ing a (ell infor%ed res/ect for By6antine %ilitary /ro(ess3 also dis/layed t)e attri&utes of t)e fo-. fter a /arley &et(een t)e t(o rulers3 t)e aggressi+e Ro%anus ad+anced against t)e 0urks (it) )is ar%oured and %ounted ar%y arrayed in a single line on a &road front and &acked &y a strong rear guard. 0)e 0urks retreated3 easily kee/ing t)eir distance on t)eir %ore lig)tly &urdened )orses. But t)ey attacked on t)e flanks3 s)o(ering t)e By6antine ca+alry (it) arro(s. 0)ese %issiles dou&tless killed fe( of t)e ar%oured riders3 &ut t)e )orses suffered and %any riders certainly lost t)eir %ounts. So%e of t)e By6antine )ea+y ca+alry still )ad &o(s3 &ut t)e soldiers no longer )ad t)e skill of earlier centuries. So t)e 0urks )ad no difficulty in o+er%astering t)e%. 0)e %ass of t)e By6antines %ade a good target7 t)e %o+ing 0urks did not. 0)e soldiers on t)e flanks3 J)a+ing &een )arassed &y t)e 0urks3 (ere o&liged to /ursue Qt)e ene%y arc)ersR &ecause ot)er(ise t)ey (ould s)oot fro% afar and kill t)eir )orses. But in /ursuing t)e% t)oug)tlessly3 t)ey fell into an a%&us).L Mean()ile3 t)e 2%/eror continued to %o+e t)e ar%y for(ard against constantly receding o//onents until Jt)e t(ilig)t took )i% &y sur/rise.L s t)e 2%/eror atte%/ted to return )is ar%y to ca%/ in t)e darkness3 t)e (ings did not understand t)e signals and t)e ar%y fell into disorder. Ro%anus3 in t)e centre and se/arated fro% t)e (ings3 co%/ounded t)e confusion ()en )e %o+ed for(ard again as t)e rear guard continued to(ard t)e ca%/. 0)e 0urks attacked and enclosed t)e se/arated /arts of t)e ar%y in a ()irl of gallo/ing arc)ers3 s)o(ering arro(s on t)e disorganised )ost of ar%oured )orse%en. JIt (as like an eart).uake (it) )o(ling3 s(eat3 a s(ift rus) of fear3 clouds of dust3 and3 not least3 )ordes of 0urks riding all around us. 1e/ending on )is s/eed3 resolution and strengt)3 eac) %an soug)t safety in flig)t. 0)e ene%y c)ased t)e%3 killing so%e3 ca/turing so%e and tra%/ling ot)ers under t)e )orses )oo+es. It (as a terri&ly sad sig)t3 &eyond any la%enting or %ourning.L 0)e 0urks killed or ca/tured +irtually all of t)e troo/s e-ce/t t)ose in t)e rear guard and destroyed t)e flo(er of t)e By6antine /rofessional ar%y.L 0)e &attle de%onstrated ()at t)e By6antines )ad long kno(n3 t)at )ea+y ca+alry could not co/e (it) lig)t ca+alry. 0)is kno(ledge underlay t)eir doctrine of kee/ing lig)t infantry (it) t)e ca+alry. 0)e lig)t ca+alry did not )a+e a great %argin of su/eriority in %o&ility3 &ut its %odest ad+antage ena&led it to refuse &attle ()ile still using its &o(s. 8ust as *reek lig)t infantry /eltasts (it) Da+elins )ad a+oided s)ock co%&at (it) )ea+y infantry )o/lites ()ile (ounding and killing t)e% (it) %issiles3 so t)e 0urkis) )orse arc)ers )ad defeated t)e By6antine )ea+y ca+alry. 0)e ca/ture of t)e 2%/eror at Man6ikert )ad %uc) to do (it) t)e By6antine ci+il (ar3 ()ic) &egan i%%ediately and ()ic) e-acer&ated t)e sudden %ilitary de&ility of t)e e%/ire. So3 fro% raiders in sia Minor3 t)e 0urks suddenly &eca%e con.uerors. But )o( could t)e Mo)a%%edan 0urks occu/y a /o/ulous and (ell#organised $)ristian territory o+er t(ice t)e si6e of Italy and one t)at /resented an essentially national resistance to rule &y infidelsK !it)out realising it3 t)e 0urks )ad already /ro+ided t)e %eans of securing t)e ac.uiescence of t)e $)ristians of sia Minor. n eye(itness descri&ed t)e e+ents as one By6antine city fell to 0urkis) raiders: J0)e ar%y entered t)e city3 %assacred t)e in)a&itants3 /illaged and &urned it3 lea+ing it in ruins3 %aking /risoners of t)ose ()o esca/ed t)e %assacre.L 0)e o&ser+er continued: JI (anted to enter t)e city and see it (it) %y o(n eyes. I tried to find a street (it)out )a+ing to (alk o+er cor/ses. But t)at (as i%/ossi&le.L More )ostile3 a $)ristian c)aracterised t)e 0urks ca/ture of anot)er city t)usly: J,ike fa%is)ed dogs3 &ands of infidels )urled t)e%sel+es on our city3 surrounded it and /us)ed inside3 %assacring t)e %en and %o(ing e+eryt)ing do(n like rea/ers in t)e fields3 %aking t)e city a desert. !it)out %ercy t)ey incinerated t)ose ()o )ad )idden t)e%sel+es in )ouses and c)urc)es.L 0)e sa%e aut)or (rote: J,ift your eyes and your looks to your BC

sons taken into sla+ery3 your infants s%as)ed (it)out /ity against stones3 your yout)s gi+en to t)e fla%es3 your +enera&le ancients t)ro(n do(n in /u&lic /laces3 your +irgins3 raised gently and in co%fort3 dis)onoured and %arc)ed off on foot into sla+ery.L If t)e 0urks )ad (is)ed to terrorise t)e re%aining in)a&itants of sia Minor3 t)is aut)or furnis)ed good /ro/aganda. If continued (it)out any /ros/ect of re%ission3 suc) a rut)less and t)oroug) reign of terror could su&stitute for a /olitical /rogra%. 0)e cost in de+astation and de/o/ulation /ro+ed i%%ense3 &ut t)e 0urks ac.uired %ost of sia Minor in t)e ensuing decade3 )a+ing crus)ed &y terror all /o/ular resistance. 0)oug) t)e By6antine 2%/ire continued for al%ost anot)er four centuries3 its %ilitary /o(er declined and it ceased really to e-e%/lify t)e *reek and Ro%an art of (ar. Mean()ile3 !estern 2uro/e (as undergoing a su&stantial c)ange in its tactical outlook and strategic re.uire%ents. Back

(he Stirru'%s -nhancement of the -ffectiveness of Cavalry

2arly in t)e eig)t) century Mo)a%%edans fro% frica o+ert)re( t)e (eak *ot)ic kingdo% of S/ain3 &eginning a long /eriod of Mosle% do%inance of t)e I&erian Peninsula. Pus)ing across t)e Pyrenees into t)e kingdo% of t)e 'ranks3 t)e Mo)a%%edans failed to e-/and t)eir do%ain3 suffering defeat at 0ours in C?2 ()en t)eir s)ock ca+alry failed against t)e co%&ined forces of t)e 'rankis) infantry3 and t)e dis%ounted 'rankis) ca+alry. 0)is &attle (as t)e %aDor e+ent of a series of raids t)at lasted /ast t)e %iddle of t)e century. 0)e ecli/se of $)ristian S/ain3 toget)er (it) an increase in strengt) and si6e of t)e kingdo% of t)e 'ranks3 %ade t)e 'ranks t)e do%inant /o(er in t)e $)ristian Ro%an !est. By B>> .1. t)e /o/e )ad cro(ned t)eir 9ing3 $)arles t)e *reat3 2%/eror in t)e !est3 and )is do%ain included in addition to 'rance %uc) of /resent#day *er%any3 $6ec)oslo+akia3 Italy3 ustria3 and :ugosla+ia. 0)us 'rankis) %ilitary de+elo/%ents of t)is /eriod )ad a /rofound and long#lasting influence on !estern 2uro/e. 0)e 'ranks reorganised t)e syste% of decentralised /rofessional soldiers3 &asing t)e ne( %ilitary force on feudalis%3 ()ic) decentralised /olitical /o(er and /laced it in t)e )ands of essentially )ereditary %agnates ()o go+erned and ()o o(ed t)e 9ing %ilitary ser+ice. In /ractice3 t)is ser+ice in+ol+ed a )ig) /ro/ortion of essentially untrained and ill#ar%ed %ilitia and a nu%&er of /ro/erly e.ui//ed and3 in %any cases3 skilled infantry and ca+alry. 'or distant ca%/aigns t)e 9ing called only t)e (ell#e.ui//ed and co%/etent fig)ters3 t)e /rofessionals3 using t)e %ilitia solely to resist in+asion. 0)e 'ranks3 &ot) on foot and )orse3 increasingly /rotected t)e%sel+es (it) a steel )el%et and %all s)irt. 0)e foot soldiers carried a si-#foot s/ear and a s(ord. 0)e 9ings regulations re.uired t)at all infantry and all %ailed ca+alry also )a+e a &o( and t(el+e arro(s and s/ecified t)at e+en t)e %ost ill#ar%ed %an s)ould )a+e a &o(3 e+en if )e lacked s)ield or s(ord. 0)is stress on t)e &o(3 a (ea/on traditionally foreign to t)e 'ranks3 reflected t)e 9ings ca%/aigns against t)e +ars of /resent#day "ungary ()o foug)t as %ounted )orse arc)ers. 0)e 9ings regulations3 ()ic) actually failed to %ake %any co%/etent arc)ers a%ong t)e 'ranks3 e-)i&it t)e sa%e res/onse to t)e identical tactical /ro&le% faced &y t)e By6antines. 'ar %ore effecti+e (as t)e stress t)at successi+e 'rankis) rulers /laced on ca+alry. 0raditionally infantry fro% a forested country3 t)e 'ranks )ad &egun to %ount e+en t)oug) t)ey dis%ounted to fig)t. But co%&at against %ounted +ars fro% t)e 2ast and t)e Mosle%s fro% S/ain %ade ca+alry essential. 8ust as t)e Ro%ans strengt)ened and t)e By6antines )ad stressed ca+alry to co%&at raiders3 so t)e 'ranks also follo(ed t)e sa%e ada/tation in t)eir %i- of (ea/on syste%s. But a %aDor tec)nological inno+ation %ade it easier for t)e 'ranks to &eco%e a nation /re#e%inent in )ea+y ca+alry in less t)an a century. 2arly in t)e eig)t) century t)e stirru/ &eca%e a+aila&le in !estern 2uro/e. 5f uncertain origin3 t)e stirru/ s/read ra/idly o+er t)e !estern (orld3 its o&+ious utility guaranteeing ra/id acce/tance: BB

(it) stirru/s a rider lost %ost of t)e )a6ard of falling fro% )is )orse. In co%&at )e could3 in a c)arge (it) )is lance3 trans%it t)e full force of )is )orses %otion to )is target3 secure in )is unity (it) t)e )orse /ro+ided &y saddle and stirru/s. In co%&at (it) )is s(ord )e )ad little reason to fear t)at a %issed stroke %ig)t &ring )i% off )is )orse. "e could e+en increase )is )eig)t a&o+e an o//onent on foot &y standing in )is stirru/s. In addition3 t)is inno+ation %ade it /ossi&le for %ediocre riders to /erfor% (ell and greatly en)anced t)e effecti+eness of t)e &est )ea+y ca+alry. 0)e stirru/3 so si%/le in conce/t3 /roduced one of tec)nologys %ost funda%ental %odifications in land (arfare since t)e introduction of t)e four &asic (ea/on syste%s and t)e de+elo/%ent of fortification and siegecraft. 0)e riding of )orses )ad su/erseded c)ariots3 and ele/)ants )ad ulti%ately /ro+en ineffecti+e. Steel re/laced Iron as iron )ad su//lanted &ron6e3 &ot) conferring ad+antages on t)e /ossessors of t)e i%/ro+ed (ea/ons. 0)ese c)anges3 like i%/ro+ed &o(s3 affected (arfare an i%/ortant3 if not funda%ental (ay. nd t)e increase in effecti+eness t)at t)e stirru/ conferred on t)e )ea+y ca+alry a%ounted to a difference as crucial as any of t)ese3 for it altered t)e &alance a%ong t)e four (ea/on syste%s. 0)is c)ange /ro+ed to &e es/ecially %arked &ecause it ca%e ()en !estern 2uro/e no longer )ad any /rofessional )ea+y infantry or e+en any ur&an %ilitia of t)e *reek and Ro%an ty/e. S)ock ca+alry )ad greater o//ortunities against undrilled )ea+y infantry3 and t)e stirru/ %arkedly en)anced t)ese. 0)e 'ranks &eca%e fa%ous for t)e irresisti&le c)arge of t)eir stirru/#sta&ilised )ea+y ca+alry3 and t)eir %et)od s/read to $)ristian !estern 2uro/e. fter %eeting suc) ca+alry3 t)e By6antines concluded: JSo for%ida&le is t)e c)arge of t)e 'rankis) c)i+alry (it) t)eir &roads(ord3 lance3 and s)ield3 t)at it is &est to decline a /itc)ed &attle (it) t)e% till you )a+e /ut all t)e c)ances on your side.L But3 t)e By6antine %anual continued3 t)e &est strategy (ould &e Jto /rotract t)e ca%/aign3 and lead t)e% into t)e )ills and desolate tracts3 for t)ey take no care a&out t)eir co%%issariat3 and ()en t)eir stores run lo( t)eir +igour %elts a(ay. 0)ey are i%/atient of )unger and t)irst3 and after a fe( days of /ri+ation desert t)eir standards and steal a(ay )o%e as &est t)ey can.L fter co%/aring t)e logistic (eakness of a 'rankis) ar%y (it) t)e tactical strengt) of its fearso%e ca+alry3 t)e By6antines concluded t)at a logistic rat)er t)an a co%&at strategy offered t)e easiest route to +ictory. J5n t)e ()ole3 t)erefore3 it is easier and less costly to (ear out a 'rankis) ar%y &y skir%is)es3 /rotracted o/erations in desolate districts3 and t)e cutting off of su//lies3 t)an to atte%/t to destroy it at a single &lo(.L 0)e i%/ro+e%ent in 'rankis) ca+alry3 largely co%/leted &y t)e &eginning of t)e nint) century3 /ro+ed fortunate indeed &ecause t)is e%/ire and its successors faced a far %ore serious c)allenge t)an t)at offered &y t)e +ars and Mosle%s. Back

Western -uro'e%s Struggle against )aiders

8ust as t)e Ro%ans )ad to co/e (it) &ar&arians3 so also did t)e kingdo%s into ()ic) t)e 'rankis) e%/ire soon dissol+ed. In t)e nint) century t)e Vikings3 co%ing &y s)i/ fro% /resent#day 1en%ark and Nor(ay3 raided t)e coasts of 2uro/e3 including t)ose of 2ngland. ,ike %any of t)e raiders faced &y t)e Ro%ans and By6antines3 t)ese )ad an essentially econo%ic %oti+ation. In t)e tent) century si%ilar %oti+es led t)e Magyars3 in)a&itants of ()at is no( "ungary3 to raid *er%any and Italy. 0alented sailors3 t)e Vikings ca%e in s%all undecked +essels3 usually (it) a single large sail3 &ut t)ese s)i/s relied /ri%arily on t)e oars of t)eir cre( of forty to one )undred fig)ting %en. 0)e /rofits (ere so great t)at t)ese raids &eca%e t)e /rinci/al occu/ation of t)e Viking co%%unities. 0)eir co%%and of t)e sea and t)eir a&ility to &eac) t)eir &oats ga+e t)e Vikings (ide latitude in t)eir c)oice of landing /laces. 0)erefore t)ey )ad une.ualled facility for a+oiding t)eir o//onents strengt) and concentrating against (eakness3 readily i%/le%enting t)eir raiding strategy and searc)

B@

for (eakly defended &ooty. nd t)ey /ro+ed far fro% +ulnera&le ()en t)ey left t)eir s)i/s and %arc)ed inland. 0)oug) initially (it)out ar%our3 t)e Vikings %ade fierce )ea+y infantry. 'a%ous for t)eir )ea+y a-es (it) si-#foot )andles3 using t(o )ands t)ey could cut t)roug) an o//onents s)ield and )el%et (it) a single &lo(. 0)ey also carried a s)ield3 a s)ort s(ord3 and a Da+elin3 and3 t)oug) t)ey usually foug)t at close .uarters3 t)ey )ad great skill (it) a &o(. 'or%ida&le as soldiers and skilful as sailors3 t)ey looted coastal cities and soon %o+ed u/ ri+ers3 /lundering interiors. %ong ot)er &ooty3 t)ese /redatory &ands soon /ro+ided t)e%sel+es (it) )el%ets and %ailed s)irts3 co%/leting t)eir )ea+y infantry outfit and fully e.ui//ing t)e%sel+es to deal (it) t)e still fee&le resistance of local aut)orities and t)e (eak and (arring %onarc)ies of !estern 2uro/e. So successful t)at so%e &ands stayed to (inter on islands off t)e coast3 t)e Vikings soon left t)eir s)i/s and &egan to carry out raids &y %arc)ing inland fro% t)e coasts or ri+ers. 2-tre%ely +ulnera&le to )a+ing t)eir s)i/s &urned in t)eir a&sence3 t)ey /rotected t)e% &y &uilding and garrisoning a stockade ()ere t)ey &eac)ed t)eir s)i/s. 'or t)eir inland raids t)ey a//ro/riated )orses found near t)eir landing /oints and so could %o+e %ounted on t)eir looting forays. But t)ey foug)t on foot ()en t)ey %et resistance. 0)ey t)us &eca%e %ounted infantry and )ad t)e strategic %o&ility of ca+alry &ut t)e ad+antages3 and disad+antages3 of )ea+y infantry co%&at. By t)e %iddle of t)e nint) century Viking raids )ad de+astated %uc) of t)e coast of *er%any and 'rance. ,ocal le+ies of untrained3 ill#ar%ed3 and often unar%oured s)ock infantry )ad little c)ance in co%&at against Vikings3 ()o &y no( )ad &eco%e (ell#ar%ed and skilled /rofessional soldiers and raiders. $o%&ating raiders /resented an e-traordinarily difficult strategic /ro&le% if only &ecause t)ey (ere not necessarily oriented to any s/ecific o&Decti+e and so could use t)e defenders /o(er of retreat and e+asion ()ene+er t)ey found it con+enient. 0)e a%&iguity of t)eir o&Decti+e ga+e t)e raiders unri+alled o//ortunities to concentrate against (eakness and to %ini%ise t)e defences strengt) on t)e tactical defensi+e. 'urt)er3 &ecause raiders relied on retreat3 t)ey )ad a//ro/riated for t)eir o(n use t)e strategy ca/a&ility nor%ally an attri&ute of t)e defence. 0)us a raiding strategy on t)e offensi+e (as stronger against a /ersisting strategy on t)e defensi+e. Since in %eeting t)is /o(erful t)reat t)ere could &e no .uestion of /rotecting e+ery /ossi&le landing /oint3 t)e defence in de/t) /ro+ided t)e only reasona&le strategy. 0)e )ea+y ca+alry3 fostered &y t)e 'ranks and ()ose effecti+eness t)e stirru/ )ad en)anced3 already e-isted. 0)oug) t)e %ounted Vikings )ad strategic %o&ility co%/ara&le to t)e )ea+y ca+alry3 t)eir stolen rural nags lacked t)e s/eed and endurance of t)e 'rankis) ca+alrys /icked )orses3 and often t)eir &ooty slo(ed t)e Viking %o+e%ent e+en %ore. But t)e defenders faced a tactical as %uc) as a strategic /ro&le%3 for ()en t)e ca+alry caug)t t)e raiders3 t)e Vikings dis%ounted. 2+en if t)ey )ad co%/etence as ca+alry%en3 t)e Vikings %ig)t (ell )a+e dis%ounted to fig)t. $a+alry (as (eak on t)e defensi+e and )ad to resort to a counter#c)arge only to e.ual t)e attackers /o(er. But dis%ounted3 t)e )ea+y ca+alry &eca%e )ea+y infantry. 2arlier Narses )ad t)us strengt)ened )is )ea+y infantry on t(o occasions3 and t)e 'ranks )ad used t)is dis/osition against t)e Mo)a%%edans at 0ours. So lea+ing t)eir )orses t)e Viking %ounted infantry &eca%e )ea+y infantry3 ()ic) still )ad a defensi+e su/re%acy o+er )ea+y ca+alry. !)en defending t)e%sel+es3 t)e Vikings al(ays c)ose a strong /osition3 a )ill or &e)ind a strea%3 or e+en in a +illage or a c)urc). 0)e 'ranks could not use arc)ery &ecause t)ey )ad failed to de+elo/ ade.uately t)eir &o(%en3 and in any case t)e Vikings (ere good arc)ers3 too. !)en t)e ca+alry caug)t t)e raiders3 t)e &attles t)us often consisted of )ea+y infantry resisting t)e c)arge of t)e )ea+y ca+alry. 0)oug) t)e Vikings )ad not drilled3 t)ey usually (on &ecause t)ey (ere /rofessional fig)ters accusto%ed to ca%/aigning toget)er.

@>

:et t)e Vikings occasionally suffered disconcerting re+erses3 as at ,ou+ain in B@1. "ere t)ey )ad esta&lis)ed an i%/regna&le ca%/ in a &end in a ri+er3 ()ic) t)ey )ad sealed off (it) a ditc) and an e%&ank%ent to//ed &y a stockade. But ()en t)e *er%an 9ing3 rnulf3 arri+ed3 )e dis%ounted )is ca+alry and attacked on foot. ,eading )is %en against t)e fortifications3 t)e (arrior 9ing (it) )is knig)ts cut t)roug) t)e (ooden /alisade (it) t)eir s(ords and dro+e t)e Vikings into t)e ri+er ()ere %any dro(ned. So foot co%&at could often )a+e gi+en &etter offensi+e ca/a&ilities t)an re%aining %ounted. Still t)e Vikings )ad co%e to loot3 not to (in &attles. Not only did a &attle defeat t)eir /ri%ary o&Decti+e3 &ut e+en a s%all force of ca+alry tracking t)eir %arc) /resented a serious %enace &y restricting looting3 /icking off stragglers3 and i%/eding t)eir ad+ance at suc) /oints as &ridges and fords. But greater success re(arded a /rogra% of fortification3 t)e ot)er ele%ent of t)e defence in de/t). "is control of t)e fortified to(ns )ad /ro+ided one ele%ent in le-anders success in Bactria and Sogdiana and to t)at of t)e Ro%ans not only against "anni&al &ut also in consolidating t)eir e%/ire. In 'rance and *er%any near t)e coast e+en s%all to(ns erected fortifications t)at t)e %ilitia3 t)oug) useless in t)e field3 could defend. In addition3 t)e local %agnates fortified defensi&le /oints in t)e country and /ro+ided enclosures as refuges for t)e /eo/le in t)e region and t)eir %o+a&le /ossessions. lt)oug) t)ese early e-a%/les of t)e castles3 like t)e ne( (alls of t)e to(ns3 consisted of a ditc) and an eart)en &ank (it) a (ooden /alisade3 t)ey /ro+ided an efficacious defence. 0)oug) ade/t at %ost t)ings3 Vikings originally kne( not)ing of siegecraft and3 in any case3 )ad not co%e to conduct sieges. 1enied access to t)e cities3 t)e raiders found little in t)e often#/lundered countryside3 es/ecially ()en t)e /eo/le (it) t)eir ani%als and ot)er +alua&les )ad taken refuge in t)e castle. 0)us3 raiding ceased to /ay (ell and t)e constant conflicts (it) t)e ca+alry %ade it )a6ardous indeed. 'urt)er3 in (intering and t)en esta&lis)ing settle%ents on t)e coast3 t)e Vikings )ad created t)e &asis for a ne( restraint on t)eir raids. !)en t)e settled Vikings raided for &ooty3 t)e 'ranks retaliated (it) counter#raids3 ()ic) )ad t)e /olitical o&Decti+e of deterring future Viking raids. 'inally3 in @113 a Viking c)ief acce/ted a /art of 'rance GNor%andyH fro% t)e 9ing in e-c)ange for gi+ing feudal allegiance to t)e 9ing and a /ro%ise to a&stain fro% future raids. 0)is /olitical settle%ent (orked3 and e+entually t)e Viking settlers of Nor%andy &eca%e 'renc) in language and culture # and added )ea+y ca+alry to t)eir (ea/on syste%s. In resisting t)e Vikings t)e 2nglis) ado/ted essentially t)e sa%e defence. 'ortifying (it) e.ually good results3 t)ey often used large eart) and ti%&er enclosures3 ()ic) could s)elter %any /eo/le and ani%als. s a nation of )ea+y infantry and lacking t)e )ea+y ca+alry of t)e Vikings $ontinental o//onents3 t)ey de/ended on t)e Viking e-/edient of %ounting t)eir &est %en to /ursue and )arry t)e raiders &ut fig)ting t)e% on foot. But soon t)e 2nglis) faced %ore t)an raiders3 for t)e Vikings3 c)iefly fro% 1en%ark3 ca%e in large nu%&ers and ado/ted t)e /ersisting strategy of con.uest. 0)e 2nglis) did not ste% t)e tide of t)e 1anis) ad+ance until t)ey )ad lost )alf of 2ngland3 t)e in+aders controlling local go+ern%ent and settling %any /eo/le in t)e occu/ied region. But t)e 2nglis)3 united &y 9ing lfred t)e *reat3 ()o &uilt a na+y t)at t)reatened t)e Vikings at sea3 )alted t)e ad+ance of t)e 1anes. 0)e 2nglis) i%%ediately (ent o+er to t)e offensi+e under lfreds son3 t)e /atient and /ers/icacious 9ing 2d(ard t)e 2lder ()o3 (it) t)e aid of )is e.ually ca/a&le sister3 2t)elfleda3 conducted a sustained3 t(enty#year ca%/aign against )is disunited o//onents. $ontinuing to rely on )is fat)ers large eart) and ti%&er fortifications enclosing areas of as %uc) as t(enty acres or %ore3 2d(ard used t)e larger of t)ese offensi+ely3 so%e()at in t)e Ro%an %anner3

@1

as s)elters for )is ad+ancing ar%y. 'ollo(ing a /ersisting strategy and fortifying t)e country )e su&dued3 )e steadily o+erca%e 1anis) 2ngland until )e )ad secured t)e su&%ission of all of t)e for%er con.uerors. 9ing 2d(ard %ade t)is an easier task &y )is /olitical /rogra% of neit)er distur&ing t)e land )oldings of t)e 1anis) settlers nor taking control of local go+ern%ent fro% t)eir leaders. 0)is sustained counteroffensi+e &roug)t t)e 2nglis) %ore t)an )ad t)e analogous /olitical settle%ent of t)e 9ing of 'rance in %aking Nor%andy a feudal de/endency &ecause it &roug)t t)e 1anes fir%ly under t)e rule of t)e co%/arati+ely centralised 2nglis) %onarc)y. 'or t)e in)a&itants of ()at is no( *er%any t)e Magyars /resented a different /ro&le% &ecause3 like t)e +ars t)ey )ad su//lanted in "ungary3 t)ey (ere lig)t ca+alry%en fro% t)e ste//e. 0)oug) as early as @1> t)ey )ad de%onstrated t)eir a&ility to defeat t)e *er%an )ea+y ca+alry3 t)ey %ade no effort to con.uer3 dis/ersing (idely to /lunder &etter3 and relied on t)eir su/erior s/eed to a+oid contact (it) t)e *er%ans. conte%/orary descri&ed t)e% t)us: J0)ey (ent not in one %ass &ut in s%all &ands3 &ecause t)ere (as no $)ristian ar%y in t)e field3 s/oiling t)e far%s and +illages and setting fire to t)e% ()en t)ey )ad s/oiled t)e%: t)ey al(ays caug)t t)e in)a&itants un/re/ared &y t)e s(iftness of t)eir a//earance. 5ften a )undred of t)e% or less (ould co%e suddenly gallo/ing out of a (ood on t)e /rey: only t)e s%oke and t)e nig)tly sky red (it) fla%es s)o(ed ()ere eac) of t)eir troo/s )ad &een.L 0)eir largest raid3 in @<43 e-)i&ited t)e c)aracteristics of a raid as (ell as t)e scale of Magyar o/erations. 2ntering Ba+aria in sout) *er%any3 t)ey /illaged t)eir (ay (est until3 crossing t)e R)ine near its %out)3 t)ey cut across 'rance into Italy3 t)roug) nort) Italy3 and &ack to "ungary. ,acking any &ase3 raiders could %o+e in any direction and )ad no need to return t)e (ay t)ey ca%e. 0)is a%&iguity3 &ot) as to o&Decti+e and route of retreat3 as (ell as t)e /ri%acy of retreat o+er /ursuit ga+e raiders t)eir offensi+e su/eriority o+er t)e /ersisting defence. If t)e *er%an )ea+y ca+alry could )a+e o+ertaken t)e Magyar )orse arc)ers3 t)e *er%ans (ould )a+e faced t)e sa%e tactical /ro&le% as t)e By6antines later %et at Man6ikert and analogous to t)at encountered in forcing t)e Vikings to fig)t # t)e )ea+y ca+alry (as a less effecti+e (ea/on syste% ()en co%/ared (it) eit)er )ea+y infantry or lig)t ca+alry. But t)e su/erlati+e Magyar %o&ility %eant t)at conflict rarely occurred3 e+en t)oug) carrying &ooty on /ack ani%als rat)er t)an in carts slo(ed t)e Magyar raiders. 5nly t)e s%all nu%&ers of t)e Magyars /re+ented t)eir raids fro% )a+ing t)e seriousness of t)e Viking %enace. 0)e *er%ans a//lied t)e defence#in#de/t) strategy &y /ursuing (it) )ea+y ca+alry and &y fortifying t)oroug)ly3 one 2%/eror earning t)e title Jt)e &uilder.L By (alling to(ns and fortifying and garrisoning /laces of refuge3 t)e *er%ans reduced t)e yield fro% raids and induced t)e Magyars to co%e less fre.uently &ut in larger nu%&ers. In @<< a )uge Magyar raiding force &esieged ugs&urg in Ba+aria ()en t)e 2%/eror 5tto (it) B3>>> )ea+y ca+alry a//roac)ed t)e% fro% t)e east. 0)e Magyars crossed t)e ,ec) Ri+er to fig)t3 /lacing t)e%sel+es &et(een t)e I%/erial ar%y and t)e ri+er. 'ig)ting in t)e %anner of t)e 0urks a century later at Man6ikert3 t)ey retreated in front ()ile s)o(ering t)e 2%/erors )ea+y ca+alry (it) arro(s fro% t)e flank and rear. But instead of dis/ersing3 t)e *er%ans )eld3 and a sudden c)arge &y so%e of t)eir ca+alry on t)e flank dro+e t)e Magyars on t)e flank &ack to(ard t)eir %ain &ody in front of 5ttos line. 0)e 2%/eror t)en ordered a c)arge of )is ()ole line3 ()ic) dro+e t)e Magyars &ack to t)e ri+er3 ()ere t)e )ea+y ca+alry sle( %any and %ore dro(ned trying to cross t)e ri+er. 0)is dra%atic and costly defeat ended t)e Magyar raids3 already seriously circu%scri&ed &y t)e fortifications. !)en &acked against an o&stacle3 lig)t ca+alry )ad no %ore c)ance against )ea+y ca+alry t)an3 under si%ilar circu%stances3 t)e Persian lig)t infantry )ad against *reek )ea+y infantry at t)e Battle of Marat)on. 0)e strategy e%/loyed against raiders &y t)e 'ranks3 *er%ans3 and 2nglis) +aried little fro% t)at e%/loyed &y t)e Ro%ans and By6antines. Nor did all of t)ese differ significantly fro% t)ose used

@2

&y 'a&ius and ot)er Ro%ans in t)eir long struggle against "anni&al. ll relied on fortifying t)e /o/ulation centres and controlling t)e routes of co%%unication ()ile )arrying t)e raiders to catc) stragglers and li%it t)eir acti+ity3 ()et)er it (as t)e Vikings searc) for &ooty or foraging &y "anni&als %en. Nor3 essentially3 did t)e strategy differ fro% t)at le-ander e%/loyed in )is struggle against t)e re&els in Bactria and Sogdiana or t)e Ro%ans in consolidating t)eir ne( 2uro/ean con.uests3 e-e%/lified &y t)eir nu%erous forts in Britain. Raiders or guerrillas relied on t)eir a&ility to a+oid action3 e+en t)oug)3 in t)e case of t)e Magyars and t)e Vikings3 t)ey could count on )a+ing a %uc) &etter t)an an e+en c)ance of (inning a &attle. 0)ese raiders3 t)oug) acting fro% t)e econo%ic %oti+e of securing &ooty rat)er t)an /ursuing /olitical or %ilitary o&Decti+es3 &e)a+ed Dust as t)ey (ould (ere t)ey follo(ing a logistic strategy3 one t)at a+oided co%&at and ai%ed at t)e ene%ys ar%y &y attacking its logistic &ase. lt)oug) t)e Ro%an ca%/aign against "anni&al differed fro% t)ose against t)e Vikings3 t)e strategies (ere alike and essentially sy%%etrical. 'a&ius and t)e e%/loyers of )is strategy used t)eir a&ility to a+oid &attle3 so%et)ing t)e !estern 2uro/ean )ea+y ca+alry3 ()ic) so often lost to t)e Vikings3 %ig)t (ell )a+e considered. But3 e-ce/t for t)is di+ergence3 t)e Ro%an strategy for defeating "anni&al (as t)e sa%e as t)at used against Viking3 Magyar3 Bar&arian3 and ra& raiders as (ell as against guerrillas in Bactria and Sogdiana. 0o essentially t)e sa%e strategic /ro&le% &ot) ancient and %edie+al soldiers a//lied an al%ost identical solution. Back

William%s Combined-#rms #rmy in the Con&uest of -ngland

lt)oug) t)e decentralised %edie+al ar%ies lacked &ot) t)e logistic organisation of Macedonian and Ro%an ar%ies and t)e &enefits of training and articulation conferred &y re%aining concentrated in one /lace3 t)e &attle and ca%/aign of "astings e-)i&its t)e )ig) le+el of strategic and tactical so/)istication of a skilfully conducted %edie+al ca%/aign. !it)out ready access to t)e %ilitary e-/erience and %et)ods of t)e ancient (orld3 t)ese %edie+al soldiers e-)i&ited t)eir fir% gras/ of t)e sa%e essentials t)at ani%ated t)e &est co%%anders of anti.uity. 0)e con.uest of 2ngland ca%e only a fe( years after t)e country )ad esca/ed a /eriod of 1anis) rule3 ()ic) )ad follo(ed &y a century lfred t)e *reat and 2d(ard t)e 2lders defeat of t)e initial in+aders. 0)e deat) of 9ing 2d(ard t)e $onfessor in early 1>== /reci/itated a crisis in t)e succession: t(o foreigners3 t)e 9ing of Nor(ay3 asserting t)e 1anis) clai% to t)e cro(n3 and t)e late 9ings cousin3 1uke !illia% of Nor%andy3 &ot) soug)t t)e t)rone. 0)e 2nglis) t)e%sel+es c)ose not 9ing 2d(ard t)e $onfessors nearest relati+e Ga c)ildH &ut )is &rot)er#in#la(3 t)e /o(erful 2arl "arold ()o like )is fat)er )ad do%inated t)e /ious 9ing and +irtually ruled t)e land. 1eter%ined and co%/etent3 "arold see%ed &est a&le to deal (it) t)e foreign clai%ants3 of ()o% 1uke !illia%3 su//orted &y t)e /o/e3 see%ed t)e %ore %enacing. 9ing "arolds %ilitary and /olitical e-/erience (ell co%/le%ented )is intelligence and courage3 &ut in 1uke !illia% of Nor%andy )e faced a for%ida&le antagonist. 0)e /ortly &ut ro&ust duke3 less t)an forty years of age3 )ad already gained deser+ed fa%e as a (arrior in se+eral ca%/aigns3 including t(o against t)e 9ing of 'rance. %&itious and t)oroug)3 !illia% /ro%/tly /re/ared a ca%/aign to assert )is clai% to t)e t)rone. "e collected a /o(erful force3 not so %uc) &y +irtue of )is control of t)e %ilitary resources of )is duc)y or )is )iring of a nu%&er of %ercenaries &ut &ecause )e /ro%ised to )is +assals and %any ot)ers large re(ards if )e s)ould succeed in gaining t)e cro(n of 2ngland. Many %en of su&stance Doined )i% (it) soldiers to ga%&le on t)e /ossi&le re(ards. In effect3 !illia% (as a )irer of so%e of )is %ercenaries on a contingent#fee &asis3 and %any of t)ose ()o acco%/anied )i% (ere %en of %eans %aking a s/eculati+e in+est%ent. !illia% s/ent t)e s/ring and early su%%er concentrating )is forces and readying )is fleet of trans/orts on t)e 'renc) coast near 2ngland.

@?

9ing "arold sent )is /o(erful 2nglis) fleet to sea in 8une and concentrated )is 23>>> )ousecarles Gor regularsH in t)e sout) of 2ngland. "e )ad (arned t)e country to &e /re/ared to %o&ilise at a %o%ents notice. ,ike t)e *reeks facing t)e sea in+asion of t)e Persians in t)e Marat)on ca%/aign3 "arold could not kno( ()ere !illia% (ould land3 &ut3 (it) )is fleet at sea3 )e i%/osed on 1uke !illia% t)e serious /eril of e-/osing )is trans/orts to an attack &y t)e 2nglis) (ar fleet. But &ad (eat)er /re+ented !illia%s force fro% sailing in early ugust. t t)is ti%e "arold )ad to face anot)er %enace3 an in+asion of t)e nort) &y t)e 9ing of Nor(ay3 Dust as )is s)i/s )ad to /ut into /ort to re/lenis) su//lies and %ake re/airs. ,ong a(are of t)is t)reat3 t)e decisi+e "arold i%%ediately decided to risk t)e /ossi&ility of a Nor%an landing and take ad+antage of )is interior lines of o/eration to %arc) nort) (it) )is )ousecarles to resist t)e Nor(egian in+asion. 1is/laying co%%enda&le energy3 "arold left ,ondon on Se/te%&er 1=t) 1>==3 and %arc)ed 2>> %iles nort) to :ork3 arri+ing t)ere on t)e 24t)3 an e-cellent %arc)3 e+en for a %ounted force on an old Ro%an road. 0)e ne-t day )e Doined )is )ousecarles (it) t)e %o&ilised nort)ern forces and3 %aking a sur/rise attack3 defeated t)e Nor(egian )ost at Sta%ford Bridge3 killing t)eir 9ing in &attle and co%/elling t)e% to return to Nor(ay. !)ile "arold ca%/aigned in t)e nort)3 t)e (eat)er cleared3 and in t)e a&sence of t)e 2nglis) fleet !illia% )ad no difficulty in landing )is ar%y on t)e sout)east coast of 2ngland on Se/te%&er 2Bt)3 t)ree days after "arolds +ictory and ()ile t)e 9ing rested )is forces in :ork and cele&rated )is triu%/). Since t)e antidote to t)e strategic ad+antage of interior lines is si%ultaneous ad+ances3 t)e fortuitous coordination of t)e Nor(egian in+asion (it) good (eat)er ga+e !illia% ti%e to take t)e initiati+e. But !illia% did not ad+ance t)e fifty %iles to try to sei6e ,ondon or ot)er(ise to ca/italise on "arolds a&sence. 1ou&tless t)e sagacious 1uke felt %ore co%forta&le fig)ting near t)e coast ()ere )e )ad e-/ected a &attle3 and )e certainly li%ited )is risk of serious losses &y staying near )is s)i/s and t)e fortifications t)at )e )ad erected to /rotect )is landing site. "e could (ell )a+e %ade t)e i%/licit calculation t)at t)e c)ances of )ig) casualties and )is /ossi&le ca/ture %ore t)an &alanced any increase in t)e c)ance of gaining t)e cro(n &y an i%%ediate ad+ance. Near t)e coast )e (as %uc) surer of kee/ing )is duc)y3 t)oug)3 /er)a/s3 a little less likely to &eco%e 9ing. !)en "arold learned of !illia%s landing3 )e ordered a general %o&ilisation and %arc)ed sout)3 reac)ing ,ondon in nine days. "e dou&tless (ould )a+e /referred to %o+e against !illia% after all of )is forces fro% t)e nort) and (est )ad Doined )i%3 &ut !illia%s syste%atic de+astation of t)e country in sout)#eastern 2ngland forced )i% to act. Recently ele+ated to t)e t)rone and )is title s)aky3 "arold could not afford tardy action in /rotecting )is su&Dects. Since a strategy for forcing &attle in ancient *reece (orked Dust as (ell in %edie+al 2ngland3 "arold %arc)ed to(ard !illia%s landing /lace (it) only )is )ousecarles and t)e )ea+y infantry fro% t)e sout). 5n t)e e+ening of 5cto&er 1?t) )e concentrated )is ar%y on a )ill eig)t %iles fro% !illia%s landing /lace. "arold arrayed )is force of )ea+y infantry in a strong defensi+e /osition along t)e )ill (it) )is flanks /rotected &y t)e stee/ness of t)e ascent. dense forest in t)e rear offered s)elter in case of retreat. "is %en /ro&a&ly nu%&ered &et(een <3>>> and 113>>>. 0)e )ousecarles3 originally 23>>> strong3 )ad suffered causalities in t)e &attle (it) t)e Nor(egians &ut still /ro+ided a significant /ro/ortion of "arolds strengt). "is ot)er troo/s consisted of t)egns3 recently %o&ilised /rofessionals ()o o(ed %ilitary ser+ice to t)e 9ing. In addition to t)e t)egns (it) )el%ets and %ailed s)irts3 "arold )ad untrained %ilitia3 +ariously e.ui//ed3 so%e (it)out any ar%our and a fe( ar%ed only (it) agricultural i%/le%ents. 1ou&tless t)e %ost ca/a&le and &est ar%oured %en stood in t)e front ranks7 t)e 9ing took a /osition on t)e )ig)est /oint on t)e &ill3 ()ere )e could sur+ey )is &attle line.

@4

1uke !illia% )ad to attack /ro%/tly3 for "arolds force (ould increase daily3 adding not Dust %ilitia &ut %ore of t)e for%ida&le t)egns ()o rode to Doin "arold &ut foug)t on foot. !illia% %arc)ed to t)e ene%y /osition in t)e %orning and arrayed )is ar%y3 ()ic) (as /ro&a&ly a&out t)e sa%e strengt) as "arolds3 in t)ree si%ilar di+isions3 eac) co%/osed of t)ree linear for%ations3 one &e)ind t)e ot)er. In t)e first line t)e e-/erienced 1uke /laced )is arc)ers7 in t)e second3 (ell# ar%oured )ea+y infantry e.ui//ed (it) s/ear and s(ord7 and in t)e t)ird3 )is )ea+y ca+alry3 fa%ous for t)e /o(er of its c)arge. 0)e 1uke /lanned for )is lig)t and )ea+y infantry to o/en ga/s in t)e 2nglis) infantry line into ()ic) t)e ca+alry could /enetrate. ll of !illia%s %en (ere /rofessional (arriors. But t)e dukes ar%y )ad to %ake a frontal attack on a +ery strong /osition. !illia% o/ened t)e &attle &y ad+ancing )is arc)ers3 ()o could s)oot relati+ely un%olested &y t)e fe( arc)ers in "arolds ar%y. Pelted (it) a )all of arro(s3 t)e 2nglis) line re%ained i%%o+a&le. 4nder si%ilar circu%stances3 S/artans )ad c)arged t)e /eltasts3 ()o t)re( t)e Da+elins at t)e%. But (it) !illia%s /o(erful )ea+y ca+alry close at )and3 "arolds %en realised t)at t)ey s)ould not &reak ranks. 0)en3 ()en t)e arc)ers a//roac)ed closer to t)e %otionless 2nglis) s)ield (all3 "arolds %en s)o(ered t)e% (it) a %iscellany of %issiles3 including Da+elins3 t)ro(ing a-es3 and t)ro(ing )a%%ers %ade of stones (it) sticks attac)ed. 0)e dukes &o(%en t)en fell &ack3 )a+ing inflicted so%e da%age on t)e 2nglis)3 e+en t)oug) t)ey )ad to s)oot u/ )ill against s)ielded %en. 0)e )ea+y infantry attacked ne-t &ut3 /redicta&ly3 failed to %ake an i%/ression on t)e ad+antageously situated and t)ick 2nglis) line. 0)en t)e )ea+y ca+alry c)arged3 and a struggle ensued as t)e ca+alry tried to &reak in a%ong t)e infantry. 0)e Nor%ans (ere s)ocked to find t)at t)e 2nglis) still used t)e old#fas)ioned )ea+y Viking t(o#)anded a-e (it) t)e si-#foot )andle7 a single &lo( fro% t)is a-e could knock do(n a )orse. !)en t)e infantry defeated t)e ca+alry3 t)e )orse%en and )ea+y infantry in t)e Nor%an left di+ision fell &ack in de%oralised confusion3 a//arently fleeing t)e field. Per)a/s (it)out orders3 t)e 2nglis) infantry surged do(n t)e )ill in /ursuit and .uickly t)e alert and resourceful 1uke !illia%3 fro% )is /osition in t)e centre3 led t)e %iddle di+ision of ca+alry against t)e flank of t)e 2nglis) ()o )ad left t)e )ill. 0)e redou&ta&le Nor%an ca+alry .uickly and easily cut do(n t)e infantry t)at after lea+ing t)eir /osition lacked any for%ation. 5nly a fe( esca/ed to t)eir /ost on t)e )ill. 0)oug) "arold )ad lost so%e %en to t)e arro(s and far %ore to t)e effort to /ursue an un&eaten ene%y3 t)e 9ings ar%y still re%ained an i%%o+a&le o&Dect ato/ t)e )ill near "astings. !illia%s ca+alry attacked again # and retreated again3 eit)er accidentally or &y t)e dukes desire to si%ulate flig)t. 0)e 2nglis) infantry again %ade t)e %istake of /ursuing t)e retreating %en3 and !illia% again directed anot)er ca+alry c)arge in t)e flank3 t)at cut t)e% do(n. 0)e 2nglis) suffered )ea+y casualties3 &ut "arolds ar%y still re%ained on t)e )ill. !illia% t)en sent )is arc)ers to s)o(er t)e 2nglis) (it) arro(s and follo(ed t)is (it) an assault of )is entire force. "e alternated t)e %issile and s)ock attacks3 inflicting casualties and de%oralising a force t)at )ad to recei+e &ot) for%s of assault /assi+ely. conte%/orary )istorian descri&ed t)is /)ase of t)e &attle as one J()ere one side (orks &y constant %otion and ceaseless c)arges3 ()ile t)e ot)er can &ut endure /assi+ely as it stands fi-ed to t)e sod. 0)e Nor%an arro( and s(ord (orked on: in t)e 2nglis) ranks t)e only %o+e%ent (as t)e dro//ing of t)e dead. 0)e li+ing stood %otionless.L 'inally an arro( %ortally (ounded 9ing "arold in t)e eye3 and t)e re%ainder of t)e /)ysically and %orally e-)austed 2nglis) ar%y ga+e (ay at t)e ne-t c)arge3 retreating into t)e forest in t)e dusk. 1uke !illia% set a&out syste%atically rea/ing t)e fruits of )is +ictory. 'irst )e %o+ed do(n t)e coast to ca/ture t)e i%/ortant /ort of 1o+er3 to secure &etter )is co%%unications (it) Nor%andy. 0)en3 not recei+ing t)e e-/ected su&%ission of t)e leaders of t)e kingdo%3 )e %arc)ed to ,ondon3 s/reading )is ar%y out on t(o or t)ree routes to find ade.uate su//lies in t)e s/arsely /o/ulated %edie+al countryside. :et ,ondon still refused to surrender to t)e con.ueror of "arold.

@<

Rat)er t)an attacking or trying to &esiege t)e large fortified city3 !illia% carried out an ostentatious raid3 scattering )is ar%y and %arc)ing around t)e ca/ital in a &road circuit3 destroying su//lies as (ell as feeding )is %en and )orses. 0)us3 )e again e-erted /olitical /ressure and de%onstrated )is %astery3 including ca/turing $anter&ury3 t)e ecclesiastical centre of t)e kingdo%3 and recei+ing t)e su&%ission of !inc)ester3 a city of traditional /olitical i%/ortance. 0)e ca/itulation of cities and castles and t)e destructi+e %arc) of t)e +ictor of "astings de%onstrated to t)e 2nglis) leaders gat)ered in ,ondon t)e futility of a resistance in t)e sout) of 2ngland3 es/ecially ()en t)e deat) of "arold )ad de/ri+ed t)e% of any strong leader. By t)e ti%e 1uke !illia% )ad co%/leted t(o#t)irds of )is uno//osed circuit of t)e countrys leading econo%ic centre3 a delegation fro% ,ondon surrendered t)e city and t)e cro(n to )i%. s a soldier !illia% deser+ed )is t)rone. In t)e &attle3 ()ere t)ree )orses )ad fallen under )i%3 )e )ad successfully co%&ined t)e .ualities of )is lig)t infantry and )ea+y ca+alry. "e used )is &o(%en to attack t)e 2nglis) )ea+y infantry (it)out fear t)at t)e 2nglis) (ould c)arge and dri+e t)e% fro% t)e field. !)en t)e 2nglis) did &reak ranks3 t)e result e-)i&ited t)e decisi+e /redo%inance of stirru/#sta&ilised )ea+y ca+alry o+er unfor%ed infantry. By (isely using t)e different ca/a&ilities of t)ese (ea/on syste%s3 t)e 1uke (on a co%/letely %erited tactical +ictory3 ()ic) )ad good su//ort fro% )is a&ility to organise )is co%%and and logistics3 )is (ise strategy3 and )is /olitical clai%s to a t)rone. "e co%/leted t)e su&Dection of t)e country3 ruled 2ngland effecti+ely3 and /aid off )andso%ely t)e /artici/ants in )is %ilitary +enture. 1is/laying a strategic %astery on a /ar (it) )is tactical skill3 )e triu%/)antly a//lied a /ersisting co%&at strategy3 Dust as )ad le-ander against 1arius. In carrying out ()at (as an essentially %ilitary occu/ation of 2ngland3 !illia% t)e $on.ueror )ad to contend (it) so%e o//osition to )is rule3 e+en t)oug) )e )ad taken o+er t)e central ad%inistration of t)e country3 )ad t)e legiti%acy of )is kins)i/ to t)e late 9ing 2d(ard3 and )ad t)e &acking of t)e /o/e. But o//osition to t)e 'renc)#s/eaking foreigners3 e-acer&ated &y t)e looting of )is soldiers3 )el/ed cause re+olts o+er t)e ne-t t)ree years. !illia% su//ressed eac) of t)ese and steadily &uilt fortifications t)roug)out t)e country3 as )ad le-ander in Bactria and Sogdiana and t)e Ro%ans in Britain and else()ere. "e introduced t)e 'renc) castle3 si%ilar to t)e eart) and ti%&er enclosures of lfred and 2d(ard t)e 2lder &ut %uc) s%aller. Sited to do%inate cities3 road Dunctions3 and ri+er crossings3 t)ese consisted of a s%all /ile of eart) surrounded &y a ditc) fro% ()ic) t)e eart) for t)e %ound )ad co%e. 4/on suc) a lo( e%inence t)e &uilder erected a (ooden stockade or to(er3 and to t)is )e often attac)ed an o+al (ooden /alisade3 ()ic) usually did not surround t)e %ound &ut for%ed an attac)ed enclosure3 t)e stockade standing on a lo( &ank &e)ind a ditc). 0)e /alisaded area /ro+ided a li+ing /lace for t)e garrison and t)eir )orses3 &ut t)e ()ole structure re.uired a relati+ely s%all garrison. $a/a&le of .uick construction of /lentiful %aterials &y largely unskilled la&our3 it offered a /o(erful defence against attackers ()o )ad little e-/erience in siegecraft. 0)us t)e rude castles /ro+ided a &ase for o/erations3 do%inated t)e country around t)e%3 and /ro+ided a /lace of refuge for t)e con.uerors in ti%e of trou&le. lt)oug) !illia% ruled &y conser+ing 2nglis) institutions and generally soug)t to conciliate t)e con.uered3 in su//ressing t)e t)ird re&ellion in 1>=@ )e de+astated t)ousands of s.uare %iles in t)e Nort). 0)is a//lication of &ot) a logistic strategy and a /rogra% of /olitical terror caused %any to die of star+ation and %ore to flee. 0)e land (as so de/o/ulated t)at fifteen years later t)e area still contained %uc) (asteland. 0)is last of t)e re&ellions )a+ing ended !illia%s effort to de/end on t)e nati+e aristocracy3 )e ga+e 2nglis) lands and Durisdiction to foreigners3 largely fro% Nor%andy3 in e-c)ange for /ro+iding a s/ecified nu%&er of fig)ting %en on call. 0)e &ack&one of t)is %ilitary force consisted

@=

of at least 43>>> ar%oured knig)ts3 ()o usually foug)t %ounted as )ea+y ca+alry &ut could /erfor% as effecti+ely on foot as t)e 2nglis) )ousecarles and t)egns ()o foug)t at "astings. 0)ese %en3 (it) t)eir castles3 defended t)e country fro% in+aders and also ena&led !illia% to control t)e land and gradually reconcile t)e 2nglis) to )is rule. 0)us t)e ne( 9ing follo(ed a successful co%&ination of %easures used in t)e /ast: /olitical conciliation3 controlling co%%unications3 fortifying and garrisoning t)e country3 and /atience and deter%ination. Back

#ttack and +efence of Fortifications

!illia%s 'renc) castle (as si%ilar to t)e %odel used t)roug)out 2uro/e. Because attackers %ig)t (ell first assail t)e (eaker /alisade3 ()ose fall (ould not affect t)e defensi+e strengt) of t)e structure on t)e %ound3 t)is ele%entary castle e%&odied3 to a %odest degree3 t)e /rinci/le of successi+e lines of defence. But t)e si%/le design /ro+ided no o//ortunities for flanking fire. 0)e stone castle3 ()ic) in t)e ele+ent) century &egan to su/ersede t)e (ooden3 included t)ese t(o funda%ental /rinci/les ()ile ad)ering to t)e &asic %odel de+elo/ed for t)e (ooden castle. /o(erful stone to(er (it) a (alled stone enclosure3 ()ic) e%&odied s%aller to(ers for flanking fire and in %ore ela&orate castles t(o co%/lete concentric lines of (alls3 %eant a structure (it) as %any as t)ree lines of resistance # outer (alls3 inner (alls3 and %ain to(er. 0o(n fortifications t)at &egan as (ood also /rogressed to stone3 incor/orating t)e sa%e /rinci/les as ancient to(n (alls. 4sually to(ns )ad a castle or citadel3 ()ic) ser+ed as a /lace of final defence and as a strong)old fro% ()ic) t)e ruler could do%inate t)e to(n. But t)e early Nor%an castle concentrated al%ost all of its strengt) in a single enor%ous to(er kno(n as a donDon or kee/. n outer (all enclosed a courtyard3 &ut it )ad for flanking fire only little turrets3 not %uc) %ore t)an sentry &o-es3 and t)ey (ere only a su&ordinate feature. Nor%an %ilitary engineers /referred to /ut %ost of t)eir %oney into a single to(er t)at co%&ined )eig)t and a %a-i%u% of s/ace inside (it) only a narro( /eri%eter to defend. 1efenders needed only %en enoug) to %an t)e &attle%ents and to dro/ t)ings do(n on anyone trying to sa/ t)e &ase of t)e (all. Increased )eig)t %ade it )arder for t)e sa//ers to resist t)e fall of ()ate+er dro//ed3 and it also ga+e a %ore e-tensi+e +ie(. So%eti%es t)e castle )ad a s)ell kee/ # a round structure (it) an o/en s/ace in t)e centre. Suc) a (ork de+elo/ed naturally fro% t)e original /alisaded ring on a %ound and often re/laced it3 es/ecially as t)e artificial %ounds %ig)t not &e fir% enoug) to stand t)e (eig)t of a solid to(er. 0)e ty/ical Nor%an kee/ (as solid and s.uare3 (it) a s.uare turret at eac) corner and often a flat# stri/ &uttress u/ t)e %iddle of eac) side. 1esigners usually /laced t)e entrance one story a&o+e ground3 u/ a stair(ay inside an o&long lo(er &uilding resting against one side of t)e %ain structure. 0)e %asonry (as crude3 t)e stones s%all and se/arated &y &road %ortar Doints. In !illia% t)e $on.uerors kee/3 t)e !)ite 0o(er in t)e 0o(er of ,ondon3 t)e Doints are so &road t)at t)e (all contains %ore %ortar t)an stone. 0)e (alls are no less t)an fifteen feet t)ick at t)e ground le+el and ten feet e+en at t)e to/. !)en &uilders e-/anded a kee/ into a castle3 t)e kee/ re%ained t)e strongest /art and t)e last line of defence in t)e castle. Medie+al soldiers used all t)e ancient siege de+ices e-ce/t t)e Ro%an agger. n agger (as a )uge %ound )ig) enoug) to co%%and t)e defences t)at &esiegers esta&lis)ed out of effecti+e range and gradually e-tended to(ard t)e (alls. 5nce t)ey )ad co%/leted it3 t)e defenders )ad to resist stor%ing colu%ns ad+ancing (it) a fairly &road front on a le+el3 or e+en a do(n(ard3 slo/e. No %edie+al ar%y could co%%and or feed t)e la&our necessary to %ake it. 4ntil t)e &eginning of t)e t(elft) century3 t)e only kno(n kinds of artillery (ere cata/ults (orked &y torsion and tension. torsion cata/ult used a )ea+y ti%&er fra%e (it) a %ass of t(isted ro/e strung across near t)e front. In t)is t(isted ro/e t)e &uilder secured one end of a %o+a&le &ea% )a+ing a s/oon#s)a/ed )ollo( in its ot)er end. 5/erators /ulled t)is free end &ack(ard and do(n @C

&y a large (inc) at t)e rear of t)e fra%e3 against t)e resistance of t)e t(isted ro/es3 and /laced t)e stone to &e t)ro(n in t)e s/oon#s)a/ed ca+ity. 0)ey t)en released t)e free end of t)e %o+a&le &ea% &y releasing a catc). 0)e force of t)e t(isted ro/es t)en %ade t)e &ea% descri&e an u/(ard and for(ard cur+e3 %o+ing fast enoug) to fli/ off t)e stone at a )ig) angle of ele+ation. Suc) a cata/ult (as kno(n as a %angon3 %angonel3 or sling. 5f course t)e /roDectiles (ere seldo% unifor% in (eig)t3 and (eat)er affected t)e ro/es. ccordingly3 t)e s)ots of t)is ty/e of %ac)ine dis/ersed so (idely t)at it (as generally used for &o%&arding large o&Decti+es3 suc) as to(ns or castles. tension cata/ult3 usually kno(n as a &allista3 consisted of an e-aggerated &o( (ound u/ &y (inc)es. It s)ot &olts or enor%ous arro(s (it) great force3 flat traDectory3 and considera&le accuracy. lt)oug) t)ey could not /enetrate (alls3 t)ey (ere used &y &esiegers and &esieged against s%all3 fairly distant o&Decti+es3 suc) as %en out of range of infantry (ea/ons. In %aking good t)eir a//roac)3 &esiegers /rotected t)e%sel+es against t)e /lunging fire of t)e defenders &e)ind %antlets3 screens strong enoug) to resist arro(s &ut lig)t enoug) to %o+e easily. Besiegers %ig)t roll u/ %o+a&le to(ers3 as )ig) as or )ig)er t)an t)e defences3 until t)e to(ers could dro/ dra(&ridges on t)e &attle%ents. ttackers %ig)t t)en deli+er an assault &y %o+ing u/ t)e to(ers and across t)e dra(&ridges. Mean()ile3 arc)ers or cross&o(%en /osted on t)e to(er to/ tried to /ick off t)e defenders. 0)e defects of t)e %o+a&le to(er are o&+ious. It (as not only )ea+y3 &ut to/#)ea+y. ccordingly3 it could %o+e for(ard only o+er ground t)at (as s%oot)3 le+el3 and /articularly fir%. It needed /rotection against co%&usti&les7 ra()ides (ere generally used in front and to so%e e-tent u/on its sides. 1efenders s)ot at it (it) arro(s carrying &alls of &urning to(. Most effecti+e (ere t)e )uge arro(s fro% t)e tension ty/e of cata/ult.

)ata ult Back

It (as a little easier to %o+e for(ard so%e sort of lo( s)elter t)at (ould /rotect %en (orking against t)e &ase of t)e defenders (alls. 0)ese s)elters (ere fairly long3 so t)at t)eir occu/ants %ig)t co%e and go &y t)e rear end G()ic) could not &e too close under t)e (allH3 and narro( and stee/#roofed in /ro/ortion to t)eir lengt) so t)at t)ey could resist stones and )ea+y (eig)ts dro//ed fro% a&o+e. 'or greater strengt)3 t)e roof )ad a stee/ /oint and (as /rotected against fire &y ra()ides. 2it)er t)e s)elter (as &roug)t (it)in a fe( feet of t)e (all3 ()ic) (ork%en t)en attacked (it) ra% or &orer3 or its )ead (as /us)ed u/ against a (all to gi+e co+er for %en attacking t)e %asonry (it) /icka-es3 )a%%ers and cro(&ars. 0)e ra% and &orer &ot) consisted of great &ea%s3 t)e largest t)at t)e &esiegers could find3 s(ung &y c)ains fro% t)e ridge/ole of t)e s)elter. 0)e ra% )ad a &road solid )ead Glike t)e fore)ead and )orns of a true ra%H3 ()ic) it &utted against t)e (all7 t)e &orer @B

)ad a /ointed )ead3 intended to &reak do(n t)e o//osing %asonry stone &y stone. If t)e (all (ere not too t)ick or (ell &uilt3 t)e ra% could s)ake3 crack3 and finally &reak it &y re/eated &lo(s in t)e sa%e s/ot. 0)e &orer )ad a slo(er and %ore localised effect. It is )ard to see ()at any ra% could )a+e acco%/lis)ed against (alls fifteen feet t)ick3 like t)ose of !illia%s 0o(er of ,ondon. Nor can one esti%ate t)e ti%e necessary for a &orer G()ic) (as used less often t)an t)e ra%H to %ake any sort of i%/ression on suc) (alls. Mean()ile3 t)e defenders3 e+en if t)ey failed to s%as) or &urn t)e s)elter fro% a&o+e3 %ig)t gri/ t)e )ead of t)e ra% or &orer (it) large /incers to /re+ent t)e cre( fro% /ulling it &ack for a for(ard stroke or %ig)t try to deaden its &lo(s &y %eans of ro/e /ads or sacks t)ickly stuffed (it) soft %aterial (it) ()ic) t)ey (ould co+er t)e face of t)e (all at t)e /oint ()ere t)e &lo(s (ere falling. If /incers or /adding succeeded3 t)e attackers )ad no alternati+e &ut to ad+ance t)e s)elter and sa/ t)e &ase of t)e (all (it) )and tools.

,am Back

0)e %ine /ro+ided attackers (it) anot)er resource. Starting fro% a s)eltered /osition near t)e (all3 t)e &esiegers dug3 dee/ and t)en under t)e (all. s t)e %ine gallery ad+anced under t)e (all3 t)e %iners s)ored it u/ (it) lu%&er. !)en t)ey Dudged t)ey )ad dug enoug)3 t)ey &urned t)e ti%&er3 colla/sing t)eir %ine7 if t)ey )ad %ade a large enoug) )ole3 a section of t)e (all (ould co%e do(n3 lea+ing a &reac). 'ortresses (ere seldo% taken &y regular sieges as no one )ad t)e resources to sustain t)e necessary %en. 5n t)e %erits of t)e case in %ilitary engineering alone3 t)e attackers (ould )a+e (on in t)e end3 e+en if t)e defenders /ro+isions and (ater )eld. 0)e %ilitary a-io% still )eld t)at any fortress3 )o(e+er strong3 %ust fall if &esieged &y nu%&ers sufficient to &lockade it and carry on an acti+e regular siege at t)e sa%e ti%e. garrison /ersistently attacked %ust decline in strengt) t)roug) casualties and fatigue. But in /ractice %edie+al fortifications rarely fell in t)is (ay. 0)e long siege of t)e island city of Paris &y t)e Vikings in BB<#BB= illustrates t)e use of +irtually e+ery tec)ni.ue kno(n to early %edie+al siegecraft. fter failing to scale t)e (alls of a fortified &ridge)ead (it) ladders3 t)e Vikings tried to &reak t)roug) t)e stone(ork (it) a lig)t(eig)t /ick. But &oiling oil and &urning /itc) fro% t)e (alls &urned t)e s)elter and t)e %en3 enoug) to cause t)e% to Du%/ into t)e ri+er. 0)en facing a narro( &reac) %ade (it) a %ine3 t)e &esieged defended t)is ga/ so (ell (it) %issiles t)at t)e Vikings failed to carry it and3 o+er()el%ed &y t)e defenders artillery3 te%/orarily (it)dre( until t)ey )ad t)ree &attering ra%s ready. 0)ey delayed t)eir attack3 a//arently &ecause t)e t(o %en /ierced &y t)e sa%e Da+elin t)ro(n &y a defenders &allista (ere t)e Vikings siege engineers. Resu%ing t)eir attack3 t)ey filled t)e ditc)3 %o+ed u/ t)e &attering ra%s3 and &egan to de%olis) t)e (alls3 &ut t)e Parisians caug)t t)e )uge ra%s (it) &ea%s lo(ered

@@

fro% t)e (alls and )eld t)e% so t)at t)e Vikings could not dra( t)e% &ack to /ound t)e (all. 0)e defenders co%/leted t)e attackers defeat &y s%as)ing t)e s)elter for t)e ra%s (it) )ea+y /roDectiles fro% torsion cata/ults. 0)e Vikings )ad used +irtually e+ery de+ice a+aila&le to &esiegers e-ce/t aggers and %o+a&le to(ers. 0)eir failure e-)i&its t)e defensi+e strengt) of e+en /ri%iti+e fortifications in %edie+al ti%es. "unger /ro+ided t)e surest %et)od for &esiegers3 &ut t)e Vikings )ad allo(ed relie+ing forces to get /ro+isions into Paris. 0)e /ro&le% of su//lies3 )o(e+er3 also li%ited &esiegers. It /ro+ed to &e a difficult task to sustain an attacking force and3 often3 &ecause of t)e li%ited ter% t)at feudal forces )ad to ser+e3 to kee/ t)e &esieging ar%y toget)er long enoug) for t)e defenders to e-)aust t)eir food reser+e. 0)e strengt) of castles and fortified to(ns re%ained a funda%ental tactical and strategic factor in %edie+al (arfare. Back

Medieval (actics
0)e strengt)ening of fortifications in t)e ele+ent) and t(elft) centuries )ad follo(ed i%/ro+e%ents in t)e ar%our of t)e )ea+y ca+alry%en3 ()o )ad lengt)ened t)e %ailed s)irt until it reac)ed t)e knees and attac)ed to t)e conical )el%et c)ain %ail t)at /rotected t)e &ack and sides of t)e )ead and t)e neck. 8oined to t)e skirt3 it &eca%e one /iece of %all ar%our t)at (eig)ed at least t)irty /ounds. 4nder t)e %all3 t)e ca+alry%an (ore a /added co+er to a&sor& t)e s)ock of &lo(s. dditional c)anges included a nose#/iece for t)e )el%et3 a longer s(ord for cutting only3 and a long3 kite#s)a/ed s)ield of (ood and leat)er t)at ga+e good /rotection %ounted or on foot. 0)e co%/lete outfit cost as %uc) as a s%all far%. 8ust as t(elft)#century ar%ies )ad essentially si%ilar e.ui/%ent3 so also did t)ey )a+e t)e sa%e (ea/on syste%s. 0)e fully e.ui//ed )ea+y ca+alry%an (it) co%/lete ar%our3 t)e knig)t3 )ad an es/ecially ro&ust )orse for carrying t)e additional (eig)t of t)e %ans ar%our and (ea/ons. )ea+y ca+alry%an ()o lacked full e.ui/%ent3 )a+ing3 for e-a%/le3 only a %all s)irt and )el%et3 (as called a sergeant. "a+ing t)e sa%e )ea+y ca+alry role as a knig)t3 a sergeant (as less effecti+e &ut cost less to e%/loy. Practically no t(elft)#century !estern 2uro/ean ar%y )ad any lig)t ca+alry. Bo(%en %ig)t )a+e )orses3 &ut t)ese arc)ers functioned as %ounted infantry3 using t)eir %ounts to %arc)3 &ut fig)ting on foot. 0)e lig)t ca+alry t)at did de+elo/3 largely on t)e fringes of 2uro/e3 /layed %ore of a strategic role and did not usually e-/loit t)e latent tactical ca/a&ility so dra%atically de%onstrated at t)e &attles of $arr)ae and Man6ikert. Most lig)t infantry used a &o(7 only a fe( relied on Da+elins. In /lace of t)e traditional &o(3 %any )ad a cross&o(3 a Ro%an in+ention3 forgotten &y t)e By6antines3 ()ic) %ay )a+e sur+i+ed in *aul and flouris)ed in t)e ele+ent) and t(elft) centuries. Really a %iniature &allista3 t)e cross&o( consisted of a s)ort3 strong &o( affi-ed to a stock t)at )ad a groo+e for an arro(3 a catc) to )old t)e &o(string3 and a trigger to release t)e catc). 0)e &o(%an cocked )is cross&o( &y /lacing it on t)e ground (it) )is feet on it and /ulling t)e string (it) &ot) )ands. "e t)en inserted a s)ort3 )ea+y arro( or &olt3 ai%ed3 and released t)e trigger. $o%/ared to t)e ordinary &o(3 t)e cross&o( )ad a lo(er rate of fire and )ig)er cost. 0)e ad+antages3 ()ic) led to its (ides/read ado/tion3 lay in its great /o(er and t)e lo(er le+el of skill re.uired of t)e &o(%an. n e-a%/le of su&stituting ca/ital for la&our3 t)e %ac)ine3 in t)is case t)e cross&o(3 re.uired less skill to ai% and less strengt) to /ull. Proficiency (it) an ordinary &o( re.uired /ractice to ac.uire t)e necessary %astery of ai%ing and t)e %uscle de+elo/%ent to %ake re/eated3 consecuti+e full /ulls of t)e &o(string. 0(elft)#century )ea+y infantry lacked t)e unifor%ity of e.ui/%ent found a%ong t)e lig)t infantry and )ea+y ca+alry. 0)e &est3 %ost often %ercenaries and ci+ic %ilitia3 ca%e e.ui//ed (it) )el%et3 %all s)irt3 s)ield3 s(ord3 and /ike Ga long s/earH. 0)ese )ea+y infantry3 like t)e &o(%en3 )ad great +alue as castle garrisons and in t)e attack and defence of to(ns and castles. 'or t)is reason t)ey 1>>

often (ere %ercenaries3 full#ti%e /rofessionals ser+ing for /ay. 0)is %ade t)e% al(ays a+aila&le3 rat)er t)an on call3 as (ere feudal +assals (it) a %ilitary o&ligation. In addition to t)e %ercenaries3 t)e feudal or decentralised syste% /roduced a fe( /ro/erly ar%oured and ar%ed )ea+y infantry. 'urt)er3 t)e %ilitary syste% could call on a larger nu%&er of %en (it) inade.uate e.ui/%ent3 %any co%ing (it)out %ail s)irts3 and (it) little skill (it) (ea/ons. full %o&ilisation could /roduce a totally untrained and unorganised infantry %ilitia ar%ed only (it) agricultural i%/le%ents. 0)e si%ilarities to t)e By6antine forces are %ore striking t)an t)e differences. 0)e e%/)asis on )ea+y ca+alry reflected like res/onses to t)e sa%e strategic /ro&le%s7 t)e greater /ro%inence of t)e &o( a%ong t)e By6antines res/onded to t)eir continuous conflict (it) for%ida&le lig)t ca+alry. ,ike t)at of t)e By6antines3 !estern 2uro/ean )ea+y ca+alry3 ineffecti+e on t)e defensi+e3 could dis%ount to fig)t3 t)us con+erting itself into )ea+y infantry. 0)oug) not trained or drilled to (ork toget)er on foot3 t)e )ea+y ca+alry%en3 ar%oured and /ossessing great skill (it) t)eir e-cellent ar%s3 %ade suc) effecti+e )ea+y infantry t)at t)ey could resist t)e c)arge of )ea+y ca+alry t)at used saddles (it) stirru/s. But like t)e %edie+al )ea+y infantry%an3 t)ey )ad no /o(er of %anoeu+re and3 (it)out t)e syste% and drill of *reek or Ro%an infantry3 )ad difficulty doing %ore t)an standing fast on t)e &attlefield. t t)e Battle of Bou+ines in 1214 2%/eror 5ttos e-cellent3 /ike#ar%ed infantry ad+anced and in a frontal fig)t3 easily defeated t)e %uc) inferior 'renc) infantry. fter t)e 'renc) infantry fled3 t)e 'renc) ca+alry c)arged t)e +ictorious /ike%en and3 &ecause %o+e%ent )ad disordered t)e foot soldiers ranks3 /enetrated t)eir for%ation and dro+e t)e% fro% t)e field (it) )ea+y casualties. 0)e infantrys si%/le act of defeating t)e ene%ys infantry and %o+ing for(ard )ad created enoug) ga/s in t)e unarticulated %ass of /ike%en to ena&le t)e ca+alry to &reak into t)e array and attack (it) t)eir )ea+y s(ords. 0)e great contrast &et(een t)e By6antine and !estern 2uro/ean ar%ies lay not in t)e %i- of t)eir (ea/ons syste%s &ut in organisation and doctrine. So%e of t)e differences ste%%ed fro% t)e +ariety of national syste%s of (ar (it) ()ic) t)e By6antines )ad to contend3 &ut %ore )ad t)eir origin in t)e e+en %ore decentralised and /art#ti%e nature of t)e %edie+al %ilitary organisation. ,acking t)e /er%anent3 regular ar%y of t)e By6antines3 %ost !estern ar%ies for%ed t)e%sel+es only for a /articular ca%/aign. !estern co%%ander usually (ould not )a+e in ad+ance a clear idea of t)e forces )e (ould )a+e3 e+en if %any of t)e% (ere %ercenaries ()ose e%/loy%ent )e )ad arranged. "e (ould not kno( t)e total nu%&ers3 t)e /ro/ortions of lig)t and )ea+y infantry and of ca+alry3 or t)e .uality of )is )ea+y infantry. !)en t)e co%%ander )ad concentrated )is ar%y3 )e rarely )ad ti%e to train it as a unit &ut )ad to e%&ark i%%ediately u/on t)e ca%/aign3 if only &ecause su//ly difficulties co%/elled )i% to %o+e /ro%/tly and t)e li%ited ti%e for ()ic) %edie+al +assals ser+ed or restricted funds to /ay %ercenaries %eant )e )ad to use t)e% ()en a+aila&le. $o%%anders did kno( t)e total si6e of an ar%y (ould &e s%all. 0)e e-/ensi+ely ar%ed and ar%oured Gand s/lendidly %ountedH knig)t cost as %uc) as se+eral *reek )o/lites or Persian &o(%en. 0)e )ig)er /ro/ortion of /articularly e-/ensi+e ca+alry in a %edie+al ar%y %eant t)at it e%/)asised .uality o+er .uantity. In addition3 !estern 2uro/e )ad a s%aller /o/ulation t)an in Ro%an ti%es3 and trade3 regional econo%ic s/ecialisation3 and t)e di+ision of la&our )ad /ro&a&ly declined since t)en. 0)ese factors3 toget)er (it) a less effecti+e go+ern%ental syste%3 %eant t)at large %edie+al ar%ies nu%&ered <3>>> to 1>3>>>. 0)e %a-i%u% effort of t)e 'renc) 9ing in t)e year 1214 /ut less t)an ?>3>>> %en in t)e field. 0)e conse.uences of t)is syste% is illustrated at t)e Battle of ,e(es in 12=43 ()en t)e e-/erienced co%%ander3 Si%on de Montfort3 s/ent a day and a nig)t %ars)alling )is forces. "e )ad to assign grou/s of une.ual si6e and une+en co%/osition and .uality to /laces in t)e &attle line and3 conse.uently3 in t)e line of %arc) to t)e &attle field. 0)oug) )e could not i%/ose articulation3 )e )ad at least to /ro+ide an orderly array of t)e forces. "e found t)is a for%ida&le task in t)e a&sence

1>1

of an esta&lis)ed c)ain of co%%and in an ar%y (it)out units of unifor% si6e3 any drill3 or a co%%on e-/erience in co%&at. 0)e infre.uency of &attles aggra+ated t)is condition &y de/ri+ing &ot) co%%anders and %en of e-/erience3 and it %eant t)at %edie+al &attles dis/layed an incredi&le di+ersity in t)e co%/osition and array of t)e forces. So%eti%es t)e ar%ies )ad no infantry at all7 so%eti%es ca+alry dis%ounted7 so%eti%es t)e ar%ies )ad a linear de/loy%ent and at ot)ers as %any as t)ree di+isions3 one &e)ind t)e ot)er. So co%%anders )ad no doctrine &eyond di+iding an ar%y into t)ree /arts. t t)e Battle of Ste//es in 121?3 ()en t)e count of ,oos and t)e courageous and co%&ati+e &is)o/ of ,iege &roug)t t)e s)ifty 1uke of Bra&ant to &ay3 &ot) sides )ad ar%oured3 /ike#ar%ed3 )ea+y infantry t)at t)ey /laced in t)e centre3 flanked &y )ea+y ca+alry. 0)e infantry struggled against one anot)er3 as did t)e ca+alry. !)en t)e &is)o/ and t)e counts ca+alry on one (ing successfully routed t)e )orse%en3 it turned against t)e flank and rear of t)e ene%ys unarticulated )ea+y infantry. 0)is attack )el/ed to defeat t)e dukes infantry and (in t)e &attle. In t)is contest3 t)e de/loy%ent of t)e forces and t)e roles of t)e infantry and ca+alry follo(ed fairly closely t)e le-andrian %odel. But t)is &attle is not re/resentati+e. 5ften co%%anders /laced t)eir ca+alry in front of t)eir )ea+y infantry3 as at ,egnano in 11C= ()en t)e 2%/eror 'rederick I3 a &ra+e and &roadly e-/erienced soldier3 ad+anced ra/idly3 c)arged (it) )is ca+alry3 and3 dis/ersing t)e ca+alry facing )i%3 attacked t)e Italian /ike%en. !)ile )e struggled in +ain against infantry J(it) s)ields set close and /ikes )eld fir%3L t)e Italian ca+alry rallied3 c)arged t)e 2%/erors ca+alry in flank3 and (on t)e &attle. 'rederick3 ()o s)ould not )a+e attacked a su/erior ene%y3 ne+er &roug)t )is infantry into action at all. In t(o later fig)ts in sout)ern Italy3 Bene+ento in 12== and 0agliaco66o in 12=B3 &ot) ar%ies )ad ca+alry only3 eac) side arraying itself in t)ree di+isions one &e)ind t)e ot)er. 9ing $)arles I of Na/les3 a ca/a&le and rut)less soldier and %onarc)3 (on &ot) &attles3 in eac) case &y co%%itting )is t)ird di+ision last. But at 0agliaco66o $)arles concealed )is t)ird di+ision and (aited3 eit)er &y design or &ecause t)e co%&at did not go as )e )ad antici/ated3 until t)e ene%y )ad dri+en )is first t(o di+isions fro% t)e field &efore sur/rising t)e ene%y3 ()o )ad dis/ersed to /ursue and loot )is ca%/. Rat)er t)an take a /osition ()ere t)ey could control t)e &attle3 %edie+al co%%anders usually foug)t in t)e ranks ()ere t)ey could )a+e little influence &eyond t)eir o(n di+ision. t t)e Battle of Bou+ines &ot) t)e 9ing of 'rance and t)e 2%/eror (ere knocked fro% t)eir )orses in co%&at and &arely esca/ed ca/ture. But (it) inade.uate c)ains of co%%and and little articulation3 %edie+al co%%anders (ould )a+e lacked t)ose o//ortunities to influence t)e &attle t)at (ere a+aila&le to "anni&al or Sci/io. 2+en (it) so %uc) )ea+y ca+alry t)at relied little on articulation3 fe( dis/layed a real gras/ of t)e role of a co%%ander or of t)e conce/t of a reser+e. Because of t)e knig)ts e%/)asis on indi+idual skill and /erfor%ance (it) lance and s(ord3 /erfected in Dousting %atc)es and tourna%ents3 co%%anders of t)is sc)ool fre.uently t)oug)t of &attles as an aggregate of suc) frontal co%&ats3 and often ca+alry &attles turned out %uc) like t)is. Suc) a culture %eant t)at %edie+al co%%anders ignored Ieno/)ons /rinci/le t)at J(ise generals)i/ consists in attacking ()ere t)e ene%y is (eak.L !it) )earts of oak3 suc) leaders often acted as if t)eir )eads (ere of t)e sa%e su&stance. 0(o s%all actions s)o( t)is attri&ute of %edie+al co%%and as (ell as furt)er e-)i&iting t)e di+ersity of %edie+al tactics. In 111@ t)e /ortly 9ing ,ouis VI of 'rance in+aded Nor%andy (it) 4>> knig)ts3 de+oting )i%self to /lundering t)e countryside rat)er t)an &esieging cities or castles. !)en 9ing "enry I of 2ngland rode out (it) <>> knig)ts to %eet )i%3 9ing ,ouis3 t)oug) a ca/a&le and seasoned soldier3 un(isely decided to attack. "enry3 dis/laying t)e %ilitary talent &efitting a son of !illia% t)e $on.ueror3 dis%ounted 4>> of )is knig)ts and /laced t)e re%aining 1>> in front of t)e knig)ts t)at 1>2

)e )ad con+erted to )ea+y infantry. 0)e first of t)e t)ree 'renc) di+isions dis/ersed t)e ca+alry and &roke in a%ong t)e far %ore nu%erous dis%ounted knig)ts3 ()o succeeded in /ulling t)e% fro% t)eir )orses and taking t)e% /risoner. fter t)e second 'renc) di+ision )ad c)arged and suffered t)e sa%e fate3 t)e t)ird3 under 9ing ,ouis3 fled3 closely /ursued &y "enrys re%ounted knig)ts. $ount !aleran3 a re&el against 9ing "enry3 also dis/layed si%ilar %ain#strengt)#and#a(k(ardness generals)i/ ()en t)e 9ings %en interce/ted )i% and &locked )is road. Part of t)e 9ings )ea+y ca+alry dis%ounted and set u/ a defensi+e /osition across t)e road. 0)e 9ings co%%ander also /ossessed forty &o(%en3 also on )orse&ack3 ()o% )e dis%ounted and /laced along t)e road on )is left ()ere t)ey could s)oot at t)e uns)ielded3 s(ord side of any force attacking on t)e road. $ount !aleran3 ()o (as only engaged in raiding3 could easily )a+e turned &ack3 &ut )e deter%ined to c)arge t)e J%ercenaries and rusticsL ()o )ad t)e te%erity to &lock )is /at). !)en )is knig)ts c)arged3 t)e line of dis%ounted knig)ts sto//ed t)e% ()ile t)e arc)ers s)ot t)eir )orses. 0)e 9ings %en t)en ca/tured $ount !aleran and eig)ty fallen knig)ts3 t)e &ulk of t)e forces t)at %ade t)e fool)ardy c)arge.L 0)e skir%is) against $ount !aleran dis/lays t)e )ea+y casualties of t)e defeated # an attri&ute of %edie+al as (ell as ancient &attles. But t)e casualties a%ong t)e knig)ts (ere largely in t)e for% of &eing taken /risoner. 0)oug) &ruised &y &lo(s and falls fro% )orses and often (ounded3 %edie+al knig)ts rarely died in &attle &ecause of t)eir co%/lete suits of c)ain %ail. 0)e )ea+y infantry3 losing its co)esion in defeat3 /ro+ided t)e &ulk of t)e %en killed3 as t)e ca+alry of t)e +ictor often slaug)tered t)e% %ercilessly. r%oured %ounted %en fre.uently suffered )ea+ily ()en t)ey fled to a+oid ca/ture: on %any occasions fleeing %ailed %en dro(ned in crossing ri+ers. fter t)e Battle of ,e(es3 for e-a%/le3 ()ere Si%on de Montfort )ad defeated 9ing "enry III of 2ngland3 so%e of t)e 9ings %en tried to s(i% t)eir )orses o+er a %ars)y ri+er at )ig) tide. 0)e ne-t day3 at lo( tide3 o&ser+ers on t)e &ank could see %any of t)e% on %ud flats3 dro(ned and still astride t)eir dro(ned )orses3 ()ic) (ere dee/ly %ired in t)e %ud. But t)e )ea+y casualties of t)e defeated did not deter co%%anders ()ose inco%/etence took t)e for% of too#/reci/itate engage%ents or failure to try to find t)e /at) of least resistance to +ictory. 5ften3 )o(e+er3 t)ey felt constrained to reac) a decision early3 &efore t)e ter% of ser+ice of t)eir %en e-/ired or t)e %oney to /ay %ercenaries ga+e out. If %any %edie+al co%%anders /ro+ed /rone to frontal attacks and to gallantry rat)er t)an circu%s/ection3 it is fair to assu%e t)at t)ey %ay )a+e dis/layed less of t)e kind of inca/acity t)at o+eresti%ates difficulties3 e-aggerates t)e ene%ys strengt)3 or finds ot)er e-cuses for delay or inaction. lt)oug) t)e art of (ar )as long offered good %odels to e%ulate3 %ost %edie+al generals lacked access to records of t)e ca%/aigns of le-ander3 "anni&al3 and $aesar and )ad to redisco+er %uc) for t)e%sel+es. nd in an era of fe( &attles &ut constant (arfare3 t)ey )ad %ore /ractice (it) strategy and de+elo/ed settled /ractices t)at accorded (it) t)e /rinci/les of t)e ancients. Back

Medieval Strategy, (he -vesham and 1ouvines Cam'aigns

0(elft)#century strategists e-/loited t)e o+er()el%ing ad+antage conferred on t)e defence &y t)e su/er& stone(alls of cities and castles. 0)oug) de+astating t)e countryside could so%eti%es force a foe to co%e out of )is fortifications3 attackers usually could not )ar% t)e defender so strong (ere t)e defences against t)e a+aila&le %eans of attack. n in+ader could raid an area &ut could not do%inate it (it)out taking t)e fortifications. siege tied u/ t)e &esieging ar%y for a ()ole ca%/aigning season3 e+en if it could su//ly itself so long in one /lace3 often in t)e face of interference fro% t)e defenders ar%y of relief. 0)e strategic situation and t)e %et)ods )ad %uc) in co%%on (it) t)e defence against raiders3 not &ecause e-/erience against raiders )ad ingrained t)ese %et)ods into %edie+al strategic t)inking &ut &ecause fortifications su//orted &y a field ar%y /ro+ided t)e &est %eans of defence and effecti+ely /re+ented t)e con.uest of territory. S%all

1>?

ar%ies in large s/aces confronted &y for%ida&le fortifications3 faced al%ost insu/era&le o&stacles in i%/le%enting a /ersisting strategy. 5ften ca%/aigns centred around control of co%%unications. 0)e ca%/aign of 2+es)a% of 12=< distinctly illustrates t)e i%/ortance of co%%unications in t)e strategy of %edie+al ca%/aigns. In an 2nglis) ci+il (ar t)is ca%/aign /itted t)e 9ings son3 t)e gifted young Prince3 ,ord 2d(ard3 against t)e far older /olitician and for%er crusader3 2arl Si%on de Montfort. 5n t)e &order of !ales3 t)e astute and (orldly#(ise de Montfort found t)at t)e tall3 at)letic Prince 2d(ard )ad raised a /o(erful ar%y east of )is and t)at t)e Princes troo/s se/arated de Montforts fro% ,ondon and t)e %ain forces of )is do%inant faction. Before t)e 2arl realised t)e seriousness of t)e situation3 Prince 2d(ards %en )ad sei6ed t)e to(ns on t)e Se+ern Ri+er3 &roken t)eir &ridges3 taken /ossession of t)e &oats on t)e ri+er and dee/ened t)e ri+ers fords. But de Montfort )ad difficulty e+en in reac)ing t)e Se+ern3 for in trying to cross t)e !ye3 t)oug) )e ca/tured t)e castle3 )e found t)e ene%y force entrenc)ed3 facing t)e &ridge. Rat)er t)an fig)t under suc) unfa+oura&le circu%stances3 t)e 2arl %arc)ed sout)3 sei6ed Ne(/ort3 and /re/ared to %arc) east &y ferrying )is ar%y across t)e Bristol c)annel. But t)e Princes %en descended t)e Se+ern fro% *loucester in t)ree galleys ca/tured t)ere and entered Ne(/ort )ar&our ()ere t)ey sank or ca/tured t)e 2arls trans/orts. 0)e 2arl t)en %arc)ed nort)3 )is soldiers suffering front lack of /ro+isions in t)e t)inly /o/ulated !els) countryside. 'urt)er3 %en used to &read found it +ery distasteful to su&sist on a !els) diet of %utton and %ilk. But t)e 2arl ins/ired )is %en3 and ()ile )e t)en rested t)e% /re/aratory to anot)er effort to %arc) east3 )e kne( t)at )is son (as %arc)ing (est fro% t)e ,ondon area3 gat)ering a large ar%y as )e ca%e. !)en de Montfort %o+ed to(ard t)e u//er Se+ern3 )e found Prince 2d(ard t)ere3 again t)(arting )is effort to cross. But Si%on )ad ac.uired so%e si6a&le &oats3 ()ic) )e /re/ared to launc) at an unguarded s/ot. Mean()ile3 )is sons ar%y3 after a too leisurely %arc)3 )ad reac)ed 9enil(ort)3 only t)irty %iles fro% )is fat)er. But t)e /erce/ti+e Prince 2d(ard3 %o+ing /ro%/tly to e-/loit )is interior lines3 %arc)ed against young Si%on. 0)e young Prince3 gracious in %anner and attracti+e in )is /erson3 could ins/ire )is %en as (ell as t)e 2arl. So 2d(ard %arc)ed )is %en all nig)t3 and at da(n )e s(e/t into t)e to(n of 9enil(ort) ()ere t)e ene%y ar%y sle/t3 &elie+ing t)at distance %ade t)e% secure. 9illing t)e fe( slee/y %en ()o offered resistance3 Prince 2d(ard ca/tured %ost of young Si%ons ar%y3 only t)ose in t)e to(ns castle sa+ing t)e%sel+es.

E%esham Area Back

1>4

Ignoring t)e castle &ut securing )is /risoners3 t)e Prince3 dis/laying an energy t)at %atc)ed t)e /rescience of )is strategy3 turned i%%ediately to(ard t)e 2arl3 ()o )ad at last crossed t)e Se+ern and (as %arc)ing to Doin )is son. Ignorant of t)e sur/rise at 9enil(ort)3 t)e 2arl rested )is )ungry ar%y in t)e little to(n of 2+es)a%3 situated on a &end in a ri+er so t)at it )ad (ater on t)ree sides. 2d(ard3 learning of Si%ons /resence in 2+es)a%3 %ade anot)er nig)t %arc) and again ac)ie+ed sur/rise. In early %orning t)e 2arl3 finding t)e to(ns sole &ridge &locked &y a strong )ostile force and realising t)e tra/ )e (as in3 e-clai%ed: JNo( %ay *od )a+e %ercy on our souls3 for our &odies are in t)e /o(er of our ene%ies.L "e t)en took t)e only alternati+e to surrender and led )is s%all force out to engage %ost of t)e Princes ar%y3 ()ic) &locked t)e only land e-it fro% t)e to(n. 5utnu%&ered %ore t)an t)ree to one3 t)e 2arl died in &attle3 on foot (it) s(ord in )and and surrounded &y foes3 as did %ost of )is %en3 %any dro(ning in t)e ri+er in t)eir atte%/t to flee. 2-ce/t t)at &attle and deat) resulted instead of surrender3 young Prince 2d(ard )ad ac)ie+ed t)e sa%e success as )ad $aesar in t)e Ilerda ca%/aign. Suc) a tra/3 s/rung &y t)e Princes /ers/icacity and +igour in %aking anot)er nig)t %arc)3 /ro+ided t)e only %eans a+aila&le to a %edie+al general to catc) an ene%y ar%y. 0o carry out t)e al(ays difficult turning %o+e%ent3 $aesar )ad )ad fa+oura&le terrain and ca+alry su/eriority3 ()ic) ena&led )i% to cri//le t)e ene%ys logistics3 a )ig) ratio of force to s/ace3 and a large force of /articularly (ell#articulated )ea+y infantry ()ic) could %arc) and %anoeu+re .uickly and easily take u/ strong defensi+e /ositions. Practically ne+er did a %edie+al ar%y )a+e t)e nu%&ers in relation to t)e land area to &lock an ene%y retreat (it)out t)e aid of suc) an o&stacle as t)e ri+er &end at 2+es)a%. 1><

Medie+al and ancient (ar actually differed little in t)e difficulty of t)e turning %o+e%ent. In %ost circu%stances no ar%y3 ancient or %edie+al3 could &lock any force si%ilarly constituted and )a+ing t)e sa%e %o&ility. Bridges3 fords3 or ot)er narro( /laces could not long delay t)e ar%ies t)at (ere s%all in relation not Dust to t)ese o&stacles3 &ut also to t)e s/ace in ()ic) t)ey ca%/aigned. !it) %any alternati+e routes a+aila&le and (it) su//lies usually e.ually a+aila&le ()ere+er t)ey %arc)ed3 one ar%y could as easily a+oid anot)er as (ould &e t)e case if t(o o//osing 9ings )ad e-clusi+e /ossession of a c)ecker&oard of greatly e-/anded si6e. 0o contain an o//osing ar%y (it)in a gi+en s/ace /resented t)e sa%e /ro&le%s encountered in co/ing (it) Viking raids: a s%all force in a large s/ace could not /re+ent anot)er fro% %o+ing confusingly to and fro3 ulti%ately reac)ing its destination. By )is skilful use of t)e ri+er3 Prince 2d(ard contained t)e (ily 2arl3 Dust as t)e Po%/eians long sty%ied $aesar fro% t)eir /osition at Ilerda. Prince 2d(ards ac)ie+e%ent ke/t t)e 2arl fro% Doining )is son and /re+ented )i% fro% affecting t)e uncertain /olitical situation in 2ngland. 0)is success in &locking t)e 2arl also /ro+ided Prince 2d(ard (it) t)e interior lines t)at )e e-/loited so &rilliantly to &ring on t(o &attles (it) )is di+ided o//onents. If3 )o(e+er3 containing an o//onent /resented al%ost insu/era&le difficulties3 forcing &attle on an un(illing foe usually /ro+ed i%/ossi&le. 2-/loiting interior lines (ould )a+e a+ailed t)e Prince not)ing )ad )is sur/rise nig)t %arc)es not caug)t one o//onent aslee/ and tra//ed t)e ot)er against t)e ri+er. In t)e ca%/aign of 2+es)a% &ot) sides e-)i&ited a t)oroug) gras/ of strategy and t)e ()ole course of e+ents s)o(s t)e i%/ortance of controlling routes of co%%unication. 0)is kind of (arfare )ad also c)aracterised ca%/aigning in t)ickly settled3 .uite ur&an nort)ern Italy. 9ing 8o)n of 2ngland3 a %an nota&le for )is co%/le- %i-ture of talent and defects of c)aracter3 s)o(ed e.ual strategic gras/ in an o/eration on a grander scale in a /lan for (ar against 'rance in ()ic) )e and )is ne/)e( and ally3 t)e young 2%/eror 5tto3 deli&erately o/erated on e-terior lines. 'or )is /art of t)e ca%/aign 9ing 8o)n landed on t)e sout)(est coast of 'rance in 'e&ruary of 1214 and %arc)ed nort) to gain control of territories to ()ic) )e )ad clai%. 9ing P)ili/ II ugustus of 'rance3 a deter%ined organiser and gifted states%an3 )ad %o&ilised and %o+ed sout) to cut off 9ing 8o)ns retreat. But 8o)n3 )a+ing consolidated )is /osition in t)e sout)(est and dra(n t)e 9ing of 'rance sout)(ard3 fell &ack to(ard )is coastal &ase. t t)is t)e cautious and crafty 9ing P)illi/3 Dudging 5ttos t)reat fro% t)e nort) %ore serious3 detac)ed )is son3 ,ouis3 a (arrior Prince and future 9ing3 (it) a force to resist 8o)n ()ile )e %arc)ed )is %ain ar%y nort) of Paris to resist 5tto. ,eading a coalition of ,o( $ountry Princes3 5tto )ad faced so %any of t)e delays t)at )a&itually /lague coalitions t)at )e )ad ti%e during t)e ca%/aign to %arry t)e daug)ter of one of t)e allied Princes. 0)us 9ing P)ili/ returned nort) &efore 5tto could %arc) to Paris. 4/on P)ili/s %arc) nort)(ard3 8o)n rene(ed )is o(n ad+ance nort) &ut3 failing to deter t)e 'renc) 9ing fro% concentrating )is forces against 5tto and facing strong o//osition fro% ,ouis3 fell &ack Dust &efore P)ili/ %et and defeated 5tto in t)e Battle of Bou+ines in 8uly 1214. 8o)ns ca%/aign failed in t)at t)e 2%/eror did not take ad+antage of )is distraction in t)e sout) to ad+ance on Paris in t)e nort)7 yet it succeeded in t)at P)ili/ still de/loyed so%e troo/s in t)e sout) instead of leading t)e% on t)e field at Bou+ines. In /lanning a ca%/aign on e-terior lines3 9ing 8o)n ai%ed to distract 9ing P)illi/3 to induce )i% to concentrate in t)e o//osite direction fro% t)e %ain attack. 9ing 8o)n could o/erate on e-terior lines (it)out fear of )a+ing to fig)t a stronger ad+ersary in &attle &ecause )e kne( )o( to e-/loit t)e a&ility of )is ar%y to retreat and refuse &attle. 1uring t)e ca%/aign 9ing 8o)n e-ercised great care t)at t)e 'renc) s)ould not catc) )i% una(are or force )i% against an o&stacle. Back

1>=

-$am'les of an 0ffensive !ersisting Strategy against )aiders

Medie+al soldiers )ad successfully co/ed (it) t)e /ro&le% of Viking and Magyar raids &y using fortifications t)at3 /erfected into ela&orate and (ell#designed structures3 ga+e t)e defence /ri%acy o+er t)e offence. Medie+al strategists also used castles to con.uer areas )eld &y )ostile and (arlike /eo/le. 0)e 2nglis) /enetration of Ireland e-)i&ited t)is %eans of i%/le%enting a /ersisting strategy. 0)e Iris)3 uncon.uered &y t)e Ro%ans3 )ad defended t)e%sel+es against t)e Vikings &y utilising t)e defensi+e .ualities of t)e e-tensi+e &ogs and forests in t)eir t)inly /o/ulated country. In &ogs t)ey dug a trenc) across t)e road and fortified it. 5n suc) a narro(3 entrenc)ed front3 ()ic) t)e attacker could not a+oid3 t)e Iris) readily )eld t)eir o(n3 e+en t)oug) t)ey lacked &ody ar%our or any skill (it) t)e &o(. In t)e t)ick forests t)ey &uilt e-tensi+e a&atis of &ranc)es t)at lined t)e road as (ell as &locked it3 again gi+ing t)e ot)er(ise inade.uately e.ui//ed defenders su/re%acy. 0)ese defences li%ited t)e inroads of t)e Viking3 &ut in 11=@3 ()en t)e )ea+y ca+alry of t)e 2nglis) arri+ed3 t)e Iris) %ade t)e %istake of %eeting t)e% in t)e o/en field. !it)out &ody ar%our or /ikes and (it) no conce/tion of a tig)t co)esi+e for%ation3 t)e Iris) infantry )ad no c)ance. Soon t)e knig)ts dro+e t)e Iris) &ack to t)eir &ogs and forests3 and t)e in+aders &uilt castles to control t)e o/en country. 0)us eac) )ad fortified )is s)are of t)e country and neit)er could do%inate t)e ot)er. 0)is stale%ate lasted 4>> years. In !ales t)e ad+ance of t)e nglo#Nor%ans took a different course against t)e deter%ined o//osition of a /eo/le ()o )ad yielded to t)e Ro%ans &ut successfully resisted t)e Sa-on &ar&arians. Mountainous3 rugged3 and often )ea+ily forested terrain /rotected !ales as did t)e da%/ cli%ate3 ()ic)3 (it) rainfall fre.uently e-ceeding eig)ty inc)es a year3 could &og do(n in+aders. Nor did t)e largely /astoral econo%y offer %uc) logistical su//ort3 for t)e !els)3 in retreat3 (ould take t)eir flocks and )erds (it) t)e%3 lea+ing little to Su&sist an ene%y ar%y. 0)e !els) relied little on ca+alry3 de/ending on infantry (it) a s)ield3 )el%et3 and often a %ail s)irt. In t)e sout) t)e infantry used a long strong &o(3 and in t)e nort) %ost )ad only s/ears. 0)is al%ost total de/endence on infantry suited t)e terrain far &etter t)an t)e )ea+y ca+alry t)at )ad /layed suc) an i%/ortant /art in t)e 2nglis) syste% of (arfare after !illia%s Nor%an con.uest. But against t)e fiercely inde/endent and (arlike !els)3 t)e 2nglis) )ad t)e ad+antage of t)eir so/)isticated co%&ined#ar%s ar%y3 ()ic) )ad lig)t and )ea+y infantry as (ell as )ea+y ca+alry to /it against t)e !els) infantry. In addition3 t)e 2nglis) could e-/loit t)e /olitical disunity of t)e !els)3 ()ic) not only /recluded a united effort against a foreign in+asion &ut also sa( t)e !els) fig)ting eac) ot)er as (ell as3 or instead of3 t)eir aggressi+e ene%y on t)e eastern frontier. s its first task t)e ne( Nor%an go+ern%ent of 2ngland )ad to /rotect t)e frontier against t)e incursions of t)e !els) seeking &ooty. 0)e 2nglis) not only studded t)e frontier (it) castles &ut also3 as )ad t)e Ro%ans in resisting &ar&arians3 /ro+ided a nu%&er of s%aller fortified /oints3 so%eti%es only a fe( )undred yards a/art. 0)us t)e 2nglis) sealed t)eir &order against s%all forays7 against a %aDor raid t)e defenders usually )ad enoug) (arning to concentrate a large force to contest its ad+ance3 one necessarily circu%scri&ed &y 2nglis) control of t)e fortified road Dunctions and ri+er crossings.

Wales Back

1>C

5n t)e &order of sout)ern !ales3 soon after !illia%s con.uest3 t)e ca/a&le !illia%3 2arl of "ereford3 s)o(ed t)e a//lica&ility to t)e offensi+e of t)is %et)od of defence. 2-/loiting t)e /olitical disunity of )is o//onents and gi+ing aut)ority to local c)iefs too (eak to resist )i%3 during )is &rief rule )e gained co%%and of a region of a&out 4>> s.uare %iles. 0)e 2arl erected castles to control t)is area and its co%%unications3 t)e castles do%inating t)e con.uered country %uc) as t)ey )ad )el/ed to /rotect t)e 2nglis) frontier against !els) raiders. 2nglis) tactical /redo%inance ena&led t)e% to %aster t)e lo(lands3 ()ic) forced t)e !els) into less fertile regions and added a logistic ele%ent to t)e in+aders co%&at /ersisting strategy. 5nce t)e 2nglis) controlled a region and erected t)eir castles3 t)e castles3 in turn3 often &eca%e t)e sites of to(ns and t)e %eans of e-tending 2nglis) econo%ic and cultural as (ell as %ilitary and /olitical influence7 generally effecti+e &ecause t)e !els) found t)e to(ns %arkets so attracti+e. 0)e castles3 ()ic) su&stituted t)e ca/ital of t)e fortifications for t)e la&our of additional soldiers3 utilised t)e /o(er of t)e defence in its %ost effecti+e for% &y t)ro(ing u/on t)e !els)3 on t)e strategic defensi+e3 t)e &urden of t)e tactical offensi+e if t)ey (ere to /re+ent t)e /er%anent loss of t)e territory t)at t)e 2arl )ad occu/ied and garrisoned. n effecti+e offensi+e /ersisting strategy &ased on t)ese castles3 cou/led (it) /olitical s)re(dness in taking ad+antage of t)e disunity of )is o//onents and in co#o/ting %any of t)eir leaders3 ena&led !illia% to co%/lete )is con.uest of t)is s%all region in less t)an t)ree years and to &uild an enduring addition to t)e area of nglo#Nor%an rule. 0)e 2arl of "erefords success e-e%/lified t)e %et)ods t)e 2nglis) (ould use to con.uer !ales. In a local3 rat)er t)an a national3 effort3 !illia%s successors e+entually /us)ed for(ard into 1>B

additional territory in t)e sout)3 t)e 2arl of S)re(s&ury follo(ing a si%ilar /olicy along t)e %iddle of t)e frontier. 5n t)e nort)ern &order3 $)ester )ad as its 2arl3 "ug) t)e 'at3 ()ose girt)3 ()ic) /re+ented )is %ounting a )orse3 &elied t)e +igour (it) ()ic) )e e-/anded into nort)ern !ales. !it)in t(enty years of t)e Battle of "astings t)e 2nglis) )ad added as %uc) territory in central !ales and also in t)e nort) as t)e 2arl of "ereford )ad con.uered in t)e sout). In t)ese areas t)e 2arls of S)re(s&ury and $)ester )ad &uilt castles to consolidate t)eir rule in t)e sa%e %anner3 as )ad t)e 2arl of "ereford in t)e sout). But t)en t)e 2nglis) /us)ed for(ard ra/idly and &y 1>@4 )ad reac)ed t)e Iris) Sea and %ore t)an tri/led t)eir area of do%ination. 0)e !els) res/onded (it) %any successful assaults u/on t)e no( far#flung 2nglis) castles and e+en (it) raids into 2ngland. Seeing )is e-tensi+e do%ain t)us t)reatened3 t)e /ortly3 red#faced 9ing !illia% II3 in)eritor of so%e of )is con.ueror fat)ers %ilitary talent3 inter+ened3 leading a /o(erful in+ading ar%y into !ales. 9no(ing t)at t)e !els) a+oided &attle (it) t)e 2nglis) &ut )ad great talent for a%&us)es3 t)e 2nglis) ar%y %o+ed slo(ly3 /receded &y (oodcutters ()o /enetrated into t)ickets t)at %ig)t conceal t)e ene%y. But t)eir ad+ersaries )ad3 in t)e (ords of a conte%/orary3 gone (it) t)eir ani%als Jinto %ountains and %oors3 so it (as i%/ossi&le to co%e at t)e%3L lea+ing t)e 9ing to %ake a futile %arc) until )e a&andoned a ca%/aign %ade un/leasant &y Jt)e %eanness of t)e country and t)e &adness of t)e (eat)er.L !els) efforts to e-/el t)e 2nglis) largely succeeded in t)e area of t)e in+aders %ost recent triu%/)s &ut failed co%/letely in t)e regions slo(ly su&dued and carefully consolidated in t)e t(enty years follo(ing t)e Nor%an $on.uest. 0)e insurgents could not take t)ese longer esta&lis)ed castles. nd3 after !illia% IIs failure3 t)e 2nglis) /erse+ered and gradually &egan re# esta&lis)ing t)eir castles3 /articularly in t)e sout). In t)e ne-t four decades t)e in+aders situated t)e%sel+es along t)e Iris) Sea in sout)ern !ales so t)oroug)ly t)at t)ey )ad an a+erage of one %aDor castle for eac) 1>> s.uare %iles of ne(ly ac.uired territory3 a//ro-i%ately t)e sa%e ratio t)at /re+ailed in t)eir area of t)e earliest do%ination and dou&le t)e a+erage for all 2ngland. So t)e /ertinacity of t)e 2nglis) &order 2arls and t)e /olitical disunity of t)e !els) /er%itted a continuation in t)e sout) of t)e /attern of incre%ental con.uest in ()ic) control of a s%all region and t)e &uilding of a castle initially and t)en /er%anently raised t)e ratio of force to s/ace3 gi+ing t)e in+ader t)e /o(er to /ursue a /ersisting strategy. s t)e 2nglis) organised t)eir ne( do%inions3 t)ey )arnessed t)e re+enues and %ilitary %an/o(er to t)e task of e-/ansion ()ile t)eir syste%atic ad+ance relentlessly di%inis)ed t)e nu%&er of t)eir ad+ersaries. 0)us t)eir /ersisting co%&at strategy incor/orated anot)er logistic ele%ent t)at strengt)ened t)e% and (eakened t)eir o//onents. not)er (ides/read !els) counterattack in 11?4 interru/ted t)is gradual 2nglis) con.uest. In addition to i%/ro+ed /olitical unity3 t)e !els) )ad so%e )ea+y ca+alry and %uc) %ore so/)isticated %ilitary %et)ods. 0)ey %et ?3>>> 2nglis) troo/s in &attle. 0)e !els) +ictory turned into a &attle of anni)ilation ()en a &ridge colla/sed under t)e fleeing 2nglis)3 dro(ning %any. !)en t)e !els) &urned a to(n and %any of t)e sur+i+ors ()o )ad taken refuge t)ere3 t)is co%/leted t)e +irtual destruction of t)e 2nglis) force. $astles fell to t)e !els)3 ()o &y t)en (ere e.ui//ed (it) siege engines3 and at least one 2nglis) relief e-/edition turned &ack ()en faced &y roads o&structed (it) fallen trees and t)e t)reat of a%&us)es along t)e route of ad+ance. 0)e !els) )ad great success in t)e recently con.uered areas7 in one region (it) at least nine 2nglis) castles3 for e-a%/le3 only one re%ained untaken. s !els) /olitical unity gradually i%/ro+ed3 t)at of t)e 2nglis) declined as a dis/ute o+er t)e succession to t)e t)rone &roug)t in a decade of inter%ittent ci+il (ar. !)en in 11<4 2ngland (as again united under t)at relentlessly energetic states%an3 9ing "enry II3 t)e 9ing3 a co%/etent soldier3 %ounted se+eral %aDor ca%/aigns into !ales. None )ad any %ilitary significance. 5ne 1>@

/enetrated forests and crossed %oors only to find t)e !els) offering &attle in an i%/regna&le /osition7 anot)er3 led &y "enry )i%self and e%/loying troo/s not only fro% 2ngland &ut also fro% t)e 9ings 'renc) do%inions3 %o+ed slo(ly3 clearing t)ickets and ti%&er as it ad+anced to a+oid a%&us)es and kee/ at &ay s%all !els) &ands3 ()ic) /reyed on foragers and stragglers. "a+ing ascended to an ele+ation of 23>>> feet into %ore o/en country3 t)e in+ading 2nglis) )ost encountered no ene%y &ut steady rain3 ()ic) ruined t)e roads and &ogged do(n t)e 9ings ar%y. I%%o&ilised &y t)e %ud3 t)e )uge force (it) its e-cessi+e a%ount of ca+alry could not su//ly itself and soon retreated3 again ad)ering to t)e /attern of failure esta&lis)ed in t)e earlier ca%/aign. ,acking t)e /atience and leisure to seek +ictory &y t)e slo(3 incre%ental %et)ods used &y t)e &order 2arls3 "enry3 an acco%/lis)ed di/lo%at3 s)o(ed a readiness to co%/ro%ise. Inti%idated &y t)e great /o(er of t)e 2nglis) and t)e )uge ar%y re/resenting t)e great e-tent of t)e nglo# Nor%an e%/ire3 ,ord R)ys3 t)e /o/ular and res/ected c)ieftain in sout)ern !ales3 )ad t)e sa%e +ie(. R)ys ackno(ledged "enrys su/re%acy3 )el/ed )i% su//ress a re+olt3 and e+en sent !els)%en to aid )i% in )is (ar (it) t)e 9ing of 'rance. 9ing "enry %ade t)e c)ief ,ord of t)e /arts of sout) !ales )e controlled3 &ut 2nglis) ,ords and 2nglis) castles do%inated %uc) of t)e region. In t)e nort)3 )o(e+er3 t)e !els) leader 5(ain3 as ade/t in (ar as in /olitics3 )ad too %uc) strengt) for t)e 9ing to e-ercise %uc) s(ay o+er t)e considera&le uncon.uered /ortions of t)at land. So 5(ain ga+e no%inal allegiance to t)e 9ing3 &ut re%ained +irtually inde/endent. century of ca%/aigning &y t)e 2nglis) +alidated t)e gradual %et)od /ioneered &y t)e 2arls of "ereford and $)ester. Based on /atience and /erse+erance and relying on castle &uilding and t)e i%/erialis% of t)e 2nglis) %edie+al econo%y and culture3 it differed little in /rinci/le fro% t)at used &y t)e Ro%ans to con.uer Britain and ot)er &ar&arian lands. 9ing "enrys in+asions3 like t)at of !illia% II &efore3 failed3 at least in /art3 &ecause t)e !els) )ad skilfully e-/loited t)e strategic defences a&ility to retreat and also &ecause t)e 2nglis) lacked t)e ratio of force to s/ace to i%/le%ent a .uick /ersisting strategy against an ene%y ()o3 t)oug) lacking in /olitical unity3 (as deter%ined to resist foreign do%ination. 5nly a slo(3 incre%ental /ersisting strategy could3 t)roug) successi+e concentrations and t)en t)e construction of castles3 )a+e t)e re.uisite force to s/ace3 and t)e /olitical strengt) to o+erco%e t)e !els) resistance. 0)ere follo(ed al%ost a century of relati+e sta&ility in ()ic)3 in s/ite of inter%ittent (ar3 2nglis) influence do%inated in t)e sout) ()ile a !els) Prince3 in t)eory t)e +assal of t)e 2nglis) 9ing3 ruled in t)e nort). s t)e 2nglis) consolidated t)eir rule in t)e sout)3 t)e !els) in t)e nort) de+elo/ed a centralised aut)ority and a /rincely go+ern%ent t)at enDoyed /o(ers co%/ara&le to t)e %onarc)ies and /rinci/alities t)en co%%on in 2uro/e. 0)e 2nglis) e-/erience in con.uering /art of !ales3 in s/ite of its slo( /rogress3 co%/ared fa+oura&ly (it) t)e !estern 2uro/ean defence against Viking and ot)er raiders (it) logistic o&Decti+es. co%/arison of t)ese t(o /rotracted (ars s)o(s t)at an offensi+e raiding strategy (as stronger t)an t)e defence against it3 e-actly t)e o//osite of t)e case of t)e /ri%acy of t)e defence against a /ersisting strategy. 0)is is true &ecause a raiding strategy nullified t)e defences t(o %aDor attri&utes#t)e tactical su/re%acy of t)e defence against frontal attack &y a si%ilar or (eaker (ea/on syste% and t)e defenders strategic a&ility to use retreats su/eriority o+er /ursuit. Since raiders soug)t to a+oid co%&at (it) strong forces and relied on retreat3 t)e defences t(o /re%ier ad+antages &eca%e i%%aterial. 1efenders against raiders tried to %ake t)e%sel+es strong e+ery()ere &y t)e use of fortifications and %ilitia and to facilitate a co%&at strategy of /ursuit &y i%/eding raiders co%%unications t)roug) fortifying &ridges and garrisoning road Dunctions. 0)e Ro%ans and By6antines )ad also soug)t to tra/ loot#&urdened raiders against t)e o&stacle of a ri+er3 (all3 or %ountain /ass. But e+en (it) t)e )uge forces used3 t)e less nu%erous raiders (ere still +ictorious on t)e offensi+e.

11>

But t)e 2nglis)3 on t)e offensi+e against raiders e%/loying guerrilla (arfare3 rendered irrele+ant t)e raiders distincti+e .ualities. 0)e raiders a+oidance of &attle and t)e de/endence on retreat )ad no utility against an offensi+e /ersisting strategy7 in fact3 suc) a//roac)es facilitated t)e %et)odical ad+ance of t)e 2nglis). In gi+ing u/ territory to t)e ene%y3 t)e !els) yielded t)eir &ase area to t)e 2nglis)3 ()o /ro%/tly con+erted it to t)eir o(n use and e+en recruited nati+e !els)%en into t)eir ar%ed forces. 0)us an offensi+e3 logistic3 /ersisting strategy )ad /ri%acy o+er a defensi+e raiding strategy. 0)at t)e s/oradic 2nglis) ad+ance rarely used %ore t)an t)e forces of t)e &order areas to %ake su&stantial con.uests s)o(s at least t)e /arity of t)e /ersisting offensi+e against t)e !els) ()o relied on guerrilla (arfare. 0)e 2nglis) also o(ed t)eir success to t)e successi+e concentrations of force in t)e s%all areas t)ey occu/ied. 5f course3 t)e !els) )ad ado/ted guerrilla (arfare &ecause t)ey lacked t)e %ilitary strengt) to follo( a /ersisting3 co%&at3 defensi+e strategy of %eeting t)e 2nglis) in &attle. In t)e t(o cases3 defending against Vikings and ot)er raiders and assu%ing t)e offensi+e into !ales3 t)e %et)od of fortification and in)i&iting co%%unication did not differ. 0)at t)e 2nglis) /enetrated t)e !els) &ase area distinguis)ed t)eir offensi+e ca%/aign fro% t)at of t)e earlier defenders against t)e incursions of Vikings and ot)ers. gainst suc) raiders3 defence (it) a co%&at strategy ena&led t)e Vikings to use retreat and e+en resistance against frontal attack7 t)e con.uerors of !ales used a /ersisting logistic strategy t)at s)o(ed an ascendancy o+er t)e raiding defensi+e. !)ereas intruders into settled areas in searc) of &ooty /ursued a logistic strategy3 ()ic) strengt)ened t)e attackers and (eakened t)e defender3 t)e /ersisting con.uerors of !ales e%/loyed a logistic strategy3 ()ic) (eakened t)eir o//onent and aug%ented t)eir strengt) &y %ore t)an t)e &ooty of raids. 0)is gradual %et)od of carrying out a /ersisting strategy also /ro+ed effecti+e in S/ain as t)e nati+e $)ristian S/aniards gradually constricted t)e area of Mosle% do%ination. "ere eac) e-/ansion of territory definitely increased t)e %ilitary and /olitical strengt) of t)e $)ristians as it di%inis)ed t)eir o//onents /o(er &ase. In con.uering a country in)a&ited &y a sy%/at)etic /o/ulation3 t)e S/aniards added (illing su&Dects to t)eir do%ain3 ()ic) e-aggerated t)e &enefits of t)e con.uest. Ne+ert)eless3 t)is e-a%/le trenc)antly illustrates t)at a /ersisting strategy of territorial con.uest incor/orates a logistic strategy. 0)e effecti+eness of t)is %et)od of fortification and its logistic i%/ortance is also +i+idly de%onstrated in t)e ot)er(ise insignificant case of *eoffrey de Mande+ille ()o3 re&elling against 9ing Ste/)en3 took refuge in t)e e-tensi+e %ars)es of eastern 2ngland. 'ro% t)is &ase )e and )is %any follo(ers /lundered and terrorised t)e adDacent country3 *eoffrey3 in t)e (ords of a c)ronicler3 de+oting J)i%self (it) insatia&le greed to t)e /lundering of flocks and )erds7 e+eryt)ing &elonging to ad)erents of t)e 9ings /arty )e took a(ay3 used u/3 and destroyed.L "e e+en sur/rised3 ca/tured3 looted3 and t)en &urned t)e to(n of $a%&ridge. ided &y t)e difficult terrain3 *eoffrey easily a+oided a /o(erful force t)at 9ing Ste/)en )i%self led against )i%. But )is elusi+eness a+ailed )i% not)ing ()en t)e 9ing s(itc)ed to a logistic strategy. $onfined to t)e %ars)y terrain &y a line of fortified /osts t)at Ste/)en erected3 *eoffrey soon could not feed )is follo(ers. "is raids )ad not only )arassed t)e 9ing and enric)ed )i% and )is follo(ers3 &ut also t)e /ro+isions )e carried off )ad &een funda%ental to )is logistic &ase. So *eoffrey and )is %en )ad to turn against t)eir o(n su//orters. JMany t)ousands t)ey killed (it) )unger3L according to a conte%/orary. J0)ey laid i%/osts on t)e to(ns continually3L and J()en t)e (retc)ed %en )ad no %ore to gi+e3 t)ey ro&&ed and &urned all t)e to(ns... 0)en (as grain dear3 and %eat3 and c)eese3 and &utter7 for t)ere (as none in t)e land. !retc)ed %en died of )unger7 so%e (ent seeking ai%s ()o at one ti%e (ere ric) %en.L Not only did t)e logistic re.uire%ents of )is force %arkedly e-ceed t)e out/ut of t)e region3 &ut *eoffrey3 &y taking t)e o-en t)at dre( t)e /loug)s3 also destroyed its /roducti+ity. Soon forced &y )unger fro% )is denuded region3 *eoffrey fell3 %ortally

111

(ounded3 during an unsuccessful attack on one of Ste/)ens castles. !it)out )is leaders)i/3 *eoffreys follo(ers soon succu%&ed to t)e 9ings forces. 9ing Ste/)ens successful ca%/aign e-)i&its t)e strategic so/)istication of t)e age as (ell as t)e /ro%inent role of fortifications in %edie+al (arfare. Practiced in strategy and in t)e attack and defence of fortifications3 soldiers in t)e Middle ges fre.uently dis/layed less skill in t)e field. 5ften ine/t tactically and lacking t)e o//ortunities to de+elo/ a settled doctrine for t)e &attlefield as )ad t)e Macedonians3 Ro%ans3 and Part)ians3 %edie+al soldiers /ro&a&ly )ad t)e &est )ea+y ca+alry t)e (orld )ad e+er seen3 ade.uate lig)t infantry3 and3 at t)eir &est3 steady3 if unarticulated3 )ea+y infantry. If t)eir strategy /roduced a stale%ate3 t)is resulted as %uc) fro% t)e strategic sagacity of t)e defenders as fro% t)e su/re%acy of fortifications o+er siegecraft. Medie+al strategists also dis/layed /erce/ti+eness in using t)e castle for offensi+e /ur/oses3 and t)e necessarily /atient and t)oroug) (ork in S/ain /roduced a %aDor /olitical c)ange ()ile in !ales and Ireland co%/ara&le %et)ods laid foundations for ra/id con.uests later. 0)e $rusades3 a ca%/aign into t)e 2ast to con.uer Palestine ins/ired in /art &y religious 6eal3 clearly de%onstrated t)e real ele%ents of e-cellence in t)e %edie+al art of (ar. Back

Combined-#rms Combat in the Crusades

Initially t)e $rusaders dis/layed great ine/titude as t)ey a//roac)ed Palestine on %arc)es fro% $onstantino/le t)roug) natolia to Syria. Muc) of t)is land t)e Mosle% 0urks )ad )eld since t)e Battle of Man6ikert3 t(enty#si- years &efore t)e $)ristians &egan t)eir first %arc). Not only did t)e $rusaders lack any kno(ledge of t)e 0urkis) lig)t ca+alry (ay of (ar3 &ut also t)ey )ad su/re%e confidence t)at t)eir )ea+y ca+alry could +an.uis) any o//onent. 0)eir first sur/rise ca%e in 1>@C3 ()en t)e first $)ristian ar%y %arc)ed fro% $onstantino/le into t)e territory of t)e 0urkis) sultan3 ad+ancing in t(o colu%ns a&out si- or se+en %iles a/art3 in order to find su//lies %ore readily. 0)e 0urks3 concentrating against t)e left di+ision3 a//eared &efore t)e $rusaders ar%y early one %orning. "alting3 ca%/ing3 and lea+ing its large force of infantry to guard t)e ca%/3 t)e $)ristian ar%y arrayed its )ea+y ca+alry against t)e %ounted 0urkis) )orse arc)ers. 0)e 0urks3 of course3 did not close &ut rode along t)e $)ristian array s)ooting t)eir arro(s and /resenting no %ass against ()ic) t)e knig)ts could c)arge. S%all grou/s did c)arge3 &ut t)e 0urks fell &ack3 continuing t)eir s)o(er of arro(s. 0)e %ail ar%our of t)e $rusaders ade.uately /rotected t)e %en3 &ut t)e arro(s killed %any )orses and t)e c)arging /arties suffered )ea+ily as3 se/arated fro% t)e %ain &ody3 t)e 0urks co%/letely surrounded t)e%. fter se+eral )ours t)e $rusaders dre( close toget)er and %o+ed &ack to(ard t)eir ca%/3 already /enetrated &y t)e 0urks against t)e ineffectual resistance of t)e disorganised infantry. conte%/orary descri&ed t)e scene: t)e knig)ts (ere Jcrus)ed one against anot)er like s)ee/ /enned u/ in a fold3 )o/eless and /anic# stricken3 (e (ere s)ut in &y t)e 0urks on e+ery side.L It see%ed to &e anot)er Man6ikert ()en suddenly t)e ca+alry fro% t)e rig)t#)and $rusader di+ision a//eared and c)arged t)e 0urks in flank and rear. Seeing t)is3 t)e dis/irited knig)ts of t)e &eleaguered left di+ision also c)arged. 0)e /anicked 0urks fled3 so%e riding t)eir )orses to deat) %iles fro% t)e &attlefield e+en t)oug) no $)ristians /ursued. But &ecause of t)eir %o&ility3 t)e 0urks )ad suffered relati+ely fe( casualties7 t)e ar%oured $rusaders actually lost %ore %en. 0)e $)ristians )ad a+oided anot)er Man6ikert &ecause t)e %en of t)e rig)t#)and colu%n3 res/onding to a %essenger sent early in t)e &attle3 )ad arri+ed fro% t)eir /osition se+en %iles to t)e sout) after t)e &attle )ad gone on for nearly fi+e )ours. //arently t)e 0urkis) sultan eit)er )ad failed to locate t)e rig)t#)and colu%n or )ad3 in t)e )eat of )is successful &attle3 forgotten a&out it. By sur/rise and an attack fro% t(o sides t)e )ea+y ca+alry )ad routed t)e 0urkis) lig)t ca+alry. 0)e defeat so s)ook t)e 0urks t)at t)ey did not %olest t)e $)ristian colu%ns for se+eral (eeks and did not )ar% t)e% seriously on t)e re%ainder of t)eir %arc). Still3 t)is res/ite did not relie+e t)e

112

ar%y of its ot)er /ro&le% # su//ly. 0)e $rusaders could easily )a+e reac)ed t)e "oly ,and &y (ater &ecause t)e By6antine na+y and t)e fleets of t)e Italian %ariti%e cities controlled t)e sea. But t)e sea %ade t)e leaders uneasy3 and t)ey c)ose t)e land route t)roug) t)e sa%e country in ()ic) le-ander t)e *reat )ad o/ened )is ca%/aign against t)e Persian 2%/ire. :et t)e $)ristian leaders lacked not only le-anders genius &ut also )is ca/acity for /lanning and )is logistical organisation. In addition to effecti+e 0urkis) o//osition3 t)ey faced ot)er difficulties unkno(n to t)e Macedonian con.ueror. 4nlike le-ander3 t)ey &urdened t)eir force (it) )ordes of non# co%&atants3 %any of ()o% (ere on /ilgri%age to t)e "oly ,and. Moreo+er3 t)ey lacked geogra/)ical kno(ledge &ecause t)e $rusaders did not al(ays )eed By6antine ad+ice and often clai%ed t)eir infor%ation (as defecti+e since t)ings )ad c)anged. s a conte%/orary e-/lained3 J land once ric) and e-cellent in all t)e fruits of t)e eart)3 )ad &een so cruelly ra+aged &y t)e 0urks3 t)at t)ere (ere only s%all /atc)es of culti+ation to &e seen at long Inter+als.L 0)e $rusaders found di%inis)ed su//ly sources on t)eir route3 and t)e 0urks co%&ined a logistic strategy (it) co%&at strategy in defence against t)e %arc)es of successi+e $)ristian ar%ies. 0)ey dro+e off t)e cattle off t)e $rusaders route and &urned t)e grass3 cro/s3 and e+en t)e +illages3 an effecti+e strategy t)at t)e Persians )ad declined to use against le-ander. 0)e 0urkis) co%&ination of t)e t(o strategies /ro+ed disastrous for %any %arc)ers. 0)e 0urks destroyed one colu%n t)at %o+ed east fro% $onstantino/le3 a fe( sur+i+ors finding refuge at a By6antine /ort on t)e Black Sea. not)er )ad C>> sur+i+ors3 dis%ounted knig)ts3 ()o )id in t)e %ountains ()ere 0urkis) ca+alry )ad difficulty /ursuing. t)ird sa+ed itself &y turning &ack3 and one reac)ed its destination on foot3 t)e 0urks )a+ing s)ot its )orses. +ery large ar%y also fell +icti% to logistic difficulties3 its %en al%ost dying of t)irst &y t)e ti%e t)ey reac)ed a ri+er. Breaking ranks at t)e sig)t of (ater3 t)e ()ole ar%y (as drinking at t)e ri+er ()en t)e 0urks attacked7 fe( sur+i+ors reac)ed near&y %ountains. not)er colu%n a+oided star+ation &y eating its )orses3 reac)ing its destination on foot. $rusading ar%ies t)at included lig)t infantry )ad little tactical difficulty (it) t)e 0urks. But t)is (ea/on syste% could do not)ing to alle+iate t)e su//ly difficulties. Since t)e 0urks /referred to a+oid t)e %ounted %en at t)e )ead of a %arc)ing colu%n3 t)ey concentrated t)eir attacks on t)e rear. "ere t)e $rusaders /laced t)eir &o(%en3 cross&o(%en3 and dis%ounted knig)ts. 0)e &o(%en3 )a+ing t)e ad+antage of s)ooting on foot and )a+ing t)e 0urk and )is )orse for a target3 %astered t)e )orse#&o(%en3 and t)e knig)ts on foot /rotected t)e cross&o(%en fro% c)arges &y t)e s(ord#carrying 0urkis) )orse arc)ers. 0)e ar%ies3 ()ic) )eeded t)e ad+ice of t)ose ()o )ad %ade t)e %arc)3 found t)is co%&ination of su/erior (ea/on syste%s %ore t)an ade.uate to deal (it) t)e Mosle% lig)t ca+alry. 'ortunately t)e $rusaders in Syria learned t)is tactical lesson .uickly and a//lied it in co%&ating t)e Mosle% %asters of t)at for%er By6antine /ro+ince. But in t)eir first encounter (it) )orse arc)ers3 t)e $)ristians3 lacking &o(%en3 successfully su&stituted &oldness. fter learning t)at t)e ene%y )ad asse%&led a )uge ar%y to raise t)e siege of ntioc)3 t)e $rusaders resol+ed to %eet it. Because t)ey )ad lost so %any )orses on t)e %arc) to Syria3 t)ey could field only C>> knig)ts to attack a force of at least 123>>> Mosle% soldiers. Ne+ert)eless3 t)e $rusaders /icked a /lace se+en %iles east of ntioc) ()ere t)ey could conceal t)eir s%all force in rolling ground and t)roug) ()ic) t)e Mosle% )ost (ould )a+e to ad+ance t)roug) a %ile#(ide ga/ &et(een a ri+er and a lake. s t)e ene%y ar%y /assed at da(n t)roug) t)is ga/3 t)e $rusaders suddenly c)arged. 1ri+ing t)e screening force &ack a%ong t)e e.ually sur/rised %ain &ody3 still in %arc) order3 t)e $rusaders inflicted terri&le casualties on t)e unar%oured lig)t ca+alry ()o3 Da%%ed toget)er and )e%%ed in &y (ater on t(o sides3 )ad difficulty in fleeing. s %any as 23>>> %ay )a+e died &y t)e s(ord or dro(ning &efore t)e Mosle% ar%y retreated fro% a cra%/ed /osition ()ere t)eir nu%&ers

11?

/re+ented use of t)eir )orse#arc)er tactics. gain sur/rise3 co%&ined (it) an o&stacle in t)e rear3 ena&led t)e )ea+y ca+alry to o+erco%e t)e intrinsically %ore /o(erful lig)t ca+alry. In t)e ne-t encounter t)e $rusaders arrayed t)eir larger3 &alanced force near t)e recently ca/tured ntioc). 'earful of %eeting t)eir ad+ersaries outside t)e city3 &ut co%/elled to do so &ecause of a lack of food3 t)e $)ristians took /ains to organise t)eir infantry ad+antageously and stiffen t)e% (it) dis%ounted knig)ts. In /lacing t)eir )ea+y ca+alry &e)ind t)e infantry3 t)ey s)o(ed t)at t)ey )ad gras/ed t)e i%/ortance of lig)t infantry in dealing (it) lig)t ca+alry. 'or%ing t)eir line of &attle so one flank rested on a ri+er and t)e ot)er on )ills3 t)ey /rotected t)eir flanks and co%/elled t)e 0urkis) )orse arc)ers to attack in front. "ere t)e long line of infantry3 fronted &y &o(%en3 ad+anced slo(ly against t)e 0urks3 s)ooting as t)ey %o+ed for(ard. 0)oug) t)e %ounted 0urks dou&tless )ad %ore skill as &o(%en3 t)e infantry (ere s)ooting on foot3 and t)e cross&o(%ens /o(erful %ac)ines %ore t)an co%/ensated for t)eir lack of skill. Steadily /ressed &ack &y a continuous )all of arro(s3 t)e 0urkis) ca+alry e+entually fled3 Doined &y anot)er grou/ t)at )ad earlier (orked its (ay into t)e rear of t)e $)ristian ar%y and t)at )ad defeated t)e $rusader reser+e. Part of t)e reason for t)at Mosle% +ictory ste%%ed fro% t)eir realisation of t)e /ri%acy of t)e foot &o(%en o+er t)ose %ounted. 0o counter t)is ad+antage3 t)e Mosle%s )ad c)anged to s)ock tactics: t)eir lig)t ca+alry c)arged and attacked t)e infantry (it) s(ords. But in s/ite of t)is ac)ie+e%ent3 t)e force )ad retreated ()en t)ey sa( t)e %ain &ody lea+e t)e field. In &ot) /arts of t)is &attle t)e Mosle% ca+alry )ad suffered negligi&le losses3 &ut ()en t)e %ain &ody a&andoned t)e ca%/ and its attendants to t)e $)ristian ar%y3 t)e %en on foot )ad no (ay to esca/e or defend t)e%sel+es against t)e )ea+y ca+alry. 0)e foot &o(%en )ad (on t)e %ain frontal &attle7 t)e $rusader ca+alry do%inated t)e action only to(ard t)e end. !it)in a year of reac)ing Syria t)e !estern 2uro/ean soldiers )ad found t)e &est %et)od of defeating t)e 0urks3 e%/loying t)e in)erently do%inant foot &o(%an against t)e )orse arc)er. 'ortuitously3 t)ey )ad also de+elo/ed t)e /ro/er co%&ination to deal (it) t)e Mosle% ra&s fro% 2gy/t3 ()o used an entirely different tactical syste%. In ad+ancing into Palestine in 1>@@ and &esieging and taking 8erusale%3 t)e $rusaders )ad in+aded territory &elonging to 2gy/t3 t)e Mosle% /o(er t)at controlled Palestine and )ad fre.uently engaged in (ar (it) t)e Mosle% states of Syria and Meso/ota%ia. 0)e 2gy/tians organised t)eir ar%y differently fro% t)eir lig)t ca+alry o//onents to t)e nort) and east: t)ey continued to rely on t)e original ra& )ea+y ca+alry tradition3 %odified &y conflict (it) t)e By6antines. No( )a+ing also ada/ted t)eir tactical syste% to deal (it) t)eir )orse arc)er o//onents3 t)ey de/loyed first a large nu%&er of &ot) lig)t and )ea+y infantry%en3 so%e ar%ed (it) &o(s and so%e (it) %aces. Be)ind t)ese3 t)ey /osted t)eir By6antine#ins/ired %ailed )ea+y ca+alry3 and on t)e (ings3 a s%all /ro/ortion of unar%oured s/ear#ar%ed ca+alry. In ado/ting t)is &alance of (ea/on syste%s and /lacing t)e arc)ers in front (it) )ea+y infantry to /rotect t)e% and t)e )ea+y ca+alry in reser+e3 t)e 2gy/tians clearly )ad an array s/lendidly suited to deal (it) )orse arc)ers. But Dust as 0urkis) lig)t ca+alry tactics )ad taken t)e $rusaders una(are3 so t)e $rusaders tactics sur/rised t)e 2gy/tians. !)en t)e $)ristians %et t)e 2gy/tians at scalon in 1>@@3 eac) )ad a flank on t)e coast. 0)e $)ristians3 also organising t)eir ar%y to co%&at t)e lig)t ca+alry tactical syste%3 /laced in front nine di+isions of %i-ed lig)t and )ea+y infantry (it) a di+ision of )ea+y ca+alry &e)ind eac) of t)ese. 0)e &attle o/ened (it) an atte%/t &y t)e unar%oured 2gy/tian ca+alry to turn t)e $rusaders o/en flank3 &ut a flank di+ision of $)ristian )ea+y ca+alry easily dis/ersed t)e%. Mean()ile3 t)e infantry lines %ade contact at &o(s)ot and &egan to e-c)ange fire. t t)is /oint t)e $rusaders )ea+y ca+alry c)arged t)roug) t)e ga/s &et(een t)e infantry di+isions3 riding do(n t)e 2gy/tian

114

arc)ers and t)eir )ea+y infantry. r%ed (it) %aces rat)er t)an /ikes and un/re/ared for suc) a c)arge3 t)e Mosle% )ea+y infantry could %ake no effecti+e resistance. 0)e ca+alry c)arge t)en reac)ed t)e 2gy/tian )ea+y ca+alry3 catc)ing %any of t)e% at t)e )alt. But e+en (it) a counter# c)arge t)e 2gy/tians (ould /ro&a&ly )a+e )ad t)e (orst of it against t)e %atc)less ;lan of t)e %ore )ea+ily ar%oured and %ore skilful knig)ts of 'rance. 0)e co%/letely disru/ted 2gy/tian ar%y suffered +ery )ea+y casualties a%ong t)e infantry and in ca+alry. 0)e sea on one flank caused %any to dro(n3 t)oug) so%e fugiti+es successfully s(a% to 2gy/tian (ars)i/s off t)e coast. 0)e to(n &e)ind offered a refuge3 &ut t)e narro( gate %eant t)at %any (ere slaug)tered (aiting to get t)roug) and ot)ers (ere crus)ed to deat) in t)e /anicked cro(d at t)e gate. 0)e $rusaders did not al(ays e-)i&it t)e )ig) co%/etence re+ealed in t)ese early &attles. 5n t(o occasions t)e sa%e leader3 dis/laying a&surd o+erconfidence3 c)arged (it) a fe( )undred knig)ts into an entire Mosle% ar%y3 losing %ost of )is %en in t)e second atte%/t. century later $rusaders %et t)e )orse arc)ers3 defeated t)e% near a city (it) t)e o%inous na%e of $arr)ae3 and /ursued t)e% for t(el+e %iles (it) only t)e )ea+y ca+alry. But t)e Mosle%s (ere not defeated7 t)ey (ere dra(ing t)e $rusaders on. 0)eir lig)t ca+alry o//onents )a+ing disa//eared o+er t)e )ori6on3 t)e $)ristians decided to ca%/ for t)e nig)t rat)er t)an try to ride t)eir (eary )orses &ack to $arr)ae. fter t)ey )ad dis%ounted and %any )ad taken off t)eir ar%our3 t)e Mosle%s c)arged (it) s(ord as (ell as &o(. 0)eir assailants destroyed a&out a t)ird of t)e force &efore t)e $)ristians found refuge on a )ill. Most %ade good t)eir esca/e in t)e nig)t3 largely &ecause t)e Mosle%s .uarrelled o+er t)e di+ision of t)e /lunder fro% t)e $rusaders ca%/. 0)e disaster3 caused &y a reckless /ursuit3 occurred at al%ost t)e sa%e /lace ()ere Part)ian ca+alry )ad killed $rassuss son and )is %en3 including *allic ca+alry. t t)e Battle of "a& in 111@ t)e $)ristians follo(ed t)eir no(#settled doctrine against )orse arc)ers of /lacing infantry and ca+alry toget)er Jt)at t)e t(o ar%s %ig)t gi+e eac) ot)er t)e /ro/er su//ort3 t)e knig)ts /rotected &y t)e arro(s of t)e foot and t)e foot &y t)e lances of t)e knig)ts.L But t)e Mosle%s )ad gras/ed t)e $)ristian /ractice3 too3 and t)eir lig)t ca+alry c)arged (it) s(ord and lance. 0)oug) t)ese unar%oured &o(%en %ade +ery /oor )ea+y ca+alry3 t)ey (ere too %uc) for t)e $)ristian arc)ers3 unorganised and ill e.ui//ed for s)ock action. 5nly t)e effecti+e use &y t)e $rusaders co%%ander of a )ea+y ca+alry reser+e sta+ed off defeat3 and secured a dra(n &attle in ()ic) &ot) sides clai%ed +ictory. 0o(ard t)e end of t)e t(elft) century t)e s%all $)ristian state in Palestine faced t)e for%ida&le /o(er of a re+i+ed 2gy/tian e%/ire under t)e leaders)i/ of t)e &rilliant soldier and states%an3 Saladin. "a+ing con.uered Syria3 Saladin ad+anced into Palestine (it) an ar%y strong in lig)t ca+alry in addition to t)e usual 2gy/tian )ea+y ca+alry and infantry. Besieging 0i&erias on t)e Sea of *alilee3 )e ca/tured it easily3 &ut t)e citadel still )eld out. 0o resist t)is /o(erful in+asion3 t)e $)ristians concentrated all of t)e forces of t)eir kingdo%3 +irtually denuding t)eir garrisons in t)eir cities and t)e castles (it) ()ic) t)ey )ad dotted t)e land. $oncentrated at t)e +illage of Saffaria3 si-teen %iles (est of 0i&erias3 t)e leaders de&ated ()at to do. Bet(een t)eir force and Saladins at 0i&erias lay a t)inly /o/ulated region in ()ic) Saladins ar%y )ad scoured t)e land of su//lies and s/oiled t)e (ells. In t)e )eat of su%%er a (aterless %arc) /resented a serious o&stacle. 5ne side in t)e de&ate ad+ocated a logistic strategy3 arguing t)at lack of su//lies %ust soon force Saladin a(ay. If t)e Mosle% ruler (is)ed to fig)t3 let )i% try t)e %arc) (est and face t)e $rusader ar%y if )e succeeded in %aking a )ot3 (aterless %arc) t)roug) desolate country. If t)e $)ristians )ad to risk in a &attle t)e ()ole %ilitary force of t)e kingdo%3 t)ey s)ould %ake t)e odds as fa+oura&le as /ossi&le. But t)e ad+ocates of a co%&at strategy (on t)e de&ate3 arguing t)at t)eir )onour co%/elled t)e% to relie+e t)e garrison of t)e citadel and t)at a +ictory could &e decisi+e &ecause Saladins &ack (ould &e to t)e Sea of *alilee.

11<

0)e Mosle% )orse arc)ers )arassed and slo(ed t)e ar%ys %arc) to(ard 0i&erias. In t)e afternoon3 si- %iles fro% 0i&erias3 t)e $rusaders faced t)e lo( )ills on ()ic) t)ey sa( Saladins %ain force. 0)e attacks of t)e ene%y lig)t ca+alry )ad co%/elled t)e rear guard to )alt to fig)t t)e%3 and t)e fatigued ar%y )ad e-)austed its (ater during t)e )ot %arc). 0)e co%%ander decided to ca%/ for t)e nig)t7 a nig)t s/ent (it)out (ater under t)e fire of arro(s constantly landing in t)eir ca%/s. Saladins %en also set fire to t)e grass u/ (ind of t)e ca%/3 &lanketing t)e $rusaders (it) s%oke3 ()ic) accentuated t)eir need for (ater. 0)e ne-t %orning e-)austed3 t)irsty %en and /arc)ed3 )ungry )orses )ad to contend (it) Saladins ()ole ar%y. But &efore t)e ar%ies closed3 t)e $)ristian infantry fled to t)e to/ of a )ill3 saying t)ey (ere dying of t)irst and (ere too (eary to fig)t. 0)e Mosle% )orse arc)ers attacked t)e ca+alry3 and t)e re%ainder of t)e ar%y c)arged t)e de%oralised $)ristian infantry3 ()ic) /ro%/tly ga+e u/. fter a longer stand under t)e )all of arro(s3 t)e knig)ts also surrendered. 0)e arro(s )ad (ounded %any3 only a fe( se+erely3 and killed e+en fe(er7 t)eir ar%our )ad /rotected t)e% (ell. Neglect of logistics contri&uted to t)e defeat. But Gand t)is is ty/ical of a %edie+al forceH t)e $rusader ar%y lacked e-/erience (orking toget)er. In /articular3 t)e infantry fro% t)e castle garrisons lacked su&di+isions3 a c)ain of co%%and3 unit es/rit or co)esion3 and any articulation to ena&le t)e% to %anoeu+re. ,ack of (ater and food )el/ed t)e colla/se of %orale3 and (it)out any organisation t)e infantry &eca%e a de%oralised as (ell as disorganised %o&. 1e/ri+ed of t)eir foot arc)ers3 t)e )ea+y ca+alry )ad no c)ance against t)e )orse arc)ers. Saladins &rilliant %anage%ent %ade t)e %ost of )is ad+antages3 a+oiding a &attle until arro(s3 )unger3 and t)irst )ad /)ysically and %orally (eakened t)e ene%ys %en and )orses. Saladin3 an e-/erienced %onarc) and soldier3 also arranged )is su//lies (ell. "a+ing destroyed t)e &ulk of t)e $)ristian ar%y and (it) it t)e larger /art of t)e fortress and to(n garrisons3 Saladin /ro%/tly ca/tured 8erusale% and %ost of t)e fortified /laces in t)e interior of Palestine. 0)e $)ristians #)ad left only a fe( /orts ()ere t)e fortifications and t)e su//ort of t)e Italian fleets still ga+e t)e% a toe)old. But Saladin faced a serious %enace in t)e for%ida&le force of a ne( $rusade3 ()ic) )ad arri+ed &y sea in t)e su%%er of 11@1 and )ad esta&lis)ed itself on t)e coast. 4nder t)e leaders)i/ of 9ing P)ili/ II ugustus of 'rance and 9ing Ric)ard I of 2ngland3 t)e $)ristian ar%y /lanned to %arc) sout) along t)e coast &efore striking inland in an atte%/t to reco+er 8erusale%. Saladin intended to strike an ar%y on t)e %arc) again. 'ollo(ing t)e %odel of )is earlier +ictory3 )e /lanned to use )is )orse arc)ers to )arass and (ear do(n t)is ar%y until )e attacked )is (eakened ad+ersary (it) )is %ain force. But in 9ing Ric)ard t)e deter%ined Saladin faced a for%ida&le antagonist. In s/ite of t)e i%/lication of )is J,ion#"eartedL nickna%e3 Ric)ard3 ()o s)o(ed %ore talent and ent)usias% for %ilitary t)an ci+il /ursuits3 /ro+ed to &e a s)re(d and careful co%%ander. 0)e young 9ing )ad already e-)i&ited )is gras/ of t)e tactical realities in Palestine ()en )e )ad organised a full force to defend against a )orse arc)er attack. In t)e front line )e /laced a /ike%en on one knee (it) )is /ike &utt in t)e sand and t)e /oint at t)e le+el of a )orses c)est. In t)e inter+als )e /laced a cross&o(%an3 standing3 (it) anot)er cross&o(%an &e)ind ()o cocked and /laced t)e arro( in t)e cross&o( /assed &ack &y t)e %an in front3 /assing )i% t)e cocked and loaded one in e-c)ange. 0)ere (as )ardly a &attle3 t)e ene%y )orse arc)ers falling &ack &efore t)e )ail of cross&o( arro(s3 un(illing to close and use t)eir s(ords &ecause of t)e line of /ikes. Ric)ard did sortie (it) a fe( knig)ts3 &ut )is i%aginati+e tactical co%&ination of t(o (ea/on syste%s settled t)e day. !)en 9ing Ric)ard /re/ared )is ca%/aign3 )e %ade use of )is tactical so/)istication as (ell as t)e lessons taug)t &y t)e disastrous %arc) to 0i&erias. 'or )is o(n %o+e sout) )e di+ided )is ca+alry and infantry eac) into t(el+e grou/s3 /airing t)e t(o ar%s. 0)en to /ro+ide a )ig)er le+el of articulation3 )e for%ed t)e t(el+e grou/s of /airs into fi+e une.ual di+isions. Since )is ar%y )ad landed in early 8une and )e did not &egin )is o/eration until t)e latter /art of ugust3 )is %en )ad

11=

ti%e to get used to one anot)er and t)e organisation. Planning to %arc) close to t)e s)ore3 )e could count on su//lies fro% t)e sea3 securely controlled &y Italian na+ies. Saladins %en )ad already denuded )is route of food and fodder. "e intended to %o+e &y easy stages3 (it) none longer t)an t(el+e %iles and alternate days de+oted to rest. Saladin (ould face an a%/ly su//lied3 t)oroug)ly rested3 and at least reasona&ly organised ar%y. 9ing Ric)ards order for t)e %o+e%ent /laced t)e su//ly colu%n ne-t to t)e s)ore3 t)en t)e t(el+e grou/s of ca+alry3 and3 on t)e outside3 t)e grou/s of infantry distri&uted so as to %ake a continuous colu%n. 0)e &o(%en (ore lig)t and ine-/ensi+e /rotection in t)e for% of t)e .uilted Dackets t)at knig)ts custo%arily (ore under t)eir %all. s soon as t)e ad+ance &egan3 t)e ene%y )orse arc)ers attacked. conte%/orary descri&ed t)e% as Jnot (eig)ed do(n (it) )ea+y ar%our like our knig)ts3 &ut al(ays a&le to outstri/ t)e% in /ace.L 0)e 9ing3 ()o &e)a+ed like a co%%ander in )is constant riding &ack and fort) along t)e colu%n to su/er+ise3 interdicted any c)arges &ecause3 t)e conte%/orary e-/lained3 J()en c)arged t)ey are (ont to fly3 and t)eir )orses are %ore ni%&le t)an any ot)ers in t)e (orld7 one %ay liken t)e% to s(allo(s for s(iftness. !)en t)ey see t)at you )a+e ceased to /ursue t)e%3 t)ey no longer fly &ut return u/on you7 t)ey are like tireso%e flies ()ic) you can fla/ a(ay for a %o%ent3 &ut ()ic) co%e &ack t)e instant you )a+e sto//ed )itting at t)e%.L Since t)e rear /resented t)e ar%ys %ost +ulnera&le /oint3 e-/osed to attack on t)e &ack as (ell as t)e side3 Saladin concentrated )is efforts t)ere3 )o/ing to cause t)ose ele%ents to )alt and so o/en a ga/3 di+iding Ric)ards ar%y. But t)e (ell#su/er+ised +eteran soldiers in t)e last for%ation ke/t u/ t)e %arc)3 e+en t)oug) so%e of t)e &o(%en (alked &ack(ard so t)ey could s)oot ()ile on t)e %o+e. Mosle% conte%/orary e-/lained: J0)e ene%y %o+ed in order of &attle3 t)eir infantry %arc)ed &et(een us and t)eir ca+alry3 kee/ing as le+el and fir% as a (all. 2ac) foot soldier )ad a t)ick cassock of felt3L t)e .uilted undergar%ent for %ail3 ()ic) (as Jso strong t)at our arro(s %ade no i%/ression on t)e%.L 0)e Mosle% o&ser+er sa( J%en ()o )ad fro% one to ten s)afts sticking in t)eir &acks3 yet trudged on at t)eir ordinary /ace and did not fall out of ranks.L But t)e )orse arc)ers ai%ed at t)e ca+alry &eyond3 Jendea+ouring to irritate t)e knig)ts and to (orry t)e% into lea+ing t)eir ra%/art of infantry. But it (as all in +ain: t)ey ke/t t)eir te%/er ad%ira&ly.L Still t)is /ersistent attack &egan to disa&le %ore and %ore )orses and t)e $rusader ca+alry did &eco%e increasingly i%/atient (it) t)eir /assi+e and de/endent role. :et Saladins ar%y suffered serious losses3 t)e s)ooting fro% t)e cross&o(s striking Jdo(n )orse and %an a%ong t)e Mosle%s.L 'inally Ric)ards ar%y neared t)e end of its %arc) ()ere it /assed a forest only t)ree %iles fro% t)e &eac). "ere3 as )e )ad /lanned3 Saladin concealed )is ar%y. But 9ing Ric)ard3 ready for &attle at t)is likely s/ot3 )ad )is (ell#organised and still fres) ar%y co%/letely in )and ()en Saladins ()ole force e%erged fro% t)e (oods3 foot arc)ers as (ell as )orse3 in ad+ance of t)eir )ea+y ca+alry. Saladin /lanned to fig)t all along t)e line &ut /us) )is %ain attack on t)e rear7 9ing Ric)ard intended to (ait until Saladin )ad fully co%%itted )is forces &efore %aking a c)arge (it) )is )ea+y ca+alry. 0)oug) t)e knig)ts of t)e rear guard /assed t)roug) t)eir infantry and c)arged &efore t)e 9ing ga+e t)e order3 t)e &attle (ent %uc) according to Ric)ards /lan. In a series of t)ree successi+e c)arges3 t)e $)ristian knig)ts dro+e Saladins ar%y into t)e forest. 0)e Mosle% infantry and ca+alry on t)e field got in eac) ot)ers (ay3 and t)e ca+alry suffered as (ell as t)e infantry. Realising Ric)ards tactical %astery3 t)e &ra+e &ut sagacious Saladin did not rene( t)e contest ()en t)e $)ristian ar%y resu%ed its %arc). But Ric)ards +ictory did not gi+e )i% 8erusale%. 5n )is %arc) inland to t)e city )e found t)at Saladin )ad destroyed t)e cro/s3 &urned t)e grass3 and /oisoned or filled in t)e (ells. Successful in co%&at &ut una&le to o+erco%e Saladins logistic strategy3 9ing Ric)ard (it)dre( )is )ungry and t)irsty ar%y3 a&andoning t)e .uest for 8erusale%. Since all %edie+al %ilitary leaders)i/ ca%e fro% t)e ranks of t)e knig)ts3 co%%anders tended to discount infantry3 not understanding its e%/loy%ent e-ce/t in sieges. Ne+ert)eless3 t)e successful 11C

co%&ination of lig)t infantry and )ea+y ca+alry during t)e $rusades s)o(s t)at co%%anders could o+erco%e t)eir &ias and sol+e a /ro&le% u/on ()ic) +ictory de/ended. But3 since t)ey (ere accusto%ed &y t)eir o(n training Gand t)e nature of ca+alry actionH to indi+idual rat)er t)an grou/ action3 %edie+al co%%anders allo(ed t)eir infantry to re%ain co%/arati+ely disorganised. 1is/ersal as /rofessional garrisons in castles or as a rural %ilitia /recluded %uc) unit training in any case7 yet %edie+al %ilitary leaders)i/ lacked any +ision of t)e i%/ortance of t)e drill of *reek ci+ic %ilitia3 %uc) less Ro%an /rofessionals. Still t)e $rusaders understanding of t)e /ro/er integration of (ea/on syste%s (ould )a+e &een essential )ad !estern 2uro/e e-/erienced %ore t)an a &rief encounter (it) Mongol ca+alry. Back

3enghi2 4han and Mongol Warfare

0)e Mongols )ad a %ounted force %uc) like t)e Part)ians3 a&out t)ree#fift)s lig)t ca+alry and t(o# fift)s )ea+y ca+alry. 0)eir lig)t ca+alry carried s/are &o(s3 t)ree .ui+ers of arro(s3 and at least one additional )orse. Most of t)e )ea+y ca+alry3 /rotected &y leat)er ar%our3 could kee/ u/ (it) t)e lig)t ca+alry. 0)e Mongols organised t)eir co%/etently disci/lined and t)oroug)ly articulated ar%y on t)e deci%al syste%3 a &asic unit of nine %en and a leader co%&ined into a larger unit of 1>>3 ten of t)ese into a unit of 13>>>3 and finally ten of t)ese into a unit of 1>3>>>. 0)eir generals co%%anded &attles3 kee/ing out of t)e fig)t and /osting t)e%sel+es (it) t)e reser+e. 0)ey )ad a t)oroug)ly organised co%%issariat and )ad learned so/)isticated siegecraft fro% t)e $)inese ()ose e%/ires t)ey )ad con.uered. 4nder 8eng)i6 9)an3 a %inor Prince ()ose a&ility )ad &roug)t )i% rule o+er t)e %ounted )erds%en of t)e ste//es of sia3 t)e Mongols )ad o+errun all of t)e areas &ordering t)eir )o%eland on t)e nort)east sian /lain. 0)eir con.uest of t)e 9)(ari6%ian 2%/ire a%/ly illustrates an essential feature of t)eir %et)od. !it)in a year t)ey o+ert)re( t)is %onarc)y3 ()ic) stretc)ed fro% Meso/ota%ia to t)e Indus and included Bactria and Sogdiana ()ic) )ad gi+en le-ander t)e *reat so %uc) trou&le. nd as soon as t)ey )ad co%/leted t)eir occu/ation and installed t)eir ad%inistration3 t)e Mongols )ad t)e sa%e e-/erience as le-ander. 0)e de+out Mosle% /o/ulation rose against t)eir con.uerors3 dis/laying a )ostility intensified &y t)e &e)a+iour of t)e occu/ying troo/s. 0o(ns re+olted3 and t)e nati+es assassinated Mongol officials and %assacred t)e garrisons of s%all /osts. 0)e Mongols retaliated &y sending a )uge ar%y on a ca%/aign of e-ter%ination. 0)e ar%y /roceeded syste%atically to recon.uer t)e country3 &esieging and taking eac) city (it) re%arka&le s/eed. 0)e Mongols /ossessed a so/)isticated kno(ledge of siegecraft and a%/le e.ui/%ent3 )a+ing for one siege 43>>> scaling ladders and 43>>> siege engines3 including so%e ada/ted to t)ro(ing /ots of &urning na/)t)a o+er t)e (alls into t)e &esieged city. 0)e Mongols o+erca%e t)eir inade.uate ratio of force needed to su&due t)e s/ace and /o/ulation of t)e )uge country &ecause t)ey ne+er left garrisons in ca/tured to(ns: t)ey killed or dro+e a(ay all of t)e /o/ulation3 lea+ing Jneit)er a cat nor a dog.L 0)e /risoners3 artisans and %en of %ilitary age3 ()ic) t)ey took a(ay (it) t)e%3 increased t)e strengt) of t)e Mongol ar%y in t)e ne-t siege &y doing t)e needed digging and &uilding and assisting in carrying out assaults. 0)ese un(illing conscri/ts coo/erated3 t)oug) t)ey faced serious danger assailing t)e fortifications3 &ecause t)ey kne( t)at certain deat) a(aited t)e% if t)ey failed to fig)t. 0)ese /risoners su//lied %ost of t)e casualties in t)e co%&ats and fe( of t)e% sur+i+ed. 0)e Mongols did s/are t)e in)a&itants of t)e large city of "erat. But no sooner )ad t)e ar%y de/arted t)an t)e in)a&itants re+olted and killed t)e Mongol go+ernor. $ritical of t)e %isguided %ercy e-tended to t)is city3 8eng)i6 9)an asked t)e ar%ys co%%ander: J!)y did t)is rising take /laceK "o( )as it co%e a&out t)at t)e s(ord )as failed of its effect so far as t)ese /eo/le of "erat are concernedKL "e t)en directed t)e co%%ander to return: JSince dead %en )a+e co%e to life again I co%%and you to strike t)eir )eads fro% t)eir &odies.L 0)is t)e co%%ander did3 taking t)e

11B

city and killing its se+eral )undred t)ousand /eo/le. ali+e.

final ins/ection re+ealed forty /eo/le left

0alking to a ca/tured 9)(ari6%ian Prince3 8eng)i6 9)an3 (is)ing to kno( ()et)er )is ca%/aign of terror (ould /er%anently su&due t)e /eo/le of t)e 9)(ari6%ian e%/ire3 asked: J1o you t)ink t)at t)is &loods)ed (ill re%ain for e+er in t)e /eo/les %e%oriesKL 0)e Prince re/lied: Jif 8eng)i6 9)an continues t)is ca%/aign of %urder3 no one (ill &e left ali+e to )ar&our a %e%ory of t)e &loods)ed.L 0)is e-c)ange clearly e-)i&its &ot) ele%ents in t)e Mongolian %et)od: t)e /olitical strategy of terror and t)e ulti%ate logistic strategy of killing ci+ilians3 t)e /otential soldiers as (ell as t)e /roducers ()o su//orted t)e%. 0)e /olitical /rogra% (orked3 so inti%idating t)e /eo/le t)at ()en a single Mongol soldier rode into a +illage3 )e so o+era(ed t)e /o/ulation t)at )e could take ()at )e desired and kill ()o% )e (is)ed (it)out t)e slig)test resistance. 0)us3 8eng)i6 9)an .uickly su&dued a large Mo)a%%edan nation united to resist do%ination &y )eat)ens. 2astern 2uro/e lacked forces to face suc) an in+inci&le %ilitary %ac)ine3 t)e Russians relying on )ea+y ca+alry and )ea+y infantry3 t)e Poles on )ea+y ca+alry only3 and neit)er )a+ing enoug) foot arc)ers to resist t)e Mongol lig)t ca+alry. 1estroying t)e Russians ar%ies in 12?B and &urning t)eir (ooden#(alled cities and castles3 t)e Mongols turned a(ay fro% No+gorod3 a city in forested and s(a%/y terrain. ,ike t)e Part)ians ca+alry3 t)at of t)e Mongols could not function in forests. 1efeating t)e Poles3 t)e Mongols concentrated against t)e "ungarians3 ()o )ad %ars)alled a great )ost3 including %any )orse arc)ers. 0)oug) lacking a do%inant (ea/on syste%3 t)e Mongols defeated t)e "ungarians &ecause of t)eir generals)i/ and t)e tactical skill of t)eir (ell#articulated ar%y of +eteran regulars. Mongol detac)%ents t)en /enetrated sout) and (est until t)ey reac)ed t)e driatic. 0)is did not /ro+e an easy task &ecause t)e nati+es a%&us)ed t)e% in t)e %ountains and cut off t)eir su//lies3 %ounted forces )a+ing as %uc) difficulty in %ountains as in forests. s Po/e and 2%/eror soug)t to %o&ilise 2uro/e to resist t)is in+asion of )eat)en &ar&arians3 t)e Mongols disa//eared %ore .uickly t)an t)ey ca%e. 0)e deat) of t)e 9)an far a(ay in sia /ro+ided t)e occasion for t)e ending of a four#year ca%/aign. Mountains3 forests3 and %asonry# fortified cities and castle a)ead %ust )a+e /ro+ided additional incenti+es to lea+e3 as did t)e logistical o&stacles /resented &y forested country t)at )ad fe( /astures and little grain co%/ared (it) t)e enor%ous re.uire%ents of t)e all#%ounted Mongol ar%ies. So t)e &ooty#laden in+aders returned )o%e to t)eir ste//es3 lea+ing desolation &e)ind t)e%. 0)is (it)dra(al %ay not )a+e sa+ed all of !estern 2uro/e fro% t)e fate of Russia#do%ination &y t)e Mongols#&ut it certainly s/ared t)e% %uc) loss of life and /ro/erty. Back

Summary of Medieval (actics and Strategy

Medie+al (arfare accentuated t)e different functions a%ong t)e four (ea/on syste%s and e%/)asised t)e relati+e ad+antage eac) )ad co%/ared to t)e ot)ers. 0)e stirru/ strengt)ened t)e s)ock ca+alry and %ade %ore /ronounced t)e s/ecialisation t)at3 des/ite t)e By6antine )orse%en (it) lance and &o(3 largely a&olis)ed dual Gor generalH /ur/ose ca+alry. lt)oug) dis%ounted knig)ts3 skilled fig)ters on foot as (ell as )orse&ack3 could resist t)e assault of )ea+y ca+alry3 %ost infantry re.uired /ikes and a dense3 i%%o&ile for%ation to stand fast against a ca+alry c)arge. 0)e %enace of t)e stronger ca+alry (ould )a+e eli%inated t)e o/en3 s(ord#(ielding Ro%an for%ation in any case3 &ut t)e decentralisation of %edie+al ar%ies aggra+ated t)e situation. 4ndrilled3 unarticulated infantry3 ()en for%ed s)ield to s)ield3 could only defend. Medie+al )ea+y infantry did not e+en )a+e t)e %anoeu+ra&ility of a Macedonian /)alan-. 'urt)er3 t)e soldiers often lacked t)e %orale and co)esion t)at training and li+ing toget)er &rings and usually did not )a+e t)e res/onsi+eness t)at co%es fro% ser+ice under fa%iliar leaders.

11@

Since &ot) %ounted and %issile troo/s functioned %ore as indi+iduals t)an grou/s3 %edie+al ar%ies suffered little3 if any3 erosion in t)e .uality of t)ese (ea/on syste%s. In fact3 t)eir )ea+y ca+alry (as /ro&a&ly t)e &est t)e (orld )ad e+er seen. In arc)ery t)e su&stitution of t)e cross&o( co%/ensated for t)e lack of an arc)ery tradition in %uc) of 2uro/e. In s/ite of t)e a+aila&ility of a fe( %ounted cross&o(%en3 2uro/eans )ad dis/layed little interest in lig)t ca+alry. !it) )ea+y infantry s/ecialised to resist )ea+y ca+alry and lig)t infantry indis/ensa&le in sieges and finding its %ost effecti+e e%/loy%ent in t)e field against lig)t ca+alry3 t)e art of (ar a&out t)e year 12>> )ad t)ese clearly distinguis)a&le ca/a&ilities: using t)e sy%&ol T to %ean (as su/erior to3 )ea+y infantry T )ea+y ca+alry3 )ea+y ca+alry T lig)t infantry3 lig)t infantry T lig)t ca+alry3 and lig)t ca+alry T &ot) )ea+y infantry and )ea+y ca+alry. 0)ese relations)i/s are con+eniently su%%arised in &elo(3 in ()ic) M %eans a&ility to attack successfully in t)e direction of t)e arro( and M1 %eans a&ility to defend successfully in t)e direction of t)e arro(. ttack includes t)e ca/a&ility to co%/el t)e attacked to fig)t7 defend i%/lies only t)e ca/acity for successful resistance &ut no a&ility to force action. 0)e sc)e%atic assu%es a flat surface.

Ta(ti(al )a a-ilities of Wea on Systems Back

0)e a&ility of t)e ca+alry to dis%ount %odifies t)is diagra%. !)en t)e )ea+y ca+alry dis%ounted3 it &eca%e )ea+y infantry and confir%ed t)e generalisations t)at t)e %an on foot is su/erior to t)e %ounted %an and t)e defensi+e is stronger ()en t)e sa%e (ea/on syste%s confront one anot)er. ,ig)t ca+alry could gain co%/ara&le ad+antages &y dis%ounting3 and in eac) case t)e dis%ounted ca+alry in t)e defence could easily take ad+antage of terrain or artificial o&stacles3 so%et)ing %ore difficult to do %ounted. Medie+al soldiers gras/ed and often e-/loited t)e +alue of dis%ounting )ea+y ca+alry &ut3 lacking lig)t ca+alry3 could ne+er %ake use of t)is transfor%ation. 0)ey did occasionally %ount &o(%en3 gi+ing t)e% t)e strategic %o&ility of t)e lig)t ca+alry. 0)ey %ore rarely resorted to a si%ilar %ounting of )ea+y infantry3 /ro&a&ly &ecause of t)eir a%/le su//ly of )ea+y ca+alry. :et3 to )a+e %ounted )ea+y infantry on nags (ould )a+e &een a far %ore econo%ical solution )ad knig)ts custo%arily foug)t on foot. It (ould )a+e sa+ed t)e considera&le cost of a ro&ust (ar#)orse and t)e e-/ensi+e3 &ut unused3 skill in fig)ting %ounted. Medie+al (arfare (it) its )eterogeneity of tactical arrays contri&uted little else to tactics t)an t)is fir%er differentiation of roles. In strategy3 t)e defence do%inated3 in s/ite of t)e i%/ro+e%ent of t)e offensi+e ca/a&ilities of )ea+y ca+alry. !ood and %asonry castles and city (alls o+er/o(ered t)e offence. Medie+al strategy again s)o(ed t)at forcing t)e ene%y to fig)t on fa+oura&le3 or at least e.ual3 ter%s continued one of t)e %ost intracta&le strategic /ro&le%s if ar%ies )ad si%ilar co%/osition. If eit)er )ad &etter %o&ility on suita&le terrain3 t)e decision to fig)t &elonged to t)e ar%y (it) t)e &etter %o&ility. 0)us t)e Mongols could force or refuse &attle (it) any 2uro/ean ar%y. But (it)in 2uro/e a co%%ander could not co%/el a reasona&ly alert ene%y to fig)t unless3 as did t)e 2%/eror 'rederick at ,egnano3 )e left )is infantry &e)ind and attacked (it) )is ca+alry7 in t)is case3 t)e 2%/eror suffered defeat ()en )e could not o+erco%e t)e Italian infantry. But instead of retreat3 %edie+al defenders fre.uently used defences ot)er recourse Gdefending in a strong /ositionH and for t)is /ur/ose t)eir (alled cities and castles /ro+ided t)e &est %eans. 0)e

12>

attacker3 faced (it) t)e alternati+e of raids or usually unsuccessful sieges3 could rarely carry out a decisi+e3 /ersisting ca%/aign. Magyar and Viking raiders %ade t)e /rinci/al use of t)e retreat alternati+e3 and t)e /ersisting strategy of defence in de/t) e%/loyed against t)e% co%&ined /ursuit (it) fortification of cities and key co%%unication /oints3 ()ic) also ser+ed as refuges for ci+ilians and &arriers to %o+e%ent. 0)e strong#/oint syste% /ro+ed %ore efficacious t)an /ursuit in dealing (it) t)ese raiders3 es/ecially as t)e Magyars )ad greater %o&ility and t)e Vikings t)e tactically do%inant )ea+y infantry facing t)e )ea+y ca+alry t)at )ad o+ertaken t)e%. Medie+al con.uerors also used fortification syste%s for an offensi+e /ersisting strategy3 t)e 'rankis) ruler $)arles t)e *reat &uilding forts to control t)e Sa-ons )e )ad defeated. By )a+ing a%ong t)eir ne( su&Dects forts t)at controlled co%%unication routes3 t)e 'ranks e-ercised a certain %easure of influence o+er t)e country3 es/ecially since t)e forts )ad great defensi+e strengt) and t)eir garrisons could take t)e offensi+e. In S/ain and !ales t)e in+aders o+erran ene%y territory /iece &y /iece3 consolidating eac) con.uest &y erecting castles. 0)e fortification a//roac)3 ()et)er on t)e offensi+e or t)e defensi+e3 constituted an a//lication of /ersisting strategy. 'ortification also %eant an e%/loy%ent of co%&at strategy3 an e-tre%e case of taking u/ a strong /osition and e-/loiting t)e /o(er of t)e defence to resist a frontal attack. 'urt)er3 since fortifications e%&odied t)e attri&utes of &ot) )ea+y and lig)t infantry3 t)ey co%/rised t)e ulti%ately su/erior (ea/on syste% on t)e defence and assured t)e /ri%acy of t)e strategic defensi+e. late %edie+al %ilitary (riter e%/)asised reliance on fortifications to resist in+asion as an alternati+e to %eeting t)e ene%y in &attle ()en )e reco%%ended t)at a ruler Jre/air and su//ly (it) foodstuffs3 artillery and %en t)e /rinci/al /laces of t)e frontierL and Jto de%olis) t)ose ()ic) (ere not defensi&le.L 0)e nu%&er of castles in %any areas %ade suc) a strategy .uite for%ida&le. 5ne region in t)e eastern /art of /resent#day 'rance )ad se+enty castles in an area of less t)an ?3>>> s.uare %iles3 a castle for a&out e+ery forty s.uare %iles. Suc) /o(erful defences often reduced in+aders to raiding to seek to secure /olitical concessions &y %aking t)e (ar e-/ensi+e t)roug) t)eir de/redations. 0)e destructi+eness of suc) raids encouraged defenders to add to t)eir for%ida&le co%&at defence in de/t) of t)e castles a defensi+e logistic strategy. 0)us t)e sa%e aut)ority urged t)e defenders Jto (it)dra( all li+estock fro% t)e frontier and a &road s(at)e into t)e interior of )is country and to /lace all food su//lies fro% t)e countryside in strong /laces so t)at t)e ene%y %ig)t not find anyt)ing ()en t)ey co%e to lay siege and ride a&out in strengt).L No (onder t)e %edie+al strategic defence )ad suc) /ara%ountcy. 0)e use of fortifications for offensi+e /ur/oses G%aking /ossi&le a gradual encroac)%ent into )ostile territoryH could also i%/le%ent an offensi+e logistic strategy. 5+er se+eral centuries t)e /ersistent $)ristian con.uest and fortification of successi+e /ieces of Mosle% S/ain )ad Dust suc) a logistic effect. 2ac) ne( /iece of $)ristian territory added %ilitary %an/o(er to t)e states. But t)ese ac.uisitions also su&tracted an e.ual a%ount fro% t)e %ilitary resources of t)e Mosle% %onarc)s. Since al%ost any logistic %et)od in strategy also re.uired co%&at to carry it out3 t)e $)ristian strategy in S/ain could &e c)aracterised as &asically logistic in effect if not in i%%ediate /ur/ose. 0)us3 a /ersisting strategy could (in gradually and attain its success as a logistic strategy. It %ig)t3 of course3 secure +ictory %ore .uickly3 as an a//lication of co%&at strategy3 if t)e aggressor )ad sufficiently li%ited goals or t)e defender )ad a (eak enoug) %oti+e for resistance. !it) frontiers against t)e $elts in 2ngland3 t)e Moors in S/ain3 and t)e Sla+s in t)e 2ast3 %edie+al soldiers and go+ern%ents learned t)oroug)ly t)e %eans of +an.uis)ing )ostile /eo/les. 5f course3 t)e 0urkis) and Mongolian syste%s acco%/lis)ed t)e o&Decti+e %ore .uickly. 0o )a+e killed off t)e %ilitary %an/o(er of t)e $elts and Sla+s (ould )a+e su&dued t)eir resistance &y terror and de/ri+ed t)e% of t)e %an/o(er resources to resist. 5n one occasion t)e Ro%ans3 ()o so%eti%es resorted to suc) %easures3 )ad carried t)is /olicy to its logical conclusion. !)en a s%all tri&e in 121

frica3 t)e Nasa%ones3 re+olted t)e Ro%an co%%ander Jattacked t)e% and anni)ilated t)e%3 e+en destroying all t)e non#co%&atants.L 0)e 2%/eror J1o%itian (as elated at t)is success and said to t)e Senate MI )a+e for&idden t)e Nasa%ones to e-ist.L But t)e $)ristian rulers of 2uro/e usually used t)e %ore )u%ane3 if less ra/id3 %eans of gradual con.uest and /acification t)roug) fortification. 0)is /olicy3 ()ic) continued unc)anged t)roug) t)e close of t)e Middle ges and in+ol+ed s/ecialised (arfare against different o//onents on +arying terrain3 )ad %uc) to do (it) t)e re# e%ergence of regional and national tactical syste%s. Back

THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW COM"INED ARMS TACTICAL SYNTHESIS, !200 !#00

(he French *ersion of Medieval Warfare
0)e ar%ed forces of 'rance3 ()ere t)e 'ranks )ad done so %uc) to esta&lis) t)e )ea+y ca+alry tradition3 &est e-e%/lified t)e %edie+al %et)ods and conce/ts of (arfare. Bounded &y S/ain3 Italy3 *er%any3 and3 across t)e $)annel3 2ngland3 'rance occu/ied suc) a central /osition in %edie+al 2uro/e t)at t)e e-/erience of frontier (arfare )ad little effect on t)e 'renc) (ay of (ar. In 'rance t)e %edie+al e%/)asis on )ea+y ca+alry and on t)e offensi+e in &attle reac)ed its )ig)est de+elo/%ent. Because %ounted %en )a+e a disad+antage on t)e defensi+e3 'renc) co%%anders3 al%ost in+aria&ly dra(n fro% t)e )ea+y ca+alry no&ility3 naturally t)oug)t in ter%s of t)e offensi+e. !it)out good arc)ers3 (it) t)e cross&o( difficult to use %ounted3 and (it) little tradition of lig)t ca+alry3 t)e c)arge of t)e )ea+y ca+alry do%inated t)e conce/t of ca+alry in 'renc) %ilitary t)oug)t. !)ile t)ey largely o+erlooked t)e key role infantry could /lay in &attle3 t)e 'renc) )ad strong tactical reasons for t)us neglecting t)e de/loy%ent of lig)t infantry on t)e &attlefield. Valua&le in sieges and indis/ensa&le for dealing (it) 0urkis) )orse arc)ers3 lig)t infantry /ro+ed too +ulnera&le to )ea+y ca+alry to )a+e a /lace on a &attlefield ()ere %ailed )orse%en /re+ailed. "ea+y infantry3 also of )ig) +alue in sieges3 too found little /lace in t)e 'renc) idea of t)e &attlefield &ecause t)e %ercenaries ()o )el/ed garrison and attack castles )ad no tradition or organisation for for%ing to resist t)e c)arge of t)e )ea+y ca+alry. Rural %ilitia %ig)t array t)e%sel+es in close order3 &ut3 ill#ar%ed and untrained3 t)ey could not resist t)e ca+alry eit)er. Belie+ing t)e offensi+e t)e strongest %ode of co%&at and t)inking in ter%s of ca+alry as t)e /re%ier (ea/on syste%3 'renc) leaders ne+er considered trying to de+elo/ a )ea+y infantry t)at could resist t)e ca+alry. 0)eir o(n tactical training centred on t)e Doust and t)e &attle#like %ounted tourna%ent in ()ic) t)ey /erfected t)e tec)ni.ues of %ounted co%&at. 0)e neglect of t)e infantry also )ad a foundation in aristocratic conte%/t for t)eir social inferiors ()o foug)t on foot. 5n one occasion3 ()en 'renc) infantry see%ed to &e (inning a &attle (it)out t)e aid of t)e ca+alry3 a )istorian of t)e ti%e sa( Dealousy as a %oti+e for t)e c)arge of t)e ca+alry7 )e )ad one of t)e 'renc) leaders say: J'or(ard great lords and little lords3 look to it t)at (e )a+e t)e )onour and t)e +ictory in t)is &attle.L Social &ias reinforced t)e /ers/ecti+e of t)e leaders. nd t)e real difficulties in /ro+iding suita&le )ea+y infantry also con+inced 'renc) co%%anders not to alter t)eir usual /ractice of relying /ri%arily on t)eir )ea+y ca+alry. 0)ese sa%e factors )ad %uc) to do (it) t)e tendency to t)ink of co%&at in ter%s of t)e frontal attack. 0)e culture of c)i+alry and t)e conce/t of )onour %ade t)e 'renc) t)ink of acce/ting c)allenges and fair fig)ts on e+en ter%s3 t)us &uttressing t)e fi-ation on t)e frontal fig)t e-/erienced in t)e Doust. Moreo+er3 li%ited &attle e-/erience furt)er in)i&ited t)e de+elo/%ent of

122

t)e tactics of en+elo/%ent3 a %anoeu+re difficult in any case for ca+alry to e-ecute against ca+alry. 4nlike infantry3 ca+alry can c)ange its front fairly readily &ecause its co%&at3 in+ol+ing %ore indi+idual t)an grou/ action3 de/ends less on for%ation and drill. 0)e assu%/tion of t)e su/eriority of t)e offensi+e also contri&uted to t)e culture of t)e frontal attack. 5f course3 t)e assu%/tion )ad trut) ()en )ea+y ca+alry faced )ea+y ca+alry3 lig)t infantry3 or inade.uately e.ui//ed or /re/ared )ea+y infantry. In 122@ t)e young 9ing of ragon3 for e-a%/le3 (it) only 4>> knig)ts c)arged 23>>> Mosle% /ike%en as t)ey %o+ed to(ard )i%. "is c)arge succeeded Gas )e )ad foreseenH &ecause t)e /ike#%ens ad+ance )ad o/ened ga/s in t)eir line into ()ic) t)e ragonese knig)ts c)arged (it) de+astating effect. 0)us t)e 'renc) as e-e%/lars of %edie+al %ilitary %et)ods failed to understand %any of t)e insig)ts of t)e soldiers of t)e ancient (orld. Notions of en+elo/%ent3 concentration against (eakness3 and (inning (it) t)e least effort )ad little or no /lace a%ong t)eir o/erational ideas. 0)ey )ad only a %odest notion of a su&tracted reser+e and e+en less of a co%%ander ()o %anaged t)e &attle rat)er t)an led )is troo/s. Because of t)e infre.uency of &attles and t)e ad#)oc c)aracter of %ost feudal ar%ies3 t)e 'renc) lacked ade.uately organised and articulated ar%ies as (ell as any co%%and structure. In fact3 a 'renc) ar%y3 co%/osed of %any %en i%/ortant for t)eir (ealt)3 social /restige3 and /olitical /o(er3 )ad %uc) %ore in co%%on (it) a collection of /ri%a donnas t)an an ar%y organised on t)e Macedonian or Ro%an %odel. Many of t)ese sa%e factors ke/t t)e% fro% de+elo/ing an ade.uate logistical organisation. 5nly t)e By6antine and Mongol ar%ies of t)e 2ast e.ualled t)e ancient %odels. But 'renc) soldiers did co%/re)end t)e significance of fortifications7 t)ey &uilt increasingly strong and co%/le- castles and to(n (alls and astutely founded t)eir strategy on t)e /ri%acy of t)e /er%anently fortified defence. Medie+al leaders could dis/lay so/)istication in t)eir strategy3 as did 9ing 8o)n in ot)er o/erations &esides )is ca%/aign (it) t)e 2%/eror 5tto against 9ing P)ili/ of 'rance. Nor (ere t)e 'renc)3 ()o /layed t)e %ost i%/ortant role in t)e $rusades3 inca/a&le of gras/ing /rinci/les clearly understood &y t)e ancients. 0)eir use of cross&o(%en to defeat )orse arc)ers and Ric)ard t)e ,ion#"earteds /erce/ti+e %i-ing of cross&o(%en and /ike%en s)o(ed t)ey could understand t)e relati+e ad+antages of t)e different (ea/on syste%s. 0)e 'renc) $rusaders also used t)e tactics of sur/rise and of flank attacks. In 2uro/e3 )o(e+er3 e-ce/t for t)eir fortifications3 t)e $rusaders %ade little effort to use t)e lessons of t)e 2ast to %odify t)eir tactical %et)ods. It took t)e e-/erience of (ar on frontiers nearer t)an Syria and Palestine to affect late %edie+al (arfare3 and t)ese occurred against a &ackdro/ of c)anges in %ilitary tec)nology and logistics. Back

Changes in "ogistics
,ate %edie+al (arfare sa( significant logistical c)anges as t)e e-/ansion of co%%erce and regional s/ecialisation and di+ision of la&our increased /roducti+ity and t)e use of %oney. I%/ro+ed agricultural %et)ods and i%/le%ents also aug%ented (ealt)3 ena&ling rulers to su//ort larger ar%ies. More and %ore suc) rulers relied on /rofessionals3 relegating %ilitias to ser+ice in sieges and to resisting raids or in+asions. But t)e /rofessional soldiers (ere not of t)e Ro%an ty/e3 recruited and organised &y %onarc)s and ke/t constantly under ar%s and in training. Instead3 t)ey (ere %ercenaries3 soldiers ()o )ired t)e%sel+es out for a /eriod rarely e-ceeding a year. !illia% t)e $on.ueror3 for e-a%/le3 )ad de/ended )ea+ily on suc) %en in )is con.uest of 2ngland. 4sually t)e ruler (orked t)roug) %ilitary contractors3 ()o undertook to /ro+ide a certain nu%&er and ty/e of troo/s for a gi+en ca%/aign. 0)e gro(t) in t)e circulation of %oney and increased tare+enues ena&led %onarc)s and /rinces to e%/loy /rofessionals rat)er t)an to rely on a %ilitary tain kind /aid t)roug) o&ligatory %ilitary ser+ice. 0)is su&stitution of /rofessional soldiers %eant %ore co%/etent ar%ies and ena&led ca%/aigns to continue as long as a rulers funds lasted. But e+en t)oug) %any soldiers3 as indi+iduals or grou/s3 12?

(orked for t)e sa%e contractor year after year3 t)e ar%ies lacked t)e /rofessionalis% of t)e Ro%an and later By6antine standing forces &ecause t)e co%/osition of t)e ar%ies did c)ange fro% year to year. 0)is fluctuation in /ersonnel %eant t)at %ercenary ar%ies3 lacking settled organisation3 )ad no esta&lis)ed unit si6e3 c)ain of co%%and3 or e-/erience in training toget)er. !it)out t)ese3 t)ey lacked articulation and )ad little unit co)esi+eness or es/rit de cor/s. s a conse.uence3 t)e )ea+y infantry co%/osed of suc) %ercenaries3 t)oug) skilled in sieges3 lacked a&ility to %anoeu+re on t)e &attlefield. 0)is kind of /ri+ate enter/rise in t)e creation and o/eration of ar%ies /ro+ed less effecti+e t)an t)e socialistic Ro%an %odel of state o(ners)i/ of ar%ies. n e-/ansion of agricultural /roduction and3 until t)e /lague t)at &egan in t)e %iddle of t)e fourteent) century3 a gro(t) in /o/ulation en)anced t)e a&ility of ar%ies to /ro+ide for t)e%sel+es and to carry out sustained ca%/aigns. 0)e greater a+aila&ility of %oney facilitated t)e /urc)ase of food3 lodging3 and fodder ()ile ca%/aigning and encouraged t)e use of /ri+ate contractors to su//ly t)e ar%ys needs. But tec)nological /rogress also /rofoundly affected logistics: t)e introduction of t)e )orses)oe and t)e /erfection of t)e )orse collar /er%itted )orses to /ull )arder3 using t)eir s)oulders rat)er t)an t)eir necks. 0)e s/read of an effecti+e tande% )arness ena&led &etter#designed (agons to )a+e as %any /airs of )orses as t)e load (arranted. 0)e faster )orse (it) greater endurance gradually su/erseded t)e o-. !)ere ade.uate roads e-isted3 t)e (agon dra(n &y )orses re/laced t)e o-cart and t)e /ack ani%al. 0)ese inno+ations &roug)t a&out suc) a dra%atic gro(t) in efficiency t)at t)e costs of road trans/ort fell &y t(o#t)irds. In Ro%an ti%es t)e e-/ense of )auling grain 1>> %iles )ad e.ualled t)e +alue of t)e grain7 in t)e t)irteent) century t)e trans/ort c)arge for 1>> %iles fell to only ?> /ercent of t)e /rice of t)e grain. Suc) a c)ange /rofoundly affected %ilitary su//ly3 ena&ling stationary ar%ies to dra( fro% a far#larger radius and3 if necessary3 to carry (it) t)e% a %uc) greater a%ount of food. S)i//ing also under(ent a %aDor transfor%ation during t)e later Middle ges3 one essentially co%/lete &y t)e year 1=>>. Merc)ant s)i/s gre( in si6e and sailing a&ility. Single %asts ga+e (ay to t(o3 t)ree3 and e+en four %asts3 and (it) as %any as t)ree sails on a gi+en %ast3 s)i/s could sail faster and closer to t)e direction fro% ()ic) t)e (ind ca%e. t first3 t)e larger s)i/s )ad dee/ drafts3 )ig) free&oards3 and stu&&y di%ensions3 a &readt) of )alf t)e lengt) of t)e keel and a t)ird of t)e o+erall lengt). 0)ese +essels /ro+ed resistant to &ad (eat)er &ut slo( and difficult to %anoeu+re. In t)e si-teent) century a//eared lo(er s)i/s (it) a &ea% a t)ird of t)e lengt) of t)e keel. 0)ese )ad )ig)er s/eed3 &etter sailing c)aracteristics3 and greater facility for %anoeu+ring. But t)e %ore significant ad+ance for (ater trans/ort ca%e (it) /rogress in na+igation. 0)e introduction of t)e co%/ass %ade it far easier for s)i/s to sail out of sig)t of land. By using t)e ti%e a s)i/ re.uired to /ass an o&Dect in t)e (ater3 a %ariner could esti%ate t)e s/eed of )is s)i/ and t)us t)e distance tra+elled. lt)oug) difficulties in deter%ining latitude at sea and t)e ina&ility to kno( longitude still %ade na+igation a//ro-i%ate rat)er t)an e-act3 t)ese ad+ances enor%ously aug%ented t)e ca/a&ilities of s)i/s. Mariners &eca%e co%/etent and confident in sailing out of sig)t of land. Back

Changes in Wea'ons
In t)e t)irteent) century ar%oured %en &egan to use /lates to strengt)en t)eir %ail ar%our at /articularly +ulnera&le /oints3 suc) as t)e s)in and knee. *radually )ea+y ca+alry added %ore and %ore /late to t)e %all until a co%/lete suit of /late ar%our3 ()ic) /rotected t)e (earer fro% t)e s)ock of &lo(s and deflected &ot) )and (ea/ons and cross&o( &olts3 &eca%e co%%on. )el%et t)at co%/letely co+ered t)e face )ad already &een ado/ted. suit of t)e ne( ar%our could (eig) se+enty /ounds3 and3 toget)er (it) its o(n ar%our3 t)e )orse )ad to carry o+er 1>> /ounds of %etal alone. !it) a )orse /rotected fro% lance (ounds in t)e c)est and t)e rider +irtually /roof against )ar%3 t)e knig)t &eca%e far %ore for%ida&le. "o(e+er3 t)is alteration &ot) raised t)e cost of t)e %ounted %an and seriously reduced )is %o&ility. 0)e )ea+ily &urdened )orse found it )arder to 124

gallo/ and t)e rider )ad difficulty in e-ecuting any %anoeu+re &ut t)e straig)t#a)ead c)arge. 1is%ounted3 t)e rider could (alk only (it) difficulty and )ad trou&le in cli%&ing onto )is )orse and in rising if )e fell. 0)e in+ention of gun/o(der took a long ti%e to affect land (arfare. Its significant use /ro+ed to &e not in rockets or in &o%&s t)ro(n &y siege engines &ut in /ro/elling %issiles fro% a tu&e. By t)e %iddle of t)e fourteent) century cannon )ad &eco%e co%%on3 &ut 1>> years ela/sed &efore t)e cannon )ad enoug) /o(er to &atter do(n (alls easily enoug) to &ring a&out a re+olution in t)e art of (ar. 0)en3 ()en e-isting castles and city (alls &eca%e o&solete3 %ilitary engineers de+elo/ed a ne( a//roac)3 and defenders erected ne( fortifications. Because of its %uc) greater effecti+eness t)e siege artillery /o(ered &y gun/o(der re/laced t)e siege engines t)en in use. So%e of t)e ne( cannon (ere large enoug) to fire a stone cannon&all (eig)ing 4>> or %ore /ounds3 &ut %ost (ere so difficult to %o+e and took so %uc) ti%e to e%/lace t)at t)ey (ere considered fi-ed. But Dust as t)e Ro%ans )ad carried s%all &allista on ()eeled carriages into t)e field and )ad e+ol+ed t)e )and &allista in t)e for% of t)e cross&o(3 so did %o&ile and /orta&le guns de+elo/. 0)e fifteent) century sa( &ot) s%all cannon on ()eels and s%all cannon carried &y indi+idual soldiers. 0)e %o&ile artillery3 on +ery /ri%iti+e carriages3 /ro+ed )ard to %o+e and ai% and )ad little influence on &attles for a long ti%e. ,acking t)e %o&ility of t)e lig)t ca+alrys and lig)t infantrys /orta&le %issile syste%s3 t)e %o&ile artillery also s)ared t)ese syste%s ina&ility to resist t)e c)arge of eit)er of t)e )ea+y (ea/on syste%s. 4nlike t)e lig)t infantry and lig)t ca+alry3 t)e guns lacked t)e %o&ility to esca/e t)e )ea+y infantry.

Plate Armour Back

0)e gun found its %aDor tactical e%/loy%ent in t)e relati+ely i%%o&ile +ersion in sieges and in t)e /orta&le )andgun. 2arly )andguns %ade little i%/ression &ecause of difficulty in ai%ing and s)ooting. 'iring a )andgun Ga %iniature cannon attac)ed to a stickH in+ol+ed &ringing a &urning su&stance into contact (it) a s%all touc))ole in t)e rear of t)e %u66le#loaded &arrel3 causing t)e

12<

c)arge to ignite and t)e gun to s)oot. 4sually a s%ouldering cord3 called a %atc)3 su//lied t)e ignition. 0o )old t)e gun in one )and and touc) t)e %atc) to t)e )ole (it) t)e ot)er %ade ai%ing +irtually i%/ossi&le. ,acking greater /o(er and (it) a slo( rate of fire3 t)e )andgun could not co%/ete (it) t)e /recision of t)e cross&o(3 t)e )ig) rate of fire of t)e &o(3 or t)e accuracy of eit)er in skilled )ands. In t)e %iddle of t)e fifteent) century t)e %atc)lock i%/ro+ed t)e a&ility to ai% t)e )andgun. By attac)ing t)e &urning end of t)e %atc) to a trigger o/erated )ook3 t)e o/erator could use t)e trigger to %o+e t)e %atc) into contact (it) t)e touc))ole ()ile si%ultaneously )olding t)e gun (it) &ot) )ands and ai%ing. But s)ooting a %atc)lock re%ained slo( (ork. In order to load3 t)e gunner )ad to %easure out /o(der3 /ut it in t)e &arrel3 insert t)e lead &all3 and /lace a (ad in to )old in t)e &ullet and /o(der. Beside t)e touc))ole (as a s%all /an t)at ()en filled (it) /o(der and ignited (it) t)e %atc)3 (ould flare to ignite t)e /o(der c)arge in t)e &arrel. 0)e gunner co%/leted loading &y closing a co+er on t)e /an to kee/ t)e /o(der fro% falling out until )e (as ready to s)oot. !)ile )e loaded3 )e )ad &ot) to kee/ )is %atc) a(ay fro% t)e /o(der and also to kee/ it alig)t. 0)is )e did after loading &y &lo(ing on it or &y gras/ing it so%e distance fro% t)e &urning end and ()irling it around in t)e air. !)en ready to s)oot )e fi-ed )is %atc) to )is )ook3 o/ened )is /an3 took ai%3 and /ulled t)e trigger. &out )alf t)e ti%e t)e gun fired3 sending out a lead &all a&out t)ree#.uarters of an inc) in dia%eter. 0)e ot)er )alf of t)e ti%e )is %atc) (ent out3 t)e /o(der fell fro% )is /an3 t)e /o(der flas)ed in t)e /an (it)out igniting t)e c)arge3 or so%e ot)er accident /re+ented a s)ot. If t)e gun s)ot3 t)e gunner )ad a&out a fifty#fifty c)ance of )itting a line of %en s)oulder to s)oulder 1>> yards a(ay. In s/ite of increases in /o(er3 t)is %atc)lock3 called an ar.ue&us3 could not )a+e co%/eted (it) t)e cross&o( )ad it not &een for its lo( cost. si%/le iron or &rass tu&e on a (ooden stock (it) an unco%/licated )ook and trigger3 t)e (ea/on cost far less t)an a cross&o( t)at )ad a (indlass or reduction gears for cocking to aug%ent its /o(er. Making a cross&o( re.uired a (eek of skilled la&our and t)e (indlass took anot)er (eek. It could take as little as a days (ork to %ake a gun. Making a cross&o( &olt re.uired a )alf )our of skilled la&our7 )andgun &alls could &e cast in &atc)es. !it) /o(er e.ual or greater t)an t)e cross&o( and (it) a&out t)e sa%e rate of fire3 t)e ar.ue&us &egan to su//lant t)e cross&o( &y t)e end of t)e fifteent) century.

Mat(hlo($ Back

$o%/ara&le in rate of fire to t)e cross&o(3 t)e ar.ue&us (as not as relia&le or accurate. 0)e fla( (as in t)e (ea/on itself Gt)e &all fitted only loosely in t)e &arrelH3 so skill in ai%ing did not constitute a factor in )andgun training alt)oug) an e-/erienced %an ()o kne( )is a%%unition and t)e idiosyncrasies of )is (ea/on could s)oot far &etter t)an a no+ice. So rat)er t)an accuracy soldiers stressed s/eed and relia&ility in loading %o+e%ents so as to increase t)eir rate of fire3 a %ore de/enda&le co%&at +aria&le t)an /recise ai%ing. s t)e less costly (ea/on syste%3 t)e ar.ue&us ra/idly dis/laced &o(s in t)e si-teent) century. But ar.ue&uses %erely re/laced &o(s

12=

(it)out adding %uc) to t)e effecti+eness of soldiers ar%ed (it) %issile (ea/ons. nd t)oug) siege artillery did de+elo/ so %uc) /o(er as to render e-isting fortifications o&solete3 t)is c)ange did not occur until a&out t)e %iddle of t)e fifteent) century. So gun/o(der contri&uted not)ing to t)e regional tactical s/ecialisation t)at )ad e%erged &y t)e later Middle ges and t)at ga+e a different fla+our to 2uro/ean (arfare in t)e t)irteent) century and after. Back

!ersisting Strategy and the Com'letion of the -nglish Con&uest of Wales

fter anot)er century of inter%ittent (arfare &et(een t)e !els) and t)e 2nglis)3 a significant conflict &et(een t)e% &roke out in 12C=. 0)e !els) in t)e nort) )ad3 in Prince ,ly(elen3 a s)re(d and e-/erienced leader (it) t)e title Prince of !ales and a /o(er &ase t)at e-tended (ell into t)e sout). ,ly(elen )ad already e-/anded )is do%ain at t)e e-/ense of t)e 2nglis)3 &ut in t)e ne( 9ing3 2d(ard I3 )e faced an acco%/lis)ed soldier and %aster strategist ()o3 as Prince 2d(ard3 )ad dis/layed )is &rilliance against t)e de Montforts in t)e 2+es)a% ca%/aign. In 12C= t)e 9ing asse%&led a large force of /aid troo/s3 (it) little ca+alry &ut %any &o(%en3 s/ear%en3 car/enters3 and diggers. Rat)er t)an t)e i%/ressi+e &ut e/)e%eral and ineffecti+e in+asions of )is regal /redecessors3 )e /lanned a /ersisting ca%/aign of occu/ation. "e a+oided serious logistic difficulties &y t)e use of little ca+alry and )ad a force t)at could fig)t t)e !els) on t)eir o(n ter%s on %oors and in %ountains and forests. 9ing 2d(ards initial ca%/aign .uickly con.uered t)e /eri/)eral and luke(ar% su&Dects of Prince ,ly(elen. 0)en3 faced in t)e (inter (it) a co%/act3 rugged3 and )ostile area in nort)#(estern !ales3 )e continued ca%/aigning3 &eginning a syste%atic &ut ra/id /ursuit of t)e i%/licit strategy of t)e /re+ious t(o centuries. Not neglecting a logistic strategy3 /otent against suc) a &arren area3 )e interdicted t)e %o+e%ent of su//lies into ,ly(elens do%ain. "is (inter ca%/aign /ro+ed so effecti+e t)at in less t)an a year t)e Prince of !ales %ade /eace3 acce/ting %arkedly di%inis)ed territories and influence. $ertainly in concluding /eace ,ly(elen %ust )a+e taken into account 9ing 2d(ards furt)er a//lication of logistic strategy in Se/te%&er 12CC3 ()en )e ca/tured t)e large3 fertile island of nglesey3 Dust off t)e coast of nort)ern !ales. 0)e 9ings %en )ar+ested t)e cro/s t)at (ould nor%ally )a+e gone to t)e %ainland to su//ly 2d(ards ad+ersaries. 9ing 2d(ard3 a t)oroug) &uilder3 t)en /us)ed t)e re/air of castles and started to construct ne( ones. 0)at t)e !els) )ad &uilt t)eir o(n %eant t)at t)e 2nglis) found ready %any t)at t)ey needed to do%inate t)eir ne( con.uests. 'i+e years later3 in anot)er (ar lasting a year3 t)e 9ings forces3 (ell o+er @> /ercent infantry and large in relation to t)e area and t)e nu%&er of t)e )ostile /o/ulation3 occu/ied t)e re%aining area of nort) !ales and took all of its castles. 0)is /ersisting ca%/aign3 ()ic) s/anned t)e (inter3 co%/leted t)e con.uest of !ales. 0)e 2nglis) faced a less difficult task t)an t)ey e-/ected &ecause ,ly(elen3 as )e )urried to Doin a detac)%ent of )is %en3 %et an 2nglis) soldier ()o3 not recognising t)e Prince of !ales3 ran )i% t)roug) (it) )is s/ear. 0)e loss of )is leaders)i/ and t)e %orale of )is follo(ers %ade 2d(ards task easier. nd t)e 9ing %o+ed .uickly to consolidate )is rule &y re/airing castles. In se+en years t)e 9ing )ad constructed or re&uilt nine castles of enlarged si6e and in accord (it) an i%/ro+ed design. In t)e ne-t ele+en years t)e 2nglis) faced t(o re&ellions &ut dealt .uickly and effecti+ely (it) eac). 0)roug)out 2d(ards ca%/aigns3 !els)%en )ad co%/osed t)e %aDority of )is forces. !ales t)en3 in s/ite of a &rief3 fierce re&ellion a century later3 re%ained a /eaceful and a gradually %ore 2nglis) /art of t)e 9ings do%ains. 2d(ard conciliated %any of t)e !els) ()en )e %ade )is son 2d(ard3 ()o )ad &een &orn in !ales3 Prince of !ales3 t)us continuing &ut a//ro/riating t)e title of t)e local ruler. But t)e gradual /enetration of !ales o+er t)e /re+ious t(o centuries /ro+ided t)e /ri%ary /olitical co%/onent of t)e con.uest. 0)e %ilitary %eans for su&duing !ales consisted of a /ersisting strategy3 essentially co%&at &ut (it) a logistical ele%ent i%/ortant o+er t)e long run. 0)e 2nglis) (ould not )a+e needed t(o 12C

centuries for t)e task )ad t)ey used %ore of t)eir kingdo%s resources and if t)ey could )a+e /ursued t)e effort in a continuous rat)er t)an inter%ittent (ay. Ne+ert)eless3 t)e %et)od re.uired /atience. 0)e con.uest of an area3 suc) as a +alley3 and t)e &uilding of a castle to control co%%unication and to do%inate t)e area took ti%e. 5nce t)e 2nglis) )ad esta&lis)ed t)eir control and )ad &egun to )arness t)e resources of t)e +an.uis)ed region to t)eir o(n uses3 t)ey could3 )ad t)ey %ade an unre%itting effort at con.uest3 )a+e /ro%/tly %o+ed on to re/eat in anot)er area t)e /rocess of in+asion and do%inance t)roug) fortification. 0)e castles e-/loited t)e /o(er of t)e defence in its %ost telling for%3 t)ro(ing u/on t)e defenders t)e &urden of a /articularly difficult tactical offensi+e if t)ey (ere to /re+ent t)e loss of anot)er /arcel of territory. $oncentration of t)e initial occu/ation and /acification effort in a s%all area also ena&led t)e in+aders to increase t)e ratio of force to s/ace and t)eir castles not only /re+ented !els) recon.uest of areas already taken &ut also in)i&ited raids into t)ese territories. 0)us t)e 2nglis) could gradually reconcile t)e defeated to t)eir rule3 assi%ilating t)e% until )olding t)e district re.uired less force and freeing %en for t)e in+asion and control of t)e ne-t seg%ent of territory. 0)e gro(t) of to(ns and culti+ation of t)e soil accelerated t)is /rocess of /ro/agating t)e 2nglis) outlook3 institutions3 and3 e+entually3 language in !ales. Back

(he -nglish Combined-#rms (actical System in Scotland

lt)oug) t)e ca%/aigns in !ales in+ol+ed a nu%&er of sieges3 t)e ad+ersaries engaged in fe( &attles3 as t)e !els) de/ended largely on t)e raids and a%&us)es of guerrilla (arfare. !)en t)e !els) in t)e nort) did face t)e 2nglis) in &attle3 t)ey e%/loyed t)eir c)aracteristic /)alan- of /ike%en. country like !ales (it) li%ited co%%erce and agricultural /roducti+ity could not afford t)e e-/ensi+e3 ar%oured )orse%an. It ado/ted ine-/ensi+e infantry and3 like t)e Macedonians3 used t)e long /ike t)at ke/t t)e ene%y at a distance3 %aking costly &ody ar%our less i%/ortant. In co%&ating t)is /o(erful defensi+e for%ation t)e 2nglis) used t)e sa%e tactics e%/loyed &y !illia% t)e $on.ueror at "astings. Instead of a futile ca+alry c)arge against t)e serried ranks of !els) /ike%en3 t)e 2nglis) first sent for(ard t)eir &o(%en and cross&o(%en ()ose %issiles so (eakened t)e /assi+ely defending !els) t)at a ca+alry c)arge could succeed. In sout)ern !ales t)e 2nglis) )ad encountered !els)%en ar%ed (it) t)e long&o(3 ()ic) is far %ore for%ida&le t)an t)e ordinary &o(. Very strong and as long as a %ans )eig)t3 t)is (ea/on )ad /o(er co%/ara&le to a cross or co%/osite &o(. In one instance t)e /oint of an arro( s)ot at a (ooden door four inc)es t)ick usually /rotruded slig)tly on t)e ot)er side of t)e door. But t)e essential feature of t)e long&o( lay in t)e %an rat)er t)an in t)e &o(: it re.uired years of /ractice to de+elo/ t)e strengt) to /ull it and to ac.uire t)e %astery for accurate s)ooting. 0)e cross&o( su&stituted a %ac)ine for t)e strengt) and facility of t)e %an7 t)e long&o( relied on a su/erlati+ely (ell#trained %an. 0)e su/erior skill of t)e %an raised t)e cost of t)e (ea/on syste%3 &ut not so %uc) in a /oor country like !ales. 1e/ending on a %ilitia to resist first Sa-on3 t)en Viking3 and finally 2nglis) in+aders3 a !els) s)e/)erd could %ake an a+ocation of skill (it) t)e long&o( &ecause t)e &o( itself (as ine-/ensi+e. skilful &o(%an could %ake use of )is (ea/ons +ersatility and use t)e ga%e s)ot to su//le%ent )is diet. 0)e !els) s/ecialisation in t)is /articularly la&our#intensi+e &o( /roduced a far %ore /o(erful (ea/on syste% t)an t)e cross&o(. Because t)e long&o( s)ot at t)ree or four ti%es t)e cross&o(s rate3 a +ery skilful arc)er at long range could s)oot ra/idly enoug) to kee/ t(o arro(s in t)e air si%ultaneously. 0)e 2nglis) incor/orated !els) long&o(%en into t)eir ar%ies and )ad so %uc) success increasing t)e /o/ularity of t)e long&o( in 2ngland t)at it +irtually dis/laced t)e cross&o(. But t)e long&o( re%ained largely a !els) and 2nglis) (ea/on3 efforts to /o/ularise it in 'rance failing &ecause of t)e long training re.uired to %aster it. 0)e ar.ue&us ulti%ately re/laced &ot) &o(s3 t)oug) its slo(er rate of fire and /oor accuracy delayed t)e su&stitution in 2ngland. But t)e

12B

strengt) and skill necessary to s)oot t)e long&o( raised t)e cost of t)at (ea/on syste% far a&o+e t)at of t)e ar.ue&us3 a factor t)at e+entually guaranteed t)e ado/tion of t)e ar.ue&us. But for t(o centuries t)e 2nglis) and !els) )ad a +irtual %ono/oly of t)e long&o( and so )ad t)e &est lig)t infantry in t)e !estern (orld. In turning fro% !ales to Scotland3 t)e 2nglis) learned )o( to use t)eir &etter lig)t#infantry (ea/on syste%. In 12@B 9ing 2d(ard I %et t)e Scots in &attle at 'alkirk. ,ike !ales3 Scotland (as a rugged country of lo( agricultural /roducti+ity7 like t)e !els)3 t)e Scots s/ecialised in )ea+y infantry3 a less e-/ensi+e and &etter ada/ted syste% to %ost of t)eir terrain t)an )ea+y ca+alry. 0)ey did )a+e so%e )ea+y ca+alry3 &ut t)eir fe( arc)ers lacked t)e effecti+eness of t)e !els) and 2nglis) long&o(%en. t 'alkirk3 kno(ing t)eir )ea+y infantry functioned &est on t)e defensi+e3 t)e Scots a(aited attack. !illia% !allace3 t)e co%/etent Scots co%%ander3 )ad learned t)is ()en )e )ad &eaten t)e 2nglis) earlier &y standing on t)e defensi+e &e)ind a s(a%/. 'or t)is &attle )e c)ose a si%ilar /osition3 on a )ill &e)ind soft ground. Ne+ert)eless 9ing 2d(ard3 an e-/ert tactician resol+ed to attack. 0)e Scottis) )ea+y infantry )ad t(el+e#foot /ikes and used a +ery dee/ for%ation in ()ic)3 on t)e defensi+e3 t)e front rank knelt )olding t)eir /ikes (it) t)e &utts in t)e ground ()ile t)e re%aining ranks le+elled t)eirs. 0)e Scots arrayed t)eir )ea+y infantry in four large for%ations ca/a&le of all#around defence and /laced t)eir &o(%en &et(een t)ese and on t)eir flanks and /ositioned t)eir fe( )ea+y ca+alry &e)ind t)e infantry. 0o /ass t)e s(a%/y ground t)e 2nglis) )ea+y ca+alry di+ided3 a//roac)ed t)e Scots on eac) flank3 and3 (it)out orders3 e-ecuted an i%/etuous c)arge against t)e %otionless ene%y. 0)e onset dis/ersed t)e Scottis) lig)t infantry &ut %ade no i%/ression on t)e four dee/ for%ations of /ike%en. 8ust as t)e 2nglis) knig)ts (ere a&out to re/eat t)eir assault against t)e )ea+y infantry3 t)e 9ing arri+ed. Seeing t)at t)e s/ontaneous first c)arge )ad &een /roducti+e &y riding do(n t)e Scottis) lig)t infantry3 t)e e-/erienced and /erce/ti+e 2d(ard also realised t)e futility of anot)er c)arge against t)e /ike%en. 'or&idding anot)er ca+alry attack3 )e a//lied t)e tactics effecti+e against !els) /ike%en &y &ringing u/ )is long&o(%en and directing t)e% to concentrate t)eir fire against a fe( /laces in t)e Scottis) line. !)en t)e deluge of arro(s )ad inflicted serious casualties and created so%e ga/s3 t)e 9ing ordered a c)arge against t)e o/enings. 0)e ca+alry /enetrated3 defeated3 and /ursued t)e Scottis) infantry3 ()ose causalities3 t)oug) se+ere3 (ere li%ited &y t)e /ro-i%ity of a forest. 0)e Scottis) co%%ander )ad selected a s/ot near a (ood to /ro+ide a refuge fro% t)e ca+alry in case of defeat. 0)e &attle3 ()ic) )ad tactical si%ilarities to !illia%s +ictory at "astings again de%onstrated t)at as in ancient ti%es lig)t infantry3 t)oug) at t)e %ercy of )ea+y ca+alry3 could stand off and seriously )urt )ea+y infantry. 0)e &attle s)o(ed t)at e+en ela&orately ar%oured elite %en3 %ounted (it) stirru/s on /icked )orses3 could not /re+ail against densely for%ed )ea+y infantry (it) long /ikes. 0)is last lesson3 t)e &asis of Narsess +ictory at 0aginae3 t)e 2nglis) knig)ts )ad s)o(n difficulty in learning. 9ing 2d(ards +ictory at 'alkirk re+ersed 2nglis) fortunes against t)e Scots. In 12@C3 in t)e a&sence of t)e 9ing3 2nglis) forces )ad felt suc) assurance t)at t)ey crossed a narro( &ridge3 e+en t)oug) t)e Scots )ad dra(n u/ t)eir ar%y Dust &eyond it. 0)is o+erconfidence recei+ed its Dust re(ard ()en t)e Scottis) )ea+y infantry c)arged after /art of t)e 2nglis) ar%y )ad crossed. Most of t)e 2nglis) force on t)e far &ank (ere killed3 ca/tured3 or dro(ned trying to esca/e. :et 2d(ards e-a%/le at 'alkirk did not i%%ediately c)ange 2nglis) tactical doctrine. fe( years later an 2nglis) co%%ander ()o kne( 2d(ards %et)od at 'alkirk faced Ro&ert Bruces Scottis) )ea+y infantry3 ()ic) (as &locking t)e narro( s/ace &et(een t(o /atc)es of s(a%/y land. Instead of &ringing u/ )is long&o(%en3 t)e 2nglis) co%%ander c)arged t)e /ikes. fter t)e second c)arge and 1>> fatalities3 t)e 2nglis) co%%ander retreated. Many %edie+al soldiers )ad trou&le

12@

disa&using t)e%sel+es of t)e idea t)at not)ing on foot could resist t)e c)arge of t)e )ea+y ca+alry. n aristocratic disdain for /le&eians ()o foug)t on foot reinforced t)eir arrogant con+iction of t)e su/re%acy of t)e )ea+y ca+alry. 0)e Scots )ad so %uc) success in dri+ing t)e 2nglis) fro% t)eir initial con.uests t)at 2d(ard II3 2d(ard Is inco%/etent son and successor3 at last stirred )i%self to action and in+aded Scotland in 1?143 &ringing a )uge ar%y to relie+e an i%/ortant castle &esieged &y t)e Scots under Ro&ert Bruce3 t)eir 9ing. Ro&ert3 a c)a%/ion of Scottis) inde/endence ()o dis/layed e.ual &rilliance in ci+il and %ilitary affairs3 )ad learned %uc) a&out (ar front !illia% !allaces e-a%/le and )is o(n ca%/aigns (it) 2d(ard I. Pre/ared for t)e 2nglis) ad+ance3 )e arrayed )is ar%y &e)ind a %ars) on a )ill near t)e castle and t)e to(n ()ere t)e 2nglis) %ust attack )i% to raise t)e siege. Ro&ert /osted )i%self on a )ig) /oint ()ere )e could see t)e ()ole &attlefield. ,acking %any &o(%en3 t)e Scots relied on t)eir /ike%en3 stiffened &y so%e of t)eir )ea+y ca+alry dis%ounted. 9ee/ing <>> )ea+y ca+alry %ounted as a reser+e3 9ing Ro&ert %ars)alled )is infantry in four se/arate3 dee/ for%ations. 0o attack t)e Scots3 t)e 2nglis) )ad to &ring t)eir far#larger ar%y across t)e %ars)y area3 dotted (it) /ools of (ater. !)en %orning ca%e3 t)e 2nglis) )ad co%/leted t)is task &ut )ad not yet fully arrayed t)eir ca+alry and )ad )ardly &egun to de/loy t)e infantry &e)ind it. Instead of a(aiting t)e 2nglis) attack as )e )ad /lanned3 9ing Ro&ert c)anged )is %ind3 deciding to attack t)e% &efore t)ey could for%. "e t)en ordered for(ard )is for%ations of /ike%en3 e-ecuting t)at rarity in (ar3 an infantry attack on ca+alry. 8ust as 2/a%inondas at ,euctra could %ore readily %o+e a &lock rat)er t)an a line of )o/lites3 t)e large3 dense for%ations of Scottis) /ike%en could kee/ t)eir order and a+oid ga/s in t)eir front as t)ey ad+anced steadily o+er t)e %ile se/arating t)e% fro% t)e 2nglis) ca+alry3 still for%ing u/ in front of t)eir infantry. 5ne grou/ of 2nglis) ca+alry /ro%/tly %et t)e first Scottis) for%ation (it) a counter#c)arge3 and3 in t)e (ords of a conte%/orary )istorian: J0)e t(o )osts so ca%e toget)er3 and t)e great steeds of t)e knig)ts das)ed into t)e Scottis) /ikes as into a t)ick (ood7 t)ere arose a great and )orri&le cras) fro% rending lances and dying )orses3 and t)ey stood locked toget)er for a s/ace.L 0)e ca+alry at t)e )alt3 outside of t)e line of /ikes3 )ad little c)ance to effect anyt)ing. Mean()ile3 as t)e ot)er Scottis) for%ations ca%e u/ to engage3 t)e 2nglis) succeeded in de/loying so%e of t)eir long&o(%en on one flank and t)ese Js)ot so fast t)at3 if only t)eir s)ooting )ad lasted3 it (ould )a+e &een )ard for t)e Scots.L But 9ing Ro&ert3 ()o )ad ser+ed at 'alkirk and J(ell kne( t)at arc)ers (ere dangerous and t)eir s)ot )ard and rig)t grie+ous3L co%%itted )is reser+e 5f <>> )ea+y ca+alry. 0)ese c)arged and easily dis/ersed t)e 2nglis) arc)ers3 t)e 9ing no( co%%itting t)e only (ea/on syste% t)at could attack and defeat t)e lig)t infantry. !it) no arc)ers to %enace t)e%3 all Scottis) /ike%en Doined &attle3 /ressing t)e 2nglis) ca+alry toget)er and &ack on t)eir i%%o&ile infantry ()o (ere )e%%ed in &y t)e %ars) /ools t)ey )ad crossed to reac) t)e attack /osition. !it) rear ranks useless3 t)e 2nglis) finally &egan to retreat3 taking t)eir cue fro% 9ing 2d(ards de/arture fro% t)e field. 0)e )uge 2nglis) ar%y suffered se+ere causalities3 %any dro(ning in crossing t)e (ater o&stacles in t)e rear. t Bannock&urn t)e 2nglis) )ad &ungled &y /lacing t)e%sel+es in suc) a dangerous /redica%ent3 &ut in t)e /ast t)e Scots )ad %ade it a /ractice to stand on t)e defensi+e. In t)e ne-t %aDor &attle t)e Scots )ad t)eir turn to suffer &ot) fro% o+erconfidence and a refine%ent in 2nglis) tactics. In 1??2 at 1u//lin a s%all force in+ading Scotland took u/ a defensi+e /osition3 and t)e Scottis) ar%y3 all )ea+y infantry3 ad+anced u/)ill in one large central %ass and t(o s%aller for%ations3 one on eac) flank of t)e largest. 0)e 2nglis) (isely dis%ounted t)eir ca+alry3 con+erting it into )ea+y infantry3 and dis/ersed t)eir nu%erous long&o(%en on t)eir flanks. Ignoring t)e &o(%en3 t)e Scottis) central %ass struck t)e stationary3 dis%ounted ca+alry &ut failed to o+er()el% it. !)ile t)e t(o forces of s)ock foot soldiers struggled against one anot)er3 t)e 2nglis) arc)ers %o+ed 1?>

for(ard and &egan ra/id s)ooting fro% t)e rig)t and left against t)e s%all flank for%ations3 causing t)e% to fall &ack against t)e %ain &ody. s t)e front ranks could %ake no for(ard %o+e%ent and t)ose on t)e flanks /us)ed in(ard as t)ey flinc)ed &efore t)e s)o(er of arro(s3 t)e Scots (ere3 according to a %edie+al )istorian3 Jt)rust so close t)at t)ey (ere crus)ed to deat) one &y anot)er3 so t)at %ore fell &y suffocation t)an &y t)e s(ord.L ssailed on t)ree sides3 t)e Scottis) situation rese%&led t)e Ro%ans at $annae3 &ut Ja %ar+el ne+er seen or )eard of &efore in any &attle of t)e /ast (as o&ser+ed3 for t)e )ea/ of dead stood as )ig) fro% t)e ground as t)e full lengt) of a s/ear.L !)en t)e Scots finally co%%enced a disorderly retreat3 %any of t)e 2nglis) re%ounted and inflicted additional )ea+y casualties. 0)e 2nglis) suffered relati+ely little3 t)e Scots killing no &o(%en at all. 0)e follo(ing year at "alidon "ill t)e Scots again attacked an 2nglis) for%ation. 0)e energetic and talented young 2nglis) 9ing3 2d(ard III3 took a /osition on a stee/ &ill and follo(ed t)e ne( tactics of dis%ounting )is ca+alry and dis/ersing )is arc)ers &ot) on t)e flank and in ga/s &et(een t)e ca+alry%en. S)ooting do(n)ill against t)e Scottis) ad+ance3 t)e long&o(%en3 unaided &y t)e )ea+y ca+alry con+erted into )ea+y infantry3 ca%e close to )alting t)e /ike%en. 0)e Scots soon left t)e field3 lea+ing +ictory to 2d(ard3 ()o at age t(enty t)us &egan an al%ost in+aria&ly successful %ilitary career. 'ro% t)ese !els) and Scottis) (ars t)e 2nglis) )ad de+elo/ed a distincti+e tactical syste% &ased on standing on t)e defensi+e3 dis%ounting t)eir ca+alry to create )ea+y infantry3 and using t)eir for%ida&le lig)t infantry to )ar% t)e attackers in a (ay &eyond t)e ca/a&ility of )ea+y infantry &y %erely snaking a successful defence. 0)e %i-ture of )ea+y and lig)t infantry can /re+ail against a frontal attack &y any co%&ination of (ea/on syste%s e-ce/t all lig)t infantry. But against an all# lig)t infantry attack3 t)e 2nglis) ca+alry (ould )a+e &een a&le to re%ount and ride do(n t)e &o(%en. gainst t)e sa%e co%&ination3 lig)t and )ea+y infantry3 t)e defenders (ould )a+e t)e ad+antage of t)e defensi+e ()en fig)ting against like (ea/on syste%s. 0)us t)e 2nglis) )ad3 fro% an offensi+e#oriented )ea+y#ca+alry &ackground3 created t)e /erfect defensi+e syste%3 one t)at not only %astered t)e Scots &ut t)at also could )a+e defeated t)e Part)ians. fter t)eir defeats at 1u//lin and "alidon "ill3 t)e Scots fell &ack on t)e (ise and effecti+e strategy /rescri&ed &y 9ing Ro&ert. "e )ad enDoined a+oiding &attle3 relying on )ills3 s(a%/s3 and forests for /rotection rat)er t)an on castles and confining offensi+e action to a%&us)es and sur/rises. "e also /rescri&ed a defensi+e logistic strategy of destroying cro/s ()en t)e in+ader ca%e &ecause Jt)en s)all t)ey /ass a(ay in )aste ()en t)at t)ey find not)ing &ut (aste.L Suc) a logistic strategy cost %uc) less t)an t)e destruction In+ol+ed3 for t)e 2nglis) in+aders t)e%sel+es (ould )a+e destroyed %ost t)at t)ey did not consu%e. nd t)e Scots rei%&ursed t)e%sel+es t)roug) fre.uent /lundering raids into adDacent 2ngland. In 1<> years of inter%ittent (arfare t)e tactics3 t)e strategy3 and t)e general situation c)anged little3 t)e Scots ne+er successfully fostering an arc)ery e.ual to t)e nglo#!els) and t)e 2nglis) ne+er su&duing t)e Scots nor containing t)eir raids. But soon after )is +ictory at "alidon "ill3 2d(ard III turned )is attention to a (ar (it) 'rance. Back

(he 1eginning of the Hundred 5ears% War and the Cr6cy Cam'aign
!)en 2nglands 9ing 2d(ard III &egan )is first ca%/aign against 'rance 1??@3 )e /lanned to de/end on t)e dis%ounted )ea+y ca+alry%an and t)e long&o(%en in t)e defensi+e array t)at )e )ad used so successfully at "alidon "ill in 1???. ,anding in t)e friendly territory of t)e Net)erlands Gno( "olland3 Belgiu%3 and t)e adDacent /art of 'ranceH3 )e %et a large force of allies and in+aded 'rance3 t)en a country dotted (it) strong %asonry castles. 0o co/e (it) suc) an ad+antage for t)e defence and to use )is defensi+e tactics3 )e e%/loyed a raid to de+astate t)e countryside3 )o/ing to co%/el 9ing P)illi/ VI to attack.

1?1

!)en 9ing P)ili/3 a rut)less %an and an ade.uate soldier3 at lengt) a//roac)ed (it) a large ar%y3 9ing 2d(ard )ad dra(n u/ )is forces in t)ree lines3 (it) )is front line )ea+y ca+alry dis%ounted and )is arc)ers on t)e flanks. But instead of ad+ancing to t)e attack3 t)e 'renc) 9ing arrayed )is ar%y so%e distance a(ay and a(aited an 2nglis) assault. 2+en if t)e 2nglis) tactics )ad /ro+ided for taking t)e offensi+e3 9ing 2d(ard (ould )a+e )esitated3 for )e e-/lained3 P)ili/ J%ade trenc)es all around )i% and cut do(n large trees in order to /re+ent us a//roac)ing )i%.L Soon e-)austing t)eir food su//lies3 t)e t(o ar%ies %o+ed a(ay fro% eac) ot)er. lt)oug) 9ing P)ili/ neit)er fully gras/ed t)e defensi+e strengt) of t)e dis%ounted 2nglis) ca+alry nor understood t)e deadly %enace /resented &y t)e long&o(%en3 Dust ordinary /rudence /re+ented )i% fro% offering an attack against a large ar%y (ell organised to recei+e it. In 1?4> 2d(ard III returned to t)e sa%e t)eatre and &egan )is ca%/aign &y &esieging t)e city of 0ournai3 using a ri+er to kee/ t)e relie+ing ar%y at &ay for nearly t(o %ont)s. 0)en s)ort of %oney to kee/ )is forces in t)e field3 t)e 2nglis) 9ing yielded to )is allies desires for a truce and concluded t)e ca%/aign (it)out ca/turing 0ournai or fig)ting a &attle. In 1?41 9ing 2d(ard3 )a+ing (on control of t)e sea &et(een 2ngland and 'rance3 s)ifted t)e t)eatre of (ar to t)e 1uc)y of Brittany3 t)e (estern%ost /ro+ince of 'rance3 ()ere )e su//orted a /ro#2nglis) clai%ant to t)e dukedo%. 0)ere follo(ed a ty/ically %edie+al seesa( struggle of sieges t)at (ent on for %any years. Mean()ile3 t)e 'renc) ad+anced steadily in *uyenne3 t)e long# )eld 2nglis) /ossession in sout)#eastern 'rance. In t)is si-#year ca%/aign t)e 'renc) )ad /us)ed to (it)in t(enty#fi+e %iles of Bordeau- ()en 9ing 2d(ards +ery co%/etent cousin3 "enry3 2arl of ,ancaster3 landed (it) a s%all ar%y in 1?4<. "is a&ility ena&led )i% to re+erse 2nglis) fortunes. ,ancaster .uickly ad+anced against t)e %ain 'renc) force3 ()ic) )eld t)e to(n of Bergerac3 and i%%ediately &egan ()at /ro+ed to &e a +ery &rief siege. !it) t)e aid of s)i/s in t)e ri+er and t)e ra/id fire of )is arc)ers3 )e .uickly ca/tured t)e to(n3 t)e 'renc) forces esca/ing. 0)e 2arl continued )is ad+ance and3 a+oiding t)e strong city of Perigueu-3 ca/tured t)e to(n of u&eroc)e3 nearly 1>> %iles fro% Bordeau-. But ()en t)e 2nglis) co%%ander returned to t)e coast3 t)e 'renc) took t)e offensi+e &y &esieging u&eroc)e. ,ancaster3 leading a %inute force of )ea+y ca+alry and &o(%en3 /ro%/tly %arc)ed to relie+e u&eroc)e3 doing so &y a late afternoon sur/rise attack t)at routed t)e &esiegers. ,ancaster t)en ca/tured t)ree to(ns3 including ,a R;ole3 ()ic) )e took &y using %o+a&le to(ers and securing t)e surrender of t)e castle &y con+incing t)e garrison t)at )e &ad under%ined t)e (alls and (as ready to fire t)e /ro/s. 0)ese successes3 ()ic) re# con.uered lost territory and t)reatened areas long 'renc)3 led to t)e arri+al of a )uge 'renc) ar%y under t)e co%%and of t)e 9ings son. 0)is ar%y &egan t)e siege of iguillon3 t)e %uc) s%aller 2nglis) forces li%iting t)eir relief acti+ities to re/lenis)ing t)e citys su//lies. Suc) %edie+al o/erations3 ()ic) centred on sieges3 also c)aracterised t)e ca%/aigning in Brittany. fter se+en years of (arfare3 no o/eration )ad resulted in a (ell#re%e%&ered &attle. But in t)e su%%er of 1?4=3 as t)e 'renc) ar%y /ursued t)e siege of iguillon3 9ing 2d(ard III /re/ared in 2ngland a large ar%y3 /roclai%ing *uyenne as )is o&Decti+e. Since t)e 9ing )ad intended t)is announce%ent to %islead t)e 'renc)3 after t)e fleet sailed3 2d(ard utilised t)e initiati+e gi+en )i% &y control of t)e sea to )a+e it land in Nor%andy3 to /ursue a ca%/aign in nort)#eastern 'rance. 2d(ard3 ()ose strategic gras/ fell s)ort of )is a&ility as a tactician3 see%ed to (ant to coo/erate (it) )is allies fro% t)e Net)erlands3 yet )e landed 2>> %iles fro% t)e%3 and t)e t(o forces )ad to act on e-terior lines (it) t)e 'renc) ar%y &et(een. "e did relie+e t)e /ressure on 2nglis) forces in *uyenne3 for 9ing P)ili/ ordered t)e 'renc) ar%y a(ay3 &ut not in ti%e to reac) )i% for )is &attle (it) 2d(ard. If 2d(ard (is)ed to /ro+oke a &attle in ()ic) )e could use )is "alidon "ill defensi+e tactics3 )e succeeded &ut only at su&stantial risk.

1?2

,anding near t)e (estern ti/ of Nor%andy3 9ing 2d(ard %ounted )is infantry to gi+e t)e% a strategic %o&ility co%/ara&le to )is ca+alry. "e &egan a %arc) east and t)en nort) to %eet )is allies near t)e /resent &order of 'rance. !)en 2d(ard )ad /assed t)roug) Nor%andy3 turned east3 and a//roac)ed t)e Seine near t)e large city of Rouen3 )e found t)at t)e 'renc) )ad &roken t)e &ridges and guarded t)e fords o+er t)e ri+er. "is o//onent of si- years &efore3 9ing P)ili/ VI of 'rance3 )ad reac)ed Rouen (it) a large ar%y. Marc)ing east to(ard Paris G(it) t)e 'renc) ar%y follo(ing on t)e o//osite &ankH 9ing 2d(ard did not find a &ridge t)at )e could ca/ture and re/air .uickly until )e )ad reac)ed a /oint /erilously close to t)e 'renc) ca/ital. But turning )is /ro-i%ity to Paris to )is ad+antage3 )e sent a force to t)reaten t)e city ()ile )is engineers s/ent t)ree days /airing t)e &ridge. 1istracted &y t)e %enace to )is ca/ital3 9ing P)ili/ /rotected Paris instead of /re+enting 2d(ards /assage of t)e ri+er. $rossing (it) )is ar%y and getting a good start on t)e 'renc)3 t)e 2nglis) 9ing %arc)ed fifteen %iles a day to(ard t)e last o&stacle &et(een )i% and )is allies3 t)e So%%e Ri+er. 0)e force fro% t)e Net)erlands )ad ad+anced as /ro%ised3 and a crossing of t)e So%%e (ould /lace t)e t(o ar%ies in a /osition eit)er to unite and fig)t t)e 'renc) or to find refuge in friendly territory. But crossing t)e So%%e /resented anot)er t)reat3 for 9ing P)ili/ )ad also %o+ed .uickly3 and again &locked 2d(ardss /assage fro% &e)ind an uns/anned ri+er (it) guarded fords. 9ing P)ili/ (as no( close to attaining )is o&Decti+e to tra/ t)e far#s%aller 2nglis) ar%y against a ri+er and to force it to fig)t. !)ile %o&ilisation of t)e %ilitia added to t)e si6e of t)e already %uc)#larger 'renc) ar%y3 t)e 2nglis) )ad (orn out %any )orses on t)eir %arc) and )ad difficulty finding food. s t)e 'renc) ar%y crossed to t)e sout) side of t)e So%%e to fig)t )i% ()ile )e (as /inned against t)e ri+er3 9ing 2d(ard led )is %en to t)e tidal estuary of So%%e3 ()ere )e found a /lace o+er a %ile (ide ()ere t)e ar%y could cross at lo( tide in knee#dee/ (ater. Marc)ing )is ar%y across t)e ford in s/ite of a 'renc) &locking force of cross&o(%en and ca+alry3 2d(ard &arely esca/ed t)e 'renc) ar%y closing &e)ind )i%3 )is (agons Dust /assing as t)e inco%ing tide /re+ented 'renc) /ursuit. !)en )e )ad crossed t)e last &arrier &et(een )i%self and )is allies3 2d(ard found t)at t)e allied ar%y3 )a+ing %et deter%ined o//osition3 )ad retreated. Ne+ert)eless3 no( (it) a secure line of retreat and confidence in )is tactical syste%3 t)e 2nglis) 9ing3 a consu%%ate tactician3 decided to fig)t t)e o+er()el%ingly %ore nu%erous 'renc) forces. ccordingly3 )e dre( u/ )is ar%y near t)e +illage of $r;cy on a lo( )ill facing t)e road o+er ()ic) t)e 'renc) (ould a//roac). "e di+ided )is %en into t)ree di+isions3 t(o in front and one in reser+e &e)ind. 2ac) consisted of dis%ounted ca+alry (it) long&o(%en on t)e flanks3 ()ic) %eant t)at arc)ers co%/osed &ot) t)e centre and t)e flanks of t)e front line. 0)e &o(%en constituted a&out t(o#t)irds of t)e 1>3>>> %en in t)e 2nglis) ar%y3 t)e dis%ounted )ea+y ca+alry )a+ing t)e aid of a fe( !els) /ike%en. 0)e 2nglis) flanks (ere /rotected &y $r;cy on t)eir rig)t and !adicourt on t)eir left. Before resu%ing )is /ursuit3 9ing P)ili/3 deter%ined to attack t)e 2nglis) raiders3 )ad %ars)alled )is ar%y into a nu%&er of di+isions and assigned t)e% t)eir /laces ()ere )e (ould later for% t)e line of &attle. "a+ing dra(n =3>>> cross&o(%en fro% )is fleet and assigned t)e% to t)e front rank in &attle3 t)e 9ing )ad t)ese arc)ers %arc) near t)e front of )is /ursuing )ost. But t)e 'renc)3 e-/ecting a long c)ase3 (ere sur/rised in late afternoon ()en t)ey ca%e u/on t)e 2nglis) ar%y arrayed for &attle. Since it (as late in t)e day3 t)e /rudent 9ing P)ili/ ga+e orders t)at )e (ould defer action until t)e ne-t %orning. But t)e knig)ts in )is disorganised and undisci/lined ar%y insisted on an attack3 e+en t)oug) %uc) of t)e ca+alry (as still arri+ing and no infantry )ad co%e u/ e-ce/t t)e cross&o(%en. 4na&le to control t)e situation3 9ing P)ili/ assented to an attack. 0)e only /art of t)e attack t)at confor%ed to t)e 9ings /lan (as t)e initial ad+ance of t)e lig)t infantry3 ()ic) used t)eir &o(s against t)e dis%ounted 2nglis) ca+alry. 0)e leaders of t)e cross&o(%en3 skilled /rofessionals used to ser+ing toget)er in t)e fleet3 for%ed t)eir %en in lines

1??

for an ad+ance to(ard t)e slo/e u/on ()ic) t)e 2nglis) ar%y a(aited t)e 'renc) attack. In s/ite of t)e loose for%ation c)aracteristic of lig)t infantry3 t)e cross&o(%en )alted t(ice to correct t)eir align%ent. Sto//ing at e-tre%e range3 t)ey s)ot a +olley of cross&o( &olts t)at fell Dust s)ort of t)e for(ard 2nglis) long&o(%en. 0)en t)e 2nglis) &egan a ra/id fire (it) t)eir long&o(s ()ose arro(s3 going do(n)ill3 fell a%ong t)e cross&o(%en and inflicted suc) serious casualties t)at t)e 'renc) &o(%en &egan to retreat. t t)is3 t)e leading 'renc) knig)ts c)arged3 s)outing3 J (ay (it) t)ese faint#)earted ra&&leN 0)ey do &ut &lock our ad+ance.L 0)e resulting rus) into t)e retreating infantry entangled t)e% all3 )alting t)e% under a rain of 2nglis) arro(s. c)arge &y a second grou/ of ca+alry got /ast t)e de&ris of t)e first &ut lost so %any )orses to t)e 2nglis) arro(s t)at t)ey too failed to reac) t)e 2nglis) line. 0)roug) t(ilig)t and into nig)t t)e 'renc) deli+ered /er)a/s a do6en %ore onslaug)ts as different grou/s reac)ed t)e front of t)eir unorganised %ass of ca+alry. 0)ey a+oided t)e long&o(%en3 directing all t)eir attacks against t)e dis%ounted ca+alry3 ranged si- to eig)t ranks dee/. lt)oug) so%e c)arges reac)ed t)e%3 and t)e %ounted %en engaged in se+ere s)ock co%&at (it) t)ose on foot3 t)e result confor%ed to /ast e-/erience ()en )ea+y ca+alry carried out frontal attacks against (ell#for%ed3 good#.uality )ea+y infantry. In s/ite of t)e 'renc) nu%erical ad+antage of t)ree to one3 2d(ard3 ()o like "anni&al or Sci/io directed t)e &attle fro% )is +antage /oint ato/ a (ind%ill3 ne+er used )is reser+e. 0)e 'renc) suffered se+ere casualties in s/ite of t)e security afforded &y t)eir /late ar%our. 0)e ar%our of t)e )orses /ro+ed co%/letely inade.uate to /rotect t)e%3 and t)e arro(s (ounded or killed %any )orses3 and falls inDured %any riders. But t)e 2nglis) for%ation (as not in+ulnera&le. If 9ing P)ili/ )ad &een a&le to control )is ad#)oc feudal ar%y and )ad /ro+ed as s)re(d a tactician as 9ing 2d(ard3 )e could )a+e foug)t t)e ne-t day and3 like a Macedonian co%%ander3 used )is %ounted %en to turn t)e 2nglis) /osition &y sending a large force around t)e +illage on t)e 2nglis) left to attack t)e i%%o&ile ene%y in t)e rear. In any attack3 ()et)er against front3 flank3 or rear3 t)e 'renc) s)ould )a+e first dis/ersed t)e long&o(%en. 0)e &lundering courage t)at carried 'renc) knig)ts t)roug) a )all of arro(s to t)e line of 2nglis) dis%ounted ca+alry s)ould )a+e /ut t)e% a%ong t)e &o(%en ()o% t)ey could )a+e ridden do(n as t)e 2nglis) ca+alry )ad t)e Scottis) &o(%en at 'alkirk or t)e Scottis) ca+alry t)e long&o(%en at Bannock&urn. 0)en 9ing P)illi/ could )a+e &roug)t u/ )is cross&o(%en to s)oot at t)e dis%ounted 2nglis) until t)ey (ere +ulnera&le to a c)arge. Since 'alkirk )ad e-)i&ited t)e +ulnera&ility of t)e lig)t infantry3 t)e 2nglis) /osition undou&tedly offered t)e long&o(%en t)e s)elter of so%e terrain o&stacle suc) as t)e terraces no( on t)e &attlefield &ut not %entioned in accounts of t)e &attle. In Palestine Ric)ard t)e ,ion#"earted )ad alternated &o(%en and /ike%en3 ()ic) /recluded a c)arge &y 0urkis) lig)t ca+alry (it)out ar%our3 and only (it) s(ords. But since a fe( /ikes could not )a+e resisted an attack &y t)e )ea+ily ar%ed and ar%oured 'renc) knig)ts3 t)e &o(%en %ust )a+e )ad so%e /rotection fro% t)e terrain3 t)oug) it %ig)t not )a+e /resented a serious &arrier3 since t)e 'renc) (ould /referred to ca/ture t)e (ealt)y knig)ts ()o% t)ey could t)en ranso%. 1ou&tless t)e s/irit of t)e Doust and tourna%ent and t)e conce/tion of &attles as decided &y a c)arge of t)e )ea+y ca+alry )ad )el/ed lead t)e undisci/lined 'renc) feudal ar%y to conduct a disastrous frontal attack instead of e-/loiting t)eir greater nu%&ers and %o&ility to attack t)e 2nglis) in flank or rear. 5f course3 t)e 'renc) could )a+e a+oided &attle and used t)eir control of t)e country and for%ida&le %ounted strengt) to e-/loit 2nglis) (eariness and t)eir inci/ient logistical trou&les. 0o de+astate t)e country a)ead of t)e%3 &lock t)eir /at)3 kill t)eir foragers3 and )arry t)eir rear (ould )a+e inflicted as %any casualties as a %aDor defeat3 e+en if t)ey )ad failed to fig)t t)e 2nglis) ad+antageously &efore t)ey esca/ed &y sea or into friendly territory. But suc) a 'a&ian strategy (as too foreign for t)e 'renc) leaders to ado/t at t)is stage in t)e (ar.

1?4

9ing 2d(ard )ar+ested t)e fruits of )is +ictory &y &eginning a siege of t)e c)annel /ort of $alais3 ()ic) )is control of t)e land and sea ena&led )i% to take after a year during ()ic) )is outer lines of circu%+allation t)(arted an atte%/t to relie+e t)e city. If t)e results of so i%/ortant a +ictory see% dis/ro/ortionately s%all3 t)ere (as no ot)er i%/ression t)at t)e s%all 2nglis) ar%y could %ake on suc) a large3 t)ickly /o/ulated3 and co%/etently fortified country as 'rance. 'or decisi+e results t)e 2nglis) )ad far too s%all a ratio of force to s/ace and /o/ulation3 as long as t)e 'renc) 9ing and )is /eo/le continued to resist t)e in+aders. Back

(he Hundred 5ears% War, -nglish )aids and French !ersisting Strategy
'ollo(ing t)e fall of $alais t)e (ar ne-t consisted of eig)t years of fig)ting in Brittany and *uyenne inter%ingled (it) truces and /eace negotiations. But in t)e autu%n of 1?<< t)e 2nglis) &egan +igorous o/erations3 9ing 2d(ard ad+ancing inland fro% $alais on a &rief e-/edition in an effort to induce t)e ne( 'renc) 9ing3 8o)n II3 to attack )i%. But 9ing 8o)n3 t)oug) fri+olous3 a+aricious3 and stu&&orn3 dis/layed t)e (isdo% to stay (it)in t)e strong city of %iens and confined )is efforts to ra+aging t)e country a)ead of t)e 2nglis) %arc)3 t)is logistic strategy costing t)e 'renc) little &ecause t)e 2nglis) custo%arily laid (aste t)e countryside t)e%sel+es. Si%ultaneously 9ing 2d(ards son3 2d(ard3 Prince of !ales e%&arked on a gigantic east(ard raid fro% *uyenne. 0)e young Prince )ad first learned (ar nine years earlier ()en )e acco%/anied )is fat)er on t)e $r;cy ca%/aign and3 &arely si-teen years of age3 )ad co%%anded a (ing of t)e 2nglis) ar%y in t)e &attle. 0)oug) t)e talented Prince )o/ed to dra( t)e 'renc) into &attle3 )e also /lanned a t)oroug) de+astation of t)e country. logistic strategy ai%ed at di%inis)ing t)e 'renc) 9ings resources3 t)e raid )ad t)e /olitical o&Dect of %aking t)e (ar so costly to t)e 'renc) t)at t)ey (ould agree to /eace. Nor did t)e Prince o+erlook t)e econo%ic goal of su&sisting )is ar%y at 'renc) e-/ense and &ringing &ack su&stantial &ooty. 0)e young Prince %arc)ed fro% t)e tlantic to t)e Mediterranean and &ack3 co+ering =C< %iles in less t)an t(o and a )alf %ont)s. 0)e 'renc) ar%ies a+oided )i%3 &ut )e acco%/lis)ed )is o&Decti+e of t)oroug) desolation along )is %arc) route. 0)e follo(ing su%%er t)e ca/a&le ,ancaster3 no( ele+ated to 1uke3 took a s%all force on a raid t)roug) Nor%andy3 re/lenis)ing t)e su//lies of t)e friends of 2ngland in t)eir &esieged castles. $o+ering ??> %iles in t(enty#t(o days3 )e eluded t)e 'renc) 9ings large ar%y and ca%e &ack (it) considera&le &ooty3 including 23>>> )orses. Soon after t)e 1uke of ,ancasters return3 t)e Prince of !ales &egan a second great raid fro% *uyenne3 t)is ti%e nort)(ard to(ard Paris. nd 9ing 8o)n of 'rance %o+ed sout)3 deter%ined to catc) and fig)t t)is destructi+e raider. 0)e 'renc) )ad /ondered t)e 2nglis) tactics at $r;cy and )ad a//lied3 on at least t(o occasions3 t)eir re%edy of dis%ounting %ost of t)eir )ea+y ca+alry so as to attack t)e 2nglis) on foot. 0)oug) )ea+y infantry )ad little if any ad+antage o+er )ea+y ca+alry in attacking defending )ea+y infantry3 dis%ounting did kee/ +ulnera&le )orses fro% t)e reac) of t)e arro(s of t)e 2nglis) long&o(%en. Since t)e knig)ts /late ar%our usually turned aside %ost arro(s3 t)ey could successfully close (it) t)e 2nglis) dis%ounted infantry. 'or t)e second feature of t)eir ne( tactics t)ey relied on t)eir )ea+y ca+alry3 so%e of ()ic) re%ained %ounted to attack t)e &o(%en. 0)e 'renc) )ad tried t)ese ne( ideas in se+eral s%all &attles &ut (it) %i-ed results. t Mauron in 1?<2 t)e %ounted force )ad dri+en t)e arc)ers on one flank into a (ood3 &ut since t)ey )ad li%ited t)e attack on t)e arc)ers to one flank only3 t)ey )ad lost t)e &attle &y t)e defeat of t)eir centre and ot)er flank. But t)e ne( tactics3 ()ic) (ould recei+e anot)er trial against t)e Prince of !ales3 still en+isioned a frontal attack. 4nderstanding lig)t infantrys +ulnera&ility to )ea+y ca+alry3 t)e 'renc) failed to gras/ t)e role gi+en )ea+y ca+alry &y t)e ancients7 t)ey could understand t)e co%/arati+e %erits of different (ea/on syste%s &ut could not sufficiently di+est t)e%sel+es of t)e idea of a frontal attack to co%/re)end t)e e-/loitation of ca+alrys %o&ility and ease of

1?<

de/loy%ent to attack t)e ene%ys (eakness3 t)e flanks and rear. Instead3 t)ey reduced t)eir +ulnera&ility to arro(s &y dis%ounting %ost of t)e )ea+y ca+alry and soug)t to use t)e re%aining %ounted /ortion to attack t)e long&o(%en. !)en t)e Prince of !ales %ade )is raid as far nort) as 0ours on t)e ,oire Ri+er3 9ing 8o)n3 )a+ing asse%&led a )uge ar%y3 o+ertook t)e slo(#%o+ing3 &ooty#laden raiders at Poitiers as t)ey %arc)ed &ack to *uyenne. !it) a +astly stronger ar%y t)e ine/t 9ing )ad deter%ined to attack t)e 2nglis) ar%y3 e+en t)oug) it )ad taken u/ a strong /osition. 'ollo(ing t)e no(#settled 2nglis) doctrine3 t)e Prince of !ales dis%ounted )is ca+alry and de/loyed )is arc)ers on t)e flanks and in ga/s in )is line. de/ression co+ered )is left flank3 so%e carts and a ditc) )is rig)t. 0)e front of )is /osition )ad good /rotection front a strong )edge /ierced only &y t(o roads3 one of ()ic) t)e 2nglis) &locked. 0)e arc)ers used t)is )edge as a s)eltered /osition fro% ()ic) to s)oot at attackers. 9ing 8o)n di+ided )is ar%y into four di+isions3 ranged one &e)ind t)e ot)er. 0)e first re%ained %ounted and3 toget)er (it) an ad+anced /arty of ?>> knig)ts3 (as to attack t)e long&o(%en. 0)e 9ing /lanned for t)e dis%ounted ca+alry to follo( and attack t)e 2nglis). But t)e &attle /ro+ed to &e a fiasco for t)e 'renc). 0)e initial %ounted attack lost its )orses to arro(s3 for it could not get /ast t)e arc)er#lined )edge. 0)e attack of t)e first foot di+ision3 aided &y infantry and cross&o(%en3 failed to defeat t)e 2nglis) dis%ounted ca+alry3 t)oug) t)e co%&at e-)austed t)e 2nglis). )istorian of t)e ti%e descri&ed t)e 2nglis) after t)e attack: JSo%e (ere carrying t)e (ounded to t)e rear and laying t)e% under t)e s)elter of trees and t)ickets3 ot)ers (ere re/lacing t)eir &roken s(ords and lances fro% t)e s/oils of t)e slain7 t)e arc)ers (ere trying to re/lenis) t)eir stock of arro(s e+en /ulling t)e% out of t)e &odies of t)e dead and (ounded. 0)ere (as no one ()o (as not eit)er )urt or utterly (orn out (it) t)e &attle3 sa+e only t)e reser+e of four )undred %en ()o% 2d(ard still ke/t a&out )is standard. !)en t)e ne-t 'renc) di+ision fled (it)out attacking3 Prince 2d(ard deter%ined to take t)e offensi+e against t)e last 'renc) detac)%ent3 co%%anded &y 9ing 8o)n )i%self. fter a struggle at close .uarters in ()ic) t)e &o(%en /artici/ated as )ea+y infantry3 t)e 'renc) ga+e (ay ()en a +ery s%all force3 sent &y 2d(ard on a (ide turning circuit3 ca%e in on t)e 'renc) flank and rear. 0)e 'renc) lost 23>>> of t)eir )ea+y ca+alry3 including t)eir 9ing taken /risoner. 0)e foot attack )ad /ro+en %ore effecti+e t)an a %ounted one3 &ut t)e /late ar%our3 ()ic) ga+e /rotection fro% arro(s3 %ade (alking difficult and running i%/ossi&le. It eli%inated e+ery trace of agility for a %an already cu%&erso%e ()en %ounted. 'ollo(ing )is +ictory3 Prince 2d(ard resu%ed )is %arc) to *uyenne3 returning (it) t)e &ooty of )is raid. 0)oug) t)e &attle )ad no %ilitary i%/act on t)e course of t)e (ar3 t)e ca/ture of t)e 'renc) 9ing did /ro+e a +alua&le /ri6e and a t(o#year truce follo(ed ()ile t)e 2nglis) negotiated (it) t)e ca/ti+e 9ing. !)en t)e go+ern%ent3 under 8o)ns astute son3 t)e future 9ing $)arles V3 as regent3 refused a treaty agreed to &y 9ing 8o)n3 9ing 2d(ard of 2ngland %ade one last raid. In t)e fall of 1?<@3 ()en )e %arc)ed into 'rance (it) a large ar%y3 2d(ard refrained fro% de+astating t)e country in an atte%/t to (in t)e 'renc) o+er to acce/ting )i% as t)eir 9ing. 'ollo(ing $)arless strategy3 t)e 'renc) ar%ies stayed in t)eir cities3 and 2d(ard )ad no /lans for long sieges. !)en R)ei%s refused to surrender to )i%3 )e a&andoned )is efforts to (in o+er t)e 'renc) and resu%ed )is de+astations on a (inter raid t)at carried )i% east of Paris and &ack to t)at city3 ()ere )e re%ained only a s)ort ()ile3 /er)a/s &ecause t)e deter%ined $)arles )ad ruined t)e country in ad+ance of t)e 2nglis). But soon 2d(ard and $)arles agreed on a /eace t)at ga+e t)e 2nglis) $alais and adDacent territory in nort)#(estern 'rance as (ell as greatly e-/anded 2nglis) do%inions in t)e

1?=

*uyenne region. :et (ar soon resu%ed (it) t)e 'renc) led &y a ne( 9ing3 t)e /atient3 s)re(d $)arles. 2d(ard continued to direct t)e 2nglis) (ar effort. In a (ar (it) so large a country as 'rance3 t)e 2nglis) strategy &asically )ad relied on raids to e-tract /olitical concessions. 0)e alternati+e3 /ersisting strategy to occu/y t)e country3 (ould )a+e taken years of sieges. 'renc) /ursuit of and attacks on raiding ar%ies )ad led to t)e great 2nglis) +ictories of $r;cy and Poitiers3 &ut t)ese3 t)oug) inflicting )ea+y casualties on t)e 'renc)3 )ad not taken any castles or (alled to(ns nor /re+ented t)e 'renc) fro% asse%&ling ne( ar%ies. 0)e t)ousands of s.uare %iles and t)e %illions of /eo/le of 'rance s(allo(ed u/ 2nglis) ar%ies of 1>3>>> and e+en 2>3>>> %en. 0)e 2nglis) )ad an inade.uate ratio of force to 'renc) s/ace and /o/ulation and )ad no solution to t)e defensi+e strengt) of fortifications. 0)e rene(ed (ar centred in t)e sout)3 ()ere t)e /o/ulation of t)e ne(ly 2nglis) areas3 including t)e no&ility3 (ere )ostile. 9ing $)arles e-/loited t)is in a strategy re%iniscent of 'a&ius against "anni&al. ,ike t)e Ro%ans in dealing (it) "anni&al3 $)arless 'renc) co%%ander3 1u *uesclin3 a+oided &attles3 an easy task since t)e 2nglis) doctrine de/ended entirely on t)e ene%ys %aking a frontal attack on a strong defensi+e array. 1u *uesclin3 un/re/ossessing in a//earance &ut e-/erienced and &ra+e3 ca/a&ly e-ecuted t)e so/)isticated strategy of )is crafty and /erse+ering 9ing. Instead of seeking &attle (it) t)e 2nglis)3 1u *uesclin strengt)ened t)e to(ns and castles and relied on t)ese fortifications ()ile taking t)e offensi+e and &esieging isolated 2nglis) /osts or 2nglis)#)eld to(ns ()ere t)e /o/ulation fa+oured t)e 'renc). But since t)e 'renc) lacked t)e Ro%an /roficiency in engineering and siegecraft3 t)ey )ad to raise %any sieges on t)e a//roac) of t)e 2nglis). 0)e %ore nu%erous 'renc)3 )o(e+er3 dis/layed /ersistence (it) sieges and in )arrying 2nglis) forces on t)e %arc) and so gradually encroac)ed on 2nglis) territory in *uyenne. ,ike "anni&al3 t)e 2nglis) (anted %ore +ictorious &attles and fell &ack on t)eir raiding strategy to /ro+oke t)e 'renc) into a fig)t and to di%inis) t)eir resources and /ut /ressure on t)e 'renc) for /olitical concessions. 0)e greatest of t)ese raids (ent fro% $alais on t)e nort)ern coast to t)e /ort of Bordeau- in t)e sout). 0)e 2nglis) %arc)ed 13>>> %iles in fi+e %ont)s3 laying (aste t)e countryside &ut losing )alf t)eir ar%y. 0)oug) )u%iliated as (ell as )ar%ed3 t)e 'renc) a+oided &attle. In t)is raid and four ot)ers3 t)e 'renc)3 like t)e Ro%ans s)ado(ing "anni&al3 follo(ed t)e raiders3 catc)ing foragers3 stragglers3 and looters. fter a decade of rene(ed (ar3 t)e 'renc) regained %astery of t)e sea and t)eir strategy not only reco+ered t)e lost territory in t)e sout) &ut also seriously encroac)ed on territory in *uyenne t)at )ad &een 2nglis) for t(o centuries. 5/erations t)en ended in /eace &et(een countries e-)austed &y (ar and t)e /lague. Back

-nglish !ersisting Strategy in the "ast !hase of the Hundred 5ears% War
!)en (ar resu%ed in 141<3 t)e situation fa+oured 2ngland. 'rance (as distracted &y factions during t)e long rule of an insane 9ing3 ()ile in 9ing "enry V t)e 2nglis) )ad an i%/ortant soldier ()o sur/assed in a&ilities )is great#grandfat)ers3 2d(ard III and t)e 1uke of ,ancaster. 0)is cultured3 de+out3 and te%/erate soldier and states%an strengt)ened t)e na+y and regained su/re%acy at sea. "e )ad a co%/re)ensi+e strategy for t)e con.uest of 'rance3 ()ic) )e &egan in ugust 141< ()en )e landed a large ar%y at t)e %out) of t)e Seine and &esieged t)e strongly fortified /ort of "arfleur3 )is artillery )el/ing )i% ca/ture t)e to(n in fi+e (eeks. 0)oug) t)is siege constituted t)e first ste/ in 9ing "enrys /lan of syste%atic con.uest3 )e undertook to conduct a raid &y %arc)ing )is s%all ar%y t)roug) nort)#(estern 'rance to return to 2ngland fro% t)e /ort of $alais. s a /art of )is ne( strategy t)e 9ing instructed )is %en to co%%it no de/redations3 so as not to alienate )is /otential su&Dects. 0)e /rinci/al /ur/oses of t)e raid %ust )a+e &een to )u%iliate t)e 'renc) and end t)e ca%/aign (it) so%e ;clat. 9ing "enry3 (it) only 13>>> )ea+y ca+alry and <3>>> lig)t infantry3 see%ed an-ious to a+oid &attle (it) t)e %uc) larger 'renc) force in t)e field against )i%. "is %arc) (ould re/eat t)at of 2d(ard III &efore t)e Battle of $r;cy3 in t)at t)e 'renc) ar%y soug)t to catc) t)e 2nglis) ar%y against a ri+er. 1?C

$onsciously ai%ing to re/eat t)e successful /art of 2d(ards $r;cy %arc)3 "enry /lanned to cross t)e So%%e &y t)e tidal ford in t)e estuary. 'inding it defended &y t)e 'renc)3 )e %arc)ed u/strea% looking for a /assage3 Dust as )is great#grandfat)er )ad )ad to do ()en )e soug)t to cross t)e Seine in )is %arc) to $r;cy. "a+ing e-)austed t)eir rations and e-/eriencing difficulty finding anyt)ing in t)e country3 )is %en )ad to eat unground ()eat. 0)ey (ere continually soaked fro% rain and suffered fro% dysentery. 0)e 'renc) %ust )a+e tried to denude t)e country of su//lies3 and if 1u *uesclins strategy could )a+e controlled 'renc) o/erations3 only a fe( of "enrys %en (ould )a+e reac)ed $alais. 0)e 2nglis) )ad to %arc) far u/ t)e So%%e &efore t)ey found an inade.uately defended crossing. But a fe( days later3 at t)e +illage of gincourt3 t)e 'renc) ar%y &locked t)e 2nglis) route to $alais. "enry )ad fe( )ea+y ca+alry to dis%ount3 so )e dre( u/ )is ar%y in a defensi+e /osition (it) arc)ers )olding %uc) 5f t)e C>>#yard front. !oods /rotected eac) flank3 and t)e arc)ers co+ered t)e%sel+es (it) a line of long (ooden stakes /ointed to(ard t)e ene%y. In s/ite of )is (eakness in )ea+y ca+alry3 "enry )ad a strong defensi+e /osition. 0)e 'renc) %ean()ile )ad a c)ance to a//ly logistic strategy &y allo(ing t)e 2nglis) to sit in t)eir /osition until )unger forced t)e% to forage3 attack3 or try to resu%e t)eir %arc). But t)e 'renc) co%%ander3 t)e re/resentati+e of t)e insane 9ing3 lacked t)e aut)ority to restrain )is ar%ys nu%erous /o(erful feudal lords3 ()o insisted t)at t)ey could not allo( t)e%sel+es to &e defied &y t)e %inute 2nglis) ar%y3 largely co%/osed of socially inferior &o(%en. So t)e 'renc) arrayed t)e%sel+es for attack3 using t(o lines of dis%ounted ca+alry3 (it) a t)ird3 in t)e rear3 still on )orse&ack. In front3 on eac) flank of t)e 'renc) ar%y3 t)e co%%ander /osted a s%all %ounted grou/ to c)arge t)e long&o(%en on t)e 2nglis) flanks. 2+en t)oug) 9ing "enry %o+ed )is line for(ard so%e distance to(ard t)e 'renc)3 in+iting t)eir attack3 t(o factors /resented al%ost insu/era&le co%/lications for t)e 'renc) in carrying out an ad+ance: t)e )ea+y ca+alry%en )ad great difficulty functioning as )ea+y infantry &ecause of t)e (eig)t of t)eir /late ar%our3 and t)e )ea+y rain )ad created ankle#dee/ %ud on t)e a//roac) to t)e 2nglis) /osition. !)ile t)e 'renc) dis%ounted %en finally %o+ed for(ard3 t)e initial ca+alry attack against t)e arc)ers colla/sed co%/letely. 0)e s%all nu%&er of %en ()o took /art G/ro&a&ly a&out 1<> on eac) flankH and t)eir slo( ad+ance &ecause of t)e %ud ena&led t)e long&o(%en to )alt t)e )orse%en: in t)e (ords of a conte%/orary )istorian3 JQ0)e 'renc)R )orses (ere so (ounded &y t)e arro(s t)at t)ey (ere un%anagea&le.L By t)e ti%e t)e ca+alry attack failed3 t)e first line of 'renc) dis%ounted ca+alry )ad a//roac)ed t)e 2nglis) line3 )indered &y t)eir ar%our3 t)e %ud3 and t)e )ail of arro(s. 0)oug) t)e long&o(%en occu/ied /art of t)e 2nglis) line3 t)e 'renc) knig)ts concentrated t)eir assault u/on t)eir social e.uals Gand ranso% /ros/ectsH3 t)e 2nglis) dis%ounted ca+alry. But 9ing "enry ordered )is %uscular and agile arc)ers into t)e fig)t3 ()o J.uitted t)eir stakes3 t)re( t)eir &o(s and arro(s on t)e ground and sei6ing t)eir s(ords3 a-es3 and ot)er (ea/ons3 sallied out u/on Jt)e ar%oured 'renc)%en and3 entering &reaks in t)eir line3 Jkilled and disa&led t)e 'renc) ... and %et (it) little or no resistanceL fro% fatigued and o+er#(eig)ted knig)ts +irtually %ired in t)e %ud. 0)e success in s)ock co%&at of t)e 2nglis) lig)t infantry did not de/end only on t)e 'renc) ca+alrys /oor /erfor%ance as )ea+y infantry. 0)oug) lacking s)ields3 and (it)out %uc) training (it) t)eir s(ords and a-es3 t)e 2nglis) &o(%en )ad a steel ca/ and a &reast/late or a .uilted gar%ent for torso /rotection. 0)us t)ey readily /ro+ed a %atc) for t)e dis%ounted ca+alry ()o3 e+en if un(ounded3 once t)ey fell could not rise (it)out assistance. 0)e 2nglis) defeated t)e attack of t)e first t(o 'renc) lines3 killing %any and ac.uiring large nu%&ers of /risoners i%%o&ilised on t)e ground. nd t)e 'renc) suffered /articularly )ea+y casualties &ecause t)eir dis%ounted knig)ts could not flee fro% t)e ni%&le 2nglis) &o(%en. 0)e t)ird 'renc) line3 ()ic) )ad re%ained %ounted3 did not atte%/t to attack3 t)oug) %any lingered at a distance ()ile t)e 2nglis) sorted t)e

1?B

fallen 'renc) into t)e li+ing and t)e dead. But t)e co%&ination of a raid on t)e 2nglis) ca%/ &y so%e local %ilitia and t)e i%/ression t)at t)e re%ains of t)e t)ird line (ere a&out to attack caused t)e 2nglis) to kill %any of t)eir /risoners. 0)e 9ing ordered t)is action3 fearing t)at t)e 'renc) %ig)t attack3 reca/ture t)e fallen knig)ts3 and returning %any of t)e% to action (ell rested fro% t)eir ti%e /rone in t)e %ud. But no attack %aterialised3 and t)e ne-t day t)e 9ing3 t(enty#eig)t years of age3 %arc)ed to(ard $alais (it) 13>>> /risoners. 5t)er t)an raise 2nglis) %orale and ent)usias% for t)e (ar3 t)e +ictory did not)ing i%%ediately to facilitate 9ing "enrys strategy of syste%atic con.uest of 'renc) territory3 &ut t)e follo(ing year )e &egan in Nor%andy3 taking to(ns and castles one &y one. Ri+al factions in a country (it) an insane 9ing on t)e t)rone ke/t t)e 'renc) fro% inter+ening e+en ()en "enry &esieged Rouen3 t)e ca/ital of Nor%andy. 0)is large city3 defended &y strong (alls fi+e %iles in circu%ference3 succu%&ed to star+ation ()en su//lies con+eyed &y (ater fro% 2ngland ena&led t)e 9ing to kee/ )is ar%y in /osition for fi+e %ont)s ()ile /aying )is troo/s and restraining t)eir looting. By 141@ "enry )ad co%/leted t)e con.uest of Nor%andy3 collected large su%s fro% cities3 like Rouen3 ()ic) )ad resisted )i%3 and soug)t to reconcile t)e Nor%ans to )is rule &y conser+ing t)eir institutions. Political su//ort (it)in 'rance soon allo(ed t)e 2nglis) to do%inate %ore territory3 including t)e city of Paris3 &ut t)en t)ey )ad e-tended t)e%sel+es as far as t)eir %eans and 'renc) o//osition (ould /er%it. 0)e great s/ace of 'rance co%/ared (it) Britis) resources /recluded %ore e-tensi+e con.uests as long as so %any 'renc)%en so strongly resisted t)e 2nglis) 9ings clai% to t)e t)rone of 'rance. 0)en3 ins/ired &y 8oan of rc3 t)e 'renc) counterattacked and gradually (on &ack nort)ern 'rance. 0)e ne( 9ing3 $)arles VII3 lacked intellectual +igour and /)ysical /ro(ess3 &ut3 finally ser+ed &y (ise ad+isors and influenced &y a ca/a&le %istress3 )e /ro+ided good guidance to t)e sustained 'renc) counteroffensi+e. 0)is in+ol+ed a /rocess of sieges3 one accelerated &y i%/ro+e%ents in artillery. 0)e 'renc) learned to a+oid frontal assaults3 (aiting to attack t)e 2nglis) on t)e %arc)3 in ca%/3 or ()en t)ey could not /rotect t)eir flanks. s t)e &esiegers3 t)e 'renc) )ad o//ortunities to e-/loit t)e /o(er of t)e defence3 and t)e 2nglis) )ad to assu%e t)e offensi+e. 0)e 2nglis) o(ed t)eir successes in t)e long (ar (it) 'rance to t)eir essentially /rofessional ar%y. 0)oug) not a standing ar%y3 continuity in /ersonnel and fre.uent ca%/aigning )ad gi+en it %any of t)e c)aracteristics of a /er%anent force. de.uate funds to /ay t)e troo/s3 a good understanding of logistics3 and (ater co%%unications fro% t)eir &ases also contri&uted to 2nglis) +ictories. 'or %ost of t)e century#long conflict3 t)e 2nglis) )ad a&le and e-/erienced leaders ()o gras/ed t)e significance of a reser+e3 understood t)e /o(er of t)e defence3 acted on t)e /rinci/le of (inning (it) t)e least effort3 and usually co%/re)ended t)at a co%%ander %ust direct t)e &attle rat)er t)an lead )is troo/s. lt)oug) t)e ra/id3 /o(erful3 and accurate s)ooting of t)e long&o(%en constituted al%ost a secret (ea/on3 2nglis) success did not de/end on t)is es/ecially effecti+e lig)t#infantry (ea/on syste%. 0)e Doint use of lig)t and )ea+y infantry /ro+ides t)e &est co%&ination for t)e defence3 t)e )ea+y infantry (it)standing )ea+y ca+alry and t)e lig)t infantry out#s)ooting t)e line ca+alry. gainst an attack &y a force of si%ilar co%/osition3 t)ese t(o (ea/on syste%s )a+e t)e ad+antage of t)e defensi+e3 including c)oice of ground and t)e a&ility to erect )asty defences or3 (it) enoug) ti%e3 field fortifications. In t)eir t)ree &ig &attles (it) t)e 'renc)3 t)e 2nglis) al(ays c)ose u/)ill /ositions (it) co+ered flanks and /rotected t)eir &o(%en (it) natural or artificial o&stacles. 2-ce/t at $r;cy3 enoug) dis%ounted ca+alry could )a+e (it)stood t)e 'renc) attacks if t)ey )ad %ade t)e %ost of t)e ad+antages of t)e defence. t $r;cy t)e long&o(%en3 ()o defeated t)e 'renc) cross&o(%en3 see%ed essential. :et e+en t)ere3 )ad t)e 2nglis) lacked t)eir su/erior lig)t infantry3 a c)arge &y a fe( of t)eir re%ounted )ea+y ca+alry (ould )a+e dis/ersed t)e slo(# s)ooting cross&o(%en.

1?@

s "enry Vs risky %arc) to gincourt re+eals3 &ot) 2nglis) tactics and strategy counted on t)e 'renc) e-e%/lifying t)e (eaknesses of t)e unorganised feudal ar%y and t)e fla(s in 'renc) %edie+al o/erational conce/ts. 0)e gincourt ca%/aign clearly s)o(s t)at t)e 2nglis) tactical syste% de/ended on t)e ene%ys %aking t)e &lunder of attacking in front. If t)e ene%y failed to o&lige3 2nglis) doctrine )ad no offensi+e for%ula. In t)eir o(n ci+il (ars t)e 2nglis) )ad no &etter idea t)an for t)e arc)ers to s)oot at eac) ot)er and t)e dis%ounted ca+alry to close in a frontal attack. $learly t)eir tactical %et)ods (ould )a+e failed against t)e ancient %asters of t)e art of (ar. In s/ite of t)eir e%/)asis on lig)t infantry3 e+en t)e 2nglis) (ere in one (ay still /risoners of t)e %edie+al conce/t of t)e /ri%acy of t)e )ea+y ca+alry%an. 0)ey )ad /ike%en %ounted on nags for strategic %o&ility3 and t)ey could readily )a+e su&stituted t)e% for dis%ounted )ea+y ca+alry%en. Since a %ounted /ike%an cost less t)an )alf a )ea+y ca+alry%an and less t)an a .uarter of an elite knig)t3 t)e 2nglis) could easily )a+e used %ounted /ike%en for )alf of t)eir )ea+y ca+alry. But3 t)oug) /resent on at least one occasion3 t)ey did not use t)eir /ike%en in t)e front line of &attle. In t)eir strategy of e-tracting concessions &y raids and t)en /ersisting &y slo(3 syste%atic con.uest3 t)e 2nglis) follo(ed t)e ideas of t)e ti%e and did as (ell as could &e e-/ected as long as t)e 'renc) re%ained loyal to t)eir %onarc) and institutions. 0)e 2nglis) did not )a+e large ar%ies &ecause t)ey )ad a s%all /o/ulation and3 like all %edie+al econo%ies3 )ad only an insignificant sur/lus /roduction to de+ote to (ar. In t)e +ast area of 'rance and a%ong t)e %illions of 'renc)%en3 t)e 2nglis) ar%ies lacked an ade.uate ratio of force to s/ace. "ad t)ey used t)eir tactical ad+antage and t)e /rotection offered &y t)eir insular /osition to a//ly a t)oroug)ly 0urkis)#Mongolian strategy of destruction3 %assacre3 and terroris%3 t)ey %ig)t )a+e (on3 &ut suc) a strategy (as unt)inka&le against fello( $)ristians. In t)e tactical and strategic su/re%acy of fortified to(ns t)e "undred :ears !ar s)o(ed t)e /ri%acy of t)e defensi+e in %edie+al (arfare. 0)e enor%ous s/ace of 'rance constituted a /o(erful ele%ent in t)e strategic defensi+e3 as illustrated &y t)e failure of t)e 2nglis) raids to do %ore t)an e-tract territorial concessions and t)e ina&ility of t)e 2nglis)3 ()en t)ey resorted to t)e /ersisting strategy of territorial con.uest3 to )a+e ade.uate %en to garrison +ery %uc) of 'rance. 0)e success of t)e 'renc) use of 'a&ian strategy to re/el t)e 2nglis) in *uyenne and t)eir a&ility to dri+e t)e 2nglis) fro% t)e nort) (it)out offensi+e &attles also e-)i&ited t)e strengt) of a defensi+e strategy &ased on /o/ular su//ort. 0)e +irtually inconse.uential strategic results t)at follo(ed fro% t)e %aDor 2nglis) +ictories furt)er confir% t)e strengt) of t)e strategic defence ()en su//orted &y castles and fortified cities3 a )uge country3 and an ade.uately deter%ined /olitical o//osition. $r;cy3 Poitiers3 and gincourt )ad only tactical i%/ortance Gt)e attrition t)at resultedH and could )a+e no %ore +alue unless t)e 2nglis) )ad only %odest /olitical o&Decti+es. 'or &attles to )a+e %ore of a result3 eit)er t)e losers %ust )a+e t)e /olitical (eakness of 1arius III ()en defeated &y le-ander or t)e +ictor %ust destroy t)e &ulk of a countrys ar%y in t)e &attle3 as at t)e By6antine defeat at Man6ikert. 5f course3 a lesser +ictory t)an Man6ikert could lead to a %o%entous retreat and t)us )el/ i%/le%ent a /ersisting strategy. nd t)e attrition of suc) a lesser +ictory could c)ange t)e &alance of forces and facilitate su&se.uent successes &y t)e +ictor. But t)e lack of decisi+eness of &attles3 t)e /o(er of t)e fortified tactical defence3 and t)e effecti+eness of t)e 'a&ian strategy3 all of ()ic) /ro+ided co%/onents of t)e strengt) of t)e strategic defence3 did not distinguis) Medie+al fro% ncient (arfare. 0)e lengt) of ti%e consu%ed in t)e syste%atic con.uests of t)e Ro%ans reflected /atient efforts to o+erco%e t)e /o(er of t)e defence ()en t)e defenders )ad a+aila&le a%/le s/ace and a %easure of /olitical unity. 2+en t)e resilience of t)e Ro%an 2%/ire s)o(s t)is strategic defensi+e strengt)3 illustrated in its successful defence after "anni&als o+er()el%ing tactical +ictories and attrition and t)e long ti%e t)at &ar&arian in+aders re.uired to con.uer territory fro% un(arlike in)a&itants ()ose /rofessional ar%ies often engaged in ci+il (ars. Back 14>

(he -$'erience of the -nglish (actical System in S'ain

0)e 2nglis) tactics3 de+elo/ed in fig)ting on t)eir !els) and Scottis) frontiers3 differed %arkedly fro% t)ose e+ol+ed as t)e $)ristians gradually dro+e t)e Mosle%s fro% S/ain. 0)oug) t)e %edie+al )ea+y ca+alry )ad a /re%ier /lace in t)e S/anis) %ilitary syste%3 t)e terrain ga+e a %ore significant role to t)e infantry. Most ar%ed t)e%sel+es (it) /ikes3 &ut so%e )ad s(ord and s)ield and3 t)oug) lacking t)e Ro%an organisation3 foug)t as indi+iduals rat)er t)an in a serried %ass. 0)e strategy of raids and constant irregular co%&at also affected ca+alry3 causing t)e de+elo/%ent of a lig)t ca+alry called genetours. Protected &y a steel ca/ and %all s)irt3 t)e genetour carried t(o Da+elins and )is s(ord. 0)oug) )e )ad +ersatility and could fig)t at close .uarters3 t)e genetour usually c)ose to kee/ )is distance and rely on )is Da+elin. In 1?=C t)e +eteran ca%/aigner3 2d(ard3 Prince of !ales3 in+aded S/ain fro% sout)ern 'rance to inter+ene in su//ort of a clai%ant to t)e S/anis) t)rone. !)en 9ing "enry II of S/ain &locked t)e in+asion route3 t)e Prince of !ales found anot)er one and3 &y %arc)ing .uickly3 forced &ack t)e S/anis) forces and ad%itted t)e Princes ar%y to S/ain. Insecure on )is t)rone3 9ing "enry felt o&liged to fig)t and3 strong in ca+alry3 resol+ed to take t)e offensi+e ()en )e )ad %o+ed to face t)e Princes ar%y. 'or t)e S/aniards to attack suited t)e Prince3 and near Na+arette )e used 2nglis) tactics &y di+iding )is dis%ounted ca+alry into t)ree successi+e lines and distri&uting )is long&o(%en a%ong all t)ree of t)ese lines. 9ing "enry3 (it) 'renc) su//ort and follo(ing a +ersion of 'renc) tactics3 co%/osed )is first line of dis%ounted )ea+y ca+alry and a fe( cross&o(%en3 follo(ing it (it) a line of %ounted ca+alry and genetours aided &y a fe( cross&o(%en. 0)e t)ird line consisted of %ilitia infantry. "enry o/ened )is attack (it) t)e ad+ance of )is dis%ounted ca+alry3 ()ic) &eca%e locked in co%&at (it) t)e Princes first line. 0)en3 taking ad+antage of Prince 2d(ards o/en flank3 )e ad+anced (it) )is genetours to assault 2d(ards rear lines. But t)e 2nglis) &o(%en dro+e off t)e Da+elin#ar%ed lig)t ca+alry %ore easily t)an $rusader cross&o(%en )ad &eaten off )orse arc)ers. 2d(ard t)en ad+anced )is second and t)ird lines and surrounded 9ing "enrys first line3 still locked in dis%ounted co%&at (it) t)e Princes first line. 0)e c)arge of 9ing "enrys re%aining )ea+y ca+alry failed to &reak Prince 2d(ards dis%ounted knig)ts3 sa+e )is o(n first line fro% defeat3 or /re+ent t)e rout of t)e S/anis) ar%y. 9ing "enrys %ounted forces suffered fe( causalities3 &ut )e lost )ea+ily in infantry3 including %any dro(ned in t)e ri+er &e)ind t)e &attlefield. n e+en si%/ler e-a%/le of t)e success of lig)t infantry against lig)t ca+alry occurred at lDu&arotta in 1?B< ()en t)e Portuguese3 (it) 2nglis) assistance and ad+ice3 resisted a S/anis) in+asion. 0)e Portuguese dis%ounted t)eir )ea+y ca+alry and stationed t)eir cross&o(%en and 2nglis) long&o(%en &e)ind )astily erected &arriers on t)e flanks. 0)is array sto//ed &ot) dis%ounted and %ounted S/anis) attacks3 t)e genetours suffering )ea+ily fro% t)e lig)t infantrys arro(s. 5t)er ca+alry sent to turn t)e flanks &eca%e lost in t)e ra+ines of t)e rugged country and ne+er acco%/lis)ed t)eir %ission. s in t)e cases of t)e 'renc) against t)e 2nglis)3 %ore e%/)asis on t)e flanks and less on a frontal attack could )a+e gi+en t)e su/erior S/anis) ar%y +ictory. Back

(he Wagenburg
In t)e early fifteent) century a Russian tactical inno+ation %ade a &rief a//earance in 2uro/e. 0o co%&at t)e Mongolian lig)t ca+alry on t)e ste//es3 t)e Russians used (agons t)at dre( toget)er in a circle u/on t)e a//roac) of t)e ene%y3 t)us %aking a fort to resist a ca+alry c)arge and to /ro+ide co+er for t)eir &o(%en to s)oot at t)e Mongols. $alled a (agen&urg ()en t)e $6ec)s used it in t)eir early fifteent) century re&ellion against t)eir 9ing3 it /ro+ed an ad%ira&le de+ice for resisting t)e c)arge of )ea+y ca+alry and an e-cellent /latfor% for t)e use of a s%all cannon.

141

,i%ited &y terrain and its se+erely defensi+e %ission3 t)e (agen&urg )ad only t(o decades of use &ut did )el/ to interest t)e *er%ans in t)e use of )andguns. Back

(he Swiss Heavy nfantry

Neit)er t)e (agen&urg nor t)e genetours )ad lasting influence in 2uro/e3 e+en t)oug) 2uro/eans )ad &egun to see t)e strategic +alue of lig)t ca+alry. 0)e 'renc) 9ing )ad no %ore success t)an t)e Scots in fostering t)e long&o(7 t)e long /ractice re.uired to attain t)e necessary strengt) and skill )el/ed /reclude its s/read &eyond sout)ern !ales and 2ngland. 5nly t)e 2nglis) and 'renc) re+i+al of t)e old /ractice of )ea+y ca+alrys fig)ting dis%ounted recei+ed attention and e%ulation else()ere. But t)e S(iss e+ol+ed a )ea+y infantry t)at ri+alled t)e &est of t)e ancients and )ad a /rofound effect on 2uro/ean (arfare. 'ig)ting on foot ca%e naturally to t)e i%/o+eris)ed %ountaineers3 suiting &ot) t)eir terrain and resources. Se/arated &y %ountains into s%all +alley co%%unities3 t)e S(iss )ad rural and ci+ic %ilitias %uc) like t)e s%all city#states of *reece and Italy. !it)out &ody ar%our or s)ields3 t)ey foug)t (it) a )al&erd3 all a-e (it) an eig)t#foot )andle t)at )ad a /oint for use as a s)ort /ike and a s/ike o//osite t)e a-e &lade3 ()ic) also ser+ed as a )ook to snag a )orse%ans reins or to /ull do(n t)e rider. s early as 1?1< at Morgarten t)ey de%onstrated t)at t)eir %ilitias could defend t)eir +alleys against t)e )ea+y ca+alry of t)eir ustrian neig)&ours. Blocking (it) a (all t)e road &et(een a forested %ountain slo/e and a lake3 t)e S(iss co%%ander )id %ost of )is %en on t)e (ooded slo/e until 1uke ,eo/olds %ounted colu%n of ustrian )ea+y ca+alry3 sto//ed &y t)e (all3 )alted along t)e road. 0)en t)e S(iss3 s/ringing t)eir a%&us)3 c)arged fro% t)e (oods (it) t)eir )al&erds3 forcing t)e %ounted ca+alry%en to fig)t on t)e defensi+e (it) t)e lake at t)eir &acks. 0)e )ea+y ca+alry on t)e defensi+e against )ea+y infantry .uickly lost t)e co%&at3 t)e un#assailed rear of t)e %ounted colu%n fleeing as t)e S(iss defeated t)e leading ele%ents. ided &y terrain3 tactical sur/rise3 and t)e /re/onderance of t)eir )ea+y infantry (ea/on syste%7 t)e S(iss could )a+e (on (it) +ery little organisation. But like t)e *reeks and Ro%ans t)ey )ad de+elo/ed a si%/le3 distincti+e )ea+y infantry doctrine and drilled t)e%sel+es t)oroug)ly in its a//lication. 4nlike t)e linear syste%s of t)e ancients3 t)e S(iss ado/ted a for%ation si%ilar to a solid s.uare. If a for%ation )ad fifty ranks and fifty files3 its front on t)e ground )ad t(ice its de/t)3 &ecause %en re.uire a&out t)ree feet side &y side &ut only3 a foot and a )alf &ack to front. Suc) a fifty#&y#fifty for%ation contained 23<>> %en and occu/ied a front of fifty yards and a de/t) of t(enty#fi+e. 0o co+er a s.uare of ground3 a for%ation re.uired t(ice as %any ranks as files. front of t)irty#fi+e %en and a de/t) of se+enty contained al%ost 23<>> %en and for%ed a s.uare of a&out t)irty#fi+e yards. S(iss for%ations /ro&a&ly did not de+iate far fro% t)e range re/resented &y t)ese s.uares. 2+en 23<>> )ea+y infantry%en3 t)us for%ed3 could kee/ t)eir for%ation and res/ond to orders &ecause t)e S(iss su&di+ided t)eir s.uare into files. 0)e file leaders for%ed t)e front rank3 and (it) no %ore t)an fifty %en a&reast t)ese leaders could usually kee/ s)oulder to s)oulder (it) one anot)er3 %aintain t)eir s)ort front in align%ent3 and a+oid any ga/s in t)eir line. 0)e %en in t)e files3 si%/ly follo(ing t)e %en a)ead3 could kee/ t)e s.uare toget)er (it)out great difficulty. 8ust as a s%all Ro%an %ani/le could a+oid ga/s3 so also could a (ell#drilled S(iss s.uare %aintain t)e integrity of its for%ation. But3 unlike t)e Ro%ans3 t)e S(iss did not for% a line3 usually arraying in t)ree s.uares. 0)ey dealt (it) t)e /ro&le% of flank /rotection &y drilling t)eir s.uare to resist attacks in flank or rear &y )alting and le+elling t)eir /ikes in all directions. ,acking a line3 t)e S(iss needed no flank /rotection &ecause t)eir s.uares )ad an all#around defence ()en )alted. But3 unlike usually i%%o&ile %edie+al )ea+y infantry3 t)e S(iss stressed t)e offensi+e3 t)eir co%%unities drilling t)eir 142

s.uares until t)ey could %o+e .uickly in for%ation. Ra/id %o+e%ent (it) large for%ations re.uired disci/line and drill3 &ut t)e %arc)ing of s.uares /resented a task far easier t)an %o+ing a line (it) its irresisti&le tendency to de+elo/ ga/s and lose its align%ent. In 1??@ at ,au/en t)e S(iss %ilitia de%onstrated t)at it could (in on an o/en field. Resisting t)e ad+ance of )ea+y ca+alry su//orted &y feudal %ilitia3 t)e S(iss for%ed in t(o s.uares and took a /osition on a )ill. 0)e attacking ca+alry /icked t)e gentler slo/e3 assigning t)e infantry t)e stee/er ad+ance. s t)e t(o &odies %o+ed u/)ill against t)e S(iss3 t)eir t(o s.uares c)arged t)eir se/arate o//onents. 0)e classic do(n)ill c)arge routed t)e infantry3 &ut t)e skilled regulars of t)e ca+alry fell &ack3 di+ided3 and c)arged t)e S(iss s.uare in flank and rear as (ell as in front. 0)e S(iss3 /re/ared for t)is e+entuality3 )alted and faced t)eir for%ation in all four directions. s t)e ca+alry attacked t)e i%%o&ile s.uare on all four sides3 t)e ot)er S(iss s.uare3 )a+ing defeated t)e infantry3 ke/t its for%ation3 %arc)ed to t)e rescue of t)e s.uare &eset &y t)e ca+alry3 and .uickly routed t)e ene%y. 0)e action clearly e-)i&ited t)e %o&ility and t)e ca/acity for all#around defence of t)e S(iss s.uare. But an all#around defence re.uired a )alt3 as t)e Persians kne( ()en t)eir doctrine called for ca+alry attacks on t)e flanks to kee/ *reek )ea+y infantry fro% closing (it) t)eir lig)t infantry. 0)oug) t)e unar%oured S(iss (it) t)eir )al&erds )ad succeeded against )ea+y ca+alry3 t)ey )ad difficulty in su&se.uent struggles3 narro(ly defeating ustrian )ea+y ca+alry t)at )ad dis%ounted so%e of t)eir %en to fig)t. ,ater3 t)e S(iss (ere glad to retreat ()en t)ey foug)t an Italian force t)at used cross&o(%en and dis%ounted its ()ole force of )ea+y ca+alry. In s/ite of t)eir &ra+ery3 disci/line3 and %orale3 t)e unar%oured S(iss )ad trou&le (it) )al&erds against t)eir ar%oured o//onents. 0)e S(iss res/onded to t)e need to %eet )ea+y ca+alry in t)e o/en &y ado/ting3 gradually3 a steel ca/ and &reast/late and3 %ore .uickly and i%/ortantly3 a /ike (it) a long steel )ead. 2+en a s)ort /ike (as a )ard (ea/on to )andle &ecause once /ike%en )a+e le+elled t)eir /ikes3 t)ey could not easily c)ange direction. 0)ey )eld le+elled /ikes (it) t(o )ands at s)oulder le+el /ointing slig)tly do(n(ard. But3 e+en (it) t)e /ike3 t)e S(iss %anaged to retain t)e %o&ility on t)e field t)at c)aracterised t)eir )al&erd#ar%ed for%ations. Part of t)eir success ca%e fro% t)e ado/tion of t)e /ike as a national (ea/on3 e+en c)ildren /racticing (it) %iniature /ikes. But t)ey retained in t)eir s.uares so%e %en ar%ed (it) )al&erds. 0)ey stationed t)ese %ore +ersatile soldiers in t)e censer of t)e s.uare3 ()ere t)ey could co%&at any ca+alry or infantry t)at &reac)ed t)e /ike (all and fro% ()ic) t)e )al&erdlers could sally to attack an o//onents flank or rear. In addition to t)e drill3 ()ic) ga+e %o&ility to t)eir s.uare3 t)e S(iss )ad a co)erence lacking in %ost ot)er units of t)e day. Since eac) grou/ ca%e fro% t)e sa%e +alley3 to(n3 or guild3 t)e %e%&ers kne( one anot)er and )ad drilled toget)er often. 0)oug) still %ilitia3 t)ey )ad so%e of t)e co)esion of t)e /rofessional ar%ies of ancient ti%es3 a unit s/irit3 arid drill t)at t)e decentralised feudal %ilitary syste% lacked3 e+en in %any %ercenary units. Before a ca%/aign &egan3 t)e S(iss %ars)alled t)eir forces in t)e sa%e order for %arc)ing and for &attle3 and so t)ey %o+ed ra/idly and could go into action .uickly. 4sually t)ey for%ed for &attle in t)ree s.uares3 using an ec)elon arrange%ent of kee/ing t)e centre s.uare a)ead of t)ose on t)e flank. 0)oug) t)is %ade a +irtue of t)e difficulty of kee/ing t)e for%ations aligned3 t)e %et)od /rotected at least one flank of t)e fore%ost unit and /ro+ided an attack co%/osed of successi+e s)ocks. nd3 unlike %ost %edie+al /ike%en3 t)e S(iss &elie+ed in t)e offensi+e. Rarely did t)ey recei+e an attack3 /referring to ad+ance against t)eir o//onent (it) a celerity al(ays startling for suc) a//arently un(ieldy for%ations. s t)e S(iss e-/anded t)e nu%&er of co%%unities &elonging to t)eir federation3 t)ey &egan to )a+e an i%/ortance &eyond t)e confines of t)eir %ountain s/)ere. In 1444 t)ey %ade a /rofound i%/ression ()en3 outnu%&ered &y as %uc) as fifteen to one3 t)ey attacked a 'renc) ar%y. 'renc) 14?

ca+alry assaults on t)e flanks )alted t)e S(iss3 Dust as )ad Narsess t)reat of a ca+alry c)arge sto//ed t)e 'ranks at $asilinu% in <<4. 0)en t)e 'renc) used t)eir cross&o(%en against t)e i%%o&ile S(iss %ass. But t)e disci/lined and confident S(iss stood t)eir ground against alternating c)arges and s)o(ers of cross&o( &olts until3 at great cost3 t)e 'renc) killed t)e% all. 0)e S(iss3 )o(e+er3 esta&lis)ed t)eir /restige &y defeating $)arles t)e Ras)3 1uke of Burgundy3 in t)ree &attles in less t)an a year3 killing t)e 1uke in t)e t)ird3 )is )ead s/lit &y a )al&erd stroke. In fact3 t)e S(iss /ro+ided t)e %ilitary o//osition t)at defeated t)e 1ukes a%&itious /lans to e-/and )is do%inions. $)arles3 a %an of so%e culture and not lacking in a&ility3 )ad asse%&led a large ar%y to ()ic) in 14C= t)e to(n of *ranson ca/itulated. But $)arles s)o(ed )is rut)less nature ()en )e killed t)e garrison &y )anging and dro(ning. fe( days later t)e &ra+e 1uke faced t)e S(iss in a &attle in ()ic) )e3 (it) )is )eterogeneous and unarticulated ar%y of %ercenaries fro% e+ery nation3 could neit)er %atc) t)e disci/line of t)e S(iss nor co/e (it) t)e ;lan of t)eir assault. fter re/ulsing t(o ca+alry c)arges3 t)e S(iss ad+anced and $)arless ar%y3 instead of res/onding to )is orders to en+elo/ t)e ene%y3 /anicked and fled. 0)ree %ont)s later3 )a+ing for%ed )is ar%y into eig)t di+isions and e-ercised t)e% toget)er3 $)arles %et t)e S(iss at Morat3 ()ere )e dug )i%self into a /o(erful defensi+e /osition. But t)e i%/etuous and (ell#coordinated attack of t)e t)ree S(iss s.uares &roke t)roug) $)arless defences ()en t)e 1uke3 t)inking t)e S(iss (ould not attack3 )ad allo(ed t)e &ulk of )is %en to return to t)eir ca%/. 0)e S(iss defeated $)arless %en3 ()o entered t)e &attle /iece%eal3 and ca/tured t)e 1ukes artillery and %uc) +alua&le &ooty. 0)e follo(ing (inter at Nancy t(o S(iss colu%ns attacked in front ()ile t)e t)ird3 )a+ing %ade a round#a&out %o+e%ent t)roug) a (ood3 attacked t)e flank3 routing $)arless ar%y. 0)e S(iss t)us ac.uired a re/utation for in+inci&ility3 a con+iction t)ey s)ared3 %aking t)e% e+en %ore confident3 deter%ined3 and for%ida&le. But3 unlike t)e 2nglis) long&o(3 t)e S(iss )ea+y infantry syste% did not re%ain a %ono/oly of t)e originators. 0)e S(iss (illingly )ired t)e%sel+es as %ercenaries and enrolled in t)e 'renc) and ot)er 2uro/ean ar%ies. But s/ending ti%e as %ercenaries did not at all dilute t)eir essentially S(iss c)aracter7 t)ey continued to re/resent t)e sa%e co%%unities and to ser+e in t)eir o(n (ay under t)eir o(n leaders3 t)us losing none of t)eir significant ele%ents of %orale3 co)esion3 and /ractice in drilling toget)er. 0)e S(iss )ad created )ea+y infantry t)at could do %ore t)an engage in sieges or in an i%%o&ile for%ation /assi+ely resist a ca+alry attack. 1isci/lined and %oderately articulated3 a )ea+y infantry ca/a&le of offensi+e %anoeu+re )ad returned to t)e &attlefield. But t)e S(iss (ould not &e t)e only source of suc) infantry &ecause ot)er nations de+elo/ed t)eir o(n /ike%en3 %odelled on t)e S(iss. 0)e *er%ans )ad t)e %ost success3 (it) t)eir for%ida&le ,andsknec)ts ()o also foug)t a&road as %ercenaries. But (it)out t)e co%%unity %ilitia &ackground and rarely ke/t toget)er under ar%s for a long /eriod3 foreign infantry3 e+en t)e ,andsknec)ts3 ne+er ac)ie+ed t)e %orale3 co)esion3 or drill and %o&ility of t)e S(iss. Back

(he "east -ffort Warfare of the talian Condottieri

lt)oug) t)ey )ad occasional clas)es (it) t)e S(iss3 t)e Italians3 (it) no %aDor land frontier (it) any /eo/le ()o )ad a different %ilitary syste%3 foug)t a%ong t)e%sel+es: t)e /rinci/al cities of t)e nort) contended (it) eac) ot)er3 (it) t)e /a/al states centred at Ro%e3 and (it) t)e sout)ern Italian kingdo% ()ose ca/ital &eca%e Na/les. "a+ing de+elo/ed co%%erce3 industry3 and a flouris)ing %oney econo%y3 t)e nort)ern cities found it easier to /ay soldiers t)an trust to o&ligated ser+ice. 8ust as t)e *reeks and Ro%ans a&andoned t)eir %ilitias as t)ey engaged in essentially continuous (arfare3 t)e Italians ca%e to e%/loy /rofessionals al%ost e-clusi+ely. But3 instead of a state#o(ned ar%y on t)e Ro%an %odel3 t)e Italians used %ercenary leaders (it) ()o% t)ey %ade a contract G(ondotta in ItalianH to su//ly and co%%and a certain nu%&er of troo/s.

144

$alled condottieri3 t)ese /rofessionals initially )ad contracts for a year or less and often (ould fig)t on different sides in different years. desire for de/enda&ility led to t)e e%ergence of longer#ter% contracts until &y t)e %iddle of t)e fifteent) century t)e /rinci/al condottieri )ad &eco%e essentially /er%anent e%/loyees of a single state.

Hea%y 'nfantryman Back

But /art of t)e forces continued to follo( t)e %ercenary %odel of e%/loying a condottiere ca/tain and )is co%/any. Not a tactical unit3 a co%/any could &e as s%all as a do6en or as large as a t)ousand. 0)e ca/tain3 &ot) a tactical leader and a &usiness entre/reneur3 raised %en and secured contracts &ased on )is re/utation as a co%%ander3 )is a&ility to %anage )is co%/any3 and )is ca/ital. ,ike ot)er &usiness%en3 ca/tains often in)erited co%/anies fro% t)eir fat)ers or fat)ers#in# la(. 'or a long ti%e t)ey co%/eted in a %arket in ()ic) t)ey sold t)eir skills as co%%anders and t)e .uality of t)eir troo/s. Naturally t)eir e%/loyers often sus/ected3 so%eti%es correctly3 t)at t)eir %ercenary leaders deli&erately a+oided &attles and casualties and t)at t)ey /rolonged a (ar to continue t)eir e%/loy%ent. $ities also often atte%/ted3 so%eti%es successfully3 to engage t)eir ene%ys co%%ander as t)e leader of t)eir o(n forces. 0)e desire for greater loyalty G()ic) )ad induced t)e states to offer continuous ser+ice contractsH later in+ol+ed creating /eaceti%e ar%ed forces. Rat)er t)an (aiting until (ar &roke out to )ire an ar%y3 &y t)e %id#fifteent) century Italian states not only )ad /er%anent co%%anders &ut also t)e nucleus of a force t)at t)ey could e-/and &y )iring %ore co%/anies. 0)e sa%e %oti+es t)at )ad ins/ired t)e cities to create long#ter% contracts and essentially /er%anent %ercenary forces also led t)e Italians to esta&lis) gradually se/arate state forces )eaded &y t)eir o(n officials and co%/osed of soldiers e%/loyed as indi+iduals rat)er t)an as condottieri. By t)e late fifteent) century a&out )alf of t)e /eaceti%e forces consisted of state e%/loyees. In addition3 go+ern%ents )ad created ci+ilian %ilitary ad%inistrations to %ake contracts3 dis/erse %oney3 /ro+ide for su//lies3 and see to %ost of t)e non#co%&at as/ects of t)e ar%ed forces. 0)e Italians (ere not inno+ators in res/ect to t)eir increasingly state#o(ned and &ureaucratic ar%y organisation3 &ut t)eir %et)ods and t)eir le+el of so/)istication (ere re/resentati+e of t)e &est 2uro/e )ad de+elo/ed out of t)e feudal and %ercenary %ilitary syste% c)aracteristic of t)e Middle ges. In tactics t)e Italians re%ained essentially %edie+al in t)eir reliance on )ea+y ca+alry. Since3 &y t)e %id#fifteent) century3 t)eir e-cellent ar%ourers %ade co%/lete suits of /late ar%our t)at (eig)ed only fifty /ounds3 t)e Italians )ad &roug)t t)e )ea+y#ca+alry (ea/on syste% to a )ig) state of /erfection. 0)oug) t)e condottieri )ad added so%e lig)t ca+alry for scouting and foraging3 t)ey )ad none t)at could function tactically. 0)eir infantry consisted of e.ual /ro/ortions of cross&o(%en3 /ike%en3 and s)ield &earers3 %en ()o carried a +ery large s)ield t)at rested on t)e ground and /ro+ided /rotection for t)e ot)er infantry. Pro/erly %ingled toget)er &e)ind t)e (all of &ig s)ields3 14<

t)e Italian infantry could resist any attack. But since suc) an array )ad e+en less %o&ility t)an %ost %edie+al infantry and since t)e /rofessional soldiers of Italy refused to c)arge suc) a for%ation3 an infantry (it)out any ca/a&ility for %anoeu+re could /lay only a s%all role e-ce/t for sieges. 5n t)e &attlefield t)is for%ation largely constituted a /osition &e)ind ()ic) t)e ca+alry could rally3 /re/aratory to a rene(ed effort. By t)e %id#fifteent) century logistics )ad i%/ro+ed so t)at ar%ies did not )a+e to %o+e e+ery fe( days to a ne( source of su//lies. 0)is c)ange ena&led co%%anders to ado/t field fortifications3 de+alued t)e s)ield &earer3 and ga+e rise to t)e occasional use of so%e )ea+y infantry ar%ed (it) s(ords and s)ields. Italian (arfare )ad reac)ed a so/)isticated le+el. 0)e strategy of Italian (arfare (as ty/ically %edie+al in its trust in t)e defensi+e /o(er of fortifications3 and it also e%/loyed sieges and de+astation of ene%y territory. :et in s/ite of a )ig) ratio of force to s/ace3 Italian (ars lacked decisi+eness3 t)e /rotracted o/erations clearly e-)i&iting t)e /re/onderance of t)e defence t)at results ()en &ot) sides )a+e t)e sa%e %i-ture of (ea/on syste%s. I%/licitly gras/ing t)is3 co%%anders a+oided frontal attacks and concentrated on sur/rise attacks3 a%&us)es3 or t)e use of ra/id %arc)es to catc) anot)er at a disad+antage or &acked against an o&stacle. 0)e use of a %ultitude of s/ies and t)e de+elo/%ent of intelligence /rocedures resulted fro% t)e conditions also caused generals to &ank on strong /ositions3 field fortifications3 and t)e ela&oration of logistic strategy3 suc) as /oisoning (ells. r%ies &eca%e t)oroug)ly organised3 (it) s.uadrons of C< to 1<> ca+alry often incor/orated into units of eig)t to ten s.uadrons called colu%ns. $o%%anders stressed t)e %anoeu+ra&ility of t)eir ca+alry on t)e &attlefield and al(ays /ro+ided a reser+e. Suc) co%/etence and so/)istication %eant t)at &attles )a//ened rarely and often only after careful calculation of t)e /ro&a&ilities of success and t)e costs of defeat. good e-a%/le occurred in 144B ()en t)e crafty3 a%&itious3 and skilful 'ransesco Sfor6a3 leading t)e forces of Milan3 &esieged t)e Venetian to(n of $ara+aggio. "e faced anot)er noted condottiere3 t)e e.ually ca/a&le Mic)ele ttendolo3 called Mic)eletto &ecause of )is s%all si6e. !)en ttendolo arri+ed (it) t)e Venetian ar%y to raise t)e siege3 )e )alted near&y to assess t)e situation. Sfor6as ar%y co+ered t)e siege fro% a strongly fortified ca%/3 and t)e little to(n could not long )old out against t)e artillery of t)e attackers. 5n t)e ot)er )and3 t)e to(n itself )ad little i%/ortance3 and sa+ing it could not Dustify t)e risk of defeat and t)e serious casualties t)at acco%/anied t)e loss of a &attle. In addition3 ttendolos loss could seriously da%age )is o(n co%/any3 )ar% )is /ersonal &usiness3 and /ro&a&ly not only de/ri+e )i% of )is contract (it) Venice &ut also cause )i% difficulty in finding anot)er. But since t)e ca%/aigning season )ad al%ost ended3 ttendolo realised t)at )is e%/loyers e-/ected action and t)at a decisi+e +ictory could )a+e a significant /olitical result: t)e o+ert)ro( of t)e re/u&lican regi%e in Milan. "e decided to attack ()en t(o co%/etent su&ordinates re/orted t)at careful reconnaissance )ad s)o(n t)at ca+alry could get t)roug) t)e %ars)y forest t)at Sfor6a relied to /rotect one side of )is ca%/. 0)is c)anged t)e odds of (inning and constituted t)e decisi+e factor in t)e s)re(d and calculating ttendolos decision to fig)t. 0)e attack t)roug) t)e forest (ent (ell3 &ut Sfor6as forces %ade a deter%ined resistance3 including a ca+alry attack on t)e Venetian rear. 0)e &attle ended in t)e ca/ture of %ost of ttendolos ar%y and )is disc)arge &y t)e Venetians. In any e+ent3 suc) careful tactical a//raisal and esti%ate of &enefits set Italian (arfare a/art fro% %uc) of t)at conducted else()ere in 2uro/e # as did t)e /ro/ensity of t)e Italian %ercenary soldier to surrender ()en )is situation looked )o/eless. Victors usually released rank#and#file /risoners after taking t)eir (ea/ons and )orses3 ()ic) sa+ed t)e cost of guarding and %aintaining t)e soldiers3 ()o (ould &e useless until t)ey )ad found ne( e.ui/%ent. 0)is attitude3 like t)e soldiers /reference for &eco%ing a /risoner rat)er t)an fig)ting against great odds3 led to criticis% of t)e ()ole syste%3 including t)e JscientificL strategy of 14=

%anoeu+res3 %arc)es3 entrenc)ed ca%/s3 arid &attles in ()ic) /risoners /redo%inated a%ong t)e defeateds casualties. But ()en &ot) sides )ad t)e identical culture and t)us follo(ed si%ilar rules3 essentially t)e sa%e stale%ate resulted ()et)er or not t)e co%&atants )ad o&ser+ed a %ore or less sanguinary %ode of (arfare. It %atters little to t)e outco%e of t)e conflict3 for e-a%/le3 ()et)er &ot) sides release3 i%/rison3 or kill /risoners3 &ut3 to so%e conte%/orary critics3 t)e Italian %et)ods see%ed un#%artial. 5t)er co%%entators alleged t)at t)ere (as one &attle in ()ic) only a single %an lost )is life and t)at not to ene%y action3 &ut &y dro(ning in a s(a%/. 0)ese c)aracterisations lacked %uc) foundation in fact ot)er t)an t)e least effort strategy and a /reference for taking /risoners and for surrender to deat). Per)a/s t)e %ost significant as/ect of Italian (arfare lay in t)e /rofessionalis% of its leaders and in t)eir t)oroug) gras/ of t)e ideas of en+elo/%ent3 concentration against (eaknesses3 and (inning (it) t)e least effort as (ell as t)eir realisation t)at frontal attacks usually failed3 t)at reser+es )ad a funda%ental role to /lay3 and t)at co%%anders s)ould direct3 not /artici/ate3 in t)e &attle. Back

)egional (actical Systems in Conflict, (he French nvasion of taly

By t)e end of t)e fifteent) century 2uro/ean tactical syste%s )ad &eco%e .uite di+erse. $ultural factors )indered t)e ado/tion of (ea/ons t)at flouris)ed in anot)er country. 0)e 9ing of 'rance3 for e-a%/le3 failed to induce )is su&Dects to take u/ t)e 2nglis) long&o(3 in /art &ecause of t)e reluctance of t)e 'renc) no&ility to /ut suc) a for%ida&le (ea/on in t)e )ands of t)e lo(er classes. 0)erefore3 %uc) of t)e ado/tion of ot)er (ea/on syste%s consisted of )iring foreigners3 suc) as S(iss )ea+y infantry and Balkan lig)t ca+alry. Ne+ert)eless3 all regional syste%s )ad %uc) in co%%on. 0)e /late#ar%oured )ea+y ca+alry%an re%ained funda%ental3 as did t)e tactic of fre.uently con+erting )i% into a )ea+y infantry%an for co%&at. 0)e 2nglis) )ad de%onstrated t)e +alue of lig)t infantry on t)e &attlefield3 and t)oug) only t)e 2nglis) )ad effecti+e long&o(%en3 all ar%ies )ad ar.ue&usiers or cross&o(%en. "ea+y infantry /ike%en ()o3 usually standing i%%o&ile3 could defend t)e%sel+es against ca+alry do%inated t)is (ea/on syste%3 &ut t)e S/anis) and t)e Italians )ad )ea+y infantry (it) s(ords and s)ields3 and t)e for%ida&ly %o&ile S(iss s.uares )ad s/read fro% t)e %ountains as t)e S(iss )ired t)e%sel+es out and i%itators created infantry %odelled on t)e S(iss syste%. 2+en lig)t ca+alry for tactical as (ell as strategic /ur/oses e-isted in t)e for% of t)e S/anis) genetours3 %ounted cross&o(%en3 and ar.ue&usiers ()o clu%sily atte%/ted to s)oot ()ile %ounted. long (it) t)is tactical +ariety e-isted t)e de+elo/%ent of /rofessional ar%ies and leaders t)at )ad e%anci/ated t)e%sel+es fro% t)e )indrance of so%e as/ects of %edie+al /ers/ecti+es and soug)t to de+elo/ a scientific art of (ar. 0)e 'renc) t)en initiated a long international (ar in Italy3 ()ic) %i-ed t)ese regional (ea/on syste%s and tactical /ers/ecti+es. By t)e end of t)e si-teent) century a ne( co%&ined#ar%s synt)esis )ad e%erged. 0)e source of t)e 'renc)#Italian (ars lay in t)e a%&itions of 9ing $)arles VIII of 'rance. 4nlike )is crafty fat)er3 ,ouis II3 ()o )ad done so %uc) to enco%/ass t)e ruin of $)arles t)e Ras)3 t)e young 9ing lacked a&ility and Dudg%ent. :et )is i%agination concei+ed +ast /roDects3 suc) as t)e ca/ture of $onstantino/le3 to ()ic) t)e con.uest of Italy (ould /ro+ide a ste//ingstone. In 14@43 ()en )e in+aded Italy3 9ing $)arles led an ar%y far different fro% t)e feudal arrays t)at )ad %et defeat at t)e )ands of t)e 2nglis) early in t)e century. Parts of t)e troo/s (ere 'renc) regulars3 for%ed in t)e last years of t)e "undred :ears !ar7 ot)ers %ercenaries ()o co%/osed %ost of t)e re%ainder of t)is for%ida&le force. 0o t)eir traditional e-cellence in )ea+y ca+alry3 t)e 'renc) )ad added t)e &est artillery in 2uro/e. lso a creation of t)e last years of t)e "undred :ears !ar3 'renc) artillery3 (it) )ig)#.uality gunners ser+ing su/erlati+e &ron6e guns on ()eel#carriages3 )ad sufficient %o&ility to kee/ u/ (it) t)e ar%ys %arc) and function on t)e &attlefield as (ell as in sieges. 0o an infantry force including large nu%&ers of 'renc) cross&o(%en3 t)e 9ing )ad added %any S(iss %ercenary )ea+y infantry. "e entered Italy (it) 2<3>>> %en3 a )uge nu%&er for t)at 14C

ti%e. 0)is ar%y3 for%ed in t)e latter years of t)e "undred :ears !ar3 re/resented t)e lessons of t)at (ar and 'renc) ada/tation to t)e c)anges of t)e fifteent) century. 0)e si6e and e-cellence of t)e 'renc) ar%y i%/ressed t)e Italians and %ade it easy for 9ing $)arles to %arc) sout) to )is o&Decti+e3 Na/les. !it) Venice neutral and t)e 1uc)y of Milan )is ally3 $)arles %o+ed on(ard and3 o+era(ing 'lorence and t)e Po/e3 secured free /assage t)roug) t)eir territories to in+ade t)e sout)ern Italian and Sicilian do%ain of t)e 9ing of Na/les. 4n/o/ular (it) )is su&Dects and (it) %any of )is no&ility /ro#'renc)3 t)e Nea/olitan 9ing offered only token resistance. 9ing $)arles con.uered Na/les3 )ardly )a+ing to strike a &lo(. :et $)arless success frig)tened Milan3 Venice3 and t)e Po/e and also 9ing 'erdinand and Aueen Isa&ella of S/ain and t)e "oly Ro%an 2%/eror3 ()ose loosely knit e%/ire )ad &y t)en &eco%e essentially confined to *er%any3 ustria3 and so%e adDacent lands. In 14@<3 ()en $)arles3 lea+ing )alf )is ar%y to garrison Na/les3 (is)ed to return to 'rance3 )e found t)e ar%ies of Milan and Venice &locking )is (ay t)roug) t)e /ennine Mountains. s/lendid 'renc) ar%y3 &ut led &y a 9ing ine-/erienced in (ar3 )ad to face a larger force of seasoned Italian soldiers under (ell#tested /rofessional leaders)i/. 0)e Mar.uis of Mantua co%%anded t)e allied )ost. Instead of i%/eding or e+en &locking t)e 'renc) in t)e /asses of t)e /ennines3 )e decided to use )is nu%erical ad+antage to attack t)e 'renc) after t)ey )ad descended fro% t)e %ountains onto terrain suita&le for t)e Italian ca+alry to o/erate. 0)e Mar.uis (anted t)e glory of con.uering t)e 'renc)3 and t)e allies desired t)e %ilitary and /olitical effect resulting fro% a serious defeat of t)e 'renc). Since t)e 'renc) route nort) lay on a road running &et(een a ri+er and a line of )ills3 t)e %ar.uis c)ose t)is /lace to attack t)e 'renc) on t)eir %arc) &ecause )e could count on t)e 'renc) to see t)at t)e ri+er and t)e )ills /rotected t)eir flank and /re/are for a &attle in front. But t)e Mar.uis3 kno(ing t)at t)e ri+er (as so s)allo( t)at )is %en could easily c)arge across it3 /lanned one attack on t)e 'renc) +anguard to )alt t)eir colu%n ()ile )is %ain forces assaulted t)e flank of t)e centre and rear of t)e 'renc) colu%n. !it) /er)a/s 2>3>>> %en3 )e outnu%&ered t)e 'renc) t(o to one. But e+eryt)ing (ent (rong (it) t)e Italian /lan. 0)e 'renc)3 des/ite 9ing $)arless inade.uacies3 dis/layed foresig)t in t)eir arrange%ents. 9no(ing t)at t)ey )ad to fig)t t)eir (ay t)roug)3 t)e 'renc) )ad /laced t)eir for%ida&le S(iss infantry in t)e +anguard and )ad for%ed t)eir line of %arc) so t)at &y facing left or rig)t t)ey (ould already )a+e for%ed t)eir line of &attle. 0)ey )ad a%/le ti%e to /osition t)eir line &ecause )ea+y rains delayed t)e Italian attack across t)e ri+er and forced t)e Italians to cross at t)e (rong /lace. 0)e S(iss routed t)e forces assailing t)e )ead of t)e colu%n3 since t)e Italian lig)t ca+alry3 ()ic) s)ould )a+e attacked t)e S(iss3 looted t)e 'renc) ca%/ instead3 t)e &elated %ain assault failed &ecause t)e reser+es re%ained inacti+e for t)e ()ole &attle: t)e Italian /lan )ad ke/t )alf t)e ar%y in reser+e3 and t)e Mar.uiss uncle3 t)e only officer ()o could co%%it t)e reser+es3 (as killed in t)e fig)ting. Ne+ert)eless3 t)e &re+ity of t)e &attle Ga %ere .uarter )ourH also %ilitated against t)e use of t)e reser+e. In s/ite of t)e li%ited ti%e3 t)e Italians suffered )ea+y casualties3 'renc) ser+ants killing fallen Italian )ea+y ca+alry%en. 0)e 'renc) continued t)eir %arc) after t)is &rief &attle at 'orno+o. 0)is tra+esty of scientific generals)i/ resulted fro% t)e rise in t)e ri+er3 t)e Mar.uiss lack of e-/erience in co%%anding so large an ar%y3 )is leading one attack )i%self rat)er t)an co%%anding t)e &attle3 and fro% a /lan t)at )ad too %any co%/lications for t)e si6e of force. 0)e &attle en)anced 'renc) /restige and di%inis)ed t)at of t)e Italian condottieri. But3 e-ce/t to confir% t)e offensi+e +alue of S(iss infantry3 t)e &attle re+ealed not)ing a&out t)e /ro/er use or co%&ination of t)e (ea/on syste%s a+aila&le to co%%anders at t)e &eginning of t)e si-teent) century. 0)e Battle of 'orno+o did not3 )o(e+er3 secure t)e 'renc) title to Na/les. 0)e 'renc) lost t)e city to a so/)isticated ca%/aign &y a S/anis) e-/editionary force led &y a great soldier3 *on6alo of $Urdo&a3 ()o landed on t)e toe of t)e Italian &oot (it) 1>> )ea+y ca+alry3 <>> Da+elin#ar%ed 14B

genetours3 and 13<>> infantry co%/osed of a fe( ar.ue&usiers and cross&o(%en3 %en (it) s(ords and s)ields /redo%inating. In t)eir first &attle t)e 'renc) )ea+y ca+alry scattered *on6alos genetours and so%e of )is s(ords%en7 t)e S(iss /ike%en of t)e 'renc) force c)arged o+er )is re%aining S/anis) s(ords%en and lig)t infantry. 0)e )andso%e and al(ays gorgeously a//arelled *on6alo )ad seen a decade of ser+ice in t)e final ca%/aign for t)e con.uest of S/ain fro% t)e Mosle%s. Aueen Isa&ella of $astile3 discerning )is latent ca/acity3 )ad e-erted )er influence to secure t)e Italian co%%and for a Dunior officer ()o )ad so%e of t)e attri&utes of an e-tra+agant and a//arently effete courtier. 0)e .ueen %ade a (ise decision3 for *on6alo &eca%e a reno(ned (arrior and /eerless leader of %en. fter )is defeat *on6alo a+oided &attles3 used )is genetours to attack t)e ene%ys con+oys and foragers3 and relied on entrenc)%ents in )is successful siege against t)e 'renc) forces. !it) t)e )el/ of S/anis) na+al su/re%acy and t)e sy%/at)y of t)e /o/ulation3 ()o% t)e 'renc) rule )ad soon alienated3 *on6alo retook Na/les and co%/elled t)e 'renc) to (it)dra( in 14@B. 0)oug) a 'a&ian strategy )ad %ade tactical success unnecessary3 *on6alo (orked at refor%ing t)e S/anis) ar%ys co%&at %et)ods. 0o assist )is s(ords%en in )olding fortifications3 )e ra/idly increased t)e nu%&er of ar.ue&usiers ()ile training %en to use t)e /ike in t)e S(iss %anner so t)at3 for co%&at in t)e o/en3 )e could co%&ine )is s(ords%en and /ike%en. !)en )ostilities resu%ed in 1<>?3 *on6alo3 outnu%&ered3 resisted t)e 'renc) in an entrenc)ed ca%/ (it) )is &ack to t)e sea ()ile )is genetours attacked 'renc) su//ly con+oys. !)en t)e 'renc) )ad dis/ersed %uc) of t)eir ar%y in searc) of su//lies3 )e took t)e offensi+e3 sei6ed t)eir &ase at $erignola3 and /re/ared to %eet t)e attack of t)e re#concentrated 'renc) in t)e o/en &y digging a trenc) and )ea/ing u/ a /ara/et. 4na(are of t)e entrenc)%ent &ecause t)e genetours /re+ented reconnaissance and eager to catc) *on6alo in t)e o/en3 t)e 'renc) /ro%/tly carried out a frontal attack. But t)e c)arging 'renc) ca+alry could not /ass t)e ditc)3 and t)e fire of t)e S/anis) ar.ue&usiers fro% t)e /ara/et sto//ed t)e infantry and killed t)e %ounted 'renc) co%%ander. !)en t)e attackers )ad )alted in confusion3 *on6alo counter#assaulted all along t)e line3 (it) )is s%all force of )ea+y ca+alry co%ing around )is flanks to Doin in. s t)e ene%y retreated3 )is genetours inflicted additional casualties on t)e S(iss infantry. !)en a +ery large 'renc) force ca%e sout) to retrie+e t)e situation3 *on6alo raided t)eir (agons and &locked t)e% in t)e inland /asses until t)e 'renc) )ad e-)austed t)e food and forage in t)e area and )ad to use t)e coast road to dra( su//lies fro% t)eir fleet. But *on6alo &locked t)e% t)ere also3 for si- rainy (eeks3 &y fortifying t)e crossing of t)e *arigliano Ri+er. 0)e ar%ies suffered )ea+ily fro% s)o(ers of sleet3 li+ing on ground co+ered (it) (ater3 and a s)ortage of food. In t)e Mar.uis of Salu66o t)e 'renc) )ad a seasoned3 kno(ledgea&le3 and +igorous co%%ander3 &ut )e lacked t)e a&ility to %aintain t)e %orale of )is %en under suc) trying conditions. fter (eeks of t)is gruelling stale%ate3 *on6alo3 su&stituting daring for )is usual circu%s/ection3 e-/loited t)e e-ce/tional %orale of )is ar%y to carry out a sur/rise attack against t)e e.ually cold and (et &ut de%oralised 'renc) ar%y. Pre/aring in ad+ance t)e %aterials for a &ridge3 t(o days after $)rist%as *on6alo .uickly erected )is &ridge on t)e 'renc) flank3 crossed )is ar%y3 and routed t)e astonis)ed ene%y3 inflicting )ea+y casualties and soon securing t)e agree%ent of t)e 'renc) co%%ander to e+acuate. *on6alo # Ro%an in )is 'a&ian strategy3 /atience3 reliance on fortification3 use of )is lig)t ca+alry genetours to i%/le%ent t)e logistic ele%ent in )is strategy3 and attention to (inning (it) t)e least effort # s)o(ed t)at t)e 2nglis) and Italians did not )a+e a %ono/oly of t)ese .ualities. "e dis/layed &rilliant generals)i/3 sustaining t)e %orale of )is o(n troo/s and correctly assessing and e-/loiting t)e de%oralisation of )is ene%y.

14@

*on6alo %ade )is lasting contri&ution in laying t)e foundation for t)e greatness of t)e S/anis) ar%ys tactical syste%. fter )is initial3 and only3 defeat3 )e largely confined )is genetours to t)e strategic roles of reconnaissance3 screening3 and raiding ene%y co%%unications3 t)oug) )e did use t)e% effecti+ely in a tactical role ()en3 in t)e /ursuit after $erignola3 t)ey e%/loyed to t)e greatest /ossi&le e-tent t)e traditional /re/onderance of lig)t ca+alry o+er )ea+y infantry. Realising t)e need for /ike%en to resist ca+alry3 )e created )is o(n as (ell as )ired so%e S(iss. "e also co%&ined )is s(ords%en (it) t)e /ike%en so t)at ()en t)e S/anis) infantry later %et /ike%en3 t)e s(ords%en (on t)e &attle &y getting under t)e /ikes3 often &y raising t)e% on t)eir s)ields and closing (it) t)e /ike%en (it) s(ord and s)ield. By increasing t)e nu%&er of ar.ue&usiers3 )e co%/le%ented )is tactic of entrenc)%ent and created an effecti+e lig)t infantry. 0)e S/aniards &uilt u/on t)is /ike and ar.ue&usier legacy. *on6alos fairly clear /erce/tion of t)e interrelation of t)e +arious (ea/on syste%s /laced )i% a)ead of )is ti%e. 5+er t)irty years of 'renc) ca%/aigning in Italy resulted in an un/recedented nu%&er of &attles in ()ic) t)e co%%anders e-/erienced great difficulty in learning )o( &est to use and co%&ine t)e +ariety of (ea/on syste%s at t)eir dis/osal. Back

(he Search for a Combined-#rms Synthesis, talian 1attles. 7879-98

Italy /ro+ided t)e setting for t)e (ar t)at /itted t)e 'renc) against an alliance of t)e S/aniards and t)e "oly Ro%an 2%/eror7 t)e Italian /o(ers t)e%sel+es (ere usually di+ided &et(een t)e t(o sides. 0)e %ercenary forces included *reeks3 l&anians3 fricans3 S(iss3 *er%ans3 Italians3 and 'renc). Italians )ad %aDor co%%and roles3 and strategy o(ed %uc) to condottieri /ractice and to t)e e-a%/le of *on6alo of $Urdo&a3 t)e Italian (ars ena&ling 2uro/eans to assi%ilate t)e so/)istication of Italian strategy. 0)oug) t)e 2nglis) )ad realised t)e tactical /ri%acy of t)e defence3 t)ey )ad no %eans of e-/loiting it ot)er t)an to take u/ a strong /osition and count on t)e ene%ys %aking t)e &lunder of attacking in front. But fifteent)#century Italian generals3 also gras/ing t)e /o(er of t)e defence3 es/ecially ()en strengt)ened &y field fortifications3 did not rely on t)eir e.ually /erce/ti+e o//onents to %ake frontal attacks. 0)eir strategy forced an ene%y to attack &y &locking )is route of retreat or &y &esieging an i%/ortant city3 co%/elling t)e ene%y to strike to raise t)e siege. 'our of t)e fi+e /rinci/al &attles &et(een 1<12 and 1<2< resulted fro% efforts to raise sieges: t)e 'renc) e+en &egan t(o sieges for +irtually t)e sole /ur/ose of &ringing t)eir elusi+e o//onents to &attle. In %ost instances t)e defender /lanned to e-/loit t)e ad+antages of entrenc)%ents3 &ut ot)er(ise t)e &attles lacked tactical consistency as t)e co%%anders soug)t to find t)e &est role for t)e +ariety of tactical syste%s t)at (ere used in t)e international (ar for control of Italy. t Ra+enna in 1<12 t)e S/anis) ar%y3 seeking to raise a siege3 dug itself in near t)e city to interfere (it) 'renc) siege o/erations (it)out )a+ing to risk an offensi+e &attle. Realising t)at to act against t)e S/aniards )e %ust %ake a frontal attack on a ditc) and /ara/et3 *aston de 'oi-3 t)e a&le young 'renc) co%%ander3 trusted to )is e-cellent artillery to force t)e S/aniards to lea+e t)eir entrenc)%ents and attack. 'or t(o )ours t)e )ostile artilleries fired at eac) ot)er3 t)e S/aniards /rotecting t)eir infantry &y )a+ing t)e% lie /rone and t)eir artillery inflicting serious causalities on t)e 'renc) infantry3 %assed in front of t)e S/anis) field fortifications. But t)e enfilading fire of t)e 'renc) artillery finally goaded t)e un/rotected S/anis) ca+alry into c)arging t)e 'renc) t)roug) a ga/ left in t)eir /ara/et and ditc). 0)e %o&ile artillery de/loyed on t)e field of &attle )ad successfully functioned as lig)t infantry3 e-ce/t t)at t)e range and /o(er of t)e cannon )ad acco%/lis)ed far %ore t)an e+en long&o(s. 0)e cannon&alls )ad a de+astating effect on t)e ca+alry for%ations3 a single &all knocking do(n t)irty#t)ree %en or )orses. !)en t)e s)aken and di%inis)ed S/anis) )ea+y ca+alry c)arged t)roug) a narro( ga/ o+er une+en terrain3 it %et not stationary artillery &ut a counter#c)arge of fres) 'renc) ca+alry3 t)e &est in 2uro/e. s t)e 'renc) )orse%en dro+e off t)e S/anis)3 *aston called for(ard )is cross&o(%en3 1<>

su//orted &y /ike%en3 (it) orders to s)oot at a )ig) angle o+er t)e /ara/et do(n u/on t)e /rone S/anis) infantry. But t)e S/aniards .uickly %anned t)eir /ara/et and dro+e &ack t)e 'renc) (it) t)eir ar.ue&us fire. n attack &y t)e 'renc) ar%ys *er%an ,andsknec)t /ike%en also failed3 e+en t)oug) t)ey crossed t)roug) t)e ar.ue&us fire and enoug) of t)e% scaled t)e /ara/et to gi+e t)e S/anis) s(ords%en an o//ortunity to de%onstrate t)e close#.uarter ad+antage of s(ord and s)ield o+er an eig)teen#foot /ike. But t)e fortified defence de%onstrated its /re#e%inence3 and t)e triu%/)ant 'renc) ca+alry /assed t)oroug) t)e ga/s in t)e entrenc)ed line3 attacked t)e defending infantry in t)e rear3 and co%/leted t)e +ictory. 0)e 'renc) ca+alry /layed )ere t)e sa%e role t)at t)e ca+alry )ad /layed in le-anders and "anni&als &attles. But %uc) of t)e disci/lined S/anis) )ea+y infantry %ade good t)eir retreat3 defying t)e /ursuing )ea+y ca+alry &y using t)e tig)t for%ations t)at t)ey )ad learned fro% t)e S(iss. 1uring t)e retreat t)e &rilliant &ut i%/etuous 'renc) co%%ander3 *aston 1e 'oi-3 s/otted a grou/ of S/anis) /ike%an %arc)ing along a raised /at) &eside t)e ri+er. !)en )e recklessly led )is staff in a c)arge against t)ese %en3 e+ery 'renc) soldier died in co%&at3 *aston of )is (ounds and se+eral of )is co%/atriots &y dro(ning in t)eir ar%our. !)en t)is sa%e grou/ of S/anis) infantry later %et a detac)%ent of 'renc) ca+alry3 t)e S/anis) leader called out J!)y %eddle (it) us3 you are not strong enoug) to &reak us3 you kno( t)at you )a+e (on t)e &attle and slaug)tered our ar%y3 &e content (it) your )onour3 and lea+e us alone.L 0)e 'renc) co%%ander t)oug)t (ell of t)is reasoning3 so re%iniscent of Belisarius ad+ice a&out fig)ting a retreating foe3 and t)e t(o /arties /assed (it)out co%&at. t No+ara in 1<1? t)e 'renc) foug)t t)e S(iss. 0)e +ictory &elonged to t)e S(iss3 (it) t)eir &y# t)en traditional %et)ods. Realising t)at t)e S(iss (ould attack to relie+e t)e forces &esieged in No+ara3 t)e 'renc) co%%ander %o+ed out to c)oose a good /osition in ()ic) to recei+e t)e S(iss assault. But t)e S(iss ca%e at da(n3 not gi+ing t)e 'renc) co%%ander ti%e e+en to erect )is /orta&le (ooden /alisades3 %uc) less to entrenc). 0)e 'renc) did get t)eir artillery into action and directed it against t)e %ain onslaug)t &y a S(iss s.uare of =3>>> %en. In t)ree %inutes under artillery fire3 t)e 'renc) cannon&alls inflicted C>> casualties on t)e densely /acked S(iss. But ()en t)e infantry reac)ed t)e guns3 t)e artillerys role ended. 0)e S(iss .uickly o+erca%e t)e ill# for%ed and unready 'renc) /ike%en and e+en turned against t)e% t)eir o(n artillery as t)ey retreated. Since t)e S(iss defeated t)e infantry &efore t)e 'renc) ca+alry could inter+ene3 t)e ca+alry retreated3 kno(ing &etter t)an to c)arge S(iss /ike%en. 0)e artillerys role rese%&led t)at of Persian arc)ers at Marat)on and Plataea in t)at t)e guns did good (ork until t)e )ea+y infantry closed. s a %issile (ea/on syste%3 artillery could function as a %ore effecti+e lig)t infantry3 &ut e+en t)e %o&ile guns used in t)e field did not &egin to a//roac) lig)t infantrys ot)er key attri&ute3 %o&ility. t Marignano in 1<1< t)e 'renc) stu%&led on t)e Persian doctrine for /rotecting t)e lig)t infantry fro% t)e c)arge of t)e )ea+y infantry. In %eeting an attacking line of )o/lites (it) a %otionless array of arc)ers3 t)e Persians )ad relied on ca+alry c)arges on t)e flanks to %ake t)e )ea+y infantry )alt to defend its flanks and so allo( t)e &o(%en to s)o(er t)eir i%%o&ilised o//onents (it) arro(s. In a t(o#day &attle in ()ic) t)e /ro%/tness of t)e S(iss assault again /recluded entrenc)%ent3 c)arges &y 'renc) ca+alry forced t)e S(iss for%ations to )alt and for% for all# around defence. 0)is ga+e t)e 'renc) artillery an o//ortunity for /rolonged fire as t)e ca+alry and artillery alternated in attacks t)at defeated t)e S(iss. But t)is doctrine )ad li%ited utility &ecause t)e S(iss foug)t alone3 (it)out ca+alry or a significant force of lig)t infantry. So si%/le a solution could not (ork against a co%&ined#ar%s ar%y. 0)(arted for a year &y t)e ade/t and 'a&ian %anoeu+ring of t)eir acute ad+ersary Pros/er $olonna3 t)e condottiere co%%ander of t)e S/anis)#I%/erial forces3 t)e 'renc) &egan a siege of t)e city of Pa+ia in 1<22 to co%/el )i% to fig)t. $olonna t)en ad+anced (it)in ten %iles of Pa+ia3

1<1

()ere )e dug )i%self in at Bicocca. ,autrec3 t)e co%%ander of t)e %ore /o(erful 'renc) ar%y3 /lanned to cut off $olonnas su//lies to force )i% out of )is /osition so t)at t)ey could attack )i% on t)e %arc)3 &ut t)e al(ays &elligerent and confident S(iss troo/s in t)e 'renc) ar%y deli+ered an ulti%atu% to ,autrec. 4n/aid3 t)ey de%anded an i%%ediate ad+ance on $olonna so t)ey could )a+e t)e &ooty of +ictory t)ey (ere sure (ould &e t)eirs3 or t)ey t)reatened to return to S(it6erland. 'aced (it) t)e loss of %ost of )is )ea+y infantry and t)e a&andon%ent of t)e ca%/aign3 ,autrec3 ()ose re/utation /ro&a&ly e-ceeded )is a&ility3 agreed to t)e frontal attack on t)e entrenc)ed ene%y /osition. 0)e S(iss carried t)e %ain &urden of t)e assault3 di+iding t)e%sel+es into t(o s.uares 5f 43>>> eac). $olonnas /osition consisted of a /ara/et &e)ind a sunken road on ()ic) )e )ad erected eart)(orks3 including &astions fro% ()ic) )is artillery could s(ee/ &ot) )is front and t)e road. 'our lines of ar.ue&usiers %anned t)e /ara/et3 (it) /ike%en &e)ind t)e%. In s/ite of t)e sogginess of t)e ground in front of t)e /osition3 ,autrec (is)ed to &ring u/ )is artillery and see ()et)er )e could da%age t)e defence. But t)e su/re%ely confident S(iss3 i%/atient to launc) t)eir irresisti&le attack3 refused to (ait and /ro%/tly %arc)ed t)eir s.uares against t)e /ara/et and artillery. ,osing 13>>> %en to t)e cannon&alls3 t)ey reac)ed t)e road3 ()ere t)ey i%%ediately recei+ed four +olleys fro% t)e lines of ar.ue&usiers. Sto//ed in t)e road3 t)ey continued under cannon and ar.ue&us fire to try to scale t)e /ara/et. 0)e defending /ike%en dro+e &ack t)e S(iss ()o got o+er t)e /ara/et7 t)e S(iss fell &ack3 (it) ?3>>> dead. 0)e re%ainder of t)e S(iss /ro%/tly returned )o%e3 lea+ing t)e 'renc) co%%ander (it) a defeat and )is ar%y cri//led &y t)e loss of %ost of )is )ea+y infantry. 0)e e-/onents of field fortifications )ad t)e satisfaction of s)attering t)e %yt) of S(iss in+inci&ility. 0)e &attle also illustrated effecti+eness of artillery and ar.ue&uses ()en cou/led (it) entrenc)%ents. 0)e 'renc) in+aded Italy again3 under t)e leaders)i/ of t)eir young 9ing3 'rancis I. Bra+e3 regal in &earing3 a (itty and affa&le /atron of arts and letters3 &ut fri+olous and lacking in (isdo% and constancy3 'rancis found )unting and tennis %ore i%/ortant t)an t)e duties of a %onarc). In t)e (inter of 1<2< t)e 'renc) once %ore &esieged Pa+ia3 and t)e S/anis) ar%y again dre( near in an atte%/t to raise t)e siege. 0)e 'renc)3 already /rotected &y a line of contra+allation3 also fortified t)e%sel+es on t)e side of t)e a//roac)ing S/anis) ar%y. 0)e S/aniards dug in3 too3 and t)e t(o forces faced eac) ot)er (it) entrenc)%ents as close as forty yards a/art. 0)e de/arture of so%e %ercenaries (eakened t)e 'renc) ar%y3 and t)e S/anis)3 running out of %oney to /ay t)eir ar%y3 decided to attack. In a %o+e re%iniscent of *on6alos crossing of t)e *arigliano3 t)e S/aniards &roke t)roug) an unguarded (all and %ade a /reda(n %arc) (it) %ost of t)eir ar%y3 /assed around t)e e-tre%e flank of t)e 'renc) entrenc)ed line3 and at sunrise faced t)eir %en to(ard t)e 'renc)3 con+erting t)eir %arc) for%ation into a line of &attle at rig)t angles to t)e 'renc) ar%y. 0)ey t)en stood on t)e defensi+e3 kno(ing t)at t)e 'renc) %ust attack to /re+ent t)e% fro% %arc)ing /ast and getting astride t)e 'renc) line of co%%unication (it) t)eir &ase at Milan. Sur/rised and a//re)ensi+e of an attack against )is dis/ersed and unfor%ed ar%y3 9ing 'rancis (isely attacked i%%ediately (it) )is ca+alry to co+er t)e asse%&ly and for%ing u/ of t)e re%ainder of )is %en. 0)is decision resulted in a &attle of successi+e attacks &y different ele%ents of t)e 'renc) ar%y. 0)e S/anis) ar%y arrayed itself (it) its ar.ue&usiers on t)e flanks and for%ations of )ea+y ca+alry and ,andsknec)t )ea+y infantry in t)e centre. 9ing 'rancis )i%self led one of t)e successful c)arges of t)e 'renc) )ea+y ca+alry against t)e S/anis) )ea+y ca+alry. But ()en )e c)arged t)e t(o dee/ for%ations of ,andsknec)ts3 t)e serried (all of long /ikes )eld off t)e deter%ined 'renc) attack. 0)e 'renc) ar%ys S(iss /ike%en %ade t)e ne-t ad+ance3 directing t)eir assault against t)e ar.ue&usiers on t)e flank. Instead of running o+er t)e lig)t infantry3 t)e S(iss faltered &efore t)e steady fire of t)e ar.ue&usiers3 t)eir attack failing3 e+en t)oug) only a fe( S/anis) /ike%en aided 1<2

t)e lig)t infantry. 0)e role of firear%s and t)e /ara/et in t)e S(iss defeat at Bicocca e-/lain t)e fee&leness of t)e attack &y t)e S(iss. )istorian of t)e ti%e (rote t)at after Bicocca t)e S(iss )ad gone J&ack to t)eir %ountains di%inis)ed in nu%&ers3 &ut %uc) %ore di%inis)ed in audacity7 for it is certain t)at t)e losses ()ic) t)ey suffered at Bicocca so affected t)e% t)at in t)e co%ing years t)ey no longer dis/layed t)eir (onted +igour.L 0)e last 'renc) effort consisted of an attack &y t)eir ,andsknec)ts against t)e S/anis) ,andsknec)ts. s t)e t(o grou/s struggled against one anot)er3 S/anis) lig)t infantry s)ot at t)e 'renc) /ike%en3 and a second for%ation of S/anis) ,andsknec)ts struck t)e 'renc) in t)e flank. 5+er()el%ing t)e 'renc) ,andsknec)ts3 t)e S/anis) )ea+y infantry t)en dis/ersed t)e re%aining 'renc) infantry3 ()ic) %ade t)e last 'renc) assault of t)e day. 0)e S/anis) ar%y t)en surrounded t)e courageous 'renc) 9ing and a &ody of )is ca+alry3 o+er()el%ing t)e% and ca/turing t)e 9ing. 0)e &attle increased t)e /restige of t)e ar.ue&usiers3 &ut not &ecause t)ey )ad resisted t)e c)arge of t)e S(iss. If t)e S(iss )ad dis/layed t)eir usual deter%ination or t)at s)o(n &y t)e ,andsknec)t /ike%en on &ot) sides3 t)e )ea+y infantry (ould )a+e scattered t)e lig)t. But %any of t)e S/anis) ar.ue&usiers used t)e traditional skir%is)ing tactics of t)e lig)t infantry and3 e+ading t)e 'renc) ca+alry &y seeking refuge in )edges and a%ong t)e trees3 ke/t u/ a steady3 if slo(3 fire on t)e 'renc) ca+alry and )ea+y infantry. 0)e lig)t infantry )ad de%onstrated its effecti+eness in t)e o/en as (ell as in entrenc)%ents. conte%/orary testified to t)eir effecti+eness3 e+en against ca+alry: J5ften t)e %ost fa%ous co%%anders and knig)ts... (ere /rostrated )ere and t)ere in una+enged slaug)ter &y t)e igno&le and co%%on infantry.L 0)e artillery )ad little role in t)e i%/ro+ised &attle. 0)e 'renc) )ad no /lan to use guns3 and t)e S/aniards )ad left %ost of t)eirs in entrenc)%ents to kee/ u/ a distracting cannonade. 0)e )ea+y infantry dis/layed its traditional a&ility to resist )ea+y ca+alry3 and t)e 'renc) )ea+y ca+alry3 in defeating t)e S/anis)3 again e-)i&ited its su/eriority to ot)er 2uro/ean ca+alry. But t)e o+ert)ro( of t)eir ca+alry did not defeat t)e S/anis) ar%y7 t)eir e-cellent lig)t infantry and t)eir i%%o+a&le )ea+y infantry )eld t)e field. 0)e all#around defence of t)e &locks of /ike%en ena&led t)e% to resist t)e +ictorious 'renc) ca+alry3 and t)is for%ation e-)i&ited enoug) &attlefield %o&ility to attack t)e 'renc) )ea+y infantry in flank. 0)e contest at Pa+ia ended a series of &attles in ()ic) generals tried +arious %i-es of ne( and old +ersions of )ea+y infantry3 )ea+y ca+alry3 and lig)t infantry. lt)oug) t)e defeat of t)e 'renc) and t)e )ea+y casualties in t)e &attles fro% 'orno+o to Pa+ia con+inced generals to reduce s)ar/ly t)e nu%&er of &attles in t)e su&se.uent /eriodic rene(al of t)e 'renc) (ars against t)e S/aniards and *er%ans3 t)e co%&atants did digest t)e tactical lessons of t)e (ars in Italy and de+elo/ed t)eir doctrine and organisation accordingly. 0)e S/aniards %ade t)e %ost successful integration of t)e (ea/on syste%s3 and t)eirs )ad t)e greatest influence in 2uro/e &ecause t)eir 9ing $)arles3 also t)e "oly Ro%an 2%/eror3 controlled Italy and ruled t)e Net)erlands and t)e "a&s&urg do%inions in *er%any. "e used S/anis)3 *er%an3 and Italian ar%ies interc)angea&ly (it) S/anis) and Italian co%%anders /re+ailing3 S/anis) tactical doctrine t)us +irtually do%inating !estern 2uro/e. Back

(he S'anish Combined-#rms (actics

lt)oug) t)e Italian (ars confir%ed S/ains traditional &elief in t)e i%/ortance of infantry3 t)ey altered its (ea/ons significantly. "a+ing ado/ted t)e /ike in sout)ern Italy3 t)e S/anis) soon used it to re/lace t)e s(ord and s)ield entirely. 0)ey %odelled t)eir for%ation on t)e S(iss3 using rectangles of /ike%en nu%&ering fro% 13>>> to ?3>>> %en. 0)eir %et)od of drill and organisation rese%&led t)at of t)e S(iss3 e+en t)oug) t)eir s.uares %ay )a+e lacked t)e %o&ility and +er+e long c)aracteristic of t)e original. Instead of a consistent co%%it%ent to offensi+e action3 t)e S/anis) ar%y often used its /ikes as a defensi+e for%ation to resist t)e )ea+y ca+alry and /ro+ide a rallying /oint for t)eir o(n )orse%en. But t)ey did not rule out offensi+e action3 t)eir /ike%en3

1<?

like t)e S(iss and t)e *er%an ,andsknec)ts3 )a+ing t)e a&ility to %o+e on t)e &attlefield and c)arge ot)er infantry. 0)e S/aniards early a&andoned t)e cross&o( in fa+our of t)e ar.ue&us and increased t)e /ro/ortion of lig)t infantry in t)eir ar%y. Pa+ia )ad i%/ressed t)e S/aniards (it) ()at ar.ue&usiers could do as skir%is)ers. 5n t)at &attlefield3 ()ic) )ad trees3 s)ru&s3 and roug) as (ell as s%oot) ground3 t)e lig)t infantry )ad dis/layed t)e indi+idual initiati+e often c)aracteristic of t)e lig)t infantry of t)e ancients and )ad used t)e terrain to kee/ out of reac) of t)e 'renc) )ea+y ca+alry and to %aintain a steady fire against t)e ene%ys )ea+y ca+alry and )ea+y infantry. 0)e S/aniards3 realising t)at t)e su% of so %any indi+idually negligi&le efforts )ad )ad a %aDor i%/act on t)e outco%e of t)e &attle3 %ade t)is a salient role for t)eir nu%erous ar.ue&usiers. !)ereas t)e 2nglis) )ad used t)eir long&o(%en in t)e line of &attle3 t)e S/anis)3 confident of t)e defensi+e /o(er of t)eir /ike s.uares3 assigned t)eir lig)t infantry an inde/endent role. :et t)e ar.ue&usiers3 &elonging to t)e sa%e unit as t)e /ike%en3 did not o/erate co%/letely inde/endently: t)e S/anis) sa( t)at eac) needed t)e ot)er. In t)e a&sence of o&structed terrain3 t)e s.uare of /ike%en /ro+ided t)e only /lace of safety ()ere t)e lig)t infantry %ig)t take refuge fro% t)e ene%ys )ea+y ca+alry. 0)ey could take a /osition on t)e flank of or &e)ind t)e s.uare3 or3 s)ould t)e ca+alry attack in flank and rear3 %any could find safety in t)e front ranks ()ere t)e (all of /ikes (ould /rotect t)e%. In turn3 t)e ar.ue&usiers fire could su//ort t)e /ike%ens defence3 and t)e %asses of t)e ene%ys )ea+y infantry or t)e )orses and %en of t)e attacking )ea+y ca+alry (ould /ro+ide fine targets for ar.ue&us &alls. 0)e S/aniards gradually increased t)e /ro/ortion of ar.ue&usiers to /ike%en until3 &y t)e end of t)e si-teent) century3 t)eir regi%ents a//roac)ed e.ual nu%&ers of lig)t and )ea+y infantry. Soldiers and %ilitary aut)ors ga+e %uc) t)oug)t to t)e /ro/er array for an ar%y. In t)eory3 an ar%y for%ed itself &efore a &attle &y first sur+eying t)e ground and %arking out locations for infantry for%ations t)at &est reconciled t)e terrain and t)e a+aila&le force. n officer kno(n as M t)e sergeant %aDor#general t)en calculated t)e si6e and co%/osition of s.uares &y using a for%ula or a set of ta&les. 9no(ing in ad+ance3 for e-a%/le3 t)e nu%&er of /ike%en (it) and (it)out &ody ar%our and t)e nu%&er of infantry (it) )al&erds3 )e could /lan a s.uare (it)3 to illustrate3 four outer ranks of /ike%en (it) &ody ar%our3 eig)t inner ranks of unar%oured /ike%en G()o )ad cost less to )ire or e.ui/H3 and a core of )al&erdiers. 0o t)is s.uare )e could assign so%e ar.ue&usiers to t)e front as skir%is)ers and ot)ers to eac) side3 ()ere t)ey (ould for% t)e%sel+es in a long3 loose colu%n of four files of t(el+e %en eac). 1uring t)e &attle3 t)e front ranks of t)e four files of ar.ue&usiers on t)e sides (ould fire3 t)en %arc) to t)e rear to reload ()ile t)e ne-t rank %o+ed for(ard to fire. In e-ecuting t)is drill3 called a counter%arc)3 t)e ar.ue&usiers could kee/ u/ a steady3 if li%ited3 fire against any target (it)in range. Suc) ideas for t)e arrange%ent of t)e infantry )ad &eco%e uni+ersal in 2uro/e &y t)e latter /art of t)e si-teent) century. 0)is careful order of &attle /ro&a&ly )a//ened rarely in /ractice3 and national and ot)er unit distincti+eness in)i&ited t)e creation of t)e nu%&er and si6e of infantry for%ations t)at t)e co%%anders and t)e sergeants %aDor general %ay )a+e t)oug)t ideal under /articular circu%stances. But t)e t)eory of %ars)alling an ar%y ade.uately e-)i&its t)e /ro&le%s tacticians faced and t)e (ay t)ey a//roac)ed t)e%. 0)e location of ca+alry in t)is infantry array )ad no settled solution. But t)e role of t)e ca+alry )ad declined in t)e S/anis) ar%y &ecause t)e S/aniards )ad increased t)eir infantry /artly at t)e e-/ense of it. Since a /ro/erly ar%oured )ea+y ca+alry%an could cost four ti%es as %uc) as a /ike%an or ar.ue&usier3 a s%all decrease in )ea+y ca+alry could finance a )uge addition to t)e infantry and &ring a&out a dra%atic alteration in t)e /ro/ortions &et(een infantry and ca+alry. 0)oug) a large /art of t)eir ca+alry consisted of traditional full#ar%oured lancers3 t)e S/anis) did )a+e ca+alry t)at /erfor%ed a lig)t ca+alrys strategic duties of reconnaissance and attack on t)e 1<4

ene%ys stragglers3 foragers3 con+oys3 and logistic installations. 4sually %ounted ar.ue&usiers filled t)is role. Because of t)e difficulties in+ol+ed in using t)e ar.ue&us ()ile %ounted3 t)ese )orse ar.ue&usiers (ere really %ounted infantry # t)ey usually dis%ounted to use t)eir (ea/on. But on at least one occasion3 after t)e Battle of $eresole in 1<443 %ounted ar.ue&usiers /ursued retreating )ea+y infantry and3 &y dis%ounting to s)oot and re%ounting to continue t)e /ursuit3 %anaged effecti+ely to si%ulate t)e traditional Part)ian or 0urkis) tactics of t)e lig)t ca+alry. 0)e rudi%ents of t)e ne( syste% recei+ed a trial at t)e Battle of $eresole ()en a 'renc) ar%y3 under t)e young3 +igorous 2ng)ien and containing S(iss3 Italian3 and 'renc) %ercenaries3 %et t)e 2%/erors S/anis)#*er%an#Italian force3 co%%anded &y 1el Vasto3 a solid3 careful soldier. 2ac) side )ad four &locks of infantry3 /ike%en (it) associated ar.ue&usiers3 ()ic) t)ey /laced in line (it) so%e of t)eir s%all force of ca+alry in t)e centre and t)e re%ainder on t)e flanks. fter four )ours of skir%is)ing &y t)e ar.ue&usiers3 t)e /attern t)at t)e &attle assu%ed in+ol+ed eac) forces engaging its o//osite. 0)is /itted ca+alry against ca+alry and infantry against infantry. 0)is action &egan ()en t)e 'renc) ca+alry on t)e sout) flank c)arged and routed t)e o//osing I%/erial ca+alry and t)en unsuccessfully c)arged t)e adDacent infantry s.uare. But t)is assault so s)ook t)e infantry t)at t)ey stood fast rat)er t)an Doining t)eir adDacent ,andsknec)ts in an attack. So3 ()en t)e &lock 5f C3>>> I%/erial ,andsknec)ts ad+anced3 t)ey faced t(o s.uares of 'renc) infantry3 one of ()ic) %o+ed for(ard and attacked t)e ,andsknec)ts in flank. 0)e I%/erial ,andsknec)ts t)en dis/layed t)eir e-cellent disci/line and drill3 di+iding t)eir for%ation into t(o /arts3 one for eac) antagonist. By t)e ti%e t)e ,andsknec)ts %et t)e onslaug)t in flank3 t)e 'renc) )ad /laced ar.ue&usiers in t)eir second line3 &e)ind t)e /ike%en of t)e first line3 ()o3 firing3 s)ot do(n t)e first ro( of ene%y /ike%en (it) a +olley Dust &efore contact3 only to e-/ose a line of *er%an gunners ()o /ro%/tly s)ot t)e 'renc) front line of /ike%en. fter a se+ere struggle &et(een t)e grou/s of /ike%en3 t)e ,andsknec)ts ga+e (ay and )ad &egun to retreat ()en a fe( 'renc) ca+alry fro% t)e sout) flank and t)e centre struck t)e% on t)eir unengaged sides.

.attle of )eresole Back

Mean()ile3 t)e ot)er I%/erial infantry for%ation3 i%%o&ile during t)is contest3 &egan retreating3 t)e ca+alry in t)e centre )a+ing left t)e field (it)out /artici/ating in t)e contest and t)e 'renc) ca+alry on t)e nort) flank )a+ing defeated t)e o//osing I%/erial ca+alry. !)en3 )o(e+er3 on t)e nort) side of t)e &attle3 t)e s.uares of I%/erial infantry attacked t)e t(o o//osing 'renc) for%ations3 &ot) fled3 lea+ing t)e 'renc) infantry +ictorious in t)e sout) and t)e 2%/erors foot

1<<

soldiers (inners on t)e nort). But t)e unifor% successes of t)e 'renc) ca+alry decided t)e day3 t)e triu%/)ant I%/erial infantry (it)dra(ing rat)er t)an face an attack of &ot) infantry and ca+alry. 0)e I%/erial force suffered so )ea+ily a%ong its ,andsknec)ts t)at its casualties a%ounted to 2> or ?> /ercent of its force3 dou&le t)e /ro/ortion t)e 'renc) ar%y lost. 0)e &attle lacked %uc) /lanning and )ad little direction3 t)e (ounded I%/erial co%%ander lea+ing t)e field and t)e young 'renc) co%%ander s/ending /art of t)e &attle leading ca+alry c)arges. 0)e 'renc) ca+alry3 greater in nu%&ers and &etter in .uality3 /ro+ed its +alue &y its a&ility to %anoeu+re .uickly and strike t)e ,andsknec)ts in flank and again to de%onstrate t)at e+en a futile c)arge against )ea+y infantry could i%%o&ilise t)e for%ation attacked. 0)e artillery on &ot) sides /layed a s%all role3 t)e ar%ies &eing at e-tre%e range and t)e soldiers )a+ing /rotection &efore t)e engage%ent &y kee/ing /rone or &eyond t)e crests of t)e lo( )ills u/on ()ic) t)e ar%ies arrayed t)e%sel+es. If attacked ()en /laced in entrenc)%ents3 artillery dis/layed its (ort) as t)e &est for% of %issile action. Still t)e co%/arati+e i%%o&ility of e+en ()eeled field artillery li%ited its usefulness on t)e &attlefield and its te%/orary ascendancy in sieges ended .uickly &ecause of i%/ro+e%ents in fortifications. Back

(he New Fortifications

Since t)e %iddle of t)e fifteent) century %ilitary engineers )ad de+oted t)eir attention to t)e /ro&le% created &y t)e increasing a&ility of artillery to de%olis) t)e (alls of cities and castles. Soon t)ey de+elo/ed t)e essentials of a ne( syste% t)at t)ey a//lied to t)e reno+ation of old fortifications and t)e construction of ne(. 0o i%/le%ent t)eir %ost &asic idea of safeguarding t)e (alls fro% artillery3 t)ey (idened and dee/ened t)e ditc)3 co%/letely co+ering its interior (it) %asonry to /re+ent its filling &y a colla/se of t)e sides. 0)e %asonry (all of t)e ditc) &eca%e a ne( &arrier to t)e attackers3 one (ell defended fro% artillery fire. cross#section of t)e ne( %et)od s)o(s t)e /rotection offered &y a (all sunk in a ditc). rtillery on t)e /ara/et could still fire at t)e ene%y3 &ut t)e /ara/et and (all recei+ed s)elter fro% t)e eart)en &ank &eyond t)e ditc).

)ross/Se(tion of new #ortifi(ations Back

0)e defence continued to rely on flanking fire in ()ic) lo(3 &road &astions took t)e /lace of t)e to(ers. Not )ig)er t)an t)e /ara/et3 t)e &astions Dutted out into t)e ditc) so t)at artillery could &ot) s(ee/ t)e ditc) and fire at t)e &esiegers and t)eir guns.

#lan$ing #ire in a +it(h Back

Outline of new #ortifi(ations Back

1<=

0)e ne( fortifications conser+ed e+ery ele%ent of strengt) of a castle and ke/t its stone (alls fro% t)e fire of t)e &esiegers artillery. If anyt)ing3 t)e ad+ent of gun/o(der %issile (ea/ons )ad strengt)ened t)e defensi+e &ecause t)e defenders artillery ke/t t)e &esiegers under fire at a greater distance and ga+e t)e flanking fire %ore range and effecti+eness. 0)e si-teent) century (itnessed t)e re&uilding of t)e defences of i%/ortant to(ns to incor/orate t)e syste% of &astioned defence. Sieges again &eca%e as )o/eless as in t)e Middle ges3 and star+ing out t)e defenders &eca%e t)e only certain %et)od. In t)eir t)ree#year siege of t)e 1utc) sea/ort of 5stend3 for e-a%/le3 t)e S/aniards finally ca/tured t)e to(n3 e+en t)oug) t)e 1utc) could su//ly it &y sea. 0)e siege cost t)e S/aniards =>3>>> casualties7 t)e 1utc) lost ?>3>>>. Back

#nother nfluence of (echnology on (actics

Since artillery did not /er%anently en)ance t)e /o(er of &esiegers3 it (ould )a+e )ad a negligi&le tactical effect )ad it not aug%ented t)e strengt) of t)e tactical defensi+e entrenc)ed in field fortifications. It also gained an added i%/act in field o/erations &y t)e successful effort of t)e S/aniards to gi+e artillery t)e %o&ility t)at )ad traditionally c)aracterised %issile (ea/ons. In t)e early si-teent) century t)e S/aniards de+elo/ed t)e %usket. 2ssentially a +ery large ar.ue&us3 it could (eig) as %uc) as t(enty /ounds3 o+er t(ice t)e (eig)t of an ar.ue&us3 and3 (it) a &ore of at least 2> %illi%etres3 fired a t(o#ounce &all3 t(ice t)e (eig)t of an ar.ue&us s)ot. 5ne %an could o/erate t)is s%all cannon &y use of a se/arate forked rest to su//ort t)e &arrel. Its /orta&ility3 great /o(er3 and 4>>#yard range %ade it so useful t)at in s/ite of its inaccuracy %usketeers gradually re/laced )alf t)e ar.ue&usiers in S/anis) infantry units and %ost 2uro/ean ar%ies took u/ t)e %usket. Its success also discouraged efforts to i%/ro+e t)e %o&ility of field artillery3 ()ic) re%ained for%ida&le only in /re/ared /ositions. Mean()ile3 in t)e early si-teent) century an ad+ance in t)e de+elo/%ent of t)e gun3 t)e ()eel lock3 (roug)t a re+olution in tactics. 0)e ()eel lock included a steel ()eel attac)ed to a s/ring t)at t)e gunner could (ind (it) a (renc) and cock. 0)en3 (orking on t)e /rinci/le of t)e cigarette lig)ter3 ()en t)e gunner released t)e s/ring3 t)e turning ()eel struck /yrites or flint3 sending s/arks into t)e /an3 igniting t)e /o(der3 and t)us firing t)e gun. But a ()eel lock ar.ue&us cost a&out VB>>3 co%/ared (it) a&out V?2< for a %atc)lock. In addition3 its delicate %ec)anis% re.uired fre.uent re/air &y )ig)ly#/aid guns%it)s7 &ut t)e si%/le3 rugged %atc)lock )ardly e+er needed attention. 0)e ()eel lock3 t)erefore3 in s/ite of its &etter relia&ility and greater safety3 ne+er re/laced t)e %atc)lock for %ilitary ar.ue&uses or %uskets. Ne+ert)eless t)e ()eel lock )ad an o&+ious ad+antage in t)at it re.uired neit)er a lig)ted %atc) nor any /recautions to kee/ it s%ouldering. 0)e one#)anded gun3 t)e /istol3 )ad little utility as long as t)e user )ad to co/e (it) t)e %atc). But t)e user could (ind u/ a ()eel lock /istol and kee/ it in a )olster until ready for use. r%ed (it) a ()eel lock /istol3 a ca+alry%an could )a+e one )and free to )old t)e reins3 t)us +astly si%/lifying t)e task of s)ooting fro% )orse&ack. 1<C

!it) suc) di%inis)ed skill re.uire%ents for lig)t ca+alry action3 &y t)e %iddle of t)e si-teent) century %ost ca+alry%en )ad ar%ed t)e%sel+es (it) t(o or t)ree /istols and re+olutionised t)eir tactics accordingly. &andoning t)e lance3 ()ic) re.uired a )and to carry it3 and using t)e sa&re3 a ca+alry s(ord3 t)at could &e s)eat)ed ()en t)ey used t)eir /istols3 t)ese ca+alry%en3 called reiters3 de+elo/ed a tactic Gt)e caracoleH t)at used a dee/ for%ation in ()ic) t)e front ranks fired t)eir /istols and t)en rode to t)e rear to /erfor% t)e slo( (ork of reloading ()ile successi+e ranks fired and follo(ed eac) ot)er to t)e rear to reload and to fire again. In t)is (ay a ca+alry &attle could &e a contest &et(een t)e %issiles of lig)t ca+alry tactics until one side lost )eart and retreated. But t)e reiter tactics of t)e caracole did not do%inate %ounted co%&at. t t)e Battle of Moorker)yde in 1<C4 t)e 1utc) reiters3 )a+ing already fired all t)eir /istols3 %et a &ody of old# fas)ioned S/anis) ca+alry ar%ed (it) lances. $)arging as t)e reiters (ere reloading t)eir /istols3 t)e S/aniards routed t)e 1utc) (it) al%ost t)e sa%e ease as )ea+y ca+alry traditionally (ould )a+e dis/ersed lig)t ca+alry. t t)e Battle of I+ry in 1<@> during t)e 'renc) ci+il (ars3 %any of t)e das)ing 9ing "enry IVs reiter ca+alry3 dis/ensing (it) /istol fire3 c)arged and routed o//onents ()o e-/ected to caracole instead of fig)t at close .uarters (it) sa&res3 again dis/laying t)e /ri%acy of s)ock tactics at close .uarters. 0)e tactics of ca+alry against ca+alry re%ained eclectic and often in+ol+ed &ot) /istol fire and s)ock action. Mean()ile3 t)e ne( ca+alry3 faced (it) t)e /o(erful %usket3 reduced t)e (eig)t of its /late ar%our: ca+alry%en ke/t t)e /istol#/roof &reast/late3 &ut %any dis/ensed (it) leg ar%our and relied on )ig) )ea+y &oots t)at could turn a /istol &ullet. 0)is c)ange di%inis)ed t)e cost of a )orse%an3 t)e greater nu%&ers of t)ese +ersatile ca+alry%en a//arently %ore t)an offsetting t)eir reduced .uality. 0)e caracole re.uired drill3 and units accusto%ed to its use de+elo/ed a disci/line3 res/onsi+eness to co%%and3 and co)esion t)at %ade t)e% far %ore effecti+e on t)e &attlefield t)an t)e knig)ts of old3 ()o )ad foug)t %ore as an aggregate of indi+iduals. Since units often found t)at t)ey could not use t)e caracole and lance3 ca+alry &attles fre.uently in+ol+ed a %elee it ()ic) t)e %en used &ot) t)eir /istols and s(ords3 t)e &etter disci/line and articulation of t)e ne( ca+alry carried o+er into co%&at (it) t)e undrilled lancers and ga+e t)e% an ad+antage. In addition3 t)e %en ar%ed (it) s(ord and /istol cost less t)an lancers3 due to t)e lo(er le+el of skill re.uired to use t)e ne( (ea/ons. In t)e latter years of t)e si-teent) century t)e &etter controlled %en (it) /istol and sa&re gradually su//lanted t)e lancers.

Wheel &o($ handgun Back

:et t)e use of t)e /istol did not de/ri+e ca+alry of its ca/a&ility for s)ock action. !it) its still li&eral allo(ance of ar%our and its s(ord3 t)e ca+alry retained t)e c)aracteristics of )ea+y ca+alry and re%ained fully ca/a&le of earnest s)ock action. 1utc) reiters fully e-)i&ited t)is ca/a&ility at t)e Battle of Nieu/ort in 1=>> ()en t)ey triu%/)antly c)arged and defeated t)e al(ays# redou&ta&le S/anis) infantry. 0)is &attle in+ol+ed a long3 confused3 infantry &attle in ()ic) t)e S/anis) /ike%en3 lea+ing t)eir for%ation3 )ad Doined and %ingled (it) t)e ar.ue&usiers in t)e difficult &ut e+entually successful task of dri+ing &ack t)e 1utc) infantry. t t)is /oint t)e 1utc) reiters &e)a+ed as s)ock ca+alry3 c)arging (it) t)eir s(ords t)e unfor%ed and disorganised %i-ture of lig)t and )ea+y infantry3 routing t)e% (it) ease. 1<B

But t)e reiter3 )a+ing %uc) in co%%on (it) t)e old By6antine )ea+y ca+alry%an ()o also carried a &o(3 )ad an aut)entic dual#/ur/ose tactical ca/a&ility. 1utc) reiters a&ly e-)i&ited t)is at 0ournout in 1<@C ()en t)ey used t)eir /istols against a for%ed &ody of S/anis) /ike%en until t)eir fire )ad created ga/s in S/anis) ranks. 0)e 1utc) t)en c)arged into t)e o/enings (it) t)eir s(ords and defeated t)e )ea+y infantry. By t)e end of t)e century only t)e S/aniards retained any lancers3 %ost ot)er !estern 2uro/ean )ea+y ca+alry )a+ing &eco%e reiters in (ea/ons3 tactics3 drill3 and +ersatility. 1uring t)e $rusades (arfare e%/loyed four &asic (ea/on syste%s3 t)oug) only t)e 2gy/tians used all four. $o%&at t)oroug)ly de%onstrated t)e +arying (ea/on ca/a&ilities and t)eir res/ecti+e su/eriorities as s)o(n in t)e %atri- &elo(3 in ()ic) M %eans t)e a&ility to attack successfully in t)e direction of t)e arro( and M1 %eans a&ility to defend successfully in t)e direction of t)e arro(.

Ta(ti(al )a a-ilities of Wea on Systems without ,eiters Back

But t)e in+ention of t)e ()eel lock /istol and t)e ar%oured3 s(ord#and#/istol#ar%ed dual#/ur/ose ca+alry%an c)anged t)is &asic relations)i/ to t)e one s)o(n &elo(.

Ta(ti(al )a a-ilities of Wea on Systems with ,eiters Back

0)e reiter ca+alry could attack )ea+y infantry (it) /istols3 kee/ing its distance3 as did t)e Part)ian )orse arc)ers against $rassuss Ro%an )ea+y infantry. It (ould not use s)ock action until and unless /istol fire )ad so disordered t)e ranks of t)e /ike%en t)at t)ey (ere +ulnera&le to a c)arge (it) t)e s(ord. 0)e reiter ca+alry could attack t)e lig)t infantry &ut not &y /itting t)eir /istols against t)e greater /o(er and range and t)e &etter accuracy of t)e ar.ue&uses and %uskets7 t)e lig)t infantry still )ad su/re%acy o+er t)e lig)t ca+alry. Rat)er3 t)e reiter (ould c)arge3 t)e s/eed of t)e )orses .uickly carrying t)e ar%oured %en t)roug) t)e danger s/ace of t)e slo(#firing )andguns and /ro%/tly /lacing t)e %ounted3 ar%oured s(ords%en a%ong t)e ranks of t)e lig)t infantry3 traditionally at a serious disad+antage in s)ock co%&at. :et t)e ado/tion of t)e /istol and t)e sa&re3 ()ic) conferred t)e offensi+e ca/a&ilities of &ot) lig)t and )ea+y ca+alry3 de/ri+ed t)e )orse%an of %uc) of )is +alue on t)e defence. !it) no lance to ser+e as a /ike ()en dis%ounted3 t)e ca+alry%an &eca%e a s(ords%an3 and one (it)out t)e s(ords traditional /artner3 t)e s)ield. 0)us3 unlike t)e %edie+al )ea+y ca+alry%en ()o strengt)ened t)eir defensi+e /o(er against )ea+y ca+alry and infantry &y dis%ounting3 t)e ne( dual#/ur/ose ca+alry%en3 ()en dis%ounted3 )ad less strengt) on t)e defensi+e t)an if t)ey )ad re%ained %ounted and used a counter#c)arge to %eet t)eir %ounted assailants on e.ual ter%s or 1<@

relied on t)eir %o&ility to a+oid infantry. 5n foot t)e inferiority of t)eir /istols to ar.ue&uses or %uskets %ade t)e% at &est an inferior ty/e of lig)t infantry. 0)us ca+alry )ad /urc)ased its +ersatility and en)anced offensi+e ca/acity at t)e cost of t)e a&ility to resist effecti+ely on foot3 t)e efficacy of ()ic) t)e 2nglis) )ad so dra%atically de%onstrated at t)e Battle of $r;cy. 0)e ne( danger /resented to infantry &y t)is dual#/ur/ose ca+alry /laced a /re%iu% u/on coo/eration &et(een lig)t and )ea+y infantry. 0)e /lan of kee/ing files of ar.ue&usiers on eit)er side of t)e /ike s.uare to %aintain a continuous fire do%inated tactical t)oug)t3 &ut co%%anders also de+elo/ed for%ations t)at arrayed t)e lig)t infantry in four ranks all around t)e /ike s.uare (it) a routine in ()ic) t)e front rank fired and knelt3 follo(ed &y t)e successi+e firing and kneeling of t)e ne-t t(o ranks and t)e firing of t)e rear rank. Since t)is for%ation essentially &lanketed t)e /ikes3 co%%anders de+ised a drill in ()ic) t)e /ike s.uare could o/en u/3 allo( t)e gunners to %arc) inside3 and refor% t)eir /)alan- of /ikes. But t)is drill to /ro+ide a refuge for t)e lig)t infantry not only t)inned t)e ranks of t)e /ike%en &ut also /resented great difficulties in e-ecution. Since t)e for%ation (ould &e doo%ed if t)e ca+alry caug)t t)e infantry ()ile e-ecuting t)e %o+e%ent3 it found little fa+our in /ractice. 0)e lig)t infantry usually relied on its initiati+e and t)e s)elter offered &y trees3 s)ru&&ery3 &uildings3 and t)e ine.ualities of t)e ground to esca/e t)e reiters s(ords7 &ut it could not desert t)e /ike%en and lea+e t)e% at t)e %ercy of t)e reiters /istols. $o%%anders disco+ered no /erfect antidote to co/e (it) resolutely and skilfully )andled dual#/ur/ose reiter ca+alry. By 1=>> 2uro/ean tactics )ad &eco%e essentially as so/)isticated and co%/le- as t)ose of t)e ancients. 0)e /istol )ad c)anged ca+alry tactics and t)e &asic tactical %atri- of ancient and %edie+al (arfare. 0)oug) t)e !estern 2uro/ean use of s.uares of )ea+y infantry differed fro% t)e *reek and Ro%an linear /ractice3 t)e resulting tactics )ad t)e sa%e essential outlook as t)e ancients. Back

(he Man'ower System in 7:;;

t t)e end of t)e si-teent) century logistics re%ained %uc) as it )ad in ancient ti%es. 0)e greater efficiency of t)e )orse )ad i%/ro+ed road trans/ort &ut )ad not altered funda%entally t)e su//ly of ar%ies nor )ad t)e larger3 &etter# rigged3 co%/ass#directed s)i/s (roug)t any funda%ental c)ange in t)e nature or co%/arati+e ad+antage of (ater trans/ort. 0)e lack of good roads /re+ented full e-/loitation of t)e ca/a&ilities of t)e )orse#dra(n3 four#()eel (agon. 0)e )ea+ily /o/ulated areas )ad a t)ick net(ork of roads3 &ut fe( )ad an ade.uate surface3 and %ost (ere little %ore t)an tracks t)at rain usually rendered nearly i%/assa&le. Most !estern 2uro/ean ar%ies3 e%/loying t)e %an/o(er syste% e+ol+ed &y t)e 'renc) and Italians3 %aintained s%all3 /er%anent regular forces and utilised %ercenaries to increase t)eir forces in (arti%e. 5ften lacking ready credit and (it)out large &ureaucracies3 rulers resorted for t)is e-/ansion to inde/endent contractors3 eit)er ca/tains ()o raised co%/anies of 2<> to ?>> %en or colonels ()o raised regi%ents of ten or t(el+e co%/anies3 usually &y su&contracting (it) ca/tains. 5ften t)ese entre/reneurs /ro+ided t)eir o(n ca/ital3 deli+ering co%/lete units &efore t)e go+ern%ent /aid anyt)ing3 &ut so%eti%es t)ey de/ended on ad+ances &y t)e Prince for ()o% t)e forces (ere raised. 0o &e /re/ared for co%&at3 go+ern%ents often /aid contractors a retainer to &e ready in case of (ar. 0)is ena&led t)e contractor to kee/ )is organisation intact and assured t)e go+ern%ent t)at )e (ould (ork for its Prince rat)er t)an t)e ene%y. 0)e contractors /ro+ided t)e %en3 often lent %uc) %oney3 and3 as ca/tains of t)e co%/anies or colonels of t)e regi%ents3 co%%anded t)e troo/s t)at t)ey )ad raised. Princes also often c)ose t)eir generals fro% t)e ranks of t)ese soldier#entre/reneurs. t t)e &eginning of t)e re+olt of t)e Net)erlands t)e S(edis) s)o(ed t)e a&ility of t)is syste% to create a )uge ar%y in an a%a6ingly s)ort ti%e. In t)e Net)erlands t)e S/aniards %aintained a

1=>

regular force of 1?3>>> %en3 a su&stantial nu%&er for t)e ti%e. 5n /ril 1st 1<C23 t)ey called on t)eir contractors7 &y ugust ?1st t)ey )ad an ar%y of =C3>>> %en3 including t)e original 1?3>>> /eaceti%e force. 0)e a&ility to raise so %any %en so .uickly %eant t)at fe( go+ern%ents could resist t)e te%/tation to )ire %ore %en t)an t)ey could afford to /ay. //re)ension t)at t)e ene%y (ould )a+e %ore3 toget)er (it) t)e &elief t)at +ictory (ould so%e)o( /ro+ide t)e funds for (ages3 su//lied a rationale for t)e e-cessi+e recruiting as did t)e &elief t)at in t)e e+ent of defeat %any of t)e soldiers (ould not &e /resent to collect t)eir %oney. Ina&ility to co%/ensate t)e troo/s3 ()o de/ended on t)eir sti/end to /ro+ide t)eir food3 ine+ita&ly /roduced %utinies &y S/anis) and ot)er un/aid soldiers. 0)ese strikes for &ack /ay often cri//led t)e S/anis) ar%ies as t)e %en elected re/resentati+es ()o negotiated (it) t)e i%/ecunious aut)orities and insisted t)at t)e soldiers (ould not ca%/aign until /aid. 5n rare occasions3 as in 1<C=3 t)e soldiers took t)eir earnings &y force. 0)at year un/aid S/anis) soldiers looted t)e /ros/erous co%%ercial city of nt(er/3 killing =3>>> ci+ilians and &urning B>> )ouses. In t)is JS/anis) 'uryL t)e soldiers destroyed %uc) %ore t)an t)ey took in lieu of t)eir (ages. $)ronic ina&ility to co%/ensate t)eir %en regularly induced t)e S/anis) to &egin /aying t)eir soldiers in /art &y issuing t)e% food and reducing t)eir (ages accordingly. 0)is %easure ke/t t)e %en fro% &eco%ing des/erate &ecause t)ey lacked %oney to &uy food. 0)e S/anis) ar%y custo%arily o(ed its troo/s /art of t)eir cas) /ay and e+en sa( in t)is a +irtue: /re+enting desertion. 5ne of t)eir co%%anders re%arked: J0o kee/ t)e soldiers toget)er it is a good t)ing to o(e t)e% so%et)ing.L conte%/orary agreed: JIt is good to kee/ t)e% s)ort of %oney so%eti%es3 in order to %ake t)e% %ore o&edient and to feed t)e% (it) )o/e.L 0)us %oney &eca%e t)e only sine( of (ar3 co%%anding all of t)e rest. not)er conte%/orary e-/ressed it (ell ()en )e said3 J"e ()o )as t)e %ost %oney (ins.L nd to %ore t)an one co%%ander of t)is era )as &een attri&uted t)e +ie( t)at t)ere (ere t)ree t)ings needed in (ar: %oney3 %oney3 and %ore %oney. $ontractors could usually recruit in neutral as (ell as friendly territory3 &ringing in /er%anent or inter%ittent /rofessional fig)ting %en as (ell as t)e une%/loyed and t)ose ()o )o/ed for ric)es t)roug) loot or ()o (is)ed to try t)e ad+enture of a soldiers life. So%eti%es ca/tains used trickery as ()en a lady3 )a+ing enticed J/oor ruffians (it) food3L t)en ga+e t)e ca/tain )el/ ()en Js)e s)ut t)e% u/ &y sur/rise in a cellar and left t)e% t)ere (it)out food until t)ey enlisted and acce/ted t)eir (ages.L n enlist%ent )ad no set ter%7 %ost go+ern%ents3 )o(e+er3 ad)ered to t)e custo% of dis&anding t)e ar%y at t)e end of t)e fall ca%/aign and )iring ane( in t)e s/ring. But continuous ca%/aigning year after year &y t)e S/anis) and 1utc) led to t)eir kee/ing %en under ar%s all year round3 t)ese soldiers )a+ing t)e o&ligation to ser+e until disc)arged. !)en contractors recruited /rofessionals3 t)e infantry ca%e e.ui//ed (it) ar.ue&us3 %usket3 or /ike and t)e ca+alry (it) )orse and suita&le (ea/ons. 0)e rate of /ay de/ended on e.ui/%ent3 ca+alry recei+ing at least t(ice t)e infantrys (age and t)e foot%en (it) ar%our for t)e torso recei+ing a /re%iu% for )a+ing t)at e-/ensi+e /iece of e.ui/%ent. 0)e contractor or t)e go+ern%ent outfitted t)e une.ui//ed %en3 deducting t)e cost fro% t)eir (ages. 0)e soldiers recei+ed little for%al training and )ad negligi&le e-/erience (it) drill. 2+en t)oug) t)e /er%anent forces of S/ain also neglected drill3 t)e /ro%inent S/anis) co%%ander3 t)e 1uke of l&a3 insisted t)at fig)ting %en needed a year or t(o of /eaceti%e ser+ice &efore t)ey (ere fit for co%&at. 5n t)e %arc) soldiers stayed in to(ns3 %o+ing in (it) fa%ilies to s/end t)e nig)t. In ene%y territory t)e troo/s took t)eir food and lodging &ut (ere su//osed to /ay for t)e% in friendly territory. 2+en so3 ci+ilians dreaded t)e a//roac) of friendly soldiers ()o3 e+en ()en so&er3 usually /ro+ed destructi+e3 %aliciously &urning &arns and re.uiring ti/s fro% t)eir in+oluntary )osts for refraining fro% destroying /ro/erty.

1=1

In t)e S/anis) ser+ice t)e soldiers (ere usually foreign3 for as a %atter of /olicy t)e S/anis) ke/t troo/s far fro% )o%e to reduce desertion and /reclude soldiers )a+ing conflicting allegiance. S/anis) official3 stressing t)e use of %en raised one /lace for ca%/aigning in anot)er3 /ointed out t)at Jtroo/s nati+e to t)e country ()ere t)e (ar is &eing foug)t dis&and +ery ra/idly and t)ere is no surer strengt) t)an t)at of foreign soldiers.L 0)oug) t)e S/aniards largely ke/t t)eir recruiting (it)in t)eir o(n large do%ains or in t)e e%/ire of t)eir "a&s&urg cousins3 foreign#recruited troo/s continued to &e as i%/ortant for ot)er countries as t)ey )ad &een in t)e Middle ges and t)e si-teent) century. 'renc) co%%ander later su%%ed u/ t)e ad+antage of foreign recruiting: J *er%an in t)e ar%y ser+es us as t)ree soldiers7 )e s/ares 'rance one3 )e de/ri+es our ene%y of one and )e ser+es us as one.L !it)out %uc) drill or training and often (it)out any national or local loyalty to t)eir cause3 ar%ies lacked %any of t)e &ases for co)esion in co%&at. But /er%anent regi%ents t)at re%ained in e-istence year after year did )a+e a kins)i/ t)at /ro+ided an ;s/rit#de#cor/s and su//lied a &asis for %orale t)at sustained t)e% in &attle. Part of t)is co%%unity included t)e infor%al &ut integral non# %ilitary /ersonnel of a regi%ent3 suc) as officers ser+ants3 sutlers3 (i+es3 (as)er(o%en3 and /rostitutes. 5n one occasion on a long inarc)3 a S/anis) force of B3=4= infantry and @=< ca+alry )ad a total of 1=3>>> /eo/le and ?3>>> )orses. conte%/orary re%arked3 (it) so%e e-aggeration3 of anot)er S/anis) force t)at Jsuc) a long tall on suc) a s%all &ody ne+er (as seen3L &ecause it (as Jsuc) a s%all ar%y (it) so %any carts3 &aggage )orses3 nags3 sutlers3 lackeys3 (o%en3 c)ildren and a ra&&le ()ic) nu%&ered far %ore t)an t)e r%y itself.L Ne+ert)eless3 suc) a )ea+ily &urdened ar%y could %arc) t(el+e %iles a day3 a distance standard in ancient and %edie+al ti%es for seasoned troo/s ()o could count on access to su//lies along t)e route. But t)e nu%&er of su/ernu%eraries3 i%/ortant as t)ey (ere in %aking a )o%e and a co%%unity for t)e soldiers3 co%/licated su//ly and increased t)e &urden on t)e ci+ilians ()o )ad to /ro+ide .uarters on t)e %arc). Back

Si$teenth-Century 1attles. Cam'aigns. and Strategy

!it) logistics essentially unc)anged since ancient ti%es and a tactical syste% t)at /laced fe( de%ands on t)e /oorly articulated and inade.uately drilled %ercenary )ea+y infantry3 t)e strategy of co%%anders also dis/layed a )ig) degree of continuity (it) t)e /ast. s in earlier ti%es co%%anders concerned t)e%sel+es (it) &ringing on &attle under fa+oura&le circu%stances and a+oiding it ()en conditions see%ed likely to cause defeat. Particularly did t)ey concentrate on t)e situation3 )ard to &ring a&out3 in ()ic) one ar%y )ad its &ack to an o&stacle and )ad to %ake a frontal attack to e-tricate itself. In addition3 si-teent)#century co%%anders )ad t(o ot)er dangers to a+oid or o//ortunities to e-/loit. 5ne arose fro% t)e difficulties of t)e transition front %arc) to &attle for%ation. No infantry or ca+alry co%&at for%ation corres/onded to t)e colu%n3 often four a&reast3 used for %arc)ing on a road. rraying an ar%y for &attle in+ol+ed )a+ing a /lan3 for%ing t)e s.uares of )ea+y infantry3 /osting t)e associated lig)t infantry to act as skir%is)ers or to /ro+ide fire su//ort3 /ositioning t)e )ea+y ca+alry units si- or eig)t ranks dee/3 and /lacing any )orse ar.ue&usiers or unar%oured ca+alry according to t)e /lan. r%ies could do t)is on t)e field ()ere t)ey e-/ected to fig)t or near t)e ene%ys /osition. 0)e attacking ar%y (ould t)en %arc) across country in &attle for%ation to engage an already for%ed o//onent3 ready to gi+e &attle. 2+en (it) a si%/le &attle for%ation of a fe( large %asses of infantry and ca+alry3 t)e transition fro% colu%ns for %arc) to &attle array al(ays in+ol+ed a slo( and cu%&erso%e /rocess. 5ne instance in ()ic) t)e transition in+ol+ed /eril occurred ()en ar%ies (ere face to face. 5ften forces confronted one anot)er for days at a ti%e3 and t)e first to lea+e3 often constrained to do so &y lack of food3 )ad to get into %arc) for%ation (it) a &attle#arrayed ene%y close &y. 0)e *reeks encountered t)is situation at t)e Battle of Plataea after t)e Persian ca+alry ca/tured t)eir /ack train (it) food and s/oiled t)e s/ring fro% ()ic) t)e *reeks dre( t)eir (ater. 0)e disorder in t)e *reek 1=2

for%ation created &y a nig)t (it)dra(al )ad /reci/itated t)e Persian attack. si%ilar instance occurred in Italy in 1<<?3 ()en a 'renc) ar%y3 o+ertaking a force of t)e 2%/eror and finding it entrenc)ed &efore t)e%3 dug in 1<> yards o//osite. Neit)er force attacked3 and after a (eek t)e 'renc)3 getting t)e (orst of t)e sni/ing and losing %en ()en t)e ene%y artillery &o%&arded t)eir (ater su//lies3 resol+ed to retreat. 'earing t)e confusion of a nig)t (it)dra(al3 t)e co%/etent 'renc) co%%ander3 Stro66i3 atte%/ted to e-tricate )is troo/s at noon. But t)e ene%y3 i%%ediately seeing t)e %o+e3 attacked and inflicted 43>>> to <3>>> casualties on a 'renc) force of 123>>> %en. In t)e (ords of a conte%/orary3 J0)e ca+alry got %i-ed u/ (it) t)e &aggage train3 t)e infantry )ad &een cut u/ on t)e roads3L in /art &ecause t)ere (as no atte%/t to do t)e only /ossi&le t)ing # to sacrifice a rearguard3 ?>> or 4>> ar.ue&usiers3 /er)a/s3 and t)e ca+alry3 in order to get t)e %ain &ody off.L 0)oug) a serious defeat rarely occurred in atte%/ting suc) a %o+e%ent3 t)e %anoeu+re (as risky3 and co%%anders )ad to /lan it carefully and carry it out e-/editiously if t)ey (ere to a+oid disaster. 0)e %o&ility of ca+alry and t)eir a&ility to c)ange .uickly fro% %arc) to &attle array caused ot)er /ro&le%s for %arc) for%ations. lt)oug) a /ursuing ar%y can %o+e no faster t)an one retreating3 a ca+alry force &y itself can o+ertake any ar%y (it) infantry. 0)is )a//ened to t)e 1utc) ()en3 at *e%&lours in 1<CB3 screened &y t)eir ca+alry3 t)ey fell &ack to a ne( /osition. S/anis) ca+alry /ro%/tly attacked ()en t)ey detected t)e %o+e3 &ut t)e 1utc) ca+alry )eld t)e% until t)e son of t)e 1uke of Patina3 later a reno(ned general3 led a force of S/anis) ca+alry around t)e 1utc) and c)arged t)e% in flank and rear. Routing t)e 1utc) ca+alry3 t)e S/anis) ca+alry t)en assaulted t)e 1utc) infantry as it %arc)ed along t)e road. $atc)ing t)e %en unfor%ed for co%&at3 t)e aggressi+e S/anis) lancers defeated one for%ation of 1utc) infantry after anot)er. t negligi&le cost t)e S/anis) ca+alry3 &y its &etter %o&ility and its ca/acity for c)anging ra/idly fro% %arc) to co%&at for%ation3 inflicted <3>>> to =3>>> casualties on t)e 1utc) ar%y. 5+er t(enty years later3 at 0ournout3 B>> 1utc) ca+alry o+ertook a %arc)ing colu%n 5f <3>>> S/anis) infantry and <>> ca+alry. 1is/ersing t)e S/anis) ca+alry3 ()ic) %ade little effecti+e resistance3 t)e 1utc) ca+alry c)arged &ot) ends of t)e S/anis) colu%n3 defeating successi+e %arc)ing grou/s of crack S/anis) infantry. !it) t)e aid of a fe( 1utc) ar.ue&usiers ()o )el/ed attack t)e rear of t)e colu%n3 B>> 1utc) ca+alry killed 23>>> S/anis) infantry and took <>> /risoners fro% t)e infantry. 0)e ca+alry o(ed its success not only to its )ig)er %o&ility &ut to its a&ility to %o+e .uickly and easily fro% %arc) to &attle array3 a /roficiency deri+ed front t)e ca+alrys )o%ogeneity and t)e )orse%ens greater reliance on indi+idual action and conse.uent s%all need for t)e infantrys integrated for%ation. 0)ese offensi+e attri&utes not only %ade ca+alry ideal for assailing forces on t)e %arc) &ut also conferred t)e &attlefield ca/acity of carrying out attacks against t)e ene%ys flank and rear. So in s/ite of t)e /redo%inance of field fortifications3 ()ic) naturally sty%ied ca+alry3 and infantry for%ations3 ()ic) united t)e defensi+e ca/a&ilities of lig)t and )ea+y infantry3 ca+alry retained its tactical rele+ance. But e+en )ad it lost its tactical /o(er on t)e &attlefield3 t)e triu%/) of t)e 1utc) ca+alry at 0ournout against t)e S/anis) %arc)ing colu%n s)o(ed t)at &etter %arc)ing %o&ility ga+e it a strategically offensi+e ca/acity to o+ertake infantry and t)en e-/loit its tactically offensi+e c)aracteristics in attacking t)e unready ene%y infantry. So in /ursuing t)eir strategy of a+oiding &attles e-ce/t under +ery fa+oura&le circu%stances3 late si-teent)#century generals also )ad to &e a(are of t)e dangers and o//ortunities /resented &y (it)dra(al ()en &ot) ar%ies faced eac) ot)er arrayed for &attle. $o%%anders faced a %ore co%%on )a6ard on %arc)es3 ()en t)e strategic %o&ility of ca+alry eli%inated t)e a//arent security /ro+ided &y distance fro% t)e ene%y. 0)oug) t)e /ossi&ility and /ros/ect of conflict conditioned %ilitary o/erations3 &attles /ro+ed to &e relati+ely rare occurrences &ecause generals still )ad no sure %et)od of forcing a fig)t on an un(illing and alert o//onent.

1=?

5f t)e &etter#kno(n &attles in !estern 2uro/e fro% 14@< until 1=>>3 ele+en occurred &y %utual consent3 eac) side eit)er &elie+ing it could (in a frontal engage%ent or /referring co%&at to retreat. In one case logistical difficulties3 /articularly t)e e-)austion of t)e ar%ys su//ly of &eer3 /resented t)e attacker (it) t)e c)oice of a frontal encounter or retreat. Se+en of t)e engage%ents ca%e a&out /ri%arily fro% efforts to raise a siege3 t(o %ig)t &e attri&uted to t)is and anot)er cause3 and t)ree occurred as a result of a sur/rise crossing of a ri+er and t)e en+elo/%ent or o+er()el%ing of t)e defender. $a+alry foug)t and largely (on single#)andedly t(o ot)ers ()en it caug)t ar%ies on t)e %arc). 'i+e of t)e ele+en frontal &attles &y %utual consent took /lace &et(een t)e a%ateuris) forces of t)e 'renc) ci+il (ars3 and four ot)ers in+ol+ed t)e relati+ely unseasoned 2nglis)3 Scots3 and 1utc). *reater circu%s/ection Gor /essi%is%H a//arently %arked t)e conduct of t)e %ore e-/erienced soldiers ()o tended to agree (it) eac) ot)er as to t)e odds of (inning and losing and soug)t to a+oid offensi+e frontal &attles. 1ata on causalities are less relia&le t)an t)ose on t)e nu%&er engaged and are usually li%ited to t)e nu%&er dead and taken /risoner3 o%itting t)e (ounded. In t(enty &attles &et(een 14@< and 1=>> t)e defeated lost ?B /ercent of t)eir %en3 t)e +ictors only = /ercent. 0)is great dis/arity reflected t)e disorganisation of t)e losing force3 a situation %ade (orse &y t)e /ri%iti+e degree of articulation of t)e troo/s3 t)e ad#)oc c)aracter of t)e ar%ies3 and t)e lack of co)esion and ;s/rit#de# cor/s in %any for%ations. !it)out su&di+ision and a co%%and )ierarc)y3 it /ro+ed difficult to rally defeated units3 to organise rearguard actions3 and to i%/art /ur/oseful %o+e%ent and direction to retreats. Men (it) little e-/erience ser+ing toget)er lacked confidence in t)eir fello(s and kne( not ()at to e-/ect of t)e% in ad+ersity. 5ften &odies of troo/s surrendered readily or easily /anicked. 0)is situation aggra+ated t)e unfa+oura&le conditions /roduced &y /oor articulation. In addition3 infantry suffered dis/ro/ortionately )ea+y casualties3 t)oug) t)ese %en usually )ad a &etter c)ance t)an t)e ar%oured )ea+y ca+alry if a (ater &arrier o&structed t)e retreat. Not only could t)e infantry not %o+e as fast as t)e ca+alry3 &ut also (it)dra(al often /ro+ided o//ortunities3 denied on t)e &attlefield3 to use a %ore /o(erful (ea/on syste% against its inferior. 1isorganisation a%ong t)e )ea+y infantry3 for e-a%/le3 %ade it +ulnera&le to t)e )ea+y ca+alry3 t)us adding danger to its traditional defencelessness against lig)t infantry3 %ounted ar.ue&usiers3 or reiters. ,ig)t infantry in flig)t /ro+ided an easy %ark for /ursuing )ea+y ca+alry. 0)is great dis/ro/ortion in losses &et(een +ictor and +an.uis)ed occurred in s/ite of t)e successful ar%ys disorganisation3 an al%ost in+aria&le conse.uence of (inning and one e-acer&ated &y t)e sa%e lack of articulation t)at /lagued t)e defeated. 0riu%/)ant ar%ies (ere usually nearly as e-)austed and confused3 if not as de/leted3 &y +ictory as t)e losers &y t)eir defeat and3 lacking t)e incenti+e of self#/reser+ation3 usually dis/layed less +igour in /ursuit t)an t)e +an.uis)ed in retreat. 5ften +ictors3 elated at (inning and relie+ed to )a+e a+oided defeat3 %ade little organised effort to follo( t)e losers. Ne+ert)eless3 t)e a+erage +ictory /roduced i%/ressi+e tactical conse.uences. %ore +igorous tactical /ursuit dou&tless (ould )a+e i%/ro+ed t)e attrition ratio. Battles also )ad a strategic i%/act. 0)is &egan (it) t)e retreat of t)e defeated ar%y3 an outco%e t)at t)e +ictor %ig)t )a+e aug%ented &y strategic /ursuit3 /ressing t)e ene%y to /rolong t)e retreat or co%/el anot)er fig)t. 0)e attrition of &attle (ould )a+e altered t)e &alance of forces in fa+our of t)e (inner3 gi+ing a /re/onderance of strengt) a&sent &efore co%&at. If &ot) ar%ies )ad 1>3>>> %en &efore an a+erage si-teent) century &attle3 after t)e engage%ent t)e +ictors (ould )a+e @34>> and t)e +an.uis)ed =32>> eac)3 including so%e (ounded3 a one and one )alf to one ad+antage in nu%&ers. Battles also )ad /syc)ological effects. 0)e losers de/ression %ig)t cause an e-aggerated reaction leading to a longer retreat t)an t)e ne( &alance of forces (ould )a+e (arranted. 0)e /syc)ological i%/act %ig)t affect t)e /olitical situation3 causing an e-tra+agant res/onse to t)e c)anged strategic situation.

1=4

0)e actual effects of &attles /ro+ed .uite di+erse. fter one +ictory in t)e 'renc) ci+il (ar t)e &ra+e and aggressi+e 9ing "enry IV ad+anced against Paris7 after anot)er )e took ad+antage of t)e lull to +isit )is %istress. fter one triu%/) in Italy3 t)e 'renc) took Milan7 after anot)er t)ey retreated &ecause t)eir o//onent recei+ed su&stantial reinforce%ents. fter defeating a S/anis) ar%y t)at soug)t to /re+ent a siege of Nieu/ort3 t)e 1utc) co%%ander used t)e re/utation gained &y )is i%/ressi+e +ictory to %arc) )o%e rat)er t)an &egin t)e siege of ()ic) )e disa//ro+ed. But none of t)e +ictories funda%entally altered t)e strategic situation. fter losing at No+ara in 1<1?3 t)e 'renc) a&andoned t)eir in+asion of Italy. But t)e 'renc) desire to con.uer Italy3 a large and relati+ely inaccessi&le /eninsula3 (as unrealistic in t)e face of (eak /olitical clai%s and t)e o//osition of t)e ar%ies of t)e e%/ire and t)e fleet and ar%y of S/ain. Victories /ro+ed e.ually ineffectual in ac.uiring suc) a territory. In saying t)at a &attle Jisnt a +ictory unless it ends t)e (ar3L a si-teent)#century 'renc) essayist set a standard t)at +irtually e-cluded all si-teent)#century &attles and %ost of t)ose in ot)er eras as !ell. 5n one occasion t)e /o(erful 2%/eror $)arles V used )is %ilitary su/re%acy to cross t)e l/s and in+ade sout)ern 'rance Dust as t)e )ar+est (as ri/ening. But t)e 9ing of 'rance3 using a logistic strategy3 dro+e off t)e li+estock3 &urned cro/s in t)e field3 and destroyed flour#%ills. 2%&arrassed &y a lack of su//lies and facing a strong 'renc) force standing on t)e defensi+e3 t)e 2%/eror retreated. In anot)er instance t)e ar%ies of t)e 2%/eror and t)e 9ing confronted eac) ot)er for t)ree (eeks3 (it) neit)er &elie+ing t)at t)e odds of +ictory counter&alanced t)e )ideous costs of defeat. 'inally3 eac) %onarc) )a+ing de/leted t)e %oney to /ay )is %en3 &ot) ar%ies retreated. s%all %argin of /roduction a&o+e su&sistence3 a situation3 aggra+ated &y ineffecti+e ta- syste%s and credit %ec)anis%s3 /re+ented eit)er contestant fro% raising forces ade.uate to o+erco%e t)e si6e of t)e )ostile s/ace3 t)e nu%&er of t)e o//osing /o/ulation3 and t)e strengt) of t)e ene%ys fortifications. Recalling t)e 2nglis) efforts at t)e con.uest of 'rance in t)e fifteent) century3 t)e 'renc) Mars)al de Montluc (rote: J'rance if united cannot &e con.uered e+en &y a do6en &attles3 considering t)e /atriotis% of its no&l;sse and t)e nu%&er of its fortresses. I )old t)ose to &e in error ()o said t)at if Paris fell3 'rance (as lost.L 0o t)e fortified country and its loyal3 (arlike gentry3 )e added t)at &esides Paris3 Jt)ere are so %any ot)er cities and fortresses in t)is real%3 t)at it (ould take t)irty ar%ies to ca/ture and garrison t)e% all. 0o )old do(n ()at )e )ad (on3 t)e con.ueror (ould )a+e to un/eo/le )is ()ole kingdo%3 ()ic) is o&+iously i%/ossi&le. !)ile t)e in+ader (as taking one /lace3 )e (ould &e losing anot)er3 for (ant of garrisons ()ic) )e could not /ro+ide.L Mars)al de Montluc sa( clearly ()y t)e 2nglis) )ad to e%/loy a raiding strategy early in t)e "undred :ears !ar and ()y (it)out %ore /olitical su//ort t)an 9ing "enry V /ossessed )is later introduction of a /ersisting strategy failed. In t)e s%aller area of ur&anised nort) Italy and t)e Net)erlands3 t)e in+aders )ad an ade.uate ratio of force to s/ace to /ursue a /ersisting strategy3 &ut in t)e Net)erlands t)ey %et %ore ene%y troo/s t)an t)ey could o+erco%e. In addition to soldiers3 t)e in+aders encountered a %ultitude of fortified to(ns and strong /oints. 0)is )ig) ratio of force to s/ace defeated t)e offensi+e in regions (it) t)e (ealt) to resist3 to(n %ilitias to aid in t)e defence3 and cities /rotected (it) %odernised fortifications. 0)ese factors ena&led t)e /ro+inces of /resent#day "olland to (it)stand con.uest &y t)e relati+ely large and efficient ar%ies of S/ain. fter a %aDor S/anis) +ictory3 an 2nglis) o&ser+er /ointed out t)e strategic irrele+ance of &attles in suc) a (ell#fortified country. 0o take ad+antage of )is success t)e S/anis) co%%ander )ad to Je-/unge one to(ne after anot)er3 t)e least of a nu%&er ()erof cannot cost )i% less t)an )alf a yeres siege (it) an infinite c)arge3 loss of %en and )a6ard of )is fortune and re/utation &ycause Gas %en of (arr are (ont to sayH one good to(ne (ell defended sufficet) to ryne a %ig)tie ar%y.L In t)e Net)erlands t)e S/anis) ulti%ately used %ore t)an ?<3>>> %en to /ro+ide 2>B /laces (it) garrisons as s%all as ten soldiers and one as large as 13>>>7 t)e a+erage

1=<

/ost nu%&ered 1=>. 0)e 1utc) fortified and garrisoned as (ell3 and %ost (arfare consisted3 in t)e (ords of a conte%/orary3 of Jfig)ts3 encounters3 skir%is)es3 a%&us)es3 an occasional &attle3 %inor sieges3 assaults3 escalades3 ca/tures and sur/rises of to(ns.L s t)e Ro%ans did earlier3 t)e 1utc) used a continuous eart)en &reast(ork to /rotect /art of t)eir area. In )ea+ily fortified regions &attles could )ardly )a+e any strategic significance and often lacked i%/ortance else()ere. In +ie( of t)e )ig) attrition defeat inflicted on t)e +an.uis)ed3 it is not sur/rising3 t)at t)e %ore a&le /rofessional soldiers a+oided co%&at unless t)e odds o+er()el%ingly fa+oured +ictory. 'urt)er3 since &attles rarely )ad a %aDor strategic i%/act3 strategic considerations )ad no cogency in o+erruling tactical caution. In 1<=B and again in 1<C2 t)e a&le 1uke of l&a3 t)e S/anis) co%%ander in t)e Net)erlands3 defeated a 1utc) in+asion &y a+oiding a fig)t until (inter ca%e on3 and3 t)eir %oney and su//lies running lo(3 t)e 1utc) retreated. But t)oug) )e could (in in t)e field (it) or (it)out co%&at3 l&a could not o+erco%e t)e %ultitude of 1utc) fortresses. "is talented successors did no &etter. !estern 2uro/ean &attles t)us rese%&led t)ose of "anni&al in Italy rat)er t)an t)ose of le-ander in sia. $onfronted (it) strong fortifications3 fir% /olitical o//osition3 and usually large s/aces to control3 +ictories t)at i%/osed )ig) attrition on t)e defeated failed to yield /ro/ortionate strategic results. 0)e ca%/aigns fro% 1<@> to 1<@2 in nort)ern 'rance clearly e-)i&ited t)e kind of so/)isticated generals)i/ t)at )ad de+elo/ed in Italy3 under t)e condottieri and %atured as t)e si-teent) century found its ne( tactical synt)esis. 0)e 1uke of Par%a3 a S/anis) educated Italian 1uke and a grandson of 2%/eror $)arles V3 led S/anis) forces fro% t)e Net)erlands in su//ort of t)e $at)olics in a 'renc) ci+il (ar t)at &y 1<@> )ad /itted /rotestant 9ing "enry IV against $at)olic insurgents ()o controlled Parts. 0)e 9ings reckless courage o+ers)ado(ed t)e tactical skill )e )ad de+elo/ed in t)e 'renc) ci+il (ars3 and )is &attlefield /roficiency o&scured )is understanding of strategy. "e /ro+ed an e-e%/lary %onarc)3 )is sy%/at)y for t)e co%%on /eo/le &eco%ing a legend and )is gracious3 accessi&le %anner ensuring )i% a glo(ing re/utation. In statecraft as (ell as (ar )e re%ained fir%ly in co%%and. 0)e 1uke of Par%a3 a daring ca+alry leader in )is t(enties3 )ad e%&raced t)e least#effort sc)ool of (arfare of t)e condottieri and )ad carried t)e re/utation as t)e &est general of )is ti%e. lt)oug) 9ing "enry could ne+er resist leading a ca+alry c)arge in /erson3 )is successful co%%and e-/erience %ade )i% an o//onent (ort)y of Par%a. 0)e first conflict &et(een t)e t(o ca%e in t)e su%%er of 1<@>3 ()en "enrys &lockade of Paris )ad so reduced t)e citys food su//lies t)at Par%a and )is S/anis) ar%y left t)e Net)erlands (it) t)e o&Decti+e of ena&ling Paris to re#su//ly itself. $oncentrating as %any %en as /ossi&le3 9ing "enry %et )is ad+ance east of Paris ()ere Par%a )ad )alted3 in+iting "enry to attack )i%. Sc)ooled in t)e a%ateuris) 'renc) ci+il (ars3 "enry faced a ne( ty/e of o//osition ()en )e reconnoitred Par%as )ea+ily entrenc)ed /osition. 1isinclined to attack fortifications3 "enry %o+ed to t)reaten Par%a3 ()o /ro%/tly occu/ied and entrenc)ed a ne( /osition. !)ile "enry searc)ed in +ain for Par%as (eakness3 a S/anis) detac)%ent ca/tured a &ridge3 o/ening a road into Paris t)roug) ()ic) su//lies .uickly flo(ed. "a+ing o/ened Paris to /ro+isions &ut )i%self finding little to eat near t)e city G()ere "enrys ar%y )ad s/ent four %ont)s consu%ing e+eryt)ing a+aila&leH and (it)out %oney to /ay )is troo/s3 Par%a /ro%/tly %arc)ed &ack to t)e Net)erlands3 losing stragglers killed &y t)e )ostile 'renc) /o/ulation. "e sustained negligi&le losses3 and )is %ini%al inter+ention )ad sa+ed Paris3 t)e o&Decti+e of )is nearly &loodless ca%/aign. In 1<@1 "enry soug)t to strengt)en )is s )old on nort)ern 'rance and in t)e autu%n &egan t)e siege of Rouen3 a to(n near t)e %out) of t)e Seine. gain t)e 9ing of S/ain sent Par%a to raise a siege. Beginning )is ad+ance in %id#8anuary 1<@23 &ut reluctant to lea+e t)e Net)erlands3 ()ere rene(ed fig)ting loo%ed3 Par%a3 like all generals3 disliked (inter ca%/aigns &ecause t)e (eat)er could )urt an ar%y al%ost as %uc) as a lost &attle. In a 1ece%&er ca%/aign in t)eir ci+il (ar3 for e-a%/le3

1==

&ot) 'renc) ar%ies )ad lost a t)ird of t)eir %en to illness and desertion caused &y intense cold and continual sleet. 'a%iliar (it) Patinas Ro%an %et)ods of (arfare3 "enry dis%issed any idea of facing t)e entrenc)ed S/anis) general in t)e field. Instead )e led C3>>> ca+alry in an effort to catc) t)e S/aniards on t)e %arc). But "enry3 not e-/ecting any significant tactical success3 ai%ed /ri%arily to )arass t)e S/anis) ar%y &y taking stragglers and cutting off detac)%ents and foraging /arties and so /re+ent t)e 1uke fro% reac)ing Rouen. 0)oug) "enry )ad %ostly )ea+y ca+alry3 )e took (it) )i% 13>>> )orse ar.ue&usiers. 0)e 9ings strategy and t)e /resence of t)e ar.ue&usiers s)o(ed t)at )e understood t)e strategic significance of lig)t ca+alry: like $aesar in t)e Ilerda ca%/aign and *on6alo in sout)ern Italy3 )e /lanned to use )is ca+alry to carry out a strategy co%/ara&le to 'a&ius against "anni&al. Because of t)e e-cellence of 'renc) ca+alry and t)e (ell#de%onstrated +ulnera&ility of an ar%y on t)e %arc)3 t)e acco%/lis)ed and careful 1uke took t)e not#unusual /recaution of %arc)ing in a +ersion of )is &attle array. 'or%ing )is infantry so t)at its s.uares %ade an o&long rectangle3 )e ke/t )is )ea+y ca+alry (it)in t)e for%ation and used )is lig)t ca+alry as scouts. Since t)e ar%y )ad to %o+e off t)e roads3 it %arc)ed slo(ly. But3 as a conte%/orary e-/lained3 J(it) t)e ar%y al(ays in order of &attle3 ne+er %o+ing unless t)e (eat)er (as fa+oura&le3 and all t)e ground in front (ell reconnoitred3 and )alting eac) afternoon in ti%e to allo( of )is ca%/ing ground &eing (ell entrenc)ed3L Par%as ar%y /ro+ed in+ulnera&le to t)e 'renc) ca+alry and )is Ro%an %et)ods defeated t)e 9ings 'a&ian strategy. But t)e relentless S/anis) ad+ance ne+er reac)ed Rouen. !)ile 9ing "enry faced Pat%a3 t)e $at)olic co%%ander in Rouen successfully sallied fro% t)e city and &le( u/ t)e &esiegers /o(der %aga6ine3 filled in t)eir trenc)es3 and o/ened )is co%%unications (it) t)e countryside. !it) no need to ad+ance fart)er and t)e $at)olics not an-ious to )a+e t)eir cause too closely identified (it) foreign troo/s3 t)e relie+ed 1uke of Par%a )alted3 e-/ecting "enry to do like(ise. !)en in %id# /ril "enry %o+ed all of )is forces to Rouen and re#esta&lis)ed t)e siege &efore t)e to(n could ade.uately resu//ly itself3 Par%a %o+ed ra/idly to Rouen3 and "enry3 not feeling strong enoug) to o//ose )i%3 raised t)e siege. Par%a t)en turned aside front Rouen and &esieged a s%all to(n to t)e (est. But t)e al(ays#/rudent 1uke )ad underesti%ated "enrys energy and resources. $alling in forces fro% afar and &ringing &ack to t)e colours no&ility t)at )ad left to a+oid (inter ca%/aigning3 t)e 9ing .uickly concentrated a larger force t)at cut t)e S/aniards off front Rouen and /enned t)e% against t)e Seine3 gi+ing t)e% t)e alternati+e of a frontal attack against 'renc) entrenc)%ents or a retreat to ,e "a+re3 a /ort &lockaded &y t)e s)i/s of "enrys 2nglis) and 1utc) allies. By )is energy and skill "enry )ad ac)ie+ed t)e goal of e+ery si-teent)#century general3 confronting an ene%y (it) t)e c)oice of a )o/eless &attle or ulti%ate ca/itulation. But t)e resourceful Par%a %o+ed to a fortified /osition on t)e Seine Ri+er3 ()ere )e %et a secretly /re/ared &ridge of &oats asse%&led during t)e nig)t and got )is ()ole ar%y across t)e ri+er &efore t)e 'renc) could interfere. 0)en3 dis/laying t)e energy al(ays latent in )is circu%s/ect ca%/aigning3 )e %arc)ed to t)e +icinity of Paris at t)e ra/id rate of eig)teen %iles a day3 strengt)ened t)e garrison3 and %arc)ed &ack to t)e Net)erlands to co/e (it) a rene(ed 1utc) offensi+e. 0)is skilfully conducted ca%/aign e-)i&ited t)e strategic %aturity of late si-teent)#century generals. 0)ey foug)t no &attles &ecause t)ey eac) /ercei+ed t)e sa%e likely outco%e. 0)e co%&ati+e 9ing could easily )a+e attacked t)e entrenc)ed 1uke &efore )e reac)ed Paris or during )is %arc) to Rouen (it) only a negligi&le likeli)ood of affecting t)e outco%e of t)e ca%/aign3 and t)e (ily Par%a could )a+e attacked "enry &efore esca/ing o+er t)e ri+er (it) little c)ance t)at )e

1=C

(ould )a+e )ad anyt)ing &ut a di%inis)ed ar%y to s)o( for )is selection of t)e &attle alternati+e. s /ractitioners of t)e /rinci/le of least effort3 neit)er t)e 9ing nor t)e 1uke risked a fig)t ()en so sure of t)e outco%e. !it) (arfare usually in /rogress so%e()ere in 2uro/e at any ti%e and (it) relati+ely young %en recei+ing res/onsi&le co%%ands and )olding t)e% for a long ti%e3 so/)isticated soldiers3 (ell tried in (ar3 (ould co%%and co%&at#seasoned +eterans in t)e o/ening /)ases of t)e 0)irty :ears !ar. 0)ey (ould )a+e t)e strategic outlook and tactical %et)od of t)e S/anis) ar%y and (ould readily do%inate t)e first decade of %ilitary3 o/erations. Back

)evolution in Naval (actics and "ogistics

Medie+al na+al (arfare in t)e Mediterranean Sea differed little fro% t)at in ancient ti%es3 galleys still constituting t)e (ar fleets. But on t)e tlantic $oast and in nort)ern 2uro/e3 larger (a+es and stor%ier (eat)er %ade t)e fragile3 narro( galleys %ore difficult to use3 resulting in a considera&le reliance on sailing s)i/s. s t)e tec)ni.ues of sailing i%/ro+ed and %ariners learned to %aintain a course %uc) nearer to t)e direction fro% ()ic) t)e (ind &le(3 t)e galleys lost so%e of t)eir ad+antage as s)i/s t)at could %o+e inde/endently of t)e (ind. So t)ey gradually assu%ed a s%aller role in t)e nort)3 es/ecially as t)e %edie+al go+ern%ents in t)at region often lacked t)e resources to %aintain su&stantial fleets of +essels s/ecialised for (ar. !ars)i/s increasingly de/ended /ri%arily on sail3 (it) oars as au-iliary and na+al +essels %ore and %ore (ere %erc)ant s)i/s /ressed into %ilitary ser+ice. 0)is difference %eant t)at na+ies could not count on ra%%ing. Sea fig)ting3 usually a confused and disorganised %elee3 consisted entirely of &oarding and t)e co%&at of soldiers. 0actics did not )inge on sailing in for%ation3 so%et)ing difficult for /ri%iti+e sailing +essels in any case. 0)e s)i/s carried infantry3 s)ock action /redo%inating (it) &o(%en /ro+iding su//ort. S)i/s /rotected t)e%sel+es fro% &oarding (it) ro/e nets3 ()ic) %ade t)e soldiers atte%/ting to cut t)eir (ay t)roug) +ulnera&le to &ot) %issile and s)ock (ea/ons. "ig) structures3 called castles3 on t)e &o(s and sterns of s)i/s /ro+ided defensi+e /ositions and /osts for t)e &o(%en to s)oot at ene%y s)i/s and &oarders3 and for t)e )ea+y and lig)t infantry to defend t)e ends of t)e s)i/ s)ould &oarders gain control of t)e deck &et(een t)e castles. 0)ey also /ro+ided /ositions to su//ort (it) %issiles t)eir o(n &oarders of )ostile +essels. lt)oug) t)e use of clu%sy sailing +essels3 ()ic)3 unlike galleys3 could %anoeu+re only (it) difficulty and not ra% effecti+ely3 re%o+ed %uc) of t)e ad+antage of a flank attack and %ade it )ard to count on co%%itting a reser+e at t)e rig)t ti%e and /lace7 de/endence on t)e (ind did not eli%inate concentration as an ele%ent of tactics. fleet to t)e (ind(ard of anot)er could eit)er refuse or delay &attle or initiate it &y sailing do(n (ind u/on its o//onent. Because of t)e difficulty of sailing s)i/s against t)e direction of t)e (ind3 t)e lee(ard fleet could not readily take t)e initiati+e against one to t)e (ind(ard. Na+al co%%anders t)us soug)t t)e (ind(ard /ositions and often atte%/ted to &ring t)eir ()ole fleet against a /ortion of t)e )ostile fleet3 /lanning to o+er()el% it &efore t)e re%ainder could co%e u/(ind to its rescue. In general3 t)oug)3 fleets usually foug)t in unorganised %asses3 co%ing alongside t)eir antagonists for t)e &oarding co%&at. 5n one occasion an 2nglis) fleet interce/ted an in+ading force3 and t)e 2nglis) ca/tain %ade dou&le use of )is (ind(ard /osition. s )e sailed do(n (ind and ca%e close to t)e )ea+ily %anned )ostile flags)i/3 t)e 2nglis) ca/tain )ad )is %en t)ro( li%e into t)e (ind3 ()ic) t)en &le( onto t)e ene%y s)i/3 &linding t)e soldiers and sailors and %aking it easy for t)e 2nglis) to co%e alongside and ca/ture t)e s)i/ and its cre(. 0)us t(o kinds of sea (arfare coe-isted in %edie+al ti%es3 t)e largely galley (arfare in t)e Mediterranean and t)e /redo%inantly sailing (arfare in t)e tlantic and nort). 0)e ad+ent of cannon3 ()ic) (roug)t no /er%anent c)ange in land (arfare3 /rofoundly influenced sea (arfare 1=B

and fa+oured t)e sailing s)i/ o+er t)e galley. Initially sea#fig)ters %erely su&stituted gun/o(der (ea/ons for &o(s3 as did (arriors on land. 0)e castles of %erc)ant s)i/s and t)e fe( s/ecially &uilt (ars)i/s carried nu%&ers of s%all cannon as anti/ersonnel (ea/ons. 0)ese /ro+ided &etter su//ort for t)e )ea+y infantry and3 &ecause t)ey did not need to &e /orta&le3 usually )ad greater /o(er t)an ar.ue&uses and S/anis) %uskets. :et t)ese c)anges3 analogous to t)ose on land3 altered sea (arfare no %ore t)an t)e su&stitution of t)e %atc)lock for t)e cross&o( )ad %odified land (arfare. But carrying to sea#cannon co%/ara&le to so%e of t)ose used in sieges did &ring a&out a re+olution in sea (arfare. 0)ese large guns could attack and seriously da%age t)e structure of s)i/s Dust as t)ey )ar%ed t)e %asonry (alls of %edie+al fortifications and /ro+ided a (ea/on syste% in so%e (ays analogous to t)e ra% of t)e galleys. Not only did guns attack t)e &uoyancy of s)i/s and da%age t)e rigging3 &ut also ()en a cannon&all /ierced t)e side of a (ooden +essel3 it s)o(ered t)e interior of t)e s)i/ (it) s/linters t)at (ounded t)e sailors and soldiers a&oard t)e s)i/. s)i/ could carry t(enty3 t)irty3 or e+en %ore cannon on eac) side3 all firing a &all (eig)ing nine /ounds or %ore. 0)is necessary arrange%ent of t)e guns c)anged s)i/#to#s)i/ co%&at fro% t)e &o(#to#&o( of galleys to a &roadside#to#&roadside array. In s/ite of t)e +ulnera&ility of t)e side of a slo(ly sailing s)i/ to t)e ra% of t)e galley3 t)e ne( cannon#ar%ed s)i/s could +an.uis) t)e galleys of t)e Mediterranean. sal+o of t(enty to t)irty )ea+y cannon&alls usually inflicted so %uc) da%age on a fragile3 lig)tly &uilt galley t)at one &roadside disa&led it. But t)is ne( na+al (arfare did %ore t)an doo% galleys. It also largely a&olis)ed t)e infantry co%&at of t)e soldiers and sailors on s)i/s locked toget)er for t)is /ur/ose. %aDor na+al ca%/aign signalled t)e transition to artillery (arfare at sea ()en t)e S/anis) sent a large ar%ada of s)i/s against 2ngland. In t)e su%%er of 1<BB %ore t)an 1>> S/anis) s)i/s entered t)e 2nglis) $)annel (it) t)e /ur/ose of co+ering an in+asion of 2ngland &y t)e ar%y in t)e S/anis) /art of t)e Net)erlands3 a force led &y t)e redou&ta&le 1uke of Par%a. Because a coo/erating 1utc) fleet &lockaded t)e 1ukes ar%y3 t)e di+ersion /ro+ided &y t)e S/anis) ar%ada a+ailed Par%a not)ing. 0)e 2nglis)3 (it) a so%e()at larger fleet3 (aited to engage t)e S/aniards. 0)e S/anis) na+al co%%ander3 t)e 1uke of Medina Sidonia3 did not rese%&le Par%a. "is /rinci/al .ualification to lead t)e ar%ada Gt)at )e (as one of t)e ric)est %en in 2uro/eH %eant )e could )el/ defray t)e costs of t)e e-/edition3 and 9ing P)illi/ II a//ointed )i% in s/ite of Medina Sidonias accurate /rotestations of ignorance of sea (arfare and )is e-cuse t)at )e (as al(ays seasick. Baron "o(ard of 2ffing)a% co%%anded t)e 2nglis) fleet. ca/a&le /olitician3 di/lo%at3 ca+alry co%%ander3 and seasoned sailor3 )e /lanned to a+oid a /itc)ed &attle (it) t)e S/anis) ar%ada. "o(ard )ad e-/erienced sea%en as su&ordinates3 a%ong t)e% Sir 'rancis 1rake3 t)e &rilliant /ri+ateer3 Martin 'ro&is)er3 an e-/lorer3 and 8o)n "a(kins3 a for%er /ri+ateer and a /roficient na+al ad%inistrator. 0)e S/anis) ar%ada3 ()ic) carried 1B3>>> soldiers3 )ad larger s)i/s3 )alf of t)e% dis/lacing %ore t)an <>> tons. 0)e 2nglis) fleet3 (it) a&out <3>>> soldiers a&oard3 )ad %uc) s%aller s)i/s3 al%ost all of t)e% dis/lacing less t)an <>> tons. 0)ese differences3 ()ic) reflected t)e S/anis) reliance on t)e traditional &oarding tactics and t)e 2nglis) doctrine of de/ending on cannon fire3 %eant t)at t)e 2nglis) s)i/s /ossessed greater %anoeu+ra&ility t)an t)e taller3 larger S/anis) +essels. 0)e 2nglis) +essels carried 13@C2 guns3 co%/ared (it) only 13124 on t)e S/anis) ar%ada. l%ost all of t)e 2nglis) cannon consisted of cul+erin3 a long gun firing a 1C#/ound %etal &all. 0)e S/aniards )ad larger guns3 %any firing a less effecti+e 2<#/ound stone s)ot. S/anis) /redo%inance in guns de/ended on t)eir 1=? )ea+y cannon to only << %ounted in t)e 2nglis) fleet. 'iring a <># /ound %etal &all3 t)ese /o(erful guns3 (it) a s)orter range t)an t)e $ul+erin3 could easily s%as) 1=@

t)roug) s)i/s at s)ort range. Ne+ert)eless3 S/anis) na+al tactics relied /ri%arily on &oarding &y t)e greater nu%&ers of t)eir e-cellent infantry3 su//orted &y o+er 13>>> s%all3 anti/ersonnel guns %ounted largely in t)e &o( and stern castles of t)eir s)i/s. !)en t)e fleets %et3 t)e 2nglis) )ad t)e (ind(ard /osition and e-/loited it ()en grou/s of 2nglis) s)i/s a//roac)ed t)e ar%ada in line a)ead and3 as t)ey /assed3 fired t)eir &roadsides at t)e S/anis) s)i/s. 0)e S/anis) s)i/s3 ()ic) still used t)e line a&reast for%ation c)aracteristic of galley fig)ting3 could %ake only an inade.uate re/ly. But t)e 2nglis) did little da%age &ecause3 (ary of t)e )ea+y S/anis) cannon3 t)ey ke/t t)eir range long3 ()ic) rendered t)eir fire inaccurate and t)e i%/act +elocity of t)e cul+erin s)ot lo(. Ne+ert)eless3 t)e 2nglis) secured far %ore )its and inflicted on t)e S/aniards losses in /ersonnel and %orale. 0)e %ore %anoeu+ra&le 2nglis) s)i/s easily follo(ed "o(ards strategy of a+oiding S/anis) efforts to close and use t)eir &oarding tactics and t)e s)ock action of t)eir larger nu%&ers of fine infantry. 0)e engage%ent )ad %uc) in co%%on (it) t)e successful attack of t)e ni%&le3 Da+elin# ar%ed /eltasts on t)e )ea+ier )o/lites3 ()o could ne+er close for s)ock action. 0)is co%&at continued for o+er a (eek as t)e S/aniards %o+ed t)roug) t)e c)annel. Bot) fleets )ad e-)austed %ost of t)eir a%%unition3 &ut ()en t)e 2nglis) )ad /artially re/lenis)ed t)eirs fro% s)ore and realised t)e S/aniards no longer )ad any <o#/ound &alls for t)eir &ig guns3 t)e 2nglis) closed t)e range. !it)out fear of t)e S/aniards &oarding t)eir %ore agile +essels3 t)e 2nglis) s)i/s ca%e close to t)e S/aniards and3 (it) t)e )ig)er +elocity of t)e di%inis)ed distance3 re/eatedly /ierced t)e S/anis) s)i/s. 1uring t)is co%&at at s)ort range3 t)e S/aniards suffered =oo killed3 B>> (ounded3 and t)e i%/air%ent of t)e sea(ort)iness of %any of t)eir +essels. 0)(arted in )is effort to o/en t)e (ay for Par%a and un(illing to face )ead(inds or again to &ra+e t)e 2nglis) fleet in t)e c)annel3 t)e 1uke of Medina Sidonia led t)e S/anis) ar%ada and its da%aged s)i/s &ack to S/ain on a stor%y and ill#su//lied +oyage around Scotland and Ireland during ()ic) t)e 1uke lost o+er )alf of )is s)i/s. 0)e stress of t)is na+al ca%/aign and t)e arduous return +oyage greyed Medina Sidonias )air at t)e age of t)irty#eig)t. 0)e success of t)e 2nglis) in relying on t)e %issiles of t)eir /o(erful s)i/#&orne artillery signalled t)e full e%ergence of a ne( ty/e of na+al (arfare3 ()ic) )ad de+elo/ed slo(ly during t)e century. 0)e %issiles of t)e artillery )ad re/laced t)e s)ock action of s)i/s and %en in sea co%&at. 0)e transition fro% t)e narro(3 s)allo(#draft galley to t)e &road and dee/ sailing s)i/ also )ad a %aDor effect on t)e logistics of na+al o/erations. Since co%%and of t)e sea de/ended on &ases fro% ()ic) t)e s)i/s could recei+e su//lies and o&tain re/airs3 t)e ado/tion of t)e sturdy3 large# ca/acity sailing s)i/ )ad a %arked effect on t)e range of na+al o/erations3 t)e ne( s)i/s greater cargo#carrying ca/acity +astly increasing t)e distance fro% t)eir &ases at ()ic) t)ey could o/erate. 'or e-a%/le3 a large sailing (ars)i/ could re%ain at sea for t)ree to fi+e %ont)s (it)out needing to re/lenis) food and (ater. 0)is greater endurance and conse.uent inde/endence of /orts increased t)e ratio of na+al force to s/ace. Ne+ert)eless3 t)e slo( and t)e uncertain rate at ()ic) (ind#/ro/elled (ars)i/s sailed %eant t)at t)ey still re.uired &ases adDacent to t)eir 6one of o/erations &ecause of t)e ti%e needed to return to a /ort for su//ly and %aintenance and again resu%e t)eir stations. Since &ases relati+ely distant fro% t)e t)eatre of o/erations %eant /ro/ortionately fe(er s)i/s a+aila&le to control a gi+en area of t)e sea3 s)i/s co%/arati+ely near a source of su//ly (ould /er%it a s%aller nu%&er of s)i/s to %aintain t)e sa%e si6e s.uadron on t)e station in t)e co%&at 6one. So3 na+ies still needed friendly /orts ca/a&le of su//lying food and (ater and carrying out re/airs close to t)eir 6one of o/erations. !)en conducted against an o//onent inferior in force &ut an-ious to lea+e )is &ase3 o/erations &y t)e stronger na+y at too great a distance fro% its o(n &ase could render it t)e (eaker or co%/el it to e-ercise only an inter%ittent co%%and of t)at /art of t)e sea. 1C>

:et3 co%/ared (it) galley fleets3 t)e ne( sailing s)i/s re+olutionised t)e logistic ca/a&ilities and strategic range of na+ies. Back

THE NEW TACTICAL SYNTHESIS IN TRANSITION, !#00 !$00

(he "ogistics of the (hirty 5ears% War
0)e 0)irty :ears !ar3 ()ic) occurred in *er%any &et(een 1=1B and 1=4B3 /ro+ided a%/le sco/e for t)e e-ercise of t)e ne( tactical %et)ods and ser+ed as a t)eatre in ()ic) a ne( linear syste% e-)i&ited its (ort). It also s)o(ed in &old relief t)e /articular logistical tec)ni.ues c)aracteristic of 2uro/ean (arfare during t)e /receding centuries and t)at )ad3 to a greater or lesser degree3 /ro+ided t)e &asis for (ar since t)e earliest ti%es. In t)is (ar /olitical factors3 ()ic) )ad at least as %uc) i%/ortance as %ilitary3 defy succinct su%%ary. Ne+ert)eless3 a &rief /aragra/) (ill )el/ e-/lain t)e fe( /olitical factors %entioned. Protestant and $at)olic /rinci/alities foug)t a ci+il (ar in a *er%any di+ided a%ong %any autono%ous states. 0)e $al+inist and ,ut)eran Protestants )ad difficulty agreeing and $at)olic Princes easily &eca%e a//re)ensi+e at any aggrandise%ent &y t)e "oly Ro%an 2%/eror3 t)e leader of t)e $at)olic forces. 'oreign /o(ers inter+ened early ()en t)e 2%/erors S/anis) "a&s&urg relati+es aided )i%3 and e+entually 1en%ark3 S(eden3 and 'rance foug)t in t)e (ar for ()ic) *er%any su//lied t)e sa%e kind of 2uro/ean &attlefield t)at Italy )ad /ro+ided %ore t)an a century &efore. 0)e e-/erience gained in t)e (ar influenced logistics and strategy as (ell as tactics %arkedly. 0)e (ar &egan in 1=1B in Bo)e%ia3 ()ere t)e Protestants3 re&elling against t)eir $at)olic "a&s&urg rulers3 elected as t)eir 9ing a Protestant Prince3 t)e $ount Palatine of t)e R)ine. 0)e ar%y of t)e league of $at)olic Princes and S/anis) forces t)en inter+ened. 0)ese ar%ies all used t)e S/anis) syste% and )ad seasoned and co%/etent co%%anders ()ose na%es G0illy3 S/inola3 Buc.uoi3 and 1a%/ierreH a%/ly illustrate t)e international c)aracter of t)e %ilitary /rofession at t)e ti%e. 'acing %ore skilful leaders)i/ and %ore /rofessional forces3 t)e Bo)e%ians soon suffered defeat and s)ortly t)e "a&s&urg#I%/erial and $at)olic forces also o+erca%e t)e $ount Palatine and o+erran )is do%ains. !)en t)e 9ing of 1en%ark inter+ened for t)e Protestant cause3 t)e ar%ies of t)e 2%/eror and t)e $at)olic Princes defeated )i%3 o+erran %uc) of )is country3 and dro+e )i% front t)e (ar. In 1=2@3 after a decade of fig)ting3 t)e &elligerents /aused. 0)is /eriod t)oroug)ly e-e%/lified t)e logistics used in t)e (ar and /ro+ided an o//ortunity to &ring t)e syste% of using %ilitary contractors to its 6enit). 0)e $at)olic /o(ers )ad enDoyed so %uc) success &ecause t)ey )ad large forces in relation to t)e s%all area of t)e Palatinate3 )ad li%ited o&Decti+es in dealing (it) t)e 9ing of 1en%ark3 and /ossessed %uc) /olitical su//ort in t)e larger area of t)e kingdo% of Bo)e%ia in t)eir ca%/aign against o//onents ()o )ad only Dust co%e to /o(er. 0raditionally3 ar%ies )ad ene%y /ro/erty as an o&Decti+e. 2+en ()en t)ey did not )a+e as a s/ecific ai% forcing &attle3 cri//ling ene%y su//ly3 or co%/elling /olitical concessions3 t)ey soug)t to ca%/aign in t)eir ad+ersaries territory to find logistic su//ort so t)at t)ey %ig)t li+e at t)eir ene%ies e-/ense. In t)e 0)irty :ears !ar ar%ies far too large for t)eir go+ern%ents to /ay also )ad to %ake neutral and friendly territory t)e o&Dect of loot. 0)e career of $ount Mansfeld3 a /articularly /roficient and resourceful soldier and entre/reneur3 dra%atically e-)i&its t)e de/endence of ar%ies on e-tracting su//ort front ci+ilians in t)e area in ()ic) t)ey o/erated. Protestant %ilitary contractor and co%%ander in Bo)e%ia3 $ount Mansfeld 1C1

left t)at kingdo% (it) )is troo/s ()en t)e /rotestant $ount Palatine suffered defeat. Mansfeld %arc)ed to(ard t)e R)ine and t)e /rinci/ality of )is e%/loyer3 t)e $ount Palatine. !it)out a logistic &ase3 Mansfeld i%/ro+ised &rilliantly3 ac.uiring fro% +arious sources %oney3 food3 and fodder to %aintain )is soldiers and )orses. 0)e to(ns of "ell&ronn3 Nure%&erg3 and !i%/fen /aid )i% to a+oid t)eir territory or to kee/ )is %en fro% looting as t)ey %arc)ed t)roug). But )e collected %uc) %ore fro% four ot)er to(ns in t)e for% of contri&utions. Part of t)ese /ay%ents )ad t)eir origin in a ranso% to a+oid destruction3 suc) as "ell&ronn and t)e ot)er to(ns )ad already offered3 and /art ca%e fro% a s/ecial ta- le+ied to sustain a (ar. 1uring and after t)e 0)irty :ears !ar co%%anders le+ied contri&utions on friendly3 neutral3 and ene%y territory and3 under t)e t)reat of looting and destruction3 collected t)e /ay%ent in t)e for% of food for t)e troo/s and %oney for t)eir /ay and t)e /urc)ase of su//lies. $o%%anders raked off as %uc) as a t)ird of t)e /ay%ent7 on occasion %ilitary contractors lent t)e cities so%e of t)e %oney to /ay t)e contri&utions t)ey )ad le+ied. 4sing t)ese /ay%ents3 toget)er (it) funds freely offered &y a city t)at )e )ad deli+ered fro% a siege &y t)e S/anis)3 Mansfeld ke/t )is ar%y su//lied and /artially co%/ensated as )e %arc)ed across *er%any and t)en o/erated near t)e R)ine. Mean()ile3 )e unsuccessfully negotiated (it) t)e 1uke of Ba+aria3 t)e leader of t)e $at)olic Princes3 a&out c)anging sides3 asking for %oney to /ay )is troo/s and a su&stantial &onus for )i%self. 0)en3 ()en t)e $ount Palatine3 )is e-iled e%/loyer3 disc)arged )i%3 Mansfeld &eca%e t)e co%%ander of an ar%y (it)out an e%/loyer. gain )e negotiated (it) t)e ene%y as (ell as (it) t)e 9ing of 'rance3 a 'renc) 1uke ()o /lanned a ca%/aign against )is 9ing3 t)e S/anis) ruler of t)e Net)erlands3 and t)e 1utc) ()o (ere fig)ting t)e S/aniards. Recei+ing a 1utc) contract for t)ree %ont)s3 )e %arc)ed t)ere3 defeating en#route a S/anis) ar%y3 and assisted t)e 1utc) in raising t)e S/anis) siege of a to(n. "is contract (it) t)e 1utc) )a+ing e-/ired3 )e /roceeded to 5stfriesland on t)e *er%an coast near t)e 1utc) frontier. "e looted t)is country3 taking3 a%ong ot)er &ooty3 eig)teen &arrels of gold ready for s)i/%ent to Vienna to /ro+ide t)e do(ry of a (ell#to#do fat)er for )is daug)ter. 'inally3 ()en t)e go+ern%ent of 5stfriesland /aid )i% a su&stantial su% to lea+e t)e country3 )e /aid off and dis&anded )is ar%y3 te%/orarily going out of &usiness. Back (ages /resented no /ro&le% &ecause )e )ad only <3>>> %en left of t)e 1@3>>> (it) ()ic) )e )ad entered 5stfriesland. "is forces )ad di%inis)ed so drastically &ecause looting ga+e soldiers a%/le o//ortunity and %oti+e to desert. soldier ()o took a +alua&le gold or sil+er artefact often ignored t)e &ack /ay due )i% and rode a(ay on a stolen )orse3 )eading )o%e to &uy a far%. Mansfeld )i%self soon disa//eared fro% +ie(. Raising a ne( ar%y and using it to /rosecute a ca%/aign against t)e 2%/erors ustrian do%inions3 )e %arc)ed into "ungary3 ()ere o//osition forced )i% to dis&and )is forces. "e t)en (ent into Venetian territory ()ere )e died on t)e 1al%atian coast in 1=2=. 0)e s)ort career of Mansfelds ar%y de%onstrates t)e tec)ni.ue for su//orting ar%ies t)at ca%e so signally to c)aracterise t)e logistics of t)e 0)irty :ears !ar3 and Mansfelds a&ility to continue )is ar%y and )is logistical forays (it)out any official &acking or sanction e-)i&its t)e /o(er and inde/endence of t)e %ilitary contractors. 0)e %et)od of su//ly de/ended not only on contri&utions &ut also on looting &y t)e un/aid soldiers. 0)e undesira&le conditions in and counter/roducti+e acti+ity &y ar%ies3 al(ays c)aracteristic of (arfare in +arying degrees3 reac)ed /ro/ortions in t)e 0)irty :ears !ar t)at al%ost caricatured t)e unattracti+e and destructi+e &e)a+iour of soldiers in %ost /re+ious (ars in 2uro/e. 0)e conduct of t)is (ar also +ery dra%atically illustrates3 in an e-aggerated (ay3 t)e defects fro% ()ic) t)e e-isting contractual syste% of raising ar%ies )ad al(ays suffered. Soldiers +isiting a +illage often gorged t)e%sel+es on t)e a+aila&le food and stole t)e )orses and %uc) of t)e re%aining food3 including c)ickens3 )ogs3 and cattle. 0)ey also looted t)e )ouses3 taking &ed linen to %ake &ags to carry &ooty and suc) ite%s as a co//er kettle3 flattened to %ake it

1C2

%ore /orta&le Gsoldiers a//reciated t)e sale +alue of t)e co//er rat)er t)an t)e utility of t)e kettleH. 're.uently t)ey tortured ci+ilians to co%/el t)e% to re+eal t)e location of )idden +alua&les. 0)is +iolence often led to (anton destructi+eness of /ro/erty3 suc) as s%as)ing )ouse)old effects and &urning &uildings. 5fficers %ade little effort to restrain un/aid soldiers3 realising t)e loyalty t)at t)is indulgence could &uy. Scottis) officer ser+ing in t)e 0)irty :ears !ar descri&ed soldiers after t)ey )ad looted a +irgin area as all )a+ing Jso%e t)ing to &allast t)eir lig)tness.L 0)e /illaging enric)ed t)e troo/s and destroyed disci/line: J0)e fury Qof lootingR /ast3 t)e ()ole street &eing full of coac)es and rusty (agons ric)ly furnis)ed (it) all sorts of ric)es3 as Plate3 8e(els3 *old3 Money3 $lot)es3 Mulets and )orses for saddle3 coac) and (agons3 ()ereof all inert t)at (ere careless of t)eir duties3 (ere too careful in %aking of &ooty3 t)at I did ne+er see 5fficers lesse o&eyed3 and res/ected t)an )ere for a ti%e3 till t)e )eig)t of t)e %arket (as /ast: and (ell I kno( so%e Regi%ents )ad no %an (it) t)eir colours3 till t)e fury (as /ast and so%e colours (ere lost t)e J()ole nig)t till t)ey (ere restored t)e ne-t day3 suc) disorder a%ongst us all occasioned &y co+etousness.L Straggling3 ()ic) constantly di%inis)ed ar%ies3 also created a class of soldiers t)at li+ed on loot. If a troo/er loses )is )orse or a %usketeer )is )ealt)3 or )is (ife and c)ild fall ill and %ust stay &e)ind3L t)ey &eco%e3 a conte%/orary e-/lained3 stragglers ()o% )e likened to gy/sies. "e (rote of Jt)e %any +illages t)at3 &y c)ance or &y %alice3 )a+e &een &urned do(n &y t)e%.L !it) so%e e-aggeration )e continued: J0)ey /lunder all t)ey can find &efore3 &esides3 and &e)ind t)e ar%y: and ()at t)ey cannot consu%e t)at t)ey s/oil so t)at t)e regi%ents3 ()en t)ey co%e to t)eir .uarters or into ca%/3 do often find not e+en a good draug)t of (ater.L !it) t)e land ali+e (it) %arc)ing or straggling soldiers3 contri&utions co+ered only /art of t)e cost of t)eir su//ort. In addition to loot and gratuitous or %alicious destruction3 soldiers co%%itted %any cri%es. Ra/e occurred fre.uently3 and on a /eaceful3 (ell#disci/lined %arc) a S/anis) co%/any of no %ore t)an 2<> %en accu%ulated accusations of forty#t)ree cri%es in a stay of one or t(o days. 0)e sergeant alone accounted for si- of t)ese3 all acts of +iolence. !it) cri%e accentuated &y t)e /resence of soldiers and ar%ies3 %arc)ing to and fro3 often t)roug) neutral as (ell as friendly and ene%y territory3 ci+il#%ilitary relations fre.uently degenerated into continuous (arfare &et(een soldiers and +illagers3 often (it) neit)er discri%inating &et(een friend and foe. $oincident (it) t)e &eginning of t)e (ar3 Protestant +illagers in $at)olic ustria engaged in a series of re&ellions. 0)eir $at)olic ruler )ad su//ressed t)ese rut)lessly3 first &urning +illages and later killing all /easants t)e soldiers could find. //lied against )eretics3 t)ese 0urko#Mongolian %et)ods effecti+ely crus)ed t)e re+olts. But t)e tension &et(een /easants and t)eir rulers illustrated )ere and in an earlier /easant u/rising added to t)e )ostility3 as did rulers ()o su%%oned t)eir su&Dects to kill in+ading forces. In 1=2<3 for e-a%/le3 on t)e call of t)eir Prince3 /easants &attled 0illys for%ida&le $at)olic ar%y3 sur/rising ca%/s and killing not only t)e soldiers &ut also t)e (o%en and c)ildren follo(ing t)e ar%y. 0)e soldiers naturally took t)eir re+enge %ercilessly3 &urning +illages and killing e+ery /easant t)ey could find. 0)roug)out t)e (ar /easants3 retaliating against looting and +iolence3 engaged in s/oradic &ut (ides/read a%&us)es of stragglers and sur/rise attacks on s%all &odies of soldiers. 0)e Scottis) officer ()o co%%ented on looting a&o+e also e-/erienced t)e )ostility of t)e /easants. 4sing t)e old ter%s &oor for /easant and dor/e for +illage3 )e (rote t)at on a %arc) J$a/taine Bos(ell co%ing after t)e Regi%ent (as killed &y a nu%&er of +illainous Boors3 e+er ene%ies to soldiers... no re/aration Q(asR )ad for )is deat) &ut t)e Boors &eing fled3 t)e 1or/e (as &urnt off.L 5n anot)er occasion )e re%arked )o( Jt)e Boors on t)e %arc) cruelly used our soldiers Gt)at (ent aside to /lunderH in cutting off t)eir noses and ears3 )ands and feet3 /ulling out t)eir eyes3 (it) sundry ot)er cruelties ()ic) t)ey used3 &eing Dustly re/ayed &y our soldiers3 in &urning %any 1or/es on t)e %arc)3 lea+ing also t)e Boors dead3 ()ere t)ey (ere found.L "e e+en told of t)e 1C?

%assacre of a garrison. !)en t)e garrison )ad surrendered and %arc)ed out (it)out any ar%s3 Jt)e $ountry Boors Ge+er cruel to SoldiersH3 re%e%&ering t)e )ard usage of t)e soldiers to t)e% in t)e (inter ti%e3 seeing t)e% co%e fort) unar%ed3 ran +iolently u/on t)e soldiers3 knocking t)e% /ittyfully do(ne.L 0)is Jkilling t)e /oor soldiersL continued until )is su/erior ordered t)e Scottis) officer to inter+ene to Jsu//ress t)e Boors # and /rotect t)e soldiers.L 0)is )is soldiers did and in t)e /rocess Jagain ro&&ed t)e Boors of t)at t)ey )ad taken fro% t)e ene%y3 and (it)all (ere (ell knockt.L Ine+ita&ly t)e soldiers (on %ost of t)e conflicts (it) t)e often#des/erate /easants. But as t)e (ar (ore on3 t)e soldiers )ad difficulty finding enoug) to eat for gradually t)e conflict de/leted *er%any of %uc) of t)e loot and contri&utions and t)e destructi+eness of ar%ies consu%ed t)e /roduce and da%aged t)e /roducti+ity of %any areas. In a region t)at )ad 13C1C )ouses at t)e &eginning of t)e (ar in 1=1B3 only =2C still e-isted in 1=4@. 5nly ?1= fa%ilies re%ained3 all 43=1= s)ee/ )ad disa//eared3 and &ut 244 of t)e original 134>2 o-en sur+i+ed. Suc) areas could no longer su//ort ar%ies and t)eir nu%erous follo(ers. 'or e-a%/le3 an infantry unit 5f 4B> soldiers )ad3 in addition3 C4 ser+ants3 ? sutlers3 ?14 (o%en and c)ildren3 and 1=> )orses. In 1=?< t)e alco)olic I%/erial general3 $ount *allas3 led )is ar%y into an e-)austed area to s/end t)e (inter. 0)e troo/s looted diligently3 &ut (it) little left to take t)e soldiers died so ra/idly t)at t)e ar%y &urnt t)e cor/ses e+ery day to a+oid t)e odour of t)e dead. 5nly t)e dying )orses and o-en ke/t t)e ar%y going. 'inally3 (it) (inter co%ing on3 *allas %o+ed )is troo/s to an area ()ere )e could still find su//lies. 0en to t(el+e t)ousand %en /eris)ed in t)e sno(y %arc)3 and (o%en t)re( a(ay t)eir &a&ies so as not to see t)e% die of star+ation. It is not sur/rising t)at t)ere (ere stories of canni&alis% during t)e (ar. $a%/aigning could (ear out an ar%y also3 t)e 1uke of Ba+aria descri&ing )is troo/s in t)e autu%n t)us: J0)e largest /art of t)e ca+alry %arc)es on foot3 t)e unfortunate soldiers are destitute3 ragged3 naked3 (orn out3 star+ing and in suc) s)a/e t)at (e %ust in fairness co%%iserate t)e%. /eriod of reco+ery is urgently needed if it is /lanned to use t)e troo/s ne-t s/ring.L *arrison life often offered little %ore to t)e soldiers t)an ca%/aigning3 &ecause go+ern%ents could not /ay t)e soldiers. 5ne of Mansfelds colonels actually sold )is fortress to t)e ene%y for %oney to /ay )is soldiers. Mansfeld confir%ed t)e colonels Dudg%ent &y gi+ing )i% anot)er co%%and. 0)oug) t)is (as not an isolated incident3 %ost co%%anders )eld t)eir fortresses and su&sisted on ()at t)e garrisoned region could su//ly t)roug) contri&utions3 &ut fre.uently t)e e-)austed countryside could not deli+er enoug) to /ro+ide t)e food /ortion of t)e soldiers /ay. fictional garrison soldier (rote of )is rations: JI (as terrified e+ery %orning ()en I recei+ed %ine: for I kne( I %ust %ake t)at suffice for t)e ()ole day ()ic) I could )a+e %ade a(ay (it) at a %eal (it)out trou&le.L So%e soldiers su//le%ented t)eir /ay &y ga%&ling ()en Jt)ey (ere &etter s)ar/ers and could get t)eir co%rades %oney fro% t)e% (it) false dice.L So%e kne( a trade t)at t)ey /racticed in t)e to(n3 and %any Jtook to t)e%sel+es (i+es Gyea3 t)e %ost +ile (o%en at needH for no ot)er cause t)an to &e ke/t &y t)e said (o%ens (ork3 eit)er (it) se(ing3 (as)ing3 and s/inning3 or (it) selling of old clot)es3 )iggling3 or e+en (it) stealing.L 5ne %arried a %id(ife and li+ed (ell7 t)e unskilled (ife of anot)er gained a li+eli)ood fro% t)e fields only7 in (inter s)e gat)ered snails3 in t)e s/ring salad#)er&s3 in su%%er s)e took &irds#nests3 and in autu%n s)e (ould gat)er fruit of all kinds.L Muc) of t)e en%ity &et(een soldiers and ci+ilians resulted fro% conflict engendered &y t)e un/aid soldiers taking rations and /ay fro% ci+ilians. 4n/aid soldiers also carried out %uc) of t)e destruction t)at reduced agricultural out/ut and contri&uted to t)e su//ly s)ortage t)at )alf star+ed a garrison and +irtually destroyed $ount *allass ar%y. 0)e looting as (ell as stealing food and artefacts resulted fro% a ruler recruiting %ore %en t)an )e could /ay. Ina&ility to re%unerate t)e soldiers led to an inefficient and often counter/roducti+e logistic syste%3 and t)e looting caused

1C4

straggling and desertion3 steadily reducing t)e si6e of t)e un/aid ar%y in s/ite of t)e /ay o(ed t)e troo/s. 0)e lack of (ages eli%inated t)e control t)at s)ould )a+e restrained looting and affected t)e disci/line t)at t)e co%%anders &elie+ed essential in tactical situations. In addition3 looting aroused t)e )ostility of ci+ilians3 in)i&iting t)e %o+e%ent of soldiers and engendering a s%all &ut steady drain on ar%y %an/o(er and causing /easants to )ide or to fig)t to /rotect goods t)at often t)ey (ould )a+e (illingly sold. Rulers3 in s/ite of t)eir ina&ility to resist t)e te%/tation to raise too %any %en3 yearned to rid t)e%sel+es of a logistic syste% t)at )ar%ed t)e ar%ies t)e%sel+es3 reduced t)e +alue of t)eir o(n as (ell as t)e )ostile do%ains t)ey co+eted3 and increased t)eir ar%ies o//onents. Rat)er t)an su//orting (ar3 t)ese logistic %et)ods see%ed to su&+ert it. 2arly in t)e (ar l&ert +on !allenstein3 a Bo)e%ian %ilitary contractor3 sa( t)e &aneful logistical and tactical effects of t)e e-isting (ays and introduced %ore syste%atic and &etter#%anaged logistics. In t)e /rocess of trying to sa+e logistic and co%&at efficiency fro% t)e de&ilitating effects of t)e %et)ods e%/loyed in t)e first decade of t)e (ar3 !allenstein )el/ed to lead t)e (ay &ack to /u&lic enter/rise and go+ern%ent o(ners)i/ of ar%ies3 ()ic) t)e Ro%ans and t)e ot)er %ore effecti+e %ilitary organisations of ancient ti%es )ad found &eneficial. !allenstein3 an insignificant Bo)e%ian no&le%an ()o &eca%e (ealt)y &y %arrying an elderly &ut ric) (ido(3 )ad ser+ed t)e 2%/eror in a co%/etent %anner as a %ilitary contractor and financier during t)e early stages of t)e (ar. !)en t)e 2%/eror re/aid )i% (it) estates taken fro% re&ellious Protestants in Bo)e%ia3 !allenstein &eca%e a general contractor3 offering in 1=2= to raise an entire ar%y for t)e 2%/eror and to use )is o(n %oney and credit to finance it. 'ro% t)e 2%/eror )e recei+ed t)e rig)t to a//oint )is o(n su&ordinate officers and to raise contri&utions to su//ort t)e ar%y and to reco+er )is start#u/ e-/enses. !)en )e )ad for%ed )is ar%y3 !allenstein3 a +igorous and (ise ad%inistrator of )is o(n do%inions3 %ade an e-/anded and syste%atic use of contri&utions t)e foundation of )is effecti+e logistics. 2arlier3 Mansfeld )ad /ointed out t)at )e could not )old soldiers Junder disci/line if t)eir (ages &e not /aid t)e%. Neit)er t)ey nor t)eir )orses can li+e &y ayre3 all t)at t)ey )a+e ()et)er it &e ar%es or a//arell3 (earet)3 (astet)3 &reaket). If t)ey %ust &uy %ore3 t)ey %ust )a+e %oney. nd if %en )a+e it not to gi+e t)e%3 t)ey (ill take it3 ()ere t)ey find it3 not as a /art of t)at ()ic) is due unto t)e%3 &ut (it)out (eig)ing and telling it.L greeing t)at un/aid soldiers destroyed e+eryt)ing and (ould not res/ond to disci/line3 !allenstein raised t)e %oney and food to /ay )is %en /ro%/tly t)roug) contri&utions. "is contri&utions (ere large3 )is collections e-acting and rut)less3 &ut )is %et)od )ad t)e %erit of efficiency. Because )is regularly /aid troo/s looted relati+ely little3 )is syste% reduced (aste3 fed and e.ui//ed )is ar%y sufficiently3 and i%/ro+ed t)e disci/line and co%&at effecti+eness of )is forces. s %uc) a &usiness%an as a soldier3 !allenstein stressed t)at )is soldiers %ust not distur& ci+ilians &ut took care t)at t)ey /rotected t)e +illages and t)eir in)a&itants so t)at /lanting and )ar+esting could go on. "e also /ro+ided for )is ar%ies &y &uying and s)i//ing in food. Muc) of t)is &usiness )e did (it) )i%self3 &uying grain and e+en &aked &read fro% )is Bo)e%ian estates3 ()ic) also furnis)ed clot)ing and cannon&alls for t)e ar%y. 0)e success of )is and 0illys $at)olic ,eague ar%ies against t)e 1anes resulted in t)e con.uest of a large /art of 1en%ark and t)e occu/ation of %uc) of *er%any along t)e Baltic coast. $ontri&utions in t)is area su//lied t)e ar%y (ell3 e+en kee/ing it (it)out significant cost to t)e 2%/erors al(ays#e%/ty treasury. !allensteins flouris)ing %ilitary entre/reneurs)i/ re/aid )is in+est%ent and %anagerial skills )andso%ely3 )is ac)ie+e%ent encouraging )is +isionary sc)e%es for reorganising t)e e%/ire. !allenstein3 s)o(ing off )is /ros/erity &y incredi&le ostentation3 tra+elled3 for e-a%/le3 (it) <> si-#)orse carriages for )i%self and )is attendants3 1> %ore for )is

1C<

/ersonal ser+ants3 <> four#)orse carriages for t)e kitc)en staff and su//lies3 follo(ed &y <> groo%s leading 1>> )orses for )is /ersonal use. "is acco%/lis)%ents3 including t)e defeat of t)e 1anis) forces and t)e eli%ination of o//osition3 %ade )i% too /o(erful for t)e co%fort of )is $at)olic e%/loyers3 ()o reduced )is ar%y and dis%issed )i% in 1=?>. "e returned to Bo)e%ia3 ()ere )e li+ed in a regal style &efitting an a%&itious %ulti#%illionaire. But 1=?> /ro+ed a &ad ti%e for t)e 2%/eror to de/ri+e )i%self of !allensteins ser+ices. Back

Gustavus #dol'hus%s +evelo'ment of the +utch (actical System

!allensteins /o(er and inde/endence as (ell as )is defeat of t)e 1anes )ad %uc) to do (it) t)e /ressure fro% t)e Princes of t)e e%/ire to ()ic) t)e 2%/eror yielded ()en )e dis%issed !allenstein in 1=?>. But t)e (ar (as far fro% o+er. 0)e 2%/erors 2dict of Restitution )ad decreed t)at Protestants %ust return all $at)olic lands ac.uired since 1<<2. By a//ro/riating t)ese +ested interests and &y i%/lication distur&ing ot)ers3 t)e 2%/eror raised t)e /olitical stakes in t)e (ar and conse.uently increased t)e %easure of %ilitary success needed to ac)ie+e )is no( %ore a%&itious goals. Many *er%an Protestants dis/layed a readiness to fig)t again ()en t)e occasion (ould offer itself. 0)e inter+ention of Protestant S(eden /resented Dust t)at o//ortunity. 2+en (it)out so %uc) latent su//ort3 t)e S(edes (ould )a+e &een for%ida&le foes of t)e 2%/eror &ecause of t)e %ilitary &rilliance of t)eir soldier#king3 *usta+us dol/)us3 and t)e ne( tactical organisation u/on ()ic) )e )ad &uilt )is ar%y. 0ested in (ar (it) t)e Poles and Russians3 *usta+uss tactics ca%e fro% t)e inno+ations t)e 1utc) ado/ted in t)e last years of t)e si-teent) century during t)eir (ar (it) t)e S/aniards. Soon after t)e introduction of t)e ne( tactics3 a 1utc) soldier (ent to S(eden to )el/ reorganise t)eir ar%y. 0)e 1utc) syste% de/ended on a funda%ental alteration in t)e structure of t)e infantry3 a study of ()at ancient aut)ors )ad (ritten a&out t)e Ro%an legion )el/ing to ins/ire t)is c)ange. Maurice of Nassau3 t)e /erce/ti+e 1utc) leader3 realised t)at t)e Ro%an %odel of (ell#articulated infantry3 (it) t)ree lines to incor/orate t)e conce/t of a reser+e (it)in t)e array and a linear de/loy%ent3 )ad t)e /ro%ise of )el/ing defeat t)e e-isting syste% of large &locks of %en t)at t)e S/anis) ar%y so &rilliantly e%/loyed. Instead of a fe( solid %asses of as %any as ?3>>> %en3 Maurice created far s%aller units3 de/loying t)e% in line. 5riginally using a for%ation ten#%en dee/3 )e finally arranged )is /ike%en fi+e dee/ (it) a front of fifty %en. 5n eac) side )e stationed t)ree grou/s of ar.ue&usiers3 four a&reast and ten dee/. In addition3 )e /ro+ided anot)er si-ty ar.ue&usiers to act as skir%is)ers. "e arrayed t)ese &attalions of a&out <>> %en in t)ree lines3 ena&ling t)e co%%ander to )a+e reser+es of &alanced infantry units t)at )e could co%%it to t)e /lace and in t)e nu%&ers t)at t)e circu%stances (arranted. nu%&er of s%aller units also /ro+ided %ore o//ortunities for initiati+e on t)e /art of lo(er co%%anders. 0o take ad+antage of t)is syste% and to furnis) t)e leaders needed to realise t)e /otential for %anoeu+ra&ility3 Maurice /ro+ided for a )ig) /ro/ortion of officers and non#co%%issioned officers. !it) its s)allo( array3 %ore 1utc) /ike%en could face t)e ene%y3 and none found t)e%sel+es out of t)e action at t)e centre of a s.uare. 0)e greater de/t) of t)e ar.ue&usiers reflected t)e syste% of continuous fire acco%/lis)ed &y t)e front ranks firing and %arc)ing to t)e rear of t)e ten ranks to reload ()ile t)e ne-t rank ste//ed for(ard to fire and t)en %arc) to t)e rear in its turn. 0)e s)allo( arrange%ent of t)e /ike%en and t)e fi-ed relations)i/ &et(een t)e /ikes and t)e ar.ue&usiers co%/elled t)e /ike%en to /ractice e-tensi+ely if t)e ne( &attalion (as to re%ain steady in s)allo( de/loy%ent as (ell as to e-/loit t)e /ro%ise of %o&ility and %anoeu+re i%/licit in t)e s%aller unit. 0o co/e (it) t)e /ro&le% of %o&ility for a linear for%ation3 Maurice took o+er t)e drill and e+en t)e (ords of co%%and fro% t)e Ro%an legion and3 for t)e first ti%e since ancient days3 created a drilled infantry in linear array. 0o su&Dect )is soldiers to t)e necessary disci/line and training re.uired regular /ay3 an inno+ation t)at t)e usually sol+ent 1utc)

1C=

go+ern%ent %ade. Maurices infantry3 regularly /aid and ser+ing year after year )ad a /roficiency3 disci/line3 co)esion3 and %anoeu+ra&ility unkno(n in t)e !est since Ro%an ti%es. 0)e ne( de/loy%ent /urc)ased its ad+antages at a )ig)er cost t)an drill and regular /ay. 0)e linear arrange%ent of /ike%en of fifty files and fi+e ranks )ad a +ulnera&le flank and rear3 ()ic) t)e con+entional &lock3 &ased on t)e S(iss %odel3 lacked. ca+alry c)arge against t)e flank or rear of a s.uare (ould co%/el it to )alt to ado/t an all#around defence3 &ut suc) a c)arge against a 1utc) /ike array (ould strike its +ulnera&le flank or rear. In addition3 t)e large nu%&er of s%all for%ations3 so useful in %arc)ing on t)e &attlefield to concentrate against an attackers strengt) or e-/loit an ene%y (eakness3 %ade t)e ar%y )arder to %anoeu+re. lt)oug) a &attalion 5f <>> %en %o+ed %ore readily t)an a single unit 5f ?3>>>3 a linear for%ation )ad to ad+ance carefully to a+oid disarray3 and a co%%ander (it) e.ual forces )ad si- ti%es as %any units to control. 0)is %eant not only trans%itting si- ti%es as %any orders &ut also fra%ing t)e orders for %o+e%ent so as to retain t)e a//ro/riate relations)i/ a%ong t)e +arious &attalions. co%%ander could %o+e se+eral &locks 5f ?3>>> %en into a ne( array far %ore easily t)an )e could acco%/lis) t)e sa%e task (it) a score or %ore 5f <>> in linear arrange%ent. 0)eir non#linear de/loy%ent )ad )eld %uc) of t)e secret of t)e %o&ility of t)e S(iss3 Dust as 2/a%inondass dee/ for%ation at ,euctra )ad a %o&ility i%/ossi&le for a line t)at )ad to kee/ its align%ent and a+oid ga/s in its ranks. But %ore officers leading /ro%/tly /aid3 carefully drilled soldiers could co%/ensate for t)e difficulties and e-/loit t)e ad+antages of t)e ne( syste%. 0)oug) t)e scarcity of &attles in t)e (ars in t)e Net)erlands /re+ented a t)oroug) test of Maurices syste% against t)e esta&lis)ed %et)od /racticed &y t)e S/anis)3 young 9ing *usta+us e%&raced t)e 1utc) tactics. n acco%/lis)ed linguist (it) a fir% grounding in t)e classics as (ell as a %astery of *er%an3 Italian3 and 1utc)3 t)e (ell#educated young Prince read &ot) Ro%an and 1utc) aut)ors on drilled3 articulated linear infantry. But )e %ade significant c)anges ()en )e arranged not only )is /ike%en in an array si- dee/ and t)irty#si- across &ut also t)e ninety#siar.ue&usiers on eac) side in si- ranks. 0)is s)allo(er de/loy%ent reflected )is )o/e for an increased rate of fire3 ()ic) )is ado/tion of /a/er cartridges containing an already %easured a%ount of /o(der (ould %ake /ossi&le. "e also su&stituted for t)e ar.ue&us a lig)ter and )andler %usket3 t)us gi+ing )is lig)t infantry a unifor% and3 in t)e aggregate3 %ore /o(erful ar%a%ent. *i+ing stress to t)e en)anced fire/o(er /otential3 )e also ado/ted a +olley#firing tec)ni.ue for )is %usketeers3 %ade /ossi&le &y t)e t)inner line in ()ic) )e could %aintain a continuous fire &y se/arate ranks. !)en all %en )ad loaded t)eir %uskets3 t)ey could reduce t)e si- ranks to t)ree &y filling t)e inter+als &et(een t)e %en a)ead. 2+en a close initial for%ation of %usketeers /ro+ided ade.uate s/ace for t)is %anoeu+re &ecause %en (it) %atc)locks needed el&o( roo% to kee/ t)eir %atc)es alig)t and (is)ed to kee/ ot)er %atc)es a(ay as t)ey (orked (it) gun/o(der loading t)eir (ea/ons. !)en t)e %usketeers )ad co%/leted t)e s)oulder#to#s)oulder rearrange%ent into t)ree ranks3 t)e front rank knelt3 t)e second rank stoo/ed3 and all t)ree ranks si%ultaneously fired a +olley. In *usta+uss tactical t)inking3 suc) a +olley /ro+ided an ad%ira&le /re/aration for a c)arge &y )is (ell#drilled /ike%en &ecause3 according to an 2nglis) e-/ert3 suc) a sal+o not only (ould do t)e ene%y J%ore %isc)iefL &ut also (ould J.uail3 daunt3 and astonis) t)e% t)ree ti%es %ore3 for one long and continued crack of t)under is %ore terri&le and dreadful to %ortals t)an ten interru/ted and se+eral Gs%allH ones.L But *usta+uss refor%s (ent far &eyond ado/ting and i%/ro+ing t)e 1utc) infantry syste%. "e also increased fire/o(er &y gi+ing to )is &attalions a s%all cannon3 ()ic) s)ot a t)ree#/ound cannon&all or3 %ore usually3 gra/e or canister s)ot. 0)ese differed little fro% %usket#&alls3 e-ce/t t)at a t)ree#/ounder cannon could s)oot %ore t)an t(o#do6en &alls (it) eac) disc)arge. 5ne )orse could /ull t)is cannon3 and t(o or t)ree %en could %o+e it on t)e &attlefield.

1CC

*usta+us did not c)ange t)e (ea/ons of t)e ca+alry3 &ut )e altered t)eir doctrine. "e )ad learned %uc) in t)e 1=2>s ()en )e tested )is ne( tactical syste% in a (ar (it) t)e Poles and sa( t)eir old#fas)ioned )ea+y#ca+alry lancers ride do(n )is ca+alry3 ()o tried to function as lig)t ca+alry (it) t)eir /istols3 and t)en cut do(n )is infantry3 ()ic) t)en consisted largely of lig)t infantry ar.ue&usiers. Rat)er t)an ado/ting t)e lance3 )e arranged )is ca+alry in t)e old linear for%ation for c)arging and instructed t)e front rank to fire only one /istol and t)en c)arge for s)ock action (it) s(ords. $a+alry )ad co%e so %uc) to rely on firing t)eir /istols and falling &ack to reload t)at )orse%en3 /articularly in *er%any3 )ad gotten out of t)e )a&it of c)arging eit)er infantry or ot)er ca+alry (it) t)eir s(ords. *usta+uss ne( ca+alry doctrine3 ()ic) (ould )a+e t)e effect of /itting )ea+y against lig)t ca+alry in s)ock co%&at3 (ould sur/rise *er%an ca+alry3 Dust as Polis) lancers )ad t)e S(edes or as le-anders $o%/anions )ad stunned t)e Persian ca+alry t)at /lanned to )url Da+elins and a+oid serious s)ock action. *usta+us catered to )is ca+alrys &elief t)at t)ey needed %issiles in &attle &y assigning so%e %usketeers to (ork (it) t)e )orse%en. Back

Gustavus%s !ersisting Strategy and -m'loyment of +istraction

!it) 1?3>>> %en of t)is ne(#%odel ar%y *usta+us dol/)us landed on t)e nort) *er%an coast on 8uly 4t) 1=?>. decade of (ar )ad %ade t)e /ortly S(edis) 9ing3 only t)irty#t)ree years of age3 a seasoned co%%ander ()o3 t)oug) )e )ad a /ro/ensity to lead reconnaissances and e+en c)arge )i%self3 )ad a t)oroug) gras/ of all &ranc)es of t)e art of (ar and t)e a&ility to %ake &rilliant a//lication of )is carefully ac.uired skill. Beco%ing 9ing Dust &efore )is se+enteent) &irt)day3 )e )ad found )i%self /re/ared for )is duties &ecause of )is good education and )is fat)ers associating )i% in t)e (ork of go+erning since )e (as t)irteen. s ca/a&le at statecraft as (ar3 *usta+us )ad t)e affection of )is su&Dects and t)e ser+ices of an e-traordinarily a&le c)ancellor to conduct t)e affairs of t)e kingdo% in )is a&sence. 1ise%&arking in nort) *er%any3 )e /ro%/tly fortified )is landing /lace Dust as !illia% t)e $on.ueror )ad. In i%%ediately resorting to field fortifications3 *usta+us /racticed ()at )ad ruled as ort)odo-y since t)e condottieri in Italy t(o centuries ago. Se+eral years &efore3 *usta+uss less# so/)isticated Polis) ad+ersary )ad co%/lained of t)e S(edis) 9ing t)at )e could not fig)t an o//onent J()o like a %ole fig)ts under ground3 and ()o &eing (eaker in ca+alry /rotects )i%self against it &y trenc)es and &astions.L n initial lack of ca+alry constrained t)e S(edis) ar%ys o/erations3 as did t)e deter%ination of t)e t)oroug) *usta+us to esta&lis) a fir% &ase area &efore ad+ancing. 0)e Poles )ad defeated )i% t(o years earlier &y a+oiding &attle and &y de+astating t)e country &efore )i% as )e ad+anced3 t)us causing )i% to lose one#t)ird of )is ar%y to t)e ene%ys successful logistic strategy. 0)is ti%e *usta+us /lanned to /ursue a /ersisting strategy and assure )is o(n su//lies as (ell as di%inis) t)ose a+aila&le to t)e ene%y. Initially occu/ying a s%all area already co%/letely scoured &y !allenstein3 *usta+us fed )is ar%y (it) su//lies &roug)t &y sea fro% S(eden. But gradually )e e-/anded along t)e coast and /ro+ided enoug) de/t) to )is &ridge)ead t)at )e could find sufficient grass to &egin to &ring in ca+alry. "is I%/erial o//onents /ro+ed too (eak to contest acti+ely )is gradual occu/ation of territory3 and t)e 1uke of Po%erania3 t)oug) still trying to %aintain )is neutrality3 surrendered to t)e S(edes t)e city of Stettin near t)e %out) of t)e 5der3 a %aDor artery of co%%erce. !)ile )e occu/ied t)e su%%er and autu%n in consolidating )is /osition in Po%erania3 *usta+us recei+ed no su//ort fro% t)e Protestant leaders3 %any of ()o% +ie(ed )i% (it) sus/icion. 0)e e-ce/tion3 t)e re+olt against I%/erial rule of t)e city of Magde&urg3 /ro+ed %ore of an e%&arrass%ent t)an a )el/ &ecause *usta+us &elie+ed )e could not yet +enture so far inland. "e dared not risk an ad+ance3 ()en )is in+asion )ad recei+ed suc) a sce/tical rece/tion3 nor could )e carry out a %arc) dee/ into territory do%inated &y t)e ene%y.

1CB

2+en if )e )ad (is)ed a %arc) to relie+e Magde&urg3 )e (ould )a+e )ad to cross t)e neutral territory of t)e 2lectors of Branden&urg and Sa-ony. l(ays /olitically alert3 *usta+us3 trying to %ake friends in *er%any3 did not (is) t)us to offend eit)er t)e 2lector or ot)er Protestant Princes ()o% suc) a %arc) (ould t)reaten and alienate. But since t)e 2%/eror )ad only a +ery s%all force engaged in t)e siege of Magde&urg3 *usta+us could e-/ect t)e city to )old out indefinitely unless t)e for%ida&le $ount 0illy %arc)ed )is /o(erful $at)olic ar%y east to Doin t)e siege. s t)e (inter of 1=?>#?1 a//roac)ed3 0illy re%ained inert3 and *usta+us faced e.ually .uiescent o//onents along t)e coast east and (est of )i% and fro% a (ell#fortified ene%y force at *art63 u/ t)e 5der fro% Stettin.

Germany Back

,ogistics continued to gi+e )i% difficulty &ecause t)e contri&utions )e le+ied in Po%erania and t)e %oney fro% S(eden did not suffice to /ay )is troo/s. 0)e resulting ra+aging of t)e country &y t)e soldiers3 J(orse3L one of )is %en said3 Jt)an if (e (ere in an ene%y country3L )ar%ed disci/line and alienated t)e Protestant Po%eranians. Sadly )e (rote3 JPo/ular feeling in t)e country )as undergone a great alteration.L But )e %anaged to kee/ )is ar%y fed and clot)ed and carried out an o/eration t)at e-/loited t)e ene%ys ina&ility to do t)e sa%e. $oncentrating a force of 143>>> %en3 *usta+us %o+ed &y foot and in a flotilla on t)e unfro6en 5der on 1ece%&er 24t) to attack t)e star+ing and undisci/lined I%/erial force at *art6. Reduced to 43>>> effecti+e infantry (it) %ost of its ca+alry in searc) of forage3 t)e garrison of *art6 %ade only a token defence &efore t)eir co%%ander led t)e% on a ra/id %arc) sout). 0)e co%%ander slo(ed )is retreat enoug) to &urn e+ery +illage on )is route to lea+e a logistic &arrier against S(edis) /ursuit. Instead of follo(ing3 *usta+us3 (it) t)e aid of )is ri+er su//ly route and )a+ing /us)ed u/ t)e 5der far enoug) to t)reaten 'rankfort3 &uilt a fortified ca%/ near t)e ri+er. 0)is %o+e resulted in eli%inating any i%%ediate danger to Magde&urg. 0)e t)reat t)at t)e S(edis) 9ing %ig)t ad+ance against 'rankfort and into t)e 2%/erors do%inion of Silesia &roug)t 0illys %ain I%/erial ar%y on a (inter %arc) east and carried )i% /ast Magde&urg3 &esieged &y inade.uate I%/erial forces3 and on to 'rankfort. 0illy intended to /re+ent *usta+uss in+asion of Silesia3 ()ic) (ould enric) t)e S(edes (it) contri&utions and i%/o+eris) t)e 2%/erors su&Dects3 e+en if it did not anne- t)e /ro+ince to t)e S(edis) s/)ere of influence. 0)oug) )e did not discount t)e /o(er of t)is t)reat nor t)e &enefits of an in+asion of Silesia or of e+en a %o+e &eyond into Bo)e%ia and to(ard Vienna3 *usta+us did not &ase )is strategy on raids. Instead )e

1C@

/ersistently and %et)odically con.uered t)e country3 su&duing and garrisoning t)e cities. 0)us )e &roug)t Protestant territory securely under )is s(ay and /rotected it &y garrisons and i%/ro+e%ents in t)e fortifications of t)e cities. In t)is (ay )e created a secure &ase of at least /otentially loyal territory3 ()ic) could )el/ su//ly )is gro(ing ar%y. lso3 as did "enry V of 2ngland ()en )e ado/ted a /ersisting strategy and started to con.uer 'rance /iece &y /iece after )is +ictory at gincourt3 *usta+us ai%ed at t)e /er%anent ac.uisition of t)e land and its resources3 a secure and +alua&le su//ort for Protestantis% and S(eden. 0)e Protestantis% of t)e country )e occu/ied /ro+ided a /olitical &ase for t)is intrusion of t)e foreign 9ing. 0)e fall of *art6 )ad t)e desired result &y causing 0illy to i%/le%ent a decision already taken to strengt)en 'rankfort and3 ()en )e3 (it) c)aracteristic energy3 %ade t)e 2>>#%ile %arc) in ten days3 to do it (it) t)e e-ce/tional celerity t)e situation %erited. No( *usta+us faced a first#class I%/erial ar%y co%%anded &y a distinguis)ed general. "a+ing entered t)e ar%y at age fifteen as a /ike%an3 t)e s)ort3 t)in3 long#nosed 0illy )ad al%ost si-ty years of acti+e ser+ice3 t(enty#se+en of it as a general. "e )ad foug)t under t)e co%%and of t)e 1uke of Par%a and against t)e 0urks and )ad %any years as an al%ost unifor%ly successful co%%ander. But t)e young 9ing )ad (on t)e first round ()en )is attack on *art6 )ad distracted 0illy3 t)us creating a (eakness else()ere.

Gusta%us"s #irst +istra(tion

Back

2+en t)oug) 0illy )ad not intended to %o+e )is ar%y to /ress t)e siege of Magde&urg3 *usta+us3 )a+ing dra(n )i% to t)e east side of )is /eri%eter3 could take ad+antage of t)is for offensi+e3 rat)er t)an )is originally intended defensi+e3 /ur/oses. nd t)e 9ing )ad t)e strategic /osition to %ake t)e %ost of t)is distraction &ecause )e could utilise )is interior lines to strike to(ard t)e (est to &roaden )is &ase and so e-/and t)e area su&Dect to )is contri&utions and fro% ()ic) )e could dra( su//lies. In %o+ing (est(ard to(ard t)e Mecklen&urg city of 1e%%in and ca/turing se+eral to(ns as )e did so3 *usta+us o/ened t)e second round of a contest t)at e-tended o+er %ore t)an a year and a )alf and /itted )i% against t(o %asters of t)e se+enteent)#century art of (ar. 0)ese skilfully conducted ca%/aigns a&ly e-e%/lify strategy under conditions in ()ic) fortifications and terrain o&stacles3 t)oug) i%/ortant3 did not do%inate co%&atants o/erating (it) a relati+ely lo( ratio of force to s/ace. s )ad al(ays &een t)e case under t)ese circu%stances (it) si%ilarly constituted ar%ies3 neit)er contestant could co%/el an un(illing o//onent to fig)t. 1B>

Gusta%us E* loits 'nterior &ines Back

Starting on 8anuary 2@t) 1=?13 *usta+us ad+anced to(ard 1e%%in and in less t)an t)ree (eeks ca/tured si- to(ns3 including t)e /o(erfully fortified and strongly garrisoned 1e%%in itself3 ()ic) t)e ine/t I%/erial co%%ander readily surrendered. lt)oug) 0illy %o+ed /ro%/tly to sa+e t)e situation3 S(edis) control of t)e inter+ening to(ns and ri+er crossings forced )i% to %arc) (est3 to t)e sout) of Berlin3 and t)en nort)3 &y ()ic) ti%e *usta+us )ad co%/leted )is ca%/aign to e-/and )is &ase area. "a+ing secured )is o&Decti+e and again foiled 0illy3 *usta+us (ent into (inter .uarters. But 0illy soug)t to redee% t)e ca%/aign and /er)a/s )a+e a &attle (it) *usta+us &y ad+ancing (it) 1?3>>> %en against t)e near&y S(edis)#)eld to(n of Neu#Branden&urg3 ()ose garrison 5f C<> lacked artillery or %odern fortifications. *usta+us res/onded &y concentrating 1@3>>> %en to relie+e t)e city. But a//re)ensi+e of a &attle (it) t)e redou&ta&le 0illy ()en )is ca+alry3 largely un/aid *er%an %ercenaries3 %ig)t /ro+e unrelia&le3 *usta+us again tried to sa+e Neu# Branden&urg &y using t)e )it)erto successful strategy of distraction. "e again %o+ed to t)reaten 'rankfort and also interfered (it) 0illys co%%unications (it) t)e Magde&urg &esieging force. But t)e o/eration failed. 0illy )ad not learned of t)e S(edis) %o+e%ents &efore )e )ad stor%ed Neu# Branden&urg3 killed a t)ird of t)e garrison3 and sacked t)e to(n. 0illy t)en %o+ed to Magde&urg3 intent no( on /us)ing t)e siege (it) +igour. "eretofore t)e &esieging ar%y3 too s%all to do %ore3 )ad %aintained only a /artially effecti+e &lockade of t)e city. ug%ented &y 0illys force and (it) t)e s)re(d old soldier in /ersonal co%%and3 Madge&urgs &esiegers could %aintain a close &lockade3 attack t)e fortifications (it) artillery3 %ines3 and all t)e ot)er resources of siegecraft3 and carry out an assault if a fa+oura&le o//ortunity /resented itself. 5n Marc) 2Ct) *usta+us3 acting to create a ne( distraction sufficient to dra( 0illy fro% Magde&urg3 %o+ed sout) on t)e 5der (it) a flotilla3 143>>> %en and 2>> guns to attack 'rankfort. Since t)e =3>>> defenders )ad ca/a&le co%%anders3 a long siege see%ed ine+ita&le3 &ut t)e na+igation of t)e 5der (ould /er%it *usta+us to %aintain it successfully. "earing of *usta+uss %o+e on Marc) ?1st 0illy /ro%/tly left Magde&urg and &egan a %arc) to relie+e 'rankfurt. But3 on /ril ?rd t)e day after t)e 9ings ar%y )ad reac)ed 'rankfort3 t)e S(edis) ar%y stor%ed t)e city3 %assacred t)e garrison3 and sacked t)e Protestant to(n. In t)is case3 )o(e+er3 success %eant

1B1

failure for t)e distraction3 since (it) t)e to(n lost 0illy turned &ack to resu%e t)e siege of Magde&urg. *usta+us3 )a+ing a(aited 0illys arri+al at 'rankfort in +ain3 turned to try to relie+e t)e city directly3 and to do t)is )e )ad to negotiate /assage for )is ar%y t)roug) t)e neutral electorates of Sa-ony and Branden&urg. 5n /ril 2>t) &efore *usta+us succeeded in gaining /er%ission to %arc) t)roug) t)is territory of t)e neutrals3 0illy carried out a +ictorious sur/rise assault against t)e city3 after ()ic) )is un/aid and &adly fed soldiers &urned t)e city and killed 2>3>>> ci+ilians3 t(o#t)irds of t)e to(ns in)a&itants. 'or t(o (eeks after t)e sack of t)e city3 &odies of t)e slain clogged t)e ri+er t)at ran t)roug) Magde&urg.

Se(ond +istra(tion #ails Back

In t)is ca%/aign &ot) *usta+us and 0illy )ad foug)t defensi+e ca%/aigns: *usta+us soug)t to /rotect Magde&urg and 0illy needed to contain t)e S(edis) &ridge)ead and co+er t)e 2%/erors Silesian /ro+ince. But eac) also )ad offensi+e goals: 0illy3 t)e ca/ture of t)e re&ellious city of Magde&urg3 and *usta+us3 a need to e-/and )is &ase area. Bot) failed in t)eir defensi+e %issions &ut attained t)eir offensi+e o&Decti+es. S(edis) strategy relied on distractions3 %ade easier to e-ecute &y t)e interior lines of o/eration /ro+ided &y t)e se%icircular &ridge)ead area of garrisoned and fortified cities. fter )is taking of *art6 )ad dra(n 0illy to t)e 5der3 *usta+us concentrated on t)e o//osite side of t)e t)eatre3 o+er()el%ed a )alf#do6en to(ns3 and significantly e-/anded )is &ridge)ead. *usta+us t)us a&ly a//lied Ieno/)ons a/)oris%: J!ise generals)i/ consists in attacking ()ere t)e ene%y is (eakest3 e+en if t)e /oint &e so%e (ay distant.L But &ecause co%/etent o//onents do not usually offer (eak /oints to attack3 t)e di+ersion /ro+ided &y t)e *art6 o/eration /ro+ed essential in creating t)e (eakness at 1e%%in against ()ic) *usta+us concentrated &y utilising )is interior lines. 0)us *usta+us s)o(ed )is %astery of a tec)ni.ue &asic to concentration against (eakness3 a distraction to lure an o//onent into creating a (eak /oint. *usta+us also used t)is t)reat as a defensi+e strategy &ecause /olitical as (ell as %ilitary considerations %ade )i% reluctant to %arc) t)roug) neutral territory dee/ into an ene%y#)eld area and t)ere risk defeat in a &attle to relie+e Magde&urg directly. 0)e ca/ture of *art6 /ro+ed effecti+e in confir%ing 0illys /re#e-isting an-iety a&out t)e 5der line and t)us distracting )i% fro% t)e S(edis) (eak /oint3 Magde&urg. 0)e effort to di+ert t)e I%/erial general fro% Neu#

1B2

Branden&urg %iscarried &ecause 0illy ca/tured t)e city &efore )e learned of t)e S(edis) %enace else()ere3 and t)e attack on 'rankfort failed &ecause *usta+us ca/tured t)e city &efore t)e t)reat /ersisted long enoug) to dra( 0illy to its relief. :et clearly t)e function of a distraction on t)e defence (as .uite sy%%etrical (it) its use on t)e offence. 5n t)e offensi+e a distraction or di+ersion created a (eakness &y dra(ing ene%y forces a(ay fro% t)e /ro/osed /oint of attack7 on t)e defensi+e3 in causing t)e ene%y to concentrate in t)e (rong /lace3 it /rotected t)e defenders (eak /oint fro% attack. 2-ce/t for 0illys ad+ance on Neu#Branden&urg ()en &ot) co%%anders )ad a fig)t in %ind3 t)e e-/ectation of co%&at )ad no role in t)ese %anoeu+res. Since neit)er ar%y could count on forcing &attle on t)e ot)er3 a &attle itself (as unrealistic as an o&Decti+e3 and t)is condition /ro+ided a considera&le %easure of security for &ot) ar%ies. 0o turn an ene%y3 as )ad $aesar at Ilerda3 usually /ro+ed i%/ossi&le &ecause t)e s%all3 co%/act ar%ies easily %o+ed a(ay fro% eac) ot)er in t)e co%/arati+ely large and uno&structed s/aces of nort)ern *er%any. terrain o&stacle could tra/ an ar%y and force a &attle or ca/itulation3 &ut t)e S(edis) and I%/erial co%%anders )ad too %uc) a&ility and e-/erience to co%/ro%ise t)e%sel+es. siege3 &y t)reatening so%et)ing +ital3 could often induce a &attle3 &ut *usta+us declined t)e o//ortunity &efore Magde&urg. 0)e use of distraction3 ()ic) /layed so large a role in *usta+uss o/erations3 ty/ified t)e (arfare of t)e /eriod. *usta+uss %enaces took t(o for%s. In ca/turing *art6 and t)en 'rankfort )e e-/anded )is &ase area3 an o&Decti+e in )ar%ony (it) )is /ersisting strategy. In /resenting a danger to Silesia3 )o(e+er3 )e t)reatened a raid into one of t)e I%/erial &ase areas. :et t)is in+ol+ed no inconsistency for *usta+us &ecause3 (it) suc) s%all ar%ies3 raids )ad constituted a sta/le of strategy since t)e &eginning of t)e 0)irty :ears !ar as (ell as for t)ousands of years &efore. ctually raids3 rat)er t)an t)e /ersisting strategy follo(ed &y *usta+us and 0illy3 ty/ified t)ese distracting o/erations3 ()ic) often took t)e for% of counter raids to induce an o//onent to a&andon )is o(n. S/anis) %inister c)aracterised suc) strategy (ell: JIf (e /ut an ar%y 5f 4>3>>> %en in t)e field t)ey &ring out as %any and %ore. !it) t)e% t)ey /re+ent us fro% doing anyt)ing. If (e (ant to cross a ri+er (it) all of our %ain ar%y3 t)ey cross anot)er (it) t)eirs. If (e lay siege to one /lace3 t)ey lay siege to anot)er of ours. In t)is situation3 Sir3 in order to get any()ere in t)is (ar it is necessary to )a+e t(o ar%ies.L In t)eir ca%/aigns *usta+us /ursued an essentially offensi+e /ersisting strategy and 0illy3 in s/ite of t)e ulti%ately successful siege of Magde&urg3 a defensi+e /ersisting strategy to contain *usta+uss offensi+e into *er%any. nd t)oug) neit)er )ad a /ri%ary o&Decti+e of &attle (it) t)e ot)er3 &ot) /ursued a co%&at strategy in t)at t)ey focused t)eir efforts not on t)eir o//onents su//lies &ut on t)e attack and defence of fortified cities. :et in t)e contest &et(een t)ese t(o fine generals3 t)e (eakness t)at3 on t)e offensi+e3 distractions ai%ed to create and3 on t)e defensi+e3 to /rotect3 )ad a /olitical and logistic c)aracter7 so eac) soug)t to e-/loit t)e ot)ers or /rotect )is o(n /olitical or su//ly +ulnera&ilities. In e-/anding )is &ase in Mecklen&urg3 *usta+us de/ri+ed t)e ene%y of su//lies and contri&utions and e-/anded )is resources &y t)e sa%e a%ount. 0illy /osed %ore of a /olitical t)an a %ilitary %enace &y )is t)reat to take Magde&urg3 &ecause t)e fall of t)e city (ould confer significant /olitical ad+antages on )is cause t)roug) inti%idating o//osition &y su//ressing a re&ellion against t)e 2%/eror. n ad+ance &y *usta+us into Silesia and /er)a/s into Bo)e%ia could a%ount to little %ore t)an a raid3 &ut t)e su//lies )e could find and t)e large contri&utions )e (ould collect (ould strengt)en )i% and corres/ondingly (eaken t)e 2%/eror7 suc) a raid could only )urt t)e I%/erial cause /olitically. So logistical and /olitical ai%s often coincided. n offensi+e /ersisting co%&at strategy3 si%/ly &y t)e ac.uisition of a significant /ortion of )ostile land area3 could (in t)e (ar if t)e attacking /o(er )ad sufficiently %odest /olitical o&Decti+es. But

1B?

(it) ai%s too a%&itious to attain &y t)e ac.uisition of suc) a /iece of territory3 t)e /ersisting strategy (ould e%&race t)e logistic strategy of de/ri+ing t)e ene%y of resources and3 if /olitical and ot)er conditions /er%itted3 also of aggrandising t)e strengt) of t)e successful aggressor. 0)us *usta+uss syste%atic con.uest and fortification of Protestant territory slo(ly &ut surely &uilt )is resources in su//lies and %oney. 0)e $at)olic forces3 on t)e defensi+e against t)e S(edes3 soug)t to retain territory &ot) &ecause lost land area stood for i%/aired /olitical o&Decti+es and &ecause retaining control of t)eir do%ain i%/le%ented t)eir defence against a /ersisting logistic strategy. In ot)er (ords3 until a /ersisting strategy )ad taken enoug) land and cities fro% t)e ene%y to constitute a &ig enoug) /ri6e to e-tract fro% t)e defeated t)e concession of t)e goal of t)e (ar3 territorial ac.uisition counted as a logistic strategy. Since /olitical o&Decti+es defined t)e %easure of %ilitary success needed for t)eir attain%ent3 %odest ai%s re.uired only li%ited +ictories and great e-/ectations de%anded i%/ortant %ilitary ac)ie+e%ents. Since *usta+us soug)t to re+erse t)e tide of %ore t)an a decade of (ar3 )is i%/ressi+e gains in nort) *er%any did not suffice to carry )i% +ery far to(ard t)e kind of /eace )e desired. Back

Gustavus%s -$'loitation of the (rium'h of His "inear System at 1reitenfeld

Soon after t)e fall of Magde&urg *usta+us secured t)e coo/eration of Branden&urg3 including contri&utions and t)e rig)t to recruit soldiers in Branden&urg territory. 4sing t)ese resources3 *usta+us resu%ed t)e e-/ansion of )is &ase area3 e-tending (est along t)e Baltic coast and sout)(est into t)e fertile3 untouc)ed country east of t)e "a+el Ri+er3 ()ere )e &egan to fortify to(ns to )old t)e line of t)at ri+er. Mean()ile3 0illy )ad left t)e Magde&urg area3 una&le to sustain )is ar%y in t)e denuded country around t)e &urned city. ,ea+ing a s%all force in t)e +icinity of Magde&urg3 )e %arc)ed sout) to find su//lies for )is ar%y and to %eet reinforce%ents fro% Italy. But ()en )e learned t)at *usta+us )ad crossed t)e "a+el3 )ad reac)ed t)e 2l&e3 and )ad occu/ied t)e /roducti+e region &et(een t)e ri+ers3 t)e no(#reinforced 0illy turned nort)7 ready to fig)t t)is ne( S(edis) e-/ansion. s 0illys strong ar%y %o+ed nort) in late 8uly 1=?13 *usta+us &egan to fortify a /osition at !er&en in a &end in t)e 2l&e. !it) )is rear and &ot) flanks /rotected &y t)e ri+er3 )e &egan erecting an ela&orate line of field fortifications across t)e neck of land. !it) )is &ack to t)e ri+er *usta+us )ad a%/le (ater for )is %en3 access to ri+er#&orne su//lies3 and /rotection for )is flanks. :et (it) only one &ridge o+er t)e ri+er3 t)e 9ing dis/layed t)e confidence ()ic) se+enteent)# century generals ty/ically )ad in t)eir fortifications7 if t)e ene%y s)ould attack and carry t)e fortifications3 *usta+us3 (it) only a single &ridge as a route of retreat3 (ould lose +irtually )is entire ar%y. s an-ious to fig)t as 0illy3 t)e 9ing %ade certain )e )ad all of t)e ad+antages t)e defence offered. 1igging ra/idly3 )e finis)ed )is entrenc)%ents &efore 0illy arri+ed7 as a Scottis) officer in S(edis) ser+ice re%arked3 ()ere 0illy Jdid &ut %arc) (it) )is ar%y in t)e day ti%e3 (e (it) s/ades and s)o+els3 (roug)t our sel+es nig)t and day in t)e ground3 so t)at3 &efore )is co%ing3 (e )ad /ut oursel+es out of danger of )is $annon.L "a+ing reac)ed !er&en (it) )is ar%y3 t)e (ise 0illy3 daunted &y t)e for%ida&le fortifications3 skir%is)ed3 fired )is cannon3 and (it)dre( t(enty %iles to t)e sout). In late ugust 0illy )i%self sei6ed t)e initiati+e: )e %arc)ed sout) into Protestant Sa-ony to su//ly )is troo/s and to lay (aste t)e 2lectors territory in an effort to force t)e Sa-on ruler to a&andon t)e alliance )e /ro/osed to conclude (it) t)e S(edes. *usta+us %arc)ed .uickly to unite )is ar%y (it) t)e 2lectors and fig)t 0illy or at least force )i% fro% Sa-ony. !it) additional reinforce%ents3 0illy )ad no a+ersion to acce/ting t)e offer of &attle3 ()ic) )is a//lication of t)e old strategy of de+astating t)e country )ad /ro+oked3 and took u/ a /osition on le+el terrain at Breitenfeld3 nort) of ,ei/6ig. *usta+uss and t)e 2lectors ar%ies %o+ed to %eet )i%.

1B4

0)e Scottis) officer .uoted a&o+e contrasted t)e a//earance of t)e S(edis) +eterans (it) t)e Sa-on ar%y3 fres) fro% garrisons or ne(ly recruited3 ()ic) Jfor /leasing t)e eye3 (as t)e %ost co%/lete little r%ie3 for /ersonages of %an3 co%ely statutes3 (ell ar%ed3 and (ell arraide3 t)at e+er %ine eyes did looke on3 ()ose officers did all looke3 as if t)ey (ere going in t)eir &est a//arell and r%es to &e /ainted.L But t)e S(edes3 J)a+ing lyen o+er#nig)t on a /arcel of /lo(d ground3 t)ey (ere so dusty3 t)ey looked out like 9itc)en#ser+ants3 (it) t)eir uncleanly rags.L S(edis) o&ser+er %ade a si%ilar o&ser+ation a&out t)e S(edes and t)e I%/erial soldiers3 t)e latter o/ulently attired in t)e loot of %any ca%/aigns. JRagged3 tattered and dirty (ere our %en Gfro% t)e continual la&ours of t)is last yearH &esides t)e glittering3 gilded and /lu%e#decked I%/erialists. 5ur S(edis) and 'innis) nags looked &ut /uny3 ne-t t)eir great *er%an c)argers. 5ur /easant lads %ade no &ra+e s)o( u/on t)e field ()en set against t)e )a(k#nosed and %ustac)lod +eterans of 0illy.L nd so t)e ar%ies (ould fig)t as eac) co%%ander3 confident of t)e outco%e3 &elie+ed t)at t)e ti%e and t)e field suited &attle. *usta+us arrayed )is ar%y t)e e+ening &efore t)e &attle3 )is %en slee/ing in t)e order in ()ic)3 on t)e %orning of Se/te%&er 1Ct) t)ey %arc)ed to co%&at near t)e little +illage of Breitenfeld. "e for%ed )is <>>#%an infantry units in t(o lines3 (it) a reser+e of infantry and ca+alry &et(een t)e t(o and a reser+e of ca+alry &e)ind t)e second line. "is linear syste%3 (it) a de/t) of fi+e for )is /ike and si- for )is %usketeers3 ena&led )i% to %ake a front t)at e.ualled 0illys and still /ro+ide a%/le reser+es. 0)e S(edis) array did not differ in su&stance fro% t)at e%/loyed &y t)e Ro%ans. 0)e seasoned 0illy3 ado/ting t)e traditional doctrine3 used for%ations (it) a fifty#%an front and a de/t) of t)irty3 ()ic) )e arranged in grou/s of t)ree3 t)e centre rectangle a little a)ead of t)e ot)er t(o. 2ssentially in one line and (it) no reser+e &eyond so%e ca+alry &e)ind )is infantry3 0illys %en assu%ed dee/ s)a/es3 ()ic) )ad one significant attri&ute Gt)e ca/acity for all#around defenceH t)at *usta+uss s)allo( arrange%ent lacked. 5n t)eir flanks eac) co%%ander /laced t)e &ulk of )is ca+alry3 *usta+uss (it) a reser+e and grou/s of %usketeers inter%ingled (it) )is first line. 0o t)e S(edis) left t)e 2lector of Sa-ony arrayed )is ar%y3 (it) infantry in t)e ort)odo- large s.uares and ca+alry on eac) flank. 0)e allied S(edis) and Sa-on forces t)us de/loyed as t(o se/arate ar%ies3 ()ic) di+ided t)eir infantry &y t)e (ings of S(edis) and Sa-on )orse. 0)us t)e co%&ined ar%ies )ad ca+alry in t)e centre as (ell as on t)e (ings. In t)e %orning t)e S(edis) )ost %arc)ed cross#country in &attle array to(ard 0illys already for%ed ar%y. 0)e o//osing forces )ad essentially t)e sa%e le+el of e-cellence3 *usta+uss (ell# drilled S(edes and 0illys +eterans3 eac) diluted3 t)e S(edes &y t)e green Sa-on ar%y and t)e I%/erialists &y t)e indifferent .uality of 0illys reinforce%ents. In t)e 2%/erors aged 'ield Mars)al t)e e-/erienced young 9ing %et a (ort)y antagonist and /roficient e-/onent of t)e si-teent)#century tactical %et)ods t)at )ad do%inated t)e first decade of t)e (ar. !it) dru%s &eating3 tru%/ets &laring3 and artillery &oo%ing3 t)e action &egan (it) t)e c)arge of t)e ca+alry on 0illys left. 0)e S(edis) ca+alry stood its ground and recei+ed t)e /istol attacks of t)e I%/erial ca+alry (it) +olleys fro% t)eir %usketeers and s)ort c)arges (it) t)e sa&re. !it) t)e su/erior (ea/on syste%s of lig)t infantry ar.ue&usiers and s)ock action &y %ounted %en fig)ting as )ea+y ca+alry3 t)e S(edes &ested 0illys )orse%en ()o3 like lig)t ca+alry3 relied on t)eir /istols. In t)is /rotracted struggle 0illys ca+alry3 led &y t)e i%/etuous &ut courageous and co%/etent $ount Pa//en)ei%3 ad+anced se+en ti%es. 0)e S(edes defeated eac) attack as lig)t ca+alry tactics (it) t)e /istol failed against t)e %uskets of t)e S(edis) lig)t infantry %ingled (it) t)e ca+alry and t)e S(edis) s)ock#action c)arge (it) sa&res3 ()ic) t)en dro+e &ack t)e I%/erial /istoleers. 0)e S(edis) reser+e ca+alry e-tended t)e front and used counter#c)arge (it) sa&res to +an.uis) Pa//en)ei%s effort to turn t)eir flank. fter t)e defeat of its se+ent) assault3 Pa//en)ei%s ca+alry (it)dre( fro% t)e field.

1B<

!)ile 0illys ca+alry %ade t)ese c)arges on )is left and t)e infantry stood i%%o&ile as eac) ar%ys artillery sent cannon&alls t)roug) t)e o//osing ranks3 t)e I%/erial ca+alry on t)e rig)t c)arged and routed t)e Sa-on ca+alry. 0)oug) t)e S(edis) ca+alry /rotected its infantry3 t)e /erce/ti+e 0illy sa( and i%%ediately a+ailed )i%self of t)e o//ortunity to e-/loit t)e (eakness of t)e Sa-ons &y sending t)e %aDority of )is infantry against t)e%. 2+en t)oug) t)ey lacked t)e drill of t)e S(iss3 0illys ad+ancing &locks of /ike%en (it) t)eir attac)ed ar.ue&usiers and %usketeers %o+ed easily on t)e le+el ground3 crossed t)e field o&li.uely to t)eir rig)t3 and attacked t)e already de%oralised Sa-on infantry3 ()ic) /ro%/tly fled3 /ausing only to loot t)e S(edis) ca%/ as it left t)e scene of &attle. !it) t)e rout of t)e Sa-ons3 0illy )ad defeated 4> /ercent of t)e ene%y ar%y and e-/osed t)e S(edis) forces to a &lo( in t)e flank &y )is infantry for%ations. But as 0illy reordered )is infantry into an array to roll u/ t)e S(edis) flank3 *usta+us and *eneral "orn3 )is skilful su&ordinate on )is left flank3 for%ed t)e (ell#drilled S(edis) infantry of t)e second line into a &attle array at rig)t angles to its front. In t)e nick of ti%e3 )a+ing &arely fifteen %inutes to co%/lete t)is rede/loy%ent3 t)e S(edis) line faced 0illys infantry.

+iagram of Positions and Mo%ements at .reitenfeld Back

0)e course of t)e re%ainder of t)e &attle is not clear3 &ut t)e c)arge of S(edis) ca+alry on t)e 9ings left dro+e off 0illys ca+alry3 and (it) its aid t)e S(edis) infantry gained t)e u//er )and. Part of t)is su/re%acy lay in t)e fire/o(er t)at t)eir si-#rank for%ation of %usketeers could deli+er in a s)ort s/ace of ti%e. 0)e I%/erial ar.ue&usiers and %usketeers3 t)irty ranks dee/3 used t)e counter#%arc) to %aintain a steady fire on a narro( front as eac) rank filed to t)e rear to reload. But t)e S(edis) %et)od /er%itted a concentration of fire in ti%e3 ()ic) /ro+ed %ore effecti+e in su//orting t)e c)arges of t)e S(edis) ca+alry and /ike%en. nd t)e lig)t infantry foug)t one anot)er also3 a /artici/ant in t)e S(edis) ar%y descri&ing t)e ad+ance of )is co%/any t)us: J'irst I )ad t)ree of t)e s%aller cannon I )ad in front of %e fire3 and I did not allo( %y %usketeers to fire a sal+o until (e (ere (it)in /istol range of t)e ene%y. 0)en I )ad t)e first t)ree ranks fire a sal+o3 follo(ed &y t)e ot)er t)ree ranks7 t)en (e dro+e in on t)e% and struck a(ay at t)e% (it) our %uskets or sa&res.L 0)is sa%e ca/tain also (itnessed a successful attack of I%/erial ca+alry on /ike%en unsu//orted &y %usketeers. J0)ey %o+ed u/ close to t)e% and fired t)eir /istol sal+os once or t(ice3 killing all of t)e Scottis) colour &earers3 so t)at suddenly %any colours fell si%ultaneously to t)e ground.L In t)e closing /)ase of t)e &attle3 0illys infantry3 deserted &y its defeated ca+alry fro% &ot) flanks and faced (it) t)e fire of t)e e-cellent S(edis) guns as (ell as its o(n artillery3 ()ic) t)e S(edes )ad ca/tured and turned against t)e ene%y3 )eld out gallantly. But (it) its co%%ander (ounded and its losses )ideous3 it a&andoned t)e field3 lea+ing C3=>> dead. S(edis) ca+alry or /easants seeking re+enge on soldiers killed %any %ore during t)e retreat3 and t)e S(edes took =3>>>

1B=

/risoners on t)e field and %ore later3 %any of t)ese e+entually enlisting in t)e S(edis) forces. 0)e S(edis) dead nu%&ered 13<>>3 t)e Sa-on3 ?3>>>. 0)e &attle /ro+ed a dra%atic endorse%ent of t)e linear syste% and ca+alry3 ()ic) relied %ore on t)e s)ock action of its sa&res t)an on t)e fire of its /istols. 0)e S(edis) e%/loy%ent of a for%ation in t(o lines to %ake a reser+e ena&led *usta+us to /rotect )is ar%ys flanks and differed in no essential res/ect fro% t)e use %ade of t)eir second lines &y Sci/io and $aesar. $lassical %odels )ad /roduced classical results. 0illy retreated (est3 crossing t)e !eser (it) 1?3>>> %en3 t)e re%ains of t)e ?43>>> )e )ad de/loyed on t)e &attlefield at Breitenfeld. "a+ing inflicted %ore t)an => /ercent casualties on )is o//onent and %ore t)an %ade u/ )is o(n losses &y recruiting /risoners3 *usta+us )ad ac)ie+ed an e-e%/lary tactical success. It )ad a %aDor /olitical effect3 &ringing in as allies %any Protestant Princes attracted &y )is +ictory or inti%idated &y )is /o(er. *usta+us )arnessed t)e% all to )is %ilitary effort3 occu/ying t)eir territory and e-acting contri&utions to %aintain )is no( ra/idly e-/anding ar%y. 0o e-/loit )is tactical ac)ie+e%ent )e i%%ediately set out to enlarge )is &ase3 t)e area )e garrisoned and t)at su//orted )is forces &y contri&utions. In t)is (ay )e could aug%ent )is forces ()ile di%inis)ing t)e &ase fro% ()ic) t)e 2%/eror could recruit and sustain )is ar%ies. 0)is /ersisting strategy of syste%atic con.uest )ad /olitical o&Decti+es as (ell as a %ilitary foundation in t)e logistic strategy of using territorial con.uest to de/ri+e t)e ene%y of t)e resources to su//ly )is ar%y. *usta+uss strategy u/ to t)is /oint differed little3 e-ce/t in t)e scale and s/eed of e-ecution3 fro% t)at ()ic) t)e 2nglis) e%/loyed to con.uer !ales or t)at used &y "enry V in t)e last /)ase of t)e "undred :ears !ar. If *usta+us )ad re%ained consistent (it) )is conser+ati+e /olicy of t)e /re+ious t(el+e %ont)s3 )e (ould )a+e used )is +ictory to /us) (est along t)e coast and to co%/lete t)e con.uest of t)e territory &et(een t)e !eser Ri+er and t)e 1utc) frontier. Suc) an o&Decti+e (ould )a+e constituted a fair strategic reco%/ense for t)e tactical success of t)e )ig) attrition gained at Breitenfeld and (ould )a+e follo(ed )is earlier strategy of not ad+ancing into %ore territory t)an )e could .uickly su&due3 fortify3 and garrison. "is %et)odical /rogress )ad t)us far /ro/ortioned t)e s/ace con.uered to t)e force t)en a+aila&le to do%inate it. But t)e 9ings +ictory induced )i% to ai% )ig)er3 and3 lea+ing t)e con.uest of t)e area to t)e (est to su&ordinates3 )e %arc)ed sout) until )e reac)ed t)e Main Ri+er3 le+ying contri&utions3 organising t)e con.uered lands3 and raising troo/s as )e ad+anced. Mean()ile3 t)e Sa-on ar%y in+aded Silesia and /us)ed into Bo)e%ia ()ile *usta+us /lanned to %o+e (est(ard3 do(n t)e Main to t)e R)ine. In addition to t)e control of t)is region3 *usta+us )o/ed t)at )is ad+ance to(ard t)e R)ine (ould distract 0illy3 dra(ing )i% out of t)e area (est of t)e !eser ()ere )e )ad retreated3 t)us ena&ling t)e S(edis) forces to %ake /rogress su&duing t)at country. :et &y recruiting and taking garrisons fro% so%e fortresses3 0illy )ad soon re&uilt )is ar%y to 2<3>>> %en3 and ()en )e res/onded to *usta+uss distraction3 )e Doined (it) anot)er I%/erial force and reac)ed t)e Main (it) at least 4>3>>> %en. 0)e /rudent *usta+us3 inti%idated &y 0illys nu%erically greater ar%y3 ke/t a(ay fro% )i%3 and 0illy3 conscious of t)e lo( %orale and deficient su//ly and e.ui/%ent of )is ar%y3 %o+ed east(ard in an atte%/t to di+ert *usta+us fro% )is %arc) do(n t)e Main &y %enacing Nure%&erg3 a city t)at /ro+ed too strong for )i%. But t)e t)reat /resented &y 0illys P)oeni-#like ar%y clearly s)o(ed t)at t)e o/ti%istic *usta+us3 in going sout) to t)e Main rat)er t)an (est of t)e !eser3 )ad atte%/ted %ore t)an t)e attrition of )is +ictory at Breitenfeld )ad (arranted. "e )ad de/arted fro% )is /olicy of consolidating )is con.uests &efore ad+ancing again and of ad+ancing no fart)er t)an )e could readily control &y garrisons and fortifications. 0)is c)ange )ad reduced t)e ratio of )is force to t)e s/ace it soug)t to do%inate to a le+el t)at %ade it difficult for )i% to secure )is ne( /osition in t)e large region along and sout) of

1BC

t)e Main Ri+er. 0)e 9ing still /ursued a /ersisting strategy &ut )ad3 &y %o+ing too ra/idly3 so attenuated )is control t)at )e +erged on a raiding strategy3 if )e )ad not actually crossed t)at line. But (it) 0illys %o+e east to(ard Nure%&erg3 t)e 9ing resu%ed )is %arc) do(n t)e Main3 taking (ealt)y cities and su//lying )is ar%y &ountifully3 J&eing in a fat land3 as t)is (as3 a&ounding in all t)ings e-ce/t /eace: t)ey )ad /lenty of corne3 (ine3 fruite3 gold3 sil+er3 De(els3 and of all sort of ric)es could &e t)oug)t of.L "a+ing reac)ed t)e R)ine3 *usta+us consolidated )is )old on t)e ric) &anks of t)e ri+er and (intered )is forces as )e %ade /lans to recruit 21>3>>> %en for t)e ca%/aign of 1=?23 enoug) to su//ort an ad+ance east(ard into Ba+aria and to(ard Vienna and to kee/ si- ot)er ar%ies in t)e field. "e (ould not raise %ore t)an 14>3>>>3 )a+ing o+eresti%ated t)e resources of t)e area under )is control. But )e did succeed in %aking (ar su//ort (ar3 for S(edes constituted only 1?3>>> of t)e 14>3>>> %en7 %ost of t)e %oney for t)e non#S(edis) forces ca%e fro% *er%an contri&utions7 &ut e+en t)oug) )e )ad raised %any less t)an )e /lanned3 *usta+us )ad recruited far %ore %en t)an )e could /ay. Back

Gustavus against Wallenstein, "ogistic and Combat Strategies

In addition to *usta+uss searc) for %en3 !allensteins rene(ed acti+ities )el/ed e-)aust t)e *er%an su//ly of soldiers. 0)e suddenly +ery dangerous S(edis) t)reat )ad /ro%/ted t)e 2%/eror to call &ack )is %ost successful %ilitary contractor3 and !allenstein (as raising an ar%y in Bo)e%ia in early 1=?2. "e ke/t )is recruiting efforts clear of Prague and t)e Sa-on ar%y t)at3 )a+ing ca/tured t)e city3 enDoyed s/ending t)e (inter at t)e ene%ys e-/ense. (are t)at t)e 2lector of Sa-ony %ig)t again &eco%e neutral3 !allenstein soug)t to foster t)is de+elo/%ent &y )is /olicy of carefully a+oiding conflict (it) t)e Sa-on troo/s occu/ying t)e Bo)e%ian ca/ital. 0)oug) a//re)ensi+e a&out !allenstein enlisting a ne( ar%y and ()at effect )e %ig)t )a+e on t)e Sa-ons3 *usta+us &egan )is s/ring ca%/aign (it) an a%&itious effort to enlarge )is sout)ern *er%an &ase to include t)e 1anu&e and e+en Ba+aria. In late Marc) t)e 9ing reac)ed t)e 1anu&e and soon controlled t)e ri+er front 4l% to 1onau(ort)3 ()ic) /laced )i% at t)e &order of staunc)ly $at)olic Ba+aria. 0)e ri+er ,ec)3 dee/3 s(ift#flo(ing ()en t)e sno(s %elted in t)e s/ring3 %arked t)is &order. *usta+uss +ictory at Breitenfeld &roug)t )i% ne( allies and created ne( t)eatres of o/eration. "e )ad success ()en t)e Sa-on ar%y /enetrated Bo)e%ia as far as its ca/ital3 Prague. But t)e efforts of )is su&ordinates to e-tend )is original &ase area (est(ard to t)e 1utc) frontier failed against t)e effecti+e o//osition of t)e talented and co%&ati+e I%/erial co%%ander3 $ount Pa//en)ei%. lt)oug) *usta+us )ad co%%and of %any cities on t)e Main and 1anu&e3 )is ad+ance into eastern and sout)ern *er%any )ad yet to gi+e )i% t)e sa%e solid control and relia&le &ase area t)at )e )ad earlier esta&lis)ed in t)e nort). nd (it)out furt)er atte%/ts to consolidate )is /osition3 )e /re/ared to in+ade Ba+aria3 ()ic) could only &e considered a raid in suc) )ostile country. 'urt)er3 !allensteins ne( ar%y in Bo)e%ia ine+ita&ly cast a s)ado( o+er future o/erations. But *usta+us /us)ed on (it) )is Ba+arian ca%/aign and3 in t)e /rocess3 e-)i&ited )is %astery of co%&ining distraction and concentration against (eakness to cross a difficult and (ell#defended ri+er line. lt)oug) 0illy )ad &roken all t)e &ridges and )ad re%o+ed all of t)e &oats3 *usta+us atte%/ted a crossing of t)e ,ec) in t)e face of a force of e.ual strengt). Skilfully distracting 0illy (it) an artillery &arrage at one /lace along t)e ri+er and o&scuring t)e /oint of t)eir real crossing atte%/t (it) t)e s%oke of gun/o(der and &urning stra(3 t)e S(edes crossed t)e ri+er on a /refa&ricated floating &ridge and3 co+ered &y t)eir /o(erful artillery3 esta&lis)ed a fir% &ridge)ead. 0)e forest increased t)e effecti+eness of t)e S(edis) artillery &ecause s/linters fro% trees )it &y cannon&alls inflicted %any inDuries on 0illys troo/s defending t)e crossing /oint. *usta+uss tactical di+ersion ena&led )i% to cross t)e carefully defended ri+er and o+erco%e t)e (eak defenders (it) )is su/erior strengt) at t)e /lace )e )ad selected.

1BB

cross t)e ri+er3 (it) t)e ene%y ar%y in retreat and 0illy %ortally (ounded3 *usta+us &egan t)e syste%atic de+astation of Ba+aria in an effort to try /olitical inti%idation and to i%/le%ent a logistic strategy of de/ri+ing t)e ene%y of t)e resources of t)is ric) land3 )it)erto untouc)ed &y (ar. 0)e Ba+arian 2lector ordered )is su&Dects to kill t)e in+aders3 intensifying t)e usual &loody conflict &et(een /easants and soldiers. But t)e ca/ital3 Munic)3 o/ened its gates to t)e S(edes to a+oid a siege and a /ossi&le sack &y /aying a )uge contri&ution. *usta+uss in+asion of Ba+aria )ad enric)ed )is ar%y (it) loot and de/leted t)e resources of t)e 2lector &ut )ad not (orked as a distraction to kee/ !allenstein fro% %arc)ing )is ar%y to Sa-ony and /ossi&ly dri+ing its often# indecisi+e 2lector fro% )is alliance (it) S(eden. 0)e /olitically astute !allenstein3 )o(e+er3 still treated t)e 2lectors do%ain carefully and3 )a+ing at last for%ed )is ar%y3 confined )is o/erations to retaking Prague and e-/elling t)e Sa-ons fro% Bo)e%ia. But !allenstein3 /re#e%inently t)e organiser and %anager3 )ad seen acti+e %ilitary ser+ice early in t)e century and inter%ittently e+er since and (ould /ro+e )is &rilliance as tactician and strategist against *usta+us. 0all3 t)in3 and red)eaded3 !allenstein )ad an aloof and i%/erious %anner t)at do%inated all around )i% yet ena&led )i% to ins/ire )is soldiers (it) confidence and ent)usias%. 0)e 2%/erors ne( co%%ander (ould /ro+e a (ort)y o//onent for t)e great 9ing of S(eden. So Dust as *usta+us soug)t to safeguard Sa-ony &y trying to dra( !allenstein to t)e sout) to /rotect Ba+aria against )is raid3 !allenstein ai%ed to dra( *usta+us fro% Ba+aria &y )is t)reat to t)e Sa-ons. !allensteins distraction (orked ()en *usta+us at last decided to %arc) to Sa-ony (it) )alf of )is ar%y. But t)e sagacious !allenstein i%%ediately %o+ed sout) to /re+ent a Dunction of t)e S(edis) and Sa-on forces. !)en *usta+us reac)ed Nure%&erg3 )e learned t)at t)e for%ida&le !allenstein (as %arc)ing sout)3 /resu%a&ly seeking &attle. 2%ulating t)e earlier effecti+eness of entrenc)%ents in sto//ing 0illy at !er&en3 t)e careful *usta+us &egan to dig in at Nure%&erg ()ile calling for reinforce%ents fro% t)e S(edis) forces &eyond t)e !eser and fro% t)e R)ine and 1anu&e. In late 8une3 united (it) 0illys old ar%y3 !allenstein3 (it) 4B3>>> %en of +ery une+en .uality3 a//roac)ed Nure%&erg3 eager for &attle3 only to find *usta+uss 2>3>>> %en (ell dug in outside of t)e city. *usta+us3 t)e +ictor of Breitenfeld3 suddenly found )i%self on t)e defensi+e at Nure%&erg3 )is Sa-on allies e-/elled fro% Bo)e%ia3 t)e ca%/aign (est of t)e !eser sty%ied &y Pa//en)ei%3 and )is efforts to consolidate a &ase area in sout)ern and eastern *er%any faltering ()ile )e dealt (it) !allenstein. If !allenstein )ad t)ro(n )is +astly stronger ar%y against *usta+uss i%/regna&le entrenc)%ents at Nure%&erg3 t)e resulting S(edis) +ictory (ould )a+e again gi+en t)e initiati+e to t)e 9ing. But Dust as )ad 0illy at !er&en3 t)e cautious !allenstein declined to attack t)e S(edis) field fortifications. In reDecting a co%&at strategy t)e resourceful I%/erial co%%ander c)ose t)e logistic strategy of star+ing out *usta+uss ar%y. !it) )is greater nu%&ers and )is control of t)e near&y to(ns3 !allenstein do%inated t)e territory nort)3 east3 and sout) of Nure%&erg. 'ortifying )i%self in a /osition on a ri+er se+en %iles fro% t)e S(edis) ar%y3 )e &elie+ed t)at &y de/ri+ing t)e S(edes of su//lies3 )e could force *usta+us eit)er to attack )is fortified /osition or to undergo t)e loss of /restige attendant on a retreat. Mean()ile3 *usta+us called for additional troo/s fro% )is ot)er ar%ies and in t)e t(o %ont)s &efore t)ey arri+ed eac) ar%y soug)t to star+e t)e ot)er out &y (aiting3 foraging3 and interfering (it) t)e ot)ers foragers. Neit)er succeeded3 &ut !allensteins larger force foraged fart)er and fared &etter t)an *usta+uss. Mean()ile3 as t)e S(edis) reinforce%ents gat)ered at a distance3 t)e 9ing directed t)e% to de+astate t)e country as t)ey %arc)ed to Doin )i%3 destroying %ore of !allensteins su//lies. In %id# ugust )is reinforce%ents %arc)ed in3 nearly ?>3>>> strong3 &ringing )is ar%y to <>3>>> %en.

1B@

:et (it) t)e larger ar%y3 t)e situation for *usta+us c)anged little7 instead of t)e S(edes defying !allensteins for%ida&le ar%y fro% &e)ind t)eir entrenc)%ents3 !allenstein no( soug)t an assault on )is (ell#entrenc)ed /osition. 0)e 9ing %ust retreat7 star+e out !allenstein3 or attack. !)en !allenstein %o+ed )is forces out on t)e (est side of )is /osition to in+ite attack in a strong /osition3 an ine/t S(edis) scout re/orted t)at t)e I%/erial ar%y +as (it)dra(ing. *usta+us %o+ed to e-/loit t)is situation &y assaulting t)e nort)east side of !allensteins /osition near an old fortification called t)e lte 'este. !it) !allensteins ar%y not in retreat &ut &ack %anning its fortifications3 t)e I%/erial soldiers sto//ed t)e S(edis) onslaug)t3 losing only =>> %en to 234>> S(edis) casualties. 0)e defeat of t)is s%all attack at t)e end of ugust %arked t)e ti%e &ut not t)e cause of t)e S(edis) (it)dra(al. !it) t)e 9ings forces %ore t)an dou&led3 !allensteins logistic strategy at last (orked and (orked (ell. By early Se/te%&er 1>3>>> S(edis) soldiers )ad deserted3 and =3>>> )orses )ad died. 5n Se/te%&er Bt) *usta+us &egan )is de/arture3 )is ca+alry reduced fro% 1=3>>> to 43>>> and t)e a+erage si6e of )is infantry co%/anies cut fro% 1<> to <C. !allensteins logistic strategy )ad inflicted t)e attrition co%/ara&le to a %aDor co%&at defeat. 0)e &usiness%an#soldier )ad arranged )is o(n su//lies so (ell t)at )is o(n force )ad suffered %uc) less. s t)e t(o ar%ies %arc)ed a(ay fro% eac) ot)er3 neit)er co%%ander kne( ()at to do ne-t3 ot)er t)an res/ond to t)e logistical i%/erati+e to lea+e t)e denuded Nure%&erg area. *usta+us3 %o+ing sout)3 finally decided to %arc) &ack to t)e 1anu&e to co%/lete t)e consolidation of )is &ase for t)e 1=?? ca%/aign and to /rotect Sa-ony &y launc)ing anot)er di+ersion into Ba+aria and to(ard Vienna. fter +acillation3 !allenstein finally %o+ed on Sa-ony3 a good /lace to (inter )is ar%y and3 &y uniting (it) t)e successful Pa//en)ei%3 to %enace &ot) Sa-ony and *usta+uss &ase area3 a dou&le di+ersion to dra( *usta+us fro% Ba+aria. So eac) /lanned to e-/loit t)e offensi+e /redo%inance of t)e raid3 %ake a foray into t)e ot)ers &ase area3 and so /ut )is ad+ersary on t)e defensi+e. Bet(een t)e co%/eting distractions of t)reats to nort) *er%any and Sa-ony3 on t)e one )and3 to Ba+aria3 on t)e ot)er3 !allenstein )ad t)e &etter /osition. 0)e S(edis) 9ing felt great solicitude for )is carefully de+elo/ed nort)ern &ase area3 kno(ing t)at Sa-ony %ig)t lea+e t)e (ar if de+astated ()ile Ba+aria3 t)e /illar of t)e $at)olic league3 (ould stay loyal to its cause. So (it) )is c)aracteristic energy3 t)e 9ing %arc)ed nort) to /rotect Sa-ony and secure )is ()ole /osition in nort) *er%any fro% !allenstein and )is ca/a&le and tireless su&ordinate3 Pa//en)ei%3 ()o )ad /re+ented S(edis) generals fro% su&duing t)e region &et(een t)e !eser and t)e 1utc) frontier. 'earful t)at t)e ene%y %ig)t &lock t)e %ountain /asses leading to Sa-ony3 t)e 9ing %arc)ed t)roug) t)e /asses to Sa-ony3 co+ering ?B> %iles in se+enteen days3 an a+erage of t(enty#t(o %iles /er day. It says %uc) for t)e disci/line3 %orale3 and )ardiness of )is +eterans t)at )e %ade t)is re%arka&le %arc) (it)out seriously di%inis)ing )is ar%y. Reac)ing Nau%&urg on t)e Saale at t)e end of 5cto&er3 *usta+us ca/tured t)is (eakly defended to(n and crossed t)e ri+er &efore !allensteins reinforce%ents arri+ed. Ignorant of t)e ()erea&outs of t)e ar%ies of eit)er !allenstein or )is o(n Sa-on allies3 *usta+us dug in t)oroug)ly at Nau%&urg3 Dust as )e )ad at !er&en and Nure%&erg. Reconnoitring *usta+uss ty/ically strong /osition3 !allenstein not only ruled out an attack3 &ut also erroneously concluded in t)e incle%ent early No+e%&er (eat)er3 t)at *usta+us intended to s/end t)e (inter at Nau%&urg. !allenstein )i%self )ad also /lanned to (inter in Sa-ony and en+isioned t)e a//lication of a logistic strategy3 a (inter re/etition of t)e Nure%&erg struggle for control of t)e country and its su//lies. So )e &egan to dis/erse )is ar%y /re/aratory to t)is logistic contest and3 re%aining )i%self at ,Et6en3 sout) of ,ei/6ig3 sent Pa//en)ei% (it) a su&stantial force to "alle3 t(enty %iles a(ay. But !allenstein %isDudged *usta+uss intent3 and ()en t)e 9ing learned of !allensteins dis/ersal3 )e /ro%/tly %o+ed to(ard !allensteins /osition at ,Et6en. Realising t)at a retreat 1@>

(ould ena&le t)e 9ing to unite (it) t)e Sa-on ar%y and reluctant to a&andon )is /osition &et(een t)e t(o ene%y ar%ies or )is co%%unication (it) ustria and Pa//en)ei%3 !allenstein resol+ed to fig)t t)e defensi+e &attle t)at )e (as confident *usta+us (ould grant )i%. Making t)e &est use of t)e flat terrain3 !allenstein3 afflicted &y gout and carried in a c)air3 /laced )is rig)t flank on a +illage3 /osting artillery near&y on a rise ()ere it could enfilade t)e front3 and co+ered )is left flank (it) t)e +ery inade.uate o&stacle of a s%all strea%. "ere )e arrayed all of )is ca+alry. In front of )is ar%y )e %ade t)e %ost of a road flanked &y t(o s)allo( ditc)es. 0)e one on t)e side of t)e S(edis) ar%y )e dee/ened3 t)ro(ing u/ t)e dirt to(ard t)e ene%y so t)at )is %usketeers could stand in t)e ditc) and fire o+er a /ara/et. 0)e ditc) on t)e ot)er side of t)e road )e dee/ened %ore3 t)ro(ing u/ t)e dirt on t)e side a(ay fro% t)e S(edes. 0)is created a second /ara/et3 one /rotected &y a ditc) and sufficiently ele+ated so t)at t)e %usketeers &e)ind it could fire o+er t)e )eads of t)ose in t)e ot)er ditc). In addition to t)ese con+entional /re/arations3 !allenstein de%onstrated )is fle-i&ility &y ado/ting s%aller for%ations3 no %ore t)an ten ranks dee/3 and arraying t)e% in t(o lines. 'or )is ca+alry )e e%/loyed a s)allo(er arrange%ent and instructed t)e% to e%ulate t)e S(edis) tactic of s)ock action. lso in t)e S(edis) fas)ion3 )e su//orted )is ca+alry (it) so%e %usketeers and )is infantry (it) a fe( lig)t guns. 0)us /re/ared3 )e a(aited t)e S(edes and3 %ore an-iously3 t)e arri+al of t)e redou&ta&le Pa//en)ei% ()o (as riding fro% "alle (it) )is ?3>>> ca+alry to su//ort )is c)ief in t)e &attle. Reac)ing !allensteins /osition in t)e late afternoon3 *usta+us /laced )is ar%y in &attle array3 /re/aratory to an early %orning ad+ance to decide t)e &attle &efore t)e arri+al of Pa//en)ei%. !it)out Pa//en)ei%s ca+alry3 !allensteins I%/erial force )ad a&out 1=3>>> %en3 )alf ca+alry3 and t)e S(edes a&out 1@3>>>3 one#t)ird ca+alry. 0)e S(edes ado/ted t)eir traditional for%ation3 (it) ca+alry on &ot) flanks3 t)e &est ca+alry occu/ying t)e rig)t3 for t)e 9ing /lanned to c)arge t)e I%/erial ar%ys o/en left flank and t)en attack t)e infantry in flank and rear. But a %ist delayed t)e S(edis) assault until ele+en oclock3 and3 Dust as t)e S(edis) ca+alry on t)e rig)t )ad defeated t)e o//osing I%/erial )orse%en and (as ready to turn against t)e infantry3 Pa//en)ei% arri+ed and turned t)e tide of t)e crucial ca+alry &attle. Mean()ile3 t)e infantry )ad ad+anced3 led &y its 9ing ()o recei+ed a %usket#&all in t)e ar% &ut continued at t)e )ead of )is %en3 defeated t)e %usketeers )olding t)e ditc)es and3 (it) t)e ca+alry on its left3 engaged in an indecisi+e struggle (it) t)e %ain I%/erial line. 0)e tide of t)e ca+alry &attle on t)e S(edis) rig)t turned again ()en Pa//en)ei%3 %ortally (ounded &y a cannon&all3 could no longer su//ly )is inco%/ara&le leaders)i/. But Dust as t)e S(edis) ca+alry again triu%/)ed and once %ore &egan to attack !allensteins infantry3 t)e %ist returned and +irtually )alted t)e &attle. !allenstein %ade t)e %ost of t)e lull to send a &ra+e and e-/ert leader3 5tta+io Piccolo%ini3 and )is re%aining ca+alry to )is left ()ere3 ()en t)e %ist lifted3 )is )orse%en3 ins/ired &y t)e ne(s of *usta+uss deat) and Piccolo%inis +igorous and courageous leaders)i/3 restored t)e situation on !allensteins (eak left. Piccolo%ini3 ()o )ad fi+e )orses s)ot fro% under )i%3 sur+i+ed si- &ullet (ounds to &eco%e t)e 2%/erors co%%ander in c)ief and a Prince of t)e "oly Ro%an 2%/ire.

+is ositions and A(tions at &0t1en Back

1@1

It looked as if !allenstein )ad (on t)e &attle &y successfully defending )is /osition. But a strong attack &y S(edis) soldiers3 an-ious to a+enge t)e deat) of t)e 9ing3 finally (on on t)eir left3 carrying t)e +illage of ,Et6en3 t)e rise in t)e ground3 and t)e guns3 toget)er constituting t)e strongest /art of t)e I%/erial /osition. 0)oug) t)e sun )ad set and )is line still re%ained intact3 t)e discouraged !allenstein resol+ed to retreat and3 co+ered &y )is ca+alry and su//orted &y t)e arri+al of Pa//en)ei%s infantry3 (it)dre( (it)out difficulty. %ore deter%ined general %ig)t )a+e retained )is /osition and clai%ed +ictory at t)e Battle of ,Et6en. 0)e S(edes3 )a+ing lost a t)ird of t)eir ar%y3 /ro+ed too de&ilitated to /ursue3 e+en t)oug) t)e I%/erialists )ad suffered in at least t)e sa%e /ro/ortion. If t)e &attle )ad an essentially neutral tactical i%/act3 it /roduced +alua&le strategic results ()en !allenstein decided to (it)dra( to Bo)e%ia3 lea+ing Sa-ony to t)e S(edes and re%o+ing t)e t)reat to t)e S(edis) /osition in nort)ern *er%any. !allenstein3 too3 soon /assed fro% t)e scene3 t)e +icti% of assassins ()o rid t)e 2%/eror of )is too /o(erful and inde/endent su&ordinate. Back

(he m'act of Gustavus%s (actics

*usta+uss deat) in &attle did not end )is tactical inno+ations. 5n t)e contrary3 as !allensteins ado/tion of %ost of t)eir funda%ental conce/ts fores)ado(ed3 t)ey s/read t)roug)out !estern 2uro/e. *usta+uss %odification of ca+alry doctrine3 (it) its stress on s)ock action in co%&at (it) ot)er ca+alry3 &eca%e standard3 e+en t)oug) %ost 2uro/ean ca+alry %ade %ore e-tensi+e use of t)eir /istols t)an *usta+us (ould )a+e a//ro+ed. But t)is a%end%ent only restored to e-isting ca+alry its real +ersatility t)at 'renc) ca+alry (ell e-e%/lified in t)e latter /art of t)e si-teent) century. 0)e %ost enduring legacy of *usta+uss c)anges (as %o+ing t)e infantry one %ore ste/ in its e+olution as t)e %aDor force on t)e &attlefield. 0)e S(iss /ike#ar%ed s.uare )ad introduced an infantry t)at could de/enda&ly resist a ca+alry c)arge fro% any direction3 and S(iss drill and aggressi+eness ga+e t)eir s.uares t)e a&ility to attack. 5riginally lig)t infantry )ad /layed no role in t)e S(iss infantry syste%3 &ut t)e /resence of an i%/regna&le s.uare ga+e lig)t infantry an o//ortunity to /erfor% on a &attlefield do%inated &y )ea+y ca+alry. 2arlier lig)t infantry )ad )ad a strictly defensi+e role in a defensi+e &attle3 as in t)e 2nglis) syste%3 ()ic) /laced t)eir long&o(%en &e)ind a /)ysical o&stacle. Since drilled and organised S(iss )ea+y infantry3 unlike t)e dis%ounted 2nglis) ca+alry3 could %o+e a&out t)e &attlefield3 so also could lig)t infantry ()ic)3 finding security (it) t)e /ike%en3 could /artici/ate in any kind of &attle and not )a+e to rely on o&stacles for defence.

1@2

0)e S(iss infantry t)us &eca%e a uni+ersal %odel. t t)e sa%e ti%e t)e cross&o(%en and ar.ue&usiers gradually assu%ed %ore i%/ortance &ecause t)e /ike%en3 usually lacking t)e drill3 co)esion3 and aggressi+eness of t)e genuine S(iss /roduct3 did not )a+e t)e %o&ility of t)e S(iss for%ations. 0)e lig)t infantry /ro+ided an offensi+e ele%ent: de/loyed as skir%is)ers3 its %en could s)oot at t)e ene%ys /ike%en and3 if t)ey could find co+er3 e+en inDure t)e ca+alry. 0)e increasing /o(er of t)e ar.ue&us3 and es/ecially t)e %usket3 %ade infantry%en dangerous to fully ar%oured %en and t)eir )orses. 0)e de+elo/%ent of reiter ca+alry and its /istol attack against /ike%en increased t)e i%/ortance of %usketeers3 no( regarded as indis/ensa&le for /rotecting t)e )ea+y infantry fro% ca+alry%ens /istols. r.ue&usiers and %usketeers ca%e to /lay t)e sa%e role as t)e cross&o(%en in t)e $rusaders (ars (it) 0urkis) lig)t ca+alry. 0)e %an/o(er syste% of t)e si-teent) century accentuated t)e offensi+e +alue of lig)t infantry. 0)e for%al dis&and%ent of %ercenary ar%ies after eac) ca%/aign often /re+ented t)e /ike%en fro% )a+ing t)e drill and ac.uiring t)e co)esion t)at t)e S(iss co%%unity syste% )ad gi+en to its forces. But t)is sa%e %an/o(er syste% did not %ilitate against t)e +alue of t)e lig)t infantry3 ()ic) traditionally foug)t as indi+iduals3 relying for its efficacy to a large degree on t)e skill and initiati+e of eac) ar.ue&usier and %usketeer3 e-ce/t ()en t)ey Doined t)e /ike for%ation to find refuge fro% and )el/ resist a ca+alry attack. In any case3 ()en %usketeers fired3 t)ey /erfor%ed an indi+idual act3 re.uiring a loose for%ation at &est. 0)roug) se+eral ca%/aigns +eteran /rofessionals (ould )a+e ac.uired t)e skills of skir%is)ing and firing. But e.ually e-/erienced /ike%en3 ()o often ser+ed (it) unfa%iliar co%/atriots3 could not dis/lay t)e sa%e effecti+eness (it) tactics t)at de/ended on coo/eration. So t)e /ro/ortion of lig)t infantry rose3 in /art &ecause t)e %an/o(er syste% retarded its skill de+elo/%ent less t)an it did t)e )ea+y infantrys. t t)e sa%e ti%e it de/ri+ed t)e /oorly drilled /ike%en of %uc) of t)eir offensi+e /otential. 0)e ad+ent of t)e reiter ca+alry%an increased t)e i%/ortance of t)e lig)t infantry%an3 not Dust &ecause of )is role in /rotecting t)e /ike%an fro% t)e )orse%ans /istol &ut &ecause t)e reiter3 in order to use )is /istol3 )ad discarded t)e lance and ado/ted t)e sa&re as )is s)ock (ea/on. No longer faced (it) t)e c)arge of a %edie+al lancer3 t)e /ike%an lost so%e of )is significance &ecause reiter ca+alry lacked t)e sa%e /o(er in s)ock action against /ike#ar%ed3 )ea+y infantry. 0)e de+elo/%ent of /istol tactics for co%&at &et(een ca+alry also reduced t)e ca+alrys ca/a&ility and inclination to e-ecute a +igorous and dangerous c)arge against a line of /ike%en. So not only )ad t)e lig)t infantry &eco%e essential to /rotect t)e )ea+y infantry fro% /istol fire3 &ut t)e (eaker ca+alry attack re.uired /ro/ortionately fe(er /ike%en to (it)stand it. By t)e se+enteent) century t)e t(o ar%s )ad &eco%e full /artners3 e.ual in t)e /ro%inence of t)eir roles and in t)eir nu%&ers. *usta+us3 t)roug) drill and doctrine3 tried to restore to t)e /ike%en t)eir old offensi+e ca/a&ility7 &ut as )is ar%ies soon ca%e to consist largely of *er%an %ercenaries3 t)is /art of )is ne( tactical doctrine failed to /ersist3 +itiated &y t)e /re+ailing syste% and attitudes. 0)e c)ange in t)e (ages /aid t)e t(o (ea/on syste%s reflected t)e %odification in t)e co%/arati+e tactical +alue and .uality of /erfor%ance of t)e lig)t and )ea+y infantry. t t)e &eginning of t)e 0)irty :ears !ar t)e /ike%an recei+ed slig)tly &etter /ay t)an t)e ar.ue&usier or %usketeer3 &ut &y t)e end of t)e (ar t)e gunner recei+ed nearly t(ice t)e /ay of t)e /ike%an. !allenstein )ad already co%/lained t)at t)e (orst recruits recei+ed /ikes3 and t)e /ay and tactical e-/ectations reflected t)is de+elo/%ent. 0)us t)e alterations of Maurice and *usta+us fitted into a /rocess t)at )ad &een going on for %ore t)an a century. *usta+uss c)anges furt)er accentuated t)e role of t)e lig)t infantry &y gi+ing it a %aDor role in resisting a ca+alry attack. By ar%ing all )and#gunners (it) t)e %ore for%ida&le %usket and /ro+iding for +olley firing3 ()ic) ena&led t)e% to concentrate t)eir fire at t)e critical %o%ent3 t)e %usketeers3 instead of taking refuge &e)ind t)e /ike3 could &eco%e /artners in

1@?

re/elling a ca+alry c)arge. By ado/ting a linear for%ation Maurice and *usta+us fully recognised t)e %odifications t)at )ad occurred since t)e introduction of t)e S(iss s.uare. If /ike%en )ad originally needed a s.uare of fifty ranks and fifty files to resist t)e deter%ined and skilful attack of lance#ar%ed3 fully ar%oured %edie+al ca+alry3 t)ey )ardly needed suc) de/t) to defeat t)e c)arge of /artially ar%oured %en attacking (it) sa&res. 0)e linear for%ation3 only fi+e or si- dee/3 could resist suc) an onslaug)t e.ually (ell. 2+en t)e /ike &eca%e s)orter3 if only &ecause it no longer needed to outreac) t)e lance. 0)e econo%y in %en %ade /ossi&le &y t)e t)in for%ations facilitated t)e use of t(o lines3 t)us &uilding a reser+e into t)e ar%ys array. Most of t)ese c)anges )ad started in t)e S/anis) syste%3 including t)e s%aller for%ations and t)e i%/ro+ed coordination &et(een t)e lig)t and )ea+y infantry. 'or t)is reason also *usta+uss inno+ations s/read ra/idly3 and t)ey (orked (ell3 in s/ite of t)e increased s)ock /o(er engendered &y *usta+uss ne( ca+alry doctrine of +igorous c)arges. 0)e t)inner for%ations of /ike3 assisted &y +olleys fro% t)e %usketeers3 )ad a%/le defensi+e /o(er to resist a deter%ined c)arge of not Dust sa&re#ar%ed )ea+y ca+alry &ut e+en of t)e Polis) lancers t)at *usta+uss infantry )ad faced successfully. *usta+us )ad created a tactical syste% like t)e Ro%an one3 (it) its t(o lines and its drill3 necessary for t)e %usketeers to fire t)eir +olleys and for t)e second line to %o+e in good order if it (ere to fulfil its function as a reser+e. But t)e ne( arrange%ent )ad greater +ersatility t)an t)e Ro%an &ecause (it) <> /ercent lig)t infantry it could resist a Part)ian attack &y /istoleers as (ell as a c)arge &y *ot)ic ca+alry. *usta+uss Ro%an sc)e%e )ad one i%/ortant dra(&ack: its lack of all#around /rotection /ro+ided &y for%ations %odelled on t)e S(iss s.uare. line fi+e ranks dee/ t)at could face only one direction %eant +ulnera&le flanks and an assaila&le rear. In t)is res/ect suc) for%ations differed not at all fro% t)e Ro%an and3 like t)e Ro%ans3 )ad t)e resources of a second line to su//ort t)e first. nd disci/line3 drill3 and articulation co%/ara&le to t)at of t)e Ro%ans /ro+ided anot)er resource for t)e safeguarding of flank and rear. second disad+antage of t)e ne( tactical for%ation lay in t)e loss of %o&ility in)erent in t)e ado/tion of t)e linear for%ation of t)e *reeks and Ro%ans. !)ereas S(iss s.uares could %o+e for(ard in a %utually su//orting relations)i/ (it)out concern to kee/ t)eir front aligned &ecause eac) co+ered its o(n flanks3 a linier for%ation )ad to kee/ eac) for%ation on t)e sa%e line as t)e ot)ers. In addition3 eac) unit3 si- dee/ (it) a front of a )undred or %ore3 )ad trou&le in kee/ing its o(n for%ation in line3 a /ro&le% t)at a s.uare (it) )alf t)e front ne+er encountered. 'urt)er3 good align%ent )ad /articular i%/ortance for t)e %usketeers ()o could s)oot one anot)er if t)ey did not stand s)oulder to s)oulder ()en t)ey fired t)eir +olley. 0)e deficient %o&ility of a line )ad s)o(n itself in t)e e-/erience of t)e ancients. 2/a%inondas at ,euctra )ad de%onstrated t)e su/erior %o&ility of a s.uare as )e attacked t)e S/artan line &y diagonal %o+e%ent across t)e &attlefield. ,ater t)e Scots and S(iss )ad often s)o(n t)e &attlefield %o&ility of t)eir solid for%ations. But t)e loss in %o&ility re%ained largely in t)eory &ecause t)e undrilled /ike%en of t)e 0)irty :ears !ar could not e-/loit t)e %o&ility in)erent in t)e solid for%ations. 2+en 0illys +eterans )ad %o+ed /onderously at Breitenfeld3 t)e (ell#drilled S(edis) lines e.ualling t)e% in %o&ility. *usta+us )ad %arkedly increased fire/o(er &y gi+ing e+ery lig)t infantry%an a %usket3 &ut )is efforts to aug%ent t)e role of artillery )ad less i%/act. "is lig)t artillery /iece3 ()ic) %en could %o+e in &attle3 still lacked enoug) %o&ility to /ro+ide %uc) assistance in t)e offensi+e. More %o&ility for t)e guns %ade it easier for artillery to kee/ u/ (it) t)e ar%y on t)e %arc) and ga+e it greater assurance of a /art in t)e &attle. :et t)at role re%ained largely defensi+e3 and i%/ro+e%ents in artillery continued to fa+our t)e defence &ecause t)e defending line )ad t)e added fire/o(er of artillery and t)e attacking line usually did not. 0)e ado/tion of t)e linear syste% did di%inis) t)e +ulnera&ility of infantry to long#range artillery fire &ecause a cannon&all could go t)roug) only siranks. But t)is raised t)e +alue of enfilade fire and co%%anders like !allenstein at ,Et6en soug)t

1@4

to /lace t)eir artillery on a flank ()ere it could fire do(n an ene%ys line or direct its &alls on a diagonal /at) t)roug) an o//osing linear for%ation. $a+alry arrayed in a linear for%ation for s)ock action rat)er t)an in de/t) for t)e caracole (it) /istols3 gained so%e /rotection fro% t)e destructi+eness of long#range artillery fire &ut re%ained +ulnera&le to enfilade fire. rtillery ac.uired greater effecti+eness fro% an i%/ro+e%ent in its tec)ni.ue. 5n le+el terrain a cannon&all t)at struck t)e ground at a s)allo( angle (ould ricoc)et and ski/ along t)e ground3 t)e (ay a flat rock (ill often ski/ on (ater. Ricoc)et fire intensified t)e danger of cannon&alls to troo/s &ecause t)ey usually stayed &elo( t)e )eig)t of a %ans )ead and3 in s/ite of t)e decreased +elocity fro% contact (it) t)e ground3 re%ained dangerous to )u%an &eings and )orses. Ricoc)et fire %itigated artillerys ineffecti+eness on t)e offensi+e7 it /ro+ided a %ore /otent %et)od of attacking ene%y for%ations /rior to an onslaug)t. But once friendly troo/s &egan t)eir assault3 artillery3 unless acco%/anying t)e attacking troo/s3 usually )ad to cease firing for fear of )itting its o(n %en. rtillery re%ained essentially /o(erful3 &ut tactically i%%o&ile3 lig)t infantry. Mo+a&le enoug) to take t)e field and /artici/ate in &attle3 it still lacked t)e %o&ility c)aracteristic of lig)t infantry (it) its /orta&le %issile (ea/ons. Its role in &attle rese%&led t)at of t)e 2nglis) long&o(%en in t)eir li%itation to t)e defensi+e. But in sieges3 it /layed t)e /re%ier role in &ot) attack and defence3 and its range and /o(er (it) eit)er round or gra/e s)ot ga+e t)e guns an a(eso%e +ersatility and deadliness. 0)e tradition of t)e (eaker &lo( of t)e %issile (ea/on )ad disa//eared (it) t)e %usket3 &ut t)e artillerys strengt) d(arfed %usket3 lance3 and s(ord. 0)roug)out t)eir s/read t)roug)out 2uro/e3 *usta+uss c)anges suffered dilution in letter and s/irit7 all ar%ies e+entually ado/ted t)e t(o#line &attle array and t)e lines for /ike%en t)at sacrificed all#around defence. But t)e linear for%ations ena&led t)e t(o lines to %ake an essentially continuous front o+er a distance as great as /re+iously co+ered &y a single line of t)e old dee/ for%ations. n all#around defence t)roug) de/t) in t)e /ike for%ation (ould )a+e re.uired eit)er a s)orter line3 one easily o+erla//ed and outflanked &y an ene%y (it) s)allo( linear for%ations3 or a line t)at left suc) large ga/s &et(een t)e units t)at it could )ardly interdict t)e /assage of ca+alry or e+en of ene%y infantry for%ations. 0)us t)e use of s%aller for%ations arrayed in t(o lines to /ro+ide a reser+e also carried (it) it t)e linear conce/t of de/loy%ent. s t)e syste% e+ol+ed t)roug)out t)e re%ainder of t)e se+enteent) century3 a su&tle s)ift took /lace3 and t)e %usketeer took e+en greater /recedence o+er t)e /ike%an. 0)e (ides/read use of slo(er#&urning gun/o(der ena&led t)e e-/losi+e c)arge to gi+e t)e &all a %ore sustained i%/etus and &y %aking t)e %ost of t)e %uskets long &arrel increasing t)e +elocity of t)e )ea+y &ullet. 0)oug) t)e %atc)lock %usket re%ained unrelia&le and difficult to fire %ore often t)an once a %inute3 its great /o(er and its danger at a range of 2<> yards %eant t)at %usketeers needed less )el/ fro% t)e /ike%en in /rotecting t)e%sel+es against ca+alry. 0)e en)ance%ent of t)e i%/ortance of fire/o(er also argued for a linear for%ation in ()ic) e+ery %usketeer could use )is (ea/on. 2+en if generals tended to re%ain content (it) an essentially defensi+e role for /ike%en3 *usta+uss tactical %et)od )ad %ade a funda%ental inno+ation in its re.uire%ent t)at lig)t infantry )a+e t)e unified and coo/erati+e action t)at only drill could /ro+ide. Instead of t)eir usual role as skir%is)ers and t)eir traditional reliance on indi+idual initiati+e3 t)e lig)t infantry%en using t)e ne( /lan of +olley firing in ranks found it necessary to %arc) toget)er and %aintain t)eir inter+al and distance as (ell as to load at t)e sa%e rate and fire on co%%and. 2+en if co%%anders )ad contented t)e%sel+es (it) a defensi+e role for t)e lig)t infantry3 as %any did (it) t)eir /ike%en3 t)e reliance on +olleys for defence %ade drill i%/erati+e. 0)e ne( tactics (ould /lace undrilled troo/s at a serious tactical disad+antage ()en t)ey faced an ade.uately drilled o//onent.

1@<

s t)e century (ore on3 tactics increasingly stressed t)e i%/ro+e%ent of t)e fire/o(er of t)e infantry. Neglecting *usta+uss idea of restoring t)e /ike%ens offensi+e %o&ility3 ar%ies soug)t offensi+e as (ell as defensi+e strengt) t)roug) %ore nu%erous and &etter drilled %usketeers. 0)e /ro/ortion of /ike%en t)us declined until it fell as lo( as one#fourt) of t)e ()ole of t)e infantry. $o%&ats &et(een infantry tended to &eco%e contests of lig)t infantry using t)eir %issile (ea/ons &ut arrayed in lines3 %uc) as Persian &o(%en (ould )a+e foug)t eac) ot)er. 0)e standard infantry unit )ad &eco%e t)e &attalion3 usually a&out =>> or C>> strong3 ()ic) arrayed itself (it) its /ike%en grou/ed in t)e centre and %usketeers on eit)er flank3 &ot) fi+e ranks dee/. If a ca+alry c)arge s)ould see% so %enacing t)at it i%/erilled t)e &attalions %usketeers3 t)e /ike%en for%ed a s.uare (it)in ()ic) so%e %usketeers took refuge ()ile t)e re%ainder /laced t)e%sel+es &et(een t)e /ikes to use t)eir fire to )el/ t)e /ike%en defend against t)e ca+alry. 0)e solidity of t)e for%ation and t)e fire of t)e %usketeers ena&led t)e t)in line of /ike%en to turn &ack t)e c)arge of ca+alry ar%ed (it) sa&res. But t)e &attalions usual for%ation (as far fro% co%/act3 since t)e loading of t)e %atc)lock (it) its &urning %atc) re.uired at least one yard &et(een %usketeers. 0o engage t)e )ostile infantry3 t)e &attalion3 fi+e ranks dee/ (it) as %any as 1<> %en a&reast3 %o+ed slo(ly for(ard3 carefully kee/ing its align%ent3 until less t)an 1>> yards fro% t)e ene%y. 0)en t)e o//osing %usketeers &egan to fire at one anot)er3 eit)er eac) rank firing a +olley and %o+ing to t)e rear to reload3 or all ranks fro% different /ortions of t)e line %o+ing for(ard3 s/reading out to fire3 and t)en failing &ack to t)eir original /ositions to reload ()ile anot)er grou/ %o+ed out to fire. Since soldiers could only carry out t)eir co%/licated reloading /rocedures ()ile standing erect3 &ot) forces /resented e-cellent targets for t)e inaccurate &ut /o(erful %usket unless3 as !allenstein )ad /ro+ided at ,Et6en3 one )ad t)e ad+antage of a /ara/et. 0)e contest ter%inated ()en one side fled3 t)e s%all nu%&er of /ike%en )a+ing no role e-ce/t as insurance against a ca+alry c)arge. !it) co%&at li%ited to t)e lig)t infantrys %issiles3 ne+er in t)eory and not too often in /ractice did &attles in+ol+e %uc) s)ock action &et(een )ostile infantry3 e+en t)oug) %usketeers often carried s(ords. In s/ite of its s%aller and /resu%a&ly %ore %o&ile units3 t)e linear syste% did not gi+e t)e infantry %ore %o&ility. *enerals )ad no re%edy for t)e need to %o+e slo(ly and carefully to kee/ t)e long front in align%ent. 0)e *reek /)alan- and t)e Ro%an legion )ad si%ilar /ro&le%s in t)eir ad+ances and )ad a /articular concern to /re+ent ga/s in t)e lines. 0)e Ro%ans e+entually left o/enings t)at t)e second#line %ani/les filled &efore t)e first line %ade contact (it) t)e ene%y. *a/s in a line of s/ear%en or s(ords%en created flanks and /er%itted t)e ene%y )ea+y infantry to /enetrate and attack. 0)e for%ation of t)e late se+enteent)#century line follo(ed Ro%an /ractice in its use of se/arate &attalions (it) inter+als as /art of t)e for%ation of eac) of t)e lines. But unlike t)e Ro%ans (it) t)eir )ea+y infantry line3 t)e se+enteent)#century generals %ade no effort to fill t)e s/aces. Because t)eir /redo%inantly lig)t infantry force did not e-/ect to close (it) t)e ene%y3 t)e generals did not fear t)e internal flanks t)at t)e o/enings created. In any case3 t)e %usketeers could co+er t)ese (it) t)eir fire. But t)e late se+enteent)#century lig)t infantry line )ad its o(n /ro&le%s. 0)e %arc) for(ard could not unduly enlarge t)e inter+al &et(een any t(o &attalions &ecause a (ide )ole (ould create a (eak s/ot ()ere t)e ene%y could concentrate t)e fire of t)ree of )is &attalions against t)e t(o t)at )ad lost t)eir /ro/er inter+al during t)e ad+ance. not)er difficulty3 one s/ecial to t)e lig)t infantry3 )ad its root in t)e organisation of t)e line. In addition to its fi+e ranks3 s)allo( co%/ared to t)e dee/er *reek and Ro%an for%ation3 t)e line3 (it) its drills to deli+er fire3 not only de/ended on eac) %an kee/ing )is /ro/er /lace in )is rank and fire3 &ut also re.uired t)at )e kee/ t)e /ro/er s/acing and distance due to t)e co%/le-ity and danger of loading and firing a %atc)lock. So t)e %usketeers needed to %aintain t)eir for%ation /recisely to e-ecute t)eir s)ooting and reloading

1@=

and as a necessary /recaution against t)e %atc)es lig)ting t)e /o(der eac) %an carried and against t)e +ery real danger of t)e %usketeers s)ooting eac) ot)er ()ile firing on a s%oky &attlefield fro% a co%/ressed3 distorted3 or disarranged for%ation. In s/ite of t)e good disci/line and drill to ()ic) co%%anders su&Dected t)eir %usketeers3 an ar%y lacked %uc) articulation &eyond t)at /ro+ided &y its di+ision into /er%anently constituted &attalions. 0)oug) t)e &attalions )ad su&di+ision into a&out a do6en co%/anies co%%anded &y ca/tains3 t)ese ne+er %anoeu+red inde/endently. 0)e re.uire%ents of fire disci/line and t)e /ro/er align%ent of t)e &attalion on itself and (it) t)e ot)ers ga+e t)e co%/anies no tactical role in &attle e-ce/t ()en se/arate grou/s in t)e &attalion carried out t)e firing. In a sense3 t)e &attalion ca%e under a tyranny of t)e re.uire%ents of fire disci/line. !)ereas t)e Ro%ans )ad needed se/arately %anoeu+ra&le %ani/les and centuries for t)e second line to fill t)e ga/s in t)e first3 t)e late se+enteent)#century line lacked any incenti+e to de+elo/ suc) su&di+ision and effecti+e articulation since se/arately %anoeu+ring co%/anies on t)e &attlefield (ould &reak t)e continuity of t)e front3 di%inis) t)e lines fire/o(er and could easily %ask t)e fire of /art of t)e line or cause friendly for%ations to fire at eac) ot)er. Si%ilarly3 no /er%anent )ig)er unit t)an t)e &attalion e-isted3 t)oug) co%%anders often for%ed ad#)oc &rigades. linear syste% t)at treated t)e entire ar%ys front as a unit )ad no tactical /lace for /er%anent grou/ings of &attalions3 any %ore t)an it could %ake %uc) use of t)e ca/a&ilities for %anoeu+re i%/licit in t)e e-istence of co%/anies. !it)out an o&+ious need for inde/endent action &y t)e &attalions co%/anies or to su//ly a /er%anent organisation of &rigades3 t)e ne( ar%ies3 t)oug) linear like t)e Ro%an3 lacked t)e Ro%an ar%ys articulation and t)erefore its /o(er to %anoeu+re and its resilience ()en it lost its order. !it) a %ore co%/le- and easily distur&ed for%ation and %any %ore %en to coordinate3 infantry lacked t)e /o(er of offensi+e action t)at t)e S(iss s.uares )ad dis/layed t(o centuries earlier. 0)oug) essentially su&stituting lig)t for )ea+y infantry3 t)e 2uro/eans )ad at last reac)ed t)e identical tactical situation as t)e le-andrian and Ro%an ar%ies )ad. $a+alry (ould )a+e to /lay t)e sa%e decisi+e role t)at it )ad in ancient ti%es. 0)e linear syste% and t)e &attalions lack of an all#around defence ca/a&ility %ade t)e infantry /articularly +ulnera&le to ca+alry attacks on its flanks. nd3 unlike Ro%an )ea+y infantry3 t)e %usketeers could not /rotect t)e%sel+es against s)ock action &y sa&re#ar%ed ca+alry. By co%/arison (it) t)e Ro%ans3 t)ey lacked t)e le+el of articulation t)at )ad often ena&led Ro%an )ea+y infantry to %anoeu+re so as to /resent a front to )ea+y ca+alry and e+en3 at P)arsalus3 to take t)e offensi+e against t)e )ea+y ca+alry atte%/ting to attack t)e infantrys flank. 0)us3 to its intrinsic (ea/on#syste% ad+antage o+er infantry &ecause it could use /istols against /ike%en and sa&res against %usketeers3 ca+alry3 t)roug) its &etter %o&ility3 could e-/loit infantrys increased +ulnera&ility in a linear array. !it) an infantry %ore e-/osed to ca+alry and less a&le to take t)e offensi+e against ene%y infantry3 late se+enteent)# century ar%ies not sur/risingly /ossessed a far#)ig)er /ro/ortion of ca+alry to infantry t)an did Ro%an ar%ies. 0)e ne( syste% ga+e t)e %ounted %en t)e e-act role t)ey )ad )ad under le-ander t)e *reat. $usto%arily de/loyed on t)e flanks as in ancient ti%es3 t)e ca+alry )ad as its first o&Decti+e t)e defeat of t)e ene%ys ca+alry7 t)is %ission co%/leted3 t)e )orse%en3 like "anni&als at $annae3 ai%ed to attack t)e flank and rear of t)e ene%y infantry. 'or t)is task t)e ca+alry )ad t)e a//ro/riate attri&utes of greater %o&ility and %ini%u% re.uire%ents for careful array /rior to e-ecuting its attack. If offensi+e troo/s %ay &e defined as t)ose t)at )a+e %o&ility su/erior to t)at of t)eir i%%ediate o//onents and t)e a&ility to go into action (it)out delay3 ca+alry fully %et t)ese criteria on t)e &attlefield created &y *usta+uss refor%s. Mo+ing at a trot3 (ell#trained )orse%en could kee/ t)eir for%ation in t)ree lines and e-ecute alterations in direction t)at3 after t)e defeat of t)e o//osing ca+alry3 ena&led t)e% i%%ediately to c)arge (it) t)eir sa&res t)e flank or rear of t)e lines of ene%y %usketeers. ny effort to conduct suc) an attack (it) slo(#%o+ing3 difficult#to# de/loy infantry (ould )a+e t)e )andica/ of suc) a sluggis) ad+ance and ti%e#consu%ing and 1@C

a(k(ard de+iation in direction t)at t)e ene%y infantry (ould )a+e a%/le ti%e to c)ange its front to %eet t)e attack. $a+alrys greater %o&ility and ease of going into action %ade it ideal for t)e offensi+e3 t)at is3 for carrying out a %o+e%ent to attack t)e ene%ys (eakness3 t)e flank or rear. In co%&at of ca+alry against ca+alry3 t)e S(edis) tactic of relying on t)e s)ock action of t)e c)arge (it) sa&re3 t)oug) it affected all 2uro/ean ca+alry3 did not totally dis/lace reliance on t)e /istol3 %any ca+alry firing a /istol +olley /rior to c)arging t)e ene%y ca+alry. $a+alry usually used s)ock action e-clusi+ely against %usketeers &ecause a delay to fire /istols %ig)t e-/ose t)e ca+alry to anot)er +olley fro% t)e infantrys far %ore for%ida&le %uskets. So %ost ca+alry ado/ted t)e s)allo( for%ation in t)ree lines3 ()ic) facilitated s)ock action3 &ut continued to e%/loy t)eir /istols in ca+alry engage%ents as (ell as to rely on t)e% to /re/are a c)arge against /ike%en un/rotected &y %usketeers. *enerals recognised t)e role of ca+alry as t)e (ea/on syste% t)at )ad t)e necessary offensi+e ca/a&ilities to decide t)e &attle. s in ancient &attles3 infantry foug)t infantry3 often indecisi+ely3 (it) t)e defender )a+ing t)e &enefit of c)oosing )is ground3 taking ad+antage of natural o&stacles3 and t)e freedo% fro% t)e distur&ance to )is for%ation caused &y a %arc) to attack7 and ca+alry foug)t ca+alry3 eac) assu%ing t)e offensi+e &ecause t)e nature of t)e )orse %ade it unsuita&le for recei+ing c)arges at t)e )alt. !it)out a lance to use as a /ike and (it) a%/le infantry forces on t)e &attlefield3 no ca+alry dis%ounted to fig)t e-ce/t t)e dragoons ()o3 in addition to acting as ca+alry3 )ad recei+ed t)e (ea/on and training to fig)t as %usketeers. 0)e Battle of Rocroi in 1=4? (ell illustrates t)e decisi+e role of ca+alry. 0)e 'renc)3 under t)e &rilliant young son of t)e Prince of $ond;3 ad+anced to relie+e t)e fortress of Rocroi3 &esieged &y a S/anis) ar%y. $onfident of )is +eterans in a defensi+e &attle3 t)e S/anis) co%%ander arrayed )is ar%y to defend )is siege. 0)e 'renc)3 (illing to fig)t to raise t)e siege3 %o+ed u/3 t)e S/aniards cannonaded t)e% at long range as t)ey de+oted %uc) of t)e day to for%ing t)eir ar%y into line of &attle. 2ac) force )ad t(o lines of infantry (it) t)e ca+alry on t)e (ings3 &ut t)e 'renc) )ad3 &e)ind t)eir second line3 an additional reser+e of infantry and ca+alry. +eteran of t)ree ca%/aigns3 t)e future Prince of $ond;3 aged t(enty#t(o on t)is day3 dis/layed all of t)e attri&utes t)at (ould %ake )i% one of t)e /re%ier generals of t)e age. "is eagerness to fig)t3 )is /o(er of .uick and fir% decision3 and )is dauntless &e)a+iour in ad+ersity all contri&uted to )is first +ictory. Personally co%%anding t)e ca+alry on )is rig)t3 $ond; o/ened t)e &attle (it) a skilful and i%/etuous attack in ()ic) t)e traditionally e-cellent 'renc) ca+alry defeated t)e %ounted S/aniards o//osing )i%. !it) /art of )is ca+alry /ursuing t)e defeated ene%y )orse%en3 $ond; )ad turned t)e re%ainder of )is %ounted force against t)e S/anis) infantry ()en )e learned of disaster on )is left. 5n t)e 'renc) left t)eir ca+alry )ad started its c)arge at too ra/id a gait and %et t)e ene%ys +igorous counter#c)arge (it) )orses (inded and ranks disordered. "a+ing defeated t)e 'renc) ca+alry3 t)e S/anis) )orse%en3 aided &y t)e infantry on t)eir rig)t3 attacked t)e 'renc) infantry and defeated &ot) lines. 5nly t)e /ro%/t action of t)e 'renc) reser+e /re+ented total disaster on t)e 'renc) left7 &ut t)eir /osition re%ained des/erate. $ond; i%%ediately gras/ed t)e situation and /ro%/tly led )is ca+alry around &e)ind t)e S/anis) infantry3 to t)e left of )is line ()ere )e attacked t)e +ictorious S/anis) )orse%en in t)eir rear3 dri+ing t)e% fro% t)e field in /anicky flig)t. "a+ing defeated all of t)e S/anis) )orse%en3 $ond; turned against t)e S/anis) infantry3 ()ic) )ad taken u/ a dense for%ation to resist ca+alry. fter first das)ing )is )orse%en in +ain against steady S/anis) +eterans3 $ond; t)en used )is artillery and %usketeers to create ga/s in t)e S/anis) ranks t)at )is ca+alry t)en e-/loited (it) a c)arge. Many S/aniards (ere killed ()en t)e 'renc) continued t)eir attack3 not realising t)at t)e S/aniards (ere trying to surrender. 0)e S/anis) suffered i%%ense losses in killed and /risoners a%ong t)eir infantry. fter t)e &attle a 'renc)%an 1@B

asked a S/anis) officer3 J"o( %any are youKL 0)e S/aniard re/lied... J$ount t)e dead and t)e /risoners # t)ey are all.L 0)e 'renc) lost a&out 1> /ercent of t)eir forces. t Rocroi t)e ca+alry (on t)e &attle3 and t)e infantry su//lied t)e casualties. 0)is o+erstates t)e case3 &ut t)e &attle does illustrate t)e crucial role of t)e ca+alry in /ro+iding t)e offensi+e ca/a&ility of t)e ar%y3 its %o&ility and case of de/loy%ent ena&ling it to attack t)e (eak flank and rear of t)e infantry. But ca+alry did not /lay a ne( role at Rocroi or in t)e t)inking of late se+enteent)#century generals. $a+alry )ad usually )ad t)e decisi+e offensi+e %ission in ancient3 By6antine3 and %edie+al ar%ies as (ell as in t)e si-teent) century. 5nly3 a failure to ca/italise on its offensi+e ca/a&ility of attacking t)e ene%ys (eak flank and rear )ad de+alued it in 'renc) co%&ats (it) t)e 2nglis)7 and t)e in+ulnera&ility of t)e S(iss s.uare )ad s)o(n again t)at )ea+y ca+alry alone could not defeat )ea+y infantry3 Dust as t)e S/anis) infantry )ad s)o(n again at Rocroi t)at no ca+alry could defeat an effecti+ely coo/erating grou/ of /ike%en and %usketeers. So t)e decisi+e role of ca+alry at Rocroi re/resented no c)ange in t)e traditional e-/loitation of ca+alrys distincti+e offensi+e attri&utes. Back

(he "ogistics of the "ate Seventeenth Century

0)e 0)irty :ears !ar %arked a (aters)ed in logistics3 for in t)e ensuing years t)e /ractices ad+ocated &y *usta+us and !allenstein ca%e to /re+ail in %ost ar%ies. 2ac) )ad soug)t to %ake (ar su//ort (ar3 not &y soldiers looting &ut &y co%%anders le+ying contri&utions. !allenstein )ad good success (it) t)is3 &ut *usta+us3 ai%ing to raise o+er 2>>3>>> %en3 finally fell into t)e error of recruiting %ore %en t)an )e could /ay. In 1=?23 ()en )is contri&utions &roug)t in less t)an one#fourt) of )is /ayroll3 t)e S(edis) ar%y %utinied. Raising %ore %en t)an an entre/reneur or go+ern%ent could afford &roug)t a&out /illaging &y t)e soldiers3 a conse.uence &ot) *usta+us and !allenstein a&)orred3 for t)ey kne( t)at looting soldiers destroyed t(ice as %uc) as t)ey took. Suc) destruction a%id inefficient use of resources not only reduced t)e si6e of t)e ar%ies t)at a region could i%%ediately su//ly &ut also often ruined its /roducti+e ca/acities for t)e su//ort of ar%ies in t)e future. Soldiers ()o )ad suc) a +i+id e-/erience of t)e logistics of t)e 0)irty :ears !ar did not fall to note its defects. 5ne (riter co%%ented t)at a region could %aintain an ar%y effecti+ely if it Jcould &e sa+ed fro% t)e (anton s/oile of t)e soldier.L *usta+us (rote of t)e e+il t)at ensued ()en )is un/aid and unfed troo/s fended for t)e%sel+es: JIt )as &een i%/ossi&le to restrain t)e )orse%en ... ()o li+e si%/ly fro% (ild /lunder. 2+eryt)ing )as &een ruined t)ere&y3 so t)at not)ing %ore can &e found for t)e soldiers in to(ns or +illages.L !allenstein also reflected t)is +ie( on entering Sa-ony in 1=?2 ()en )e ga+e t)e follo(ing orders: J,et not)ing &e destroyed or taken fro% t)e /easantry3 for (e %ust li+e during t)e (inter on t)e su//lies (e can find )ere.L 0)ese understandings ani%ated t)e c)anges in logistics t)at %arked t)e second )alf of t)e se+enteent) century. 0)us go+ern%ents &egan to kee/ t)e si6e of t)eir ar%ies (it)in t)e nu%&ers t)at t)ey could /ay (it) reasona&le regularity. Since t)ey could t)us feed and /ay t)eir o(n %en3 t)ey could enforce a &an against looting. By taking fro% su&Dect areas e-clusi+ely &y contri&utions usually collected t)roug) t)e local go+ern%ent3 t)ey %a-i%ised t)e efficiency of con+erting t)e resources of t)e country to t)e su//ort of t)e in+ading ar%y. 0)is /rocedure also %ini%ised t)e en%ity of local aut)orities and a+oided arousing t)e acti+e )ostility of t)e /easants and t)eir conse.uent /uniti+e actions and guerrilla (arfare against t)e soldiers. r%ies also largely a&andoned t)e /ractice3 co%%on a%id t)e c)aos and logistical cala%ities of t)e 0)irty :ears !ar3 of le+ying contri&utions on neutral or friendly territory3 a /ractice t)at )ad also increased an ar%ys ene%ies. 0)is /olicy of /re+enting soldier de/ri+ations fostered an attitude of res/ect for ci+ilian /ro/erty t)at in t)e eig)teent) century &eca%e a rule for t)e conduct of (ar. 0)is )ad t)e result of di+orcing

1@@

ci+ilians fro% (ar &y insulating t)e% fro% %ost of its )ar%ful effects # ot)er t)an ta-es and go+ern%ent de&t. 0)e ne( a//roac) conser+ed ci+ilian /roducti+ity in &ot) t)e rulers o(n do%ains and in t)e /ro+inces t)ey co+eted3 ()ic) also reduced ci+ilian )ostility to in+aders. 0)e ne( (ay of su//ly and its often#scru/ulous care for ci+ilian /ro/erty did reduce t)e needless costs of (ar and in t)is res/ect li%ited it. So%eti%es ar%ies carried t)e circu%scri/tions on t)e conduct of t)e soldiers to ridiculous e-tre%es. 'or e-a%/le3 a s%all 'renc) force3 fleeing fro% /ursuing ustrians3 crossed a ri+er on a ferry3 duly /aying t)e ci+ilian ferry%an for )is ser+ices. !)en t)e ustrians reac)ed t)e ferry3 t)ey a&andoned t)eir /ursuit &ecause t)ey lacked t)e %oney to /ay t)e ferry%an. 5f course3 in t)is instance3 t)e li%itation on t)e conduct of t)e soldiers did not alter t)e outco%e7 if t)e retreating 'renc) )ad disregarded t)e sanctity of ci+ilian /ro/erty and sunk t)e ferry3 t)e ustrians still could not )a+e crossed regardless of ()et)er t)ey (ere (illing to sei6e t)e ferry. 0)e ne( tactics /laced a /re%iu% on soldiers ade.uately fed and /aid (it) reasona&le regularity &ecause only suc) an ar%y could )a+e /ro/er disci/line. 0)e (ealt)y and &usinesslike 1utc) )ad long reco%/ensed t)eir %en /ro%/tly and )ad a sufficiently disci/lined ar%y t)at could i%/le%ent Maurices tactical conce/ts. 0)e ne( s)allo( for%ations and t)e e%/)asis on +olleys on co%%and re.uired a le+el of training t)at only t)is ty/e of ar%y could attain. 0)e need for &etter drilled troo/s also c)anged t)e %et)od of recruiting ar%ies. Instead of dis&anding soldiers after eac) ca%/aign3 go+ern%ents ke/t t)e forces in garrison during /eace. Muc) of t)e sa+ing in (ages )ad &een illusory any(ay7 e%/loyers sa+ed (inter (ages &ut )ad to /ay )ig)er (age rates to t)eir seasonal e%/loyees during t)e /eriod of acti+e ca%/aigning. 9ee/ing soldiers all year around cost little %ore and &roug)t i%%ense di+idends in %ilitary effecti+eness. 0)e training acco%/lis)ed during (inter ser+ice constituted one of t)e s%aller &enefits of a standing ar%y7 t)e continued e-istence of t)e unit fro% year to year de+elo/ed a co%%unity t)at /ro+ided co)esion and ;s/rit de cor/s and accusto%ed soldiers to continuous ser+ice under t)e sa%e officers and non#co%%issioned officers3 furt)er strengt)ening disci/line3 %orale3 and t)e resilience of t)e unit ()en it faced t)e )ards)i/s of ca%/aigning. 2+en t)e /ractice of t)e drill needed for &attlefield effecti+eness contri&uted to unit co)esion and %orale3 creating a sense of unity and confidence a%ong t)e %en as (ell as strengt)ening t)e )a&it of o&edience. 0)e e-istence of /er%anent regi%ents %ade /ossi&le t)e introduction of unifor%ity in drill and tactical doctrine in /lace of t)e +ariety of different regi%ental %et)ods. In t)e 'renc) ar%y 8ean Martinet3 ins/ector#general of infantry3 enforced t)is consistency (it) suc) rigor and effect t)at )is na%e )as e+er since denoted a /unctiliousness in %atters of disci/line and drill3 t)e de/reciatory connotation suggesting t)e strictness (it) ()ic) Martinet enforced t)e ne( regulations. 0)e /ersistence of (arfare in t)e latter )alf of t)e se+enteent) century %eant t)at kee/ing &attalions on t)e /ayroll during t)e li%ited /eriods of /eace did not constitute a +ery great additional &urden3 and e+en t)is cost go+ern%ents di%inis)ed &y kee/ing co%/anies at reduced nu%&ers during /eaceti%e. !)en (ar &roke out3 rulers recruited t)e co%/anies to full strengt)3 adding t)e ne( %en to a long#esta&lis)ed3 t)oroug)ly trained unit in ()ic) t)ey could e-/ect to learn t)eir duties /ro%/tly and easily ac.uire t)e %orale of t)e +eteran unit. 0)e /ractice of %aintaining /eaceti%e ar%ies created anot)er argu%ent for /ro%/t /ay and su//ly during (arti%e. ,ooting encouraged desertion &y /resenting t)e o//ortunity for t)e dis/ersed soldiers to lea+e and encouraging soldiers to de/art in t)e &elief t)at since t)ey )ad ac.uired a /iece of +alua&le loot3 t)ey s)ould lea+e t)eir unit and t)eir arrears of /ay. Suc) losses )ad long constituted a serious drain on ar%ies3 &ut t)e desertion of a soldier3 disci/lined and trained during /eaceti%e3 constituted an e+en greater (aste. 0)e loss of suc) soldiers and t)eir re/lace%ent &y ra( recruits caused a %uc) greater reduction in efficiency t)an t)ose &orne fro% co%/anies of

2>>

/oorly drilled %ercenaries in units t)at %ig)t &e dissol+ed at t)e end of eac) ca%/aigning season. r%ies (ere a&le to increase t)eir /recautions against desertion &ecause food and /ay /er%itted t)e% to kee/ t)eir %en disci/lined and concentrated under t)e su/er+ision of t)eir officers and non co%%issioned officers. Maintaining for%ations in e-istence during /eaceti%e3 e+en at reduced strengt)3 eli%inated %uc) of t)e role of t)e %ilitary entre/reneur. !it) fe( ne( regi%ents or co%/anies needed for (ar3 t)e soldier#&usiness%an gradually disa//eared3 and go+ern%ent o(ners)i/ of ar%ies de+elo/ed. 0)oug) /ro/rietors)i/ of co%/anies and regi%ents continued3 state control and %anage%ent soon &eca%e a fact3 and3 e-ce/t for /ri+ate contractors dra(ing t)e artillery and /ro+iding su//lies3 ar%ies &eca%e entirely staffed &y ci+ilian ad%inistrators or soldiers /aid &y rulers. r%ies continued to recruit &y +oluntary enlist%ent3 ()ic) often included c)icanery and coercion. 0)e /u&lic increasingly ca%e to see ar%ies as /laces for societys undesira&les3 and a+oided enlisting /roducti+ely e%/loyed citi6ens. 'oreigners continued to a//eal as recruits &ecause t)ey (it)dre( no one fro% t)e nati+e (ork force. Suc) soldiers so%eti%es s)o(ed an alar%ing tendency to desert3 and co%%anders )ad to gi+e %uc) attention to /re+enting desertion3 e+en a+oiding %ilitary %o+e%ents t)roug) territory t)at fa+oured desertion. 0)e 9ing of Prussia3 for e-a%/le3 directed )is officers Jto fa%iliarise t)e%sel+es (it) t)e terrain around t)eir garrisonL station3 not (it) t)e idea of /re/aring for co%&at &ut &ecause it (as Jof t)e greatest necessity for all officers to kno( ()en t)ey are looking for deserters.L Suc) soldiers re.uired disci/line so t)oroug) and se+ere t)at it co%/letely acculturated t)e% to unt)inking o&edience. 0)e Prussian ar%y3 ()ic) )ad as %any as t(o#t)irds foreigners and relied on coercion in recruiting nati+es3 )ad a /articularly &rutal disci/line t)at in+ol+ed not Dust for%al cor/oral /unis)%ent &ut also in t)e course of drill. 0)e sa%e 9ing of Prussia3 'rederick 0)e *reat /rescri&ed t)at Jat drill no&ody %ust &e struck or /us)ed or scolded. %an learns to drill (it) /atience and %et)od3 not (it) &lo(s.L "e also /ointed out t)at Je+eryt)ing %ust &e taug)t to a ne( recruit &y kind e-/lanations3 (it)out scolding and s)a%ing3 so t)at )e is not at t)e +ery start %ade to feel de/ressed and fearful &ut (ill de+elo/ /leasure and lo+e for )is ser+ice.L But t)e officers continued to rely on &lo(s3 inti%idation3 and fear as t)e &asis of t)eir disci/line. 2+en t)e 9ing )ad t)e ideal t)at soldiers %ust fear t)eir officers %ore t)an t)e ene%y. 0)e officers increasingly &eca%e a se/arate and e-clusi+e class in all 2uro/ean ar%ies. Most of t)e% ca%e front t)e aristocracy3 and fe( co%%issions (ent to co%%oners. 0)ey (ere distinct fro% t)e %en in social differentiation as (ell as in organisational duties and /ri+ileges. 0)is created a se/aration &et(een officers and enlisted %en greater t)an t)at ()ic) e-isted in t)e units raised &y t)e %ilitary entre/reneurs. 0)is alteration also reinforced t)e su&ordination to t)e )ierarc)y &y adding distinction &ased on social class &ut aug%enting t)e )ostility &et(een t)e t(o categories of soldiers. No&ility ser+ing e-clusi+ely as officers and largely %ono/olising t)ese /ositions su//lied t)e only feudal or %edie+al attri&ute of t)e syste%. 2+ery ot)er as/ect )ad c)anged. 'ro% /ri+ate /ossession of go+ern%ental and %ilitary /o(er3 !estern 2uro/e )ad %o+ed to a socialisation first of /olitical institutions and finally of t)e ar%ed forces. 0)e result differed little fro% t)e %et)ods used &y Ro%e. In a sense Ro%an tactics )ad fostered a Ro%an organisation of t)e /er%anently esta&lis)ed /rofessional ar%y3 ()ic) &elonged to t)e state and ()ic) re%ained concentrated ()ere unit training could take /lace and grou/ es/rit de+elo/. $)anges in !estern 2uro/ean kingdo%s and /rinci/alities )el/ed to %ake /ossi&le t)ese %odifications. 0)e de+elo/%ent of financial resources3 &ot) in ta-ation and credit3 ena&led rulers to create &ureaucracies large and effecti+e enoug) to %anage si6ea&le /er%anent %ilitary esta&lis)%ents t)at t)eir e-/anded resources could ade.uately finance.

2>1

0)e c)ange in logistics res/onded to t)e needs of strategy. s t)e 0)irty :ears !ar )ad (orn on3 logistics )ad increasingly fettered strategy. $a%/aigns conducted in e-)austed territory ine+ita&ly failed for (ant of su//lies3 and ar%ies e+en +irtually /eris)ed in t)is (ay. $ount *allas3 I%/erial co%%ander#in#c)ief3 &eca%e notorious for losing )is 2%/erors ar%ies as )e %arc)ed into de+astated areas ()ere t)ey could not su&sist. !iser generals allo(ed logistics to dictate strategy3 &ut &y t)e end of t)e (ar ca%/aigning often consisted of ignoring t)e ene%y in t)e searc) for areas t)at could su//ly t)e ar%y. 0)e 'renc) %inister Ric)elieu /ro/erly su%%arised ()at t)e 0)irty :ears !ar )ad taug)t a&out logistics: J"istory kno(s %any %ore ar%ies ruined &y (ant and disorder t)an &y t)e efforts of t)eir ene%ies7 and I )a+e (itnessed )o( all t)e enter/rises ()ic) (ere e%&arked on in %y day (ere lacking for t)at reason alone.L Su&stituting contri&utions and &usinesslike su//ly %et)ods for looting &y un/aid troo/s increased t)e yield of su//lies t)at ally region could /ro+ide an ar%y. But generals re.uired ot)er alternati+es to &eco%e inde/endent of t)e need to )a+e t)eir %o+e%ents dictated &y necessity to find food for t)eir %en and fodder for t)eir )orses. 0)oug)3 as in ancient ti%es3 su//ly considerations (ould al(ays condition strategy3 t)e Ro%an logistical organisation3 like le-anders3 )ad gi+en ar%ies a %a-i%u% a%ount of li&erty to /ursue strategic ai%s. ,ate se+enteent)#century ar%ies follo(ed t)is tradition ()en t)ey de+elo/ed %aga6ines to collect and store ()eat for &read and e+en oats and )ay for t)e )orses. By )a+ing an initial in+entory (it) ()ic) to start t)e ca%/aign and a reser+e on ()ic) to dra( later3 ar%ies gained a su&stantial a%ount of strategic li&erty. 0)ey still /laced /ri%ary reliance on li+ing off t)e country t)roug) contri&utions or re.uisitions3 and one %aDor strategic ai% re%ained: to try to in+ade t)e ene%ys land and to su//ort ones o(n ar%y at )is e-/ense. But go+ern%ents no( )ad t)e %oney and ar%ies t)e logistical organisation to su//ly ()en necessary t)eir %en and3 to a %uc) s%aller degree3 t)eir )orses. But e+en if go+ern%ents )ad (is)ed to /ro+ide all of t)eir ar%ies needs fro% t)eir o(n %aga6ines and assu%ing t)eir /)ysical and financial resources (ould )a+e /er%itted it3 li%itations on trans/ortation (ould usually )a+e %ade t)is i%/ossi&le. 5nly (ater(ays )ad t)e efficiency to trans/ort enoug) food for t)e )orses3 and &ad roads %ade it difficult and often i%/ossi&le to su//ly %en o+er a +ery great distance. 0)oug) a )orse could /ull t(ice as %uc) as it could carry and roads )ad i%/ro+ed3 (agon trans/ortation still could not furnis) t)e (ants of troo/s o+er long distances. Ne+ert)eless3 i%/ro+ed logistics ga+e late se+enteent)#century ar%ies ca/a&ilities t)at earlier 2uro/ean ar%ies )ad lacked. But t)e increased re+enues of go+ern%ents %eant t)at ar%ies gre( in si6e3 and t)eir +ery nu%&ers continued to ta- se+erely t)e resources of t)e regions in ()ic) t)ey o/erated and t)e ingenuity of t)eir co%%issaries and .uarter%asters. Back

)e'resentative "ate Seventeenth-Century Cam'aigns and 1attles

!it) e-/anded ca/a&ilities for su//orting t)eir ar%ies3 soldiers increasingly /ursued a /ersisting strategy e-e%/lified &y *usta+uss con.uest of nort)ern *er%any. nd t)e ne( logistics facilitated t)is &y di%inis)ing t)e )ostility t)at ci+ilians felt to(ard in+aders. So3 soldiers t)oug)t less in ter%s of raids t)at (ould te%/orarily su//ort t)eir force and e-tract /olitical concessions and %ore in ter%s of solid territorial ac.uisitions t)at could /ro+ide a continuing flo( of su//lies and a con.uest t)at t)eir ruler %ig)t e-c)ange for /olitical goals. :et suc) a strategic o&Decti+e re.uired %any sieges and a slo( ca%/aign to %ake and consolidate gains. But t)e larger ar%ies of t)e second )alf of t)e se+enteent) century facilitated t)is c)ange &y increasing t)e ratio of force to s/ace. :et t)is s)ift to a /ersisting strategy could affect o/erations +ery little3 as a nota&le ca%/aign in *er%any gra/)ically illustrates. In 1=C? t)e great 'renc) Mars)al3 0urenne3 )ad to defend t)e R)ine ()ile 'renc) ar%ies /us)ed t)eir ca%/aign against t)e 1utc). 0)e /rinci/al general of (arlike 9ing ,ouis IIV3 0urenne3 t)e Mars)al general of t)e ar%ies of t)e 9ing3 )ad &egun %ilitary ser+ice nearly fifty years &efore. fter ser+ing under ca/a&le co%%anders3 0urenne )ad 2>2

&eco%e a general at t(enty#t)ree and constantly i%/ro+ed )is generals)i/ in t)e years t)at follo(ed. In an era of constant (arfare )e ser+ed in %any ca%/aigns and /artici/ated in a nu%&er of &attles and sieges. 5ne of t)ese3 t)e siege of 0urin in 1=4>3 illustrates t)e di+ersity of )is e-/erience. !)ile t)e Italians in 0urin &esieged a 'renc) garrison in t)e citadel3 a 'renc) ar%y laid siege to t)e city &ut3 in turn3 )ad to co/e (it) encircle%ent &y a )ostile ar%y. 'ro% t)is long ser+ice 0urenne learned strategy and tactics e.ually (ell and also )o( to (in t)e affection of )is soldiers. 0urenne e-/ected an offensi+e &y t)e 2%/erors &rilliant and e-/erienced co%%ander3 Rai%ondo Montecuccoli3 ()ose ar%y )ad yet to a//ear in (estern *er%any. %ilitary sc)olar and a +eteran of t)e &attles of Breitenfeld and ,Et6en3 t)e I%/erial 'ield Mars)al )ad already seen as %uc) ser+ice as 0urenne3 and it )ad like(ise earned )i% a deser+ed re/utation as one of t)e /re%ier soldiers of t)e day. 'or )is offensi+e ca%/aign against 0urenne3 Montecuccoli )ad t)e ad+antage of alternati+e strategic o&Decti+es. "e could eit)er /roceed to(ard t)e nort) to reinforce t)e 1utc) or go fart)er sout) to cross t)e R)ine and in+ade lsace. 0)e /ossession of t)e initiati+e and a c)oice of goals ga+e Montecuccoli an o//ortunity to &e(ilder )is o//onent &y a//arently ai%ing at one target3 to dra( 0urenne a(ay3 and t)en striking out for t)e ot)er3 )is real o&Decti+e. Since t)e I%/erial co%%ander /lanned to aid t)e 1utc)3 )e intended to distract 0urenne &y t)reatening to cross t)e R)ine and ad+ance into lsace. "e t)us %o+ed )is ar%y (est(ard sout) of t)e Main Ri+er rat)er t)an to(ard Bonn3 ()ere )e /lanned to unite (it) t)e 1utc)3 take t)e city3 and dri+e 'rances ally3 t)e 2lector of $ologne3 fro% t)e (ar. !)en Montecuccoli reac)ed Nure%&erg3 0urenne3 a(are of t)e direction of )is o//onents %arc)3 )ad gone sout) of t)e Main and negotiated (it) t)e 2lector of Main6 for t)e use of )is &ridge at sc)affen&urg. $rossing t)e &ridge3 )e +eered sout) to occu/y t)e line of t)e 0au&er Ri+er3 /lanning to use it as an o&stacle to /re+ent Montecuccoli fro% reac)ing t)e R)ine in /ursuit of )is a//arent %ission to cross it and ad+ance into lsace. s Montecuccoli ne-t %arc)ed (est(ard fro% Nure%&erg3 t)e 'renc) Mars)al /us)ed east(ard to %eet )i%. Britis) soldier ser+ing in t)e 'renc) ar%y recorded: if 0urenne could catc) Jt)e I%/erialists at an ad+antage (e s)all certainly fig)t t)e%3 and dou&tless t)ey )a+e t)e sa%e intentions7 so no( t(o of t)e greatest generals in $)ristendo% e%/loy all t)at t)eir long e-/erience )as taug)t t)e% ... kno(ing t)e great conse.uence t)e loss of a Battle (ould &e to eac) side.L 0urenne (is)ed force &attle3 &ut Montecuccoli )ad no intention of engaging 0urenne3 if %erely &ecause a fig)t (ould delay t)e co%/letion of t)e allied concentration at Bonn. But ()en )e &egan to de/loy )is ar%y for &attle at !inds)ei%3 t)e I%/erial co%%ander used t)e /ros/ect of co%&at to )el/ co%/lete )is distraction and aid )i% in carrying out )is %o+e nort) to(ard Bonn. s 0urenne reac)ed !inds)ei% and &egan t)e slo( /rocess of %ars)alling )is ar%y for t)e contest3 t)e I%/erial forces sli//ed a(ay3 t)eir &aggage and one line of &attle leading on t)e road to t)e &ridge o+er t)e Main at Markt&reit. 0urenne3 )astily getting )is %en &ack in %arc) order3 /ursued t)e I%/erial troo/s3 and3 reac)ing Markt&reit &efore )is ene%y could cross t)e ri+er3 took u/ a strong /osition near&y3 ready to attack ()en Montecuccoli s)ould )a+e to di+ide )is troo/s during t)e slo( /rocess of crossing t)e ri+er. 0)e ar%ies faced eac) t)ere for a (eek. In s/ite of )is failure to cross &efore 0urenne ca%e u/ (it) )i% and )is conse.uent ina&ility to use t)e &ridge i%%ediately3 Montecuccoli )ad /laced )is ar%y in an ad+antageous /osition. s a *er%an general ca%/aigning in *er%any3 )e o/erated in essentially friendly territory in s/ite of t)e neutrality of so%e of t)e rulers in t)e region. 0)is %eant t)at )e controlled all of t)e &ridges o+er t)e Main e-ce/t t)at at sc)affen&urg3 ()ic) 0urenne )ad used to cross and at ()ic) )e )ad left only a s%all garrison. 5nce o+er t)e ri+er t)e I%/erial co%%ander could cross and re#cross at (ill to take a direct line of %arc) to reac) t)e sc)affen&urg &ridge &efore 0urenne ()o (ould )a+e to %arc) sout) of t)e ri+er. 0)en3 )a+ing enclosed t)e 'renc) ar%y sout) of t)e Main &y

2>?

taking t)e sc)affen&urg Bridge3 )e could ad+ance to Bonn. Montecuccoli )ad astutely used )is control of t)e ri+er to %ake it an o&struction for t)e defender7 as a rule3 defenders enDoyed an ad+antage of e%/loying ri+er o&stacles. ,ogistics )el/ed Montecuccoli co%/lete )is crossing. 0)e )ostility of t)e country to t)e 'renc) %ade gat)ering su//lies for t)eir ar%y difficult. s )e (atc)ed Montecuccolis ar%y3 0urenne (rote )is %inister of (ar t)at )e needed %ore ca+alry &ecause J(it) t)e entire countryside o//osed to %e %ore troo/s (ill &e needed to /rocure food.L fter a (eek of su//ly difficulties3 0urenne fell &ack to(ard t)e 0au&er3 acutely conscious t)at e+en if Montecuccoli t)en crossed to t)e nort) side of t)e Main3 t)e t)reat to lsace re%ained &ecause t)e I%/erial co%%anders control of t)e &ridges (ould ena&le )i% to re#cross and again t)reaten t)e 'renc) /ro+ince. 'or t)is reason 0urenne did not %ake forced %arc)es to try to cross at sc)affen&urg7 )e re%ained in genuine dou&t as to )is ene%ys ulti%ate o&Decti+e and so%e()at tra%%elled &y fir% instructions fro% )is go+ern%ent to /rotect lsace. In t)e additional %anoeu+ring t)at follo(ed )is crossing of t)e Main3 Montecuccoli continued to e-/loit t)e a%&iguity created &y )is t(o /otential o&Decti+es. 4lti%ately controlling all &ridges on t)e Main3 )e %arc)ed nort) to Bonn3 ()ic) )e and )is allies soon ca/tured3 o+errunning t)e adDacent territory and dri+ing t)e 2lector of $ologne fro% t)e 'renc) alliance. Mean()ile 0urenne3 lacking control of a &ridge3 )ad to %arc) sout) to cross at P)ili//s&ourg3 ()ere )e encountered a furt)er delay &ecause )e )ad to forage for su//lies. 0)e ca%/aigning year ended &efore 0urennes ar%y could again take /art in o/erations. Montecuccoli )ad skilfully used t)e initiati+e conferred on )i% &y )is t(o /otential goals to kee/ 0urenne constantly in dou&t as to )is real o&Decti+e. "e )ad co%&ined distraction (it) use of )is control of t)e &ridges o+er t)e Main to ena&le )i% not Dust to a+oid t)e o//osing ar%y &ut also to kee/ it fro% follo(ing )i% in ti%e to inter+ene ()en )e Doined )is allies. In addition3 )e )ad i%/osed on )is o//onent %uc) )urried %arc)ing (it) its conse.uent straggling3 desertion3 and loss of e.ui/%ent. 0)e conduct and o&Decti+es of t)e ca%/aign differed in no significant essentials fro% t)ose of *usta+us nor3 funda%entally3 fro% t)at of four centuries &efore ()en Prince 2d(ard and de Montfort %anoeu+red to decei+e and to e-/loit or o+erco%e a ri+er o&stacle3 and ()en 9ing P)illi/ t)(arted 2d(ard III on )is %arc) to $r;cy. 0)e o/ening /)ases of t)e !ar of t)e *rand lliance G1=B@#@CH clearly e-)i&it %ilitary o/erations at t)e end of t)e se+enteent) century. In 1=BB 'renc) forces )ad raided in *er%any al%ost as far as Munic)3 &ut3 instead of inti%idating t)e *er%ans3 t)is raid contri&uted to t)e for%ation of a *rand lliance against 'rance consisting of S/ain3 "olland3 t)e 4nited 9ingdo%3 t)e "oly Ro%an 2%/eror3 and a nu%&er of *er%an states including Branden&urg. lt)oug) unity of co%%and and t)e great si6e and )ig) le+el of e-cellence of t)e 'renc) ar%y counter&alanced t)e a//arent su/eriority of t)e allies3 'rance stood on t)e defensi+e (it) ar%ies guarding its S/anis)3 Italian3 R)ine3 and Net)erlands frontiers. !eakest along t)e R)ine frontier3 t)e 'renc) used a logistic strategy ()en t)eir ca+alry de+astated t)e Palatinate region to render it inca/a&le of su&sisting )ostile ar%ies. 0)e tec)ni.ue did seal t)at /art of t)e frontier3 &ut3 t)oug) 0urenne )ad used t)e %et)od in *er%any fifteen years earlier3 t)e t)oroug)ness of t)e 'renc) ca+alry in t)eir (ork of destruction %ade t)e o/eration counter/roducti+e. 0)e )ostility t)at it aroused in *er%any added i%/etus to t)e (ar against 'rance3 ()ile t)e effect on its o(n forces clearly s)o(ed ()y generals )ad a&andoned looting as a %eans of su//ly and a source of /ay and re(ard for soldiers. In s/ite of t)e a&sence of o//osition3 t)e 'renc) lost 43>>> ca+alry%en3 largely t)roug) desertion. 0)ey lost e+en %ore )orses &ecause in t)e orgy of /lundering t)e soldiers neglected to feed t)eir %ounts and t)en o+er#&urdened t)e% (it) loot. 0)e 'renc) %inister of (ar ec)oed t)e conclusion of one co%%ander t)at Jnot)ing is %ore dangerous for soldiers t)an e-cessi+e /illagingL ()en t)e %inister &e%oaned t)e J(asting 2>4

a(ay of t)e ca+alry.L "ea+y troo/ casualties and intensified /olitical o//osition )ardly %ade t)is a//lication of a logistic strategy /ay3 es/ecially ()en t)e allied ar%y ad+anced nort) of t)e de+astated region to &esiege and ca/ture t)e R)ine cities of Main6 and Bonn. 2lse()ere t)e ca%/aign of 1=B@ /ro+ed une+entful. In 1=@> t)e allies again )ad difficulty %o&ilising t)eir strengt) for deter%ined ca%/aigns against t)e 'renc). But in t)e Net)erlands t)e successful o/erations of a gifted and aggressi+e 'renc) Mars)al3 t)e 1uke of ,u-e%&ourg3 clearly illustrate t)e /ersisting strategy c)aracteristic of %uc) ca%/aigning in a t)oroug)ly fortified region ()ere3 since t)e 'renc) alone fielded 1>>3>>> %en3 t)e co%&atants o/erated (it) a +ery )ig) ratio of force to s/ace. 0)en t)e a&lest of t)e Mars)als of 9ing ,ouis IIV3 t)e )u%/&acked ,u-e%&ourg )ad learned %uc) as a disci/le of )is friend3 t)e Prince of $ond;. 0)e Mars)als fa%e rested e.ually on )is tactical %astery on t)e &attlefield and )is skill in %arc)ing and ca%/ing. 0)e Mars)al3 co%%anding t)e centre ar%y of t)e t)ree t)e 'renc) sent to t)e Net)erlands3 o/ened t)e ca%/aign &y %o+ing to(ard t)e S/anis) forces t)at )eld *)ent and occu/ying t)e adDacent country for a %ont)3 su//lying )is %en and )orses at t)e ene%ys e-/ense. But on 8une 12t)3 ()en )e learned t)at an allied ar%y under t)e Prince of !aldeck3 an I%/erial 'ield Mars)al3 (as ad+ancing (it) t)e a//arent /ur/ose of &esieging 1inant3 t)e Mars)al &egan to %o+e sout) and t)en east to interce/t !aldeck. "e conducted t)e latter stages of t)is %arc) in t)e %anner in ()ic) )e /lanned &ot) to ca%/ and fig)t3 follo(ing t)e 1uke of Par%as /ractice in 'rance and Montecuccolis %a-i%: J0)e secret of success is to )a+e a solid &ody so fir% and i%/enetra&le t)at ()ere+er it is or ()ere+er it %ay go3 it s)all &ring t)e ene%y to a stand like a %o&ile &astion3 and s)all &e ca/a&le of defending itself.L 0o do t)is3 t)e ar%ies %arc)ed across country usually in at least fi+e colu%ns3 t)e ca+alry on eac) flank3 t)e infantry ne-t3 and t)e &aggage and artillery in t)e centre. In t)is (ay t)e ar%y /rotected itself against any ene%y ca+alry attack and could %ars)al its &attle array .uickly if it %et an ene%y force une-/ectedly. !)en )e learned of t)e a//roac) of t)e 'renc)3 !aldeck )alted at 'leurus and /laced )is ar%y ()ere )is flanks rested on +illages and )is front (as o&structed &y a %ars)y strea%. 0)e allied co%%anders (illingness to fig)t under suc) circu%stances (ould nor%ally )a+e %eant t)at )is o//onent (ould not. But t)e /ugnacious Mars)al ,u-e%&ourg )ad called in reinforce%ents fro% t)e 'renc) troo/s on )is rig)t and3 )a+ing reconnoitred t)e /osition3 %o+ed )is %en u/ to attack. !)ile /art of )is force %ade an unsuccessful frontal assault3 t)e Mars)al led t)e ot)er around !aldecks flank3 undetected &ecause (oods and cro/s concealed )is %arc)ing infantry and ca+alry. 0)ree )ours after t)e contest &egan3 ,u-e%&ourgs turning force &egan to array for &attle in t)e allied rear. 0)oug) !aldeck used )is reser+e and second line to create a front to face t)e 'renc) Mars)al and /rotect )is rear3 )e found )i%self (aging a losing &attle. :et t)e allied ar%y continued t)e fig)t3 unsuccessfully3 and finally t)e infantry retreated to adDacent &roken ground &y for%ing a )uge s.uare t)at resisted 'renc) ca+alry &y alternately %arc)ing and )alting until it found refuge in a terrain unsuita&le for ca+alry. 0)is &attle at 'leurus +i+idly e-)i&its t)e tactical and strategic li%itations of t)e ar%ies of t)e day. ,u-e%&ourgs %arc)ing for%ation /ro+ided security against t)e ca+alrys %o&ility and /ro+ed an ad+antage o+er %usketeers. It %ade %o+e%ent +ery slo(3 )o(e+er3 t)oug) ,u-e%&ourg3 fa%ous for )is %arc)ing skill3 %anaged to /rogress at ele+en %iles a day ()en carrying a&out ?>3>>> %en cross#country. "is successful tactical turning %anoeu+re3 in ()ic) )e reac)ed t)e ene%ys rear3 failed to secure t)e &enefits of sur/rise &ecause of t)e ti%e ()ic) it took to get )is infantry into &attle array. Infantry &attalions nor%ally %ade suc) %arc)es across country in solid for%ations (it) a front ranging fro% eig)t to t(enty files. 5n reac)ing t)e co%&at ground t)e &attalions )ad to find t)eir /laces in line and refor% t)e%sel+es fi+e ranks dee/ (it) t)eir /ike%en concentrated in t)e centre. By t)e ti%e ,u-e%&ourg )ad co%/leted t)e for%ation of )is %en for &attle3 !aldeck

2><

)ad rede/loyed )is second line and reser+e to %ake a front against t)e%. Ne+ert)eless3 ,u-e%&ourgs %anoeu+re contri&uted %uc) to )is +ictory3 for )is turning force defeated t)e o//osing ca+alry and infantry. It (ould )a+e yielded really s/ectacular results if )is infantry )ad )ad t)e a&ility to fig)t in t)e sa%e for%ation as t)ey %arc)ed. But &y distracting t)e ene%y (it) its frontal attack and carrying out an uno&ser+ed turning %o+e%ent of a strong /osition3 ,u-e%&ourg (on t)e &attle3 attacking t)e allied ar%y ()ere it (as (eakest. 0)e allies suffered 1B3>>> casualties3 nearly )alf t)eir force3 t)e 'renc) =3>>>3 a&out 1< /ercent of t)eirs. !aldeck fell &ack to t)e +icinity of t)e fortified city of Brussels.

A(tion at #leurus Back

0)oug) o/erations continued in t)e Net)erlands for se+eral %ore years and Mars)al ,u-e%&ourg (on t(o %ore su&stantial +ictories3 t)e antagonists )ad too %uc) e.uality and t)e country too %any (ell#fortified /oints interdicting its co%%unications for eit)er side to %ake %uc) /rogress or for t)e attrition of a +ictory in &attle to c)ange t)e &alance of strengt) sufficiently for ,u-e%&ourgs triu%/)s to gi+e t)e 'renc) enoug) su/eriority to do %ore t)an try to encroac) on t)e ene%ys territory &y &esieging and ca/turing an i%/ortant city. 0)ese o/erations differed significantly fro% t)ose fifteen years earlier3 ()en 0urenne and Montecuccoli )ad faced one anot)er along t)e Main (it) forces of less t)an ?>3>>> %en. 0)e ar%ies (ere s%all in relation to s/ace and t)e region )ad fe( enoug) fortified /oints to /re+ent t)eir troo/s %o+ing at (ill unless constrained &y %aDor ri+ers suc) as t)e Main and R)ine. Neit)er side could e-/ect to e-clude t)e ot)er3 &ut an in+ader could do no %ore t)an raid unless3 as )ad *usta+us in t)e sa%e region3 )e could syste%atically &esiege3 ca/ture3 and garrison t)e cities. In t)e Net)erlands t)e )ig) ratio of force to s/ace /roduced a stale%ate7 in t)e Main country 0urenne (ould )a+e faced a different sort of stale%ate )ad )e tried to use )is s%all ar%y to su&due suc) a large territory7 )is troo/s could ne+er )a+e controlled %ore t)an a little of t)e area. 5n t)e ot)er fronts3 t)e !ar of t)e *rand lliance dragged on indecisi+ely3 (it) t)e allies una&le to e-/loit t)eir su/eriority on t)e R)ine. 'renc) ar%y did enter S/ain ()ere it re%ained and &esieged Barcelona3 conducting an ideal defensi+e ca%/aign &y %aintaining itself in ene%y territory and /ro+iding for its needs t)roug) contri&utions le+ied on t)e ene%y. 0)e seesa( struggle in Italy &roug)t all allied in+asion of sout)#eastern 'rance. But t)e acti+e )ostility of t)e 'renc) /easants led &y t)eir no&ility %ade it so difficult for t)e in+ading ar%y to o&tain su//lies t)at it soon fell &ack into Italy. 0)e se+enteent) century )ad &roug)t su&stantial c)anges to tactics (it) t)e linear %et)od of de/loy%ent in ()ic) t)e fire/o(er of lig)t infantry in for%ation su//lanted &locks of /ike%en as

2>=

t)e infantrys /ri%ary (ea/on syste%. 2-ce/t for t)e role of lig)t infantry in line3 t)e organisation rese%&led t)at of t)e Ro%ans (it) its &uilt#in reser+e of a second line. But &ecause t)e infantry )ad less offensi+e /o(er t)an t)e Ro%an )ea+y infantry and t)e /redo%inant %usketeer )ad greater +ulnera&ility to %ounted s)ock action3 ca+alry )ad far %ore i%/ortance in late se+enteent)#century &attle tactics t)an it )ad )ad for t)e Ro%ans in t)e )eyday of t)e legion. ,ogistics )ad &eco%e distincti+ely Ro%an in its reliance on a (ell#organi6ed co%%issariat to su//ly troo/s3 organise trans/ortation3 and accu%ulate reser+es in %aga6ines to assure su//ly and gi+e ar%ies greater li&erty to /ursue t)eir strategic o&Decti+es. 0)e ne( syste% of /er%anent /eaceti%e ar%ies3 (it) continuity in units and sta&ility of /ersonnel3 also e%ulated t)e Ro%ans3 as did kee/ing t)e forces toget)er for training and drill. So strategy c)anged little. Still3 no co%%ander could force &attle on an un(illing o//onent. t 'leurus Mars)al ,u-e%&ourgs failure to attack /ro%/tly !aldecks rear ste%%ed fro% t)e infantrys ina&ility to for% .uickly its delicate line fro% its co%/act %arc)ing for%ations. 0)is sa%e relati+e i%/otence of t)e infantry in)i&ited any ar%y fro% forcing &attle on anot)er. !)ile t)e (ould#&e attacker for%ed )is line of &attle3 t)e reluctant o//onent %arc)ed a(ay. But t)ese insu/era&le difficulties did not first arise in t)e se+enteent) century7 t)ey in)ered in t)e nature of infantry for%ations. *reek and Ro%an infantry )ad suffered fro% t)e sa%e li%itations3 and %edie+al )ea+y infantry )ad dis/layed +irtual i%%o&ility. 5nly t)e si%/le S(iss for%ation (it) its drill and %orale )ad &een a&le to ad+ance to co%&at in t)e for%ation in ()ic) it intended to fig)t. But its undrilled successors lost t)is %o&ility3 and t)e linear syste% increased t)e difference &et(een infantrys %arc) and co%&at for%ations and added to t)e difficulty of t)e de/loy%ent /ro&le%. 5nly ca+alry /ossessed t)e offensi+e attri&utes of &etter %o&ility and t)e ca/acity to de/loy so ra/idly t)at t)ey could al%ost fig)t as t)ey %arc)ed. But e+en so3 a ca+alry could not force &attle on ca+alry and could co%/el an ar%y (it) infantry to fig)t only at t)e cost of facing t)e defensi+e /redo%inance of t)e infantry. 0)e defeat of t)e ca+alry of t)e 2%/eror 'rederick at ,egnano &y t)e o//osing foot soldiers s)o(s ()y ca+alry rarely atte%/ted t)is against for%ed infantry. 0)e eig)teent) century (ould (itness a c)ange in t)e ca/a&ilities of infantry and an accentuation of so%e of t)e trends of t)e se+enteent) century at t)e sa%e ti%e t)at %ilitary intellectuals soug)t to gi+e i%/ro+ed offensi+e ca/a&ilities to t)e ne( linear array of lig)t infantry. Back

(he +evelo'ment of Missile Warfare at Sea

0)e se+enteent) century sa( t)e (orking out of t)e conse.uences of t)e si-teent) centurys &ig# gun re+olution in na+al (arfare3 ()ic) t)e defeat of t)e S/anis) r%ada )ad signalled. Na+al arc)itects designed (ars)i/s to fig)t &roadside to &roadside and %ount only )ea+y guns3 /lacing t)e% on t)e strong decks lo( in t)e s)i/s ()ere t)ey fired t)roug) gun /orts. 0)e largest s)i/s3 s)i/s of t)e line3 )ad t(o and e+en t)ree decks of long3 )ea+y guns firing &alls (eig)ing fro% t(el+e to o+er t)irty /ounds. 0)ese s)i/s of t)e line3 %ounting as %any as ninety guns and intended for fig)ting ot)er suc) s)i/s3 gradually &eca%e lo(er and larger. 0)ey /ossessed stout /lanking3 es/ecially around t)e (aterline3 and )ad far %ore /o(er t)an %erc)ant s)i/s3 ()ic) also continued to carry guns. !ars)i/s3 designed to carry t)e largest nu%&er of )ea+y guns3 )ad definitely &eco%e a distinct class in t)e tlantic 5cean and t)e nort)ern (aters3 Dust as t)ey al(ays )ad &een in t)e Mediterranean. S%aller and faster (ars)i/s of +arious ty/es3 %ounting fe(er and s%aller guns3 co%/leted t)e co%/le%ent of any na+y. 0)ese s)i/s3 fast and /o(erful co%/ared e+en to larger %erc)ant s)i/s &ut less e-/ensi+e to &uild and %an t)an s)i/s of t)e line3 /atrolled t)e trade routes and /ro+ided scouts for a fleet. 0)e %ost /o(erful of t)ese3 t)e frigates3 %ounted t)irty to forty guns of a si6e e.ui+alent to t)e s%aller guns of t)e &ig s)i/s. Boarding and fig)ting &y sailors and %arines

2>C

re%ained i%/ortant3 &ut ra/id fire at close range usually decided &attles. Badly &attered s)i/s often surrendered or3 )a+ing sustained )ea+y /ersonnel casualties3 /ro+ed +ulnera&le to &oarding &y t)e cre(s and %arines of ene%y s)i/s. 0actics3 as e+ol+ed &y t)e latter /art of t)e se+enteent) century3 in+ol+ed s)i/s %o+ing in line a)ead (it) an inter+al of a&out 1>> yards &et(een t)e%. Because t)e s)i/s foug)t (it) t)eir sides rat)er t)an &o(s3 t)e )ead or stern of t)e line constituted t)e /otentially +ulnera&le /art of t)e for%ation3 not t)e flank as in galley and land (arfare. 0o lead a line /ast t)e )ead or rear of an ene%y colu%n constituted t)e na+al analogy of t)e flank attack on land3 &ecause it ena&led t)e ()ole attacking se.uence of s)i/s to deli+er t)eir &roadsides in succession at s)i/s una&le to re/ly &ecause t)eir unar%ed ends faced t)e ene%y. But t)e rear of a line actually /resented little +ulnera&ility &ecause t)e attackers usually found it %o+ing a(ay fro% t)e%. nd to attack t)e )ead of a line e-/osed t)e attacking fleet to )a+ing its o(n line cut. Because of t)e s)ort range3 little %ore t)an a %ile3 and deficient accuracy of t)e guns3 a disad+antage accentuated &y t)e %otion of t)e (a+es3 a s)i/ &reaking an ene%ys line )ad only li%ited e-/osure to )ostile s)ot. 2+en at close range only a fe( s)i/s could fire at t)ose &reaking t)eir line &ecause guns firing t)roug) /orts in t)e sides of s)i/s3 )a+ing little +ariation in t)e a6i%ut) of t)eir fire3 could not &e trained to s)oot at targets o&li.ue to t)eir sides7 ai%ing guns t)roug) larger arcs re.uired ai%ing t)e s)i/. !it) an inter+al of t)ree to fi+e %inutes3 or %ore3 &et(een &roadsides3 a s)i/ %o+ing at no %ore t)an fi+e or si- %iles all )our %ig)t recei+e no %ore t)an t(o &roadsides at a dangerous range. !)en one line of s)i/s /ierced anot)er3 its guns could return t)e fire it recei+ed during its a//roac) &y firing a single3 s)ort#range &roadside in eac) direction as it /assed &et(een t)e ene%y +essels. 'urt)er3 t)e fleet t)at )ad &roken t)e ene%ys line also di+ided t)e )ostile fleet and )ad t)e o//ortunity to concentrate against only a /ortion of t)e ene%y force. 0)us a fleet lacked t)e kind of +ulnera&ility found in an ar%y. 0)e /eculiarity of )a+ing t)e co%&at front of t)e for%ation at rig)t angles to its line of ad+ance %ade %anoeu+ring difficult. !it) fleets on /arallel courses3 ad%irals could attain concentration &y reducing t)e inter+als &et(een t)eir s)i/s3 &ut t)e ene%y could res/ond &y doing like(ise. not)er for% of concentration in+ol+ed &reaking t)roug) t)e ene%ys line (it) /art of a s.uadron or ot)er(ise /ositioning s)i/s on eac) side of a /ortion of t)e ene%ys line. S)i/s )ad an e.ual nu%&er of guns on eac) side &ut carried only enoug) cre( to %an fully t)e guns on one side of t)e s)i/. 0o (ork t)e guns on &ot) sides si%ultaneously for %ore t)an one &roadside seriously reduced t)e rate of fire3 +irtually nullifying t)e ad+antage of &eing a&le to use all guns. 0)ese %anoeu+res /ro+ed difficult to e-ecute3 and concentration at one /lace created a (eakness at anot)er3 ()ic) t)e ene%y could detect and e-/loit &y attack or &y reinforcing t)e /art of t)e fleet t)at o//osed larger nu%&ers. t t)e Battle of Beac)y "ead in 1=@>3 for instance3 t)e 2arl of 0orrington3 under /ressure fro% )is su/eriors3 used )is (ind(ard /osition to lay )is nglo#1utc) fleet alongside a stronger 'renc) fleet. !)en 0orringtons fleet engaged3 it )ad ga/s &et(een its di+isions and3 as t)e fore%ost and rear%ost s)i/s of t)e (eaker nglo#1utc) line closely engaged t)e 'renc) )ead and rear3 t)e Britis) centre re%ained at long range. 0)is ena&led d%iral 0our+ille3 one of 'rances %ost nota&le ad%irals3 to direct s)i/s fro% )is centre to co%e u/ on t)e far side of t)e lead s)i/s of t)e nglo#1utc) fleet ()ile unengaged s)i/s at t)e )ead of t)e 'renc) line turned &ack to do like(ise. ssailed on t(o sides3 t)e leading allied s)i/s suffered )ea+ily and3 &efore t)e fleet could %ake good its (it)dra(al3 lost ten of its fifty#se+en s)i/s of t)e line. lt)oug) defenders afloat )ad no tactical ad+antage in resisting attack3 t)ey retained t)at ot)er traditional ad+antage of t)e defence # t)e a&ility to retreat.

2>B

In /rinci/le3 fleets of si%ilar s/eed could not o+ertake one anot)er3 t)oug) in /ractice t)e flukiness of t)e (ind3 differences in sea%ans)i/3 and cleanliness of t)e &otto%s of s)i/s did %ake successful /ursuit /ossi&le. :et o//osing ad%irals al(ays )ad essentially )o%ogeneous forces3 all (it) t)e sa%e (ea/on syste%. lt)oug) t)e s%aller +essels )ad greater s/eed t)an t)e s)i/s of t)e line3 t)eir +ulnera&ility and (eak gun /o(er %ade t)e% al%ost useless against t)e &ig s)i/s. 2+en in /ursuit3 t)e faster s)i/s )ad little +alue e-ce/t in attacking s)i/s of t)e line disa&led &y t)e loss of %asts. 0)ey could not3 t)erefore3 use t)eir &etter %o&ility to /lay t)e role of ca+alry in attack or /ursuit. So (it) no useful /re/onderance in s/eed and no differentiation in (ea/on syste%s at sea3 t)e offensi+e enDoyed +ery little ad+antage. 2+en t)oug) t)e retreating fleet could not o&struct or delay t)e /rogress of /ursuers3 t)e e.uality in s/eed &et(een o//osing fleets /re+ented a fleet on t)e offensi+e fro% forcing &attle on an inferior. Sea fig)ters lacked e+en t)e de+ice of t)e siege for forcing &attle7 its analogy3 t)e &lockade of a fleet in a fortified )ar&our3 could neit)er take t)e /ort nor star+e it out. 0)e &lockade could3 )o(e+er3 /lay t)e land (arfare role of de+astating t)e countryside to force &attle &ecause t)e &lockade interdicted t)e co%%erce of t)e /ort. By c)allenging t)e &lockade3 t)e &lockaded fleet could o/en t)e /ort to trade if it could defeat and dri+e a(ay t)e &lockading s.uadron. Inferior fleets rarely atte%/ted t)is. near&y s)ore often /resented an o&stacle against ()ic) to tra/ an inferior fleet. Protected anc)orages and e+en (ell fortified )ar&ours so%eti%es /ro+ided inade.uate s)elter against an enter/rising foe. But suc) successes (ere rare co%/ared (it) t)e /rolonged /eriods of security enDoyed &y inferior fleets in fortified anc)orages. Big guns in fortified land e%/lace%ents easily o+er%atc)ed s)i/s in any artillery co%&at. 5f course3 so%eti%es fleets foug)t for co%%and of t)e sea (it) no ot)er issue t)an to /reci/itate t)e &attle. But3 as on land3 &attles occurred &y %utual consent ()en a difference of o/inion a&out t)e likely outco%e or t)e stakes %ade ad%irals and go+ern%ents (illing to risk a contest. But re+olutions in tactics and logistics )ad little influence on t)e &asic logistic c)aracter of na+al strategy. 0rans/orting and su//lying troo/s re%ained an i%/ortant o&Decti+e3 and interdicting co%%erce &eca%e easier as (ars)i/s de+elo/ed t)e sea endurance to engage in &lockades to i%/le%ent t)e /ersisting strategy at sea. 0)e i%/ro+e%ents of t)e sea#kee/ing .ualities of (ars)i/s e-tended t)e effecti+eness of t)e strategy of raids against co%%erce. stronger sea /o(er ke/t an inferior fleet in /ort cit)er &y a &lockade or t)e latters fear of %eeting t)e )ostile fleet or )a+ing itself cut off fro% its &ase. 0)e &lockade ga+e t)e s%aller s)i/s of t)e stronger fleet t)e li&erty to interdict t)e co%%erce of t)e (eaker. 0)oug) ne+er co%/lete3 a co%%ercial &lockade often cri//led t)e co%%erce of t)e inferior sea /o(er and ena&led t)e su/erior to ca/ture %any of t)e ene%ys %erc)ant +essels. But t)e (eaker could resort to raids u/on t)e ene%ys co%%erce. S%all3 fast3 ar%ed slo/s could outrun (ars)i/s and readily cruise t)e seas e-tensi+ely3 ca/turing t)e %erc)ant s)i/s of t)e stronger /o(er. 5n t)ese t)ey could /lace cre(s and atte%/t to sli/ t)e% &ack into friendly /orts. 0)is kind of (ar a//ealed to /ri+ate enter/rise &ecause of t)e )uge /rofit in ca/turing a s)i/ and its cargo. Many of t)e (eaker /o(ers su&Dects engaged in t)is kind of (arfare7 it &eca%e a s/eciality of t)e 'renc)3 ()o )ad te%/ting targets in t)e large %erc)ant %arines of t)eir Britis) and 1utc) o//onents. In t)e !ar of t)e *rand lliance3 for e-a%/le3 t)e Britis) gained co%%and of t)e sea and ruined 'renc) o+erseas co%%erce &y &lockading its /orts. 5n t)e ot)er )and3 t)e effecti+e 'renc) /olicy of raids during t)e (ar took 43>>> of t)e ene%ies %erc)ant s)i/s3 a dangerous &ut not fatal &lo( at t)eir ad+ersaries co%%erce. 0)us &ot) sides used a logistic strategy in a (arfare t)at rese%&led Ro%an and By6antine /rotection of t)eir frontiers and t)e !estern 2uro/ean efforts to co/e (it) Viking raiders. Na+al

2>@

(arfare differed3 )o(e+er3 in t)at t)e stronger /o(ers defensi+e stance against raiders included its /ersisting &lockade of ene%y co%%erce3 a %ore effecti+e a//lication of a logistic strategy t)an raids. 0)e nu%&er of sea &attles so%eti%es e-ceeded t)e fre.uency of land &attles. 5ften t)e /rotection of trade /reci/itated na+al action. Britis)3 1utc)3 or 'renc) fleets soug)t to defend or attack con+oys of %erc)ant s)i/s. 0)e stakes (ere large: on one occasion t)e 'renc) fleet attacked a Britis) con+oy 5f 14> s)i/s and ca/tured eig)ty. sea#&orne in+asion could also cause a &attle3 as ()en t)e inferior 1utc) fleet foug)t t)e co%&ined 'renc) and Britis) fleets and3 later3 a 'renc) fleet attacked a %uc) larger Britis)#1utc) fleet at ,a "ogue in 1=@2 in a +ain effort to o/en t)e (ay for a 'renc) ar%y to land in 2ngland. Back

THE %RIMACY OF THE LINE OF "AYONETED MUS&ETS, !$00 !$'!

(he 1ayonet. the Flintlock. and Further Changes in (actics
t t)e &eginning of t)e eig)teent) century tec)nological inno+ations significantly strengt)ened t)e tactical trend t)at )ad /laced t)e lig)t infantry%an in line and relied on )is fire/o(er as t)e %ain offensi+e and defensi+e /o(er of t)e infantry. 0)e successful atte%/ts to con+ert t)e %usket into a s)ort /ike /ro&a&ly )ad as great tactical i%/ort for (arfare on land as any c)ange in (ea/ons since t)e de+elo/%ent of t)e four &asic (ea/on syste%s. 0)e first efforts in+ol+ed a knife (it) a foot# long &lade t)at /lugged into t)e &arrel of t)e %usket. s early as t)e %iddle of t)e se+enteent) century suc) (ea/ons3 called &ayonets3 &egan to a//ear3 first in t)e 'renc) and t)en in ot)er ar%ies. conte%/orary descri&ed it as Ja &road dagger (it)out any guard3 generally %ade (it) a round ta/er )andle to stick in t)e %u66le of a %usket3 in ()ic) %anner it ser+es instead of a /ike to recei+e t)e c)arge of t)e "orse3 all t)e %en first )a+ing t)e ad+antage of t)eir S)ot &efore inserting t)e /lug &ayonet into t)e %u66les of t)eir %uskets3 t)us con+erting all of t)e %usketeers into /ike%en. 0)e disad+antage of t)e syste% lay not in t)e s)ortness of t)e /ike3 e+en t)oug) t)e %usket and &ayonet toget)er %easured only a&out si- to se+en feet. In fact3 in co%&at (it) ca+alry infantry%en (ould not )old t)eir %uskets3 as did a /)alan- of %en (it) long /ikes &ut3 instead3 use t)e% as sta&&ing (ea/ons like s)ort s/ears or sta&&ing s(ords. 0)ese could not3 )o(e+er3 )a+e /ro+en effecti+e against ca+alry%en (it) lances3 ()ic) de%anded t)at t)e defenders )a+e a &ristling (all of long /ikes. :et (it) all %en e.ui//ed (it) e+en inferior /ike su&stitutes3 t)e ca+alry3 ar%ed only (it) sa&res rat)er t)an long lances3 faced too for%ida&le a re/lace%ent for t)e traditional )ea+y infantry array to &reak t)roug) t)e ranks. But t)e %usketeers3 reluctant to forego t)eir +olleys3 al(ays ran t)e risk of recei+ing a c)arge &efore t)ey )ad ti%e to insert t)eir &ayonets. By t)e 1=@>s t)e socket &ayonet re/laced t)e /lug &ayonet and %ade t)e /ike%an co%/letely o&solete. 0)e socket &ayonet consisted of a &lade attac)ed to t)e side of a %etal slee+e t)at fitted o+er t)e &arrel3 lea+ing t)e %usket free to fire (it) t)e &ayonet attac)ed. No( all infantry%en could si%ultaneously function as )ea+y and lig)t infantry. By 1C>>3 ()en t)e socket &ayonet &eca%e uni+ersal3 a successful frontal ca+alry c)arge against for%ed infantry )ad &eco%e i%/ossi&le. 0)e ca+alry )ad to face +olleys fro% a for%ation %ade u/ co%/letely of %usketeers and3 if t)ey still could close (it) t)e infantry3 t)en confronted a for%ation entirely co%/osed of /ike%en. 0)e /istol3 ()en co%&ined (it) t)e sa&re3 )ad %ade )orse%en into a truly dual#/ur/ose (ea/on syste%3 &ot) )ea+y and lig)t ca+alry si%ultaneously. 0)is de+elo/%ent )ad strengt)ened t)e

21>

offensi+e ca/a&ilities of t)e %ounted (ea/on syste% against t)e infantry3 %aking it su/re%e on o/en ground unless lig)t and )ea+y infantry coo/erated closely. 0)e &ayonet ti//ed t)e scales all t)e (ay in t)e o//osite direction. 0)e ca+alry lacked offensi+e /o(er against any infantry3 its /istols outclassed &y %uskets and its sa&res ineffecti+e against a (all of &ayonets. /rescri/tion for t)e /ro/er training of infantry illustrates t)e ascendancy t)at for%ed infantry )ad o+er ca+alry. In 1C?> a S/anis) general reco%%ended t)at in front of )is infantry an officer Js)ould %ount a strong and sturdy )orseL and s)o( t)e defensi+e /o(er of infantry &y t)en trying Jto ride do(n a foot soldier3 ()o (ill stand fir% ar%ed only (it) a /ole7 t)ey (ill see t)at &y /ointing t)e stick at t)e )orses eyes or ta//ing its )ead (it) it3 t)e )orse (ill s)y and refuse to ad+ance.L 0)e officer (ould t)en take t)e o//ortunity to /oint out to t)e soldiers t)at if a )orse (ill not ride do(n a %an ar%ed only (it) a /ole )o( %uc) less (ill ca+alry /ros/er against for%ed &attalions3 ()ose &ayonets3 &ullets and din of ar%s ... are e+en %ore ca/a&le of scaring t)e )orses.L But t)e ca+alry retained its distincti+e offensi+e ad+antages of greater %o&ility and t)e ca/acity to go into action (it)out ela&orate and ti%e#consu%ing de/loy%ent. 0)e linear syste% of infantry for%ation /ro+ided a%/ly +ulnera&le flanks and rear against ()ic) ca+alry could use its still for%ida&le attri&utes. Since a t)ree#rank array of &ayonet#ar%ed %usketeers could resist a ca+alry c)arge3 infantry /ro+ided itself (it) all#around defence &y for%ing into a )ollo( s.uare3 t)ree ranks dee/. But3 it took ti%e to for% into a s.uare and ca+alry attacks (ere often too ra/id and3 on a s%oke#o&scured &attlefield3 too une-/ected for infantry al(ays to )a+e ti%e to ado/t its /o(erful defensi+e for%ation. Since3 )o(e+er3 t)e &ayonet did circu%scri&e ca+alrys role and di%inis) its effecti+eness3 t)e /ro/ortion of ca+alry in !estern 2uro/ean ar%ies declined3 t)oug) gradually3 t)roug)out t)e eig)teent) century. 0)e introduction of t)e &ayonet %ade ar%ies %ore )o%ogeneous and si%/lified t)e tacticians task. In ancient ar%ies3 (it) four (ea/on syste%s3 tacticians )ad to ac)ie+e t)e o/ti%u% co%&ination and soug)t to &ring t)e su/erior (ea/on syste% to &ear against t)e inferior. 0)e By6antines )ad &ased %uc) of t)eir success on e%/loying t)eir +ariety of (ea/on syste%s against +arious foes # sto//ing *ot) )ea+y ca+alry at 0aginae (it) )ea+y infantry and dis%ounted ca+alry and using t)eir lig)t infantry against 'rankis) )ea+y infantry at $asilinu%. $rusaders also )ad &ased t)eir tactics on e%/loying t)e stronger (ea/on syste% against t)e (eaker. Since !estern 2uro/eans )ad ne+er %ade significant use of lig)t ca+alry3 t)e ad+ent of t)e reiter (it) sa&re and /istol )ad not si%/lified t)eir tactical /ro&le%7 t)ere re%ained ca+alry and t(o kinds of infantry3 eac) +ulnera&le to ca+alry if unaided &y t)e ot)er. But t)e &ayonet#ar%ed %usketeer not only reduced ar%ies to t(o (ea/on syste%s &ut ga+e t)e infantry distinct /ri%acy. !it) M1 %eaning t)e /o(er to defend against an attack3 t)e t(o (ea/ons )ad a si%/le relations)i/ G&elo(H. $o%/ared to t)e four (ea/on syste%s of earlier (arfare3 tactics )ad undergone a funda%ental transfor%ation.

Mus$eteers with .ayonets %erses )a%alry Back

0)e tactician no longer )ad t)e /ro&le% of defending against a &etter (ea/on syste% nor t)e o//ortunity of e-/loiting one. "is analogous o//ortunity lay in using ca+alrys s)ock action against disordered infantry or against t)e flanks or rear of infantry for%ed in line. *enerals)i/ lost so%e of its creati+e o//ortunities for talented co%%anders and so%e of its c)ances for ine/t tacticians to &lunder. !it) greater )o%ogeneity in t)e ar%ies3 &attles s)ould &eco%e less decisi+e and t)e casualties of t)e defeated s%aller.

211

I%/ortant i%/ro+e%ents in t)e %usket also increased its fire/o(er and strengt)ened t)e infantrys reliance on %issiles. fter o+er a )alf century in de+elo/%ent and /erfection3 t)e flintlock reac)ed t)e ar%ies in .uantity in t)e 1=@>s. 0)e (ea/on ignited t)e /o(der in its /an (it) s/arks fro% a flint )itting a steel. 0)e flint3 )eld &y t)e s/ring#loaded )a%%er3 struck a &lo( against a /late attac)ed to t)e co+er of t)e /an3 o/ening t)e /an as it si%ultaneously caused s/arks ()ic) ignited t)e /o(der and fired t)e %usket. 0)e %ec)anis% /ro+ed %uc) %ore relia&le t)an t)e %atc)lock3 initially firing t(o#t)irds of t)e ti%e as against t)e %atc)locks <> /ercent rate. Su&se.uent i%/ro+e%ents ena&led t)e %usket to fire B< /ercent of t)e ti%e. 0)e flintlock greatly increased t)e rate of fire3 a /rocess s/eeded u/ &y t)e use of an o&long /a/er cartridge t)at contained t)e &all and t)e /ro/er a%ount of /o(der. !it) t)e old %atc)lock3 a %usketeer first filled )is /an fro% a /o(der#)orn7 o/ened a s%all (ooden cartridge and e%/tied its /o(der into t)e &arrel7 took a &all fro% its /ouc) and /ut it in t)e &arrel along (it) a /iece of clot) fro% )is )at7 took )is ra%rod and ra%%ed t)e clot) and &all do(n u/on t)e /o(der7 and3 finally3 took t)e &urning %atc) attac)ed to )is (rist3 &le( on it3 and fastened it to t)e lock3 ready to fire at last. !it) a flintlock t)e %usketeer &it off t)e end of t)e cartridge (it) )is teet)3 retaining t)e &all in )is %out)7 used so%e /o(der fro% t)e cartridge to fill t)e /an and /oured t)e re%ainder do(n t)e &arrel3 follo(ing it (it) t)e &all front )is %out) and t)e /a/er of t)e cartridge7 )e t)en used )is ra%rod to dri+e /a/er and &all do(n on t)e /o(der3 and )e (as ready to fire. Instead of one round a %inute3 t)e soldier (it) a flintlock (it) /a/er cartridge could fire t(o or t)ree or e+en %ore rounds in a %inute.

#lintlo($ Me(hanism Back

not)er c)ange in+ol+ed &etter %etal for t)e &arrel3 ()ic) /er%itted larger /o(der c)arges and resulted in a %u66le +elocity of 13>>> feet /er second (it) a one#ounce &all. lt)oug) ar%ies )ad ado/ted s)orter3 lig)ter %uskets (it) &ores of no %ore t)an t)ree#fourt)s of an inc)3 t)ese flintlocks )ad a range and /o(er nearly co%/ara&le to t)e older S/anis) %usket3 ()ic) re.uired a forked rest under t)e &arrel. 'urt)er3 t)ey )ad tri/le t)e old (ea/ons rate of fire and a %uc) greater /ercentage of s)ots fired for eac) /ull of t)e trigger. !it) its si%/ler loading /rocedure and no need to guard against accidents (it) a lig)ted %atc)3 t)e flintlock allo(ed a %eaningful c)ange in infantry for%ations. !)ereas %atc)lock#e.ui//ed %usketeers re.uired at least a yard &et(een t)e% to load3 infantry%en (it) flintlocks could load and for% u/ s)oulder to s)oulder (it) as little as t(enty#t(o inc)es /er %an. 0)is could %ore t)an dou&le t)e nu%&er of soldiers in eac) rank. Suc) a for%ation not only increased t)e nu%&er of (ea/ons firing for eac) yard of front3 &ut /resented t)e ca+alry (it) a t)icker (all of &ayonets. $o%%anders could e%/loy t)e closer s/acing of %en (it)out any sacrifice in t)e (idt) of t)e front &ecause t)e %ore#ra/id loading of t)e flintlock %ade /ossi&le a reduction in t)e ranks fro% si- to t)ree as (ell as t)e %aintenance3 if t)ey used firing &y rank3 of a t)ird of t)eir %en (it) loaded (ea/ons.

212

But ar%ies (ere slo( to /ractice t)e tactical c)anges i%/lied &y t)e introduction of t)e flintlock3 for%ation in four rat)er t)an t)ree ranks lasting in %any ar%ies until nearly t)e %iddle of t)e century. *radually t)ey ado/ted t)ree ranks t)at could fire toget)er3 t)e first rank kneeling3 t)e second stoo/ing3 and t)e t)ird standing. In an alternati+e %et)od3 t)e second rank stood and t)e t)ird %o+ed enoug) to t)e side to fire &et(een t)e files of t)e second. Since t)e first %et)od often in+ol+ed &roken collar&ones a%ong t)e %en in t)e second rank3 and t)e second %et)od often inflicted ar% and &and (ounds on t)e %en of t)e second rank3 si%ultaneous fire &y all t)ree ranks ne+er /ro+ed co%/letely satisfactory. 4lti%ately3 ar%ies a&andoned consistent use of t)e t)ird rank &ut did not a&olis) it officially until t)e nineteent) century. 0)e s%oot)&ore %usket re%ained inaccurate. 0)e &urning of t)e &lack /o(der caused t)e &arrel to foul and3 to a+oid )a+ing to clean t)e &arrel during &attle3 t)e &all )ad a +ery loose fit3 usually one# t(entiet) of an inc) s%aller t)an t)e &ore. 0)is sacrificed %u66le +elocity and accuracy &ut s/eeded u/ loading and deferred t)e need to rea% out &arrels. 'or t)ese reasons ar%ies did not use rifles t)at re.uired a tig)t fit for t)e &all going do(n t)e &arrel if t)e &all (ere to engage t)e rifling co%ing out. 0)e fe( %ilitary rifle%en )ad %allets to )a%%er on t)eir ra%rods to dri+e t)e &all into t)e &arrel. !it) all %en ar%ed (it) %uskets3 firing recei+ed e+en %ore attention. !)en %en stood s)oulder to s)oulder to fire3 e+en unifor%s )ad to c)ange3 t)e late se+enteent)#centurys &road#&ri%%ed )ats and coats (it) full skirts gi+ing (ay to narro(#&ri%%ed or &ri%less )eadgear and tig)t#fitting clot)es suita&le for %en in close array. 0)e &est %et)od of e-/loiting t)e en)anced fire/o(er occu/ied tacticians3 ()o soug)t &etter alternati+es to t)e /rocedures used (it) t)e %atc)lock. 0)e 'renc)3 slo( to c)ange to %ake t)e %ost of t)e flintlock3 clung to a dee/er for%ation and controlled fire &y ranks. !)en still arrayed in fi+e ranks3 t)e 'renc) (ould )a+e t)e first four ranks kneel3 t)e fift) fire3 t)e fourt) rise and fire3 and so on until eac) rank )ad stood and fired. 0)ey could a//ortion or reser+e t)eir fire &y )a+ing only one or %ore ranks fire. But it /ro+ed difficult to control t)e fire of an entire &attalion in t)is (ay3 and ot)er ar%ies su&di+ided t)e &attalion into as %any as eig)teen /latoons for firing. If t)ey organised /latoons dra(n front eac) /art of t)e &attalion line into t)ree grou/s for firing /ur/oses3 eac) grou/ could fire se/arately on co%%and. Since t)e /latoons firing at any one ti%e (ere distri&uted o+er t)e ()ole front of t)e &attalion3 t)e entire front deli+ered and reser+ed fire eac) ti%e one of t)e t)ree grou/s of /latoons fired. Si%ultaneous firing &y all t)ree lines of a /latoon ga+e officers &etter o//ortunities to su/er+ise and so took ad+antage of t)e &attalions su&di+ision and su&ordinate co%%and structure to i%/ro+e control and /erfor%ance. In addition3 it &ot) si%/lified reloading ()en all ranks /erfor%ed t)at task concurrently and3 at t)e sa%e ti%e3 assured t)at all /arts of t)e line fired at one ti%e ()ile retaining so%e %en (it) t)eir %uskets reloaded and ready to fire. 1rill )el/ed &attalions kee/ t)eir align%ent in &attle3 &ut on t)e &attlefield a conte%/orary kne( t)at t)e aligned %arc)es and ot)er Js/lendid e+olutionsL /racticed in /eaceti%e %et difficulties in (ar. J /loug)ed field or a c)urned u/ %eado( are enoug) to reduce t)e )ar%ony to dissonance. So%e of t)e soldiers lose ste/3 and in trying to regain it t)ey %ake a cou/le of )o/s and fall &e)ind. !)en t)ey fall &ack into ste/ t)e ot)ers /ro%/tly lose it. 0)e ad+ance )esitates and t)e ()ole line falters.L 0)e drill also ga+e soldiers skill in loading and firing ra/idly3 &ut ()en lines fired at eac) ot)er at a )undred yards3 t)e fire at co%%and soon ga+e (ay to indi+idual firing &ecause officers could no longer control t)eir %en. J1uring long and )ot actions3 ()en %any troo/s )ad &een killed3 t)ey could not /re+ent t)eir soldiers fro% firing at (ill.L not)er conte%/orary descri&ed suc) co%&ats (it) %uskets t)us: J:ou &egin &y firing &y /latoons3 and /er)a/s t(o or t)ree (ould get off orderly +olleys. But t)en (ould follo( a general &la6ing a(ay # t)e usual rolling fire ()en e+ery&ody &lasted off as soon as )e )ad loaded3 ()en t)e ranks and files &eca%e inter%ingled3 ()en t)e first rank (as inca/a&le of kneeling3 e+en if it (anted to. 0)e co%%anders3 fro%

21?

su&alterns to generals3 (ould &e inca/a&le of getting t)e %ass to /erfor% anyt)ing else: t)ey Dust )ad to (ait until it finally set itself in %otion for(ards or &ack(ards.L In addition to de+oting %uc) drill to t)e /erfection of firing3 co%%anders trained t)eir %en to for% s.uares to resist ca+alry and to for% into line of &attle. 0)roug) drill t)ey soug)t to /roduce soldiers ()o )ad suc) disci/line and fa%iliarity (it) t)eir firing3 %arc)ing3 and tactical e+olutions t)at t)ey could function as s%oot)ly and res/onsi+ely as /ossi&le a%id t)e s%oke3 din3 and &loods)ed of t)e &attlefield. 5n t)e ()ole3 t)ey )ad a re%arka&le degree of success3 e+en t)oug) t)e aristocratic officers tended to rely too %uc) on dri+ing t)e %en and not enoug) on eliciting t)eir loyalty and leading t)e%. Back

-ighteenth-Century "ogistics
,and trans/ortation )ad undergone no %aDor c)anges since t)e introduction of t)e )orse3 &ut s%all .ualitati+e en)ance%ents did increase its efficiency. 0)e four#()eel (agon3 ()ic) could carry %ore t)an a ton3 could take &est ad+antage of t)e ra/id increase in t)e %ileage of surfaced roads3 t)e de+elo/%ent of ()ic) c)aracterised t)e late se+enteent) and t)e eig)teent) centuries. 0)e gro(t) in t)e nu%&er of canals also en)anced t)e econo%y of land trans/ortation. 0)e increase in t)e a+aila&ility and accuracy of %a/s aided t)e /lanning and e-ecution of ca%/aigns3 and t)e telesco/e %ade a si%ilar contri&ution to t)e conduct of &attles. Steady i%/ro+e%ents in s)i/s and t)eir sailing .ualities %arked a si%ilar gradual /rogress in sea trans/ortation. 0)e de+elo/%ent of t)e c)rono%eter /er%itted calculation of longitude3 and &etter instru%ents aug%ented t)e accuracy of t)e deter%ination of latitude and longitude. d+ances in co%%erce3 agriculture3 and %anufacturing fostered econo%ic /roducti+ity and (ent )and in )and (it) t)e %arked /o/ulation gro(t)3 also occasioned &y t)e decline in t)e +irulence of e/ide%ic disease. 0)e introduction of t)e /otato not only )el/ed food /roduction &ut also /ut at t)e dis/osal of ar%ies a cro/ t)at could su&stitute for &read &ut t)at did not re.uire any ela&orate /rocessing. Soldiers could dig /otatoes and cook t)e% t)e%sel+es. But t)ese c)anges did not c)ange t)e logistical %et)ods of su//ly esta&lis)ed in t)e latter )alf of t)e /receding century. Reser+es accu%ulated in %aga6ines continued to /lay a role3 &ut largely to su//ort t)e initiation of a ca%/aign or to sustain a siege. nd e+en t)en %aga6ines could only su//ly flour for &read7 a %aga6ine could not /ossi&ly %eet t)e +astly greater re.uire%ents of forage for t)e ar%ies nu%erous )orses. ty/ical ar%y )ad t(o#t)irds as %any )orses as %en3 and )orses on ca%/aign consu%ed t(enty /ounds of food a day co%/ared to t)e one and a )alf /ounds of flour needed to &ake t(o /ounds of &read for a %an and anot)er /ound for %eat3 c)eese3 and ot)er food. %%unition3 e+en in sieges3 a%ounted to an insignificant ite% co%/ared to t)e (eig)t of t)e food and fodder needed &y a &esieging ar%y. 0)us ar%ies continued to li+e on t)e country3 a /rocess organised and regularised &y contri&utions &ut still fully de/endent on t)e e-/loitation of local sources of food and3 es/ecially3 fodder. 0)e great si6e of ar%ies %eant t)at t)ey )ad difficulty re%aining long in one /lace3 e+en if good roads3 and an a%/le nu%&er of (agons (idely e-tended t)e area fro% ()ic) t)ey dre( su//lies. Stationary ar%ies usually )ad to organise t)e resources of t)e region for t)e%sel+es3 esta&lis)ing o+ens to &ake &read and )ar+esting )ay for t)e )orses and e+en ()eat for t)e %ens &read. 0)ese latter o/erations often )ad t)e attri&utes of a %aDor %ilitary o/eration. 1is/ersal for suc) /roducti+e acti+ities furnis)ed e-cellent o//ortunities for soldiers to desert and for ene%y ca+alry or e+en infantry to catc) t)e ar%y at a disad+antage. large force often acco%/anied t)e foraging /arties. Since ene%y ca+alry raiders al(ays found su//ly (agons te%/ting targets3 t)e (agons usually %o+ed in )ea+ily guarded con+oys3 and t)e need to safeguard a large con+oy often /ut t)e entire ar%y on t)e alert.

214

0)oug) %ore a%/le ta- re+enues and loan resources and &etter and %ore &usinesslike logistical arrange%ents tet)ered ar%ies less to su//ly considerations t)an in any &ut ancient ti%es3 t)e a&ility to /ro+ide for ar%ies still funda%entally conditioned strategy3 as it )ad in le-anders ti%e. 0)e fre.uency of sieges increased t)e i%/ortance of logistics3 and t)e a&ility of t)e &esiegers su//lies to outlast t)ose of t)e garrison assu%ed funda%ental i%/ortance in any o/eration against a large3 (ell#fortified /lace. 0)us3 attackers offered li&eral ter%s for an early surrender and t)reatened e-ter%ination for resistance to t)e end3 ()ic) (ould ne+er co%e3 if t)e &esiegers e-)austed t)e resources of t)e adDacent country &efore t)e garrisons su//lies ga+e out. ,ike t)e *reeks3 &ut unlike le-anders3 eig)teent)#century ar%ies still )ad %any non#co%&atants (it) t)e%3 including (o%en and c)ildren. 0)e &aggage of t)e %any (ell#to#do officers also (as a %aDor source of t)e large train t)at acco%/anied eig)teent)#century ar%ies. Many officers &roug)t along a &ed3 c)airs3 a %o&ile kitc)en3 (riting stand3 and e+en &rass candlesticks as (ell as large (ardro&es3 including nig)tca/s3 sli//ers3 and clot)es &rus)es. 0)e I%/erial r%y of t)e ustrian "a&s&urgs li%ited officers to one /ri+ate (agon for t)eir &aggage3 colonels to t(o3 generals fro% t(o to four3 and 'ield Mars)als3 of ()ic) t)e ar%y )ad %any3 to fi+e. In all ar%ies3 +ery (ealt)y officers circu%+ented suc) regulations ()ere t)ey e-isted and &roug)t into t)e field (it) t)e% a +ery su%/tuous lifestyle. Suc) officers &roug)t +alets3 e-tensi+e (ardro&es3 and c)efs3 and carried into t)e field ela&orate sil+er ser+ices and one3 a trou/e of actors. 0)oug) not re/resentati+e &ecause it occurred on a %anoeu+re and ()en t)e 9ing (as /resent (it) t)e ar%y3 t)e scale of entertaining &y a 'renc) Mars)al3 t)e 1uke of Boufflers3 illustrates t)is /ro&le%. 0)e Mars)al J)ad %ore t)an C1 cooks and at least ?4> do%estics3 of ()o% 12> (ore li+ery. 0)ere (ere 4>> do6en na/kins3 B> do6en /lates of sil+er and si- do6en of ena%el &esides /lates and sil+er &o(ls for fruit3 and e+eryt)ing else in /ro/ortion. 5n an ordinary day t)ey consu%ed <> do6en &ottles and ()en t)e 9ing and t)e Princes ca%e to eat3 B>. In one day 23>>> /ounds of coffee (ere consu%ed and 2=B litres of li.ueurs.L 2+en !allenstein (ould )a+e found it difficult to sur/ass t)e /rofuse %agnificence of t)is style of li+ing. Back

(he Strategy and (actics of Marlborough%s Cam'aigns

0actical conditions &asically /recluded t)e realistic /ursuit of a co%&at strategy t)at did not in+ol+e sieges. 0)oug) co%%anders ()o )ad confidence in t)e e-cellence of t)eir ar%ies and t)eir o(n skill soug)t &attles3 t)ey still lacked t)e /o(er to co%/el t)e ene%y to fig)t. 'aced (it) t)e defensi+e strengt) of t)e &ayonet#ar%ed3 dual#/ur/ose infantry3 t)e tactical offensi+e )ad lost /o(er since co%%anders could no longer /it a su/erior (ea/on syste% against an inferior. So t)e greater )o%ogeneity of ar%ies strengt)ened t)e defence3 already /redo%inant &et(een si%ilarly constituted forces. 0)us (it) Ro%an logistics3 Ro%an linear tactics3 and Ro%an skill in field and /er%anent fortifications3 strategy e-)i&ited t)e sa%e indecisi+eness t)at )ad c)aracterised Ro%an o/erations ()en t)e Po%/eians sty%ied $aesar at Ilerda and $aesar and Po%/ey eac) &affled t)e ot)er until &ot) decided t)ey could /rofit fro% a &attle at P)arsalus. 0)is condition of stale%ate did not differentiate eig)teent)#century (arfare fro% /receding centuries3 for e+en ()en )ea+y ca+alry do%inated t)e &attlefield7 t)e castle and fortified cities ga+e /ri%acy to t)e strategic defence. Strategists continued to ai% at logistic o&Decti+es &ut )ad largely a&andoned raids to su//ly t)e raiding ar%y3 deny resources to t)e ene%y3 and e-ert /ressure on t)eir o//onent for /olitical concessions. Instead3 t)ey soug)t to occu/y ene%y territory3 to su&sist t)ere %ore /er%anently and efficiently t)an t)ey could as raiders3 deny %ore conclusi+ely t)e resources to t)e ene%y3 and t)us e-ert a %ore effecti+e /olitical /ressure (it) a %et)od t)at /ro%ised to arouse less acti+e anti/at)y to soldiers or /olitical o//osition a%ong t)e in)a&itants and aut)orities. 0)e 'renc) e-/erience in de+astating t)e Palatinate )ad s)o(n t)at (anton raids could intensify o//osition as (ell as inti%idate.

21<

0)e !ar of t)e S/anis) Succession clearly e-)i&its %ilitary o/erations of t)e early eig)teent) century and )o( %uc) t)ey )ad in co%%on (it) t)ose of t)e late se+enteent) &efore t)e introduction of t)e &ayonet. In t)is (ar 'rance and S/ain foug)t t)e 4nited 9ingdo%3 "olland3 t)e "oly Ro%an 2%/eror3 and t)e %aDority of t)e *er%an /rinci/alities. But Ba+aria sided (it) t)e 'renc)3 and3 reinforced &y a /o(erful 'renc) ar%y under Mars)al Marsin3 in 1C>43 t)e 'ranco# Ba+arian forces /osed a %enace to t)e 2%/erors )eartland3 ustria. 5n t)e R)ine3 I%/erial forces under t)e Margra+e of Baden faced a 'renc) ar%y under Mars)al 0allard and in t)e Net)erlands Mars)al Villeroi o//osed allied forces3 largely 2nglis) and 1utc)3 under t)e 1uke of Marl&oroug). lt)oug) t)ey fell far &elo( t)e standard of 0urenne and ,u-e%&ourg3 Marsin and 0allard ga+e ade.uate /erfor%ances as co%%anders. Mars)al Villeroi3 )o(e+er3 a /olis)ed courtier ()o recei+ed )is co%%and &ecause of t)e friends)i/ of 9ing ,ouis IIV3 /ro+ed )o/elessly inco%/etent. 5n t)e ot)er )and3 t)e 1uke of Marl&oroug)3 ()o )ad also risen )ig) &y )is connections at court3 (ould &eco%e one of t)e greatest of Britis) generals. "is e-ce/tional concern for t)e sensi&ilities of ot)ers and t)e c)ar% of )is %anner %ade )i% e-cel in t)e di/lo%acy necessary in a coalition (ar and )el/ed )i% &ind )is soldiers to )i% &y )is constant consideration of t)eir needs. "is strategy3 c)aracterised &y careful /lanning3 %atc)ed )is tactical skill3 founded in large %easure on )is in+aria&le coolness on t)e &attlefield. $oncerned a&out t)e 'ranco#Ba+arian t)reat to t)e 2%/eror3 t)e 1uke of Marl&oroug) deter%ined to %o+e t)ere (it) /art of t)e forces fro% t)e Net)erlands. Beginning in early May3 t)e 1uke %arc)ed sout) along t)e east &ank of t)e R)ine3 )is intentions .uite o&scure to t)e ene%y3 a confusion )e fostered &y %aking /re/arations to cross t)e R)ine Dust as )e left t)e ri+er to %arc) east(ard to t)e 1anu&e to strengt)en t)e I%/erial ar%ies facing t)e 'renc) and t)eir Ba+arian ally. But Mars)al Villeroi )ad %o+ed sout)3 and t)e 'renc) /lan called for )i% to face t)e Margra+e of Badens I%/erial troo/s ()ile Mars)al 0allards %en crossed t)e R)ine fart)er sout) in a tentati+e ad+ance east(ard. Mean()ile3 t)e 2%/erors a&lest general3 Prince 2ugene of Sa+oy3 )ad taken t)e co%%and fro% Baden3 ()o )ad Doined Marl&oroug) (it) a s%all reinforce%ent. 2ugene )ad t)e task of kee/ing &ack t)e 'renc) on t)e R)ine ()ile t)e 1uke of Marl&oroug) soug)t to dri+e Ba+aria fro% t)e (ar. 0)e 1uke )ad reac)ed t)e 1anu&e (it) )is ar%y in fine condition and (it) its full strengt) in s/ite of tra+elling /er)a/s ?<> %iles. "e )ad %arc)ed only in t)e %orning3 gi+en rest days3 and still a+eraged %ore t)an nine %iles a day. 9no(ing )is itinerary &efore )is de/arture3 )e )ad %ade ad+ance logistic /re/arations along t)e route3 e+en recei+ing ne( &oots for t)e %en. "e %ini%ised desertion &ecause )e usually ke/t )is force concentrated3 su&sisting t)roug) )is .uarter%asters. 0)e friendly or neutral local aut)orities /ro+ided t)e su//lies3 res/onding to t)e /ro%ise of /ay%ent and a genteel for% of /ressure e-e%/lified &y )is letter to t)e 2lector of Main6: JIt (ould /lease your )ig)ness ... to see to it t)at (e %ay find /ro+isions on our (ay3 /ending /ro%/t re/ay%ent. It (ould &e +ery ad+antageous for t)e troo/s and also for t)e country in /re+enting disordersL in ()ic)3 /resu%a&ly3 unfed3 tur&ulent troo/s took loot as (ell as food. rri+ing on t)e nort) &ank of t)e 1anu&e3 t)e 1uke found t)e 2lector of Ba+aria and Mars)al Marsin in /ossession of all of t)e &ridges o+er t)e ri+er and (it) t)eir forces dis/osed to kee/ )i% nort) of t)e 1anu&e. Mo+ing east along t)e ri+er3 Marl&oroug) ca/tured t)e fortified &ridge)ead at 1onau(ort). "e lost <3>>> %en in an assault on t)e strongest /art of t)e fortifications3 one ()ic) so distracted t)e defenders t)at t)e %ain attack easily succeeded. 0)e o+er()el%ed defenders lost 1>3>>> of t)eir 143>>> %en3 and t)e 1uke )ad a &ridge)ead across t)e 1anu&e3 ()ic) )e ra/idly e-/loited to enter Ba+aria3 confining t)e 'ranco#Ba+arian forces to t)e area (est of t)e ,ec). !it) control of t)e &ridge and an a&ility to cross and re#cross t)e 1anu&e3 Marl&oroug) could /ursue )is logistic strategy of occu/ying t)e ene%ys resource areas. Since )e could not occu/y t)e% all si%ultaneously3 )e %ust3 as Prince 2ugene e-/lained it3 de+astate Ba+aria: J0)us I see in

21=

t)e final analysis t)at t)ere is no ot)er %eans &ut t)at entire Ba+aria3 toget)er (it) t)e surrounding districts3 %ust &e totally destroyed and laid (aste in order to deny t)e ene%ies t)e o//ortunity of continuing t)e (ar any longer eit)er fro% Ba+aria or any surrounding area.L So Marl&oroug) ra+aged Ba+aria3 &urning ?>> +illages /re/aratory to returning nort) of t)e ri+er to control t)e ene%ys re%aining /otential su//ly regions t)ere. Since t)e ene%y could find not)ing to eat in Ba+aria3 t)is strategy (ould lea+e t)e% de/endent for food and fodder on t)e s%all area &et(een t)e ,ec) and t)e 1anu&e to su&sist an ar%y reinforced &y t)e arri+al of Mars)al Marsins ar%y fro% t)e R)ine. nd to carry it out Marl&oroug) also )ad %ore %en3 Prince 2ugene )a+ing sli//ed a(ay fro% Villeroi and follo(ed 0allard east(ard. 0)e Prince a(aited Marl&oroug) nort) of t)e 1anu&e. But t)e 'ranco#Ba+arian force )ad crossed t)e ri+er at "oc)stett and occu/ied a strong /osition fro% ()ic) t)ey guarded t)eir su//ly area and interdicted t)e allies access to t)e su//lies in t)e region nort)(ard to(ard Nure%&erg. Since sout)(ard t)e allies )ad access only to de+astated Ba+aria3 t)is ne( /osition of t)e 'ranco#Ba+arian ar%y (ould co%/el Marl&oroug) and 2ugene to retreat or attack to dri+e t)e 'ranco#Ba+arian ar%y fro% its source of rations for %en and )orses. lt)oug) 0allard in+ited a &attle3 )e )ad confidence t)at Marl&oroug) and 2ugene (ould not assault )i%3 /osted as )e (as (it) flanks /rotected and )is front o&structed &y +illages and a strea%7 rat)er3 )e t)oug)t t)ey (ould fall &ack3 lea+ing )i% in control of t)e 1anu&e region. But t)e Britis) and I%/erial co%%anders resol+ed to attack. In Prince 2ugene t)e 1uke )ad a (ort)y co%/atriot. 'ro% Sa+oy3 a region on t)e &order &et(een 'rance and Italy3 t)e /)ysically un/re/ossessing Prince t)irsted for %ilitary fa%e3 ser+ing t)e 2%/eror &ecause )e could not o&tain a co%%ission fro% t)e 9ing of 'rance. 0)e Prince3 seasoned in (ars (it) t)e 0urks as (ell as against t)e 'renc) in Italy3 )ad already e%erged as one of t)e /re%ier soldiers of t)e age. 2.ually a %aster of strategy and tactics3 in &attle )e dis/layed al%ost reckless courage and e-/ected t)e sa%e of )is %en. "e and Marl&oroug)3 e.ually aggressi+e often co%%anded in t)e sa%e t)eatre3 (orked )ar%oniously toget)er3 and &eca%e fast friends. s did *usta+us at Breitenfeld3 0allard co%%anded t(o ar%ies3 )is o(n and t)e 'ranco#Ba+arian of Marsin and t)e 2lector of Ba+aria. Since )e de/loyed t)e% side &y side3 )e3 like *usta+us3 )ad a )ig) /ro/ortion of )is ca+alry in )is centre. 0allard /rotected )is left &y (oods and )is rig)t &y t)e +illage of Blen)ei%3 ()ic) touc)ed t)e 1anu&e. "ere )e )ad a strong garrison of infantry. S)ortly after noon Marl&oroug) on t)e allied left and 2ugene on t)e rig)t &egan t)eir assault. !)ile 2ugene attracted t)e attention of t)e ene%y on )is /art of t)e front3 Marl&oroug) assailed t)e +illage of Blen)ei% (it) t(enty &attalions of infantry. !)en t)e first Britis) infantry in line a//roac)ed t)e 'renc)3 234>> 2nglis)%en recei+ed a +olley at less t)an t)irty yards fro% 43>>> 'renc)%en3 i%%ediately losing B>> killed or (ounded7 &ut t)e Britis) /ersisted and t)e alar%ed 'renc) defender of Blen)ei% /ut in all of )is infantry reser+es3 ulti%ately cra%%ing 1B3>>> %en into t)e little +illage3 far %ore %en t)an could e%/loy (it) effect. n o&ser+er noted t)at Jt)e %en (ere so cro(ded in a%ong one anot)er t)at t)ey couldnt e+en fire # let alone carry out any orders. Not a single s)ot of t)e ene%y %issed its %ark3 ()ilst only t)ese fe( of our %en at t)e front could return t)e fire.L !)ile )e so successfully distracted t)e ene%y on eit)er end of t)e line3 Marl&oroug) %o+ed infantry and ca+alry to attack o+er t)e creek in t)e centre of t)e ene%y line of &attle. 0)oug) &ot) ar%ies )ad a&out t)e sa%e strengt)3 )e )ad <> /ercent %ore ca+alry in t)e centre and t(enty#t)ree &attalions of infantry to only nine for t)e 'renc). Since t)e 'renc) )ad so fe( infantry and no reser+es a+aila&le fro% t)eir rig)t3 t)eir (eakness (as greater t)an t)eir nu%&ers indicated. Because t)eir strengt) lay in ca+alry3 ()ic) )ad no /redo%inance on t)e defence3 t)ey o//osed t)e allied onslaug)t on t)eir centre (it) forces ill ada/ted to t)e defence. 5f infantry t)at could stand

21C

fir% &e)ind t)eir &ayonets and +olleys t)ey )ad &arely <3>>>3 )a+ing to rely instead on ca+alry ()ose only defence lay in t)e counter#c)arge. S%all (onder t)at Marl&oroug)s co%&ined infantry and ca+alry assault &roke t)e 'renc) centre and t)at %any of t)e 'renc) ca+alry fled to t)e 1anu&e in a )asty retreat. JSo tig)t (as t)e /ress3L (rote one /artici/ant in t)at /anicky flig)t3 Jt)at %y )orse (as carried along so%e t)ree )undred /aces (it)out /utting )oof to ground # rig)t to t)e edge of a dee/ ra+ine: do(n (e /lunged a good t(enty feet into a s(a%/y %eado(7 %y )orse stu%&led and fell. %o%ent later se+eral %ore %en and )orses fell on to/ of %e as t)e re%ains of %y ca+alry s(e/t &y all inter%ingled (it) t)e )otly /ursuing foes. I s/ent se+eral %inutes tra//ed &eneat) %y )orse.L 0)ree t)ousand 'renc) ca+alry dro(ned trying to s(i% t)e 1anu&e3 and t)e allies took a )uge nu%&er of /risoners fro% t)e %en ()o )ad cro(ded into Blen)ei%. 0)e 'renc) suffered ?<3>>> casualties3 including 143>>> /risoners. 0)is a%ounted to t(o#t)irds of t)eir force3 $o%/ared to an allied loss of 2? /ercent. 0)e Battle of Blen)ei% inflicted t)e greatest attrition of any %aDor !estern 2uro/ean &attle in t)e eig)teent) century. It )ad t)e strategic result of re%o+ing t)e 'ranco#Ba+arian t)reat to ustria3 t)e allies occu/ying Ba+aria and t)e 'renc) falling &ack to t)e R)ine. 0)e re%ainder of Marl&oroug)s ca%/aigns during t)e (ar occurred in t)e Net)erlands. 0)e 'renc) )ad occu/ied t)is S/anis) /ro+ince ()en t)e grandson of t)eir 9ing ascended t)e t)rone of S/ain and t)e t(o countries &eca%e allied.

.lenheim2 +istra(tion and )on(entration Back

0)e Britis) and 1utc) &ot) )ad a keen interest in ousting t)e 'renc)3 and Marl&oroug) led nglo# 1utc) ar%ies in t)is effort for t)e succeeding se+en years. "e faced a for%ida&le task &ecause fortified to(ns studded a country t)at )ad &affled t)e S/aniards in t)e si-teent) century and (ould ta- Marl&oroug)s genius. ,ike t)e S/aniards3 )e faced a defence in de/t) suc) as t)e Ro%ans )ad organised to /rotect t)eir frontiers. 0)e fortified cities /ro+ided su//ly de/ots and /laces of refuge for ar%ies3 as (ell as &locking all of t)e %ain roads and /rinci/al ri+er crossings. 'or t)is reason ar%ies found it not only difficult to &y#/ass t)e% &ut )a6ardous also3 as t)e garrisons sallied out to ca/ture su//ly con+oys and attack foragers and s%all forces (it)in striking distance. Siegecraft and logistical organisation )ad de+elo/ed so (ell and t)e Net)erlands )ad suc) a dense /o/ulation and a&undant cro/s t)at an ar%y could count on %aintaining itself outside of a city for t)e %ont) and a )alf to t(o %ont)s needed to take a strongly fortified city. But t)e &esiegers

21B

re.uired enor%ous nu%&ers of %en to surround a city and %an its lines of circu%+allation3 so%eti%es as %any as ten ti%es t)ose in t)e garrison. In addition3 an ar%y )ad to /rotect itself against t)e ar%y of relief3 ()ic) ine+ita&ly t)reatened to interfere3 e+en if it ne+er assu%ed t)e tactical offensi+e. 0)is condition %eant t)at a single siege could so%eti%es consu%e an entire ca%/aigning season3 usually li%ited to t)e /eriod May t)roug) 5cto&er. But in 1C>= Marl&oroug) )ad t)e good fortune to face t)e ine/t Mars)al Villeroi. In May Villeroi ad+anced3 eager for a &attle (it) t)e 1uke of Marl&oroug)s allied ar%y. $onfident of )is a&ility3 )e /lanned to gi+e ,ouis IIV re+enge for t)e defeat at Blen)ei%. 0)e 'renc) dre( u/ =>3>>> %en in a conca+e /osition3 (it) t)e +illage of Ra%illies in t)e centre. Marl&oroug)3 far %ore Dustifia&ly confident of )is a&ility to defeat Villeroi3 de/loyed and &egan a frontal &attle in t)e early afternoon. Bot) ar%ies )ad t)e con+entional de/loy%ent of infantry in t)e centre and ca+alry and so%e infantry on t)e (ings. Marl&oroug) &egan )is offensi+e &attle (it) /ro&ing attacks on eit)er flank. 5n )is left t)e 1ukes ca+alry inflicted )ea+y casualties on so%e dis%ounted 'renc) ca+alry3 and )is infantry ca/tured t(o +illages. 5n t)e 1ukes rig)t an attack &y t(el+e &attalions of redcoated Britis) infantry caused Mars)al Villeroi to %o+e infantry fro% )is centre3 re/lacing t)e% (it) infantry fro% )is already (eakened rig)t. !)en an assault in t)e centre failed and 'renc) ca+alry dro+e )is &ack3 e-/osing t)e infantrys flank3 Marl&oroug) acted. Percei+ing t)at ca+alry could not cross t)e %ars)y creek on )is rig)t and so kno(ing t)at t)e ground ga+e /rotection fro% a counterattack &y t)e 'renc) ca+alry3 )e called off )is attack t)ere3 /ulled &ack )is ca+alry3 and %arc)ed t)e% to )is left3 uno&ser+ed &y Mars)al Villeroi &ecause of t)e s%oke and t)e une+en terrain. 0)ese ca+alry t)e 1uke used first to dri+e &ack t)e 'renc) ca+alry and t)en3 (it) nearly a t(o#to#one su/eriority in ca+alry3 to assault t)e 'renc) in a c)arge aided &y t)e ad+ance of t)e infantry in t)e centre. 0)ese attacks succeeded and ()en3 too late3 t)e Mars)al realised t)at t)e danger lay on )is rig)t and centre3 )is %o+e%ent to t)e rig)t of t)e unused ca+alry of )is left found )is rig)t and centre in full retreat. 0)e 'renc) lost 1?3>>> %en3 o+er 2>/ercent of t)eir strengt)7 Marl&oroug)s ar%y suffered less t)an < /ercent casualties. 8ust as at Blen)ei%3 Marl&oroug)s infantry attacks )ad distracted t)e ene%y3 causing )i% to (eaken a /art of )is line against ()ic) t)e 1uke concentrated )is ca+alry. But t)is +ictory3 tactically inconse.uential ()en co%/ared (it) Blen)ei%3 yielded %aDor strategic results ()en Marl&oroug) /us)ed for(ard against de%oralised ene%y resistance. J0o(ns t)at (e t)oug)t (ould )a+e endured a long siege are yielding (it)out a stroke3L co%%ented one conte%/orary as t)e dis)eartened Villeroi fell &ack and )is su&ordinates surrendered one fortified /oint after anot)er. ,ack of )ostility fro% local in)a&itants aided t)e allied ad+ance. Since t)e "a&s&urgs )ad long ruled t)e Net)erlands3 t)e ne( Bour&on dynasty )ad less )old on t)e /eo/le3 es/ecially since t)e in+ader acted on &e)alf of an alliance ()ic) included t)e "oly Ro%an 2%/eror3 a "a&s&urg cousin of t)e late 9ing of S/ain. Marl&oroug) e-/loited t)is and t)e 2%/erors &rot)ers clai% to t)e t)rone of S/ain as $)arles III ()en )e /ro%ised to guarantee to $)arles IIIs Net)erlands su&Dects Jt)e full and /erfect enDoy%ent of all t)eir estates3 goods3 and effects. !e do )ere&y3L Marl&oroug)s /rocla%ation read3 Jstrictly for&id all t)e officers and soldiers of our ar%y to offer t)e least inDury to ye said in)a&itants.L 0)is lack of indigenous resistance )el/ed Marl&oroug) ca/ture Brussels3 t)e ca/ital of t)e Net)erlands3 and nt(er/3 ()ere t)e S/anis) go+ernor ga+e u/ )is forces and /art of t)e 'renc) garrison as (ell. 4lti%ately t)e allies controlled %uc) of t)e Net)erlands &efore t)e end of t)e ca%/aigning season and t)e +igour of Mars)al Vendo%e3 Villerois a&le re/lace%ent3 )alted t)e easy fall of for%ida&ly fortified /laces. In Vendo%e3 a great#grandson of 9ing "enry IV3 Marl&oroug) faced an o//onent of an entirely different cali&re fro% Villeroi. "a+ing entered t)e ar%y at age eig)teen and seen %ore t)an t)irty years of acti+e ser+ice3 t)e Mars)al )ad de%onstrated skill3 courage3 i%agination3 and an 21@

e-ce/tional a&ility to influence %en. :et t)e follo(ing year /ro+ed une+entful3 as t)e adroit Mars)al stayed on t)e defensi+e ()ile %aking /otentially %enacing %o+e%ents3 and Marl&oroug)3 too3 /ursued t)e defensi+e (it) an ar%y di%inis)ed to su//ort ot)er t)eatres. 0)e ne-t year t)e 'renc) took ad+antage of t)e Net)erlanders dissatisfaction (it) allied rule to use +ery s%all forces to reca/ture t(o %aDor cities and so regain control of %uc) of t)e Net)erlands. But t)e di+ided 'renc) co%%and3 s)ared &y t)e e-/erienced Vendo%e and t)e 9ings young grandson3 contri&uted to Marl&oroug)s a&ility to &ring on a &attle. 0)e t(o ar%ies faced eac) ot)er ()ile s%all 'renc) forces sei6ed t)e disaffected to(ns. Marl&oroug)3 %arc)ing fifty %iles in t(o and a )alf days3 reac)ed a ri+er at 5udenarde3 only si%iles fro% t)e /oint ()ere t)e 'renc) ar%y (as crossing in t)e sa%e direction. Mars)al Vendo%e learned of t)e /resence of t)e allied ar%y ()en so%e of t)e 1ukes ca+alry routed )is foragers. "a+ing )is %en already across t)e ri+er3 t)e Mars)al deter%ined to fig)t7 Marl&oroug)3 kno(ing t)e 'renc) )andica/ of dual co%%and3 like(ise &elie+ed )e could (in. Since eac) side /us)ed %en into t)e contest as t)ey &eca%e a+aila&le3 neit)er e+er for%ed a regular line of &attle. !it) a larger nu%&er of soldiers at )and3 Vendo%e could easily )a+e dri+en &ack t)e allies )ad t)e 9ings grandson not %isunderstood t)e Mars)als /lan and failed to add )is (ing of t)e ar%y to su//ort t)e attack. !)en Marl&oroug) &roug)t infantry and ca+alry around Vendo%es flank3 t)is assault (on t)e Battle of 5udenarde and t)e 'renc) ar%y successfully retreated as nig)t fell. 0)e allies suffered ? /ercent casualties3 t)e 'renc) 1<. 0)us t)e ar%ies encountered eac) ot)er3 neit)er ready to fig)t nor occu/ying c)osen ground3 and &ot) attacking as (ell as defending. !it) t)e 'renc) in retreat3 Marl&oroug) t)en confused t)e ene%y as to ()et)er )e intended to &esiege 0ournai3 :/res3 Mons3 or ,ille. "e settled on ,ille3 %o+ing for(ard in early ugust. ,ille3 a %aDor 'renc) city3 )ad suc) sy%&olic and %aterial significance t)at t)e 'renc) )ad garrisoned it (it) 1=3>>> %en co%%anded &y a senior Mars)al3 t)e talented Boufflers. n allied force of 1>>3>>> carried out t)e siege. Prince 2ugene3 t)e 2%/erors /rinci/al 'ield Mars)al3 su/er+ised t)e &esieging forces7 Marl&oroug)3 t)e ca/tain general of t)e Britis) ar%y3 co%%anded t)e co+ering troo/s. Since artillery could not reac) (alls sunk in a ditc) &e)ind a slo/ing glacis of eart)3 t)e attackers slo(ly dug t)eir (ay for(ard in trenc)es t)at ran /arallel to t)e fortifications (it) 6ig6ag trenc)es connecting t)e%. 0)ey %o+ed u/ artillery to continue &o%&ard%ent of t)e fortifications3 cannon&alls ai%ing at t)e to/s of t)e redou&ts and %ortar &o%&s failing (it)in. 0)e assailants needed t)is fire/o(er as (ell as strong garrisons for t)e trenc)es t)ey dug3 to resist sorties &y t)e &esieged and to co/e (it) any trenc) lines t)e defenders %ig)t &uild out fro% t)e fortifications to &ring t)e trenc)es of t)e attackers under enfilade fire. !)ile t)is a//lication of t)e fairly standard %et)ods of siegecraft (ent on slo(ly against a deter%ined defence and t)e su/er& fortifications of ,ille3 Marl&oroug) )ad to /rotect t)e o/eration fro% a 'renc) ar%y of 11>3>>> %en t)at (arily circled t)e to(n. Raising sieges )ad long occasioned &attles3 &ut Marl&oroug)s strong /osition and )is great re/utation as a co%&at co%%ander %ade t)e 'renc) gi+e u/ t)e idea of &attle3 first in early Se/te%&er and again in 5cto&er ()en Vendo%e a//eared (it) a second relie+ing force. 0)e 'renc) did succeed in &ringing t)e garrison so%e gun/o(der ()en 23>>> ca+alry%en3 eac) carrying a 1>>#/ound &ag of /o(der3 suddenly tried to ride t)roug) t)e &esiegers defences. "alf %ade it3 &ut t)e ot)ers %et disaster ()en3 as a conte%/orary descri&ed it3 &ullets fro% t)e &esiegers J%ade se+eral s/arks to set fire to so%e of t)e ene%ys /o(der &ags7 in an instant se+eral )undred of t)e% (ere )urled into t)e air a%idst a terrifying e-/losion.L s t)e sur+i+ors t)en )astily retreated3 so%e of t)eir /o(der &ags Js/rang leaks3 lea+ing a trail of /o(der along t)e road &e)ind t)e%. s t)ey rode t)eir )orses)oes %ade t)e s/arks fly u/ ()ic) set fire to t)e /o(der trail and t)is in turn ignited t)e sacks3 &lo(ing u/ a nu%&er of %en and )orses (it) an infernal din. It (as a

22>

)orri&le s/ectacle to see t)e re%ains of %en and )orses3 ()ose legs3 ar%s and torsos e+en )ad &een flung into t)e trees.L But t)e fortress continued to )old out as t)e 'renc) succeeded in interru/ting t)e &esiegers co%%unications (it) t)eir &ase at Brussels. Mean()ile3 Marl&oroug) esta&lis)ed a ne( line of co%%unications fro% 5stend on t)e coast3 &eat off 'renc) raids on t)e su//ly con+oys3 and3 ()en t)e 'renc) let in sea (ater and flooded t)e country3 used &oats for /art of t)e su//ly route fro% 5stend. 0)e 'renc) %ade t)eir last effort to raise t)e siege &y e%/loying t)e classic strategy of a di+ersion ()en t)ey ad+anced to Brussels to t)reaten t)e city. But t)eir &o%&ard%ent neit)er inti%idated t)e garrison of t)e city nor distracted Marl&oroug)3 ()o %o+ed to %enace t)eir line of retreat3 ending t)e /ossi&le /eril for Brussels. fter four %ont)s ,ille surrendered3 a %aDor triu%/) in +ie( of t)e resources t)e co%&atants )ad la+is)ed on t)e ca%/aign. 0)e ca/ture of ,ille resulted fro% t)e +ictory of 5udenarde3 and t)e significance &ot) sides attac)ed to ,ille indicates t)e real difficulties of ra/id ad+ance against co%/etent and confident leaders)i/ su//orted &y t)e defence in de/t) /ro+ided &y t)e )ea+ily fortified country. In 1C>@ t)e allies &esieged 0ournai (it)out serious interference fro% t)e (eakened 'renc) under t)eir &est co%%ander3 t)e &rilliant Mars)al Villars. "a+ing ser+ed under $ond;3 0urenne3 and ,u-e%&ourg3 t)e &oastful and a%&itious Villars /ro+ed a /u/il (ort)y of )is teac)ers. !)en 0ournai fell and t)e allies &egan t)e siege of Mons3 Villars felt &ound to inter+ene. $ounting on Marl&oroug)s (illingness to take t)e offensi+e in &attle3 t)e Mars)al ad+anced )is ar%y so close to Mons t)at )e interfered (it) t)e siege and took u/ a /osition at t)e +illage of Mal/la.uet ()ere )e )ad )is flanks ade.uately /rotected &y (oods. s Marl&oroug) %o+ed u/ and de/loyed )is ar%y3 t)e 'renc) )ad a day and a nig)t to fortify t)eir front (it) redou&ts se/arated &y ga/s to allo( t)eir ca+alry to /ass t)roug). s t)e astute Mars)al Villars )ad antici/ated3 Marl&oroug) and Prince 2ugene3 t)e )ar%onious /air of great generals3 /lanned to attack t)e 'renc) flanks until t)ey )ad co%/elled t)e 'renc) to (it)dra( so %any %en fro% t)eir centre t)at3 as at Blen)ei%3 t)e allied ca+alry could s(ee/ t)roug) to c)arge t)e rear of t)e 'renc) on t)e flanks and (in t)e &attle. 0)e initial assaults failed ()en3 on t)e allied rig)t3 successi+e +olleys at fifty /aces fro% 'renc) infantry four ranks dee/ re/ulsed t)e allied troo/s7 on t)e rig)t t)e attacking 1utc) infantry suffered <3>>> casualties in )alf an )our ()en enfilading fire fro% a concealed &attery of t(enty guns su//orted t)e +olleys of 'renc) infantry. !it) Mars)al Villars co%%anding t)e 'renc) left and Mars)al Boufflers t)e rig)t3 t)e 'renc) )eld fir%ly and a+oided t)e %istakes of Blen)ei%. But allied troo/s )ad gotten /ossession of t)e (oods on t)e 'renc) left3 and Villars )ad to (it)dra( infantry fro% )is redou&ts in centre to counterattack t)e (oods. In asse%&ling 1<3>>> infantry to deal (it) t)is t)reat3 )e +irtually denuded t)e centre redou&ts t)at t)e allied infantry ca/tured3 lea+ing t)e 'renc) ca+alry &e)ind as t)e only force )olding t)e 'renc) centre. 0)irty t)ousand allied ca+alry &egan /assing t)roug) t)e ga/s as a &ullet (ounded Mars)al Villars3 causing )i% to faint. Mars)al Boufflers assu%ed co%%and3 ordered +igorous &ut unsuccessful attacks against t)e allied ca+alry3 and &egan to (it)dra( )is (ing fro% t)e field ()en )e sa( t)e 'renc) left &egin to retreat. lt)oug) t)e 'renc) (it)dre(3 t)eir ar%y and leaders %aintained t)eir %orale3 and t)e de/leted allied force could do no %ore t)an continue t)e siege of Mons to its successful conclusion. Marl&oroug) )ad )o/ed for a signal +ictory t)at (ould ena&le )i% to ad+ance into 'rance. Instead3 )e lost 2<3>>> killed and (ounded3 22 /ercent of )is 11>3>>> %en7 t)e 'renc) )ad suffered only 123>>> killed3 (ounded3 and /risoners3 only 1< /ercent of t)eir B>3>>> %en. fter )is costly triu%/)s o+er t)e Ro%ans3 Pyrr)us )ad re%arked t)at %ore suc) +ictories (ould force )i% to

221

return to *reece (it)out an ar%y. fter )is defeat at Mal/la.uet Mars)al Villars (rote 9ing ,ouis IIV3 JIf it /lease *od to gi+e your %aDestys ene%ies anot)er suc) +ictory3 t)ey are ruined.L If attrition %easured +ictory3 t)e 'renc) )ad (on t)e contest. t Mal/la.uet Marl&oroug)s distractions on t)e flanks )ad /ro+ed so costly t)at e+en +ictory could not redee% t)e /rice /aid. But Marl&oroug)s &attles s)o(ed )i% to &e a tactical %aster ()o successfully a//lied t)e /rinci/le of assaulting +igorously at one /oint to dra( t)ere t)e ene%ys reser+es and &y t)is distraction creating a (eak /oint else()ere3 ()ic) )e e-/loited (it) t)e &attle# (inning attack. Marl&oroug) al(ays used ca+alry for t)e final %ain attack &ecause of its %o&ility and ease of de/loy%ent. Back

!ersisting Strategy in North taly

0)e ca%/aigns in nort) Italy took /lace in a region co%/ara&le in si6e to t)e Net)erlands3 a&out 1<> %iles fro% east to (est and a&out C> %iles fro% nort) to sout). lt)oug) t)is area )ad a large nu%&er of cities and )ad often /ro+ided a t)eatre for (ar &et(een t)e 'renc) and *er%ans3 it )ad fe(er )ea+ily fortified cities t)an t)e Net)erlands. 0)e tri&utaries to t)e Po Ri+er (ere t)e site of %ost cities and constituted t)e /rinci/al &arriers to %o+e%ent east and (est. 5nce an ar%y /assed one of t)ese ri+ers3 it could %arc) fairly freely until it reac)ed t)e ne-t ri+er &arrier. 5/erations in nort) Italy also in+ol+ed fe(er stale%ates &ecause of t)e lo(er ratio of force to s/ace3 &ot) contestants in t)e !ar of t)e S/anis) Succession fielding s%aller ar%ies t)ere t)an t)ey did in t)e S/anis) Net)erlands3 so close and i%/ortant to 'rance3 Britain3 and "olland. 0)e 'renc) alliance (it) t)e 1uc)y of Sa+oy3 situated on t)e 'renc) &order3 and (it) S/ain3 ()ic) still )ad control of %uc) of nort) Italy3 %eant t)at at t)e out&reak of (ar in 1C>1 'renc) ar%ies and t)e forces of t)e 1uke of Sa+oy )eld all of nort) Italy u/ to t)e dige Ri+er3 t)e frontier of t)e neutral state of Venice. Standing on t)e defensi+e3 t)e 'renc) co%%ander3 t)e ca/a&le Mars)al $atinat3 )ad )ad a%/le and successful e-/erience co%%anding in Italy. "e garrisoned a nu%&er of cities and ke/t )is %ain force at Ri+oli to &lock t)e 2%/erors in+asion route &et(een t)e dige and ,ake *arda. Rat)er t)an face $atinat and )is ar%y3 Prince 2ugene3 t)e I%/erial co%%ander3 decided to +iolate t)e territory of neutral Venice and %arc) sout) t)roug) t)e difficult terrain east of t)e dige. 1istracting $atinat (it) ostentatious /re/arations to ad+ance fro% t)e nort) and )idden &y t)e ri+er and t)e rugged country3 2ugene and )is ar%y reac)ed Verona &efore t)e curiously negligent 'renc) Mars)al disco+ered 2ugenes %o+e%ent. su/er& general3 2ugene t)en t)reatened to cross t)e dige at se+eral /oints and3 )a+ing con+inced $atinat t)at )e (ould cross nort) of Verona3 &uilt a &ridge and /assed o+er t)e dige on 8uly @t)3 far to t)e sout) at $astel&aldo. !it) %ost of t)e I%/erial force on t)e ot)er side of t)e ri+er and )is o(n troo/s dis/ersed3 Mars)al $atinat3 uncertain as to 2ugenes o&Decti+e3 fell &ack to t)e Mincio3 only to find t)at 2ugene )ad %arc)ed far to t)e nort)(est and3 on 8uly 2Bt)3 )ad /assed nort) of $atinats ar%y and &ridged t)e Mincio a fe( %iles sout) of Pesc)iera. 'acing 2ugenes continuing (est(ard %arc) to t)e $)iese3 t)e scattered 'renc) resu%ed t)eir retreat until t)ey finally took a /osition &e)ind t)e 5glio. By distracting t)e ene%y and t)en e-/loiting t)eir dis/ersion to guard t)e ri+ers3 2ugene )ad dri+en t)e% &ack o+er t)ree ri+er &arriers and taken a t)ird of t)eir nort) Italian )oldings. In )is ad+ance 2ugene did not conduct a raid. Rat)er3 )e do%inated t)e area around )is ar%y3 used it as a &ase of su//lies3 and essentially follo(ed *usta+uss /ersisting strategy of syste%atic con.uest. Sa+e for one nota&le e-ce/tion3 &ot) co%&atants in nort) Italy follo(ed t)is strategy of trying to ac.uire3 do%inate3 and e-/loit t)e resources of t)e fertile nort) Italian region.

Eugene +istra(ts )atinat Back

222

$oncerned (it) t)e defeat in Italy3 9ing ,ouis IIV of 'rance re/laced $atinat (it) t)e inca/a&le Mars)al Villeroi ()o3 reinforced until )e )ad 4<3>>> %en to 2ugenes ?>3>>>3 crossed t)e 5glio in late ugust and attacked 2ugenes ar%y in its strong /osition at $)iari. But since Villeroi did not /us) )is unsuccessful atte%/t +ery )ard3 t)e 'renc) lost only 23<>>. 2ugenes force suffered only negligi&le losses. 'or t)e re%ainder of t)e autu%n t)e o//osing ar%ies tried to disru/t eac) ot)ers foraging until t)ey (ent into (inter .uarters. 1uring t)is /eriod 2ugene &lockaded t)e fortified city of Mantua3 still )eld &y t)e 'renc). In a (inter raid 2ugenes %en ca/tured Mars)al Villeroi3 &ut t)is /ro+ed a lia&ility ()en ,ouis IIV re/laced )i% (it) t)e keen and resourceful Mars)al Vendo%e. 0)e Mars)al /ro%/tly turned t)e ta&les on 2ugene: on May 12t) 1C>23 )e une-/ectedly %arc)ed nort) fro% $re%ona3 crossed t)e 5glio at Ponte+ico3 t)e Mella at Maner&io3 t)e $)iese at Medote3 and a//eared at *oito on May 2?rd3 ()ere )e disru/ted 2ugenes &lockade of Mantua. !it) t)is action Mars)al Vendo%e took control of t)e territory nort) and (est of Mantua and occu/ied a /osition &et(een 2ugene and ustria3 co%/elling t)e 2%/erors 'ield Mars)al to concentrate )is forces3 dig in sout) of Mantua3 and su//ly )i%self fro% t)e country sout) of t)e Po3 ()ere )e )ad earlier esta&lis)ed %aga6ines. Recei+ing additional reinforce%ents3 Vendo%e left 2?3>>> %en fortified at Ri+alto to face 2ugene3 %o+ed (est to t)e Po3 crossed (ell u/strea% fro% t)e I%/erial forces3 and ad+anced ra/idly east(ard3 taking se+eral cities in 2ugenes &ase area sout) of t)e Po. 0)e 'renc) co%%ander t)en /roceeded nort) to ,u66ara3 ai%ing to take t)e &ridges o+er t)e Po and so force 2ugene to enter Venetian territory and retreat &ack to(ard ustria. But (it)out t)e kno(ledge of t)e 'renc) co%%ander at Ri+alto3 2ugene )ad &roug)t %ost of )is ar%y sout) across t)e Po and %arc)ed on ,u66ara3 deter%ined to retrie+e )is situation &y attacking )alf of Vendo%es di+ided ar%y3 ()ic) (as no stronger t)an t)e I%/erial force. 2ugene took ad+antage of t)e canals3 dikes3 and (oods in t)e ,u66ara region to conceal )is troo/s3 )o/ing to sur/rise t)e 'renc) as t)ey %ade ca%/. But ()ile )e still )ad )is %en in t)e usual /recautionary fi+e colu%ns3 Vendo%e disco+ered t)e ene%y ar%y in a%&us) and de/loyed )is o(n &efore t)e I%/erial co%%ander could get )is into line of &attle. Ne+ert)eless3 2ugene attacked at <:>> /.%. and t)e resulting frontal &attle raged until %idnig)t &ut (it)out t)e I%/erial forces dri+ing t)e 'renc) fro% t)e field. 0)e ar%ies continued to face eac) ot)er t)e follo(ing day &ut li%ited t)eir co%&at to cannonading eac) ot)er. In fact3 t)e ar%ies faced eac) ot)er for anot)er fifty#fi+e days3 ()ile t)e 'renc) used detac)%ents to try to do%inate 2ugenes su//ly region and 2ugene e%/loyed t)e sa%e %eans to /rotect )i%self. In t)e end t)e 'renc) /us)ed 2ugene east(ard &eyond t)e Secc)la ()ere )e (intered )is

22?

troo/s. !it) total forces nearly dou&le t)ose of 2ugene7 t)e skilful Vendo%e )ad dri+en )is %ore ca/a&le o//onent fro% %ost of )is con.uests of t)e /re+ious year3 confining )i% to an area sout) of t)e Po. But )e )ad not dri+en 2ugene fro% Italy3 and t)e &rilliant I%/erial 'ield Mars)al )ad %aintained )i%self at t)e ene%ys e-/ense and co%/elled t)e 'renc) and t)eir ally3 t)e 1uke of Sa+oy3 to co%%it t(ice )is nu%&ers in t)eir ca%/aign to force )i% out. s usual3 &attles only occurred &y %utual consent3 as ()en Vendo%e (as (illing to stand on t)e defensi+e and 2ugene took t)e risk of attacking in an effort to /rotect )is &ase area fro% 'renc) occu/ation. Vendo%e3 &y )is sudden ad+ance in May3 )ad reco+ered %uc) of t)e lost territory3 and ()en )e left )alf of )is ar%y near Mantua at Ri+alto3 )e distracted 2ugene ()ile )e crossed t)e Po to t)e (est and in+aded 2ugenes &ase area. But &y t)is di+ision of )is forces t)e 'renc) Mars)al )ad gi+en t)e alert 2ugene interior lines t)at )e e-/loited to fig)t t)e stronger 'renc) (it) e.ual nu%&ers at ,u66ara.

Eugene"s 'nterior &ines Back

In 1C>? t)e 1uke of Sa+oy c)anged sides3 Doining t)e 2%/eror in t)e (ar against t)e 'renc). 0)is created a dou&le front in nort) Italy (it) t)e 'renc) facing t)e 2%/erors forces in t)e east in t)e region of Mantua and ,ake *arda and t)ose of t)e 1uke of Sa+oy in t)e (est in t)e region around t)e 1ukes ca/ital3 0urin. In 1C>?3 (it) 2ugene a&sent fro% Italy3 little occurred e-ce/t t)at an I%/erial ar%y sli//ed /ast t)e 'renc) to reinforce t)e 1uke. In 1C>4 t)e 'renc) forces3 continuing under Vendo%e and (it) 2ugene still a(ay3 %ade )ead(ay against t)e 1uke of Sa+oy3 ca/turing so%e of )is i%/ortant cities. In 1C>< 2ugene returned to Italy (it) instructions to reinforce t)e seriously &eleaguered 1uke. d+ancing (est of ,ake *arda3 2ugene faced Vendo%e for a %ont) ()ile a(aiting reinforce%ents. !)en t)e Mars)al left )is indolent younger &rot)er in co%%and and took /ersonal c)arge of t)e 'renc) forces facing t)e 1uke of Sa+oy near 0urin3 t)e Prince /assed t)roug) t)e %ountains around t)e left of t)e younger Vendo%e and )ad crossed t)e 5glio3 &y t)e ti%e t)e Mars)al )ad returned to take co%%and. !)en 2ugene t)en soug)t to cross t)e dda &y %arc)ing far nort) to cross at Paradiso3 Vendo%e learned of it in ti%e to forestall )i%. 2ugene t)en %o+ed sout) (it) )is 243>>> %en to sei6e t)e fortified &ridge)ead at $assano3 only to find t)e Mars)al )i%self co%%anding t)e garrison of 1>3>>> %en. 'ailing to distract t)e (ily 'renc) leader and get /ast )i% to reinforce t)e 1uke3 2ugene deter%ined to attack t)e %uc) inferior 'renc) force in its strong situation at $assano.

224

Vendo%e )ad )is &ack to t)e dda in a /osition /rotected &y a canal t(enty feet (ide and four or fi+e feet dee/. 0)e 'renc) easily defeated t)e first I%/erial attackers ()o (aded t)e canal &ecause t)e neck#dee/ (ater )ad da%/ened t)e soldiers /o(der. 0)e %ain contest t)us re+ol+ed around 2ugenes efforts to ca/ture a stone &ridge o+er t)e canal. 0(ice )is %en sei6ed it3 &ut eac) ti%e 'renc) counterattacks /us)ed t)e% &ack. !)en t)e courageous 2ugene at last led )is troo/s in /erson3 )e dro+e &ack t)e 'renc) for a t)ird ti%e and see%ed a&out to reac) t)e ri+er3 cutting t)e 'renc) in )alf and dri+ing t)e% into t)e (ater. But Vendo%e3 in t)e %anner of )is ancestor "enry IV3 led )is %en in a counterattack3 and3 ()en &ullets (ounded 2ugene in t)e neck and t)e knee3 t)e 'renc) /re+ailed. 0)e I%/erial ar%y fell &ack3 losing o+er 43>>> casualties3 a&out a si-t) of t)eir force7 t)e deter%ined 'renc) resistance )ad3 )o(e+er3 cost t)e% %ore t)an )alf of t)eir 1>3>>> %en. !it) res/ect to t)e tactical result of attrition3 2ugene (on t)e &attle3 &ut t)e Mars)al3 still )olding dda3 )ad t)e strategic +ictory. 5utnu%&ered t(o and a )alf to one3 t)e 'renc) )ad succeeded3 again e-)i&iting t)e /o(er of t)e tactical defence. 0)e +ictory e-/lained t)e un(illingness of t)e generals of t)e era to attack e+en suc) see%ingly +ulnera&le detac)%ents as t)at led &y Vendo%e3 (it) its &ack to a ri+er3 and t)e readiness of co%%anders to take suc) see%ingly )a6ardous /ositions. fter one %ore futile effort to /ass around t)e 'renc) ar%y3 2ugene fell &ack to occu/y (inter .uarters near Mantua. But as )e %arc)ed east(ard3 t)e Mars)al follo(ed and3 &y %o+ing /arallel and to t)e sout)3 forced )i% to (inter in t)e less attracti+e area on t)e (est s)ore of ,ake *arda ()ile t)e 'renc) occu/ied t)e %ore a&undant region nort) of Mantua. Vendo%e )ad /re+ailed in kee/ing 2ugenes ar%y fro% reinforcing t)e 1uke3 &ut t)e Princes effort )ad so occu/ied t)e Mars)al t)at )e could not s/are t)e %en to &egin t)e siege of 0urin. 2ugene /ro/erly c)aracterised t)e Italian ca%/aigns as Jnot a (ar of con.uest3 nor of esta&lis)ing (inter .uarters3 &ut a (ar of di+ersion. 0)is di+ersion in+ol+es a )ea+y e-/enditure for t)e 'renc) in %en and %oney. 0)ey )a+e to kee/ B>3>>> %en in Italy... ()ereas t)e llies only )a+e 4>3>>o t)ere.L But )e also kne( t)e traditional 'renc) interest in Italy and &elie+ed t)at 'rance (ould not %ake /eace as long as s)e controlled nort) Italy. In t)e autu%n of 1C>< t)e situation in Italy looked &leak to 2ugene. !it) )is ar%y un/aid3 )e (rote t)e 2%/eror t)at Jt)e soldiers resist /unis)%ent (it) force. I )a+e to c)oose &et(een t)e e-tre%es of leniency and se+erity.L s (inter &egan3 )e re/orted: JMy ar%y is ruined3 t)e )orses (orn out (it) /ast fatigues3 no sure footing in t)e country3 and t)e ene%y reasse%&ling t)eir forces in %y front. Besides t)e Venetians t)reatened to declare (ar against us3 if (e do not .uit t)eir territory.L !)ile Prince 2ugene a&sented )i%self fro% Italy in /ril 1C>=3 t)e Mars)al sur/rised t)e I%/erial ar%y in (inter .uarters3 dri+ing it &ack into t)e %ountains (it) a loss3 including deserters3 of 1>3>>> %en. In %id#May t)e 'renc) &egan t)e siege of 0urin3 and 1<> %iles to t)e east Vendo%e &uilt fortifications to /rotect t)e crossings of t)e dige and so /reclude t)e /ossi&ility of 2ugenes interfering (it) t)e siege. If t)e 'renc) could ca/ture 0urin3 t)ey (ould dri+e t)e 1uke of Sa+oy fro% t)e (ar and consolidate t)eir gri/ on nort) Italy. In %id#May 2ugene %o+ed for(ard (it) ?B3>>> %en against Vendo%e and t)e 4>3>>> (it) ()ic) )e guarded t)e dige. In Venetian territory3 as )e a(aited reinforce%ents &efore ad+ancing3 2ugene took /ains to a+oid arousing t)e )ostility of )is un(illing )osts. "e (rote t)e 2%/eror: JI )a+e &een so insistent on t)e strictest disci/line t)at t)ere )a+e &een no e-cesses7 orc)ards )a+e &een .uite untouc)ed3 )ar+est gat)ered (it)out loss or )indrance3 ()ilst ()ere t)e 'renc) )a+e &een t)ere )as &een ()olesale s/oliation.L 0)e Venetians took no action against t)e I%/erial ar%y3 a//reciating t)e contrast &et(een its careful &e)a+iour and 'renc) de/redations. 0)e 'renc) )ad gained a re/utation for t)eir occu/ations3 so%e of t)eir contri&utions in *er%any &eing so )ea+y t)at /o/ulations )ad e%igrated3 una&le to /ay t)e e-or&itant e-actions.

22<

In early 8uly3 )a+ing left a force at Verona and successfully con+incing t)e 'renc) )e /lanned to cross t)e u//er dige3 2ugene secretly %arc)ed sout) along t)e ri+er until3 far to t)e sout) and east3 )e crossed t)e dige (it)out o//osition fro% t)e 'renc). Instead of t)en turning (est3 )e %o+ed fart)er sout)(ard (it) )is 2C3>>> %en and crossed t)e Po. Since ,ouis IIV )ad called Mars)al Vendo%e to go to t)e Net)erlands to retrie+e t)e situation after t)e 'renc) defeat at Ra%illies3 t)e 9ings young cousin3 t)e co%/etent &ut ine-/erienced 1uke of 5rleans3 no( co%%anded t)e 'renc). "e reacted /ro%/tly to 2ugenes sur/rise %o+e%ents3 calling reinforce%ents fro% t)e &esiegers of 0urin and falling &ack to t)e Mincio. 0)is ri+er &arrier )e guarded (it) ?>3>>> %en ()ile )e sent anot)er ?>3>>> to &lock t)e Princes (est(ard ad+ance sout) of t)e Po. But ()en t)e ad+ance of t)e force 2ugene )ad left at Verona caused t)e 1uke of 5rleans to fear losing t)e line of t)e Mincio and so to concentrate all of )is forces nort) of t)e Po3 2ugene /roceeded to go for(ard ra/idly3 still sout) of t)e Po. s a result3 t)e young 1uke failed e+en to )old t)e Mincio. 0)e I%/erial 'ield Mars)al could not so easily )a+e distracted t)e seasoned and sagacious Vendo%e. 0)e 1uke of 5rleans sa( t)at )is only )o/e of &locking t)e ene%ys route to 0urin lay at Stradella3 ()ere t)e /ennine Mountains al%ost reac)ed t)e &anks of t)e Po. 0o &lock t)e /ass )e sent a)ead a force 5f C3>>> infantry and ca+alry3 t)e infantry riding in (agons to increase t)eir s/eed of %o+e%ent in t)e su%%er )eat of nort) Italy. !)en 2ugene3 ()o )ad %aintained a %odest /ace and %arc)ed often at nig)t &ecause of t)e )eat3 learned of t)is3 )e too )urried for(ard C3>>> %en3 ()ic) )e follo(ed (it) anot)er si%ilar detac)%ent and all of t)e ca+alry under )is /ersonal co%%and. 0)e I%/erial lead detac)%ent &eat t)e 'renc) to Stradella3 and 2ugene %arc)ed )is ()ole ar%y /ast Stradella and /us)ed it ra/idly for(ard3 &y/assing 'renc)#)eld fortresses3 until )e Doined )is cousin3 t)e 1uke of Sa+oy3 near 0urin3 t)e 1uke of 5rleans follo(ing (it) %uc) of )is 'renc) ar%y. But 2ugenes ad+ance differed signally fro% t)ose t)at )ad c)aracterised t)e earlier seesa( ca%/aigning in Italy. ,ike a raider3 2ugene )ad %erely /assed t)roug) nort) Italy3 lea+ing %ost of t)e territory still garrisoned and controlled &y t)e 'renc). "is ca%/aign3 t)oug) skilful and &rilliant3 )ad a%ounted only to a %arc) to reinforce t)e &esieged garrison of 0urin. !it)out success at 0urin3 )e (ould )a+e only conducted a raid t)at )ad disconcerted t)e 'renc) &ut acco%/lis)ed little else. 2ugenes successful distractions and s/eedy3 (ell#conducted %arc) )ad &roug)t &ot) ar%ies to 0urin. But t)e 'renc) )ad B>3>>> %en3 and t)e allies3 ()o )ad 1<3>>> in t)e garrison and 423>>> in t)e relie+ing ar%y3 faced t)e usual /ro&le% in raising a siege: t)e &esiegers (ould )old t)e out(ard#facing fortified lines of circu%+allation. 0)is defensi+e ad+antage of t)e &esiegers (ould )a+e %uc) to do (it) t)e failure of larger 'renc) relie+ing forces to raise t)e siege of ,ille t(o years later7 &efore 0urin3 t)e Prince3 (it) inferior nu%&ers3 faced an e+en %ore difficult /ro&le%. Since t)e 'renc) stayed in t)eir lines of circu%+allation and only an attack could sa+e 0urin3 2ugene reconnoitred and found on t)e (est side of t)e city t)at t)e 'renc) )ad failed to construct t)oroug)ly or ade.uately garrison a /art of t)eir lines t)at t)ey regarded as relati+ely inaccessi&le. ,ea+ing %en on t)e east side to distract t)e ene%y3 an effort su//orted &y t)e garrison t)at sent out %ilitia to t)reaten t)e &esiegers3 t)e Prince asse%&led %ost of )is forces at t)e (eak /oint in t)e ene%ys fortified lines. $oncentrating ?>3>>> against B3>>> to 1>3>>> defenders3 2ugene %ade a +igorous attack (it) infantry in t(o lines3 follo(ed &y )is ca+alry also in t(o lines. ided &y an additional distraction in t)e 'renc) rear &y t)e regular troo/s of t)e garrison3 2ugene &roke t)roug) t)e un#reinforced 'renc) lines. !)en reinforce%ents did arri+e3 2ugenes %en &eat t)ese in detail as t)ey ca%e u/3 routing t)e ()ole 'renc) ar%y. 0)e 'renc) lost nearly 1>3>>> %en3 t)e allies only a fe( %ore t)an ?3>>>. In retreat t)e 'renc) %ade a serious &lunder: t)ey fell &ack to(ard 'rance rat)er t)an to

22=

Milan and t)e large area of nort) Italy t)at t)ey still controlled t)roug) garrisons. 2ugene t)en &egan to attack and take t)ese Italian garrisons. In Marc) 1C>C ,ouis IIV and t)e 2%/eror concluded an agree%ent for t)e e+acuation of t)e re%aining 'renc) forces3 a&out 2>3>>> %en. 2ugenes triu%/)ant %arc) )ad defied Vendo%es &elief t)at t)e 'renc) )ad Jtoo %any /ositions to sto/ )i% for )is e+er drea%ing of &ringing reliefL to 0urin. In s/ite of t)e )eat3 t)e difficulty in finding (ater3 and t)e lack of an ad+ance /ro+ision for su//lies3 )e )ad co+ered t)e 24> %iles of )is %arc) at a rate of fifteen %iles a day. But t)e %arc) alone did not raise t)e siege. 0)e 'renc) force )ad a%/le strengt) to control enoug) of t)e country around 0urin to su//ly itself3 as did 2ugenes relie+ing ar%y. nd t)e 'renc) also )ad a large &ase area east of 0urin in ()ic) to continue t)eir occu/ation of %uc) of Italy. Victory at 0urin3 i%/ossi&le (it)out t)e %arc)3 )ad an essential role in raising t)e siege. 0)e 'renc) %istake of retreating (est to 'rance instead of east to t)eir garrisons %ade t)e ca%/aign decisi+e for gaining allied control of nort) Italy. Blunders in trying to &lock 2ugenes ad+ance and in t)e dis/ositions and entrenc)%ents around 0urin %ade /ossi&le 2ugenes ac)ie+e%ent. But 2ugene dis/layed &rilliance in defeating )is nu%erically stronger o//onents. "is strategic %et)od3 distraction to create a (eak /oint t)roug) ()ic) to %arc) /ast )is o//onents3 )e re/eated at t)e tactical le+el ()en3 like Marl&oroug)3 )e cou/led di+ersions east of 0urin (it) concentration against t)e (eak /oint in t)e ene%ys lines to t)e (est of t)e city. "is skilful conduct of t)e &attle and )is /ersonal leaders)i/ co%/leted t)e +ictory %ade /ossi&le &y )is e-cellent /lan.L Back

(he -volution of the "inear System

In t)e years after t)e end of t)e !ar of t)e S/anis) Succession in 1C143 %ilitary study flouris)ed3 and soldiers and t)eorists ga+e %uc) t)oug)t to t)e linear tactical syste% t)at )ad &losso%ed into fullest flo(er (it) t)e ad+ent of t)e &ayonet. 5ne grou/ of sc)olars and soldiers ad+ocated a return to s)ock action. In 1C24 'olard3 a 'renc) soldier and +eteran of %any ca%/aigns3 /ro/osed restoring s)ock action t)roug) t)e use of a colu%n (it) a&out t(ice as %any ranks as files. Ins/ired &y )is &elief t)at 2/a%inondas )ad (on at ,euctra &ecause )is &lock of )o/lites )ad o+er()el%ed t)e S/artan line3 'olard (as con+inced t)at a c)arge &y suc) a colu%n (ould easily &reak t)roug) a line of %usketeers t)ree#dee/3 at ()ic) ti%e it (ould di+ide in )alf and3 t)e /arts ad+ancing in o//osite directions3 roll u/ t)e flanks it )ad created. "e /ro/osed to ar% t)e %en in t)e outer%ost ranks of t)e colu%n (it) s)ort /ikes. lt)oug) )is ideas created %uc) contro+ersy and )e ac.uired disci/les as (ell as critics3 'olard failed to con+ince %any t)at )is colu%n could in fact &ra+e t)e %usket +olleys and &reac) t)e line. Ne+ert)eless3 )is t)eories re%ained influential in %ilitary t)oug)t t)roug)out t)e re%ainder of t)e eig)teent) century3 causing t)e 'renc) ar%y in /articular to /ro+ide in its regulations for for%ing troo/s in colu%n. not)er 'renc) soldier3 Mars)al Sa-e3 t)oug) dis/araging colu%ns3 also t)oug)t in ter%s of s)ock action3 ad+ocating ar%ing so%e troo/s (it) /ikes and e+en s)ields. More significantly3 as it turned out3 )e did see t)at for%ations (it) greater de/t) and less (idt) (ould /ossess %ore %o&ility t)an t)e t)in lines necessary to de+elo/ %a-i%u% fire/o(er. But t)e ad+ocates of fig)ting at a distance (it) %uskets re%ained uncon+inced3 and anot)er line of %ilitary t)oug)t led to t)e re+i+al of lig)t infantry tactics. 0raditionally *reek and Ro%an lig)t infantry3 ()et)er ar%ed (it) Da+elins3 slings3 or &o(s3 )ad foug)t as indi+iduals3 a+oiding for%ation so t)at t)ey could use t)eir %issiles against t)e o//osing )ea+y infantry ()ile a+oiding close co%&at (it) eit)er t)e )ea+y infantry or t)e )ea+y ca+alry. Many si-teent)#century ar.ue&usiers e%/loyed t)e sa%e tactics3 t)oug) t)e /ike s.uare /ro+ided a /lace of refuge on t)e &attlefield. !)en *usta+us dol/)us e.ui//ed all lig)t infantry (it) %uskets and /laced t)e% in line (it) t)e /ike%en3 t)e %usketeers a&andoned al%ost entirely t)e tactics traditional (it) lig)t infantry. 0)e introduction of t)e &ayonet3 ()ic) %ade t)e lig)t infantry into )ea+y or s)ock

22C

infantry as (ell3 co%/leted t)e transition &y for%ing t)e co%/letely )o%ogeneous infantry in t)e custo%ary )ea+y infantry for%ation. But t)is c)ange and t)e conse.uent drill re.uired of all infantry to fig)t in line as a grou/ o%itted t)e contri&ution t)at infantry could %ake &y e%/loying t)e traditional lig)t infantry tactics. 5n a &attlefield infantry ado/ting suc) tactics could )ide in t)e terrain and in &uildings and still fire at t)e line infantry (it)out e-/osing itself to +olleys. 0roo/s using t)is a//roac) also e-celled at reconnaissance and in raids on ene%y con+oys and su//ly installations. 0)e realisation of t)e neglect of t)is role for infantry led to an eig)teent)#century distinction &et(een lig)t infantry and line infantry. 0)e se/aration &et(een t)e t(o lay not in a difference in (ea/on syste%s or in t)e action eac) used7 &ot) relied /ri%arily on %uskets. 0)e line infantry utilised t)e disci/lined and drilled grou/ and for%ed itself to resist ca+alry and deli+er t)e %a-i%u% rate of fire. 0)e lig)t infantry de/ended /ri%arily on an indi+iduals /erfor%ance in tactics3 called skir%is)ing. It %ade use of co+er and conceal%ent to a+oid t)e ca+alry and t)e +olleys of t)e line and concentrated on s)ooting at t)e target /resented &y t)e for%ed line infantry. 0)is training for skir%is)ing on t)e &attlefield %eant t)at lig)t infantry e-celled at out/ost duty3 reconnoitring3 and raiding. $a+alry )ad already de+elo/ed )orse%en ()o s/ecialised in t)e sa%e functions for t)e %ounted forces. ,ig)t ca+alry3 ar%ed (it) sa&re and /istol3 s/ecialised in t)e strategic duties in ()ic) lig)t ca+alry )ad traditionally e-celled ()ile ot)er si%ilarly ar%ed ca+alry3 often on larger )orses and still /rotected &y &reast/lates3 trained for t)e s)ock action of t)e &attlefield c)arge. 1ragoons3 ar%ed also (it) a lig)t %usket and ca/a&le of fig)ting as infantry3 also /erfor%ed t)e strategic ser+ices of reconnaissance and raiding. lt)oug) tec)nological c)ange )ad co%&ined t)e %issile and s)ock (ea/on syste%s for t)e infantry as (ell as for t)e ca+alry3 a )ig)er le+el of %o&ility and3 for t)e infantry3 less de/endence on a for%ation in ()ic) t)e soldiers filled interde/endent roles fitted lig)t infantry and lig)t ca+alry for se/arate functions. 1ifferences in training and tactical and strategic roles rat)er t)an &ody ar%our or (ea/on syste%s )encefort) distinguis)ed t)e lig)t and line &ranc)es of t)e infantry and ca+alry. Variations in unifor%s and e.ui/%ent often ser+ed to differentiate t)e t(o ty/es of troo/s. So%e lig)t infantry recei+ed t)e slo(#loading &ut %ore accurate rifles as t)e &est (ea/on for t)e &attlefield and3 since t)ey did not )a+e to resist ca+alry c)arges3 )ad no &ayonets. 0)e t)ird line of de+elo/%ent in t)e first )alf of t)e eig)teent) century concerned t)e i%/ro+ed )andling of t)e for%ations of )o%ogeneous infantry. !it)out &ot) /ike%en and %usketeers3 t)e task of for%ing an ar%y for &attle s)ould )a+e &eco%e si%/ler. 0)e fullest realisation of t)is in /ractice3 largely t)roug) +ery t)oroug) drill3 occurred in Prussia.

&ight )a%alryman Back

22B

4nlike %any 2uro/ean ar%ies in t)e 1C2>s and 1C?>s3 t)e Prussian ar%y )ad a unifor% syste% of drill for all of t)e ar%ys regi%ents. ll units /racticed loading and firing until a Prussian &attalion could fire fi+e rounds /er %inute3 eac) of t)e &attalions eig)t /latoons constituting a se/arate fire unit. Because t)e (ooden ra%rod tended to &reak under t)e stress of suc) ra/id loading and firing3 t)e Prussian ar%y su&stituted a ra%rod of iron. 0)e Prussians also de+oted %uc) attention to constant training and great /recision in %arc)ing in ste/3 so t)at t)e &attalion learned to kee/ its front aligned3 and ()en t)e ar%y &roug)t toget)er large nu%&ers of troo/s3 t)e routine included kee/ing a ()ole &attle array e+en ()ile %arc)ing for(ard in line of &attle. 0o facilitate %aintaining t)e &attalions in line a&reast3 t)e regulations ke/t t)e rate of ad+ance slo(3 se+enty# fi+e /aces /er %inute. 0)e Prussian units3 in ()ic) t)e %en stood s)oulder to s)oulder (it) fi+e feet &et(een ranks3 %arc)ed in ste/ and re/eatedly carried out suc) drills as for%ing a s.uare to resist ca+alry. 0)ey e-/ected to use t)is cu%&erso%e /rocedure rarely since3 for ca+alry in t)eir rear3 an a&out#face &y t)e rear ranks /ro+ided an i%%ediate res/onse. But Prussian training did lead to an i%/ro+ed %et)od of for%ing t)e ar%y for &attle. !it) )o%ogeneous soldiers and t)e sa%e drill for e+ery regi%ent3 t)e Prussians for%ed t)eir infantry in t(o colu%ns to %arc) to t)e &attlefield. 2ac) colu%n co%/osed one of t)e standard t(o lines of &attle and t)e &attalions %arc)ed one &e)ind t)e ot)er. 0)is %eant t)at t)e ar%y already stood in its co%&at for%ation and needed no sorting or rearrange%ent /rior to for%ing t)e line of &attle. 0)e only /ro&le%s consisted of con+erting t)e &attalions fro% %arc) to &attle order and aligning t)e line of &attle /arallel (it) t)e ene%y ()en3 /resu%a&ly3 t)ey )ad directed t)eir %arc) /er/endicular to t)e ene%ys de/loy%ent. 0)e Prussians used a %arc) order in ()ic) t)e &attalions /latoons %o+ed for(ard3 one &e)ind t)e ot)er3 Dust as t)ey (ould in line3 t)ree ranks dee/ and t(enty#four %usketeers a&reast (it) an officer and non#co%%issioned officer on eac) flank. 0)is for%ation )ad a front of less t)an t(enty yards and a de/t) of four. 0)e &attalions eig)t /latoons %arc)ed one &e)ind t)e ot)er in an o/en order t)at left t(enty yards3 t)e (idt) of t)e front of a /latoon3 &et(een eac) /latoon. !)en t)e &attalion )alted3 it could )a+e eac) /latoon %ake a ninety#degree turn and t)e &attalion (ould &e in line of &attle3 since t)e distance &et(een eac) /latoon in t)e %arc) colu%n e.ualled t)e s/ace of its front in line of &attle G&elo(H. &attalion in %arc) t)us )ad a lengt) of a&out 1<> yards3 t)e sa%e distance it (ould occu/y on a front3 and an ar%y (it)3 say3 forty &attalions of infantry (ould %arc) in t(o /arallel colu%ns of

22@

&attalions3 eac) a&out t(o %iles long. 0o for% a line of &attle t)e colu%ns )ad only to )alt and t)e /latoons all %ake a ninety#degree turn.

Prussian A roa(h Mar(h Back

0o )a+e t)e ar%y face t)e ene%y after t)is turn3 t)e Prussians could )a+e %ade t)e /rocessional %arc) in ()ic) t)e t(o /arallel colu%ns %arc)ed u/ to t)e left side of t)e e-/ected &attlefield3 and ()en t)e lead &attalion reac)ed t)e /lanned left end of t)e line of &attle3 t)e colu%n turned ninety degrees to t)e rig)t3 its /latoons eac) turning one &y one as t)e colu%n %arc)ed /arallel to t)e ene%y and filled t)e s/ace /lanned for t)e line of &attle. 0)e second line (ould )a+e %ade a si%ilar rig)t turn se+eral )undred yards in t)e rear and (ould continue its %arc) /arallel (it) t)e ot)er. !)en t)e lead &attalion reac)ed t)e rig)t#)and end of t)e /ro/osed line of &attle3 all &attalions )alted . nd all t)e /latoons turned left ninety degrees. 0)e ar%y t)en faced t)e ene%y.

Pro(essional Mar(h Back

2-cellent %astery of /latoon and &attalion drill ena&led t)e Prussian ar%y to /erfor% t)is %anoeu+re and )a+e t)e ar%y in order in t)e /lace t)at t)e co%%ander )ad /lanned for it. Precision and ra/idity of e-ecution could &ring t)e ar%y to t)e ene%ys front &efore )e e-/ected3 or (as ready for3 t)e s(iftly de/loying Prussians. But t)e ar%y could )a+e %uc) %ore ra/id de/loy%ent if it could %arc) on t)e field of &attle in a colu%n of %arc) /arallel to t)e ene%ys line of &attle. If t)e co%%ander could %anage t)is3 eac) /latoon need only e-ecute its ninety#degree turn ()en t)e colu%n of %arc) fronted t)e ene%ys /osition. Suc) a /rocedure in+ol+ed no de/loy%ent /rocess e-ce/t t)e )alt and t)e .uick turn of t)e /latoons. If a Prussian co%%ander could contri+e to %ake t)is line of %arc) /arallel to t)e ene%ys line of &attle3 t)e (ell#drilled Prussian ar%y %ig)t easily arri+e and de/loy &efore t)e o//osing force e-/ected or )ad /re/ared to fig)t it. Back

(actics and Strategy as -$em'lified in the Silesian Wars of Frederick the Great
In IC4> 'rederick t)e *reat ca%e to t)e t)rone of Prussia and /ro%/tly /ut into use t)e e-cellent ar%y t)at )e )ad in)erited fro% )is fat)er. 0)e cultured young 9ing lacked %ilitary e-/erience3 &ut )is /erfor%ance (ould de%onstrate a natural genius for (ar and go+ern%ent. long (it) a su/er& ar%y3 )e )ad in)erited a (ell#organised and frugally go+erned state. "e soon ins/ired great loyalty

2?>

a%ong )is su&Dects and )is soldiers. In i%%ediately /lunging into a (ar3 )e /ro+ed to )a+e an une.ualled gras/ of t)is unfa%iliar task3 and Prussian %ilitary %et)ods and success i%/osed on 2uro/e ne( standards of %ilitary efficiency and ga+e an i%/etus to t)e searc) for i%/ro+e%ents in t)e art of (ar. 'redericks o//ortunity to use )is ar%y ca%e in 1C4>3 ()en t)e 2%/eror died lea+ing )is "a&s&urg estates to Maria 0)eresa3 )is t(enty#t)ree#year#old daug)ter. !)en t)e 'renc) and Ba+arians dis/layed an interest in taking /arts of Maria 0)eresas in)eritance3 'rederick in+aded Maria 0)eresas /ro+ince of Silesia at t)e )ead of an ar%y of 2C3>>> %en in t)e fall of 1C4>. !it) dila/idated fortifications and only =3>>> %en in t)e ()ole /ro+ince3 Maria 0)eresas s%all force fell &ack into t)e %ountains of Mora+ia. 'rederick ac.uired a /o/ulation of o+er a %illion7 nearly )alf of t)at of t)e entire young 9ings ot)er /ossessions. But )e aroused t)e en%ity of a for%ida&le o//onent3 ()ose do%ains included t)e Net)erlands3 Mora+ia3 and /art of nort) Italy as (ell as t)e rc)duc)y of ustria and t)e kingdo%s of "ungary and Bo)e%ia. //ealing in a//earance and (it) great (ar%t) and c)ar% of %anner3 Maria 0)eresa )ad a&ility3 Dudg%ent3 and deter%ination3 ()ic) in %any res/ects ca%e close to %atc)ing 'redericks. 5t)er %enaces3 )o(e+er3 distracted )er attention3 and e+en if 'rederick )ad recei+ed t)e undi+ided attention of t)e ustrian ar%y3 )is +ery sol+ent treasury and (ell#drilled ar%y of @>3>>> (ould )a+e %atc)ed ustrias ar%y of 1>B3>>> scattered %en and usually e%&arrassed e-c)e.uer. In s/ite of /eriodic (arfare (it) t)e 0urks3 t)e ustrian ar%y dis/layed all of t)e (eaknesses t)at a long /eriod of /eace can &ring to any %ilitary force. It lacked a unifor% drill3 eac) regi%ent )a+ing its o(n %et)ods and not ade.uately /racticing t)e drills t)at it )ad3 its generals saying t)at t)eir soldiers learned in co%&at3 not on t)e /arade ground. In t)e early s/ring of 1C41 ustria counterattacked. 'ield Mars)al Nei//erg led 1B3>>> %en into Silesia to try to reco+er t)e /ro+ince. 0)e 'ield Mars)al )ad a re/utation as a (itty con+ersationalist and for serious &ungling in t)e last (ar (it) t)e 0urks. "e ca%/ed )is ar%y3 )is infantry %ostly consisting of ra( recruits3 in a t)reatening /osition near t)e +illage of Moll(it6 ()ere t)e ine-/erienced 'rederick3 (it) energy t)at (ould ty/ify )is later ca%/aigning3 %arc)ed to attack )i%. Since t)e Prussian a//roac) ca%e to(ard t)e centre of Nei//ergs )astily for%ed line3 it took t)e Prussian infantry a long ti%e to for% t)eir line3 gi+ing t)e unready ustrians an o//ortunity to for% for &attle. !)ile t)e infantry took u/ its array3 t)e ustrian ca+alry c)arged and routed t)e Prussian )orse%en3 t)e ca%/aigning e-/erience against t)e 0urks /ro+ing a guarantee of +ictory against 'redericks ca+alry3 a neglected &ranc) of t)e Prussian ser+ice. But t)e e-cellently drilled Prussian infantry &egan to ad+ance and soon &roug)t t)e ustrian &attalions under fire. 4ntrained ustrian infantry still e.ui//ed (it) (ooden ra%rods could not co%/ete7 an o&ser+er noted: J0)e &attalions sank into disorder3 and it (as /at)etic to see t)e /oor recruits tried to )ide &e)ind one anot)er3 so t)at t)e &attalions ended u/ t)irty or forty dee/3 and t)e inter+als &eca%e so great t)at ()ole regi%ents of ca+alry could )a+e /enetrated &et(een3 e+en t)oug) t)e ()ole second line )ad &een &roug)t for(ard into t)e first.L !)en t)e failure of t)e infantry so discouraged t)e ustrian ca+alry t)at t)ey refused to e-/loit t)eir a&ility to attack t)e flank and rear of t)e Prussian infantry3 Nei//erg lost t)e &attle. "e (it)dre( in good order3 losing a .uarter of )is %en3 t)e sa%e /ro/ortion as t)e +ictorious Prussians of an ar%y of t)e sa%e si6e. But Nei//erg re%ained in sout)ern Silesia3 and t)e t(enty#nine year old 'rederick3 ()o )ad left t)e scene of )is first &attle ()en t)e ustrian ca+alry (on its initial success3 (as content to lea+e t)e ustrians alone t)roug)out t)e ca%/aigning season ()ile )e trained )is ca+alry and i%/ro+ed )is ar%y in t)e lig)t of its first serious &attle e-/erience in nearly t)ree decades. 'rederick3 ()o &egan ins/ection tours at 4:>> a.%.3 i%/osed a rigorous training sc)edule. 'renc) o&ser+er (itnessed t)e 9ing drilling a &attalion in /erson: J0)e (eat)er (as frig)tful and t)e sno( (as falling in large flakes3 ()ic) did not /re+ent t)e &attalion e-ercising as

2?1

if it )ad &een a fine day. I )ad so%e inkling &efore I ca%e of t)e ar%ys disci/line3 o&edience and e-actitude3 &ut I %ust say t)at t)ey (ere dri+en to suc) a degree t)at I (as ill#/re/ared for t)e reality.L In 'e&ruary 1C42 'rederick %o+ed into Mora+ia to (inter at t)e ene%ys e-/ense3 &ut t)e )ostility of t)e /easants and ot)er factors caused )i% to %o+e to Bo)e%ia3 ()ere an ustrian ar%y found )i% in ca%/ at $)otusit6 t)e follo(ing May3 /artially sur/rised &ecause of inade.uate (arning front t)e Prussian lig)t ca+alry. 0)e &attle at $)otusit6 re/eated Moll(it6 in t)at t)e ustrian ca+alry still /ro+ed its su/eriority o+er t)e Prussian &ut failed to e-/loit its ad+antage3 and t)e e-cellent /erfor%ance of t)e Prussian infantry again caused t)e ustrians to (it)dra( after sustaining casualties co%/ara&le to t)ose of t)e Prussians. fter t)is tactically indecisi+e &attle3 /eace follo(ed3 and t)e ustrians3 sorely &eset on ot)er fronts3 ceded Silesia to 'rederick. But 'rederick3 %ade a//re)ensi+e &y ustrian successes against 'rance3 resu%ed t)e (ar. In 1C44 )e in+aded Bo)e%ia and on Se/te%&er 1=t) ca/tured Prague and its s%all garrison after only a &rief siege. 0)e ustrians /ro%/tly %o+ed to o//ose 'rederick (it) a large ar%y under t)e ine/t Prince $)arles of ,orraine3 ()o )ad secured i%/ortant co%%ands &y )is confident %anner3 )is %arriage to Maria 0)eresas sister3 and )is &rot)ers to Maria 0)eresa )erself. But3 unfortunately for 'rederick3 'ield Mars)al 0raun3 a +eteran of fifty years of +ariegated ser+ice3 e-ercised t)e effecti+e ustrian co%%and3 and t)is cunning old %aster of t)e defence a+oided 'redericks ar%y ()ile using )is /redo%inance in lig)t infantry and lig)t ca+alry to )a%/er 'redericks foraging. 0)e ustrians )ad %any of t)ese /articularly ade/t lig)t troo/s dra(n fro% t)e regions of t)eir frontiers (it) t)e 0urks. nd t)is force of 2>3>>> to ?>3>>> largely lig)t infantry3 (as t)e key to ustrian success. 0)ey foraged for t)eir o(n ar%y3 accu%ulating a large de/ot of su//lies ()ile denying resources to 'redericks forces. 0)ey ke/t close to t)e 9ing3 forcing )i% to entrenc) )is ca%/3 as t)ey cut off )is foraging detac)%ents3 ca/tured )is su//ly colu%ns3 and /re#e%/ted )is efforts to find food. !)en a Prussian detac)%ent entered a Bo)e%ian +illage3 t)ey found t)at t)e ustrians )ad taken a(ay t)e in)a&itants and t)e su//lies. 8ust as in t)e Ilerda ca%/aign $aesars ca+alry )ad cri//led t)e Po%/eians &y controlling t)e countryside3 so did t)e ustrian forces co%/el 'redericks (it)dra(al3 in s/ite of Prussian tactical su/eriority. But 'rederick could ne+er force &attle on )is (ily o//onent3 and e+en ()en )e could get close to t)e elusi+e 'ield Mars)al 0raun3 )e found )i% t)oroug)ly entrenc)ed in a for%ida&le /osition. So 'rederick3 )a+ing entered Bo)e%ia (it) B>3>>> %en3 de/arted (it) 4>3>>>3 t)e re%ainder3 including )is )ea+y artillery and %any (agons3 casualties to star+ation3 sickness3 desertion3 and co%&at (it) t)e ustrian lig)t forces. 0)e king3 recognising t)e skill of )is 'a&ian o//onent in inflicting so se+ere a defeat3 co%/li%ented 0raun t)us: J0)e conduct of t)e Mars)al (as a /erfect %odel ()ic) e+ery general ()o delig)ts in )is /rofession oug)t to study if )e )as t)e a&ilities to i%itate.L 'ield Mars)al 0rauns logistic strategy )ad inflicted on 'rederick %ore casualties t)an t)e 9ing )ad suffered in )is t(o &attles (it) t)e ustrians3 and t)e e-/erience strongly i%/ressed on 'rederick t)e )a6ards of a dee/ /enetration into ene%y territory. 0)e follo(ing s/ring t)e young Prince $)arles3 )a+ing arrogated to )i%self credit for 0rauns ca%/aign3 )ad sole co%%and of t)e )uge ustrian ar%y t)at in May 1C4< ad+anced into Silesia fro% t)e (est. 'rederick3 )is troo/s dis/ersed in (inter .uarters3 concentrated and /lanned to attack t)e ustrians after t)ey )ad /assed t)roug) t)e %ountains into Silesia. Prince $)arles3 assu%ing a Prussian retreat &ecause )e su//osed t)at 'redericks %en still suffered fro% t)e de%oralisation of t)eir retreat fro% Bo)e%ia3 ad+anced slo(ly3 confidently3 and carelessly. fter t)e ustrians and t)eir Sa-on allies ca%/ed t)eir C>3>>> %en near "o)enfried&urg on 8une ?rd3 'rederick &egan a nig)t %arc) to(ard t)e% (it) )is entire =<3>>> %en in o/en colu%ns3 ready to de/loy. 'rederick

2?2

e-/ected %uc) of )is ca+alry3 )a+ing instructed t)e% as follo(s: J0)e ca+alry %ust i%/etuously c)arge t)e ene%y3 s(ord in )and3 and %ust %ake no /risoners during t)e )eat of action7 its &lo(s %ust &e directed at t)e )ead7 after o+ert)ro(ing and dis/ersing t)e ca+alry it s)all assail... t)e infantry of t)e ene%y3 and take it in flank or rear3 according as t)e occasion s)all re.uire.L 0)e resulting &attle at "o)enfried&urg occurred in t(o /arts3 t)e first ()en t)e Prussian rig)t (ing defeated t)e Sa-ons ()ose ca%/ occu/ied t)e ustrian left. In a &attle o+er &y C:>> a.%.3 t)e Prussian ca+alry dis/layed t)e fruits of 'redericks rigorous training &y defeating t)e Sa-on ca+alry3 and t)e Prussian infantry3 o+erco%ing t)e o&stacles of a %ars) and a +illage3 dro+e t)e Sa-on infantry &ack in full retreat. Mean()ile3 as Prince $)arles discussed t)e noise of t)e &attle as e+idence of uni%/ortant skir%is)ing3 'redericks left )ad de/loyed3 )is ca+alry decisi+ely defeating t)e +aunted ustrian ca+alry &ut )is infantry encountering difficulty and so%e &attalions suffering 4> /ercent casualties in a frontal attack against ustrian +eterans e.ui//ed (it) t)eir ne( iron ra%rods. But Dust as t)e ustrian infantry &egan to feel discouraged &ecause of t)e defeat of t)e ca+alry on &ot) (ings and t)e retreat of t)e Sa-on infantry3 13<>> Prussian ca+alry c)arged and o+er()el%ed t(enty &attalions of ustrian infantry3 taking 23<>> /risoners. 'rederick )ad sur/rised an incautious ene%y and3 (it) t)e aid of t)e ra/id de/loy%ent of )is (ell# drilled ar%y3 defeated )i% in a frontal &attle3 inflicting o+er 1>3>>> casualties co%/ared to less t)an <3>>> in )is Prussian ar%y. fter )is soldiers nig)t %arc) and difficult +ictory3 'rederick %ade no effort to follo( Prince $)arles &ack to Bo)e%ia ()ere )e re%ained all su%%er. In Se/te%&er Prince $)arles atte%/ted to sur/rise an a//arently negligent 'rederick in )is ca%/ at Soor. But &y t)e ti%e t)e ustrians co%/leted t)eir &ungling a//roac) %arc) and e%erged fro% t)e (oods3 'rederick )ad learned of t)eir arri+al3 for%ed )is troo/s3 and successfully attacked (it) &ot) infantry and ca+alry. Peace &et(een ustria and Prussia follo(ed soon after3 reconfir%ing 'redericks /ossession of Silesia. fter t)e (ar &ot) ustria and Prussia set to (ork refining t)eir ar%ies. 0)e ustrians introduced unifor% drill t)roug)out all of t)eir regi%ents3 i%/ro+ed t)eir artillery significantly3 and conducted annual %anoeu+res in ()ic) officers and %en &eca%e accusto%ed to (orking in large for%ations. 'rederick continued training )is ca+alry and soug)t to /erfect ra/id infantry de/loy%ent3 t)e +alue of ()ic) t)e une-/ected &attles of t)e (ar )ad dra%atically de%onstrated. "e sa( clearly t)e ad+antages of .uick de/loy%ent %ade /ossi&le &y an o/en#order a//roac) %arc) /arallel to t)e ene%ys line in ()ic) turns &y eac) /latoon (ould al%ost instantly con+ert t)e ar%y fro% %arc) for%ation to line of &attle. 0)e (ar )ad %ade 'rederick an e-/erienced general and )is ar%y a &attle#seasoned organisation. In /eace )e )ad /erfected )is ar%y and )ad a t)oroug) gras/ of )o( to use it in t)e ne-t (ar3 ()ic) Maria 0)eresas deter%ination to reco+er Silesia %ade ine+ita&le. But Maria 0)eresas ar%y3 )a+ing fart)er to go3 )ad %ade %ore /rogress during t)e years of /eace3 a fact 'rederick did not fully a//reciate. Back (he Seven 5ears% War< (actics and Strategy in +efence against the "ogistic -ffects of a !ersisting Strategy 'rederick took t)e initiati+e in t)e Se+en :ears !ar &ecause )e (is)ed to /re#e%/t t)e action of ustria3 'rance3 and Russia3 a /otential coalition t)at skilful ustrian di/lo%acy )ad done %uc) to create &y 1C<=. "e occu/ied Sa-ony in t)e autu%n of 1C<= and ad+anced far enoug) into Bo)e%ia to get )is nose &loodied ()en )e &lundered into an ustrian ar%y at ,o&osit63 t)inking )e faced an out/ost. But t)e ustrians (it)dre(3 and 'rederick co%/leted t)e con.uest of Sa-ony ()en )e secured t)e ca/itulation of t)e s%all Sa-on ar%y. In taking Sa-ony 'rederick )ad ac.uired a /ros/erous country t)at could contri&ute %uc) to t)e su//ort of )is ar%ies. ,ike Silesia3 it also %ade an e-cellent t)eatre of (ar &ecause its /o/ulation density#a&out t(o Gt)irds of t)at of t)e Net)erlandsH /ro+ided a large agricultural out/ut t)at (ould %aintain t)e ar%ies (ell.

2??

In 1C<C 'rederick faced 'rance as (ell as ustria and could e-/ect a 'renc) ar%y to %o+e east(ard to(ard Sa-ony so%eti%e during t)e year. 0o deal (it) t)is /ro&le%3 )e ai%ed to dri+e t)e ustrians a(ay fro% Sa-ony and Silesia to gi+e )i% t)e o//ortunity to deal (it) t)e 'renc) ()en t)ey arri+ed. So in t)e s/ring )e ad+anced into Bo)e%ia &y se+eral routes3 arri+ing &efore Prague in early May. 1ra(n u/ on a /lateau3 facing nort) outside of Prague3 )e found t)e ar%y of t)e sluggis) Prince $)arles of ,orraine. !)en 'rederick %arc)ed )is colu%ns sout) so t)at3 as t)e /latoons turned rig)t3 t)ey faced t)e ustrian rig)t flank3 one of Prince $)arless a&le su&ordinates not only %o+ed t)e ustrian second line to its rig)t &ut also for%ed it and counterattacked t)e Prussians ()ile t)ey /assed o+er difficult ground. But t)e Prussian %anoeu+re )ad left t)e ustrian first line facing nort) (it) no Prussians de/loyed against it. 0)e ()ole Prussian ar%y attacked3 and t)oug) t)e ustrians )eld3 /art &roke t)roug) at t)e rig)t angle ()ere t)e t(o ustrian lines Doined and forced a (it)dra(al of t)e &ulk of t)e ustrian ar%y into Prague. Bot) forces suffered a&out 22 /ercent casualties. fe( of Prince $)arless %en Doined t)e ar%y of 'ield Mars)al 1aun3 ()ic) )eaded to(ard Prague fro% t)e east. 0)e ca/a&le and circu%s/ect 1aun3 an e-/erienced soldier ()o )ad %uc) to do (it) t)e recent i%/ro+e%ents in t)e ustrian ar%y3 %o+ed to relie+e t)e &eleaguered Prince $)arles3 a//roac)ing close to Prague and t)reatening 'redericks su//lies. 'rederick t)en %arc)ed to %eet 1aun and resol+ed to attack ()en )e found )i% at 9olin3 facing nort) in &attle array on a line of lo( )ills. 'rederick /lanned again to %arc) /ast t)e ustrians and attack t)eir rig)t flank3 &ut ()en 1aun /ercei+ed t)e Prussian %anoeu+re3 )e de/loyed )is ar%y to t)e rig)t. In t)eir frontal assaults t)e Prussians suffered )ea+ily fro% t)e sni/ing of t)e for%ida&le ustrian lig)t infantry3 t)e fire of its e-cellent artillery3 and t)e ra/id +olleys of its t)oroug)ly trained troo/s. t t)e close of t)e day 'rederick fell &ack3 )a+ing lost nearly 143>>> %en3 4? /ercent of )is force3 co%/ared to @3>>> for t)e ustrians3 Dust 2> /ercent of t)eir force. In t)ese defensi+e &attles t)e i%/ro+ed ustrian artillery )ad a de+astating effect3 as one Prussian /artici/ant testified: J stor% of s)ot and )o(it6er s)ells /assed clear o+er our &eads3 &ut %ore t)an enoug) fell in t)e ranks to s%as) a large nu%&er of our %en... I glanced aside Dust once and I sa( an N$5 torn a/art &y a s)ot near&y: t)e sig)t (as frig)tful enoug) to take a(ay %y curiosity.L ,ater3 )e continued3 t)e %en ad+anced Jt)roug) long corn3 ()ic) reac)ed as far as our necks3 and as (e ca%e nearer (e (ere greeted (it) a )all of canister t)at stretc)ed ()ole clu%/s of our troo/s on t)e ground. !e still )ad our %uskets on our s)oulders and I could )ear )o( t)e canister &alls clattered against our &ayonets.L In t)e first t(o &attles of t)e (ar 'rederick )ad lost slig)tly %ore %en t)an t)e ene%y7 in t)e t)ird )e )ad lost significantly %ore. Since t)e total ustrian ar%y )ad a greater nu%&er of %en t)an )is and )e )ad to face ot)er o//onents also3 it see%ed t)at )e could not long continue to attack )is ene%ies in t)eir c)osen /ositions. "is de/loy%ent fro% a %arc) /arallel to t)e ene%ys line )ad &roug)t +ictory at Prague3 &ut against t)e alert and cautious 1aun at 9olin it )ad failed to do %ore t)an &ring t)e ar%y into a frontal &attle in su&stantially t)e /osition in ()ic) 1aun (is)ed to fig)t it. 0)e e-/ertly drilled ustrian ar%y )ad /ro+en for%ida&le in co%&at and resilient in defeat. Prince $)arless strategy )ad %ade t)e Battle of 9olin necessary. fter )is defeat at t)e Battle of Prague t)e ustrian co%%ander3 instead of retreating into sout)ern Bo)e%ia as 'rederick e-/ected3 )ad s)ut )i%self u/ in Prague. In t)is (ay )e )ad frustrated 'redericks strategic o&Decti+e of dri+ing )i% a(ay fro% Sa-ony and Silesia and t)us gi+ing t)e 9ing t)e o//ortunity to (it)dra( t)e &ulk of )is forces to deal (it) t)e 'renc) ()ile t)e slo(#%o+ing ustrians soug)t to reco+er Bo)e%ia rat)er t)an in+ade eit)er of t)ose /ro+inces. 'redericks defeat at 9olin t)(arted )is entire strategy &y forcing )i% to ter%inate t)e &lockade of Prague and e+acuate Bo)e%ia3 lea+ing $)arles and 1aun united and ready to ad+ance Dust as t)e 'renc) took t)e field.

2?4

!)en 'rederick (it)dre( into Sa-ony3 Prince $)arles %o+ed at a dilatory /ace3 directing )is forces into Silesia. s 'rederick )eld )is ar%y in Sa-ony3 t)e sedate ustrian ad+ance &esieged t)e fortress of Sc)(eidnit63 t)e fall of ()ic) (ould ena&le t)e )uge ustrian ar%y to t)reaten Breslau3 t)e /rinci/al city of Silesia. Mean()ile3 'rederick )ad %o+ed (est(ard to deal (it) t)e 'renc). 0)e ar%y 'rederick faced in t)e !est consisted of ill#disci/lined 'renc) troo/s under t)e co%%and of t)e Prince of Sou&ise3 a general /ri%arily noted for )is la+is) style of li+ing in t)e field. But )e a%/ly e-e%/lified 'renc) officers of t)e /eriod3 as t)e &ooty of t)e ca%/ illustrated. Prussian ca+alry ca/tured not only +alets &ut also actors and ot)er e+idences of t)e aristocratic lifestyle3 including J()ole c)ests full of /erfu%es and scented /o(ders3 and great .uantities of dressing go(ns3 )air nets3 sun s)ades3 nig)tgo(ns3 and /arrots.L In addition to Sou&ises 'renc) force t)e ustrian 'ield Mars)al "ild&urg)ausen co%%anded a *er%an ar%y t)at3 ()en Doined (it) t)e 'renc)3 /ro+ed an e.ually undisci/lined force co%/osed of *er%an contingents3 %any su//lied &y /rincely %ilitary contractors. Bot) ar%ies su&sisted t)e%sel+es &y looting t)e countryside in t)e %anner of t)e 0)irty :ears !ar. !)en 'rederick ad+anced against t)e% (it) 223>>> %en3 )alf t)eir force3 Sou&ise and "ild&urg)ausen (isely fell &ack. But ()en 'rederick turned and %o+ed &ack east(ard to(ard t)reatened Silesia3 t)e t(o co%%anders again ad+anced3 ()ic) caused 'rederick turn and once %ore %arc) (est(ard after t)eir again#retreating ar%y. 'rederick ca%e u/ (it) t)e% facing east in a strong /osition near Ross&ac). fter 'rederick de/loyed o//osite t)e%3 "ild&urg)ausen and Sou&ise resol+ed to %o+e t)eir ar%y into a line of &attle sout) of t)e Prussian to take a /osition t)at (ould restrict 'redericks co%%unications. 0)e allied co%%anders did not )a+e full agree%ent as to t)eir /ur/ose3 "ild&urg)ausen desiring a &attle and Sou&ise (is)ing to a+oid a full#scale conflict. "a+ing o&ser+ed t)is %o+e3 'rederick /ulled &ack )is ar%y. 0)e allied co%%anders t)en erroneously concluded t)at t)e Prussians )ad &egun to retreat and c)anged t)eir /lan into one of /ursuit. But 'rederick3 using t)e conceal%ent /ro+ided &y t(o )ills3 rede/loyed )is ar%y across t)e allied line of %arc). fter )is ca+alry )ad c)arged and routed t)e sur/rised allied ca+alry3 a fe( &attalions of )is infantry ad+anced in line against t)e ill#drilled allied infantry3 %ost of it still in %arc) for%ation and disorganised &y its %o+e%ent. coo/erating c)arge &y t)e Prussian ca+alry co%/leted t)e rout of t)e 'renc) and *er%an infantry. In t)is Battle of Ross&ac) t)e Prussians lost less t)an =oo %en3 t)e allies o+er 1>3>>>. But i%%ediately after )is +ictory 'rederick )urried east &ecause Prince $)arles )ad ca/tured Sc)(eidnit63 defeated t)e s%all ar%y /rotecting Breslau3 and ca/tured t)at city. 0)e Prussian 9ing (as losing a t)ird of )is do%inions. In early 1ece%&er 'rederick3 )a+ing tra+elled in t(el+e days t)e 1C> %iles of )is interior lines of o/erations and Doined t)e force t)at )ad co+ered Breslau3 )ad ??3>>> %en ()en )e a//roac)ed Prince $)arless =<3>>> in &attle array near t)e +illage of ,eut)en. 'rederick %arc)ed directly to(ard t)e ustrians3 %ade %enacing %o+e%ents to(ard t)e ustrian rig)t3 turned )is o(n colu%ns to )is rig)t3 and %arc)ed /arallel (it) t)e ustrian ar%y3 out of sig)t &e)ind a line of lo( )ills. Prince $)arles3 t)oug) in t)e to(er of t)e c)urc) at ,eut)en3 could see not)ing and res/onded to 'redericks distraction &y %o+ing )is reser+e to )is rig)t flank. But ()en t)e )eads of t)e t(o su/er&ly drilled Prussian colu%ns3 t)e distances &et(een t)e %arc)ing /latoons re%aining e-actly t)e (idt) of eac) /latoons front3 )ad /assed t)e ustrian left flank3 t)e colu%ns +eered left to(ard t)e ene%y and continued t)eir %arc) until t)e )eads of t)e t(o colu%ns )ad /assed &eyond t)e ustrian flank. 0)en3 on co%%and3 t)e /latoons of t)e colu%ns turned left3 and t)e ()ole Prussian ar%y lay in line of &attle at nearly a rig)t angle to t)e left flank of t)e ustrian /osition. 0)e Prussians )ad carried out (it) t)eir ()ole ar%y a %anoeu+re analogous to t)at used &y t)e S/artans to attack t)eir ene%y in flank.

2?<

#rederi($"s 'nterior &ines Back

0)e Prussian infantry3 arrayed in t)e con+entional t(o lines of &attle3 t)e% ad+anced and rolled u/ t)e ustrian flank. Prince $)arles rus)ed troo/s fro% )is rig)t to )is left3 &ut t)ey /iled u/ in )el/less %asses as %any as 1>> %en dee/7 t)e ca+alry fro% t)e ustrian rig)t ca%e to attack3 &ut Prussian ca+alry3 )eld &ack for t)e /ur/ose3 c)arged t)e% in t)e flank. 0)e ustrians retreated in confusion3 losing 223>>> to less t)an 123>>> Prussian casualties. Breslau surrendered s)ortly after3 adding 1C3>>> de%oralised /risoners to 'redricks &ag. 'rederick )ad conser+ed )is )old on Sa-ony and Silesia &y energetic e-/loitation of )is interior lines3 &ut )e o(ed de&ts to Sou&ise3 "ild&urg)ausen3 and Prince $)arles for offering )i% t)e &attles t)at ena&led )i% to e-/loit to t)e fullest t)e ad+antage of )is strategic /osition. 0)e ustrians fell &ack into Bo)e%ia3 Maria 0)eresa /ro+iding t)e only /ositi+e result of t)e &attle &y re.uiring t)e resignation of Prince $)arles3 )er ine/t dou&le &rot)er#in#la(. 'rederick )ad e%/loyed )is interior lines to )alt t)e 'renc) and reco+er Silesia3 a %o+e t)at )ad necessarily in+ol+ed t)e &attle t)at Sou&ise and "ild&urg)ausen )ad initially denied )i%. s t)e t(o co%%anders fell &ack &efore 'rederick and t)en ad+anced again ()en )e fell &ack3 Prince $)arles syste%atically used )is o+er()el%ingly su/erior force to con.uer Silesia fro% 'redericks su&ordinate. !)ereas 'rederick e-/loited )is interior lines to concentrate in s/ace3 )is o//onents )ad %ade si%ultaneous ad+ances3 concentrating in ti%e3 and secured t)e fall of Breslau as t)e re(ard of t)eir coo/eration. "ad Sou&ise and Prince $)arles %anaged t)eir %eetings (it) 'redericks ar%y as (ell as t)ey did t)eir strategic coo/eration3 t)ey (ould )a+e attained significant success. !)en t)e Ro%an general Nero e-/loited )is interior lines to %arc) against "anni&als &rot)er "asdru&al3 )e )ad t)e good fortune to catc) "asdru&als ar%y (it) its &ack to a ri+er and force &attle on t)e unready $art)aginian general. !)en Prince 2d(ard e-/loited )is interior lines &et(een t)e de Montfort fat)er and son3 )e )ad sur/rised one and tra//ed t)e ot)ers inferior force. But until Sou&ise and "ild&urg)ausen left t)eir strong /osition and &lundered into disaster at Ross&ac)3 t)ey )ad eit)er gi+en 'rederick no o//ortunity for &attle or for one +ery %uc) on t)eir ter%s. Prince $)arles3 too3 could )a+e a+oided &attle &ut c)ose instead to offer it in a /osition (it)out great natural strengt). Ne+ert)eless3 )e )ad co%/elled 'rederick to attack dou&le )is nu%&ers to rea/ t)e )ar+est of )is interior lines and sa+e Silesia3 one of t)e funda%ental &ases of )is %ilitary /o(er. :et in offering &attle $)arles did ()at t)e By6antine Belisarius )ad dis/araged3 gi+en )is ene%y a second c)ance at +ictory7 )e s)ould )a+e &een content (it) t)e +ictory concentration in ti%e )ad gi+en )i% o+er 'redericks concentration in s/ace. 2-/loiting interior lines3 )is aggressi+eness and confident t)e su/eriority of )is ar%y3 and )is tactic of de/loying )is ()ole ar%y against one flank of t)e ene%y caused 'rederick to fig)t a re%arka&ly large nu%&er of &attles. 0)e ine/titude of )is o//onents )ad )el/ed to gi+e )i% +ictories against t)e% on t)eir c)osen ground. 4nlike t)e earlier &attles of 1C<C3 'rederick could afford to fig)t %ore Ross&ac)s and ,eut)ens.

2?=

'or t)e ca%/aign of 1C<B 'rederick )ad little to fear fro% t)e 'renc): )is Britis) ally )ad an ar%y in t)e field t)at successfully occu/ied t)e attention of t)e 'renc) for t)e re%ainder of t)e (ar. But )e could e-/ect t)e Russians3 ()o )ad already con.uered 2ast Prussia3 to ad+ance (est(ard to(ard t)e 5der and t)e )eart of )is states. 0o deal (it) t)is %enace3 co%/ara&le to t)at /resented &y t)e 'renc) t)e /re+ious year3 'rederick resorted to t)e sa%e strategy: /us) &ack t)e ustrians in Bo)e%ia &efore )is ot)er foe arri+ed. +oiding t)e ustrians3 ()o guarded t)e routes into Bo)e%ia3 )e in+aded Mora+ia in t)e s/ring of 1C<B and &esieged t)e t)oroug)ly fortified and strongly garrisoned to(n of 5l%ut6. "e could also look for(ard to t)e ene%ys co%ing to )i% in )is c)osen location &ecause a siege al(ays /ut t)e &esiegers on t)e defensi+e against t)e relie+ing ar%y. But )is o//onent3 t)e /rudent 'ield Mars)al 1aun3 t)oug) )e a//roac)ed +ery close and )is lig)t ca+alry disru/ted 'redericks foraging3 carefully a+oided o&liging 'rederick &y an attack and relied instead on a logistical strategy ()ile )e re%ained in a +irtually i%/regna&le /osition. !)en t)e 'ield Mars)al learned t)at an a%%unition con+oy 5f 43>>> (agons (as co%ing to 'rederick fro% Silesia3 )is su&ordinates3 aided &y t)eir s/lendid lig)t infantry3 attacked3 inflicted o+er 23>>> casualties on t)e con+oy guard of @3>>> %en3 and destroyed t)e (agons and )orses. 'rederick3 defeated &y 1auns i%itation of t)e logistic strategy of 0raun3 one re%iniscent also of 'a&ius and 1u *uesclin3 a&andoned )is siege and %arc)ed into Silesia3 continuing nort)(ard to resist a Russian ad+ance to(ard t)e 5der. lt)oug) t)e Prussians )ad foug)t t)e Russians t)e year &efore and learned to res/ect t)e solidity of t)eir infantry and t)e .uantity and .uality of t)eir artillery3 'rederick continued to regard t)e% (it) so%e conte%/t. ,acking a siege train3 t)e Russian ar%y engaged in an ineffectual &lockade of t)e 5der city of $ustrin3 ()ic) t)ey raised ()en 'rederick arri+ed (it) 143>>> %en and united (it) )is su&ordinate ()o )ad o&ser+ed t)e Russians. 'rederick deter%ined to attack to induce t)e Russians to kee/ t)eir distance. !)en t)e Russian co%%ander3 *eneral 'er%or3 /laced )is %en in a rat)er /oor situation &e)ind a strea% near Porndorf3 'rederick %arc)ed )is ar%y all t)e (ay around t)e Russian /osition3 to take it in t)e rear. But ()en 'er%or skilfully re+ersed )is front3 'rederick still )ad to fig)t a frontal &attle. n o&ser+er in t)e Russian lines descri&ed t)e Prussians as t)ey %arc)ed to(ard )i%: J0)eir (ea/ons flas)ed in t)e sun and t)e s/ectacle (as frig)tening... Ne+er s)all I forget t)e silent %aDestic a//roac) of t)e Prussian ar%y3L follo(ed &y Jt)at s/lendid &ut alar%ing %o%ent ()en t)e Prussian ar%y suddenly de/loyed into a t)in3 staggered line of &attle ... 0)en t)e %enacing &eat of t)e Prussian dru%s carried to our cars.L But t)e Russians /ro+ed e.ual to t)e occasion3 anot)er o&ser+er co%%enting t)at3 Jt)e e-traordinary steadiness and intre/idity of t)e Russians on t)is occasion is not to &e descri&ed7 it sur/assed e+eryt)ing t)at one )as )eard of in t)e &ra+est troo/s. lt)oug) t)e Prussian &alls %o(ed do(n ()ole ranks3 yet not a %an disco+ered any sy%/to%s of unsteadiness3 or inclination to gi+e (ay3 and t)e o/enings in t)e first line (ere instantly filled u/ fro% t)e second or t)e reser+e.L fter a /rolonged &loody fig)t3 t)e Russians fell &ack a s)ort distance and3 encountering su//ly difficulties3 (it)dre( co%/letely t(o days later. fter t)e &attle a Prussian officer +ie(ed so%e of t)e Prussian (ounded Jcra(ling on )ands and feet3 ot)ers (ere li%/ing on %uskets (it) t)e &utts tucked under t)e ar%/it to ser+e as crutc)es.L "e also sa( Jt)e re%ains of &lo(n#u/ a%%unition (agons and /o(der carts3 and near&y a %ultitude of )alf roasted gunners ()o (ere gi+ing off an un/leasant s%ell of &urningL fles). ni%als suffered3 too3 for )e descri&ed Ja ()ole train of t(o# ()eeled Russian carts3 (it) t)e )orses s)ot in t)e traces3 and around t)e ()ole &attlefield ran (ounded )orses3 (it) t)eir intestines dragging t)e ground or )o//ing a&out on t)ree legs.L 0)e Prussians lost ?< /ercent of t)eir ar%y3 t)e Russians <? /ercent.

2?C

!it) t)e Russians dri+en &ack3 'rederick t)en used )is interior lines to )urry (it) /art of )is ar%y3 %arc)ing at t(enty#t(o %iles a day3 to Sa-ony ()ere 1aun at last t)reatened t)e Sa-on ca/ital3 1resden. 5n 'redericks a//roac) 1aun (it)dre(3 and eac) ar%y )ad o&ser+ed t)e ot)er for %ore t)an a %ont) ()en t)e o+erconfident and too casual 'rederick ca%e carelessly near t)e ustrians in an e-/osed /osition at "oc)kirc). In all unc)aracteristic effusion of t)e offensi+e s/irit3 1aun %ade a nig)t %arc) and sur/rised 'redericks ca%/ in a da(n attack3 t)e ustrians /ouring in front all sides. 0)e su/er&ly disci/lined Prussians esca/ed (it) a loss of @3>>> %en to C3>>> for t)e ustrians. But 'rederick3 learning t)at anot)er ustrian ar%y t)reatened Silesia3 %arc)ed t)ere3 raised t)e siege of Neisse3 and %arc)ed &ack to Sa-ony .uickly enoug) to /re+ent 1aun fro% %olesting 1resden. In 1C<B concentration in ti%e3 languidly /ursued3 )ad failed to o+er%atc) 'redericks +igorous concentration in s/ace. 'rederick )ad once %ore used )is interior lines effecti+ely3 &ut at Porndorf and "oc)kirc) )e )ad again lost %ore of t)e %en ()o% )e )ad t)oroug)ly trained in t)e /re#(ar /eriod. Re/lace%ents ke/t )is ar%y u/ to strengt)3 &ut its .uality declined ()ile t)at of t)e ustrian ar%y steadily i%/ro+ed as it gained &attle e-/erience3 (inno(ed out t)e less effecti+e senior officers3 and learned )o( &etter to e%/loy its %ore /o(erful artillery in t)e defence. 0)e ustrians )ad also created a staff cor/s t)at successfully )el/ed co%%anders /lan and su/er+ise %o+e%ents3 su//ly arrange%ents3 and e+en ca%/aigns and &attles. In 1C<@ 'rederick faced a rene(ed Russian ad+ance (it) ()ic) t)e ustrians /lanned to coordinate a %arc) &y t)eir %ain ar%y into Silesia ()ile continuing to %enace Sa-ony in coo/eration (it) t)e re%ains of t)e force "ild&urg)ausen )ad led at Ross&ac). 'rederick dis/osed ?>3>>> %en to face t)e =>3>>> t)e Russians intended to &ring and fielded anot)er ?>3>>5 to guard Sa-ony. In addition3 )e )ad <>3>>> %en in Silesia to co+er t)at /ro+ince and to use along )is interior lines to reinforce Sa-ony or t)e ar%y o//osing t)e Russians. "is Britis) allies continued to )old t)e 'renc) at &ay in t)e (estern /art of *er%any. 0)is year 'rederick re%ained on t)e defensi+e3 (aiting to counter )is o//onents rat)er t)an trying to /ress t)e% &ack. 0)e Russians3 %o+ing east(ard under t)e talented *eneral Salryko+3 %arc)ed around t)e o//osing Prussian force and3 entrenc)ing at 9ay facing east(ard3 &loodily re/ulsed t)e attack of t)e co%&ati+e &ut si%/le#%inded Prussian co%%ander. Resu%ing )is %arc) east3 Salryko+ reac)ed t)e 5der Ri+er3 ca/tured 'rankfurt3 and united (it) 243>>> ustrians sent &y 1aun under t)e co%%and of t)e skilful *eneral ,oudon. But in early ugust 'rederick %arc)ed a(ay fro% Silesia3 and 1aun3 after )is dis/lay of das) at "oc)kirc)3 re+erted to )is usual slo( and un#enter/rising %ode of o/erations. !it) 1auns large ar%y only fifty %iles a(ay3 'rederick3 (it) <>3>>> %en3 attacked Salryko+ and ,oudouns =>3>>> Russians and ustrians at 9unersdorf. Starting )is %en at 2:>> a.%.3 )e %arc)ed entirely around t)e allied flank3 concentrating )is entire force against t)e rear and flank of one (ing of t)e allied /osition. But )e found )is alert o//onents so t)oroug)ly entrenc)ed and (ell e.ui//ed (it) artillery t)at3 in s/ite of dri+ing &ack t)e attacked (ing3 t)e Prussian assaults ended in g)astly failure. 'rederick lost ?C /ercent of )is %en3 t)e allies 2= /ercent. 'redericks greater %o&ility )ad a+ailed )i% not)ing &ut a &loody re/ulse3 ()ic)3 )o(e+er3 ga+e t)e allies no strategic &enefit. $o%&ined (it) 1auns ar%y3 t)e allies could )a+e %arc)ed to Berlin and3 &y collecting contri&utions and (intering in Branden&urg3 cri//led Prussian /o(er &y de/ri+ing t)e 9ing of su//lies3 re+enues3 and recruits for )is ar%ies. But since t)e Russians (ere reluctant to undertake suc) an a%&itious enter/rise and 1aun at first dou&ted t)at Branden&urg offered enoug) su//lies for t)e (inter3 t)e ustro#Russian co%%anders +acillated and at one /oint resol+ed to (ait until anot)er ar%y )ad occu/ied Sa-ony and t)en to seek to e-/loit t)eir +ictory &y (intering in Silesia. But t)e t(o allies ended in disagree%ent3 t)e Russians later %arc)ing to t)e east to (inter3 as usual3 on t)e Vistula.

2?B

0)e ustrians )ad ca/tured 1resden &y t)e ti%e 1aun3 follo(ed s)ortly &y 'rederick3 reac)ed Sa-ony. stale%ate resulted3 (it) 1aun in too for%ida&le a /osition for 'rederick3 ()o still controlled %uc) of Sa-ony3 to +enture an attack. 0)e deadlock lasted t)e year and (as &roken only &y a successful sur/rise attack against a Prussian force t)at netted t)e ustrians o+er 1?3>>> /risoners. lt)oug) t)e 9ing reco+ered fro% )is defeat at 9unersdorf3 )e t)ereafter soug)t to a+oid )a+ing to fig)t a &attle3 reflecting t)at t)ere (ere Jsituations in ()ic) one %ust fig)t7 one s)ould3 )o(e+er3 allo( )i%self to &e dra(n into &attle only ()en t)e ene%y3 eit)er in ca%/ing or on t)e %arc)3 is careless or ()en one can force )i% to acce/t /eace &y a decisi+e &lo(.L $onsidering 1auns caution3 t)e )ardi)ood of t)e Russians in &attle3 and t)e +ast si6e of )is ad+ersaries3 )e )ad little c)ance of %eeting t)ese conditions. Meditating on t)e )istory of t)e co%&ati+e 9ing $)arles III of S(eden3 )e continued: J'urt)er%ore3 it is certain t)at %ost generals ()o resort easily to a &attle rely on t)is e-/edient only &ecause t)ey do not kno( ()at else to do. 'ar fro% &eing considered to t)eir credit3 one regards t)is rat)er as an indication of a lack of genius.L In 8uly 1C=> 'rederick3 follo(ed &y 1aun3 %o+ed to Silesia ()ere )is ar%y faced t)e Russians ad+ancing fro% t)e nort) and ,oudon co%ing fro% t)e sout). 1aun and ,oudon (it) @>3>>> %en %o+ed to attack 'redericks ?>3>>>. But 'rederick c)anged )is /osition3 and at ,iegnit6 ,oudon lost o+er a t)ird of )is troo/s in a +ain3 unsu//orted assault against 'redericks so%e()at stronger force. In )is first traditional defensi+e &attle of t)e (ar 'rederick forfeited only 11 /ercent of )is %en. fter a raid on Berlin3 ()ic) e-acted contri&utions fro% t)e city3 1aun ad+anced to Sa-ony3 digging )i%self in at 0orgau in t)e centre of t)e electorate. Since 'rederick could not afford to lose t)e contri&utions and resources of Sa-ony3 )e decided to attack 1auns %ig)tier force3 t)oroug)ly entrenc)ed (it) 2C< artillery /ieces. "e sent *eneral Pieten (it) a t)ird of t)e ar%y to(ard t)e ustrian front7 )e %arc)ed (it) t)e re%ainder to assail t)e ustrian rear. But t)e i%/ertur&a&le and +igilant 'ield Mars)al o&ser+ed 'redericks %o+e%ent3 for%ed a front to )is rear3 and ad%inistered &loody re&uffs to t)e assaults 'rederick launc)ed in t)e %istaken &elief t)at t)e inert Pieten )ad )is %en in action. conte%/orary noted of t)e last Prussian attacks t)at Je+en &efore t)e Prussians caug)t sig)t of t)e ene%y t)e tree to/s (ere se+ered &y t)e ene%y s)ot and fell on t)eir )eads3 and t)e t)under of t)e cannon re+er&erated fearfully t)roug) t)e forest.L !)en t)e Prussians left t)e trees to ad+ance o+er t)e ground of /re+ious attacks3 t)ey sa( Ja slaug)ter ground3 full of cor/ses and %utilated &odies3 /anting and s(i%%ing in t)eir &lood.L But ()en at last Pietens troo/s acted and found a route to t)e ustrian flank and 'redericks %en %ustered one %ore attack3 t)e Prussians turned t)e ustrian flank and co%/elled t)e% to (it)dra( to 1resden. Sa+ing )is +alua&le )old on Sa-ony cost 'rederick dearly: )e lost ?? /ercent of )is ar%y co%/ared to 2@ /ercent for t)e ustrians.L In 1C=13 ()en 'rederick o//osed t)e ustrians and Russians in Silesia3 )e took a leaf fro% 1auns &ook and dug in ad+antageously in a strong /osition. 0)e ar%ies faced one anot)er for t)ree (eeks3 eac) suffering su//ly difficulties. But 'redericks &etter logistic /re/arations ena&led )i% to outlast )is o//onents3 and ()en t)e Russians (it)dre( in Se/te%&er3 t)e ca%/aign ended for t)e year. In 1C=2 t)e Russians not only left t)e (ar &ut also c)anged sides3 ending any real %enace to 'redericks sur+i+al until )e %ade /eace (it) ustria in 1C=?. "e retained Silesia3 t)e /olitical o&Decti+e of )is defensi+e (ar and Maria 0)eresas goal in )er t)ird conflict (it) 'rederick. 1uring t)e (ar t)e Prussians lost 1B>3>>> dead &ut finis)ed (it) %ore in t)e treasury t)an at t)e &eginning. 'rederick /aid for t)e conflict in /art fro% coinage de&ase%ent3 ()ic) )ad su&stantially t)e sa%e effect as inflation. But t)is %eans3 and loans3 for%ed a relati+ely s%all /ortion of t)e cost. 0)e follo(ing ta&le s)o(s t)e contri&ution of t)e +arious re+enue sources. Since t)e &alance on

2?@

)and at t)e end e-ceeded t)at at t)e &eginning &y a//ro-i%ately t)e a%ount of t)e loans3 'rederick )ad financed t)e (ar on an essentially /ay#as#you#go &asis.

Sour(es of Prussian 'n(ome in the Se%en 3ears" War Back

'rederick took t)e offensi+e in se+en of )is ten &attles in t)e Se+en :ears !ar. 2-ce/t at ,o&osit63 )e attacked )is o//onents in t)e /ositions t)ey )ad c)osen to recei+e )i%. "e did so also at Ross&ac)3 &ut since t)e ene%y %ade t)e initial %o+e%ent3 on t)is occasion )e defended. In t)ese conflicts )is casualties a//ro-i%ated 1>43>>> %en G1C /ercentH co%/ared (it) 12?3>>> G24 /ercentH for )is o//onents. 2+en t)oug) 'rederick could not afford suc) losses as (ell as )is i%/osing grou/ of ene%ies3 suc) contests on t)e foes ter%s reflected a reasona&le solution to 'redericks serious strategic /ro&le% and constituted a &etter alternati+e to t)e usual strategy of defending o&stacles to deny t)e o//onent access to )is territory. 'redericks &loody &attles did i%/ose caution on )is ad+ersaries. 'renc) o&ser+er could say of 1aun3 ()o )ad defeated 'rederick in t(o of t)eir t)ree engage%ents: Jif only t)e field#%ars)al (as a little less ti%id: &ut t)is is a +ain )o/e. 0)ere is suc) a narro( %argin &et(een a ti%orousness of t)is kind3 and t)e /rudence you %ust al(ays s)o( ()en you are facing t)e 9ing of Prussia3 t)at a naturally cautious %an is inclined to confuse t)e t(o.L 'redericks skill and co%&ati+eness3 co%&ined (it) t)e /syc)ological i%/act3 losses3 and disorganisation of e+en a +ictory o+er )is ar%y3 %eant t)at )is &attles al(ays ser+ed at least to )alt t)e )ostile ad+ance. 4/on t)is funda%ental result of )is fig)ts 'rederick i%/licitly founded )is strategy. "e could not sur+i+e if )is ad+ersaries occu/ied Sa-ony or )is o(n e-tre%ely +ulnera&le territory. 'ro% Bo)e%ia t)e ustrians )ad ready access to Sa-ony and Silesia. Since t)e Sa-ons )ad sided (it) ustria and Silesia )ad long &elonged to t)e "a&s&urgs3 'rederick could e-/ect t)ese areas to offer no local resistance3 es/ecially against t)e essentially *er%an ar%ies of Maria 0)eresas )us&and3 t)e 2%/eror. 0)e natural a-is of t)e Russian ad+ance took t)e% to Branden&urg and (estern Prussia3 %aDor /arts of 'redericks do%ains. 0)oug) t)e Russians )ad no clai%s to t)e territory3 t)eir care of ci+ilian sensi&ilities )ad )el/ed reconcile t)e 2ast Prussians to t)eir occu/ation. 0)ese areas )ad neit)er t)e defence in de/t) /ro+ided &y t)e nu%erous fortresses of t)e Net)erlands nor t)e o&stacles /resented &y t)e se.uence of ri+er lines in nort) Italy. ll of t)e /ro+inces (ere sufficiently s%all in relation to t)e ustrian and Russian ar%ies t)at t)e in+aders could readily occu/y and control t)e%. !)en t)e 'renc) and t)e 2%/eror struggled for control of nort)ern Italy and 'rance and )er ene%ies foug)t o+er t)e Net)erlands3 none of t)e co%&atants de/ended on t)e dis/uted region for %uc) of t)eir resources for kee/ing t)eir ar%ies in t)e field. But t)e situation differed %arkedly for 'rederick7 )e relied on Sa-ony3 Silesia3 Branden&urg3 and (estern Prussia for %oney and recruits. 0o lose e+en one (ould significantly reduce )is forces t)e follo(ing year3 increasing t)e danger to )is re%aining territory. 'or )is ene%ies3 a con.uest of 'redericks /ro+inces (ould constitute a (ar#(inning logistic strategy. 0o co%&at t)is strategy and to /rotect )is +ital logistic &ases3 'rederick could )ardly e%/loy t)e strategy of di+ersions used &y *usta+us and Montecuccoli3 for t)e ene%y t)reatened o&Decti+es far %ore +ital to )i% t)en any of t)ose /resented &y t)e e-/osed ustrian )oldings of Bo)e%ia or Mora+ia. ,ike(ise3 )e could not rely on /rotecting o&stacles3 for t)e see#sa( ca%/aigns in Italy )ad de%onstrated t)at in+aders could /ass t)e ri+ers and &ase t)e%sel+es in t)e country &eyond. If 24>

t)e ustrians sli//ed into Silesia3 for e-a%/le3 not only (ould t)ey )a+e an area to su//ort t)eir ar%ies and force 'rederick to forage else()ere3 &ut also t)ey (ould )a+e con.uered nearly a t)ird of t)e 9ings su&Dects. 0)us 'rederick soug)t to fig)t t)e (ar in Bo)e%ia and so kee/ t)e ene%y far fro% Sa-ony and Silesia. "is +ulnera&ility led )i% to acce/t a fig)t on t)e ene%ys ter%s &ecause &attles ke/t t)e foe at &ay. 'redericks strategic +ulnera&ility e-/lains )is &attle at 0orgau3 ()ere )e atte%/ted to attack 1aun3 dug in (it) t)e al%ost e-tra+agant /ro+ision of fi+e artillery /ieces /er 13>>> %en. But )o(e+er di% (ere t)e /ros/ects of +ictory3 'rederick )ad to %ake t)e assault &ecause 1aun controlled t)e &ulk of Sa-ony. If 'rederick could reco+er Sa-ony3 )e could )ire ne( soldiers to re/lace )is casualties7 (it)out Sa-ony )e (ould )a+e lost nearly a t)ird of )is re+enues and could not )a+e %aintained )is ar%y at its e-isting strengt). 'redericks attacks on 1aun and on ot)er o//onents %ake e%inently good strategic sense ()en +ie(ed as a %eans to defeat )is ene%ies i%/licit &ut /otentially deadly logistic strategy. 'rederick sur+i+ed &ecause )e did not face an o//onent (it) t)e talent and enter/rise of Mars)al Vendo%e3 to say not)ing of t)e .uick defeat to a logistic strategy )is (eak situation could (ell )a+e &roug)t )ad )e o//osed %en of t)e cali&re of Marl&oroug) and 2ugene or of Mars)als ,u-e%&ourg and Villars. ,ater3 ()en 'rederick /lanned )o( )e (ould conduct yet anot)er (ar (it) t)e ustrians3 )e ga+e an e-/licit state%ent of t)e logistic &ases of )is strategy: JI (ould first con.uer enoug) land to ena&le %e to /rocure /ro+isions3 to li+e at t)e e-/ense of t)e ene%y3 and to select as t)e t)eatre of o/erations terrain t)at is %ost fa+oura&le to %e7 I (ould )asten to fortify %y defensi+e line &efore t)e ene%y could a//ear in t)e +icinity.L 'rederick &ased )is reliance on &attles not only on strategic necessity &ut also on )is distincti+e tactical a//roac). "is +ictory at ,eut)en &est e-e%/lified )is o&Decti+e. "ere )e /laced )is ar%y o&li.uely to t)e ustrians and not only concentrated all of )is force against one (ing of t)e ene%y &ut also attacked t)eir flank3 al(ays a (eak /oint. 0)is o&li.ue attack )eld &ack one flank3 kee/ing it and t)e o//osing ene%y forces unengaged. Since 'rederick intended t)at )is unengaged flank al(ays )a+e a /ro/ortionately %uc) (eaker force t)an t)e unengaged /ortion of t)e ene%ys ar%y3 t)is o&li.ue attack si%/lified and accentuated t)e concentration of )is troo/s. By ad+ancing )is &attalions in ec)elon (it) eac) of t)e% fifty to 1>> yards &e)ind t)at adDacent3 )e accelerated t)e engage%ent of t)e stronger /art of )is ar%y and delayed t)at of t)e (eaker. "e could e%/loy suc) an ec)elon for%ation &ecause t)e fire/o(er of t)e &attalions a%/ly co+ered t)e ga/s &et(een t)e%. 0)us &y t)e dis/osition of )is ar%y 'rederick acco%/lis)ed a concentration of force against (eakness3 t)e ene%ys flank. t ,eut)en )e facilitated t)is %anoeu+re &y distracting Prince $)arles and con+incing )i% t)at t)e Prussian attack ai%ed at t)e o//osite flank. In )is ot)er offensi+e &attles )e )ad less success t)an at ,eut)en3 &ut in e+ery one )e atte%/ted to assail t)e ene%y fro% an une-/ected direction ()ere )e could antici/ate finding t)e foe (eaker t)an in front. 'redericks %et)od t)us differed funda%entally fro% t)at of Marl&oroug)3 ()o foug)t t)e traditional frontal &attle3 using infantry assaults to attract t)e ene%ys reser+es and c)arges &y ca+alry to e-/loit t)e (eakness created &y t)e distractions. 'redericks a//roac) relied on concentrating against (eakness. 0)oug) )is e-cellent ca+alry continued to /lay a key role3 )is o&li.ue attack ga+e infantry a %uc) %ore &asic offensi+e c)aracter. 'redericks %et)od )ad so%et)ing in co%%on (it) 2/a%inondas use of )is Sacred Band at ,euctra as (ell as (it) t)e S/artan drill for a flank attack. Back

Changes in #ttrition in )elation to the Com'osition of #rmies

In s/ite of t)e de+astating losses fro% t)e ra/idly deli+ered +olleys at close range3 t)e ar%ies of 'rederick and )is o//onents suffered fe(er casualties t)an one %ig)t e-/ect. 0)is reflected a trend 241

of t(o centuries. $asualties of t)e +ictors during t)e 0)irty :ears !ar a%ounted to 12.< /ercent of t)eir forces3 t)ose of t)e defeated3 ?C.4 /ercent. 0)ese /ercentages differ fro% t)ose of a )undred years earlier &ut (arrant no conclusion &ecause t)e data lack co%/ara&ility. But co%/ara&le data for t)e /eriod 1=4@ t)roug) 1C>1 indicate a %arked c)ange. Victors casualties3 12.= /ercent3 did not c)ange3 &ut t)e losses of t)e defeated dro//ed to 2C.= /ercent. lt)oug) t)e linear syste% &eca%e uni+ersal and %any soldiers )ad /lug &ayonets during t)e latter /art of t)is /eriod3 /er%anent regi%ents and drilled standing ar%ies see% t)e &est )y/ot)esis for e-/laining %ost of t)is dra%atic decline. 1isci/lined3 /er%anently esta&lis)ed ar%ies could &etter (it)stand t)e disorganisation of defeat t)an could t)e often /oorly trained %ercenary infantry of t)e 0)irty :ears !ar. 0)e era of t)e socket &ayonet3 1C>2#=?3 (itnessed3 at 11.< /ercent3 no c)ange in t)e +ictors losses and a s%aller dro/3 to 21.@ /ercent3 in t)ose of t)e defeated. Since )o%ogeneous3 &ayonet#ar%ed %usketeers3 su/erior as a (ea/on syste% to ca+alry3 suffered less in defeat t)an /ike%en and %usketeers (it)out &ayonets3 t)is c)ange in (ea/on syste%s see%s t)e %ost likely e-/lanation for t)e &ulk of t)is decline. 0)at ar%ies foug)t less concentrated3 s/read in lines rat)er t)an asse%&led in &locks3 %ay also )a+e contri&uted to t)e dro/ in casualties3 if only &ecause t)e +ictors )ad to searc) fart)er to disco+er de%oralised and +ulnera&le grou/s of defeated and often in flig)t3 find t)e% in s%aller nu%&ers ()en t)ey )ad t)e o//ortunity to assail t)e%.L Standing ar%ies containing (ell#trained3 &ayonet#ar%ed %usketeers )ad a//arently %arkedly reduced t)e casualties of t)e defeated in &attle. 0)is decrease in attrition di%inis)ed t)e tactical significance of a gi+en &attle and s)ould )a+e increased t)e nu%&er of &attles. 'ield Mars)al 1aun succinctly e-/ressed t)e attitude to(ard co%&at )eld &y co%%anders since t)e condottieri: JMy o/inion is t)at you s)ould offer &attle ()en you find t)at t)e ad+antage you gain fro% a +ictory (ill &e greater3 in /ro/ortion3 t)an t)e da%age you (ill sustain if you retreat or are &eaten.L If t)e 'ield Mars)al )ad added )is esti%ate of t)e /ro&a&ility of +ictory3 )e (ould )a+e fully stated t)e factors go+erning t)e decision to engage in a &attle.L If t)e costs of defeat fall3 a co%%ander s)ould dis/lay a greater (illingness to risk a contest e+en t)oug)3 if a (inner3 t)e sa%e factor lessens t)e tactical %agnitude of +ictory3 &ecause %any &ettors (ill %ake s%aller (agers %ore often t)an t)ey (ill large ones3 e+en ()en t)e odds are t)e sa%e. In t)e Se+en :ears !ar 'rederick foug)t often ()en co%/ared (it) co%%anders in t)e 0)irty :ears !ar3 and3 unlike Marl&oroug) ()o foug)t less fre.uently3 )e suffered so%e defeats. But )e gat)ered Mi%/ortant strategic fruits fro% )is &attles ()en )e successfully guarded )is +ital &ase territories and defended )i%self against )is ene%ies i%/licit logistic strategy. Back

Significant +evelo'ments in French Military (hought

!)ile 'rederick used )is su/er&ly drilled troo/s to %ake &rilliant a//lications of t)e o&li.ue attack to concentrate against (eakness3 t)e 'renc) ar%y follo(ed anot)er line of de+elo/%ent. I%/ressed3 as (as 'rederick %o%entarily3 &y 'olards ideas a&out s)ock action3 t)e 'renc) used colu%ns in t)e Se+en :ears !ar. But t)e colu%ns )ad t)eir /rinci/al utility as for%ations in ()ic) to )old reser+es or %o+e troo/s readily on or near t)e &attlefield. 0)e 'renc) also %ade syste%atic use of skir%is)ers a)ead of t)e line3 also a c)aracteristic ustrian /ractice &ut one initially neglected &y 'rederick. :et t)e distincti+e 'renc) /ractice consisted in using a nu%&er of colu%ns to increase s/eed of de/loy%ent against &etter#drilled o//onents. 0)is tactical inno+ation )el/ed to lead t)e 'renc) to se/arate t)eir ar%y into /er%anent di+isions co%/osed of &ot) infantry and artillery. di+ision )ad no %ore t)an si-teen &attalions # or less t)an 1>3>>> infantry. !it) &attle a /ossi&ility3 t)e ar%y a//roac)ed t)e ene%y in four di+isions3 (it) eac) of t)ese for%ed into t(o colu%ns3 &ot) of four &attalions for t)e first line and four for t)e

242

second line. In t)is (ay t)e 'renc) soug)t to e.ual t)e s/eed of de/loy%ent of t)eir o//onents &etter#trained infantry. In t)e ca%/aign of 1C=> t)e /erce/ti+e and inno+ati+e Mars)al Broglie %ade effecti+e use of colu%ns to %anoeu+re )is ar%y3 de%onstrating t)e /racticality of t)is a//roac). n ar%y se/arated into di+isions could %o+e faster t)an a concentrated force &ecause it could %ake use of %ore roads. By a&andoning t)e a//roac) %arc) (it) t)e ar%y concentrated to (ard off a ca+alry attack3 t)e 'renc) recognised t)at an infantry e.ui//ed (it) %uskets and &ayonets and di+ided into (ell#drilled &attalions did not )a+e enoug) to fear fro% ca+alry to (arrant t)e continued use of t)e self#defensi+e %arc) for%ation used so skilfully &y Par%a and reco%%ended &y Montecuccoli. 0o guard against an une-/ected confrontation (it) t)e ene%y3 Mars)al Broglie screened )is ar%y (it) lig)t infantry as (ell as lig)t ca+alry. By se/arating )is ar%y3 t)e Mars)al could %o+e it %ore ra/idly ()en it (as near t)e ene%y3 &ut it re%ained conce/tually a unit3 res/onsi+e to )is orders and ready to concentrate i%%ediately. fter t)e (ar t)e 'renc) continued t)eir /ursuit of tactical inno+ations. In 1C== t)ey introduced a %et)od of de/loying a closed colu%n into a line facing t)e direction of t)e colu%ns line of %arc). 0)oug) suc) %et)ods already e-isted3 t)ey (ere slo(3 ungainly3 and usually in+ol+ed an o/en colu%n. 0)e only .uick de/loy%ent fro% line to colu%n3 t)at used &y 'rederick t)e *reat3 )ad relied on t)e si%ultaneous turn of all /latoons fro% an o/en#order colu%n. 0)is )ad necessarily faced t)e resulting line at rig)t angles to t)e colu%ns line of %arc). 0)e ne( 'renc) drill ena&led a co%/act colu%n .uickly and easily to de/loy into a t)ree#dee/ line facing in t)e direction of %arc) si%/ly &y )a+ing t)e colu%n )alt and t)e se/arate units (it)in t)e colu%n %arc) diagonally to t)eir /laces in t)e line. 0)is de/loy%ent could e+en take /lace ()ile t)e lead ele%ent continued to %arc) &y )a+ing t)e ot)ers run to t)eir /laces in t)e line. 0)is a&ility to for% line fro% colu%n )ad t)e /otential for a re+olutionary i%/act on tactics. 0roo/s in linear for%ation %o+ed slo(ly to kee/ align%ent. 0)is re%ained true e+en after 'rederick introduced t)e ec)eloning of &attalions and tacticians realised t)at t)e fire of t)e flintlock could co+er su&stantial ga/s &et(een &attalions. But t)e &attalions t)e%sel+es )ad to %aintain t)eir o(n align%ent to )a+e t)eir full fire/o(er and to a+oid t)e danger of t)e %ens s)ooting eac) ot)er. t)ree#dee/ for%ation (it) a front of 2>> %en )ad to %o+e slo(ly to sustain its align%ent3 e+en on s%oot) terrain3 &ut for%ed into a closed#u/ colu%n of eig)t co%/anies one &e)ind t)e ot)er3 for e-a%/le3 it could %o+e as a rectangle (it) t(enty#fi+e files and t(enty#four ranks t)at )ad a front of fifty feet and a de/t) of /er)a/s 1<>. In t)is for%ation &attalions could %o+e (it) co%/arati+e ease to t)e &attlefield and t)en de/loy into line to utilise t)eir fire/o(er. Because t)eir fire could co+er t)e ga/s &et(een t)e &attalions3 t)ey did not need /recise align%ent on eac) ot)er. t t)e sa%e ti%e t)at t)e 'renc) ado/ted di+isions for t)eir ar%ies and gro/ed t)eir (ay to(ard t)e conce/t of %anoeu+ring t)eir troo/s on t)e &attlefield in colu%n &ut de/loying t)e% in line for actual co%&at3 t)ey %ade a nu%&er of i%/ortant tec)nical i%/ro+e%ents in t)eir artillery. !)en researc) re+ealed t)at s%aller /o(der c)arges (it) stronger &arrels and a tig)ter fitting &all could /roduce t)e sa%e range as for%erly3 cannon foundries could %ake t)e &arrels t)inner as (ell as s)orter3 )al+ing t)e (eig)t of so%e guns. ,ig)ter carriages and i%/ro+ed )arnesses also aug%ented %o&ility3 and a &etter ele+ating %ec)anis%3 a significantly %ore effecti+e sig)t3 and an increased rate of fire en)anced /erfor%ance. 0)e ad+ance in t)e %o&ility of t)e artillery %ade 'renc) soldiers confident of t)e a&ility of t)e artillery to kee/ u/ (it) t)e ar%y in al%ost any %arc) and %ade t)e% &elie+e t)at t)e artillery (ould )a+e enoug) &attlefield %o&ility to /lay a %ore conse.uential role in offensi+e &attles3 one co%/ara&le to its /ro%inence on t)e defence. Since s%all &alls /acked in canisters outranged t)e %usket3 artillery could &e a /o(erful aid in t)e attack if t)e artillery%en could &ring it into action on t)e &attlefield at t)e ti%e and /lace of t)e infantrys assault.

24?

)annon #iring Twel%e/ ound .all Back

Muc) t)eorising and contro+ersy acco%/anied t)e c)anges in t)e 'renc) infantry and artillery3 and %any %ilitary /)iloso/)ers influenced %odification in t)e drill and for%ation of 'renc) ar%ies and on t)e education and t)inking of officers. In t)e infantry t)ese +ariations constituted as funda%ental an alteration as ()en t)e S(iss suddenly e-ercised a /rofound influence on t)e &attlefields of 2uro/e. 0)e S(iss infantry in t)eir solid#&lock for%ation )ad dis/layed not only considera&le &attlefield %o&ility &ut also t)e ca/acity to %arc) to t)e &attlefield in t)eir co%&at for%ation and go into action i%%ediately. 0)eir %o&ile for%ation %ig)t (ell )a+e do%inated &attlefields longer if t)ey )ad not de/ended so %uc) on drill and %orale3 if t)e s.uare did not )a+e to )alt to defend its flanks against ca+alry3 and )ad t)e solid for%ation not &een so +ulnera&le to %issile fire and so ill ada/ted to returning it. So t)e infantry t)at ca%e to /lay a %aDor role on si-teent)#century &attlefields consisted of &ot) /ike%en and ar.ue&usiers and re.uired a careful &attle array to insure t)at it /ro+ided %utual su//ort against lance Gor sa&reH ar%ed ca+alry as (ell as /rotection for t)e /ike%en fro% %usketeers and %ounted /istoleers. Since t)is co%/le- array )ad t(o interde/endent ty/es of infantry and )ad to ada/t itself to t)e ground on ()ic) it foug)t3 it could neit)er %arc) to t)e &attlefield in co%&at for%ation nor dis/lay %uc) %o&ility on t)e field of &attle. It lacked3 t)erefore3 t(o funda%ental c)aracteristics of t)e essentially )o%ogeneous S(iss infantry for%ation. 0)e conce/t of offensi+e troo/s3 )el/ful in understanding ()y ca+alry retained its tactical i%/ortance after t)e &ayonet#ar%ed %usketeer )ad rendered it an inferior (ea/on syste%3 )as so%e utility in understanding t)e significance of t)e differences &et(een t)e S(iss infantry and its successors. 0)e S(iss could fig)t in t)e sa%e for%ation as t)ey %arc)ed. 0o t)is attri&ute t)e S(iss o(ed t)eir +ictory at Morat o+er t)e entrenc)ed Burundians. Because of t)e t)reat of ca+alrys using its greater %o&ility and ca/acity for attacking an ar%y on t)e %arc) (it)out de/loy%ent and t)en e%/loying sa&res against %usketeers and /istols against /ike%en3 ar%ies (it)in reac) of t)e ene%ys ca+alry %arc)ed in a .uasi#&attle for%ation3 a slo( %o+e%ent across country in t)e self#defensi+e for%ation /rescri&ed &y Montecuccoli. !)ereas t)e S(iss could startle t)eir o//onents &y %arc)ing ra/idly to t)e field of &attle and going into action /ro%/tly3 t)e si-teent)#century )eterogeneous infantry force %o+ed slo(ly to t)e &attle area and faced a see%ingly inter%ina&le delay in for%ing for co%&at. It is )ardly sur/rising t)at no co%%ander t)oug)t in ter%s of forcing a &attle on un(illing o//onents ot)er t)an &y tra//ing t)e% against o&stacles or co%/elling attack to raise a siege.

244

0)e ad+ent of *usta+uss linear syste% did not c)ange t)is situation. 0)e infantry re%ained )eterogeneous3 re.uiring a %utually su//orting array3 and e-ce/t for t)eir &etter su&di+ision and articulation3 linear for%ations )ad e+en less &attlefield %o&ility t)an t)e /ike s.uares (it) t)eir associated %usketeers. 0)e &ayonet %ade t)e ar%ys infantry )o%ogeneous3 and t)e /ro&le%s of %arc)ing near t)e ene%y and of de/loy%ent /otentially decreased significantly. ny grou/ of &ayonet#ar%ed infantry could defend against ca+alry if it could for% itself at all. Marc) colu%ns lent t)e%sel+es not only to t)e for%ation of a s.uare &ut also to facing a line to t)e a//roac)ing ca+alry. In &attlefield de/loy%ent3 (it) e+ery infantry%an and e+ery foot unit a /erfect su&stitute for t)e ot)er3 arraying for &attle could &eco%e far si%/ler. In t)e drill t)at ar%ies e+ol+ed to control t)eir linear for%ations and de+elo/ safely t)eir %a-i%u% fire/o(er3 co%%anders )ad t)e %eans at )and to realise t)is /otential of t)e ne( infantry. But it /ro+ed difficult for eig)teent)#century soldiers to see t)e /ossi&ilities /resented &y )o%ogeneous infantry3 ()ic) could constitute a do%inant (ea/on syste% o+er t)e ca+alry. 0)e linear for%ation3 necessary to utilise all of t)e %uskets3 so cri//led t)e infantrys &attlefield %o&ility t)at soldiers continued to t)ink of ca+alry as t)e only (ea/on syste% (it) real offensi+e ca/a&ilities. 0)e /ro&le% of &attlefield %o&ility ga+e rise to t)e idea of colu%ns3 as did t)oug)ts of t)e s)ock action of t)e /re+ious century. But t)e logic of t)is line of t)inking foundered on t)e /o(er3 relia&ility3 and rate of fire of t)e flintlock %usket3 a (ea/on t)at see%ed to doo% &ot) s)ock action and any for%ation t)at could not %ake &est use of its fire/o(er. Soldiers )ad difficulty t)inking in ter%s of offensi+e troo/s3 ()ic) )ad t)e a&ility to fig)t in %arc)ing for%ation and t)e greater %o&ility to reac) an ene%ys rear. 0)is action re%ained t)e /rerogati+e of t)e ca+alry3 and t)e traditional li%itations on co%&at &et(een si%ilarly constituted ar%ies3 found long ago in *reek and Ro%an ti%es3 )ad endured so long t)at fe( soldiers could t)ink of anyt)ing &ut frontal &attles &y %utual consent. Prussian general3 for e-a%/le3 on finding )is ar%y accidentally facing t)e ene%ys flank3 la&oriously %arc)ed )is ar%y around to t)e ene%ys front so t)at )e could attack in t)e traditional (ay. 'rederick a//roac)ed t)e Doint /ro&le%s of &attlefield %o&ility3 .uick de/loy%ent3 and flank attacks t)roug) )is o&li.ue order of &attle3 ()ic) increased t)e s/eed of de/loy%ent as (ell as %ade /ossi&le concentration against t)e (eakness of a flank. But )e only e-/loited t)e /ossi&ilities in)erent in t)e e-isting syste%7 )e )ad created not)ing ne(. 0)e 'renc) ado/ted t)e colu%n # actually still a for%ation (it) greater &readt) t)an de/t). &attalion colu%n often for%ed itself t(el+e dee/ (it) at least four ti%es as %any files as ranks. 0)is colu%n ga+e t)e% a solid &lock of %en3 ()ic) )ad t)e sa%e &attlefield %o&ility as a S(iss s.uare. But t)e drill t)at ena&led t)e &attalion to de/loy .uickly into a t)ree#rank line %eant t)at t)e %o&ile colu%n could +ery nearly fig)t as it %arc)ed. 0)oug) 'renc) doctrine en+isioned not only an ad+ance in line &ut also a colu%n attack (it) /ri%ary reliance on s)ock action3 in /ractice tactics used colu%ns to %o+e troo/s on t)e &attlefield and to(ard t)e ene%y &ut usually de/loyed t)e% into lines for actual co%&at. 0)is syste% could i%/art to 'renc) foot soldiers %ore celerity t)an t)at of t)e infantry o//osing t)e% in a linear for%ation and t)e a&ility to fig)t al%ost as t)ey %arc)ed3 .ualities t)at )ad long %ade ca+alry offensi+e troo/s. 0o e-/loit t)ese attri&utes3 t)e infantry could eit)er concentrate great strengt) at one /oint on t)e &attlefield or attack t)e flank and rear of t)e ene%y infantry &y %o+ing (it) a s/eed i%/ossi&le for de/loyed lines3 since t)ey )ad no align%ent to conser+e and could %arc) around o&stacles &ecause t)ey )ad no continuous front to %aintain. !)en t)e colu%ns reac)ed t)e ene%ys +ulnera&le flank or rear3 t)ey could .uickly de/loy into a line3 an irregular one3 to &e sure3 &ut one in ()ic) t)e fire/o(er of t)ree ranks of flintlocks co+ered t)e ga/s

24<

&et(een &attalions. 'renc) organisation facilitated control of t)e troo/s conducting suc) tactical en+elo/ing or turning %o+e%ents &y co%&ining &attalions into regi%ents and regi%ents into &rigades. Su&di+ision of &attalions into nine co%/anies co%/leted t)e rat)er full articulation of t)e 'renc) infantry. I%/ro+e%ents in t)e %o&ility of artillery ena&led artillery%en to en+isage collecting artillery toget)er and focusing t)e fire of t)e guns in a (ay co%/ara&le to t)e ca/acity to use t)e %o&ility of colu%ns to gat)er infantry at one /oint t)e (ay Marl&oroug) )ad asse%&led )is ca+alry. 0)e 'renc) artillery%an3 t)e $)e+alier du 0eil3 (rote t)at Jit is necessary to %ulti/ly t)e artillery on t)e /oints of attack ()ic) oug)t to decide t)e +ictory.L Belie+ing in t)e concentration of t)e artillery to secure Jdecisi+e results3L du 0eil e-/ounded t)is conce/t ()en )e (rote t)at Jit is necessary to asse%&le t)e greatest nu%&er of troo/s3 and a great .uantity of artillery3 on t)e /oints ()ere one (is)es to force t)e ene%yL and assure t)at t)is is a (eak /oint &y distraction else()ere ()en Jone t)reatens attacks u/on t)e ot)ers. 5ne (ill i%/ose u/on )i% &y %o+e%ents and false attacks.L 0)e ne( tactics3 ()ic) /ro+ided t)e /otential for tactical en+elo/ing and turning %o+e%ents as (ell as for artillery# reinforced &attlefield concentrations3 )ar%onised co%/letely (it) t)e su&di+ision of 'renc) ar%ies into /er%anently constituted di+isions. In e%/loying t)is se/aration of forces3 t)e 'renc) could %arc) near t)e ene%y (it)out ado/ting a .uasi#&attle for%ation as t)e infantry )ad less to fear fro% t)e ca+alry no( t)at it )ad t)e &ayonet. closed#u/ &attalion %arc)ing on a road eig)t or t(el+e a&reast /resented a daunting target for ca+alry3 e+en if t)e infantry lacked t)e ti%e to for% a )ollo( s.uare. Marc)ing &y &attalions and %aking full use of t)e roads increased an ar%ys strategic %o&ility. Se/arated into di+isions and a&le to de/loy ra/idly fro% colu%ns into lines of &attle3 t)e infantry %ig)t &e a&le to %aintain its %a-i%u% %o&ility until it reac)ed t)e ene%y and t)en &e a&le to de/loy so ra/idly t)at3 in a strategic sense3 it could fig)t as it %arc)ed. 0)e result (as t)at infantry could )a+e a strategic offensi+e co%/etency si%ilar to3 t)oug) not as great as t)at al(ays enDoyed &y t)e ca+alry. n ar%y se/arated into di+isions )ad t)e /otential for forcing &attle on an ad+ersary. 5nce near an ene%y3 suc) an ar%y could %ake an o//onents retreat %ore )a6ardous. It )ad long /ro+en difficult to (it)dra( fro% an ene%y ()en &ot) ar%ies )ad for%ed for co%&at7 no( it (as )arder to %arc) a(ay fro% a foe t)at (is)ed to fig)t. 0)e se/aration of an ar%y into di+isions also /resented anot)er strategically offensi+e o//ortunity. 0)e )o%ogeneity and +ersatility of ca+alry3 a result of t)e de+elo/%ent of t)e /istol in t)e si-teent) century3 and t)e ne(er )o%ogeneity of t)e infantry3 %ade /ossi&le &y t)e &ayonet3 created an ar%y %uc) less co%/le-. Because infantry no( )ad su/eriority as a (ea/on syste%3 t)e ar%y no longer needed a Dust %i-ture of (ea/on syste%s and a careful interrelation of its /arts. 0)is situation3 ne( in t)e eig)teent) century3 %ade it easier to en+ision an ar%y co%/osed of se/arate3 self#contained3 interc)angea&le /arts. 0)e idea of su&di+iding an ar%y into di+isions re/resented a %aDor conce/tual &reakt)roug). n ar%y originally se/arated only to e%&ark on different ca%/aigns or redistri&ute detac)%ents to guard cities3 forts3 &ridges3 or ot)er strategic /oints. But t)e %et)od of di+ision t)roug) distri&uting detac)%ents (it) s/ecific %issions Gcalled t)e cordon syste%H (eakened t)e ar%y &ecause co%%anders usually did not concei+e of t)ese detac)%ents as still /art of t)eir ar%y. By su&di+iding an ar%y into di+isions and +ie(ing t)ese se/arate units as still /art of t)e ar%y3 as acting toget)er and as ca/a&le of .uickly reuniting3 'renc) soldiers introduced an idea and /ractice (it) %aDor i%/lications. 1i+isions se/arated &y as %uc) as a days %arc) could %o+e %ore ra/idly7 t)ey )ad access to %ore roads and could co+er a (ider territory for su//lies.

24=

n ar%y se/arated into di+isions t)at %arc)ed o+er a front of t(enty#fi+e %iles )ad a greater /otential for %aking contact (it) an o//onent. $ontact (it) t)e ene%y3 co%&ined (it) t)e strategically offensi+e attri&utes of %ore ra/id %o+e%ent ()en near t)e ene%y and t)e facility of .uick de/loy%ent into &attle array3 could easily in+ol+e t)e ene%y in an encounter &attle suc) as Marl&oroug) and Vendo%e )ad at 5udenarde. 5f course3 all encounter &attle3 in ()ic) only one of an ar%ys four di+isions engaged t)e entire ene%y force3 %ust al%ost in+aria&ly end disastrously for t)e di+ision. But t)e decline in t)e casualties of t)e defeated significantly %itigated t)e conse.uences of defeat. Better drilled and disci/lined troo/s suffered3 on t)e a+erage3 less t)an dou&le t)e /ercentage casualties of t)e +ictor. 0)e i%/ro+ed articulation of t)e 'renc) ar%y %itigated t)e disorganisation of and so di%inis)ed t)e casualties of defeat. Moreo+er3 t)e di+ision did not need to co%%it itself to a full#scale &attle. If it could fig)t a day (it)out )ea+y casualties or if it could engage t)e ene%y (it)out co%%itting all of its troo/s3 t)e result could delay an ad+ersary reluctant to fig)t ()ile t)e ot)er di+isions of t)e ar%y %arc)ed to its aid7 and t)ese di+isions could co%e fro% directions t)at %ig)t /ro+e a(k(ard for t)e concentrated ene%y ar%y facing a single di+ision. rri+ing on a flank3 for e-a%/le3 and de/loying ra/idly3 t)e di+isions uniting on t)e &attlefield could )a+e distinct ad+antages of /osition. 0)e resulting conflict could differ %arkedly fro% t)e traditional frontal &attle &y %utual consent. Suc) encounter &attles like 5udenarde )ad occurred in t)e /ast3 &ut t)ey )ad )ardly ty/ified co%&at and3 usually )a//ening &y accident3 )ad not figured %uc) in %ilitary t)inking e-ce/t for /recautions to a+oid t)e%. Se/aration of ar%ies into di+isions %ade encounter &attles %ore likely and %ade t)e% a /ossi&le o&Decti+e of strategy. Suc) contests could confer an ad+antage not only on t)e ar%y deli&erately /reci/itating t)e% &ut also on t)e ar%y /er%anently se/arated into di+isions. 'ig)ting (it) suc) di+isions (ould gi+e t)e co%%ander a /redo%inance &ecause t)e ar%y )ad organised in ad+ance for t)e i%/ro%/tu &attle t)roug) a /re#e-isting co%%and organisation and its resulting i%/ro+ed articulation. 'renc) ar%y3 arranged in di+isions and %arc)ing (it)out s/ecial /recautions3 could %o+e %ore ra/idly t)an a unitary ar%y and3 ()en it united its di+isions on t)e &attlefield3 could use its colu%n for%ation to go into &attle /ro%/tly. Prior to de/loying all colu%ns into line3 t)e 'renc) co%%ander could use t)eir %o&ility to concentrate at a /oint of ene%y (eakness or to outflank t)e foes line to attack it in t)e flank and rear (it) infantry. 0)us3 ()en co%/ared (it) o//onents using t)e %et)ods of t)e Se+en :ears !ar3 a 'renc) ar%ys infantry (ould )a+e3 on &ot) t)e strategic and tactical le+el3 t)e ca/a&ilities of offensi+e troo/s3 attri&utes t)at infantry )ad lacked since t)e &rief ascendancy of t)e S(iss. 'or suc) an ar%y co%&at &eca%e a realistic o&Decti+e of strategy. Pre+iously &attles )ad essentially de/ended on %utual consent3 t)e %ore an-ious contestant usually )a+ing to acce/t t)e disad+antage of t)e offensi+e against an ene%y in a (ell#selected and so%eti%es entrenc)ed /osition. 4nless an un(illing o//onent retreated directly to t)e rear3 a co%%ander of an ar%y dis/ersed into di+isions could count on t)e /ossi&ility of co%/elling t)e ene%y to fig)t and of doing so in an encounter &attle rat)er t)an &y engaging an o//onent defending a carefully selected /osition. !it) t)e %anoeu+ra&ility /ro+ided &y t)e (ell#articulated 'renc) ar%y3 (it) its e-cellent c)ain of co%%and fro% &attalion to ar%y co%%ander3 e+en contests in c)osen /ositions could differ &ecause t)e 'renc) ar%y could %ore readily concentrate its infantry on t)e &attlefield and %ore easily %anoeu+re to attack t)e flanks and rear of strong /ositions. 0)is c)ange could increase %o%entously t)e co%&at ele%ent in strategy3 ()ic) )ad long &een necessarily do%inated &y logistic goals. lt)oug) 'renc) %ilitary t)inkers did not analyse t)e strategic and tactical /ossi&ilities in ter%s of t)e notion of offensi+e troo/s3 so%e realised t)e /otential of t)e c)anges in t)e 'renc) ar%y. Bourcet sa( t)at t)e dis/ersal of an ar%y se/arated 24C

into di+isions auto%atically created an a%&iguity a&out t)e ar%ys o&Decti+e3 ()ic) distracted t)e ene%y as effecti+ely as a successful feint &y a concentrated ar%y. Bourcet ad+ocated t)at a generals /lan of ca%/aign s)ould )a+e se+eral alternati+es so t)at t)e co%%ander could take ad+antage of t)e distraction t)at dis/ersal /roduced to concentrate ()ere t)e ene%y left )i%self (eak. "e sa( t)e /ossi&ilities of turning t)e o//onents /osition and also &elie+ed in %arc)ing and counter%arc)ing to confuse t)e ene%y as a /re/aration for concentrating t)e ar%y against t)e ene%ys (eakest detac)%ent. Bourcet t)us ec)oed Ieno/)ons %a-i% t)at J(ise generals)i/ consists in attacking ()ere t)e ene%y is (eak3 e+en if t)e /oint &e so%e (ay distantL and ga+e full e%/)asis to t)e %eans of distracting t)e ene%y so as to lead )i% to create a (eakness to e-/loit &y an offensi+e concentration. "e e-/lained )o( a di+isional organisation created an o//ortunity for a strategy for (inning (it) t)e least effort. *ui&ert3 a /recocious young %an ()o )ad ser+ed (it) Mars)al Broglie and de+ised t)e %et)od of de/loying a colu%n into a line facing t)e direction of t)e %arc)3 e%&raced &ot) tactics and strategy in )is elo.uently e-/ressed +ision of t)e /ossi&ilities offered &y t)e kind of ar%y )e desired3 one ()ic)3 in /art due to )is efforts3 t)e 'renc) ar%y increasingly rese%&led as t)e century ended. "e en+isaged t)e co%%ander of a traditional ar%y in a strong /osition facing t)e kind of ar%y )e foresa(3 one Ja&le to %o+e itself3 to /ounce ra/idly on t)e (eak /art of a dis/osition3 to /ass in a %o%ent fro% t)e order of %arc) to t)e order of co%&at # and ready Jto attack t)e flank or rear of )is /osition.L 0)is ne( force (ould take a(ay fro% t)e co%%ander of t)e traditional ar%y Jt)e ad+antage of t)e ground on ()ic) )e )ad relied3 and )e (ill &e co%/elled to acce/t &attle ()ere )e can.L 0)e %o&ility of t)e ne( %odel ar%y s)ould &e suc) t)at JDust as t)e lig)tning )as already struck ()en one sees t)e flas)3 so ()en t)e ene%y sees t)e )ead of t)e ar%y a//ear3 t)e ()ole of it s)ould &e t)ere3 allo(ing )i% no ti%e to counteract t)e dis/ositions it takes.L *ui&erts %odel ar%y3 co%/osed of troo/s Jaccusto%ed to t)e e-ecution of grand %anoeu+res3 ()o )a+e %et)ods of ra/id de/loy%ent3L could de/loy and attack J&efore t)e ene%y )as )ad t)e ti%e to discern ()ere one (is)es to strike )i%3 or if )e )as discerned it3 &efore )e )as )ad t)e necessary ti%e to c)ange )is dis/osition in order to /arry it.L If3 )o(e+er3 Jarri+ed in sig)t of t)e ene%y3 and finding )i% not to &e in a disad+antageous situation3L t)e co%%ander of *ui&erts ar%y J%anoeu+res o//osite )i%3 )e seeks to decei+e )i%3 )e %akes use of all of t)e resources of t)e ground and of tactics in order to delude )i% concerning )is /roDect3 )e feints an offensi+e %o+e%ent on )is left in order to for% )is real attack on )is rig)tL until3 if J)e s(allo(s t)e &ait3 a&andons or occu/ies a /ost t)at lays )i%self o/en3 or else (eakens )i%self at a /oint3 eit)er in lea+ing too fe( troo/s t)ere or in lea+ing too fe( of t)e ar%y /ro/er for its defence t)ere3 or in lea+ing t)e /oorest troo/s of )is ar%y t)ere3 and t)en t)at fault is sei6ed u/on3 t)e a&le and %anoeu+ra&le general directs all )is efforts u/on t)e (eakened /art.L If t)e distractions fall and t)e Jene%y lays )i%self o/en3 )o(e+er3 neit)er &y )is /osition nor &y )is dis/osition3 t)en t)e general )as co%%itted not)ing7 )e (it)dra(s3 takes a /osition and a(aits a %ore fa+oura&le o//ortunity3L )a+ing a+oided a costly and unsuccessful offensi+e &attle.L So *ui&ert /rescri&ed co%&at %et)ods t)at relied on distraction to facilitate concentration against (eakness and t)at (ere an %ated &y t)e conce/t of (inning (it) t)e least effort. *ui&ert sa(3 as t)e strategic conse.uences of t)is action &y )is ne( ar%y3 t)at )is co%%ander J(ill e%&arrass )is ene%y3 (ill astonis) )i%3 (ill lea+e )i% no /lace to rest3 (ill force )i% to fig)t or retreat continuously &efore )i%.L In 1C@1 t)e 'renc) ar%y ado/ted ne( regulations destined to endure for forty years3 t)at e%&odied t)e tactical ideas of *ui&ert. So%e of t)e leaders of t)e ar%y )ad read t)e (orks of Bourcet and *ui&ert3 and if t)ey lacked t)eir +ision and co%/etence3 t)ey and t)eir ar%y at least )ad a gras/ of t)e ne( %et)ods and so%e of t)eir /ossi&ilities. nd t)e ra/id ad+ance in /o/ulation and (ealt) 24B

)ad %ulti/lied t)e nu%&er of roads3 facilitating t)e dis/ersion of an ar%y into di+isions &ecause adDacent roads led in t)e sa%e direction and lateral roads facilitated courier co%%unication a%ong t)e se/arately %arc)ing di+isions. d+ances in cartogra/)y and t)e greater a+aila&ility of %a/s ena&led co%%anders to /lan and coordinate t)e %o+e%ents of t)e different /arts of t)e dis/ersed ar%ies en+isioned &y *ui&ert. Back

Warfare in the Western Hemis'here

2uro/eans trans/lanted to t)e !estern "e%is/)ere t)eir (ea/ons and %ilitary %et)ods3 &ut t)e different geogra/)y %odified t)eir o/erations. In )ea+ily forested Nort) %erica3 for e-a%/le3 ca+alry could /lay only a s%all /art in co%&at. !it)out a serious t)reat fro% t)e ca+alry c)arge3 )ea+y infantry for%ations )ad little utility. So t)e /redo%inant infantry consisted first of ar.ue&usiers and %usketeers suited to t)e defence of fortifications as (ell as fig)ting in forests. !it) t)e introduction of t)e &ayonet3 lig)t infantry tactics still do%inated3 t)e rigidity of t)e linear syste% )a+ing little a//lica&ility in (ooded terrain and in t)e a&sence of )ea+y ca+alry. In Sout) and $entral %erica t)e 2uro/eans con.uered %ost of t)e nati+es (it) relati+e case3 in %aDor /art &ecause t)ey deci%ated t)e% (it) diseases of t)e 2astern "e%is/)ere to ()ic) t)e 2uro/eans )ad &eco%e largely inured. In t)inly settled Nort) %erica t)e nu%erous 2uro/ean i%%igrants gradually dro+e &ack t)e nati+es3 o+er()el%ing t)e% &y t)eir nu%&ers as t)ey saturated successi+e /ieces of territory (it) agricultural settle%ents. 0)e nu%erous ar%ed settlers /ro+ed a&le to co/e (it) t)e co%/arati+ely s%all nu%&ers of t)eir o//onents (it) little aid fro% regular %ilitary forces. In t)e %erican Re+olution &et(een 1CC< and 1CB? Nort) %erica (itnessed &attles like t)ose foug)t in 2uro/e. But t)e +ast e-/anse of t)e colonies %ade it i%/ossi&le for t)e s%all ar%ies of t)e Britis) to do%inate t)e country. !it) ar%ies little larger t)an t)ose used in t)e "undred :ears !ar (it) 'rance3 t)e Britis) )ad to co/e (it) at least as %uc) s/ace. In s/ite of a large nu%&er of sy%/at)isers a%ong t)e colonies3 %any of t)e% ar%ed3 t)e %ericans controlled t)e country3 and3 (ell organised /olitically and3 as %ilitia3 %ilitarily3 t)ey usually do%inated t)e country in t)e a&sence of su&stantial Britis) regular forces. Victories in &attles and ca%/aigns yielded to t)e Britis) no %ore t)an "anni&al )ad long &efore attained in )is in+asion of Italy. In fact3 t)e Britis) )ad an e+en %ore difficult task t)an "anni&al &ecause3 unlike t)e $art)aginian3 t)ey ai%ed at t)e /olitical su&Dugation of t)e ene%y. !it) suc) an a%&itious /olitical o&Decti+e3 t)ey lacked t)e %ilitary %eans to defeat suc) a deter%ined o//onent3 es/ecially ()en t)e %ericans )ad t)e aid of t(o for%ida&le %ilitary and na+al /o(ers3 'rance and S/ain. Back

Warfare at Sea
0)e eig)teent) century sa( a continuation of t)e trends in na+al (arfare esta&lis)ed in t)e se+enteent) century. S)i/s &eca%e increasingly standardised and classified &y t)e nu%&er of guns t)ey carried. S)i/s of t)e line )ad fro% se+enty to a )undred or %ore guns (it) t(o or t)ree decks for )ea+y guns. 'or e-a%/le3 t)e 1>>#gun3 t)ree#decked Britis) s)i/ Victory carried on its lo(est deck t)irty guns firing ?1#/ound &alls3 on its ne-t deck t(enty#eig)t guns firing 24#/ound &alls3 and on its u//er deck and t)e truncated fore and stern castles forty#t(o guns firing 12#/ound &alls. 0)e s%aller s)i/s of t)e line (eig)ed 23>>> tons3 t)e larger so%e()at %ore3 (it) a fe( (eig)ing as %uc) as ?3>>> tons. 'rigates )ad gro(n to dis/lace as %uc) as C>> tons and so%e e+en %ore. s (it) t)e %usket3 t)e flintlock )ad re/laced t)e &urning %atc) as t)e %eans of firing cannon3 and t)is c)ange e-e%/lified %any s%all i%/ro+e%ents in s)i/ and rigging design and t)e (orking t)e guns3 all of ()ic) %arked t)e gradual i%/ro+e%ent in na+ies during t)e century. 0actics re%ained t)at of co%&at &et(een lines of s)i/s on /arallel courses. 0)e attackers still soug)t t)e (ind(ard /osition. Britain and 'rance (ere t)e /re%ier na+al /o(ers3 and contests 24@

&et(een t)e% esta&lis)ed t)e nor%s of na+al (arfare. Indecisi+eness c)aracterised t)e na+al &attles in ()ic) t)e 'renc) usually )ad t)e s%aller fleet. Realistic a&out t)eir inferiority in &attle3 t)e 'renc) did not try to destroy t)e Britis) fleet. 0)e 'renc) foug)t to /rotect a con+oy or to allo( an o+erseas e-/edition to %ake good its de/arture. $onse.uently3 t)ey follo(ed a conser+ati+e tactical doctrine3 al(ays c)oosing t)e do(n(ind /osition to facilitate (it)dra(al fro% &attle. 5ften t)ey s)ot at t)e rigging of t)e Britis) s)i/s3 ai%ing to da%age t)eir sailing a&ility rat)er t)an killing %en3 disa&ling guns3 or i%/airing &uoyancy. 0)is tactic )el/ed insure t)eir retreat and could e+en force t)e Britis) s)i/s &ack to /ort to re/air rigging. If t)is )a//ened3 t)e 'renc) fleet could e-/loit a &rief /eriod of co%%and of t)e sea. 0o(ard t)e end of t)e century3 at t)e Battle of t)e Saints in 1CB23 t)e Britis) d%iral Sir *eorge Rodney %ade a significant tactical inno+ation. Rodney3 ()o )ad fifty years of ser+ice and a%/le co%%and e-/erience3 faced in t)e $o%te de *rasse an o//onent of e.ual e-/erience and a&ility ()o )ad larger s)i/s (it) &etter sailing .ualities. s Rodneys t)irty#si- s)i/s /assed t)e 'renc) fleet of t)irty#one on t)e o//osite course3 Rodney took ad+antage of so%e ga/s in t)e 'renc) line. 0)e ad%iral and t)e leader of )is rear turned into t(o different ga/s in t)e 'renc) line3 t)us di+iding t)e ene%y fleet into t)ree se/arate seg%ents. 0)e rear%ost of t)e t)ree seg%ents co%/rised only t(el+e s)i/s3 against ()ic) t)e centre and rear of t)e Britis) line turned and to(ard ()ic) t)e )ead of t)e Britis) line turned round to attack. 0)is concentration of force against t)e rear of t)e 'renc) line resulted in )ea+y da%age to %any 'renc) s)i/s and t)eir (it)dra(al. 0)e Britis) ca/tured fi+e 'renc) s)i/s3 including t)e flags)i/ on ()ic) t)ey found t)e d%iral de *rasse and 4>> dead. 0)is &attle e-)i&ited t)e /otential for concentration of su/erior force offered &y t)e tactic of &reaking t)e ene%ys line. 0)e strategy for t)e e-ercise of sea /o(er re%ained t)e sa%e3 t)e Britis) follo(ing a /ersisting one in seeking to close 'renc) /orts to trade and t)e 'renc) raiders /reying on Britis) co%%erce. In t)e !ar of t)e ustrian Succession fro% 1C4> to 1C4B eac) lost ?3?>> %erc)ant s)i/s. But t)e 'renc) suffered greater da%age &ecause t)e Britis) cri//led 'renc) o+erseas co%%erce (it) &lockades and sei6ures. In t)e Se+en :ears !ar t)e Britis) instituted suc) a close &lockade of 'renc) /orts t)at t)ey al%ost co%/letely /aralysed 'renc) co%%erce. In t)is (ar co%%and of t)e sea ena&led t)e Britis) to send out and su//ly o+erseas e-/editions and to score significant gains3 /articularly in dri+ing t)e 'renc) fro% $anada and India. Britains strangle)old on 'renc) co%%erce and its de&ilitating effect on t)e 'renc) econo%y indirectly aided )er continental ally3 Prussia3 ()ic) %aintained an ar%y o//osing t)e 'renc) in *er%any3 as did )er direct financial su//ort3 &ased in /art on t)e /ros/erity engendered &y )er co%%erce. Back

TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC TRANSFORMATION IN THE ERA OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND NA%OLEON, !$'! !(!)
(he (actics and Strategy of the 0'ening Cam'aigns in the North
In 1CB@ t)e calling of t)e long#unused legislature of t)e 'renc) %onarc)y /ro+ided t)e %eans &y ()ic) a re+olution first li%ited t)e /o(er of 9ing ,ouis IVI and t)en e+entually de/osed and e-ecuted )i%. Successi+e elected asse%&lies /ro+ided t)e e-ecuti+e as (ell as t)e legislati+e leaders)i/ of a re+olutionary go+ern%ent and ga+e reality to t)e ideals of /olitical li&erty and e.uality. 0)is radical alteration in t)e traditional3 no&le#do%inated 'renc) society not only aroused t)e )ostility of %onarc)ical 2uro/e &ut also se/arated 'rance fro% its 2uro/ean neig)&ours ()en t)e re+olutionary go+ern%ent announced its intention of s/reading its /olitical gos/el o+er 2uro/e. !)en (ar ca%e3 &ot) sides )ad far %ore a%&itious and t)reatening ai%s t)an )ad ani%ated 2uro/ean (arfare for a long ti%e. But t)oug) 'rance and its ene%ies ostensi&ly ai%ed at t)e

2<>

o+ert)ro( of ()at eac) sa( as a )ostile regi%e3 con+entional /olitical o&Decti+es and %ore li%ited goals /layed an increasing role in guiding t)e course of %ilitary o/erations. 0)e re+olution seriously affected t)e 'renc) ar%y in ()ic) )ostility to t)e /ri+ileges of t)e no&ility )ad di+ided officers and %en. Political agitation3 e-tensi+e desertion3 and t)e ulti%ate de/arture of t(o#t)irds of t)e officers )ad reduced t)e si6e and effecti+eness of t)e ar%y as (ar (it) t)e 2%/eror and Prussia see%ed likely. 0)e go+ern%ent asked for +olunteers in t)e fall of 1C@1 and t)e 11>3>>>#%an ar%y (as aug%ented &y one#t)ird. 0)e +olunteers )ad se/arate units3 (ore &lue rat)er t)an t)e 9ings ()ite unifor%s3 and elected t)eir o(n officers. 0)ey also &egan training (it) t)e ne( 1C@1 regulations3 and (it) t)is force 'rance (ent to (ar in 1C@1 against t)e for%ida&le ar%ies of ustria and Prussia. $oncerned a&out conditions in 2astern 2uro/e3 ustria and Prussia did not co%%it all of t)eir troo/s in a ca%/aign t)at 'renc) e-iles assured t)e% (ould recei+e t)e (elco%e of /o/ular su//ort for 9ing ,ouis IVI and t)e foreign soldiers inter+ening to restore )is /o(er. 0)e allies fielded ar%ies along t)e R)ine and in t)e Net)erlands3 ()ere t)e 'renc) conducted an offensi+e ca%/aign (it) forces consisting of +olunteers and disorganised regulars. 0)ese soldiers fled ()en t)ey faced disci/lined ustrian /rofessionals and3 &la%ing t)eir officers3 e+en s)ot one general for treason. 0)e ustrians t)en took t)e offensi+e3 &esieging ,ille and %o+ing sout) to unite (it) t)e ustro#Prussian ar%y of t)e 1uke of Bruns(ick3 ()ic) %o+ed steadily a)ead3 took t)e 'renc) fortress of ,ong(y in late ugust3 and in early Se/te%&er Doined t)e ustrian force fro% t)e Net)erlands t)at )ad taken Verdun. 0)e 1uke3 a relati+e of 'rederick t)e *reat and &rot)er#in#la( of 9ing *eorge III of 2ngland3 )ad dis/layed a&ility in res/onsi&le co%%ands in t)e Se+en :ears !ar. In co%%anding )is ar%y )e e-)i&ited t)e sa%e co%/etence and care t)at )e s)o(ed in ruling )is duc)y. 5n entering 'rance3 Bruns(icks ar%y encountered no (elco%e fro% t)e 'renc) /o/ulation and suffered fro% dysentery and t)e )ea+y rains. 4nder t)ese conditions a long %arc) to Paris3 dee/ in t)e )eart of a )ostile country3 (ould )a+e &een unrealistic3 e+en if t)e ca/a&le 'renc) /olitician# soldier *eneral 1u%ourie6 )ad not %arc)ed fro% t)e Net)erlands to o//ose t)e% and unite )is ar%y (it) t)at fro% Met6 under *eneral 9eller%an3 a seasoned regular officer and /ro/onent of t)e re+olution. 1u%ourie6 )ad already succeeded in i%/arting so%e training and disci/line to )is +olunteers3 and 9eller%ans force )ad a )ig)er /ro/ortion of regulars. !it) t)is co%&ined ar%y 1u%ourie63 taking u/ a /osition at Val%y on t)e flank of Bruns(icks route to Paris3 offered &attle. 4n(illing to ignore e+en an ar%y /resu%a&ly rendered ineffecti+e &y re+olutionary conditions3 Bruns(ick %o+ed to confront 1u%ourie6 and 9eller%an. 0)e &attle &egan (it) an ustro#Prussian cannonade3 &ut ()en t)e 'renc) infantry re%ained steady and t)eir artillery3 ()ic) &ad lost only a t)ird of its (ell#trained regular officers3 /ro+ed e.ual to t)e &est /erfor%ance of t)e traditionally e-cellent 'renc) artillery3 t)e 1uke did not carry out an infantry attack against t)e a//arently fir% 'renc) troo/s. fter t)e t(o ar%ies faced eac) ot)er for ten days3 t)e allied forces (it)dre( to(ard t)e R)ine3 ending ()ate+er %enace <>3>>> Soldiers /resented to a country of 2< %illion /eo/le. In t)e a&sence of su&stantial and o+ert /olitical su//ort &y /artisans of t)e 9ing3 t)ese troo/s could not )a+e re/resented a serious t)reat3 /articularly in +ie( of t)e /olitical and %ilitary +igour of t)e re+olutionary go+ern%ent. ,ea+ing 9eller%an to (atc) Bruns(icks (it)dra(al3 1u%ourie6 %o+ed )is ar%y &ack to t)e Net)erlands t)eatre ()ere in early No+e%&er3 in si- di+isions %arc)ing o+er t(o se/arate routes3 )e sur/rised t)e ustrians in t)eir (ell#fortified (inter .uarters and3 (it) a nu%erical /re/onderance of at least t(o to one3 defeated t)e% at t)e Battle of 8e%a//es3 dro+e t)e% &ack3 and ca/tured Brussels. 0)e 'renc) soldiers e-)i&ited good %orale and steadiness under fire and

2<1

s)o(ed t)at t)ey like t)eir general )ad learnt to use t)e si%/le3 effecti+e drill of t)e ne( 1C@1 regulations. t 8e%a//es %ost troo/s )ad %o+ed u/ in colu%ns3 de/loyed into line3 and conducted t)eir attack in linear fas)ion7 ot)ers also follo(ed t)e %anual ()en t)ey used colu%ns of attack in a successful assault on a +illage. !it) t)e out&reak of (ar t)e 'renc) go+ern%ent resorted to co%/ulsion to strengt)en t)e ar%y3 again for%ing se/arate units in &lue unifor%s under elected officers. 0)e %en of t)e ne( units tended to select e-/erienced soldiers for t)eir leaders and dis/layed enoug) Dudg%ent to elect nine future %ars)als of 'rance. But ()en one for%er sergeant &eca%e an officer3 )e learned t)at t)e s/irit of t)e ar%y %ilitated against disci/line as )e tried to drill )is &attalion. "is %en denounced t)eir ne( drill %asters des/otic )ostility to li&erty and e.uality and tried to )ang )i%. Ne+ert)eless3 t)e ent)usias% of t)e +olunteers and conscri/ts for t)eir nation and its re+olutionary ideas %ade t)e %en (illing learners and /ro+ided t)e foundation for a %ore de%ocratic disci/line under non#aristocratic officers of t)e sa%e social &ackground as t)eir %en. 0)ree %ont)s of training ena&led infantry%en to Doin a &attalion and e-ecute t)e ne( drill ade.uately. 0o su//ly disci/line and to (atc) t)e senior officers3 t)e go+ern%ent sent to eac) ar%y3 ci+ilian /olitical re/resentati+es called de/uties on %ission. 0)ese de/uties )ad considera&le success in i%&uing t)e soldiers (it) re+olutionary and /atriotic feeling as (ell as (atc)ing and occasionally directing t)e ar%y co%%anders ()o% t)ey )ad t)e /o(er of relie+ing. But 6ealous soldiers (it)out disci/line and training did not /ro+ide t)e &est %aterial (it) ()ic) to realise t)e %ilitary /otential of t)e ne( tactical regulations and t)e ideas of Bourcet and *ui&ert. 0)e go+ern%ent3 faced (it) re&ellion (it)in 'rance and (ar (it) Britain3 "olland3 and S/ain as (ell as ustria and Prussia3 lacked ade.uate %ilitary resources e+en t)oug) it )ad drafted )undreds of t)ousands of %en in 1C@?. Since %any of t)ese ne( troo/s )ad little %ilitary +alue3 t)e 'renc) (ere fortunate t)at t)e a(eso%e coalition against t)e%3 still /reoccu/ied (it) ot)er /olitical .uestions3 did not e-ert its full %ilitary force or /ursue its ca%/aigns (it) %uc) +igour. In 'e&ruary3 ()en 1u%ourie6 tried to in+ade "olland3 t)e I%/erial co%%ander3 t)e ort)odoPrince 8osias of Sa-e $o&urg3 ()o )ad t)e aid of a good3 e+en inno+ati+e3 staff3 ad+anced &riskly against )i%. !it) 4<3>>> %en 1u%ourie6 i%%ediately took t)e offensi+e3 %eeting t)e 4>3>>> %en of t)e allies on Marc) 1Bt) 1C@?3 at Neer(inden. But $o&urg )ad s/read )is ar%y enoug) to co+er )is flanks against 1u%ourie6s eig)t3 (idely s/aced attacking forces3 and (it) skilful su&ordinates in $lerfayt3 ()o )ad distinguis)ed )i%self as a su&ordinate in t)e Se+en :ears !ar3 and t)e young rc)duke $)arles3 t)e ustrian co%%ander resisted t)e 'renc) assaults. !it) t)e rc)dukes +igorous counterattack3 $o&urg finally dro+e 1u%ourie6s %en fro% t)e field. 0)e defeat3 toget)er (it) t)e su&se.uent retreat3 so de%oralised t)e 'renc) t)at )alf of t)e ar%y soon deserted. 1u%ourie63 after failing to /ersuade )is %en to %arc) on to Paris and restore t)e %onarc)y3 (ent o+er to t)e allies. nd $o&urg3 /ursuing a /ersisting strategy of ca/turing i%/ortant /laces to kee/ or to use for di/lo%atic &argaining3 /ro%/tly reoccu/ied t)e Net)erlands and &egan t)e siege of t)e 'renc) to(n of $ond;. ne( 'renc) co%%ander rallied t)e ar%y &ut lost )is life in a &attle to relie+e $ond;. 0)e ne-t t(o co%%anders ()o also failed to relie+e $ond; (ere e-ecuted for treason. //re)ensi+e &ecause of re&ellions (it)in a country &eset on e+ery side3 t)e re/u&lican leaders in Paris and t)e de/uties on %ission (it) t)e ar%ies could not understand ()y t)eir large &ut ill#trained forces could not %ake )ead(ay against t)e s%aller3 ade.uately co%%anded3 /rofessional forces of t)e allies. !)en t)e siege and fall of t)e city of Valenciennes follo(ed t)e surrender of $ond;3 t)e Britis) contingent &egan t)e siege of 1unkirk3 a &ase for 'renc) co%%erce raiders. 0)e ne( 'renc) co%%ander3 "ouc)ard3 an ine/t3 old ca+alry officer guided &y an a&le staff3 asse%&led a )uge force and directed it in a &u%&ling attack at "ondsc)oote against t)e ustrian ar%y co+ering t)e siege of 2<2

,ille. 0)e troo/s sent to turn t)e ene%y &eca%e lost3 and "ouc)ard3 (aiting in rain (it) )is %en under artillery fire3 considered retreat ()en )is (ell#disci/lined ene%y ad+anced3 firing +olleys as t)ey ca%e. 1el&rel3 t)e de/uty on %ission3 /ersuaded "ouc)ard not to retreat and3 ()en "ouc)ard (ent to get t)e rig)t (ing to attack3 actually assu%ed co%%and ()en )e ordered t)e co%%ander in t)e centre3 t)e young general 8ourdan3 to %o+e against t)e ene%y. "a+ing ordered t)e assault3 1el&rel t)en returned t)e co%%and to 8ourdan and ser+ed )i% as an aide ()ile 8ourdan carried out t)e attack. 1el&rel and anot)er de/uty3 (earing red3 ()ite3 and &lue sas)es and /lu%es in t)eir )ats3 )el/ed lead t)e c)arge3 a conte%/orary &elie+ing t)at Jt)e &rilliant courage of t)ese 1e/uties3 t)e sig)t of t)e /lu%es and tri#coloured scar+es ()ic) floated fro% t)eir )ats3 /roduced3 as al(ays3 an electrical effectL on t)e %en. 8ourdans successful assault contri&uted significantly to t)e +ictory at "ondsc)oote. "ouc)ard and )is 4>3>>> 'renc)%en3 )a+ing /ressed &ack less t)an )alf t)eir nu%&ers and o/ened co%%unications (it) 1unkirk3 t)en %arc)ed to t)e east and attacked and dro+e &ack an allied force at Menin. But ()en )e /us)ed on3 )e %et defeat at t)e )ands of allied forces concentrated against )i% and (it)dre(. Mean()ile3 fart)er east3 $o&urg )ad taken still anot)er city and )ad &egan t)e siege of Mau&euge. 0)e go+ern%ent /ro%/tly &roug)t "ouc)ard to Paris3 tried3 t)en guillotined )i%. 1ou&tless (it) tre/idation3 t)e a&le young 8ourdan acce/ted t)e co%%and of t)e ar%y and continued t)e strategy originated under "ouc)ard. 0)is consisted of e-/loiting t)e allied dis/ersal along a front of al%ost 1>> %iles. In Se/te%&er "ouc)ard )ad attacked &ot) t)e 1unkirk co+ering force and t)at at Menin7 in 5cto&er 8ourdan led 1>>3>>> %en to t)e relief of Mau&euge3 $o&urgs last siege of t)e year. In a t(o#day &attle at !attignies3 8ourdans t(o#to#one nu%erical /re/onderance o+er )is un#reinforced o//onent ena&led )i% to dri+e &ack $o&urgs force and raise t)e siege. 0o so%e degree t)e /atriotis% and re+olutionary 6eal of %any of t)e solders )ad su&stituted for disci/line and drill ()en large nu%&ers foug)t effecti+ely as skir%is)ers. 8ourdan3 )olding &ack %en in colu%ns out of range until t)e skir%is)ers )ad unsettled t)e ene%y3 t)en %o+ed in (it) )is for%ed troo/s (it) a rus). Success in relie+ing Mau&euge /er%itted t)e go+ern%ent to send troo/s sout)#east(ard to t)e R)ine3 ()ere t)ey )el/ed /us) &ack allied forces in No+e%&er and 1ece%&er. In 1C@?3 t)oug) t)ey )ad lost t)e Net)erlands and so%e i%/ortant frontier to(ns3 t)e 'renc) )ad sur+i+ed3 and t)eir success in t)e field ga+e t)eir ne( ar%y so%e confidence as (ell as e-/erience. lt)oug) t)eir +ictories )ad inflicted only %inor losses on t)eir o//onents and )ad cost t)e% %ore casualties t)an t)e allies3 t)ey )ad sa+ed 1unkirk and Mau&euge. 0)e ca%/aign e-)i&ited t)e strategic %erits of concentrations against successi+e /oints against o//onents lacking ade.uate unity of co%%and and t)e /oint of +ie( to a//ly t)e sa%e %et)ods on t)e offensi+e or to use t)e% to res/ond ade.uately (it) defensi+e concentrations. lt)oug) t)e essentially frontal &attles did little %ore t)an /ress &ack )ostile forces3 t)e o/erations s)o(ed t)e strategic /otential of dis/ersed ar%ies in t)e )ands of young generals ()o3 sti%ulated &y t)e de/uties on %ission3 and t)e s)ado( of t)e guillotine3 took t)e risk of &attle. long t)e R)ine and ot)er frontiers t)e allies )ad so%e success3 &ut t)e re+olutionary ar%ies gained e-/erience and3 in /art &y t)e e-ecution of se+enteen generals in 1C@?3 found co%/etent officers for t)e )ig)er co%%ands. 0alent and luck )astened generals to t)e to/3 8ourdan3 for e-a%/le3 rising fro% lieutenant to ar%y co%%ander in t)e first four years of t)e re+olution. But t)e ne-t year3 ()en t)e go+ern%ent e-ecuted si-ty#se+en generals3 it found officers declining /ro%otion3 and e+en /ri+ates3 ()o )ad a +ery dangerous /lace in t)e line of &attle3 said t)at t)ey (ould not &eco%e generals. 0)e 'renc) )ad used t)e conscri/ts of 1C@? to &ring u/ to strengt) t)e &attalions of old regulars and t)ose of t)e +olunteers of 1C@1 and 1C@2. "a+ing increased t)e old units and used t)e +eterans to

2<?

instruct and season t)e ne( %en3 for t)e 1C@4 ca%/aign t)e 'renc) a%alga%ated t)eir different +olunteer and conscri/t units and t)en co%&ined t(o &attalions of t)ese (it) one &attalion of old regulars into a unit called a de%i#&rigade. 0)ey furt)er &lended t)e old and t)e ne( &y %o+ing around t)e constituent co%/anies until t)ey )ad created t)ree ne(3 t)oroug)ly integrated &attalions. &rigade consisted of t(o de%i#&rigades and a di+ision of t(o or %ore &rigades. 0)is organisation distri&uted t)e +eterans t)roug)out t)e ar%ies3 and /ro+ided t)e% (it) e-cellent articulation fro% t)e &attalion le+el u/(ard. Pri%arily infantry units3 di+isions ne+ert)eless )ad t)eir o(n artillery and ca+alry. lt)oug) still no %atc) for t)eir o//onents3 t)e 'renc) ar%ies in 1C@4 sur/assed t)ose t)at )ad %anaged to defend t)e re+olution in 1C@?. 0)e 'renc) re+olutionary soldiers )ad %any sources of %orale and %oti+ation to )el/ su&stitute for disci/line and training. 0)e conditions of ser+ice reinforced t)e soldiers &elief and (illingness to fig)t for t)e /rinci/les of li&erty for ()ic) t)e re+olution stood. !it) t)e disa//earance of aristocratic officers3 t)e %en )ad far less distance fro% and %ore attac)%ent to t)eir officers ()o tended to treat t)eir %en (it) t)e consideration due to citi6ens of t)e re/u&lic. 0)e soldiers /atriotis%3 self#res/ect3 and allegiance to an ideal3 ()ic) t)ey sa( (orking in /ractice in t)e ar%y3 also %oti+ated t)e%. 0)e organisation of t)e soldiers also contri&uted to t)eir %orale. Many +olunteers and conscri/ts3 for e-a%/le3 ca%e fro% t)e sa%e locality3 ()ic)3 as a soldiers /etition /ut it3 %eant t)at Jciti6ens ()o fig)t alongside t)eir friends and relati+esL (ould dis/lay J%ore 6eal.L !)en t)e ar%y &roke u/ )is s%all unit3 anot)er soldier alluded to t)e sa%e source of %oti+ation ()en )e said3 Jlittle satisfied to ser+e (it) %en ()o% t)ey )ad ne+er seen &efore3 %any co%rades (ent &ack to Paris3 and se+eral returned to our de/art%ent.L 0)e organisation of t)e ar%y into s%all grou/s t)at often li+ed and ate toget)er3 ()ic) t)e i%/ro+ed su&di+ision and articulation tended to foster3 /ro+ided for &etter coo/eration a%ong indi+iduals and sustained eac) soldiers %oti+ation and /erfor%ance. Suc) an ar%y &ore defeat in &attle far &etter t)an %any earlier ones3 ()ic) disintegrated into an aggregation of indi+iduals ()o lacked &ot) t)e %anoeu+ra&ility of t)e &etter articulated force and t)e co)esion su//lied &y suc) grou/s. 0)us t)e ne(ly for%ed ar%ies )ad %any sources of %orale and %oti+ation3 so%e c)aracteristic of long#esta&lis)ed /rofessional units and ot)ers at least so%e()at uni.ue to t)e 'renc) ar%ies. 0)e si%/licity of t)e ne( regulations and t)e reduced de/endence on t)e e-act drill necessary to %ake a long ad+ance in /recise linear for%ation also aided in t)e .uick con+ersion of citi6ens into effecti+e soldiers. 0)ree %ont)s of training sufficed to /ro+ide ade.uate %anoeu+ring skill and to su//ly t)e &asis u/on ()ic)3 co%&ined (it) dedication3 soldiers could gi+e a good co%&at /erfor%ance (it) t)eir ne( tactics. In strategy G&y s/reading t)eir forces out in di+isions t)at )ad a facility for and (illingness to attackH t)e ine-/erienced generals of t)e ar%ies of re+olutionary 'rance )ad already &egun to i%/ose ne( %et)ods on t)eir o//onents. 1istri&uted in a cordon to co+er sieges or secure territory3 t)e allied ar%ies lacked t)e conce/tual unity of one ar%y scattered in di+isions3 a unity t)at t)e 'renc) generals as yet only di%ly /ercei+ed and still e-/loited ine/tly. Ne+ert)eless3 t)e re+olutionary generals )ad in 1C@? concentrated significantly greater nu%&ers successi+ely against t)eir scattered o//onents and3 t)roug) t)is strategy3 )ad contri&uted to kee/ing t)eir ene%ies at &ay. In May 1C@4 t)e ad+ance east(ard of t)e nort)ern%ost 'renc) ar%y in t)e Net)erlands /reci/itated a conflict t)at e-)i&ited t)e c)anges taking /lace in (arfare. !)en t)e 'renc) ar%y reac)ed ,ille and $ourtrai3 it found itself &et(een $o&urg at 0ournai and $lerfayt nort) of t)e ,ys Ri+er. Sou)a%3 t)e young 'renc) te%/orary co%%ander ()o )ad enlisted as a /ri+ate in t)e Royal r%y3

2<4

i%%ediately /lanned to use )is interior lines to )old $o&urg and concentrate against $lerfayt. But $o&urg7 )ad forestalled t)is3 ado/ting t)e i%aginati+e /lan of $olonel Mack3 a staff officer3 to %ake a si%ultaneous con+erging attack against Sou)a%. 0)e /lan called for t)e %ain ar%y to %o+e nort)(est fro% 0ournai in t)ree grou/s3 on a si-#%ile front7 t(o %ore detac)%ents (ould ad+ance fro% t)e sout) and3 after defeating t)e 'renc) troo/s near ,ille3 for% a link &et(een t)e %ain ar%y and $lerfayt3 ()o (ould %ake )is attack &y crossing t)e ,ys at !er(ick. If $o&urgs %en )ad %o+ed ra/idly enoug) and Sou)a% )ad failed to act3 t)e allied forces (ould )a+e en+elo/ed t)e 'renc)3 enclosing B>3>>> 'renc) (it)in %utually su//orting attacks &y C>3>>> allied soldiers. But Sou)a%3 gras/ing )is ene%ys /ur/ose3 /ro%/tly c)anged )is /lan and concentrated against $o&urg. 5n May 1Ct) t)e t)ree %ain allied colu%ns %et Sou)a%s %en3 and t(o of t)e% succeeded in dri+ing &ack t)e 'renc)7 &ut $lerfayt3 %eeting o//osition3 could not cross t)e ,ys until )is /ontoons arri+ed. Mean()ile3 t)e ot)er t(o forces fart)er sout) %o+ed slo(ly # t)e sout)ern%ost colu%n3 under rc)duke $)arles3 late starting and %o+ing across country in t)e traditional defensi+e for%ation3 )ad not e+en a//roac)ed ,ille. 0)e coordinated allied attack )ad failed to reac) its first#day o&Decti+es. 5n May 1Bt) Sou)a% concentrated against t)e t(o %ain detac)%ents3 ()ic) )ad ad+anced t)e fart)est3 ()ile a su&ordinate ke/t $lerfayt out of t)e action &y attacking )is flank as )e %o+ed for(ard7 $o&urgs t(o sout)ern detac)%ents da(dled3 t)e rc)duke failing to res/ond to an urgent call fro% $o&urg &ecause )is staff declined to distur& )is slee/ ()en t)e %essage arri+ed. !it) a t(o#to#one nu%erical su/eriority at t)is /oint3 t)e 'renc) assailed t)eir nearest ad+ersaries on front and flank at 0ourcoing and dro+e &ack t)e t(o allied nort)ern colu%ns al%ost to t)e Sc)eldt. 0)e 'renc) foug)t (ell3 an o//onent descri&ing t)eir skir%is)ers as Js)ar/#sig)ted as ferrets3 and as acti+e as s.uirrels.L nd t)e %en )ad %astered t)e ne( de/loy%ent3 one soldier testifying t)at ()en )is colu%n ca%e under fire3 J(e %arc)ed at t)e c)arge /ace3 or rat)er (e ran3 to /ut oursel+es into line.L 0)e 'renc) )ad cons/icuous success3 not only re/elling t)eir o//onent &ut also ca/turing fifty#siartillery /ieces in line on a road as t)e ene%y retreated. !)en 'renc) infantry o+ertook allied ca+alry3 its (it)dra(al &locked &y t)e guns on t)e road3 t)e infantry +olleys s)ot do(n t)e ca+alry3 and t)e ad+ancing 'renc) e+en &roug)t t)eir o(n artillery into action. Not only did t)ey s)oot t)e ca+alry &ut also t)e ci+ilians follo(ing t)e ar%y3 a Britis) soldier re/orting t)at )e Jsa( a soldiers (ife take a &a&y fro% )er &reast and3 gi+ing it a kiss3 fling it into t)e strea% or ditc)3 ()en s)e frantically rus)ed for(ards and &efore s)e )ad got ten yards3 (as rent in /ieces &y a disc)arge of gra/e t)at entered )er &ack3 sounding like a sack of coals &eing e%/tied.L But t)e attackers suffered3 too3 finding t)e ene%y artillery /o(erful on t)e defensi+e. 0)e soldier ()o )ad de/loyed on t)e run )ad a /lace in t)e second rank &e)ind a soldier na%ed ,e Blond ()en a s%all canister &all3 )e said3 Jstruck t)e unfortunate ,e Blond ()o co+ered %e in t)e first rank. I sa( )i% cross )ands3 fall to )is knees3 and t)en roll on )is &elly3 (it) a total e-/ression of /ain. I dee/ly (anted to )el/ )i%3 &ut sei6ed &y fear... I dre( &ack Dust like %y co%/any3 ()ic) &roke to find co+er fro% t)e &attery.

)o-urg"s Attem ted En%elo ment Back

2<<

Success in dri+ing &ack $o&urgs nort)ern colu%ns and t)e tardiness of t)e sout)ern forces ena&led Sou)a% to concentrate against $lerfayt on May 1@t)3 only to find t)at $lerfayt )ad antici/ated )is co%ing &y falling &ack (ell &e)ind t)e ,ys. By )is energy and +igorous e-/loitation of )is central /osition3 Sou)a% )ad sa+ed )is ar%y fro% a (ell concei+ed and %enacing en+elo/%ent. But t)e dis/osition of t)e forces3 t)e 'renc) &et(een )ostile concentrations a do6en %iles a/art3 /resented a situation on t)e &order &et(een en+elo/%ent and interior lines. "ad t)e allies less distance &et(een t)e%3 t)ey could readily )a+e en+elo/ed and seriously )urt t)e 'renc)7 if %ore distance )ad se/arated t)e%3 t)e 'renc) could )a+e easily e-/loited t)eir interior /osition. But Sou)a%s energy and t)e allied difficulty of coordinating so%eti%es sluggis)ly %o+ing forces on an outer ring rendered t)e circu%stances one of interior lines and ga+e +ictory to t)e 'renc). In a//lying t)e ne( tactical regulations3 ()ic) en+isioned %anoeu+res in colu%n and .uick de/loy%ent into line for co%&at (it) %usketry3 t)e 'renc) dis/layed eclecticis% and 2<=

i%/ro+isation. 0)ey used colu%ns for attack as (ell as for %anoeu+re3 finding o//ortunities ()en a colu%n could o+er()el% an unready ene%y3 e+en using co%&at (it) t)e &ayonet against t)e o//osing infantry. colu%n could effecti+ely /enetrate a ga/ in t)e )ostile line as (ell as ad+ance against an o//osing line not ready to recei+e it (it) t)e orderly series of +olleys3 ()ic) could usually )alt t)e assault of a colu%n. 0)e 'renc) also %ade %uc) use of skir%is)ing &y lig)t infantry and &y line infantry de/loyed a)ead to use co+er and conceal%ent to kee/ u/ a fire at t)e ad+ersarys line. 0)is skir%is)ing could create an o//ortunity for a colu%n attack3 unsteady an o//onent &efore a 'renc) line ad+anced3 or di%inis) t)e +igour of an ene%ys o(n attack.

Souham A(ts on 'nterior &ines Back

0)e 'renc) skir%is)ers3 dis/ersed for %issile co%&at like t)e slingers3 arc)ers3 and Da+elin %en of old3 could inDure t)eir ad+ersaries3 e+en t)oug) &ot) sides )ad t)e sa%e (ea/ons. 0)e 'renc) skir%is)ers could do t)is &ecause t)e ene%y infantry )ad a line for%ation &ot) to use t)eir &ayonets in s)ock action and to de+elo/ t)e full fire/o(er /otential of t)eir %uskets. 0aking ad+antage of ditc)es3 ground co+er3 &uildings3 trees3 cro/s3 and )edges3 t)e skir%is)ers could )ar% )ea+y infantry and artillery gunners (it)out t)e risk of serious inDury. But t)ey could not resist t)e c)arges eit)er of )ea+y infantry or )ea+y ca+alry. %inority of t)e 'renc) infantry3 t)e skir%is)ers3 ()o (ere s/ecially trained %en or line infantry detailed for lig)t infantry duties3 de/loyed &et(een t)e lines to a degree seldo% /racticed earlier in t)e century and did t)eir (ork &efore t)e lines of infantry %et. *er%an general of t)e Se+en :ears !ar )ad (ritten t)at lig)t 2<C

infantry Jare al(ays )idden &e)ind trees like t)ie+es and ro&&ers and ne+er s)o( t)e%sel+es in t)e o/en field3 as is /ro/er for &ra+e soldiers.L 0)e 'renc) soldier3 (it) )is %oti+ation to fig)t and )is lack of reliance on auto%aton#like drill3 /ro+ed ad%ira&le at t)is kind of co%&at. nd t)e role of skir%is)ers could )a+e %uc) significance if t)ey disorganised and (eakened t)e ene%ys line &efore t)e clas) of for%ed infantry. 0)ey also functioned (ell in reconnaissance3 su//le%enting and re/lacing t)e initially %eagre and /oorly skilled 'renc) ca+alry. So 'renc) infantry )ad skir%is)ers as (ell as linear for%ations and colu%ns for assault and %anoeu+re. "a+ing also /roficient %o&ile artillery (it) e-cellent %ateriel3 t)e 'renc) ar%y /ossessed an e-tre%ely +ersatile and effecti+e tactical syste% t)at could ada/t itself to al%ost any /)ysical or tactical circu%stance and /erfor% (ell in defence3 attack3 retreat3 and ad+ance. In strategy t)ese o/erations )a+e distinction &ecause of t)e (ide dis/ersal of t)e forces. In guarding to(ns and crossing /oints3 t)e allies )ad custo%arily distri&uted t)eir %en in a t)in cordon7 in s/reading t)eir ar%ies in di+isions3 t)e re+olutionary generals )ad %ade an e.ual dis/ersion. In 1C@? t)e 'renc) )ad used t)e conce/tual unity of t)eir forces to %ake successi+e concentrations3 attacking t)e allies at "ondsc)oote3 Menin3 and t)en !attignies. But3 on t)e ad+ice of Mack3 $o&urg )ad concentrated to %ake a con+erging attack in ()ic)3 in addition to $lerfayts se/arate ad+ance3 )e distri&uted <>3>>> %en o+er an eig)teen#%ile front. 0)us t)e allies as (ell as t)e 'renc) e-)i&ited t)e fle-i&ility in)erent in ar%ies in ()ic) t)e &ayonet#e.ui//ed %usketeer )ad &eco%e t)e /ri%ary (ea/on syste%. 0)e casualties for one day of t)e &attle GMay 1Bt)H ()en t)e 'renc) )ad (on at 0ourcoing &ut $lerfayt )ad counterattacked and defeated t)e force t)at attacked )i% a%ounted to B /ercent of t)e (ell#disci/lined allied forces7 t)e /oorly trained &ut &etter articulated 'renc) )ad suffered a&out t)e sa%e /ercentage of casualties. 0)e o/erations )ere s)o(ed3 as )ad ot)ers3 t)at co%%anders took little risk in (idely dis/ersing suc) resilient for%ations. Suc) dis/ersion contri&uted to t)e increased fre.uency of &attles and c)anged t)eir c)aracter. No longer did t)ey necessarily occur &et(een co%/actly arrayed unitary ar%ies on a field selected &y t)e defender. s (it) 'rederick3 infantry /layed a %aDor offensi+e role3 &ut t)e significance of ca+alry )ad decreased still furt)er and infantry dis/layed %ore +ersatility in t)e offence. 0)e strategy of dis/ersed forces corres/onded fully to t)at en+isioned &y Bourcet and *ui&ert3 and Mack as (ell as Sou)a% )ad seen so%e of t)e /otential /resented &y t)e ne( situation. But since Sou)a% )ad only a te%/orary co%%and and Mack %erely a staff /osition3 it re%ained for a general ()o understood (ar to e-/loit t)e /otentialities of t)e situation. Back

(he #dvent of General 1ona'arte

In early 1C@= good /olitical connections ena&led *eneral Na/oleon Bona/arte3 t)en t(enty#si-3 to recei+e co%%and of t)e %ain 'renc) ar%y facing Italy. 0)e go+ern%ent ga+e )i% t)e %ission of dri+ing t)e kingdo% of Sardinia and its strategically located 1uc)y of Sa+oy fro% t)e (ar and /us)ing &ack t)e ustrians. In addition to a genius for (arfare and t)e (ill to do%inate any situation3 *eneral Bona/arte )ad t)oroug)ly learned t)e doctrine of t)e 'renc) ar%y in ()ic) )e )ad ser+ed as a young officer in t)e 1CB>s. ustrian intelligence correctly descri&ed )i% as a J/rofound t)eoristL for )e kne( (ell t)e ideas of Bourcet and carried on )is ca%/aign a co/y of *ui&erts (ork. "e )ad an une.ualled gras/ of )o( to realise t)e /otentialities of t)e 'renc) ar%y. Bona/arte )ad at )is dis/osal seasoned3 if not /articularly (ell#disci/lined3 infantry. 5f ca+alry )e )ad little3 %ost )orses )a+ing failed to sur+i+e (inter su//ly s)ortages3 ()ic) also )ad de/ri+ed t)e soldiers of sufficient rations and ade.uate clot)ing. 0)e ar%y only recei+ed its &arely sufficient su//lies &ecause s)i/s could %o+e along t)e coast3 a+ailing t)e%sel+es of defended /oints of refuge and t)e negligence of t)e Britis) na+y in not using t)eir /re/onderance to interdict t)e

2<B

co%%erce. Beginning an offensi+e in early /ril3 t)e %agnetic Bona/arte )ad already ins/irited )is %en and /ointed out t)at t)e /ros/erous land of nort)ern Italy could /ro+ide a%/le su//lies. 'acing coo/erating allies &ut not a unified co%%and3 t)e 'renc) /lanned to se/arate t)e% and3 &y defeating $ollis Sardinian ar%y3 force Sardinia fro% t)e (ar7 t)ey e-/ected t)at t)e ustrian co%%ander3 Beaulieu3 (ould de+ote )is attention to /rotecting t)e ustrian /ossession of Milan. !)en Beaulieu o/ened t)e ca%/aign &y concentrating to /ounce on t)e e-/osed 'renc) force at Voltri3 t)e ustrian co%%ander )i%self /ro+ided t)e distraction t)at Bona/arte needed to ena&le )i% to dri+e nort) to 1ego and se/arate t)e Sardinian and ustrian ar%ies. 5n /ril 1Ct) t(o days after Beaulieus successful attack on Voltri3 t)e 'renc) ar%y &egan a nig)t %arc) fro% t)e coast to(ard 1ego3 ()ile near Montenotte a 'renc) force 5f C3<>> assaulted 43<>> ustrians in front as ?3<>> 'renc) co%/leted a turning %o+e%ent and attacked t)e ustrian rear. 0)e ustrians fled3 and t)eir %ain forces did not /artici/ate furt)er in t)e action. Beaulieu3 a soldier /ast se+enty years old3 )ad initially failed to gras/ ()at (as )a//ening and t)en %ade no real effort to reunite )is forces7 t)e e.ually elderly and so%e()at infir% $olli co%%anded t)e Sardinians. fter difficulties ca/turing 1ego and its su&se.uent loss to an enter/rising ustrian co%%ander ()ile its garrison sle/t and its general lay in &ed (it) a lady fro% t)e to(n3 Bona/arte easily )eld t)e inert Beaulieu at &ay and3 t)roug) constant t)reats to turn )is /osition3 forced $olli &ack. Vigorous frontal attacks also /layed a role. future Mars)al of 'rance /artici/ated in an attack in ()ic) Serurier3 an older general and a +eteran of t)e Se+en :ears !ar3 dis/layed e-e%/lary leaders)i/. J0o for% )is %en in t)ree colu%ns3 /ut )i%self at t)e )ead of t)e central one3 t)ro( out a cloud of skir%is)ers3 and %arc) at t)e dou&le3 s(ord in )and3 ten /aces in front of )is colu%n7 t)at is ()at )e did. fine s/ectacle3 t)at of an old general3 resolute and decided3 ()ose +igour (as re+i+ed &y t)e /resence of t)e ene%y.L 2sca/ing t)e )ostile &ullets3 t)e general led )is %en to +ictory. !)en suc) +e)e%ent and efficacious actions )ad3 along (it) t)e turning of )is /ositions3 forced $olli &ack until )e dre( near 0urin3 t)e 9ing of Sardinia asked for an ar%istice. 5n /ril 2Bt) a little o+er t(o (eeks after t)e &eginning of t)e 'renc) ad+ance3 Sardinia )ad left t)e (ar. 'ortunately t)is /)ase of t)e ca%/aign ended /ro%/tly &ecause t)e 'renc) ar%y could find little to eat in t)e %ountains and )ad scant reser+es to send su//lies fro% t)e coast on too fe( /ack %ules. $ontrol of t)e foraging region on t)e coast )ad caused &ot) t)e 'renc) occu/ation of Voltri and Beaulieus ca/ture of it. ,ack of su//lies )ad delayed o/erations an entire day in one case ()ile t)e soldiers scoured t)e countryside to find food. 0)e ar%ies foug)t (idely dis/ersed3 (it) as %uc) as t)irty %iles se/arating t)e e-tre%es of t)e 'renc) forces. But Bona/arte treated t)e% as a unit and directed t)e %o+e%ents of all /arts of )is ar%y to(ard )is strategic ai%. lt)oug) no classical &attle occurred &et(een t)e o//osing forces3 fig)ting (as al%ost continuous3 as t)e t(o ar%ies nearly al(ays )ad contact. S%all &attles and tiny sieges /unctuated and %ade /ossi&le t)e %anoeu+res t)at di+ided t)e ustrians and Sardinians. Bona/arte )ad not only deli&erately /laced )is ar%y &et(een )is ene%ies &ut also )ad to fig)t to create a ga/ into ()ic) to %o+e. In a situation like Sou)a%s &et(een $o&urg and $lerfayt3 Bona/arte took ad+antage of )is o//onents disunity to e-/loit )is central /osition to dri+e &ack t)e ustrians3 and t)en concentrate against t)e Sardinians. 0)oug) outnu%&ered <>3>>> to 4>3>>>3 &ecause of )is central /osition )e enDoyed nu%erical su/eriority on al%ost e+ery occasion3 cul%inating in t)e ratio of t(o to one (it) ()ic) )e dro+e $olli to(ard 0urin. "e and )is su&ordinates kne( )o( to &ring t)e ar%y into &attle /ro%/tly3 to use its nu%erical ad+antage3 and to e-/loit its %o&ility and articulation3 consistently e%/loying turning and en+elo/ing %o+e%ents to defeat or force &ack t)e ene%y. 'renc) successes ga+e t)e% access to t)e fertile regions of Sa+oy and ade.uate food su//lies for t)e %en3 ()ic) (it) t)e e-)ilaration of +ictory3 raised t)e %orale of t)e ar%y of Italy and its

2<@

confidence in its general. Bona/arte %o+ed /ro%/tly to atte%/t to cross t)e Po Ri+er and %o+e into t)e fertile and /o/ulous 1uc)y of Milan3 ()ere )e could find a &ase a%/le for su//lying )is ar%y3 %aking )i% inde/endent of co%%unication (it) 'rance. 0o cross t)e Po )e )ad already /ro+ided a distraction &y including in t)e Sardinian ar%istice /er%ission to cross at Valen6a3 a fact t)at Beaulieu kne(. $oncentrating )is ar%y near Valen6a3 Bona/arte )ad t(o /lans3 one to %arc) /art of )is ar%y east and cross at Piacen6a if Beaulieu s)ould concentrate to resist )is ostentatious /re/arations at Valen6a3 t)e ot)er to cross at Valen6a if Beaulieu s)ould counter )is /lan for an eastern crossing. Beaulieu3 e-/erienced in defending ri+er lines3 concentrated t)e &ulk of )is forces &et(een t)e Po and t)e 0icino3 and on May 4t) )e sent a detac)%ent east to guard t)e Po as far as Piacen6a. But t)e ne-t day t)e 'renc) started3 /icked %en %arc)ing ra/idly in ad+ance of t)e %ain force3 reac)ed Piacen6a3 and crossed t)e Po on ca/tured &oats &efore t)e ustrians could interfere. !)en t)e co%%ander of t)e ustrian detac)%ent took u/ a defensi+e /osition instead of attacking3 all t)e 'renc) forces crossed3 and Beaulieu3 seeing )is defence of t)e Po and 0icino co%/ro%ised3 fell &ack o+er t)e dda. !)en a co%&ination of luck and energetic e-/loitation of o//ortunities ena&led a 'renc) force3 under Bona/artes /ersonal co%%and3 to sei6e at ,odi a &ridge o+er t)e dda3 t)e discouraged Beaulieu retreated to t)e Mincio. 0)e ca/ture of t)is &ridge sealed t)e de+otion of Bona/artes %en to t)eir young general3 ()ose s%all stature detracted not at all fro% )is %agnetis% and a&ility to co%%and. !it)in t(o (eeks after t)e Sardinian ar%istice Bona/arte )ad secured t)e 1uc)y of Milan and dri+en )is ene%y &ack 1>> %iles. 8ust as in 1C>13 ()en Mars)al Vendo%e )ad utilised )is nu%erical /re/onderance to fi- 2ugenes attention ()ile %arc)ing /art of )is ar%y to turn t)e Princes /osition on t)e Po3 so Bona/arte )ad used )is greater nu%&ers in t)e sa%e (ay. 4nlike 2ugene3 ()o soug)t to retrie+e t)e situation &y a &attle (it) all )is forces against )alf of t)e 'renc)3 Beaulieu retreated7 and3 unlike Vendo%e3 Bona/arte .uickly united all )is forces3 ready s)ould Beaulieu attack. Beaulieu /ro&a&ly dis/layed (isdo% in retreating &efore t)e 'renc)3 ()o )ad %arc)ed ra/idly east(ard and )ad %ade anot)er crossing7 )is dis/ersed ar%y (ould dou&tless )a+e suffered )ea+ily in a conflict (it) 'renc) di+isions coordinated &y t)e &rilliant *eneral Bona/arte. 0)e ustrian retreat ena&led t)e 'renc) to occu/y Milan and le+y )uge contri&utions on t)e duc)y. In s/ite of initial re+olts against t)e%3 t)e 'renc) enDoyed considera&le /olitical su//ort. Bona/arte )ad tried3 (it)out co%/lete success3 to %aintain t)e disci/line of )is soldiers and /re+ent t)e looting t)at usually c)aracterised re/u&lican ar%ies. 0)e 'renc) re+olutionary /rogra% of /olitical li&erty and e.uality a//ealed to t)e Italian %iddle class3 creating a significant &ase of su//ort for Na/oleon. 0)e /o/ulation of Milan )ad c)eered t)e arri+al of t)e 'renc)3 &ut3 in /art due to t)e &e)a+iour of t)e 'renc) soldiers3 t)e city re+olted against t)e 'renc) eig)t days later. Si%ilar /olitical su//ort in "olland3 toget)er (it) an un/recedented (inter t)at fro6e t)e (ater &arriers3 )ad already ena&led t)e 'renc) to con.uer t)at country3 a feat t)at long &efore )ad &affled t)e &est co%%anders and soldiers of t)e S/aniards and of ,ouis IIV. !it) )is troo/s /aid as (ell as fed3 )is ar%y refitted3 re&ellions &ut not all /easant guerrilla acti+ity crus)ed3 Bona/arte %o+ed east(ard at t)e end of May. $oncentrating .uickly fro% a %arc) in t)ree di+isions3 )e forced a crossing of t)e Mincio at Borg)etto and di+ided Beaulieus ar%y. !)ile )alf t)e ustrian troo/s re%ained to garrison t)e /o(erful fortifications of Mantua3 t)e re%ainder retreated (it) Beaulieu nort) along t)e dige. !it) neutral Venice to t)e east3 Bona/arte dro+e t)e ustrians fro% Italy in less t)an t(o %ont)s. "a+ing recei+ed reinforce%ents fro% 'rance3 for t)e ne-t t(o %ont)s Bona/arte de+oted )i%self to organising )is con.uests3 le+ying contri&utions3 su//ressing o//osition to 'renc) rule3 and sending forces sout) to i%/ose /eace and le+ies on t)e re%ainder of Italy. Bona/artes success 2=>

ena&led )i% to send to 'rance not only %oney &ut also +alua&le /aintings for %useu%s. "e ke/t )is ar%y in t)e +icinity of Mantua3 first &lockading t)e garrison of o+er 123>>> %en and t)en3 ()en )is siege artillery arri+ed3 in %id#8uly &eginning to dig t)e trenc)es t)at (ould &ring t)e &esiegers under co+er to t)e fortress ditc) and /ro+ide t)e o//ortunity to &reac) t)e defences. 0o su//ort t)e ar%y3 t)e 'renc) &roug)t su//lies &y road fro% Milan +ia Brescia along an esta&lis)ed3 guarded route. 0)e ustrian counteroffensi+e naturally took t)e for% of a %o+e to relie+e Mantua &y dri+ing a(ay t)e &esieging forces to resu//ly t)e garrison and fill in t)e siege trenc)es. 0o reac) Mantua t)e ustrians di+ided t)eir forces3 e-/ecting t)at if e+en one could get t)roug)3 t)at (ould suffice to re/lenis) su//lies and de%olis) t)e siege(orks. 1B3>>> %en under Auasdono+ic) %arc)ed sout) on t)e (est side of ,ake *arda7 on t)e east 'ield Mars)al $ount !ur%ser3 t)e o+erall co%%ander3 led 243>>> %en sout) along t)e dige. Bona/arte )ad distri&uted )is a//ro-i%ately e.ual forces so as to /rotect t)e siege3 t(o detac)%ents co+ering t)e dige fro% Verona to ,egnano3 once under t)e ca/a&le *eneral Mass;na &locking !ur%sers route3 one conducting t)e siege3 and only 43<>> %en around Salo in Auasdono+ic)s /at). 0)e 'renc) )ad no central reser+e ()en on 8uly 2Bt) t)e ustrians3 )a+ing %arc)ed ra/idly3 suddenly a//eared at all /oints. 'ield Mars)al !ur%ser3 o+er se+enty and .uite deaf3 /ro+ed a +igorous o//onent and one ca/a&le of ins/iring )is %en. s !ur%ser /us)ed &ack Mass;na3 Auasdono+ic) dro+e a)ead and ca/tured Brescia3 cutting t)e 'renc) line of co%%unications. 5n t)e e+ening 5f 8uly ?>t)3 ()en )e fully gras/ed t)e situation and realised t)at )e faced en+elo/%ent3 Bona/arte resol+ed to a&andon t)e siege of Mantua and concentrate %ost of )is forces against Auasdono+ic) and dri+e )i% &ack. If )e succeeded3 t)e 'renc) co%%ander could t)en use )is interior lines to turn against t)e 'ield Mars)al7 if )e failed3 )e (ould )a+e to retreat3 eit)er t)roug) Brescia or on a %ore sout)erly route. But )is ra/id concentration against Auasdono+ic) re/elled t)e ustrians and reco+ered Brescia. Mean()ile at Mantua3 t)e 'renc) )a+ing (it)dra(n east(ard to co+er t)eir line of co%%unications and retreat3 !ur%sers forces entered t)e city3 and t)e 'ield Mars)al t)en /lanned to cross t)e Mincio and catc) t)e 'renc) &et(een )is ar%y and Auasdono+ic)s. But &efore !ur%ser acted3 t)e 'renc) defeated Auasdono+ic)3 and t)e ustrian general3 concluding t)e 'renc) )ad &eaten t)e 'ield Mars)al also3 &egan a retreat nort). 0)us Bona/arte could turn )is ()ole force against !ur%ser3 ()o )ad crossed t)e Mincio and de/loyed for &attle at $astiglione on terrain t)at did not fa+our t)e use of )is nu%erous ca+alry.

4a oleon"s +is ersion Back

2=1

"a+ing called in all )is forces3 t)e 'renc) co%%ander delayed )is %ain attack until t)e original &esieging force fro% Mantua arri+ed and3 as directed3 took u/ its /osition on t)e ustrian left rear. !ur%ser turned )is second line to %eet t)is %enace3 &ut t)e %o+e%ent disordered )is %en3 and t)e 'renc) assault in front and flank dro+e t)e ustrians fro% t)e field and soon across t)e Mincio. 0)e 'ield Mars)al3 ()o )ad narro(ly esca/ed ca/ture &y 'renc) ca+alry3 t)en ordered a retreat nort) along t)e dige. 0)is /ro+ed an orderly and un%olested %arc) &ecause3 as Bona/arte re/orted3 Jour troo/s3 (orn out &y fatigue3 could only kee/ u/ t)e /ursuit for t)ree )ours.L t 0orgau 'rederick t)e *reat )ad attacked 1aun in t)e front and rear si%ultaneously3 &ut )is de/loy%ent (it)in sig)t of t)e ene%y allo(ed t)e ustrian co%%ander a%/le ti%e to c)ange )is &attle dis/ositions. Bona/arte3 &y not concentrating )is ar%y until it reac)ed t)e field of &attle3 did not gi+e !ur%ser t)e sa%e notice. 0)e 'renc) clai%ed +ictory in t)e Battle of $astiglione and success in sa+ing t)eir ar%y fro% defeat at t)e )ands of !ur%ser and Auasdono+ic). But t)e 'ield Mars)al )ad acco%/lis)ed )is o&Decti+e of strengt)ening Mantuas garrison3 re/lenis)ing its su//lies3 de%olis)ing t)e siege(orks3 and ca/turing 1C@ 'renc) siege guns and 4 %illion /ounds of lead. "encefort)3 (it)out artillery3 t)e 'renc) could only &lockade Mantua.

)on(entration on 'nterior &ines Back

2=2

0)e &attle at $astiglione )ad e-)i&ited t)e strengt) of t)e 'renc) di+isional syste% ()en a su&ordinate Doined Bona/arte on t)e &attlefield to attack t)e ene%ys rear. 0)is a&ility to dis/erse3 &ut act as a unit /layed a key role in t)e ()ole 'renc) res/onse to ()at /ro+ed t)reatening concentric ad+ances. In a situation %uc) like Sou)a%s3 ()en )e found )i%self &et(een $lerfayt and $o&urg3 Bona/arte used )is interior lines to concentrate first against one and t)en t)e ot)er. lso3 like Sou)a%3 Bona/arte faced en+elo/%ent3 t)e forces of t)e ustrians )a+ing a real o//ortunity to attack t)e 'renc) front and rear si%ultaneously. lt)oug) t)e +ictory in t)e Battle of $astiglione ga+e a gloss of triu%/) to t)e 'renc) o/erations3 Bona/arte failed cons/icuously to co+er t)e siege of Mantua3 and t)e ustrians )ad +ery nearly defeated or dri+en )i% &ack. lt)oug) Bona/artes a&ilities )ad %uc) to do (it) a+oiding t)ese t(o conse.uences3 t)e 'renc) o(ed %uc) of t)eir success to t(o /rinci/les i%/licit in t)e ne( 'renc) syste% of (arfare. Bona/arte )ad a//arently dis/osed )is forces in t)e traditional cordon co+ering eac) route of ad+ance and )ad /ro+ided no central reser+e to reinforce a t)reatened /oint. "e did not see% to a//ly to )is strategic dis/ositions ()at t)e ancients )ad learned in tactics # al(ays su&tract /art of t)e forces to act as a reser+e to co%%it in a critical offensi+e or defensi+e situation. But t)e effecti+eness and ra/idity (it) ()ic) Bona/arte %o+ed and ulti%ately concentrated )is %en s)o(ed t)at t)e dis/ersed 'renc) forces did not consist of detac)%ents in a cordon3 tied to t)e %ission of guarding s/ecific routes. Instead3 t)ey re%ained /art of a single ar%y3 res/onsi+e to t)e (ill of t)e co%%ander. 'urt)er3 t)is res/onsi+eness s)o(ed t)at Bona/arte )ad a reser+e in t)at )e could %o+e any forces not irre+oca&ly engaged (it) an ene%y and t)at t)ese forces t)us constituted a reser+e Dust as %uc) as if t)ey )ad &een su&tracted and )eld &ack in a central /osition. In tactics generals found it difficult to disengage troo/s fig)ting an ene%y3 &ut in strategy t)is /resented a far si%/ler /ro&le%. 0)us )is dis/ersed ar%y acted as a unit and all forces not resisting a %aDor ene%y t)rust constituted a reser+e at t)e dis/osal of t)e co%%ander. 0)e s/irit of Bourcet and *ui&ert )ad truly ani%ated Bona/artes defence3 and t)e ar%y effecti+ely articulated in di+isions and su&ordinate units3 )ad an ad%ira&le organisation to e-ecute a strategy concei+ed &y %en ()o )ad so %uc) influenced Bona/arte.

'nterior &ines E* loited Back

2=?

ll of t)ese attri&utes3 so clear in t)e o/erations of Bona/arte3 )ad already e%erged in t)e earlier years of t)e re+olution ()en "ouc)ard and 8ourdan )ad concentrated successi+ely against /oints of t)e allied cordon in t)e Net)erlands. But ()ereas Sou)a% )ad &lundered into a central /osition &efore t)e Battle of 0ourcoing3 Bona/arte )ad deli&erately created t)is situation ()en )e forced )i%self &et(een Beaulieu and t)e Sardinians. 8ust as interior lines re+ealed t)e%sel+es as a /attern in Bona/artes ca%/aigns3 so also did t)e use of t)e strategic and tactical %o&ility of t)e 'renc) ar%y to turn or en+elo/ an ene%y /osition. In Bona/artes first traditional &attle3 $astiglione3 t)e /ro%/t rear attack &y a force called fro% t(enty %iles a(ay constituted t)e decisi+e ele%ent in &ringing a&out t)e +ictory. 0)roug)out3 o/erations e-)i&ited t)e safety of dis/ersal ()en s%all forces delayed t)e %o+e%ents of far larger ()ile (ell#articulated +eteran units suffered co%/arati+ely fe( casualties ()en fig)ting +astly su/erior nu%&ers. In resisting t)ree additional ustrian efforts to relie+e Mantua3 Bona/arte continued to rely on ra/id concentration of forces and t)e a&ility of t)e 'renc) infantry to %o+e .uickly fro% %arc) to co%&at for%ation7 )e again e-/loited t)e ene%ys di+ision of its ar%y &y concentrating against first one and t)en t)e ot)er of t)e o//osing forces7 and )e and )is su&ordinates usually %ade t)e %ost of t)eir a&ility to turn or en+elo/ t)e o//onents flank. lt)oug) t)e ustrians &egan to ada/t to t)is ne( for% of (arfare3 t)e funda%ental organisation3 tactical doctrine3 and strategic s/irit re%ained essentially 'renc). In t)e end Mantua fell and *eneral Bona/artes ad+ance to(ard ustria led to an ar%istice in ()ic) t)e 'renc) ac.uired3 a%ong ot)er gains3 control of %ost of nort)ern Italy3 a triu%/) for t)e /ersisting strategy t)at &ot) &elligerents /ursued. In s/ite of constant fig)ting3 Bona/artes +ictory cost little. In )is successful %aDor engage%ents (it) t)e ustrians )e )ad lost an a+erage of less t)an @ /ercent of )is engaged forces co%/ared to 2= /ercent for t)e ustrians3 a ratio %ore fa+oura&le t)an t)at of eig)teent)#century &attles. Back

(he Strategic (urning Movement of the Marengo Cam'aign

By 1B>> *eneral Bona/arte3 after an in+asion of 2gy/t3 )ad %ade )i%self dictator. "e t)en took /ersonal co%%and of t)e ca%/aign to reco+er Italy3 ()ic) t)e 'renc) )ad lost to t)e ustrians during )is a&sence. n ustrian ar%y of o+er 1>>3>>> %en3 under t)e e-/erienced and co%/etent Melas3 controlled nort) Italy3 &esieged Mass;nas 'renc)%en in *enoa3 and /us)ed for(ard to(ard 'rance along t)e Ri+iera against t)e resistance of only 143>>> 'renc) soldiers7 ustrian forces garrisoned Italian cities and guarded t)e /asses in t)e l/s. gainst t)is strong ene%y 2=4

Bona/arte e%/loyed a ne( ar%y3 less t)an 4>3>>> largely green troo/s and 123>>> %en ordered fro% sout) *er%any. 4sing fi+e different /asses t)roug) t)e l/s3 t)e 'renc) ar%y &egan to %arc) into Italy in early May3 t)e largest nu%&er co%ing t)roug) t)e *reat St. Bernard Pass. Sno( /resented a serious o&stacle for t)e artillery3 &ut t)e soldiers i%/ro+ised sledges to &ring t)e% o+er t)e /ass. 5n t)e do(n slo/e t)e 'renc) encountered 'ort Bard3 Ja s%all fortress /erc)ed on to/ of a /reci/itous rock at t)e /oint ()ere t)e +alley is narro(est.L !)en t)e fort3 ()ic) co%%anded t)e road and t)e +illage3 successfully resisted assault3 t)e 'renc) found a /at) around it for t)e infantry &ut could not use it for artillery. 'inally3 t)ey took t)e fe( guns /ast t)e fort at nig)t3 t)e gunners Jdra(ing t)eir cannon in t)e dark t)roug) t)e to(n3 close under t)e guns of t)e fort3 &y s/reading stra( and dung on t)e streets3 and (ra//ing t)e ()eels so as to /re+ent t)e slig)test sound.L So Bona/artes %ain force and a fe( of its guns &egan to concentrate at I+rea on May 2?rd. 'aced (it) t)e alternati+e of %arc)ing sout) to fig)t Melas and trying to relie+e t)e deter%ined and resourceful Mass;na &esieged in *enoa or )eading east to Milan3 Bona/arte c)ose Milan. Sending )is ad+anced guard to(ard 0urin to decei+e t)e ene%y as to )is o&Decti+e3 )e /roceeded to Milan3 ()ere )e e-/ected to unite (it) t)e force fro% *er%any t)at (ere co%ing t)roug) t)e Si%/lon and St. *ot)ard /asses. Melas %isDudged t)e 'renc) action. "is attention (as fi-ed on t)e siege of *enoa and t)e Ri+iera ca%/aign3 and t)e s%all force t)at %o+ed t)roug) t)e Mont $ents /ass also distracted )i%. "e &elie+ed t)at )e )ad to deal only (it) it and Bona/artes ad+anced guard t)at3 after its de%onstration3 )ad %o+ed east to Doin t)e concentration on Milan. !)ile Melas (as &eginning to co%/re)end t)e e-tent of t)e 'renc) %o+e%ent3 Bona/arte took Milan on 8une 2nd3 occu/ied t)e 1uc)y3 ca/tured large .uantities of ustrian su//lies3 and ac.uired a &ase area a%/le to su//ort )is ar%y. "e relied on t)e St. *ot)ard /ass for a line of co%%unications and a route of retreat. s Melas called &ack )is force on t)e Ri+iera and &egan to concentrate )is ar%y to deal (it) t)e 'renc)3 Bona/arte /us)ed sout) of t)e Po Ri+er to &lock t)e ustrian route of (it)dra(al east(ard. 5+erco%ing t)e resistance of ustrian garrisons3 )is %en crossed t)e ri+er and )eld t)e defile at Stradella &efore an ustrian detac)%ent reac)ed it. In )is 1C>= %arc) to raise t)e siege of 0urin3 Prince 2ugene )ad &eaten t)e 'renc) in a race to control t)is narro( /assage &et(een t)e Po and t)e /ennine Mountains. No( t)e 'renc) &locked it and interdicted not t)e ad+ance &ut t)e esca/e of t)e ene%y. *eneral Bona/arte )ad carried out on a +ery large scale t)e sa%e turning %o+e%ent t)at $aesar )ad e-ecuted at Ilerda against Po%/eys forces in S/ain. !)en $aesar )ad /laced )is nu%erically larger ar%y on t)e Po%/eians line of retreat3 )e )ad gained t)e ad+antage of t)e tactical defensi+e. $aesar could readily &lock )is o//onents (it)dra(al &ecause )e could )old t)e /asses in t)e %ountainous terrain7 (it) /er)a/s 2<3>>> %en to co+er a front of ten %iles3 )e )ad a +ery )ig) ratio of force to s/ace. In addition3 )is o//onents lacked food3 and (it) )is /re/onderance in ca+alry $aesar could control t)e countryside3 t)us /ro+iding for )is %en and denying resources to t)e ene%y. But Bona/arte )ad a far different and %ore difficult /ro&le%. Not only )ad t)e ustrians enoug) su//lies in %aga6ines and access to a considera&le fertile territory3 &ut also Mass;na )ad at last surrendered *enoa. 0)roug) t)is /ort t)ey could count on o&taining su//lies3 since t)eir Britis) ally controlled t)e Mediterranean. In addition3 t)e 'renc) did not significantly outnu%&er t)e ustrians3 and t)ey lay &et(een Bona/artes turning force and t)e s%all 'renc) ar%y on t)e Ri+iera. Still t)e ad+antages of t)e tactical defensi+e (ould )a+e out(eig)ed any su/eriority of nu%&ers if Bona/arte )ad /ossessed a ratio of force to s/ace co%/ara&le to $aesars. Ne+ert)eless3 (it) t(ice as %any %en as $aesar3 t)e 'renc) co%%ander )ad to &lock an ustrian ad+ance

2=<

t)roug) t)e ga/ fifty %iles (ide &et(een t)e l/s and t)e /ennines. Bona/arte )ad t)e age#old /ro&le% of trying to /re+ent an ene%y fro% /assing )i%. 0)is sa%e dile%%a )ad faced Beaulieu four years earlier ()en )e )ad tried to kee/ Bona/arte out of t)e 1uc)y of Milan. 5n t)e nort) side of t)e ga/ &et(een t)e %ountains3 t)ree ri+ers3 t)e Po3 t)e 0icino3 and t)e dda3 (ould /ro+ide successi+e o&stacles3 &ut no ri+ers &arred t)e route sout) of t)e Po t)at Bona/arte )ad used against Beaulieu in 1C@=. 0)e Po also )andica//ed t)e defender &ecause3 &y di+iding t)e area &et(een t)e %ountains3 it created an o&struction to ra/id concentration of troo/s to t)e nort) or sout). 4nlike Beaulieu four years earlier3 Bona/arte took t)e risk of di+iding )is forces3 kee/ing o+er )alf (it) )i% sout) of t)e ri+er. In addition )e (orried a&out Melass falling &ack to *enoa ()ere3 (it) t)e Britis) fleet at )is &ack3 )e could cit)er )old out fore+er or re%o+e )is ar%y &y sea. Bona/arte3 t)inking t)at Melas (ould try to esca/e sout) of t)e Po &ut a//re)ensi+e t)at )e %ig)t fall &ack to *enoa3 (as also concerned a&out ustrian &ridge &uilding o+er t)e Po at $asale. So )e ad+anced east(ard to(ard lessandria3 ()ere )e &elie+ed Melas )ad concentrated a s%aller force t)an t)e 2B3>>> 'renc) a+aila&le sout) of t)e Po. 5n a//roac)ing lessandria and seeing no o&+ious signs of t)e ustrian ar%y3 Bona/arte sent <3>>> %en sout)3 to reconnoitre and delay any ene%y %o+e%ent to(ard *enoa3 and distri&uted ot)er forces for action s)ould Melas atte%/t to )ead nort). 0)us3 on t)e %orning of 8une 14t) Bona/arte )ad only 143>>> %en outside of lessandria at t)e little +illage of Marengo ()en Melas %o+ed ra/idly out of t)e fortress and attacked (it) al%ost ?13>>> %en in an effort to o/en t)e (ay east along t)e sout) side of t)e Po. 0)e &ulk of t)e ustrian ar%y de/loyed and3 )el/ed &y t)eir %ore /o(erful artillery3 engaged in a long3 se+ere struggle to (rest t)e to(n of Marengo fro% t)e 'renc) ()o found t)e %any ditc)es and far%)ouses a +alua&le aid in t)e defence. 8ust as deter%ined ustrian attacks (ere a&out to /us) t)e 'renc) fro% Marengo3 a second ustrian force ca%e around t)e nort) flank of t)e 'renc) line. 0)e 'renc) t)en &egan a retreat3 and t)e se+enty#one year old Melas3 &ot)ered &y t)e )eat and slig)tly inDured ()en ene%y fire killed t(o of t)e )orses )e )ad ridden3 returned to lessandria3 lea+ing to su&ordinates t)e task of co%/leting t)e +ictory. 0)e ustrians (ere slo( in /ursing t)e 'renc)3 ()o late in t)e afternoon for%ed a ne( line t)ree %iles east of Marengo. !)en t)e lead ustrian units de/loyed a&out < /.%.3 t)ey attacked t)e <3>>> 'renc) troo/s t)at Bona/arte )ad sent sout) &ut recalled in ti%e to get in line for t)is second /)ase of t)e &attle. 0)e &rief3 des/erate struggle reac)ed a cli%a- as so%e 'renc) &rigades ad+anced ()en four 'renc) artillery /ieces %o+ed u/ to fire at t)e ustrians at s)ort range3 an a%%unition (agon e-/loded3 and 4>> 'renc) ca+alry c)arged t)e ustrian flank. 0)e ustrians &egan a /anicky flig)t3 t)eir ca+alry rus)ing to t)e rear o+er its o(n %en on t)e road in %arc) colu%n3 and t)e ()ole ustrian ar%y turned and %ade for lessandria. Successful in t)eir defensi+e engage%ent3 t)e 'renc) suffered less t)an =3>>> casualties co%/ared to o+er @3>>> for t)e ustrians. lt)oug) t)e Battle of Marengo )ad sto//ed t)e ustrian effort to esca/e to t)e east3 its ar%y re%ained /o(erful and so (ell su//lied t)at Melas )ad issued e-tra rations and ne( unifor%s &efore t)e &attle. So Bona/arte and Melas agreed to forego t)e uncertainties of furt)er o/erations ()en t)ey negotiated an ustrian (it)dra(al to t)e Mantua area. 4nlike $aesars3 Bona/artes turning %o+e%ent )ad failed to eli%inate t)e o//osing ar%y3 &ut it )ad3 (it) %odest casualties3 .uickly forced t)e ene%y &ack 2>> %iles3 reco+ering t)e &ulk of nort) Italy and attaining t)e o&Decti+e of t)e 'renc) /ersisting strategy.

4a oleon"s Strategi( Turning Mo%ement Back

2==

"is t(o ca%/aigns in Italy de%onstrated t)e /otential of t)e ne( tactical doctrine of t)e 'renc) ar%y and t)e strategic /ossi&ilities t)at it i%/lied. 0)e 'renc) a&ility to de/loy ra/idly fro% colu%n to line )ad %ulti/lied t)e a%ount of fig)ting3 ()ic) t)e ustrian ar%ies could not a+oid (it)out constant retreats. But t)e increase in co%&at did not /ri%arily occur in t)e traditional &attles of ar%ies de/loyed (it) e.ual fronts on terrain suita&le for co%&at. Rat)er3 t)e )ostile forces3 &ot) dis/ersed3 )ad fre.uent contacts3 and t)e 'renc) (ere eager to assu%e t)e offensi+e &ecause t)e tactical %o&ility of t)eir colu%ns ena&led t)e% to concentrate %ore readily and to en+elo/ and turn t)eir o//onents. 4nder %any of t)e tactical circu%stances t)at arose3 t)e %anoeu+ra&le3 (ell#articulated 'renc) infantry )ad /ri%acy on t)e offensi+e against an ustrian defensi+e conducted &y disci/lined3 trained +eterans fig)ting in t)e old (ay. 0)e strategic e-/loitation of t)ese tactical ca/a&ilities and t)e strategic dis/ersal of forces increased t)e /oints of contact &et(een o//osing forces and /er%itted a &rilliant &ut ine-/erienced co%%ander like Bona/arte to use a dis/ersed yet still unified ar%y to concentrate and fig)t at first one /oint and t)en anot)er. Bona/arte e-)i&ited )is control of t)e se/arated ar%y ()en )e reco%&ined its /arts on t)e &attlefields of $astiglione and Marengo. gainst $ollis Sardinians and Beaulieus ustrians and again against !ur%ser and Auasdono+ic) )e used interior lines to engage a )ig)er /ro/ortion of )is forces t)an t)e ene%ys3 to fig)t (it)out )is o//onents consent and not e+en necessarily at )is ene%ys con+enience3 and to concentrate on successi+e interior lines of o/erations in an area %uc) s%aller t)an t)e t)eatre in ()ic) 'rederick t)e *reat )ad earlier e-/loited interior lines. Because &attles took /lace on fields not carefully c)osen for flank /rotection3 t)e 'renc) could often ca/italise on t)eir greater nu%&ers to en+elo/ or turn t)eir o//onents. lt)oug) )is %et)ods +aried so%e()at3 Bona/artes strategy in )is t(o &rilliant con.uests of nort) Italy )ad not differed %uc) fro% so%e of )is /redecessors. In eac) case t)e co%%anders )ad t)e o&Decti+e of con.uering territory t)at (ould /ro+ide /olitical3 financial3 and logistical ad+antages. Instead of an essentially logistical strategy of a+oiding t)e ene%y to /ass a ri+er &arrier and t)en do%inating t)e in+aded territory fro% tactically and strategically strong /ositions3 Bona/arte relied e-tensi+ely on co%&at3 %eeting t)e ene%y in s%all &attles to /us) it &ack7 %uc) of )is success rested on )is a&ility to engage t)e ene%y3 and not al(ays on t)e ene%ys ter%s. 0)is co%&at strategy and t)e offensi+e strengt) of t)e infantry and its ne( de/loy%ent %ade t)e 'renc) ar%y effecti+e in gaining +ictory (it) un/recedented s/eed. :et t)e result Gac.uisition of nort) Italy and

2=C

t)e desira&le logistical and /olitical conse.uences of t)isH differed little fro% t)at of t)e ca%/aigns of VendU%e and 2ugene. Back

Na'oleonic 0'erations on a "arger Scale, (he Strategic (urning Movement of /lm and +istraction and Concentration at #usterlit2
In 1B>< Bona/arte3 &y t)en Na/oleon I3 2%/eror of t)e 'renc)3 a//lied t)ese %et)ods in *er%any and secured uni.ue results. 0)oug) )e faced t)e ar%ies of ustria and Russia in sout) *er%any and t)e ustrians in Italy3 )e )ad no o//osition else()ere in *er%any nor in t)e Net)erlands. !it) Ba+aria as an ally and ar%ies co%/ara&le in si6e and .uality to t)ose of ,ouis IIV3 Na/oleon )ad 1=<3>>> %en at )is dis/osal for a ca%/aign ai%ed at forcing /eace on ustria. !it) forces t)e si6e of t)ose of ,ouis IIV and (it)out )is %ore nu%erous o//onents3 Na/oleon could atte%/t a ca%/aign t)at lay &eyond &ot) t)e strengt) and +ision of t)e 'renc) 9ing. century of econo%ic /rogress also aided Na/oleon3 as i%/ro+ed roads3 e-/anded /o/ulations3 and increased agricultural /roducti+ity )el/ed su//ly )is )uge ar%y. 'urt)er3 'renc) ar%ies )ad far less &aggage t)an t)eir o//onents3 not )a+ing3 for e-a%/le3 to carry t)e &elongings of (ealt)y3 aristocratic officers. In a later ca%/aign against t)e Prussians3 t)e 'renc) )ad only one#eig)t) as %uc) &aggage as t)eir o//onents. 0)us t)e 'renc) )ad fe(er )orses to feed and also t)e a&ility to %o+e faster &ecause t)ey cluttered t)e roads less. In t)is res/ect 'renc) su//ly rese%&led t)at of le-ander t)e *reat. Na/oleon di+ided )is field ar%y3 t)ree ti%es as large as )e )ad %anaged &efore3 into a nu%&er of s%all ar%ies called cor/s. "is t)eatre of o/erations3 fro% t)e Main to sout) of t)e 1anu&e3 )ad dou&le t)e (idt) of t)e Italian t)eatre and3 if )e %arc)ed t)e 4>> %iles to Vienna3 nearly tri/le t)e de/t). In s/ite of /lanning to %ake )is initial %arc) t)oug) t)e /roducti+e and friendly /arts of *er%any3 Na/oleon also %ade careful3 if inco%/lete3 /re/arations to su//ly )is )uge force in territory unfa%iliar to )i%. By %o+ing in early autu%n )e )ad t)e assurance of a%/le stocks fro% t)e recent )ar+est. 5ne region of 1<3>>> to 1=3>>> /eo/le3 for e-a%/le3 furnis)ed )is ar%y (it) 12C3<>> /ounds of &read3 143>>> /ounds of salt3 ?3=>> &us)els of )ay3 =3>>> sacks of oats3 <3>>> /ints of (ine3 B3>>> &us)els of stra(3 and 1>> four#)orse (agons. 0)e su//ly officers used a %et)od for contri&utions called re.uisitions3 in ()ic) t)ey re.uired deli+eries &ut ga+e recei/ts3 for ()ic)3 in friendly territory3 t)e 'renc) go+ern%ent /aid7 in )ostile territory o(ners of t)e recei/ts could try to collect front t)eir o(n go+ern%ent. !it) a country full of food and fodder to %arc) t)roug)3 a t)oroug)ly o+er)auled su//ly organisation3 and /lans for a (agon route of co%%unications to &ring a%%unition and clot)ing fro% 'rance3 Na/oleon )ad %ade as %uc) /ro+ision for t)e su//ort of )is ar%y as )e could under t)e e-isting tec)nology of trans/ortation. 0)e ustrians took t)e offensi+e in early Se/te%&er3 ()en rc)duke 'erdinand %arc)ed into Ba+aria (it) C>3>>> %en3 t)e Ba+arian ar%y a+oiding co%&at &y %o+ing nort) to Doin t)e 'renc). !)en t)e ustrians reac)ed 4l%3 t)ey )alted to a(ait t)e arri+al of t)eir Russian ally3 *eneral 9utuso+ and )is ar%y7 %ean()ile t)ey )ad /ro+isioned t)eir ar%y fro% t)e resources of Ba+aria. 0)e ustrian co%%and really &elonged not to t)e rc)duke &ut to *eneral Mack3 ()o )ad guided t)e Prince of $o&urg in )is o/erations o+er a decade earlier. Mack3 an a&le %an ()o )ad risen fro% t)e ranks3 underesti%ated &y3 )alf t)e nu%&er of %en Na/oleon (ould )a+e and also assu%ed t)at t)e 'renc) (ould %arc) directly on 4l%. Na/oleon ca%e (it) %ore %en t)an t)is /art of *er%any )ad e+er seen3 a fact t)at alone altered t)e c)aracter of o/erations. In 1=C?3 ()en 0urenne and Montecuccoli )ad %anoeu+red along t)e Main3 eac) co%%anded ar%ies of less t)an ?>3>>> %en3 )ardly %ore t)an geo%etrical /oints in t)e large area in ()ic) t)ey ca%/aigned. lt)oug) Marl&oroug) and 2ugene )ad =>3>>> %en and t)eir o//onents )ad t)e sa%e nu%&er3 t)eir concentrated forces )ad difficulty do%inating %uc) of t)e territory in ()ic) t)ey ca%/aigned. 5n Se/te%&er 2<t) Na/oleon ad+anced on a 1>>#%ile front

2=B

(it) se+en cor/s3 eac) co%/ara&le in si6e to t)e entire ar%y of 0urenne or Montecuccoli. ll directed t)eir %arc)es nort) of 4l%. s t)e 'renc) cor/s ad+anced3 t)ey dre( closer toget)er3 ai%ing for t)e 1anu&e east of 4l%3 ()ic) /laced t)e% &et(een t)e ustrians and t)eir slo(ly ad+ancing Russian allies as (ell as in t)e rear of 'erdinand and Macks ar%y at 4l%. By 5cto&er =t) t)e 'renc) a//roac)ed t)e ri+er3 and Mack )ad concentrated )is %en at )is fortified /osition at 4l%. !ell could Na/oleon announce t)at )is June-/ected and no+elL %o+es )ad carried t)e ar%y Jse+eral days %arc) into t)e rear of t)e ene%y ()o )as no ti%e to lose if )e is to a+oid a co%/lete disaster.L !)en t)e 'renc) crossed to t)e sout) &ank of t)e ri+er at and east of 1onau(ort)3 Mack3 at last clearly gras/ing )is situation3 /lanned to retreat &y %arc)ing nort)east fro% 4l%. But Na/oleon assu%ed t)at Mack (ould e%ulate Melas and dri+e east(ard3 eit)er directly or &y +eering sout)(ard. So t)e 'renc) 2%/eror /re/ared for a &attle east of 4l% and rus)ed +irtually all of )is troo/s sout) of t)e 1anu&e3 eit)er to fig)t a &attle or to try to /re+ent an ustrian retreat due sout).L

4a oleon"s Turning Mo%ement at Ulm Back

0)e ustrians deli&erated3 delayed3 and3 encountering roads flooded &y t)e 1anu&e3 only e-tricated one detac)%ent &y t)e nort)ern route &efore Na/oleon understood t)e situation and sent forces nort) of t)e 1anu&e to &lock t)at e-it. 5n 5cto&er 2>t) Mack3 t)e rc)duke 'erdinand )a+ing fled3 surrendered 2C3>>> %en in 4l%7 t)e 'renc) )ad a large nu%&er of /risoners already3 and t)e ustrians )ad lost %any %en to desertion. 0)e 'renc) ar%ys official announce%ent of t)e +ictory clai%ed =>3>>> /risoners for t)e ca%/aign and concluded: JNe+er )a+e +ictories &een so co%/lete and less costly.L 0)e young 2%/eror3 t)roug) )is +ast strategic turning %o+e%ent3 )ad inaugurated )is e%/ire aus/iciously &y essentially destroying t)e )uge ustrian ar%y. :et Na/oleons e-ecution did not %atc) )is &rilliant conce/tion3 ()en )e acted on unfounded assu%/tions a&out ()at t)e ene%y (ould do. Mack3 too3 /erfor%ed &adly3 for at one /oint3 ()en )e learned t)e 'renc) troo/s (ere %arc)ing (est(ard to(ard 4l%3 )e Du%/ed to t)e conclusion t)at t)e 'renc) (ere retreating &ecause t)ey could not su&sist in territory already foraged and denuded &y t)e ustrians. But &ot) %en dealt (it) a situation +irtually uni.ue in (ar3 its only %odern /recedent &eing Na/oleons Marengo ca%/aign of 1B>>. Na/oleon succeeded in a %easure far greater t)an in t)e Marengo ca%/aign &ecause )e )ad a nu%erical /redo%inance of t(o to one and a ratio of force to s/ace far )ig)er t)an t)at in )is co%/ara&le o/eration in Italy. 0)ese t(o factors +ery nearly assured )is a&ility to /re+ent t)e

2=@

retreat of t)e ustrians in any direction &ut (est(ard3 to(ard t)e 'renc) frontier3 and %ade al%ost ine+ita&le t)e ustrian defeat. fter organising )is su//lies and dis/atc)ing detac)%ents to control t)e region and deal (it) ustrians in t)e l/s3 Na/oleon &egan ad+ancing east(ard to(ard Vienna3 )is (ay &arred &y 4>3>>> Russians under 9utuso+3 a general ()ose e-cellent a&ilities )ad ena&led )i% to /rofit fro% )is %ore t)an forty years of e-/erience. 0)e Russians retreated ra/idly3 )o(e+er3 and soon t)e 'renc) occu/ied Vienna3 finding t)e %aga6ines of t)e ustrian ca/ital &ulging (it) (ea/ons and food. 0)e Russians continued t)eir (it)dra(al nort)(ard into Mora+ia3 ()ere t)ey %et reinforce%ents and anot)er ustrian force. 0)e allies concentrated at 5l%ut6 in Mora+ia3 and Na/oleon )alted forty %iles to t)e sout)(est at Brunn3 ()ere )e again found fully stocked ustrian %aga6ines. 4na&le to feed B<3>>> %en for long around 5l%ut63 t)e allies ad+anced against Na/oleon3 trying to turn )is rig)t to cut )i% off fro% Vienna. In )is dis/ositions (est of t)e +illage of usterlit63 Na/oleon soug)t to reinforce t)e o&+ious allied intention to attack )is rig)t3 adding to Russian o+erconfidence. 0o co%/lete )is distraction3 )e %ade )is rig)t look (eak3 t)e ene%y &eing una(are of t)e /lanned /resence (ell in t)e rear of t)e cor/s of t)e ca/a&le Mars)al 1a+out3 t)en %aking a )asty %arc) to Doin t)e 2%/eror. 2+en so3 Na/oleon )ad already concentrated )is forces3 t)e sout)ern )alf of )is line )a+ing far fe(er %en t)an t)e nort)ern. Na/oleon )ad /re/ared /rudently to fig)t )is first classical &attle3 and3 standing on t)e defensi+e3 )e /lanned to %ake t)e %ost of )is o//onents ine/titude and t)eir o&+ious intention to o+er()el% )is rig)t. "e intended to use a /o(erful3 /re#/lanned counterattack against t)eir centre to inflict a crus)ing defeat. "e succeeded in distracting t)e% &y te%/ting t)e% to attack )is rig)t and )ad )is %en already concentrated in )is centre and on )is left to assault t)eir (eak centre. ll de/ended on t)e a&ility of t)e skilful 1a+out to )old t)e rig)t. 0)e co%&ined allied ar%y3 under t)e co%%and of t)e 0sar of Russia3 did not function (ell as a unit. 0)e o+erconfident Russians /atronised t)e recently defeated ustrians3 and t)e 0sar tended to ignore t)e ad+ice of *eneral 9utuso+3 t)e senior Russian general. 0)e council of senior officers &efore t)e &attle e-e%/lified t)e state of t)e allied ar%y: ()en an ustrian officer e-/lained t)e 0sars /lan3 %any officers /resent /aid little attention3 and 9utuso+ sle/t Soundly. 0)e allied co%%and t)us /ro+ided t)e /erfect foil for Na/oleons %aturing %ilitary genius. 2+en for a general like Na/oleon to s)ine )is &rig)test3 ine/t o//osition3 of t)e kind t)e Ro%ans su//lied for "anni&al at $annae3 (as essential. 0)e &attle follo(ed Na/oleons /lan. 1a+out %o+ed )is cor/s u/ to resist t)e Russo# ustrian assault against t)e 'renc) rig)t3 ()ic) &egan in a )alting %anner &ecause of t)e difficulty of getting so %any %en %o+ed for(ard and de/loyed on %uddy3 so%e()at o&structed ground. s soon as t)e allies )ad t)oroug)ly co%%itted t)e%sel+es in t)is effort and 1a+out &egan )is successful resistance3 Na/oleon ordered )is attack in t)e centre. fter o+erco%ing stiff o//osition3 t)e 'renc) &roke t)roug) and di+ided t)e allied ar%y into t)ree /arts: t)e retreating centre7 t)eir rig)t3 engaged in an inconclusi+e struggle (it) an e.ual nu%&er of 'renc) troo/s7 and t)e large force attacking on t)eir left. Na/oleon t)en directed t)e &ulk of )is centre against t)e flank and rear of t)e allied left Dust as 1a+out launc)ed a +igorous t)rust in front. 0(o large fro6en /onds o&structed t)e flig)t of t)e disorganised allied troo/s3 and t)e ice on one ga+e (ay under t)e (eig)t of t)e fugiti+es and t)e fire of 'renc) artillery. 0)e Battle of usterlit63 ()ic) occurred on 1ece%&er 2nd 1B><3 t)e first anni+ersary of Na/oleons e%/ire3 /ro+ed &ot) satisfactory and disa//ointing fro% a tactical stand/oint. 5f t)eir C?3>>> %en t)e 'renc) lost a&out @3>>>3 t)e 12 /ercent long traditional for +ictors. 0)e allies lost a&out 1<3>>> killed and (ounded fro% t)eir larger ar%y3 ()ic)3 ()en added to 113>>> /risoners3 e.ualled ?> /ercent of t)eir forces. In s/ite of a disastrous defeat at t)e )ands of a tactically su/erior ar%y (it) 2C>

a )ig)er /ro/ortion of &attle#seasoned troo/s and officers3 t)e allies ?> /ercent co%/ared fairly fa+oura&ly (it) t)e 22 /ercent for t)e losers of &attles in t)e /eriod 1C>2#=?. $o%/ared to Blen)ei%s o+er => /ercent loss3 t)ose at usterlit6 see% .uite s%all. Better training3 disci/line3 and articulation )ad %ade e+en t)e old#fas)ioned forces of ustria and Russia far %ore resilient in defeat t)an t)e &ayonet#ar%ed %usketeers of a century &efore.

A(tion at Austerlit1 Back

Ne+ert)eless3 t)e +ictory at usterlit6 )ad gratifying /olitical results: t)e ustrian 2%/eror /ro%/tly sued for /eace. 0)e tactical outco%e of t)e &attle )ad e-tended far &eyond %ere attrition3 for t)e Russian and ustrian forces (ere no( seriously disorganised and de%oralised. 0)e /syc)ological i%/act of t)is serious defeat3 ()ic) occurred dee/ in t)e )eart of )is do%inions3 %ade t)e ustrian 2%/eror /essi%istic enoug) to concede defeat and %ake t)e territorial concessions t)at constituted Na/oleons /rice of /eace. 0)e 0sar of Russia3 +an.uis)ed in a foreign land and at so%e distance fro% )is o(n &orders3 (as in a situation .uite different fro% )is ustrian colleague and did not sue for /eace. 0)e ustrians could )a+e continued t)eir resistance. Na/oleon3 )a+ing %arc)ed a&out <>> %iles fro% t)e R)ine3 )ad at usterlit6 less t)an )alf t)e force (it) ()ic) )e )ad &egun t)e ca%/aign. 0)e rest garrisoned t)e territory t)at )e )ad ca/tured and occu/ied /ositions to resist t)e ot)er ustrian ar%ies t)at still re%ained in t)e field. No( inde/endent of t)e Russians3 t)e ustrians re%ained a for%ida&le o//onent3 if only &ecause of t)e s)eer e-/anse of t)eir territory. Bo)e%ia3 ustrian Poland3 and t)e +ast do%ains of t)e "ungarian cro(n far e-ceeded t)e territory t)e 'renc) )ad su&Dugated. 0)e 'renc) ar%ies3 t)oug) large in relation to sout)#(estern *er%any3 (ere so s%all in co%/arison to t)e +ast ustrian do%inions t)at t)ey could not do%inate t)at %uc) s/ace in t)e a&sence of a /olitical /rogra% a//ealing to t)e su&Dects of t)e ustrian 2%/eror. 4nlike 1arius III3 t)e 2%/eror 'rancis co%%anded great loyalty fro% t)e su&Dects of )is di+erse e%/ire3 and t)e 'renc) /rogra% of /olitical li&erty and e.uality lacked a//eal to a largely rural /o/ulation. In addition3 t)e 'renc) re/utation for anti/at)y to religion created additional )ostility again 'renc) rule. 0)e ustrian 2%/eror )ad too %uc) /olitical strengt) for usterlit6 to )a+e t)e significance of le-anders +ictory at Issus or r&ela. But Na/oleons co%/arati+ely %odest /olitical goals facilitated /eace3 and t)e enor%ous costs of a continued ustrian resistance far o+er&alanced t)e concessions t)at Na/oleon de%anded. s in t)e /ast3 /olitical leaders /ro/ortioned %ilitary %eans and /olitical ends. Back

2C1

Some Characteristics of Na'oleon%s Cam'aigns

Na/oleons t)ree +ictories o+er ustria re+eal a tre%endous +ariety of ne( and old o/erational c)aracteristics. "is a//roac) to logistics differed little fro% t)at /erfected in t)e eig)teent) century3 and )e usually soug)t su//lies t)roug) contri&utions3 seeking to a+oid t)e looting re%iniscent of t)e 0)irty :ears !ar and t)e early days of t)e re/u&lic. "e de/ended less on %aga6ines and su//ly fro% t)e rear &ecause )e )ad conducted fe( sieges. Not )a+ing to fig)t in t)e Net)erlands relie+ed )i% of %any sieges3 and )is (illingness to &y/ass fortified /oints in Italy and *er%any %ade t)e% negligi&le t)ere3 too. 2noug) %en to lea+e &e)ind in garrisons facilitated t)is3 and )is a&ility to force &attle on )is o//onents re%o+ed one of t)e traditional attractions of a siege O t)e o//ortunity to gi+e a relie+ing ar%y a strong incenti+e to fig)t on t)e &esiegers ter%s. 0)e tactics of t)e &attles continued t)e 'renc) re+olutionary tradition of relying3 (it) %any +ariations3 on t)e regulations of 1C@1. Manoeu+ring in a colu%n t(el+e dee/ and fifty or si-ty files &road3 'renc) &attalions could ra/idly de/loy into reasona&ly (ell#aligned for%ations t)ree dee/. 0)e &attalions did not constitute a continuous line3 &ut t)e fire/o(er of t)e %usket co+ered t)e ga/s. 4sually so%e &attalions de/loyed in line ()ile ot)ers re%ained in colu%n ready to e-/loit (eakness3 reinforce success3 or take ad+antage of a )ole in t)e ene%ys line &y %arc)ing t)roug)3 still in colu%n for%ation. Variety c)aracterised )is tactics3 &ut Na/oleon /referred t)is and its s/irit usually ani%ated t)e dis/ositions of )is su&ordinates. lt)oug) t)e ustrians &egan gradually to ado/t so%e of t)e 'renc) ideas3 t)e tactics ins/ired &y t)e regulations of 1C@1 ga+e t)e 'renc) &etter tactical %o&ility and t)e a&ility to %ake use of it &y ra/id de/loy%ent. In a sense t)ey )ad a &etter (ea/on syste%. 8ust as le-anders use of s)ock ca+alry )ad gi+en )i% &attle su/re%acy3 so did t)e 'renc) tactical syste% gi+e t)e% a consistent ad+antage. 0)ey enDoyed t)is ascendancy in s/ite of t)e /re/onderance of t)e e-cellent ustrian ca+alry until Na/oleon3 like 'rederick t)e *reat earlier3 i%/ro+ed t)e 'renc) )orse%en after 1B>>. 0)e %ost striking feature of Na/oleons ca%/aigns is t)e fre.uency of &attles. lt)oug) t)e reduction of casualties in defeat s)ould )a+e %ade all co%%anders %ore (illing to risk co%&at3 t)is )ad done little to aug%ent t)e nu%&ers of &attles in t)e eig)teent) century. nd no furt)er reduction in casualties occurred during Na/oleonic ti%es to s/ur )is increase in &attles. 0)e 'renc) /ossession of a &etter (ea/on syste% introduced a ne( factor t)at not only %ade t)e% Dustifia&ly confident of t)e result of co%&at &ut also decreased t)e cost of re/lacing soldiers: t)eir tactics reduced re.uire%ents for training. lt)oug) t)e 'renc) used an essentially linear syste%3 only &attalions needed /ro/er align%ent3 %usket fire co+ering ga/s in t)e line. 0)is s%aller re.uire%ent for an e-act linear array3 toget)er (it) %uc) %o+e%ent taking /lace in colu%n3 %eant t)at soldiers needed less training in t)e drill necessary to ena&le %any %en to ad+ance in linear de/loy%ent. In addition3 since t)e 'renc) did not fig)t t)e traditional &attle (it) continuous o//osing fronts &ut used t)eir %o&ility to concentrate against (eakness or to en+elo/ an ene%y /osition3 t)ey did not de/end so %uc) on a %ore ra/id rate of fire in a frontal fig)t (it) an o//osing line. 0)is %eant t)at t)ey could dis/ense (it) %uc) %usketry training. Re/lace%ents soon &eca%e fairly effecti+e soldiers3 es/ecially if t)e ne( %en did not greatly outnu%&er +eterans in any &attalion. lt)oug) as a /ro/ortion of /o/ulation 'renc) ar%ies under Na/oleon did not e-ceed in si6e t)ose of ,ouis IIV3 conscri/tion assured a continuous flo( of %en ()o needed co%/arati+ely little training. 'urt)er3 'renc) ar%ies dis/layed %ore (illingness t)an %ost of t)eir o//onents to dra( on t)is source of %an/o(er and could generally count on %ore /atriotis% and %oti+ation fro% t)eir conscri/ts t)an could t)eir ene%ies. But t)ese factors e-/lain only a s%all /art of t)e c)ange. Most i%/ortant (as t)e a&ility of an ar%y dis/ersed in di+isions to force co%&at. dis/ersed ar%y could turn strong /ositions3 a %anoeu+re long &affling to a (ell#concentrated force t)at )ad to fig)t as a unit. 0)e 'renc) infantrys offensi+e attri&utes3 %arc)ing ra/idly and going into action .uickly3 co%/elled an o//onent eit)er 2C2

to resist or to retreat to t)e rear. It (as no longer /ossi&le to retreat side(ays or3 as Montecuccoli )ad done to 0urenne3 to %arc) a(ay /ast a flank. No( suc) a retreating ar%y )ad to %eet a di+ision3 ()ic) (ould soon &e reinforced &y t)e rest of its ar%y. Na/oleon foug)t so %any &attles for a +ariety of reasons. !it) )is genius and a&ility to ins/ire )is %en and )is (ell#Dustified confidence in +ictory3 )e soug)t &attle &ecause )e understood t)e +alue of t)e attrition inflicted &y a +ictory and t)e /olitical and /syc)ological i%/act of a dra%atic triu%/) in &attle. :et )is &attles al(ays in+aria&ly )ad a significant strategic conte-t. In )is initial ca%/aign against t)e Sardinians and ustrians3 )e foug)t no %aDor &attle &ut used co%&at to /lace )is ar%y &et(een )is o//onents and dri+e &ack first one and t)en t)e ot)er. In )is su&se.uent crossing of t)e Po and t)e Mincio ri+ers3 )e used t)e traditional %et)od of distraction and crossing at t)e une-/ected /oint t)at )ad long ty/ified o/erations against t)e Italian ri+er lines. But )is defence of )is Mantua siege did not follo( t)e usual /attern of t)e &esiegers co+ering ar%y standing ready on c)osen ground to recei+e t)e attack of t)e relie+ing force. Instead3 t)e ustrian syste% of ad+ancing (it) t(o %ain colu%ns in t)e e-/ectation t)at one (ould get t)roug) t)reatened Bona/artes rear3 &ut also /resented Na/oleon (it) t)e o//ortunity as (ell as t)e need to concentrate against eac) o//onent in turn. 0)is resulted in !ur%sers recei+ing &attle at $astiglione and Bona/artes (inning &y attacking t)e ustrian left rear (it) a turning force. In eac) of t)e t)ree succeeding ustrian efforts to relie+e Mantua t)e /attern re/eated itself3 t)e di+ided ustrians al(ays /resenting an o//ortunity to e-/loit interior lines and3 on one occasion3 to atte%/t en+elo/%ent. In eac) instance Bona/arte dro+e &ack t)e ene%y3 finally securing t)e ca/itulation of Mantua and a garrison aug%ented &y 'ield Mars)al !ur%ser and /art of )is second relie+ing force. 5n t)e strategic defensi+e co+ering )is siege3 Bona/arte )ad assu%ed t)e tactical offensi+e to counter t)e ustrians %et)od of relief and to e-/loit t)eir di+ision. 0)e result of t)ese o/erations3 ()ic) e-tended o+er %ore t)an si- %ont)s3 /ro+ed +ery e-/ensi+e for t)e ustrians. 0)eir losses in &attle and at Mantua far e-ceeded t)ose of t)e 'renc). $oncentration on interior lines )ad as its o&Decti+e t)e &attles and t)e s%aller conflicts not recorded as %aDor &attles. 0)e 'renc) syste% of de/loy%ent fro% colu%n to line and t)e di+isional structure and articulation of 'renc) ar%ies ga+e a %aDor ne( i%/ortance to interior lines3 forcing t)e ene%y to fig)t or to retreat directly to t)e rear. Na/oleons concentrations and successful co%&ats )ad t)e strategic outco%e of forcing t)e retreat of t)e relie+ing forces and t)e tactical result of attrition3 ()ic) contri&uted a %aDor s)are to t)e cri//ling cost of t)e relief efforts to t)e ustrians. By Marc) 1C@C3 (it) Mantua and its garrison in 'renc) )ands3 Bona/arte )ad t)e strengt) to assu%e t)e offensi+e into ustrian territory. In t)e Marengo ca%/aign3 &attle also )ad an i%/ortant /art3 and again Bona/arte re+ersed t)e usual corres/ondence &et(een strategy and tactics. !)ereas t)e strategic defence usually led to t)e tactical defence in &attle3 in defending )is Mantua siege Bona/arte foug)t offensi+e &attles. 5n t)e strategic offensi+e in Italy3 )e foug)t on t)e tactical defensi+e at Marengo: t)e ustrians )ad to fig)t t)eir (ay &ack to t)eir /ri%ary &ase area and line of co%%unications (it) t)eir )o%eland. 0)e Battle of Marengo /layed a key role in &locking t)e ustrian retreat3 and3 t)oug) it did not result in ca/itulation3 it did lead ustria to a&andon %ost of nort)ern Italy. 0)e sa%e outco%e occurred at 4l%3 ()ere %ost of t)e concentrated ustrian forces surrendered (it)out a &attle. 0)e s%aller &attles fro% Na/oleons initial entry into Italy in 1C@= to t)ose around 4l%3 like t)e &attles fro% $astiglione to Marengo3 all i%/le%ented and co%/leted t)e strategic %anoeu+res t)at led to t)e%. 0)e fig)ts3 &ig and s%all3 %ade t)e %anoeu+re /ossi&le3 and t)e %anoeu+res ga+e strategic significance to t)ese co%&ats3 %any of ()ic) /lucked t)e fruit %ade ri/e &y t)e %arc)ing ()ic) concentrated on interior lines or turned t)e ene%y. 0)e use of interior lines %ade &attlefield success likely3 and t)e su&se.uent +ictory forced t)e ene%y &ack. 0)e

2C?

strategic turning %o+e%ent forced t)e ene%y to ca/itulate &y cutting off its line of retreat7 &ut t)e %anoeu+re re.uired a defensi+e &attle if t)e ene%y soug)t to retreat3 as Melas did at Marengo. !it)out t)e strategic turning %o+e%ent no &attle (ould )a+e occurred3 (it)out t)e &attle3 or t)e (illingness to fig)t it in a /osition to &lock t)e ene%ys retreat3 t)e turning %o+e%ent (ould )a+e lost %uc) of its i%/ort. 0)e a&ility to force &attle3 toget)er (it) a &etter tactical syste%3 ()ic) en)anced t)e likeli)ood of a 'renc) +ictory3 ga+e an i%/ortance to interior lines and t)e strategic turning %o+e%ent t)at t)ey )ad lacked earlier. 4sed &y $onsul Nero against "anni&al and "asdru&al3 &y $aesar against Po%/ey3 &y Prince 2d(ard against t)e de Montforts3 and 'rederick against )is encircling ene%ies3 t)ey )ad re%ained of little i%/ortance in (arfare until t)e dis/ersed ar%y and t)e a&ility to entangle an ene%y in &attle )ad suddenly %ade t)e% i%/ortant. But Na/oleon did not alter t)e funda%ental strategic goals t)at )ad e%erged fro% *usta+uss use of a /ersisting strategy. "e ai%ed to ca/ture ene%y territory to su//ort )is ar%y3 to (eaken )is ad+ersary3 and to gain t)e le+erage necessary to attain t)e /olitical o&Decti+es of (ar. lt)oug) in t)e 4l% ca%/aign )e &asically destroyed a %aDor ustrian ar%y3 )e could not )a+e founded a strategy on consistently ac)ie+ing suc) %arked co%&at success. "e )ad su&stituted a co%&at strategy &ased on %anoeu+res and &attle for t)e logistic %et)ods of )is /redecessors. "e re/laced t)e slo( (ork of sieges (it) )is ne( for% of co%&at strategy. "e su/erseded t)e distraction and &y/assing of an ene%y ar%y3 as e-e%/lified &y VendU%e and 2ugene3 to carry out t)e essentially logistic strategy of forcing &ack t)e foe &y getting into and controlling an o//onents &ase area. 0)is earlier strategy did forecast t)e strategic turning %o+e%ent used in t)e Marengo and 4l% ca%/aigns. Mars)al VendU%e )ad acco%/lis)ed t)is %anoeu+re against Prince 2ugene3 and t)e I%/erial co%%ander )ad attacked to reco+er )is &ase area. But t)e 4l% ca%/aign %ost dra%atically illustrated t)e difference3 for Na/oleon &locked t)e retreat and ca/tured t)e ustrian ar%y3 so%et)ing &eyond t)e a&ility of VendU%e and )is concentrated ar%y. 0)e old logistic strategy of &y/assing t)e ene%y could only force t)e ene%y &ack &y de/ri+ing )i% of su//lies7 t)e ne( co%&at strategy could ca/ture )is ar%y since a &roadly dis/ersed ar%y could &lock t)e routes of (it)dra(al ()en t)e co%%ander )ad a fa+oura&le ratio of force to s/ace. Na/oleon3 )a+ing &rilliantly e-)i&ited t)e /otentialities of t)e ne( ar%ies to i%/le%ent t)e /ersisting strategy &y a funda%entally ne( co%&at strategy3 defeated ustria for t)e t)ird ti%e in a traditional &attle at usterlit6. "e /ro+ed as &rilliant at t)e con+entional &attle as )e )ad in strategy3 and t)e dee/ /enetration of ene%y territory resulting fro% )is +ictory at 4l% %ade usterlit6 decisi+e for ending t)e (ar. In so%e (ays Na/oleons o/erations reflected a /eculiar stage in t)e transfor%ation of (arfare. In contests &et(een ar%ies (it) t)e sa%e (ea/on syste%s3 t)e tactical defence al(ays )ad )ad t)e ad+antage. $onse.uently3 generals since t)e early si-teent) century (ere reluctant to fig)t offensi+e &attles and )ad soug)t to e-/loit t)e /ri%acy of t)e defence &y atte%/ting to tra/ an ene%y against an o&stacle3 as "enry IV )ad al%ost succeeded in doing to Par%a3 or &y forcing t)e ene%y to attack to raise a siege. In strategy t)ey often used logistics rat)er t)an co%&at to con.uer an ene%ys territory3 a+oiding an engage%ent under unfa+oura&le tactical conditions. Na/oleons use of t)e strategic turning %o+e%ent at Marengo and 4l% introduced a no+el %et)od of forcing t)e ene%y to assu%e t)e tactical offensi+e. 'urt)er3 )is offensi+e strategy3 ()ic) e%/loyed t)e tactical defence3 endo(ed t)e &attle (it) a strategic i%/ortance t)at %ost contests could not )a+e: t)e ene%ys retreat (as &locked3 Dust as t)e Seine )ad a//arently foreclosed Par%as (it)dra(al. Victory on t)e tactical defence at Marengo t)us )ad great strategic significance. 0)e ar%y3 distri&uted in di+isions &ut unified in action3 )ad %ade t)is strategic turning %o+e%ent /ossi&le3 and t)e tactical strengt) of &ayonet#ar%ed %usketeers )ad %ade

2C4

co%%anders co%forta&le (it) a dis/ersion t)at in+ited attack &y a ca+alry e-celling in %o&ility &ut (eaker as a (ea/on syste%. But Na/oleon also effecti+ely used t)e tactical offensi+e ()en )e e%/loyed )is interior lines to concentrate and attack an o//onent ()o )ad often3 as )ad !ur%ser at $astiglione3 de/loyed )i%self for &attle on )is c)osen ground. Na/oleon could assu%e t)e tactical offensi+e &ecause )is ar%y )ad a &etter a&ility3 to concentrate on t)e &attlefield3 and3 (it) greater tactical %o&ility3 'renc) infantry could %o+e and de/loy ra/idly enoug) to attack t)e ene%ys flank or rear3 t)e traditional /reser+e of ca+alry. ,ike 'rederick t)e *reat3 Na/oleon could afford to assu%e t)e tactical offensi+e. 'redericks and Na/oleons e-/loitation of interior lines aug%ented t)eir nu%&ers for a &attle7 to ca/italise on it re.uired an offensi+e &attle unless t)e ene%y o&liged &y attacking t)ese aug%ented forces. Back

(he #ugmented Significance of Numerical Su'eriority

0)e si6e of ar%ies (as assu%ing greater i%/ortance in co%&at. In &attles &et(een *reek )o/lites of e.ual strengt)3 skill counted %ore t)an nu%&ers. 5nly if &ot) sides foug)t to t)e finis) (ould t)e .uantity of %en tell. 'or e-a%/le3 a force of 1>3>>> (ould )a+e at least <3>>> %en re%aining after killing or (ounding all %e%&ers of a force of <3>>>. 0)roug) t)e si-teent) century and for so%e ti%e after3 skill continued to )a+e %ore significance t)an .uantity: fronts re%ained e.ual as generals carefully anc)ored t)eir flanks on o&stacles. But t)e use of t)e %usket and artillery gradually in+ol+ed %ore %en t)an t)e front rank alone3 and ()en turning and en+elo/ing %o+e%ents e-tended &attle lines3 nu%&ers &eca%e increasingly i%/ortant. Not only could a larger ar%y lengt)en its front %ore readily3 &ut it could easily &ring %ore %en into action. 0)us on a discontinuous front or as a result of a %o+e%ent against t)e flank3 t)e greater force %ig)t engage t(o &attalions against one. co%%ander using )is nu%erical su/eriority in t)is (ay attained an ad+antage t)at (as %ore t)an /ro/ortional to )is greater nu%&ers. If all %en of t(o forces3 e.ual in skill &ut une.ual in si6e3 could fire at one anot)er3 eac) co%&atant (ould suffer losses /ro/ortional to t)e .uantity of &ullets recei+ed. 0)us if force )ad dou&le t)e %en of force B3 Bs (ould recei+e t(ice t)e &ullets and )a+e t(ice t)e casualties of . If )ad 23>>> and B 13>>> %en and3 in t)e first %o%ent of t)e co%&at3 )ad lost 1 soldier3 B (ould )a+e lost 2. 0)e ratio &et(een t)e t(o forces (ould no longer &e 2 to 1: (ould )a+e 13@@@ and B @@B3 a ratio of 2 to >.@@B<. no( (ould )a+e relati+ely greater strengt) t)an at t)e &eginning. s t)e &attle /rogressed3 (ould gain relati+e strengt) until anni)ilated B. If one follo(ed t)is idea of '. !. ,anc)ester and used )is differential e.uation to sol+e for t)e casualties3 (ould )a+e losses not of 13>>> %en3 as in con+entional s)ock action3 &ut of only 2=B %en ()ile at least one &ullet (ould )a+e )it all of Bs soldiers. 0)us3 ()en all %en on &ot) sides can fig)t (it) %issiles3 nu%erical su/eriority confers a dis/ro/ortionate ad+antage3 /ro+iding co%%anders can &ring into action all %en on eac) side. In fact3 under t)ese conditions3 t)e fig)ting strengt) of forces is in /ro/ortion to t)e s.uare of t)eir strengt): a force of 23>>> %en is 4 ti%es as /o(erful as t)e force of 13>>>. 0)is rule3 ()ic) its originator '. !. ,anc)ester called t)e N#s.uare la(3 assu%es t)e sa%e fig)ting +alue of t)e soldiers on &ot) sides. If t)e fig)ting +alue differed3 one (ould )a+e to %odify co%&at /o(er &y %ulti/lying t)e s.uared strengt) &y t)e co%&at +alue of t)e soldiers on eac) side. 'or e-a%/le3 if t)e soldiers in force B )ad t(ice t)e co%&at effecti+eness of t)ose in force 3 t)eir ratios (ould &e 2 to 13 rat)er t)an 4 to 1 G23>>> s.uaredH3 or3 43>>>3>>>3 to 13>>> s.uared3 or 13>>>3>>> Gti%es 2H3 or 23>>>3>>>.

2C<

0)e sa%e .ualification a//lies (it) res/ect to co%&at &et(een different (ea/on syste%s. ssu%e3 for e-a%/le3 t)at force consisted of Mosle% )orse arc)ers and force B (as $rusader cross&o(%en3 eac) e.ually &ra+e and as skilful (it) t)eir (ea/ons. But since t)e %en on foot3 (it)out t)e insta&ility and distraction of %anaging %ounts3 )ad an ad+antage o+er %ounted %en3 assu%e t)e cross&o(%en )ad t(ice t)e effecti+eness of t)e )orse arc)ers. 0)en force (ould )a+e only 2 Grat)er t)an 4H ti%es t)e co%&at +alue of force B G13>>> s.uared3 or 43>>>3>>>3 to 13>>> s.uared Gor 13>>>3>>>H - 23 or 23>>>3>>>. 0)e N#s.uare la( also assu%es t)at &ot) forces are on t)e offensi+e. But &et(een %usketeers3 for e-a%/le3 t)e %en on t)e defensi+e )a+e t)e ad+antage of %aintaining continuous +olleys (it)out t)e interru/tion of t)e ad+ance or concern (it) align%ent. In addition3 t)ey %ay )a+e co+er3 suc) as ditc)es and &anks. gain one (ould )a+e to %odify t)e results of t)e N#s.uare la( &y t)e aug%ented co%&at effecti+eness conferred &y fig)ting on t)e defensi+e under /articular circu%stances. In s/ite of t)e &enefit of t)e defensi+e3 t)e /ossession of %ore %en )ad a %agnified effect if a co%%ander could fig)t so as to &ring t)e additional %en into action. 0)us concentration of greater nu%&ers3 )o(e+er ac)ie+ed3 could confer significant ad+antages. !)en co%&ined (it) t)e uni.ue tactical ca/a&ilities of 'renc) infantry and t)e &enefits conferred &y dis/ersal in di+isions3 Na/oleon )ad o//ortunities on t)e tactical offensi+e una+aila&le to )is o//onents3 e+en t)oug) 'renc) soldiers lacked t)e ustrian skill in +olley firing. But since t)e ustrians enDoyed no suc) added strengt) on t)e tactical offensi+e3 t)e 'renc) could e-/loit t)e traditional /redo%inance of t)e defensi+e at Marengo ()ile %aking t)e %ost of t)eir offensi+e e-cellence at $astiglione and else()ere. 0)e 'renc) )ad t)e &est of &ot) (orlds3 and Na/oleons strategy %ade t)e %ost of it. 0)e success t)at )e enDoyed and )is s%all losses indicate t)at )e )ad not o+erlooked any easier /at) to +ictory. But )is o//onents &egan to ado/t t)e 'renc) syste%3 and &y 1B1? t)e 'renc) no longer )ad any ad+antage fro% t)eir tactical %et)ods3 articulation3 and dis/ersion in di+isions. Back

Some "ater Na'oleonic Cam'aigns

Na/oleons later o/erations (ere consistent (it) )is earlier ca%/aigns. In 1B>= )e foug)t Prussia3 /itting )is (ell#led co%&at +eterans against a force t)at )ad )ad no %aDor &attle e-/erience in %ore t)an forty years and ()ose /eaceti%e training )ad continued to stress t)e %et)ods of 'rederick t)e *reat. "e %ade t)e %ost of t)is ad+antage &y a turning %o+e%ent t)at /laced )is ar%y on t)e Prussian flank and rear3 and /ro%/tly attacked t)e ene%y. lt)oug) t)e Prussians faced t)eir attackers3 'renc) tactical /ri%acy easily o+er()el%ed t)e%. Na/oleon follo(ed u/ t)ese t(in +ictories at 8ena and uerstadt &y a +igorous and unre%itting strategic /ursuit t)at o+erran a large /art of Prussian territory and secured t)e ca/itulation of %ost of t)e de%oralised Prussians fortified /oints as (ell as t)eir ar%y. 0)e )uge 'renc) force soon do%inated %ost of t)e s%all countrys le+el terrain3 including its %ost i%/ortant and /roducti+e territory. 5nly t)e fortifications of Silesia and t)e troo/s in t)e distant /ro+inces of Poland and 2ast Prussia )eld out. Na/oleon t)en %arc)ed east against t)e Russians and t)e re%ains of t)e Prussian ar%y. In a (inter ca%/aign in s/arsely /o/ulated3 nearly roadless Poland and 2ast Prussia3 Na/oleon3 so%eti%es confused &y erratic Russian %o+es3 /us)ed t)e elusi+e ene%y &ack 1<> %iles until its co%%ander c)ose a defensi+e &attle o+er retreat and de/loyed for co%&at at 2ylau. "ere Na/oleon3 (it) inferior nu%&ers3 atte%/ted to unite )is forces on t)e &attlefield to attack t)e Russian flank and rear. "e failed to reac) t)e Russian rear &ut (on instead an essentially frontal &attle (it) t)e traditionally o&stinate Russians7 eac) side lost a&out ?> /ercent of t)eir forces. fter a four#%ont) interlude for (inter .uarters3 rest and resu//ly3 Na/oleon resu%ed t)e ca%/aign. !)en again t)e Russians decided to fig)t rat)er t)an retreat3 )e )ad %ore success at 'riedland3 ()ere in anot)er funda%entally frontal &attle )is for%ida&le ar%y inflicted o+er ?> /ercent casualties on t)e ine/tly

2C=

co%%anded and &adly /ositioned Russian ar%y at a cost of less t)an 14 /ercent casualties to t)e 'renc) ar%y. s a result of t)ese +ictories Na/oleon o+erran t)e re%ainder of Prussian territory3 &ut %ore t)an 13>>> %iles fro% t)e R)ine3 )e )ad Dust reac)ed t)e Russian frontier. 0)e 0sar )o(e+er3 %ade /eace at t)e %odest cost of only forcing )i% to sacrifice )is goal of succouring t)e Prussians. In /ril 1B>@ Na/oleon faced (ar (it) a for%ida&le ustrian ar%y3 /art of ()ose strengt) lay in its sagacious co%%ander3 t)e rc)duke $)arles. 0)e rc)duke3 an e/ile/tic3 )ad &y age t)irty# se+en de%onstrated a /rofound %astery of strategy and tactics and garnered %uc) /restige &y )is +ictories o+er 'renc) generals. But )e )ad yet to %eet Na/oleon. "e could a//roac) t)is daunting task (it) confidence &orn of )is acco%/lis)%ents3 )is %ore t)an a decade of ser+ice in )ig) co%%ands3 and t)e refor%ation3 t)oug) yet inco%/lete3 of t)e ustrian ar%y3 ()ic) )e )ad guided. $onscious t)at t)e ustrians %ig)t ad+ance at any ti%e3 Na/oleon re%ained in Paris3 kee/ing in touc) (it) )is ar%y )ead.uarters in *er%any t)roug) a significant inno+ation3 t)e $)a//e telegra/)3 installed in 'rance fifteen years earlier. 0)e $)a//e telegra/) consisted of a line of signal stations (it)in sig)t of eac) ot)er3 t)e stations a&le to relay a %essage on a clear day at a to/ s/eed of =>> %iles an )our. !)en t)e rc)duke $)arles suddenly ad+anced (it) 2>>3>>> ustrians3 Na/oleon learned a&out it /ro%/tly3 t)e %essage tra+elling t)e C>> %iles fro% Ratis&on to Paris in t(enty#four )ours. 4ntil )e arri+ed to take /ersonal co%%and3 Na/oleon used t)e telegra/) to direct )is dis/ositions3 t)oug) a stor% so i%/aired +isi&ility t)at it delayed a crucial telegra/)ic order. !)en t)e ustrian ar%y ad+anced along t)e 1anu&e (it) si- cor/s sout) of t)e ri+er and t(o on t)e nort) &ank3 t)e rc)duke $)arles looked for o//ortunities to e-/loit t)e dis/ersion in (inter .uarters of t)e 'renc) ar%y of 1C>3>>> %en. "e sa( )is c)ance and directed one cor/s on t)e nort) of t)e ri+er and fi+e on t)e sout) against t)e inco%/ara&le Mars)al 1a+out3 ()ose cor/s occu/ied a for(ard /osition at Ratis&on. !it) t(o ustrian cor/s to t)e (est to delay t)e %o+e%ent of t)e 'renc) on &ot) sides of t)e ri+er3 t)e rc)duke /lanned to use )is fi+e cor/s sout) of t)e ri+er .uickly to crus) 1a+out and )is one cor/s nort) of t)e ri+er to /re+ent t)e 'renc) retreat. But Na/oleon %o+ed for(ard ra/idly3 s/lit t)e ustrian forces in )alf3 and dro+e /art sout) and /art o+er t)e 1anu&e into Bo)e%ia. gain Na/oleon )ad di+ided )is o//onent and dri+en )is (ings in o//osite directions. s t)is o/eration dre( to a close3 t)e &uoyant 2%/eror3 on /assing a regi%ent of infantry3 sto//ed and asked t)e colonel if )e could see t)e &ra+est soldier in t)e unit. !)en t)e colonel introduced t)e %an3 a &ands%an3 t)e 2%/eror said to )i%: JI )ear t)at you are t)e &ra+est %an in t)is regi%ent. I a//oint you a knig)t of t)e ,egion of "onour. Baron of t)e 2%/ire3 and a(ard you a /ension of 43>>> francs.L Suc) a gesture3 including t)e raising of an enlisted %an to a /eerage3 )ad3 as t)e story tra+elled around t)e ar%y3 a /rofoundly fa+oura&le effect on t)e %orale of t)e rank and file. Na/oleon /ursued t)e retreating ustrians3 &ut ()en )e reac)ed Vienna3 )e )ad a /rotracted struggle %arked &y t(o &attles &efore )e succeeded in dri+ing t)e rc)duke $)arles fro% t)e nort) &ank of t)e ri+er. "e again i%/osed /eace on ustria3 su&tracting ?>3>>> s.uare %iles fro% t)e s)rinking ustrian 2%/ire. In 1B12 Na/oleon in+aded Russia. "e ad+anced (it) 5+er 4>>3>>> 'renc) and allied troo/s and %ade ela&orate su//ly arrange%ents to co/e (it) )is large force in a t)inly /o/ulated country. In t)ree %ont)s )e %arc)ed =>> %iles fro% Poland to Mosco(3 t)e Russians retreating &efore )i% and to )is flanks. 0)e Russians foug)t t(ice3 losing t(o frontal &attles. 5ccu/ying t)e traditionally

2CC

i%/ortant Russian city of Mosco( in %id#Se/te%&er3 t)e 'renc) 2%/eror t)en %ade /eace o+ertures to t)e 0sar of Russia. 0)e 0sar dis/layed no %ore interest in /eace t)an )ad 'renc) kings )arassed &y 2nglis) raids during t)e "undred :ears !ar. 0)oug) Na/oleon )ad larger forces in /ro/ortion to t)e si6e of 2uro/ean Russia t)an t)e 2nglis) in /ro/ortion to 'rance3 'renc) forces in Russia still could do little %ore t)an garrison /oints on t)e route o+er ()ic) t)ey ad+anced. 0)e )uge 'renc) ar%y )ad no %ore effect on %ost of Russia t)an t)e 2nglis) )ad in 'rance3 and it Gand its less syste%atic de/redationsH %ade t)e soldiers Dust as un/o/ular in Russia as 2nglis) looting )ad &een in 'rance. 0)oug) Na/oleons raid /ro+oked Russian resistance in &attle Dust as )ad 2nglis) raids3 t)e 0sar dis/layed t)e sa%e deter%ination not to concede anyt)ing to a raiding strategy3 as )ad t)e 'renc) kings of t)e fourteent) century. Na/oleon3 failing to gras/ t)at )e )ad %ade a raid t)at )ad failed3 lingered a %ont) in Mosco( &efore &eginning to %arc) )is ar%y &ack to Poland in t)e t)ird (eek of 5cto&er. ,ike t)e Prince of !aless raiders %arc)ing &ack to(ard Poitiers in 1?<=3 Na/oleons ar%y3 also )ea+ily laden (it) &ooty3 %o+ed slo(ly3 t)e Russians )arassing t)eir %arc). 4nlike t)e Prince of !ales3 Na/oleon lacked a &al%y Se/te%&er cli%ate and t)e fertile and (ell#/o/ulated 'renc) countryside u/on ()ic) to forage. In addition3 on %uc) of t)e (it)dra(al t)e 'renc) ar%ies %arc)ed o+er territory t)ey )ad foraged on t)eir ad+ance. 0)e %anage%ent and t)e contents of t)e su//ly de/ots on t)eir retreat also disa//ointed t)e 'renc). 8ust as t)e 'renc) 9ing caug)t t)e Prince of !ales at Poitiers3 so t)e Russians caug)t t)e retreating 'renc)3 al%ost /re+enting t)eir crossing of t)e Beresina Ri+er. Suc) raids as Na/oleons and t)ose of t)e "undred :ears !ar usually cost t)e raiders %any stragglers. In t)eir &iggest raid in 'rance3 t)e 2nglis) %arc)ed 13>>> %iles in fi+e %ont)s and lost )alf of t)eir ar%y7 in Russia t)e 'renc) %arc)ed o+er t(ice as far3 faced &etter#organised o//osition3 and )ad to contend (it) cold (eat)er and t)e &arren Russian countryside. 0)eir losses3 +ariously esti%ated3 far e-ceeded )alf of t)ose in+ol+ed in t)e ca%/aign3 including %any 'renc) +eterans. 0)is defeat &roug)t Russia and Prussia into t)e (ar against 'rance in 1B1?. !it) a ne( ar%y of green troo/s3 Na/oleon dis/layed )is usual a&ilities ()en )e %anoeu+red a dis/ersed force of o+er 1>>3>>> %en &et(een 1resden and Magde&urg. "e dro+e &ack t)e Russians and Prussians fro% t)e 2l&e into Silesia3 (inning t(o %aDor &attles in t)e /rocess. fter a truce in 8une and 8uly 1B1? t)e allies3 no( Doined &y ustria3 dis/osed t)ree large ar%ies under talented co%%anders. In t)e nort) around Berlin t)e ca/a&le Bernadotte3 for%er 'renc) Mars)al and $ro(n Prince of S(eden3 co%%anded a&out 1>>3>>> %en. 0o t)e east in Silesia t)e elderly Prussian 'ield Mars)al Bluc)er )ad al%ost as %any. 0)e old ca+alry%ans %ind )ad (eakened: )e so%eti%es (alked on ti/toe &ecause )e t)oug)t 'renc) s/ies )ad )eated t)e floor3 and often )e i%agined )i%self /regnant (it) an ele/)ant. But )e /ossessed t)e in+alua&le assets of unre%itting energy3 /)ysical and %oral courage3 t)e /o(er of %aking fir% decisions3 and a )ar%onious relation (it) *neisenau3 )is e-traordinarily co%/etent c)ief of staff. 0o t)e sout) in Bo)e%ia3 rc)duke $)arles )a+ing retired3 t)e ustrian co%%and (ent to t)e astute young soldier#di/lo%at3 'ield Mars)al Prince Sc)(ar6en&erg. Ironically3 Sc)(ar6en&erg3 ()o led 24>3>>> %en3 /artly o(ed )is ele+ation to t)e fa+oura&le i%/ression )e )ad %ade on Na/oleon ()ile on a %ission to Paris. 0)e ustrian co%%ander also e-ercised control o+er all allied forces. But t)e 0sar of Russia3 t)e 2%/eror of ustria3 t)e 9ing of Prussia3 and t(o fa%ous %ilitary e-/erts acco%/anied Sc)(ar6en&erg3 and t)e %onarc)s deter%ined )is decisions. !eaknesses in )is o(n staff and t)e cluster of rulers and fa+ourites caused e+en t)e di/lo%atic

2CB

Sc)(ar6en&erg to la%ent3 JIt really is in)u%an ()at I %ust tolerate and &ear3 surrounded as I a% &y fee&le#%inded /eo/le3 eccentric /roDectors3 intriguers3 asses3 &a&&lers3 and niggling critics.L 0)e allies did3 )o(e+er3 %ake a /lan designed to deal (it) Na/oleons use of interior lines. If Na/oleon concentrated against any of t)e t)ree ar%ies3 t)at force (ould retreat and a+oid &attle ()ile t)e ot)er t(o ad+anced. 0)us in t)e area ()ere 'rederick )ad %ade t)e %ost of )is interior lines in 1C<B3 t)e allies (ould a+oid co%&at and (ear out t)e 'renc) (it) %arc)ing ()ile t)ey concentrated in ti%e &y gradually closing in until t)eir t)ree ar%ies ca%e near enoug) to eac) ot)er to /ro+ide %utual su//ort. 0)oug) t)e co%%anders /ro/erly stood in a(e of Na/oleons %ilitary genius3 %any of t)eir rank and file )ad &etter training and %ore co%&at e-/erience t)an Na/oleons ra( troo/s3 and all allied ar%ies )ad ado/ted 'renc) tactical and strategic doctrine3 t)e ustrian and Prussian units )a+ing t)e tactical ca/a&ilities t)at )ad long distinguis)ed t)e 'renc) ar%ies. gainst t)e for%ida&le force 5f 4<>3>>> %en Na/oleon )ad a&out ?>>3>>>. !)en 'ield Mars)al Bluc)er &egan t)e ca%/aign &y %arc)ing (est3 Na/oleon3 seeing t)at t)e forces in Bo)e%ia (ould concentrate slo(ly3 ad+anced to dri+e &ack Bluc)er &efore turning against Sc)(ar6en&erg. 5n t)e a//roac) of Na/oleon (it) aug%ented forces3 Bluc)er follo(ed t)e allied /lan3 a+oided &attle3 and (it)dre( )astily to t)e east ()ile Sc)(ar6en&erg e%erged fro% Bo)e%ia and t)reatened 1resden. Na/oleon .uickly %o+ed troo/s (est(ard to(ard 1resden3 one &ody of %en %arc)ing 12> %iles in four days. "e concentrated 1>>3>>> %en in t)e defence of 1resden in ti%e to re/el t)e attack of 2>>3>>> allied troo/s and to defeat t)e% in &attle3 inflicting ?>3>>> casualties to 1>3>>> for )is forces. But in )is /ursuit of t)e retreating allies3 )e lost 1@3>>> %en to only 13>>> for t)e allies on t)eir %arc) &ack into Bo)e%ia. nd t)is s%all +ictory at t)e end of defeat at t)e )ands of t)e dreaded Na/oleon raised t)e s/irits of t)e allied leaders3 c)anging3 according to a Russian officer3 into Ja cry of Doy t)e des/air ()ic) (as s/reading t)roug) t)e +alleys of Bo)e%ia.L Mean()ile3 Bluc)er )ad in+aded Silesia again3 defeating t)e (eakened 'renc) in engage%ents foug)t in suc) a continuous do(n/our of rain t)at %any %uskets (ould not fire. :et since Bernadottes tentati+e ad+ance in t)e nort) /resented an o//ortunity3 Na/oleon /lanned to concentrate against t)e nort)ern ar%y3 dri+e it &ack3 and take Berlin. But Bluc)er continued )is ad+ance3 and Na/oleon /ersonally %o+ed reinforce%ents against )i% ()ile t)e e-ce/tionally &ra+e &ut fre.uently ine/t Mars)al Ney %arc)ed nort) against Bernadotte. In a &adly &ungled &attle3 Ney suffered defeat against Bernadotte3 and Bluc)er /ro%/tly retreated &efore Na/oleon ()ile t)e allied ar%y of Bo)e%ia again t)reatened 1resden. !)en Na/oleon returned to 1resden3 t)e allies (it)dre( again t)roug) t)e %ountains into Bo)e%ia. fter o+er a %ont) of %arc)ing &ack and fort)3 Na/oleon decided to (it)dra( (est(ard to ,ei/6ig3 ()ic) (ould /ro+ide )i% (it) a &etter central /osition3 if only &ecause it lay fart)er fro% t)e refuge t)at t)e Bo)e%ian %ountains ga+e t)e allied ar%y. t t)is ti%e t)e allies recei+ed a reinforce%ent of <>3>>> Russians ()o %o+ed to Bo)e%ia ()ile Bluc)er %arc)ed nort)(est to reinforce Bernadotte. 0)e allies no( )ad only t(o forces on e-terior lines3 1B> degrees a/art. s )e fell &ack to ,ei/6ig3 Na/oleon sent reinforce%ents to Ney3 directing t)e% to(ard t)e eastern flank and rear of Bernadotte and Bluc)ers forces. 0o counteract t)is %enace3 Bernadotte and Bluc)er retreated (est instead of east3 and &y early 5cto&er Bluc)er )ad &egun to ad+ance sout) on a line directed so%e()at (est of ,ei/6ig. !it) 'renc) forces in t)eir rear3 Bluc)er and Bernadotte %o+ed so t)at t)ey t)reatened to /lace t)e%sel+es in t)e 'renc) rear. In s/ite of t)e great si6e of t)e ar%ies3 t)e recent )ar+est /ro+ided a%/le su//lies3 t)oug) t)e incredi&ly acti+e ca%/aign allo(ed little leisure for gat)ering food or &aking &read. !)ile Na/oleon )ad directed )is attention nort)3 Sc)(ar6en&erg )ad e%erged fro% Bo)e%ia3 ad+anced nort)(ard and )ad &egun to t)reaten ,ei/6ig fro% t)e sout). But ()en Na/oleon turned

2C@

sout) to dri+e &ack t)e ar%y of Bo)e%ia3 Bluc)er3 follo(ed &y Bernadotte3 /us)ed to(ard ,ei/6ig. By 5cto&er 1=t) Bluc)er and Sc)(ar6en&erg3 t)oug) nort) and sout) of ,ei/6ig3 )ad dra(n close enoug) toget)er to su//ort one anot)er. In t)e Battle of ,ei/6ig t)at follo(ed3 t)e allies defeated Na/oleon3 losing B>3>>> of t)eir ?2<3>>>7 )e3 =>3>>> of )is 1C<3>>>. 0)e allied /lan )ad (orked &ecause t)eir ar%ies in t)e nort) and east )ad a%/le s/ace in ()ic) to retreat directly to t)eir rear and t)e Bo)e%ian %ountains )ad /ro+ided an effecti+e refuge for Sc)(ar6en&ergs ar%y. 4nder t)ese conditions t)e allies could a+oid &attle ()ile gradually closing a ring around Na/oleon. 2-ce/t at 1resden3 ()ere t)ey foug)t on t)e defensi+e (it) a t(o to one nu%erical su/eriority3 t)ey )ad a+oided fig)ting Na/oleon )i%self and )ad (on t)e &attles in ()ic)3 (it) greater strengt)3 t)ey )ad %et )is su&ordinates. 0)e e-/loitation of interior lines )ad de/ended on t)e a&ility to co%/el an un(illing ene%y to fig)t3 so%et)ing not /ossi&le ()en t)e reluctant ene%y )ad a%/le s/ace directly in t)eir rear and t)e ot)er forces on e-terior lines %o+ed /ro%/tly and effecti+ely against t)e di%inis)ed forces o//osed to t)e%. By coordinating t)eir %o+e%ents t)e allies )ad concentrated in ti%e and effecti+ely counter&alanced Na/oleons concentrations in s/ace3 si%ultaneous or coo/erating %o+e%ents counteracting concentrations on interior lines. Back

0'erations in S'ain, (he French -ncounter the )aiding Strategy of Guerrilla Warfare
2-ce/t for conducting a raid into Russia3 Na/oleon )ad used only a /ersisting strategy3 as )ad all of )is o//onents e-ce/t t)e S/anis). Na/oleon con.uered Portugal in 1B>C and in 1B>B )ad de/osed t)e S/anis) 9ing and /laced )is &rot)er 8ose/) Bona/arte on t)e t)rone of S/ain. But Na/oleon )ad not reckoned on )ostility in S/ain3 ()ic) )ad fe( ur&an %erc)ants to ()o% li&erty and e.uality a//ealed3 %any de+out $at)olics ()o detested t)e 'renc) re/utation for at)eis%3 and a /eo/le attac)ed to its %onarc)y and institutions. ,ooting &y t)e undisci/lined 'renc) conscri/ts co%/leted t)e alienation of t)e S/anis). 0)e 'renc) situation rese%&led t)at of "anni&als in Italy. 0)e 'renc) could &eat S/anis) regulars al%ost as easily as t)ey could t)e untrained and undisci/lined forces t)at (ere raised &y local S/anis) aut)orities. Initially (it) 1>>3>>> %en3 t)e 'renc) )ad /er)a/s .uadru/le "anni&als force3 &ut t)e I&erian Peninsula )ad at least four ti%es t)e area of t)e /art of Italy t)at "anni&al )ad soug)t to control. 0)oug) t)e S/aniards lacked effecti+ely fortified cities and a (ell#drilled %ilitia3 %uc) of t)eir country )ad rugged %ountains and agricultural /roducti+ity (as +ery lo(. 0)e 'renc) )ad difficulty feeding t)eir troo/s3 and instead of %eeting a fortified ur&an defiance3 t)ey %et an elusi+e rural resistance in ()ic) t)eir o//onents (aged a guerrilla (ar of raids. 0)e S/anis)3 ()et)er on foot or %ounted3 )ad t)e sa%e funda%ental (ea/on syste%s as t)e 'renc) and could t)us rely in t)eir raids on t)e /ri%acy of retreat o+er /ursuit ()en &ot) co%&atants )ad t)e sa%e (ea/on syste%s. !)ereas against "anni&al t)e Ro%ans3 t)oug) t)ey )ad used (it)dra(al to a+oid &attle3 )ad %ade e-tensi+e use of t)e defences /re/onderance against frontal attack3 es/ecially ()en aided &y fortifications3 t)e S/aniards3 o+er%atc)ed &y t)e 'renc) e+en ()en on t)e defensi+e3 relied al%ost e-clusi+ely on retreat. 0)e 'renc) a//lied a co%&at strategy ()en t)ey /ursued S/anis) raiders &ut found t)e% too elusi+e. !it) t)e sy%/at)y of t)e in)a&itants3 t)e S/anis) soldiers )ad good intelligence of 'renc) %o+e%ents and could readily a+oid t)e 'renc) troo/s sent against t)e%. If necessary3 S/anis) guerrillas could a%/lify t)eir /o(er of (it)dra(al &y dis/ersal or e+en &y &eco%ing indistinguis)a&le fro% t)e ci+ilian /o/ulation. 'renc) general descri&ed )is frustration (it) suc) elusi+e o//onents: J"ardly forty# eig)t )ours after t)e ene%y )as &een dri+en a(ay )e rea//ears and seeks to %aintain a s%all (ar (it)out result for us3 &ut3 on t)e contrary3 of enor%ous ad+antage for )i% &y en)ancing t)e )o/es of t)e &lind %ountain in)a&itants.L

2B>

0)e sa%e /eo/le3 M&lind to t)e ad+antages of 'renc) rule3 /ro+ided t)e (arning of t)e co%ing of t)e 'renc)3 su//lied t)e intelligence t)at ena&led t)e /artisans to concentrate against s%all 'renc) detac)%ents3 /osts and (eakly guarded con+oys and %aga6ines. 0)e 'renc)3 on t)e ot)er )and3 follo(ed a /ersisting strategy3 garrisoning cities and co%%unication focal /oints. But t)ey lacked t)e strengt) to interdict t)e %o+e%ents of t)e S/anis) raiders3 )a+ing far too lo( a ratio of force to s/ace to do%inate t)e country. 0)e 'renc) aggra+ated t)eir /ro&le%s not only &y li+ing on t)e country &ut often &y allo(ing t)eir %en to forage for t)e%sel+es3 as soldiers )ad done in t)e 0)irty :ears !ar. 'renc) general co%/lained t)at an Jo/eration t)at (as to e-ter%inateL a &and of /artisans )ad failed3 lea+ing t)e guerrillas Jstrengt)ened &y t)e infuriated in)a&itants ()o )a+e )ad to lea+e t)eir )ones o(ing to t)e /illage ()ic) t)e troo/s )a+e co%%itted.L So 'renc) (aste3 destructi+eness3 and &rutality furt)er alienated t)e /easantry and engendered %ore su//ort for t)e guerrillas3 ()o also )ad to li+e at t)e e-/ense of t)e countryside. !it) %et)ods often as irregular and so%eti%es as &rutal as t)ose of t)e 'renc)3 t)e S/anis) /artisans (ould )a+e sacrificed %uc) %ore of t)eir su//ort )ad t)e 'renc) not first &egun t)is %et)od of dealing (it) t)e /eo/le. Moreo+er3 t)e 'renc) atrocities of ra/e3 %urder3 and &urning +illages in retaliation for aid to t)e re&els alienated %ore S/aniards t)an did t)e guerrillas %ore syste%atic and reasoned retri&ution against indi+idual colla&orators (it) t)e 'renc). Still t)is un)a//y /osition &et(een t)e ad+ersaries dro+e %any /easants to des/eration and +iolence against &ot) o//ressors. 0)e (ar )ad a sa+age c)aracter as eac) co%&atant retaliated against t)e ot)er. 0)e 'renc)3 facing o//onents (it)out unifor%s3 often treated guerrillas as &eyond t)e a//lication of t)e la(s of (ar3 killing t)eir /risoners. 0)e S/aniards re/lied in kind3 one /artisan c)ieftain3 for instance3 routinely cutting off one ear of a 'renc) /risoner /rior to interrogating )i%. 0)roug) %any )ard lessons of defeat in skir%is)es (it) t)e 'renc)3 t)e guerrillas learned t)e strategy a//ro/riate to t)e kind of (ar t)ey (aged. 5/erating in s%all &ands3 t)ey /reyed u/on %essengers3 s%all detac)%ents3 su//ly (agons3 and lig)tly guarded to(ns and su//ly con+oys. 0aking ad+antage of t)eir kno(ledge of t)e terrain3 t)ey )ad learned )o( to a+oid t)e /ursuing forces aroused &y t)eir raids. 0)ey co%/elled t)e in+aders to erect field fortifications at all t)e unfortified /oints t)ey )eld and e+entually to /ro+ide escorts as large as ?>> %en3 infantry as (ell as ca+alry3 for %essengers carrying i%/ortant dis/atc)es or official %ail. 0)eir acti+ities /ro+ed suc) a %enace t)at at one /oint t)e 'renc) de+oted as %any as @>3>>> of t)e a//ro-i%ately 2?>3>>> troo/s t)en in t)e country to guarding against raids. In addition to t)eir %astery of t)e raiding strategy of guerrilla (arfare3 t)e S/anis) recei+ed su//ort fro% t)e Britis) inter+ention in Portugal and S/ain. (ell#a//ointed3 ade.uately su//lied3 and &rilliantly led Britis) ar%y aug%ented t)e Portuguese and S/anis) ar%ies and co%/elled t)e 'renc) to increase t)eir forces in S/ain and de+ote a )ig) /ro/ortion of t)e% to a co%&at /ersisting ca%/aign against t)e nglo#Portuguese#S/anis) ar%ies. 'urt)er3 t)e Britis) assisted t)e /artisans (it) (ea/ons3 su//lies3 and %oney3 in+alua&le su//orts for t)eir %orale as (ell as t)eir o/erations. !)en a Britis) force ca%/aigned (it) guerrillas early in t)e (ar3 a Britis) officer )ad a lesson in t)eir strategy after )e (itnessed si-teen 'renc) ca+alry%en c)arge 4>> %ounted /artisans and sa( t)e S/aniards flee so /reci/itously t)at in t)eir rus) to t)e rear t)ey dro+e a s%all Britis) detac)%ent off t)e road. 0)e Britis) ca+alry )a+ing dri+en off t)e 'renc)3 t)e S/anis) co%%ander e-/lained )is kind of (arfare to t)e a%a6ed and angry Britis) officer. S/anis) strategy3 t)e guerrilla leader e-/lained3 did not conte%/late %aking counter#c)arges against 'renc) ca+alry3 trained and /re/ared for suc) co%&at7 rat)er3 )is %en )ad t)e %ission of )arrying t)e 'renc) and interru/ting t)eir su//lies. 0)us t)e S/aniards )ad learned t)e a//ro/riate strategy &ut re%ained /at)etically G&ut .uite (isely (aryH of %eeting t)e 'renc) in co%&at. In ti%e t)eir tactical skill (ould %atc) t)eir %astery of strategy. 2B1

0)e Britis) )ad at first dis/araged t)e )eterogeneity of t)e (ea/ons and clot)ing of t)eir allies as (ell as t)eir lack of t)e drill and disci/line a//ro/riate for t)e line infantry and ca+alry of t)e Britis) ar%y. But at lengt) t)ey discerned t)at t)e S/aniards )ad de+elo/ed a disci/line and organisation e-actly ada/ted to t)eir fre.uent use of lig)t infantry and lig)t ca+alry tactics and t)eir strategy t)at re.uired .uick ad+ances on raids and elusi+eness in retreat. 0)e 'renc) enDoyed t)eir greatest success in dealing (it) guerrilla resistance in t)e nort)#eastern S/anis) /ro+ince of ragon. "ere t)e defeat of t)e con+entional forces in a /rolonged siege and t)en a &attle so discouraged t)e /eo/le of t)e /ro+ince t)at t)e 'renc) co%%ander3 t)e astute *eneral Suc)et3 could secure t)e coo/eration of %any of t)e aristocracy in ruling t)e country. 1is)eartened o//osition and ine/t guerrillas3 fe( in nu%&er3 ena&led Suc)et to /acify t)e country &y t)e &eginning of 1B1>3 t)oug) )e still faced a /assi+ely )ostile /eo/le. Suc)et )ad su//ressed t)e guerrillas in )is co%%and &y relentless acti+ity. "e &egan one se.uence of %o+e%ents in 8uly 1B>@ &y sending t(o regi%ents against t)e &ase 5f ?3>>> /artisans. fter t)ey retreated3 t)e 'renc) &urned t)eir su//lies and t)en fanned out to do%inate t)e country. !)en a regi%ent reac)ed t)e to(n of $alatayud3 it found t)at t)e guerrillas )ad ca/tured t)e officials t)e 'renc) )ad installed t)ere in /ril. :et3 as soon as t)e 'renc) again left t)e city3 t)e S/aniards returned and re%o+ed t)e ne(ly a//ointed 'renc) officials. In early ugust t)e 'renc) ca%e &ack to take $alatayud again3 after a co%&at in ()ic) t)ey inflicted o+er 1>> casualties on t)e guerrillas. Su&se.uently Suc)ets soldiers once %ore de/arted and t)e /artisan c)ief returned3 o+er()el%ed a s%all /ost near&y3 and &egan to recruit )is force. 0)is /ro%/ted t)e 'renc) to send t(o colu%ns fro% different directions3 ()ic) failed to tra/ t)e S/aniards as t)ey e+acuated. 0)e 'renc) t)en decided to garrison t)is to(n. Suc) constant %arc)ing3 so%eti%es at a ra/id /ace in an effort to sur/rise t)eir o//onents3 caused significant 'renc) casualties fro% stragglers3 /ro&a&ly %ore t)an fro% co%&at (it) t)eir e+asi+e3 tactically ine/t3 and usually nu%erically inferior o//onents. But t)e guerrillas suffered e.ually3 and3 de/ri+ed of a secure &ase area &y t)e s(ee/s of t)e 'renc) colu%ns3 %ost (it)dre( to an area &eyond Suc)ets Durisdiction. In 1ece%&er 1B>@ t)e co%%anders neig)&ouring Na+arre coo/erated (it) Suc)et in a ca%/aign to send t)ree con+erging colu%ns3 a%ounting to t)ree &attalions to tra/ a guerrilla &and. 5ne colu%n scattered 1<> /artisans en#route3 &ut t)e %ain )ostile force eluded t)e concentric ad+ances3 lea+ing &e)ind recri%inations &et(een t)e 'renc) co%%anders. In t)e ne-t %ont)3 )o(e+er3 a ne( effort3 (it) tri/le t)e force and using si- colu%ns to co%& one area3 eradicated t)e guerrillas. 0)is )ig) ratio of force to s/ace )ad not ac)ie+ed t)e ca/ture of %any S/aniards &ut did co%/el t)e guerrillas to dis/erse co%/letely. It (ould re.uire a long ti%e &efore t)ey could reorganise and again t)reaten t)e 'renc) occu/ation. 0)us 'renc) strengt) and energy su&dued %ost of t)e guerrilla o//osition. Suc)et garrisoned t)e country3 )olding cities or fortified con+ents3 usually (it) a force of 1>> %en or less. 0)is /lan /ro+ided t)e 'renc) (it) a /ost for e+ery <>> s.uare %iles of ragon3 co%/ared (it) one 2nglis) castle for eac) 1>> s.uare %iles in a ne(ly con.uered region of !ales. Ne+ert)eless3 t)is syste% (orked (ell3 e+en t)oug) it did not &lock %any of t)e routes of co%%unication7 t)e /osts controlled t)e adDacent country and /ro+ided &ases for 'renc) colu%ns t)at s(e/t t)e country to searc) for guerrillas or collect ta-es in %oney and su//lies. But ()en Suc)et left ragon to ca%/aign in a neig)&ouring /ro+ince3 )e )ad to )al+e t)e garrison3 usually lea+ing at least 1>3>>> %en. 0)ese interludes /ro+ided an o//ortunity for t)e guerrillas to re+i+e t)eir acti+ities. 1uring t)ese /eriods of reduced strengt) in 1B1> a /artisan c)ief engaged in an unsuccessful siege of a to(n3 destroyed a detac)%ent of 1=> troo/s3 and took 1C> /risoners ()en )e o+er()el%ed anot)er s%all

2B2

force. ,ater3 guerrillas failed in attacks on a to(n and on a con+oy escorted &y only eig)ty %en &ut ca/tured a garrison of fifty#four soldiers and &ested an escort of o+er ?>> %en to ca/ture a con+oy. 0)en /artisans defeated a &attalion of green troo/s %arc)ing to Doin t)eir +eteran regi%ents and ca/tured %ore con+oys. not)er &and defeated a ta-#collection detac)%ent3 enric)ing t)e%sel+es and i%/o+eris)ing t)e 'renc) &y t)e ca/ture of B3>>> s)ee/. 0)ese sa%/les of guerrilla acti+ities all occurred during t)e t)ree inter+als in 1B1> ()en Suc)et )ad )ad to reduce )is garrison to su//ort ca%/aigns else()ere. fter t)ey returned3 t)e 'renc) troo/s took t)e offensi+e and )arried t)e /artisans3 often eli%inating ()ole &ands3 in one instance ca/turing t)e leader3 or dri+ing t)e% entirely out of ragon. !)en t)e /artisans foug)t t)e 'renc)3 as t)ey so%eti%es did3 t)ey rarely )ad %uc) success3 one e-/erienced leader losing a defensi+e &attle ()en )e outnu%&ered t)e 'renc) t(o to one. But t)e guerrillas usually /ro+ed elusi+e7 on t(o occasions3 ()en con+erging 'renc) colu%ns see%ed to doo% t)e &and of t)e i%/ortant /artisan leader Mina3 t)e S/anis) c)ieftain dis/ersed )is %en into s%all grou/s3 ()ic) e+aded t)e relati+ely concentrated 'renc) forces. So t)e 'renc) controlled ragon fairly (ell3 alternating &et(een t)e offensi+e and defensi+e strategies3 de/ending on t)eir troo/ strengt) in t)e /ro+ince. 0)is /attern )ad t)e disad+antage of /ro+iding only s/oradic control in so%e areas. nd after t)e 'renc) (it)dre(3 t)e guerrillas (ould fre.uently return3 re#esta&lis) t)eir aut)ority3 and take +engeance on officials ()o )ad s(orn loyalty to t)e 'renc). 5n one occasion ()en t)e /artisans ca/tured a to(n %ayor ()o% t)ey dee%ed es/ecially de+oted to t)e 'renc)3 t)ey &urned )i% ali+e. :et t)ese s(ee/s of t)e country did disru/t t)e guerrillas &ase and facilitate t)e collection of t)e ta-es and su//lies needed to su//ort t)e 'renc) ar%y in ragon and its ca%/aigns in neig)&ouring /ro+inces. In Se/te%&er 1B11 Suc)et )ad reduced )is forces in ragon to C34>> %en in order to )a+e t)e largest /ossi&le force for a ca%/aign to con.uer Valencia. t t)is %o%ent a force of =3>>> guerrillas entered ragon fro% t)e sout) and &esieged t)e to(n of $alatayud3 )eld &y B>> green %en and con+alescents. !)ile ?3>>> /artisans /rosecuted t)e siege3 dri+ing t)e garrison into a fortified con+ent3 anot)er ?3>>> /artisans occu/ied a /ass and defeated t)e attack of a force of @>> trying to get t)roug) to reli+e t)e to(n. !)en a %ine &reac)ed t)e (all of t)e con+ent3 t)e garrison surrendered. 0)e ne-t day a second and larger relie+ing force arri+ed and found t)at t)e guerrillas and t)eir /risoners )ad de/arted. Meanti%e3 t)e /artisan c)ief Mina )ad in+aded nort)ern ragon fro% Na+arre on t)e (est3 o+er()el%ed a /ost )eld &y 1>> %en3 &esieged anot)er3 assailed a relief force of 1.>>> %en on t)e %arc)3 and3 )a+ing killed 2>> and (ounded 2C13 acce/ted its surrender. "e t)en (ent on to occu/y t)e second largest city in ragon ()en t)e garrison e+acuated on )is a//roac)3 and le+ied a su&stantial contri&ution on t)e city &efore returning (est(ard3 e+ading t(o large /ursuing colu%ns in t)e /rocess. 0)ese e+ents3 toget)er (it) t)e loss of %ore /osts and t(o indecisi+e &attles &et(een guerrillas and su&stantial 'renc) colu%ns3 de%onstrated t)e )ig) le+el of tactical skill t)e /artisans )ad attained after t)ree years of ca%/aigning. 0)ese e+ents ins/ired Na/oleon to create a s/ecial ar%y3 intended at ?=3>>> %en &ut %uc) s%aller in fact3 to e-tir/ate t)e /artisans in nort)#eastern S/ain in one .uick ca%/aign. 0)is 'renc) o/eration in t)e (inter and s/ring of 1B12 collided (it) a rene(ed guerrilla offensi+e su//orted &y t)e no longer /assi+e /eo/le of ragon7 t)e /artisan successes )ad gi+en t)e% )o/e. 0)e 'renc) attained one %aDor +ictory ()en t)ey crus)ed one of t)e &ands t)at )ad taken $alatayud in 1B113 taking o+er 131>> /risoners. 5t)er(ise t)e 'renc) encountered a series of re+erses. Mina concentrated against one of t(o colu%ns /ursuing )i% and defeated it decisi+ely3 ca/turing all of its artillery7 a %ont) later Mina attacked t)ree &attalions on t)e %arc)3 defeated t)e%3 and co%/elled t)e% to retreat. n effort to ca/ture anot)er /artisan c)ief (it) four con+erging colu%ns ended (it) t)e defeat of 'renc) detac)%ents ranging in si6e fro% 1>< to an entire &attalion7 t)is 2B?

c)ieftain t)en de/arted &ecause of t)e difficulty of continuing )is o/erations (it) t)e &urden of 13>>> /risoners. 0)e 'renc) suffered anot)er kind of loss ()en guerrillas ca/tured a con+oy (it) ?3>>> /airs of s)oes3 B3>>> s)irts3 and B>3>>> francs. 0)at t)e officials of one city in+ited t)e garrison officers to a &an.uet so t)at t)e /artisans could take t)e to(n easily and ca/ture t)e officers and garrison s)o(s t)e degree of (eakness in t)e 'renc) /olitical /osition. 'urt)er3 S/anis) forces )ad t)e effrontery to conduct a raid into 'rance3 defeat a 'renc) &attalion3 le+y contri&utions on t(o to(ns3 and return to S/ain dri+ing a )erd of 23>>> cattle and s)ee/. 0)e set&acks of t)e s/ring of 1B12 esta&lis)ed t)e /attern for t)e decline in 'renc) control in ragon. !it) t)e Russian ca%/aign &eginning3 Na/oleon )ad no troo/s a+aila&le to increase t)e ratio of force to s/ace in S/ain and t)e guerrillas adroitly e-/loited t)e (eakness of t)e 'renc) defensi+e /osition. So%e of t)eir raids )el/ed t)e% as (ell as )urt t)e 'renc) as ()en t)ey ca/tured con+oys3 or in t)e case ()ere /artisans entered a to(n ()ere t)e 'renc) )ad siege artillery stored in t)e &ull#ring3 s/iked nineteen guns3 and %ade off (it) si- )o(it6ers and so%e )orses. 4lti%ately t)e guerrillas outnu%&ered t)e 'renc) %ore t)an t(o to one and %atc)ed t)e% in tactical %astery e-ce/t in &attles ()ere t)e 'renc) could %ake use of t)eir &etter understanding of t)e e%/loy%ent of ca+alry and artillery. 0)at t)e 'renc) lost ?34>> %en in t)e first ten %ont)s of 1B12 testifies to S/anis) skill and t)e attrition of %any s%all and a fe( large defeats. 0)e 'renc) strong)olds t)at )el/ed t)e% )old t)e country ()en t)ey )ad su/erior strengt) &eca%e a lia&ility ()en t)ey found t)e%sel+es continuously on t)e defensi+e. 0)e /osts consu%ed %any %en in s%all garrisons t)at fre.uently )ad too little strengt) to +enture outside t)eir (alls to atte%/t to control t)e surrounding country. 0)us3 %any 'renc) forces lost t)eir %o&ility ()ile t)e /artisan forces )ad a%/le freedo% of %o+e%ent to concentrate against in+iting targets7 t)e s%all /osts )ad lost %uc) of t)eir defensi+e strengt) once t)e S/aniards )ad learned t)e siege tec)ni.ue of %ining or )ad ac.uired artillery. Ne+ert)eless3 t)e fortified defence still s)o(ed its traditional /o(er. 'or e-a%/le3 a force 5f C>> guerrillas failed to ca/ture a (alled fort )eld &y t(enty#t(o deter%ined %en. 1aunted &y t)e (alls3 t)e S/aniards s/ent t)ree days digging a %ine t)at &reac)ed t)e (all7 yet ()en t)e attackers could not get t)roug) in s/ite of sustaining t)irty casualties3 t)ey a&andoned t)e siege. But not all 'renc) garrisons dis/layed suc) fortitude. 5ften t)e 'renc) relie+ed a &esieged fort only to use t)e occasion to (it)dra( t)e garrison fro% its e-/osed /osition and a&andon t)e /ost. 0)is accelerated t)e /rocess of turning ragon o+er to t)e S/aniards3 ()o do%inated t)e area around (eak garrisons and )ad undis/uted control in areas t)e 'renc) )ad e+acuated. In regions ()ere t)e 'renc) (ere strong3 t)e /artisans took t)e /easants ani%als so t)at t)ey could not trans/ort t)e ta- in grain to 'renc) de/ots. In areas ()ere t)e 'renc) (ere (eaker3 t)e /easants fled (it) t)eir +alua&les on t)e a//roac) of a ta-#collecting colu%n. 0)e guerrillas also ta-ed t)e /easants t)ey controlled &ut at a lo(er rate t)an t)e 'renc). So gradually t)e 'renc) &ase area s)rank and t)at of t)e guerrillas e-/anded3 t)e /artisan forces increasing in /ro/ortion to t)e e-tension of t)eir &ase. 0)e /rocess )ad so%et)ing in co%%on (it) t)e 'renc) offensi+e at t)e end of t)e "undred :ears !ar ()en t)e 'renc) slo(ly ca/tured t)e cities and castles of nort)ern 'rance and dro+e out t)e nu%erically (eak &ut defensi+ely strong 2nglis). By t)e s/ring of 1B1? t)e S/aniards controlled o+er )alf of t)e ad%inistrati+e districts in ragon3 and t)e 'renc) could do little %ore t)an try to kee/ o/en t)eir co%%unication routes. t t)is /oint Na/oleon ordered anot)er ca%/aign against t)e guerrillas3 using troo/s t)at )e /lanned later to de/loy against t)e Britis). 0)e 2%/eror entrusted t)e ca%/aign to *eneral $lausel3 a talented officer ine-/erienced in dealing (it) guerrillas. 0)e general directed a %aDor effort against Mina ()o )ad &egun $lausels o/eration &y (recking t(o 'renc) &attalions3 netting 13>>> /risoners. 'aced (it) $lausels offensi+e3 Mina3 di+ided )is forces and t)e 'renc) general directed )is troo/s against one of t)ese in t(o colu%ns. 5ne ca%e u/ (it) Mina3 foug)t a costly &attle3 and induced Mina to retreat &y dis/ersing )is force. lt)oug) $lausel &elie+ed t)is &attle Jdecided

2B4

not)ing3L )e sent t)e o/ti%istic re/ort to )is su/erior t)at )e )ad defeated Mina3 a ty/e of re/orting also c)aracteristic of Suc)et. 0)us ended t)e last ca%/aign against t)e guerrillas7 t)e 'renc) soon e+acuated ragon after t)e Britis) defeated t)eir ar%y and ca%e close to t)e 'renc) frontier. 0)oug) %any /artisan c)iefs (ere S/anis) regular officers3 Mina3 t)e %ost cele&rated leader3 (as in %any res/ects re/resentati+e of t)e co%%anders ()o (rested control of so %uc) of S/ain fro% t)e 'renc) occu/ation forces and t)e fee&le go+ern%ent of 9ing 8ose/). young far%er ()en t)e 'renc) in+aded3 Mina &eca%e an e-e%/lary organiser and strategist. In t(o years )e asserted t)at )e )ad engaged in 14? co%&ats3 taken fourteen fortified /osts3 and ca/tured 143>>> /risoners3 t)e latter indicating conduct to(ard )is ene%ies %ore )u%ane t)an %ost of )is fello( guerrilla leaders. "e e-celled in )is a&ility to concentrate .uickly for a raid and retreat ra/idly3 e+en3 as )e )ad s)o(n against o+er()el%ing forces3 &y scattering )is %en ()o% )e )ad (ell enoug) organised and disci/lined t)at )e could reasse%&le t)e% ()en safe to do so. ,ike t)e ot)er S/anis) co%%anders3 )e %ade good use of t)e rugged terrain of Na+arre and nort)ern ragon to e+ade )is o//onents. 0)e t)oroug) Mina so organised t)e countryside )e controlled t)at )e )ad )is o(n gun/o(der %anufactories. 4lti%ately )e so co%/letely interdicted co%%unications t)roug) t)e territory )e do%inated in nort)ern S/ain t)at )e sold /asses to %erc)ants and ot)ers ()o (is)ed to use t)e roads. 0)is re+enue ena&led )i% to /ay )is %en3 ()ic)3 in turn3 )el/ed )i% confine )is de/redations solely to t)e 'renc). 0)is /olicy co%/le%ented t)e fir% rule &ased on )is ar%y and conser+ed )is /olitical /osition (it) t)e /eo/le &y di%inis)ing t)e &urdens ()ic) t)e (ar /laced on t)e s%all far%er ()o /ro+ided )is %ost relia&le Su//orters. 2+entually )e could clot)e )is %en in ca/tured 'renc) unifor%s and %eet %any of )is ot)er needs t)roug) a trade (it) t)e occu/iers carried on t)roug) inter%ediaries. 2+entually )e so organised so%e of t)e routes fro% 'rance into S/ain t)at )e confiscated only (ar %ateriel3 allo(ing ot)er goods to /ass # after )e (as /aid a tariff. So t)e skill and tenacity of t)e S/anis) guerrillas /layed a %aDor /art in defeating t)e 'renc) efforts to control S/ain. 0)e 'renc) )ad %et suc) resistance else()ere3 &ut ne+er on suc) a scale nor /rosecuted so unre%ittingly. ntonie "enri 8o%ini3 an officer ()o ser+ed (it) t)e 'renc) in S/ain and ()o (as a reno(ned inter/reter of t)e (arfare of Na/oleon and 'rederick t)e *reat3 co%%ented on t)e difficulties t)e 'renc) encountered. J0)e in+ader )as only an ar%y: )is ad+ersaries )a+e an ar%y3 and a /eo/le ()olly or al%ost ()olly in ar%s3 and %aking %eans of resistance out of e+ery t)ing3 eac) indi+idual of ()o% cons/ires against t)e co%%on ene%y. 2+en t)e non#co%&atants )a+e an interest in )is ruin and accelerate it &y e+ery %eans in t)eir /o(er. "e )olds scarcely any ground &ut t)at u/on ()ic) )e enca%/s7 outside t)e li%its of )is ca%/ e+ery t)ing is )ostile and %ulti/les a t)ousand#fold t)e difficulties )e %eets at e+ery ste/. 0)ese o&stacles &eco%e al%ost insur%ounta&le ()en t)e country is difficult. 2ac) ar%ed in)a&itant kno(s t)e s%allest /at)s and t)eir connections. "e finds e+ery()ere a relati+e or friend ()o aids )i%7 t)e co%%anders also kno( t)e country3 and learning i%%ediately t)e slig)test %o+e%ent on t)e /art of t)e in+ader3 can ado/t t)e &est %easures to defeat )is /roDects7 ()ile t)e latter3 (it)out infor%ation of t)eir %o+e%ents3 and not in a condition to send out detac)%ents to gain it3 )a+ing no resource &ut in )is &ayonets3 and certain safety only in t)e concentration of )is colu%ns3 is like a &lind %an: )is co%&inations are failures7 and ()en3 after t)e %ost carefully#concerted %o+e%ents and t)e %ost ra/id and fatiguing %arc)es3 )e t)inks )e is a&out to acco%/lis) )is ai% and deal a terri&le &lo(3 )e finds no signs of t)e ene%y &ut )is ca%/fires: so t)at ()ile3 like 1on Aui-ote3 )e is attacking (ind%ills3 )is ad+ersary is on )is line of co%%unications3 destroys t)e detac)%ents left to guard it3 sur/rises )is con+oys3 )is de/ots3 and carries on a (ar so disastrous for t)e in+ader t)at )e %ust ine+ita&ly yield after a ti%e.L 2B<

8o%ini t)en illustrated t)e u&i.uity and de-terity of guerrillas. "e )ad ca%/ed t)e co%/anies of an artillery train Jin t)e %idst of four &rigades distant fro% t)e ca%/ fro% t(o to t)ree leagues3 and no S/anis) forces )ad &een seen (it)in fifty %iles... ne+ert)eless3L )e continued3 Jone fine nig)t t)e co%/anies of t)e train G%en and )orsesH disa//eared3 and (e (ere ne+er a&le to disco+er ()at &eca%e of t)e%: a solitary (ounded cor/oral esca/ed to re/ort t)at t)e /easants3 led &y t)eir %onks and /riests3 )ad t)us %ade a(ay (it) t)e%.L 0)e (ar3 )e (rote3 J/resented a t)ousand incidents as striking as t)is. ll t)e gold in Me-ico could not )a+e /rocured relia&le infor%ation for t)e 'renc)7 ()at (as gi+en (as &ut a lure to %ake t)e% fall %ore readily into snares.L "e /rescri&ed an ade.uate ratio of force to s/ace and a /ersisting strategy as t)e %eans of +ictory in suc) a (ar. JNo ar%y3 )o(e+er disci/lined3 can contend successfully against suc) a syste% a//lied to a great nation3 unless it &e strong enoug) to )old all t)e essential /oints of t)e country3 co+er its co%%unications3 and at t)e sa%e ti%e furnis) an acti+e force sufficient to &eat t)e ene%y ()ere+er )e %ay /resent )i%self.L "a+ing t)us descri&ed %ilitary %eans si%ilar to t)ose e%/loyed &y le-ander t)e *reat in Bactria and Sogdiana3 8o%ini turned to t)e /olitical co%/onent in suc) a struggle3 ()ic) le-ander )ad e-/loited (it) success &y )is %arriage to Ro-ana3 a local Princess. Since Na/oleon3 )a+ing re/laced t)e S/anis) 9ing (it) )is &rot)er3 )ad no suc) resources3 8o%ini looked to t)e local le+el. If success &e /ossi&le in suc) a (ar3 t)e follo(ing general course (ill &e %ost likely to insure it # +i6.: %ake a dis/lay of a %ass of troo/s /ro/ortioned to t)e o&stacles and resistance likely to &e encountered3 cal% t)e /o/ular /assions in e+ery /ossi&le (ay3 e-)aust t)e% &y ti%e and /atience3 dis/lay courtesy3 gentleness3 and se+erity united3 and3 /articularly3 deal Dustly.L Most 'renc) co%%anders relied on rut)less se+erity and e+en terror3 ()ic) so%eti%es inti%idated t)e S/aniards &ut did not .uenc) t)eir )ostility. 'ro% Suc)ets regi%e in ragon3 8o%ini dre( )is /olitical /rescri/tion for dealing (it) guerrillas. Suc)et3 not e-e%/lary in )is use of %ilitary %eans against guerrillas3 s)o(ed )is a&ility in )is /olitical %easures. 'ortunate in &eginning )is rule (it) 2>3>>> %en a+aila&le for se+en %ont)s to crus) only an inci/ient resistance &y ine/t /artisans3 )e could t)en /roceed to conciliate t)e S/aniards. "e t)en s)re(dly /lacated %uc) o//osition &y attracting /ro%inent %en to )is ad%inistration3 ruling t)roug) t)e e-isting lo(er officials3 doing %uc) to %ollify t)e c)urc)3 and cur&ing erratic and &rutal &e)a+iour &y )is soldiers. "e left t)e /easants alone if t)ey /aid t)eir ta-es and did not acti+ely resist. 0)e general realistically soug)t only ac.uiescence and a//lied force +igorously against t)ose ()o o//osed t)e 'renc)3 for e-a%/le3 routinely e-ecuting /riests found ar%ed. "is /olicy succeeded as long as )e )ad ade.uate force and did not )a+e to co/e (it) in+asions of guerrillas fro% neig)&ouring /ro+inces not as effecti+ely su&dued as )is. "is ina&ility to recruit %ore t)an 4>> %en into a S/anis) %ilitary force )e esta&lis)ed to aid t)e 'renc) indicates )is failure to %ake foreign rule /o/ular. Suc)et %ig)t (ell )a+e )ad so%e()at %ore /olitical success )ad )e not )ad to su//ort )is ar%y and its o/erations in ot)er /ro+inces on t)e )ea+y ta-es )e )ad to collect in ragon. !it) Britis) inter+ention t)e 'renc) faced anot)er difficulty &ecause t)e Britis) su//lied t)e S/aniards and fielded t)eir o(n ca/a&ly co%%anded ar%ies t)ere. 8o%ini sa( t)e key role /layed &y Britis) in /ro+iding Ja regular ar%y of res/ecta&le si6e to &e a nucleus around ()ic) to rally t)e /eo/le.L "e /articularly sa( t)e role of t)ese forces in di%inis)ing t)e 'renc) ratio of force to s/ace ()en )e asked: J!)at force (ill &e sufficient to &e su/erior e+ery()ere3 and to assure t)e safety of long lines of co%%unication against nu%erous &odiesKL le-ander did not )a+e to contend against t)is kind of /ro&le% nor did t)e 2nglis) in t)e long3 %et)odical con.uest of !ales.L So t)e Britis) ar%y and t)e S/anis) and Portuguese regular forces t)ey su//orted ke/t %any 'renc) soldiers concentrated and so aggra+ated t)e 'renc) /ro&le% of )a+ing a force ade.uate for %ilitary con.uest &ut not e.ual to t)e task of /olitical /acification. nd t)e skill of t)e Britis) 2B=

co%%ander also /layed an i%/ortant /art3 for t)e 1uke of !ellington s)o(ed t)at )e too understood t)e %erits of retreat and t)e +alue of a fleet at ones rear. 0)e 'renc) )ad a /ro&le% fa%iliar to con.uerors of t)e Middle ges. 0)e 2nglis) in !ales )ad faced t)e sa%e o&stacles and )ad o+erco%e t)e% &y a gradual /rocess of su&Dugating s%all /atc)es of territory and consolidating t)eir %astery &y castle &uilding. But since t)is /rocedure took literally al%ost t(o centuries3 it (as not t)e %et)od for a .uick consolidation of 9ing 8ose/)s rule. 0)e 0urks and Mongolians )ad attained i%%ediate results &y %assacring a large /ro/ortion of t)e /o/ulation3 ()ic) co%&ined t)e logistic strategy of de/ri+ing t)e ene%y of fig)ting %en (it) t)e /olitical /rogra% of terror. But t)e 'renc) (ould )a+e )ad difficulty acce/ting suc) a strategy3 if only &ecause t)ey (ere still no%inally $)ristian. 0)oug) $)ristians )ad s)o(n no co%/unction a&out %assacring infidels or )eretics3 t)e S/aniards .ualified on neit)er count3 and t)e 'renc) culture (ould )a+e /recluded t)e ()olesale ado/tion of a 0urko#Mongolian strategy. 0)us3 t)e 'renc) used a co%&at /ersisting strategy to fig)t and failed to (in a (ar t)at e-)i&ited t)e ascendancy of a raiding strategy o+er a defensi+e /ersisting strategy. By initially atte%/ting to occu/y t)e ()ole country and t)en steadily e-tend t)eir s(ay3 t)e 'renc) )ad really /laced t)e%sel+es on t)e defensi+e against t)e raiding guerrillas. In t)e 2nglis) con.uest of !ales3 on t)e ot)er )and3 t)e in+ader )ad used an offensi+e /ersisting strategy &y concentrating on a s%all area and /acifying it &efore ad+ancing fart)er. 0)roug) do%ination of eac) successi+e region3 t)e 2nglis) )ad %ade t)is also a logistic strategy of de/ri+ing t)e !els) of a /ortion of t)eir &ase area and also of )arnessing its resources to t)eir needs. 0)e 'renc) only a//arently de/ri+ed t)e S/anis) guerrillas of t)eir &ase area7 t)e su/erficial 'renc) control actually left %uc) of t)e country to t)eir ad+ersaries. !it) a %uc) )ig)er ratio of force to s/ace or (it) a %ore su&stantial /olitical &ase3 t)e 'renc) %ig)t )a+e triu%/)ed. 5+er ti%e3 /atience and carefully considerate &e)a+iour &y 'renc) soldiers and locally recruited troo/s %ig)t )a+e gradually legiti%ised 9ing 8ose/)s rule. But (it) a skilfully co%%anded Britis) ar%y in t)e field as (ell as Portuguese and S/anis) forces and t)e feeling of urgency to co%/lete t)e task /ro%/tly3 t)e 'renc) /ersisted (it) t)eir too t)inly a//lied /ersisting strategy. 0)e si6e of t)e I&erian Peninsula and t)e i%/laca&le )ostility of so %any S/aniards doo%ed t)e 'renc) efforts. Back

(he Foundations of the French Con&uests

0)e (ar concluded in 1B14 (it) a nu%&er of large ar%ies %arc)ing into 'rance in a coordinated ca%/aign. gainst t)ese3 Na/oleon %anoeu+red a su&stantial nu%&er of %en trying3 (it)out success3 to e-/loit )is central /osition to )alt t)e allies. 0)e nu%&ers of soldiers3 t)oug) large3 did not really differentiate t)ese o/erations fro% t)ose of earlier ti%es3 es/ecially ()en ,ouis IIVs 'rance %ade its &est effort against t)e ar%ies of Britain3 "olland3 and t)e 2%/eror. But t)e coordination of t)e 'renc) ar%ies and of t)e allied contingents and t)e conce/tion t)at all ar%ies of eac) side functioned in t)e sa%e t)eatre as /art of a single force distinguis)ed t)ese %anoeu+res fro% t)ose ti%es ()en se/arate ar%ies recei+ed se/arate %issions and /erfor%ed largely inde/endently. 0)e a&ility of t)ese ar%ies to dis/erse and i%/ose &attle u/on one anot)er contrasted (it) t)e ca%/aigns of old. 0)e tactical fle-i&ility of all of t)e ar%ies3 in ()ic) t)ey often foug)t (it) discontinuous fronts and easily %o+ed infantry units on t)e &attlefield3 /resented anot)er %arked de/arture fro% t)e /ast. But (it) all ar%ies organised alike and e.ually (ell articulated3 t)e offensi+e lost t)e strengt) it )ad ac.uired ()en t)e 'renc) )ad a %ono/oly on t)ese %et)ods. 'or e-a%/le3 on t)e second day of t)e Battle of Baut6en in May 1B1?3 Na/oleon concentrated t(o cor/s on t)e field of &attle3 sending t)e% into t)e flank and rear of t)e Russo#Prussian ar%y. 5ne cor/s engaged t)e %en guarding t)e allied flank ()ile t)e ot)er reac)ed t)e allied rear. But t)e

2BC

outflanked troo/s counterattacked and /rotected t)e%sel+es (ell enoug) to esca/e (it)out serious loss. :et t)is attack3 t)oug) /oorly e-ecuted3 (ould in t)e /ast )a+e inflicted a defeat suc) as 'redericks on t)e ustrians at ,eut)en )ad not t)e Prussians )ad t)e articulation and tactical %o&ility t)at )ad long c)aracterised t)e 'renc). !it) &ot) ar%ies /ossessing t)e sa%e tactical and strategic ca/a&ilities3 t)e traditional ascendancy of t)e defence &et(een si%ilarly constituted ar%ies using a /ersisting strategy reasserted itself. 0)e ne( strategy e-/loited t)e a&ility to co%/el &attle &y trying to concentrate against (eakness to %ake an o//onent fall &ack. Indi+idual &attles t)us &eca%e i%/ortant and occurred at a fre.uency unkno(n in /re+ious (ars. But &attles lacked t)e tactical i%/ortance of serious attrition3 t)e /ro/ortion of casualties rising only a&out 1 /ercent fro% t)e 12.< /ercent for +ictors and 21.@ /ercent for +an.uis)ed t)at )ad c)aracterised co%&at in t)e first si- decades of t)e &ayonet era. 2+en ()en t)e 'renc) )ad a &etter co%%ander and a distincti+ely &etter tactical syste%3 +ictory failed to inflict significantly greater casualties on disci/lined3 %oderately (ell articulated forces of regular troo/s. 0)e s/read of t)e i%/ro+ed 'renc) articulation only &uttressed t)e resilience of t)e defeated ar%ies. So co%%anders no longer )ad t)e o//ortunity for +ictories like "anni&als at $annae or le-anders at Issus and r&ela#ar%ies )ad &etter training and articulation and &ot) sides lacked t)e do%inant (ea/on syste% t)at )ea+y ca+alry )ad /ro+ided in le-andrian co%&at. !it)out t)e /ossi&ility of t)e %aDor attrition of so%e ancient contests3 &attles increased in fre.uency3 &ut not &ecause t)eir tactical conse.uences %ade t)e% ends in t)e%sel+es3 t)e role t)at le-ander and "anni&al )ad /ro/erly and successfully gi+en t)e%. Nor (ere t)e /olitical conse.uences of an indi+idual &attle generally significant. 0)e incidence of &attles gre( &ecause t)ey )ad &eco%e t)e %aDor tool in carrying out t)e traditional late se+enteent) and eig)teent)# century strategy of ac.uiring and consolidating control of an ene%ys territory. !it) t)e effects of defeat %itigated &y i%/ro+ed articulation3 generals risked conflicts %ore readily and t)eir +ery fre.uency )el/ed to %eliorate t)e ;clat of +ictory # and t)e o//ro&riu% attac)ed to t)e +an.uis)ed. 0)e ne( strategy did de/end on an ade.uate ratio of force to s/ace. In a large area3 suc) as 2uro/ean Russia3 e+en t)e enor%ous aggregation of ar%ies t)at Na/oleon used in 1B12 could not co%/el t)e ene%y to gi+e &attle. In so %uc) s/ace3 e+en large3 (ell#dis/ersed &odies of troo/s occu/ied relati+ely little %ore roo% t)an t)ose of 0urenne and Montecuccoli ()en t)ey )ad %anoeu+red along t)e Main in 1=C?. 2+en Na/oleons ar%y in Italy in 1B>> )ad great difficulty in gat)ering t)e fruit of its turning %o+e%ent &y &locking Melass retreat. 0)e far greater ratio of force to s/ace in t)e 4l% ca%/aign %ade it %uc) easier for Na/oleon to &lock t)e ustrian retreat. s Na/oleons ca%/aign in ustria in 1B>< could )a+e s)o(n3 )ad t)e ustrians &een less (illing to %ake /eace or )ad Na/oleon asked a great deal %ore3 as )is o/eration in Russia dra%atically de%onstrated3 occu/ation of territory (it)out /olitical su//ort re.uired a greater ratio of force to s/ace. In t)e early days of t)eir re+olution t)e 'renc) )ad a /olitical &asis in t)e ur&an areas of "olland3 t)e R)ine region of *er%any3 and nort) Italy t)at )ad /ro+ided %eaningful )el/ for t)eir con.uests. 0)eir success in t)e Net)erlands3 including o+errunning "olland3 )ad a /arallel in t)e nglo#I%/erial con.uest of a great deal of t)e S/anis) Net)erlands after t)e defeat of Mars)al Villeroi at Ra%illies in 1C>=. Muc) of t)e )ea+ily fortified country yielded to t)e +ictors ()o re/resented t)e traditional "a&s&urg rulers. So also in t)e 1C@>s did t)e 'renc) /rogra% of /olitical li&erty and e.uality e-ercise an a//eal a%ong t)e %iddle class t)at )el/ed t)e% o+erco%e t)e )istorically i%/regna&le defences of t)e Net)erlands and "olland. 0)is sa%e /olitical factor aided t)e% in Italy and assisted t)e% in co/ing (it) t)e %uc) larger territory of *er%any. :et t)e 'renc) dissi/ated t)is asset &y allo(ing t)eir troo/s to forage and loot in t)e %anner of soldiers of t)e 0)irty :ears !ar. s earlier3 t)e S/anis) Net)erlanders3 disillusioned (it) t)eir

2BB

ne( rulers3 later (elco%ed &ack t)e 'renc) as re/resentati+es of t)e ne( Bour&on 9ing of S/ain3 so territories occu/ied &y t)e 'renc) de+elo/ed an anti/at)y to(ard t)eir ill#&e)a+ed con.uerors. 0)e disorganisation of t)e i%/ro+ised re+olutionary ar%ies and t)e lack of %oney to &uy su//lies for t)e troo/s caused t)e %en to fall &ack on %arauding. fter a century of scru/ulous regard for ci+ilian /ro/erty3 t)e 'renc) soldiers looting /roduced a /articularly )ostile reaction a%ong t)e /u&lic3 es/ecially ()en t)e allied ar%ies ad)ered to ()at )ad &eco%e traditional /olicy. t t)e outset of t)e (ar in t)e Net)erlands3 for e-a%/le3 *eneral 1u%ourie6 co%%ented: JI fear t)e dreadful conse.uences of a retreat in a country ()ere (e )a+e raised t)e in)a&itants against us &y /illage and indisci/line.L 2+en in 'rance at t)at ti%e3 t)e troo/s alienated ci+ilians fro% t)e ne( go+ern%ent of li&erty and e.uality. Pointing out t)is result3 one soldier re/orted t)at %any 'renc) /easants )ad told )i%3 J(it) tears in t)eir eyes3 t)at t)ey /referred t)e ancient regi%e a t)ousand ti%es %ore t)an our constitution3 since at least t)en no one carried off t)eir /ro/erty.L 0)e go+ern%ent soug)t to control t)e troo/s &ut faced t)e sa%e difficulties encountered in t)e 0)irty :ears !ar. 0)e great ,a6are $arnot3 ()o )ad c)arge of t)e re/u&lics (ar effort3 noted t)at )e and Jt)e generals found it i%/ossi&le to sto/ t)e disorders7 t)e drunken soldiers )eard not)ing3 and t)e nu%&er guilty (as too great to t)ink of a +iolent /unis)%ent3 ()ic) %oreo+er3 (ould )a+e &een i%/ossi&le to e-ecute in suc) a circu%stance.L !)en trying to %o+e t)ese %en to(ard t)e ene%y3 $arnot found t)at Jt)ey (ere al%ost all drunk3 %ore or less... 0)e soldiers /acks (ere so full of t)ings t)ey )ad stolen t)at t)ey could no longer carry t)e%.L Seeing suc) %ilitary e+ils result fro% a return to t)e old %et)ods3 $arnot concluded: JIf e+ery soldier ()o steals a /in is not s)ot on t)e s/ot you (ill ne+er acco%/lis) anyt)ing.L But t)e 'renc) soldiers continued to s.uander %uc) of t)e re/u&lics /olitical ca/ital and under%ined t)is +ital &asis of t)eir con.uests. 8ust as ntioc)us VII of Syria con+erted )is (elco%e in Meso/ota%ia into a+ersion3 so t)e 'renc) alienated t)eir su//orters. !)en t)e &e)a+iour of Na/oleon s troo/s /ro+oked an u/rising in Milan in 1C@=3 t)is ty/ified t)e conduct of 'renc) troo/s. In t)e sa%e year one 'renc) general re/orted fro% *er%any: JI a% doing %y &est to control t)e /lundering3 &ut t)e troo/s )a+e not &een /aid for t(o %ont)s3 and t)e ration colu%ns cannot kee/ u/ (it) our ra/id %arc)es7 t)e /easants flee3 and t)e soldiers lay (aste e%/ty )ouses.L not)er general also re/orted fro% *er%any t)at Jt)e soldiers %istreat t)e country to t)e %ost e-tre%e degree7 I &lus) to lead an ar%y t)at &e)a+es in suc) an un(ort)y %anner.L !)en Prussian troo/s in+aded 'rance in 1B143 t)ey took re+enge for t)ese earlier de/redations. 0)e result: t)e Prussians antagonised t)e ot)er(ise a/at)etic 'renc) /o/ulace3 con+erting t)e% into acti+e o//onents. But t)e (ar ended too .uickly for t)is )ostility to affect %ilitary o/erations. 0)e lack of %oney3 disci/line3 and good %anage%ent t)at )ad /er%itted t)is &e)a+iour on t)e /art of t)e 'renc) soldiers )ad contri&uted to t)e erosion of t)e good (ill felt to(ard t)e 'renc) in t)e ,o( $ountries3 Italy3 and *er%any and t)e s.uandering of +alua&le /olitical ca/ital. Initially3 /o/ular /olitical su//ort )ad /ro+ided one of t)e keys to t)e early 'renc) success in o+erco%ing o//osition in areas t)at )ad long defied 'renc) control. But in t)e largely rural ustrian e%/ire t)e 'renc) could )a+e found fe( allies and (ould )a+e faced a serious /ro&le% in garrisoning and do%inating suc) a large area. In Russia t)eir ca%/aign a%ounted to not)ing %ore t)an a s/ectacular raid3 and in S/ain t)e 'renc) s)o(ed t)at against essentially national )ostility t)ey (ould need ti%e as (ell as %ore a%/le forces if t)ey (ere to su&due t)e country .uickly (it)out %assacring a su&stantial /art of t)e /o/ulation. n ade.uate ratio of force to s/ace /er%itted t)e ne( &attle#oriented strategy to con.uer territory ra/idly. But areas s%all enoug) to fall to t)is strategy %ig)t still &e too large if t)e in+ader faced su&stantial /olitical o//osition. 0)en t)e in+ader (ould need eit)er a /olitical /rogra% to (in

2B@

su//ort or an e+en greater ratio of force to s/ace3 one res/onsi+e to /olitical rat)er t)an %ilitary needs. In S/ain t)e 'renc) encountered too %uc) /olitical antagonis% for t)eir force3 a situation not unlike t)at ()ic) faced "anni&al in Italy and le-ander in Bactria and Sogdiana. 0)e transfor%ations of (arfare during t)e era of t)e 'renc) Re+olution3 toget)er (it) t)e ratio of force to t)e geogra/)ical area in+ol+ed3 go far to(ard /ro+iding t)e reasons for 'renc) +ictories. !)en one adds t)e /olitical factors influencing t)e rece/ti+ity of t)e defeated to t)e rule or )ege%ony of t)e con.uerors3 t)ese t)ree offer a con+enient3 if o+erly si%/le3 %eans of understanding t)e resulting un/recedented3 if transitory3 e-/ansion of 'renc) territory and influence. 0)e 'renc) success in con.uering t)e Net)erlands and adDacent areas of *er%any and Italy illustrates t)e o/eration of all t)ree of t)ese factors. In S/ain3 ()ere t)ey )ad t)e %ilitary %eans to con.uer and t)e forces to occu/y suc) a large country3 t)ey failed &ecause t)ey lacked a /olitical &ase. In Russia3 ()ere t)ey )ad only %ilitary su/re%acy3 Na/oleons in+asion &eca%e a %ere raid3 a /ersisting strategy &eing &eyond %ilitary %eans alone. In t)eir searc) for t)e e-/lanations for t)e success of Na/oleon and )is re+olutionary /redecessors /eo/le )a+e found a fe( reasons t)at see% to lack +alidity. So%e &elie+ed t)at Na/oleonic ar%ies %arc)ed %ore ra/idly t)an t)ose of t)e old regi%e. "is %en did %arc) +ery s(iftly on occasion &ut not faster t)an for e-a%/le3 t)ose of 0illy and *usta+us. Na/oleons usual rate of %arc) did not differ fro% t)e t(el+e %iles /er day t)at )ad c)aracterised ar%ies since ancient ti%es. "e did %arc) %ore .uickly t)an t)is %ore often t)an did generals of t)e earlier centuries &ecause t)e ne( strategy of dis/ersal and concentration created %ore occasions for ra/id %arc)es. "is greater %o&ility3 dis/layed in t)e long ad+ance t)at3 for e-a%/le3 /layed suc) a role in t)e 4l% and usterlit6 ca%/aigns3 %ade o&ser+ers t)ink t)at in finding food and fodder along t)e %arc) route3 )e differed fro% )is /redecessors. "e li+ed on t)e country3 ()ereas t)ey de/ended on su//lies &roug)t fro% t)e rear. But earlier ar%ies3 too3 unless engaged in a siege3 li+ed on t)e country in essentially t)e sa%e (ay. nd t)e s/read of t)e culti+ation of t)e /otato )ad )el/ed %en find food in t)e area ()ere t)ey ca%/aigned. 2ssentially as nutritious as &read3 t)e /otato re.uired no %illing into flour or &aking in o+ens as /re/aration for eating. It is true t)at t)e ar%ies of t)e re+olution3 and often Na/oleons also3 took food and loot in a %anner re%iniscent of t)e soldiers of t)e 0)irty :ears !ar. But t)e 'renc) /aid a significant /olitical /rice for t)is re+ersion to t)e older %et)od of su//ly3 facing guerrilla (arfare in Italy as (ell as S/ain and sacrificing real indigenous /olitical su//ort else()ere. But t)e %et)od of su//lying ar%ies differed not at all7 t)e only +ariation lay in t)e %eans of collecting t)e su//lies. ll ar%ies in t)is /eriod usually li+ed on t)e country Dust as ar%ies )ad t)roug)out t)e )istory of (arfare. Because )e engaged in fe(er sieges3 Na/oleon relied less on %aga6ines and su//ly con+oys to su//ort a stationary ar%y. "e continued to de/end on contri&utions3 and for t)e first t(el+e years of )is rule foreign nations &ore t)e costs of )is (ars3 Dust as Sa-ony )ad /aid so %uc) of 'redericks costs in (aging t)e Se+en :ears !ar. 5&ser+ers also t)oug)t t)at Na/oleon attained %ore &ecause )e )ad no li%itations on )is %eans or )is o&Decti+es. "e did acco%/lis) %ore &ecause of )is unsur/assed %ilitary genius and &ecause of t)e kind of ar%y e+ol+ed &y t)e (ork of eig)teent)#century 'renc) %ilitary refor%ers and fro% t)e ideas of Bourcet and *ui&ert. 0)e ne( ar%ies and t)e co%&at strategy t)at )e /ioneered ga+e )i% %ilitary %eans not at t)e dis/osal of t)ose ()o ca%e &efore )i%. "e )ad a%&itious /olitical o&Decti+es3 and3 to a degree3 t)ese e-/anded to %eet t)e )ig)er effecti+eness of )is %ilitary %ac)ine. 'or a ti%e3 )e do%inated t)e non# ustrian /art of t)e old "oly Ro%an 2%/ire and %ade ustria an un(illing ally. 0)is goal (as &eyond t)e ca/acity of ,ouis IIV3 ()ose ar%ed forces lacked t)e ca/a&ilities of Na/oleons3 furt)er7 t)e 9ing )ad no /olitical &ase t)at could )a+e )el/ed to reconcile t)e states of t)e e%/ire to )is )ege%ony. But Na/oleon e-/loited t)e /olitical ac)ie+e%ents of t)e 'renc) Re+olution3 and t)e ideal of /olitical li&erty and e.uality e-ercised 2@>

enoug) influence to ena&le )i% to )a+e a tenuous /olitical &ase u/on ()ic) to found ()at /ro+ed to &e a +ery e/)e%eral 2uro/ean 2%/ire. !it)out t)e fee&le /olitical o//osition t)at faced le-ander t)e *reat3 Na/oleon could not re/roduce t)e Macedonians I%/erial triu%/). Na/oleons ai%s in dealing (it) ustria re%ained %oderate and con+entional. But ()en )e raised )is /olitical o&Decti+e in S/ain to t)e o+ert)ro( of t)e ruling )ouse and t)e introduction of 'renc) re+olutionary ideas3 )e found t)at )e )ad ado/ted3 as )e did in Russia3 /olitical o&Decti+es &eyond )is %ilitary ca/acity. Per)a/s )e )ad %ore a%&itious and less realistic goals t)an any 'renc) %onarc) since $)arles VIII and )is successors )ad ai%ed to con.uer Italy3 &ut )e )ad %ore %ilitary %eans t)an t)ey since t)e art of (ar )ad ad+anced faster in 'rance t)an else()ere. Still3 Na/oleon did not e%/loy all of t)e %eans at )is dis/osal. 1es/ite t)e great (ealt) of 'rance and t)e conscri/tion of soldiers3 t)e /ro/ortion of %en under ar%s re%ained fairly s%all3 less t)an in Britain3 for e-a%/le3 and 'renc) allies and su&Dect and satellite states &ore a large /art of t)e cost of )is (ars. Back

(he Military "egacy of the Na'oleonic -ra

0)e c)anges in (arfare fro% 1C@2 to 1B1< did not affect t)e essentials of tactics. Missile#(ea/on infantry still de/loyed in lines in t)e traditional %anner for )ea+y infantry3 and t)e /redo%inance in fire continued to decide t)e contest. 0)e &ayonet still (as a t)reat in fending off ca+alry attacks and (as used occasionally in infantry co%&at. 0)e eig)teent)#century idea of returning to s)ock action &et(een infantry for%ations t)roug) t)e i%/etus of a colu%n )ad fe( trials and fe(er successes. In re/elling an effort to e%/loy t)e &ayonet for s)ock action against infantry3 t)e defender enDoyed t)e &enefit of firing +olleys ()ile stationary as (ell as recei+ing a c)arge in a c)osen /osition (it) ranks undisordered &y any %arc) to deli+er an attack. 1e/t) of for%ation /ro+ed no antidote to t)ese ad+antages of t)e defence3 and additional %en in t)e rear added no i%/etus to t)ose in front ()o )ad to face t)e sal+os of )ostile fire &efore reac)ing t)e o//osing line of %uskets and &ayonets. 0)us t)e defensi+e re%ained stronger in co%&at &et(een t)e sa%e (ea/on syste%s. nd ca+alry3 its /istols do%inated &y %uskets and its c)arge (it) sa&res o+er%atc)ed &y a line of %usketeers (it) &ayonets3 re%ained t)e inferior (ea/on syste%. lt)oug) t)e greater %o&ility of artillery ena&led it to acco%/any t)e attack %ore often3 it continued to contri&ute %ore to defence t)an to offence. !it) full#si6e &alls at a distance and canisters of s%aller /roDectiles at 4>> yards or less3 it /o(erfully aug%ented t)e +olleys of t)e %usketeers. 0)us3 t)e relati+e /o(er of t)e (ea/on syste%s )ad not c)anged3 as s)o(n in t)e sc)e%atic &elo(3 in ()ic) M1 is t)e a&ility to defend successfully.

)om-at ,elationshi -etween 'nfantry and )a%alry Back

But ca+alry could refuse &attle and its greater %o&ility assured it a continued3 if s)runken3 tactical /lace in ar%ies ()ile infantry in linear for%ation re%ained +ulnera&le to a ca+alry assault in its flank and rear. Battles in S/ain and Portugal illustrate t)ese tactical +aria&les3 as t)oroug)ly drilled Britis) units (it) good training in firing %et t)ose of t)e 'renc) trying to )old S/ain for Na/oleons &rot)er. t t)e Battle of l&uera3 for e-a%/le3 a&out 223>>> 'renc)3 under t)e ca/a&le co%%and of t)e +eteran ca%/aigner3 Mars)al Soult %et a Britis)3 S/anis)3 and Portuguese force of ?<3>>> co%%anded &y t)e one#eyed Britis) general3 Beresford3 ()o3 as a Portuguese Mars)al3 )ad effecti+ely reorganised t)e Portuguese ar%y. Mars)al Soult sent a s%all force to attract t)e attention of t)e allies &y attacking t)eir front ()ile )e directed )is %ain ar%y to )is left to turn t)e

2@1

allied /osition. But &efore t)e 'renc) could attack t)e allied flank and rear3 t)e alert Beresford )ad rede/loyed t)e &ulk of )is %en and for%ed a ne( line to resist t)e 'renc) assault. 0)e 'renc) cor/s t)at conducted t)e attack )ad four &attalions3 one &e)ind t)e ot)er3 eac) for%ed (it) fifty files and line ranks. 5n eit)er side of t)ese &attalions3 t)e 'renc) di+ision co%%ander de/loyed a &attalion in line3 1<> %en in t)ree ranks. In /art to /rotect t)e flanks of )is di+ision fro% a ca+alry c)arge3 )e /osted on eac) side of t)e de/loyed &attalions an additional &attalion (it) a front of t(enty#fi+e %en and eig)teen ranks dee/. 5n eac) side of t)e di+ision a do6en cannon su//orted t)e attack3 firing at S/anis) troo/s <>> yards distant7 t)e S/aniards )ad ten guns. 0)e 'renc) di+ision3 kee/ing its %i-ed for%ation3 ca%e (it)in si-ty yards of t)e S/anis) line ()ere t)ey )alted and3 returned t)e +olleys of t)e steady S/anis) infantry%en. Britis) force of four &attalions aided t)e S/aniards &y for%ing on t)eir rig)t3 angling for(ard3 and firing into t)e 'renc) flank. t t)is %o%ent3 ()en a sudden t)understor% co%/letely o&scured t)e &attlefield3 a 'renc) ca+alry force c)arged t)e flank of t)e Britis) &attalions3 for%ed in a single line t(o ranks dee/3 and co%/letely defeated t)ree of t)e &attalions3 only one succeeding in for%ing a s.uare and /rotecting itself. Bot) sides t)en reinforced t)e &attle3 si- Britis) &attalions relie+ing t)e S/aniards and t)e 'renc) /us)ing for(ard a second di+ision t)at3 ()en inter%ingled (it) t)e first3 created a %ass (it) a front 5f 4>> and de/t) of t(enty3 not at all a ty/ical 'renc) for%ation. 5f t)e ?3>>> Britis) troo/s in a dou&le line3 a&out 231>> could fire on t)e 'renc) front as close as si-ty yards a(ay3 directly in front of t)e 'renc) for%ation3 to as %uc) as 2>> yards a(ay ()en firing at an angle front t)e flanks. 0)e 'renc) front 5f 4>> could &ring into action t)e first t(o ranks3 B>> %usketeers3 &ut /ro&a&ly not %ore &ecause of t)e traditional difficulty in securing fire fro% t)e t)ird line3 ()ic) Na/oleon (ould soon eli%inate &ecause it usually functioned as a reser+e for t)e first t(o lines rat)er t)an contri&uting its fire. 'renc) artillery could fire so%e rounds &ut3 stationed &e)ind t)e infantry and at longer range3 could offer little %ore. 0)e Britis) )ad se+en guns t)at could fire on t)e 'renc)3 and t)ey )ad great effect on t)e +ulnera&le target of t)e closely /acked infantry. In t)e &attle3 ()ic) lasted forty#fi+e %inutes until t)e 'renc) retreated3 t)e Britis) suffered 13B>> casualties3 )alf t)eir strengt)3 and t)e 'renc) ?3>>> of t)eir B3>>>. Britis) artillery accounted for a&out one#t)ird of t)e 'renc) casualties3 and t)e 'renc) artillery inflicted ?>> or 4>> casualties on t)e Britis). Musket fire caused t)e re%ainder of t)e casualties. If t)e Britis) )ad co%/ressed t)eir line as t)e centre suffered losses3 t)ey (ould )a+e )ad an a+erage of a&out 13B<> %uskets firing t)roug)out t)e engage%ent7 if t)ey let t)e 'renc) s)oot a(ay t)eir centre (it)out dra(ing in t)eir flanks to fill t)e ga/s3 only 13?<>. If t)e 'renc) t)ird line did not fire3 t)ey (ould )a+e ke/t B>> %uskets in action continuously3 t)e rear ranks filling t)e /laces of t)e fallen in t)e front t(o ranks. s a result of t)e firing3 eac) +eteran soldier on &ot) sides fired as %any as fifty rounds and accounted for a&out one or one and a )alf ene%y soldiers. 0)e casualties in t)is &attle roug)ly fit ,anc)esters )y/ot)esis. ssu%ing t)at t)e Britis) ke/t closing t)eir line so as not to /resent a ga/ o//osite t)e 'renc) %ass3 t)ey )ad an a+erage of 13B<> %en firing against B>> 'renc). 0)e a//ro-i%ately 131<> Britis) casualties to %usket fire a%ounted to a little o+er )alf of t)e 23>>> 'renc) losses attri&uta&le to s%all#ar%s fire. 0)e casualties3 ()ic) reasona&ly confor% to t)e nu%&ers firing3 do not reflect t)e likely su/eriority of t)e Britis) troo/s in %usketry3 &ut fres) 'renc) soldiers (it) unfouled %uskets3 as (ell as t)e /rotection offered &y t)e &odies of t)e fallen3 %ay (ell account for t)e failure of a .ualitati+e difference to %ake itself felt. If3 )o(e+er3 t)e 'renc) )ad continued t)e &attle3 e+en in t)eir inefficient for%ation3 t)ey (ould ulti%ately )a+e so s)runk t)e Britis) line as to )a+e %ore %en firing and t)en t)ey (ould )a+e .uickly e-tinguis)ed t)eir o//onent. But t)eir defecti+e array for using t)eir %uskets (ould

2@2

)a+e caused t)e 'renc) to suffer far %ore casualties t)an ,anc)esters la( (ould indicate. 0)at t)e 'renc) %asked t)e fire of so %any of t)eir %en (ould e-/lain t)is di+ergence. 0)is &attle is re/resentati+e in %any res/ects3 &eginning (it) Soults turning %o+e%ent3 ()ic) at least succeeded in directing )is su&se.uent frontal attacks against a /osition ()ere Mars)al Beresford )ad not /lanned to recei+e t)e%. 0)e failure of t)e dee/ 'renc) for%ation to close (it) t)e &ayonet +indicated t)e o//onents of s)ock action and t)e sce/tics of t)e argu%ent t)at de/t) could /ro+ide i%/etus to t)e attack. !)en faced (it) ene%y +olleys3 t)e front ranks )alted and returned fire3 t)e rear ranks standing still3 /rotected front fire &y t)eir co%rades in front. 5n occasion in t)e (ar in S/ain and Portugal3 ()en Britis) troo/s c)arged after t)eir fire )alted a 'renc) colu%n3 t)e dense 'renc) for%ation &eca%e &adly disordered and de%oralised3 its additional de/t) contri&uting not)ing. In %any of t)e co%&ats in S/ain3 t)e 'renc) attacked in colu%n (it)out de/loying in line. In so%e instances t)e co%%anders c)ose to do t)is3 &ut often t)ey (ere forced into it3 )a+ing %isDudged t)e location of t)e ene%y3 fre.uently &ecause t)e defending Britis) /laced t)eir line on t)e slo/e of a )ill a(ay front t)e 'renc). In t)is case3 ()en t)e 'renc) colu%ns of %anoeu+re ca%e o+er t)e crest of t)e )ill3 t)ey ca%e i%%ediately under t)e fire of Britis) +olleys. 0)us t)e 'renc) co%%ander (ould find t)at )e )ad (aited too late to de/loy Into line and /referred t)en to fig)t in colu%n rat)er t)an to carry out t)e %anoeu+re into line under fire. 0)e successful attack of t)e 'renc) ca+alry clearly3 e-)i&ited ()y ca+alry3 t)oug) an inferior (ea/on syste%3 could still use its &etter %o&ility and a&ility to fig)t as it %arc)ed to attack infantrys +ulnera&le flank. Battles (itnessed %any re/etitions of t)e Battle of l&ueras instance of co%&at of for%ations standing as close as forty yards a/art and firing at eac) ot)er until one ga+e (ay. In al%ost e+ery occasion t)e colu%n for%ation failed to close (it) t)e ene%y3 t)oug) it usually )ad greater nu%&ers and %ore strengt) concentrated at t)e /otential /oint of contact. 0)e co%&ats3 )o(e+er3 did de%onstrate t)e +alue of effecti+e nu%erical /re/onderance ()en %issile (ea/ons and a linear for%ation ena&led one side to &ring %ore %en into action. !it) t)e a&andon%ent of continuous lines and3 often in t)e 'renc) ar%y3 a deficiency in t)e drill and firing /ractice originally used (it) linear for%ations of %issile#(ea/on infantry3 t)e distinction tended to &lur &et(een line and lig)t infantry. ,ig)t infantry learned to fig)t in line3 and line infantry learned to use t)e skir%is)ing tactics traditional for t)e %issile#ar%ed soldier. By t)e end of t)e Na/oleonic (ars lig)t and )ea+y infantry could readily su&stitute for one anot)er and )ad really for%ed a general#/ur/ose infantry t)at could use t(o different tactics. Increasingly Na/oleon3 originally an artillery officer3 ga+e a %ore effecti+e offensi+e role to t)e artillery. 0)e artillery%en learned &etter )o( to &ring t)eir guns for(ard on t)e &attlefield and unli%&er t)e% as close as ?>> yards fro% ene%y infantry. t t)is range t)e gunners (ould still )a+e relati+e i%%unity fro% %usket fire ()ile a&le to s)oot canister or t)e larger gra/e s)ot effecti+ely at t)e ene%y infantry. 4sed in t)is (ay3 t)e fire of t)e artillery )ad suc) a destructi+e effect t)at t)e infantry )ad little to do &ut e-/loit t)e artillerys success. $oncentration of large nu%&ers of guns in one /lace facilitated t)is use of artillery fire in t)e offensi+e3 and ()en generals a//lied t)e artillery doctrine concei+ed &efore t)e 'renc) Re+olution3 t)ey %ade t)e sa%e use of artillerys a&ility to concentrate as infantry co%%anders did (it) t)eir &attalion colu%ns. Intre/id artillery%en3 &y &ringing %ore of t)eir guns for(ard on t)e &attlefield3 )ad gi+en increased +alue to %o&ile %issile (ea/ons. 0)e (ea/ons dra(n for(ard &y t)e )orses fired a %uc) larger load of %issiles t)an t)e s%all infantry guns introduced &y *usta+us dol/)us3 accentuating t)e /redo%inance of t)e )ea+y3 /o(erful %o&ile %issile (ea/ons as co%/ared (it) t)e /orta&le %usket. t t)e Battle of 'riedland in 1B>C3 for e-a%/le3 t)irty 'renc) artillery /ieces ad+anced (it) a di+ision in an attack against t)e Russians. Beginning effecti+e fire at e-tre%e canister range3

2@?

t)e 'renc) artillery %o+ed for(ard in stages until it )ad reac)ed first 12> yards and finally => yards ()ere t)e guns tore &loody ga/s in t)e line of Russian infantry. 0)is cli%a-ed a t(enty#fi+e %inute struggle in ()ic) t)e artillery inflicted 43>>> casualties and co%/elled t)e sturdy Russian soldiers to retire. !)en Russian ca+alry t)en c)arged t)e artillery in t)e flank3 t)e 'renc) co%%ander rede/loyed )is guns in ti%e to fire t(o sal+os t)at routed t)e )orse%en. 0)e artillery t)en follo(ed t)e infantry across a ri+er into a +illage ()ere it did terri&le )ar% to Russian infantry cro(ded in t)e narro( streets. In s/ite of suc) an e-e%/lary use of guns3 ()ic) s)o(ed t)e /art t)ey could /lay on t)e offensi+e3 artillery still re%ained stronger on t)e defensi+e3 ()ere it )ad %uc) greater certainty of finding suita&le targets. 0)e %enace of t)e i%/ro+ed artillery led co%%anders3 /articularly t)e s)re(d Britis) co%%ander3 !ellington3 to /lace t)eir infantry &eyond t)e crests of )ills3 ()ere t)ey )ad co+er against artillery fire fro% a distance &ut )ad t)e crest of t)e )ill (it)in good %usket range to &ring assaulting infantry under fire ()en it a//eared. 2-ce/t in sieges3 artillery re%ained a %ore effecti+e &ut less %o&ile for% of t)e &asic %issile (ea/on syste%. 0)e greater articulation of de%i#&rigades3 &rigades3 and di+isions and t)e &attalions facility in %anoeu+re and de/loy%ent re%ained an enduring tactical legacy of t)is /eriod. 4/on t)ese inno+ations and t)e resulting tactical %o&ility rested t)e no+el a&ility of infantry to concentrate u/on t)e &attlefield and to s/read out to en+elo/ and turn an ene%y /osition. 0)ese alterations also e-/lain t)e a&ility of defenders to c)ange front and e-tend to resist attacks in flank and rear as (ell as infantrys increased ca/acity to co/e (it) ca+alry and t)e foot soldiers great resilience in defeat. 0)e /eriod of t)e 'renc) Re+olution and Na/oleon affected t)e su//ly of ar%ies )ardly at all3 yet t)e /ro+ision of %en for t)e ar%ies )ad c)anged considera&ly. 2-ce/t in Britain3 co%/ulsory ser+ice /layed a greater role and ar%ies &eca%e increasingly national. 0)e %ilitary entre/reneur3 like t)e foreign recruit3 d(indled into +irtual insignificance e-ce/t in t)e for% of t)e )eterogeneous ar%ies of t)e e-tensi+e 'renc) 2%/ire3 ()ere its di+erse territories and satellite kingdo%s /ro+ided national contingents. Particularly in Prussia and 'rance did %ilitias )a+e an i%/ortant role as forces in t)e field and a source for %an/o(er for t)e ar%ies. In +arying degrees in all ar%ies national feeling and dynastic loyalty /layed a role in ani%ating soldiers3 %any of ()o% also foug)t (ell &ecause of t)e co)esion /ro+ided &y t)eir regi%ents and t)e leaders)i/ of t)eir officers. 2ssentially t)e 'renc) re+olutionary %odel )ad s/read3 as %any soldiers (ere coerced into t)e ar%y and %any (ere ins/ired &y t)e cause of t)eir country. 0)e re+olution in strategy3 de/ending %uc) on t)at in tactics altered (ar /rofoundly &y resting strategy on co%&at3 or its t)reat to a degree )eretofore unkno(n &et(een ar%ies co%/osed of si%ilar (ea/on syste%s. 1is/ersion and concentration against an o//onents (eakness ani%ated a strategic en+iron%ent in ()ic) &attle %ust occur if one3 rat)er t)an &ot)3 contestants (is)ed it3 unless t)e reluctant ar%y retreated. 0)is ga+e ne( resources and t)e a&ility to force a decision to t)e strategic offensi+e and3 t)oug) &attles figured /ro%inently3 ena&led successful ca%/aigns to engulf and )old large sections of t)e ene%ys territory. ,arger ar%ies in relation to t)e s/ace of t)e traditional territorial /ri6es and ca%/aigning areas )ad %uc) to do (it) t)ese greater con.uests3 &ut t)e ne( co%&at strategy %ade a funda%ental contri&ution to t)e s/eed and scale of t)e strategic successes and3 conse.uently3 to reducing t)e effort re.uired for +ictory in (ar. Back

(he (actics of Warfare at Sea

0)e na+al contest &et(een 'rance and Britain continued t)e /attern esta&lis)ed in t)e /re+ious century. Britain &lockaded 'renc) %erc)ant and na+al +essels3 and t)e 'renc) na+y continued to stay inferior to t)e Britis)3 %ostly &ecause3 (it) t)eir s.uadrons al(ays &ottled u/ in t)eir /orts3 officers and %en lacked e-/erience at sea. 0)e 'renc) soug)t to a+oid &attles or to %ake t)e% indecisi+e ()ile acco%/lis)ing a strategic o&Decti+e.

2@4

0)e first %aDor co%&at of t)e (ar occurred in late May 1C@43 ()en t)e courageous and co%/etent d%iral Villarer de 8oyeuse (it) t)e t(enty#si- %en#of#(ar of t)e Brest fleet sallied to co+er t)e arri+al of a 'renc) con+oy of 1?> s)i/s &earing ()eat3 sugar3 and coffee. !)en t)e o//onents %et3 t)e 'renc) )ad t)e ad+antage of t)e (ind(ard /osition and for t(o days ke/t d%iral "o(e3 a sailor (it) %ore t)an fifty years ser+ice3 and )is t(enty#si- Britis) (ar +essels at &ay. 2+en ()en "o(e secured t)e (ind(ard /osition3 stor%y (eat)er /re+ented &attle for t(o %ore days. 5n 8une 1st3 (it) (eat)er i%/ro+ing3 t)e Britis) engaged in t)e usual %anner &y turning eac) of t)e s)i/s in t)eir line o&li.uely to(ard t)e /arallel 'renc) line. 0)e enter/rising "o(e a//arently intended t)at )is +essels /ass t)roug) t)e inter+als &et(een t)e 'renc) (ars)i/s and engage t)e% on t)e lee(ard side3 )a%/ering t)eir esca/e. But only eig)t s)i/s carried out t)is %anoeu+re. 0)e &ulk of t)e co%&at in+ol+ed t)ese +essels on ()ic) t)e 'renc) also concentrated &y &ringing so%e of t)eir s)i/s u/on t)e Britis) lee(ard side3 catc)ing t)eir ad+ersary &et(een t(o fires. :et t)e Britis) (on3 due to t)e /roficiency of t)eir cre(s and t)e 'renc) (eakness in officers3 %any of t)eir &est %en lost on account of t)e re+olution. 0)e 'renc) esca/ed3 (it) one s)i/ sunk and si- ca/tured. 0)e Britis) cele&rated t)is co%&at as t)e *lorious 'irst of 8une3 a great tactical +ictory &ecause of t)e losses inflicted on t)e ene%y. 0)e 'renc) also cele&rated t)eir strategic +ictory3 for t)eir con+oy arri+ed unscat)ed. 5ff $a/e St. Vincent on t)e S/anis) coast in 1C@C anot)er &attle took /lace. 0)e S/anis) Mediterranean s.uadron of t(enty#four +essels entered t)e tlantic3 escorting a con+oy as it %o+ed to Doin t)e 'renc) Brest fleet co+ering a 'renc) atte%/t to send an ar%y against *reat Britain. 0)e S/anis) ad%iral3 ()o )ad good s)i/s &ut not enoug) sailors and fe( (it) ade.uate sea e-/erience3 )ad no allusions t)at )e co%%anded a fleet fit to fig)t. In s/ite of )a+ing only fifteen s)i/s of t)e line3 t)e Britis) ad%iral3 8er+is3 a strict disci/linarian ()o kne( t)e (eakness of t)e S/aniards3 attacked t)e ene%y s.uadron3 ()ic) )e found di+ided into t(o /arts3 t)e s%aller3 eig)t %en#of#(ar3 for%ing a se/arate grou/ in t)e rear. Sailing )is line t)roug) t)is ga/ in t)e S/anis) for%ation and deli+ering a succession of &roadsides against t)e rear%ost s)i/s of t)e lead S/anis) di+ision3 t)e Britis) t)en turned not to(ard t)e s%aller grou/ &ut against t)e rear of t)e larger section )eading t)e S/anis) fleet. In s/ite of efforts of t)e S/anis) rear contingent to co%e u/ and of t)e s)i/s of t)e lead grou/ to turn &ack3 t)e Britis) o+er()el%ed four S/anis) +essels and secured t)eir surrender. 0)e +ictorious ad%iral t)en &roke off t)e &attle to /rotect )is ca/tured (ars)i/s as t)e far %ore nu%erous S/anis) %en#of#(ar at last concentrated against t)e Britis) &et(een t)e t(o /arts of t)eir fleet. By &reaking t)roug) t)e su&stantial ga/ &et(een t)e t(o sections of t)e S/anis) fleet3 d%iral 8er+is )ad concentrated a t(o to one nu%erical ad+antage against t)e S/anis) s)i/s )e attacked. 0)us )e )ad used a %et)od like Rodneys to (in a +ictory co%/ara&le to t)at at t)e Saints against a fleet al%ost dou&le )is strengt). 0)e first#class sea%ans)i/ of t)e Britis) )el/ed t)e% against t)e S/aniards3 ()ose +essels )ad little recent sailing e-/erience. Better#drilled Britis) gunners aided also3 as e+idenced &y a Britis) se+enty#four#gun s)i/ %eeting3 sur+i+ing3 and da%aging t)e gigantic Santissima Trinidad3 a four#decked s)i/ of 1?>3 guns3 t)e largest (ars)i/ of t)e ti%e. Successful /enetration of t)e ene%y line contri&uted to t)e +ictory at $a%/erdo(n in 1C@C3 ()en t)e aggressi+e d%iral 1uncans si-teen Britis) s)i/s %et t)e sa%e nu%&er of slig)tly s%aller 1utc) +essels. 'earing t)e 1utc) %ig)t esca/e3 t)e Britis)3 in t(o di+isions3 did not (ait to for% &ut rus)ed )eadlong at t)e 1utc) line3 so%e Britis) %en#of#(ar secured a lee(ard /osition3 )a%/ering 1utc) (it)dra(al3 taking so%e s)i/s fro% t(o sides3 and creating t(o se/arate close &attles in ()ic) t)e Britis) took nine 1utc) +essels in a )ard#foug)t contest. 0)is +ictory caused t)e 'renc) to a&andon /lans for a landing in *reat Britain.

2@<

In 1C@B at &oukir Bay in 2gy/t d%iral "oratio Nelson (it) fourteen Britis) s)i/s attacked an unready 'renc) fleet of t)irteen +essels3 all at anc)or. $oncentrating t(o %en#of#(ar to one on t)e )ead of t)e 'renc) line3 t)e Britis) )ad an es/ecial ad+antage &ecause t)e 'renc) s)i/s3 (it) sailors as)ore fetc)ing (ater3 (ere so s)ort#)anded t)at t)ey could fire only one of t)eir &roadsides. Since d%iral Nelsons t(o to one concentration against t)e )ead of t)e 'renc) line failed to include one 'renc) s)i/3 t)e se+enty#four#gun Britis) .ellero -on )ad to face t)e 12>#gun 'renc) flags)i/3 Orient. lt)oug) t)e /o(erful &roadsides of t)e Orient knocked off all t)e %asts of t)e .ellero -on and inflicted enor%ous casualties3 +ictory (ent to t)e Britis). 0)e Orient caug)t fire and &le( u/ ()en t)e fire reac)ed )er /o(der %aga6ines. 0)e .ellero -on used a single sail to /ull a(ay fro% t)e danger. 5t)er 'renc) +essels3 t)oug) &adly &attered3 fared so%e()at &etter in t)at one &y one t)ey surrendered and t)e Britis) concentration %o+ed gradually do(n t)e anc)ored 'renc) line until only t(o 'renc) s)i/s esca/ed. 0)is +ictory ca/tured no con+oy nor frustrated any in+asion atte%/t &ut s)ifted t)e na+al &alance of /o(er &y destroying a %aDor /art of t)e 'renc) Mediterranean fleet. 0)e &attle s)o(ed Nelsons /re#e%inent traits as a tactician and ins/irer of )is ca/tains and sea%en alike. ca/tain at age t(enty3 rising &y c)ar% and a&ility rat)er t)an influence3 )e )ad already lost an eye and an ar% in ser+ice to )is country and3 /laying a &rilliant role in t)e Battle of Saint Vincent3 earned t)e co%%and in t)e Mediterranean3 ()ic) ga+e )i% t)e o//ortunity to lead )is fleet at &oukir Bay. "e (ould later dis/lay )is %astery of na+al tactics against d%iral Villeneu+e3 ()o )ad reac)ed t)e rank of rear ad%iral at age t)irty#t)ree in /art &ecause t)e na+y )ad lost so %any officers to deat) or e%igration. Villeneu+e )ad foug)t at &oukir and )ad led t)e t(o s)i/s t)at esca/ed. 0)e tactical trends &egun at t)e Battle of t)e Saints and e-)i&ited in t)ese later conflicts reac)ed t)eir cul%ination at t)e Battle of 0rafalgar in 1B><. "ere d%iral Nelson3 )is fleet reduced to t(enty#se+en %en#of#(ar as si- (ere re/lenis)ing t)eir (ater3 %et d%iral Villeneu+es 'ranco# S/anis) fleet of t)irty#t)ree +essels. Nelson attacked in t(o grou/s3 one3 ()ic) )e co%%anded3 directed at t)e centre3 and t)e ot)er3 t)e larger di+ision3 at t)e rear of t)e ene%y line. 2-/loiting )is (ind(ard /osition and not (aiting to for% eit)er of )is t(o di+isions into a line3 Nelson ai%ed to )a+e )is +essels &reak into Villeneu+es line and )a+e )is concentration of greater force o+er()el% t)e centre and rear &efore t)e )ead of t)e ene%y line could turn &ack and enter t)e fig)t. 0)us Nelson /itted all t(enty#se+en of )is s)i/s against t(enty#t)ree of t)e ene%y. Since all s)i/s could fire at all ot)ers3 t)e Britis) ad+antage3 &y ,anc)esters t)eory3 co%/ared as 2C s.uared to 2? s.uared3 or C2@ to <2@. 0)e do%inance gi+en t)e seasoned Britis) &y t)eir &etter sea%ans)i/ and gunnery %ade t)e odds in t)eir fa+our greater t)an t)ose indicated &y ,anc)esters aug%entation. 0)us t)e /erce/ti+e Nelson /erfected t)e conce/t of &reaking t)e ene%ys line &egun &y Rodney at t)e Battle of t)e Saints &y initially e%/loying a /er/endicular a//roac) rat)er t)an atte%/ting to %ake t)e /enetration fro% t)e traditional /arallel line of &attle. "e did &y design ()at d%iral 1uncan )ad i%/ro+ised at t)e Battle of $a%/erdo(n. But3 unlike 1uncan3 )e directed )is s.uadrons to secure concentration of greater force against t)e ene%ys rear. By a&andoning t)e line arrange%ent for )is t(o di+isions and a//roac)ing t)e ene%y in t)e sa%e for%ation in ()ic) )e sailed3 Nelson e%anci/ated )i%self fro% t)e conce/t t)at fleets %ust %anoeu+re in t)e sa%e (ay t)at t)ey foug)t3 (it) t)eir &roadsides to t)e ene%y. "e also decentralised control3 assigning full aut)ority to )is su&ordinate to e-ecute t)e /lan and gi+ing co%/lete discretion to t)e ca/tains of )is +essels to carry out )is aggressi+e sc)e%e to reac) t)e (ind(ard side of t)e ene%y line and sink or ca/ture as %any as /ossi&le. In reac)ing t)e far and lee(ard side of Villeneu+es line and &locking t)e traditional 'renc) tactic of retreat3 Nelson successfully and fully syste%atised an e+ol+ing tactic t)at )ad so%et)ing in co%%on (it) t)e en+elo/%ent and t)e turning %o+e%ent on land. Since s)i/s )ad no /ri%acy on t)e defence3 a %ere concentration of greater force could attain +ictory

2@=

%ore readily t)an concentrations in frontal &attles on land. 0)us ad%irals needed no flank attack and # since e-ce/t for &riefly e-/osed )eads or tails of lines fleets really lacked any suc) +ulnera&le side # could deli+er none. In Nelsons a&andon%ent of t)e co%&at for%ation of t)e line for attacking t)e ene%y in t)e arrange%ent in ()ic) t)e fleet sailed3 an o&+ious /arallel e-ists (it) t)e c)anges in land (arfare t)at occurred at t)e sa%e ti%e. By )is decentralisation of co%%and to t)e co%%ander of a di+ision of t)e fleet and to t)e ca/tains3 )e secured an articulation like t)at ()ic) c)aracterised 'renc) ar%ies. nd Dust as 'renc) ar%ies %anoeu+red t)eir &attalions in colu%n &ut usually de/loyed t)e% into line to fig)t3 so Britis) %en#of#(ar ad+anced to(ard t)e o//osing fleet se/arately and directly3 &ut3 on engaging3 t)ey turned t)eir &roadsides to t)eir ene%ies. 5n t)eir (ay t)roug) t)e )ostile line3 t)e s)i/s took ad+antage of t)e sailing s)i/s analogy of t)e flank attack3 a &roadside against t)e &o(s and3 /articularly3 t)e +ulnera&le sterns of t)e +essels t)ey /assed. So Nelsons /lan for t)e conflict %arked a transition fro% a rigid linear arrange%ent3 ()ic) %ade decisi+e engage%ent difficult3 to a decentralised attack in sailing for%ation3 ()ic) facilitated forcing close &attle on t)e ene%y. 0)is c)ange )as close /arallels (it) t)e transfor%ation of land (arfare fro% unitary ar%ies in linear array3 ()ic) could not co%/el &attle3 to t)e dis/ersed di+isions of t)e 'renc) ar%y3 ()ose &attalions could %anoeu+re in colu%n &ut fig)t in line. 0)e discerning d%iral Villeneu+e3 conscious of Britis) su/eriority3 antici/ated Nelsons tactics and soug)t to /ro+ide for it &y allocating t(el+e of )is t)irty#t)ree s)i/s to a reser+e3 ()ic) )e stationed in a second line to t)e lee(ard of )is %ain line. !)en t)e fleets %et in a lig)t (ind off $a/e 0rafalgar3 t)e /essi%istic Villeneu+e re+ersed t)e course of )is fleet to kee/ close to t)e S/anis) /ort of $adi6 as a refuge in defeat. In t)e /rocess of carrying out t)is %anoeu+re3 )is reser+e ended u/ as t)e rear of )is line3 out of /osition to carry out its /ur/ose. Nelsons &attle (ent as )e intended it. "is s)i/s reac)ed and /ierced t)e 'ranco#S/anis) line e-actly as /lanned and )ad o+er()el%ed t)e ene%y rear and centre &efore t)e )ead of Villeneu+es line could turn and sail &ack to )el/ t)eir outnu%&ered co%/atriots. 0)e allies lost se+enteen s)i/s ca/tured3 one &lo(n u/3 and a&out 143>>> %en killed3 (ounded3 and ca/tured3 including t(o S/anis) ad%irals killed and d%iral Villeneu+e a /risoner. lt)oug) a stor% sank all &ut four of t)e ca/tured +essels3 t)e loss of so %any s)i/s and %en co%/leted t)e ruin of 'ranco#S/anis) sea /o(er and re%o+ed t)e /ossi&ility of any future t)reat of an in+asion of Britain. Released soon after )is ca/ture3 Villeneu+e co%%itted suicide u/on )is return to 'rance. Back

(he Strategy of Warfare at Sea

0)e c)ange in tactics3 ()ic) cul%inated at 0rafalgar and su&stituted &attles (it) significant attrition for t)e relati+ely innocuous co%&ats in ()ic) t)e 'renc) )ad long defended so (ell3 )ad no /arallel in strategy. But &efore t)e Battle of 0rafalgar3 t)e long (ar of &lockade and raiding )ad included an inter%ittent %enace of an in+asion of *reat Britain &y t)e 'renc) ar%y. 0)e first of t)ese t)reats %aterialised in 1ece%&er 1C@=3 ()en a 'renc) con+oy carrying a force of 143>>> %en sli//ed out of Brest and (ould )a+e landed t)e %en in Ireland )ad a se+ere t)ree#(eek stor% not scattered t)e 'renc) s)i/s. 0o rene( t)is effort3 t)e Mediterranean fleet of 'rances ally3 S/ain3 left $artagena for $adi63 ()ere t)e Britis) s.uadron fro% ,is&on interce/ted it off $a/e St. Vincent and defeated it in &attle. 0)e Britis) t)en &lockaded t)e re%aining s)i/s in $adi6. 0)e Britis) faced t)ree s.uadrons t)at could su//ort an in+asion3 t)e S/anis) at $adi63 t)e 'renc) at Brest3 and t)e fleet of 'rances 1utc) ally. 0)e Britis) )ad s)i/s (atc)ing eac) of t)ese &ut understood t)at if any one of t)ese s.uadrons s)ould elude its &lockading flotilla and sail to anot)er of t)e &lockaded /orts3 t)e 'renc) and t)eir allies (ould )a+e t(o fleets to t)e Britis) one and t)e /otential to control t)e sea. Since only ene%y control of t)e c)annel &et(een 'rance and 2ngland created t)e crucial %enace of in+asion3 Britis) strategic doctrine /rescri&ed t)at ()en any ene%y 2@C

s)i/s eluded its &lockading s.uadron3 t)at force s)ould sail i%%ediately to t)e 2nglis) c)annel and Doin t)e s)i/s &lockading Brest and guarding t)e c)annel. !)en S/ain entered into t)e (ar on t)e 'renc) side and c)anged t)e &alance of na+al /o(er3 t)e Britis) )ad to gi+e u/ t)eir &ase in $orsica and (it)dra( fro% t)e Mediterranean3 &ut in 1C@B t)ey re#entered t)at sea in force ()en *eneral Bona/arte led an e-/edition fro% t)e 'renc) /ort of 0oulon to 2gy/t. lt)oug) t)e 'renc) ar%y gained control of 2gy/t3 in ugust 1C@B3 ()en d%iral Nelson destroyed %uc) of t)e 'renc) 0oulon s.uadron at &oukir Bay3 t)e Britis) regained control of t)e Mediterranean and secured for t)e%sel+es a ne( &ase on t)e (estern Mediterranean island of Minorca. :et t)e i%%ediate 'renc) effort to retrie+e t)e situation dis/layed t)e difficulties al(ays in)erent in t)e Britis) strategy of &lockading )ostile fleets in (idely se/arated /orts. 0)e 'renc) ordered t)eir s)i/s at Brest to t)e Mediterranean. In /ril 1C@@3 ()en a strong offs)ore (ind dro+e t)e &lockading fleet far to sea3 d%iral Brui- sailed t(enty#fi+e %en#of#(ar (it) t)e (ind out of Brest and /ast t)e Britis) &lockading s.uadron. 'ollo(ing t)e doctrine of co+ering *reat Britain against in+asion and3 %isled &y a 'renc) ruse3 t)e Britis) ad%iral /ro%/tly /ositioned )is force to /rotect Ireland. 0)e 'renc) ad%iral3 co%%anding t)e &est#%anned fleet t)e 'renc) )ad sent to sea since t)e re+olution3 t)en3 as ordered3 took )is s)i/s to(ard t)e Mediterranean and3 e+ading t)e Britis) s.uadron &lockading $adi6 and t)e s%all force at *i&raltar3 led it to 0oulon. 0o deal (it) t)e %enace /resented &y t)e ne( 0oulon fleet3 t)e Britis) $adi6 &lockading s.uadron entered t)e Mediterranean3 raising Britis) forces t)ere to t)irty#se+en s)i/s of t)e line. But ()en t)e S/anis) $adi6 fleet of se+enteen %en#of#(ar follo(ed its &lockading s.uadron into t)e Mediterranean and (ent to $artagena3 Britains ene%ies /ossessed forty#t(o +essels. //re)ensi+e a&out )is unfortified &ase on Minorca3 t)e Britis) ad%iral /ositioned )is fleet to co+er )is &ase as (ell as to /lace it in a central /osition &et(een 0oulon and $artagena to /re+ent a concentration of t)e t(o )ostile fleets and to attack t)e first t)at ca%e out. Still3 since suc) a central /osition did not ser+e to close 0oulon3 a second s.uadron of si-teen +essels guarded t)e routes to t)e eastern Mediterranean to /rotect Britis) and 0urkis) efforts to defeat *eneral Bona/artes forces in 2gy/t and Syria. 'or t)e first task for t)eir ne( 0oulon fleet3 t)e 'renc) sent it (it) a con+oy of troo/s and su//lies to relie+e a 'renc) ar%y &esieged in *enoa. !)en t)e Britis) ad%iral &et(een $artagena and 0oulon left t)is station to follo( d%iral Brui- to *enoa3 Brui- sailed fro% *enoa3 sli//ed /ast t)e Britis) s.uadron3 and (ent to $artagena3 ()ere t)e S/anis) fleet ca%e out to Doin )i%. !it) forty s)i/s of t)e line t)e 'renc) ad%iral t)en )eaded into t)e tlantic (it) d%iral 9eit) and t)e Britis) Mediterranean s.uadron on )is )eels. !)en d%iral 9eit) Doined t)e Britis) &efore Brest t)e day after d%iral Brui- arri+ed3 )e restored t)e &alance of na+al /o(er in t)e c)annel. "ad )e %istaken t)e 'renc) destination and3 for e-a%/le3 sailed to(ard 2gy/t3 t)e 'renc) and S/anis) (ould )a+e )ad su/re%acy in t)e c)annel. 0)us3 (it) so %any 'renc) and S/anis) s)i/s &lockaded in Brest3 t)e Britis) )ad a %uc) si%/ler strategic /ro&le%. :et t)e ()ole ca%/aign s)o(ed t)e co%/le-ity of t)e situation created ()en one of t)ese &lockaded ene%y s.uadrons esca/ed. Su/erficially t)e Britis) )ad interior lines ()en t)e 'renc) )ad to di+ide t)eir s)i/s &et(een t)eir tlantic and Mediterranean coasts and t)e Britis) )ad &ases &et(een t)e% at *i&raltar and ,is&on. :et as long as t)e 'renc) fleets re%ained in t)eir /orts3 t)e Britis) could not use t)eir interior lines to concentrate and take t)e offensi+e against t)e se/arated 'renc) na+al forces7 t)e 'renc) s)i/s did not e+en )a+e to defend t)e%sel+es &ecause t)eir ela&orately fortified &ases /rotected t)e% fro% t)e )ostile na+y. 0)us interior lines a+ailed t)e Britis) not)ing on t)e defence and little on t)e offence &ecause3 ()en a &lockaded s.uadron eluded its &lockaders3 t)e Britis) ad%iral (ould usually not kno( ()ere t)e 'renc) (ere and )ence could 2@B

)a+e no idea ()ere to concentrate. 'urt)er3 t)e large distances &et(een t)e fleets %eant slo( co%%unication3 e+en t)oug) a line of frigates along t)e coast %ig)t s/eed u/ t)e trans%ission of t)e ne(s of t)e 'renc) esca/e. So not only could t)e Britis) not take t)e offensi+e against s.uadrons in /rotected )ar&ours3 &ut once a 'renc) fleet e+aded its &lockading s.uadron3 t)e 'renc) )eld initiati+e. 4nder t)ese circu%stances t)e Britis) found t)e%sel+es in a funda%entally defensi+e co%&at strategic situation. nd t)is condition really (as inse/ara&le fro% t)eir /o(erful logistic strategy of &lockade. 0)e 'renc) s.uadrons3 (it) t)e strong land defences of t)eir fortified &ases assu%ing t)e full &urden of /rotecting t)eir s)i/s3 )ad t)e ad+antage of t)e offensi+e3 t)e a&ility to %ake a sortie ()ene+er t)e (ind or (eat)er fa+oured t)e%. 0)e 'renc) %en#of#(ar t)at &roke t)e &lockade )ad a c)oice of sailing to at least t(o ot)er /orts ()ere t)eir arri+al (ould gi+e t)e% an o//ortunity to unite t)eir forces and effect a concentration in %enacing strengt). 0)us t)e 'renc) )ad strategic o//ortunities not unlike t)ose of a co%%ander on land t)at )ad t)e a&ility to e-/loit interior lines to concentrate against successi+e ene%y ar%ies. !)en *eneral Bona/arte took co%%and of all 'renc) forces3 )e also undertook to e-/loit t)is strategic o//ortunity to %ake /ossi&le an in+asion of 2ngland. In t)e s/ring of 1B><3 (it) )is troo/s /oised o//osite 2ngland3 Na/oleon &egan a na+al ca%/aign to gain enoug) /redo%inance in t)e c)annel to ena&le )is ar%y to cross to 2ngland. Na/oleons strategy )ad t)e distincti+e feature of /lanning a concentration in t)e !est Indies. In t)is (ay )e could &ot) concentrate )is s)i/s (it) less danger of %eeting a Britis) fleet and distract t)e ene%y. Because t)e (ealt) of t)e !est Indies )ad %ade t)e% traditional o&Decti+es of 'renc) and Britis) e-/editions3 t)e Britis) could not disregard t)e /ossi&ility of a 'renc) concentration t)ere. 0)us Na/oleons strategy %ig)t dra( t)e Britis) na+y to t)e !est Indies Dust as )e i%/le%ented a concentration in t)e c)annel to co+er an in+asion. s in land (arfare3 ()ere distraction often could create t)e (eak /oint against ()ic) to concentrate3 Na/oleon soug)t to a//ly t)e sa%e /rinci/le at sea. "is s)re(dly concei+ed /lan faced t)e difficulty t)at for decisi+e results )e )ad only one /ossi&le o&Decti+e: t)e c)annel. i%ing at an o&+ious goal se+erely )andica//ed concentration against (eakness. nd Britis) doctrine )ad long stressed t)at &lockading fleets s)ould re/air to t)e c)annel if t)ey lost t)eir &lockaded ene%y s.uadron. 'urt)er3 t)e +agaries of (ind and (eat)er %ade na+al o/erations e+en %ore uncertain t)an t)ose on land. In addition3 at sea Na/oleon relied not on +eteran soldiers under seasoned co%%anders &ut on sailors ()o )ad ser+ed %ore in /ort t)an at sea and ad%irals ()o lacked t)e successful o/erational e-/erience of )is generals. Na/oleon /lanned for t)e 0oulon fleet to esca/e3 /ick u/ t)e S/anis) s)i/s at $artagena3 t)en t)ose at $adi63 and all sail to t)e !est Indies. 0)e Brest s)i/s (ould also esca/e3 release t)ose at 'errol in nort)#(estern S/ain3 and rende6+ous in t)e !est Indies. 0)e ()ole ar%ada (ould t)en sail for t)e c)annel and co+er t)e in+asion. If t)e Brest s.uadron failed to esca/e to t)e !est Indies3 t)e co%&ined 0oulon3 $artagena3 and $adi6 fleets (ould sail to t)e c)annel3 release t)e s)i/s at Brest3 and seek to gain na+al su/re%acy for t)e in+asion. 5n Marc) ?>t) d%iral Villeneu+e eluded d%iral Nelsons &lockading s.uadron and esca/ed fro% 0oulon3 &ut ()en )e reac)ed $artagena3 )e found t)e S/anis) +essels unready for sea. 'earful of Nelson and realistic a&out t)e readiness of )is s)i/s for co%&at3 )e did not (ait &ut sailed into t)e tlantic and3 too strong for t)e Britis) force (atc)ing $adi63 added t)e eig)t s)i/s at $adi6 to )is fleet &efore sailing for t)e !est Indies. Nelson did not i%%ediately /ursue3 stationing )i%self to &lock Villeneu+es /assage to t)e eastern Mediterranean. 0)e s%all Britis) force at $adi63 follo(ing t)e doctrine3 sailed nort) to t)e c)annel3 and Nelson soon set sail for t)e Straits of *i&raltar.

2@@

"ead(inds ke/t )i% fro% reac)ing *i&raltar until May =t)3 al%ost a %ont) after Villeneu+e )ad /assed. "earing no re/ort of Villeneu+es )eading for t)e c)annel and concluding )e %ust )a+e gone to t)e !est Indies3 Nelson set off in /ursuit. 0)is /art of Na/oleons /lan )ad (orked (ell3 &ut since t)e Brest s.uadron )ad not %ade its esca/e3 Na/oleon c)anged )is strategy and ordered Villeneu+e to (ait only a little longer for it and t)en3 if it )ad not a//eared3 return first to 'errol to /ick u/ (ars)i/s and t)en sail to t)e c)annel to unite (it) t)e Brest fleet. 0)ree days after recei+ing Na/oleons orders3 Villeneu+e )eard of Nelsons arri+al in t)e !est Indies. //re)ensi+e at Nelsons /resence and a(are t)at t)e 2%/erors strategy )ad indeed distracted t)e ene%y3 Villeneu+e i%%ediately set sail to release t)e si-teen s)i/s of t)e 'errol fleet and /roceed to Brest. 0)ree days later Nelson learned t)at Villeneu+e )ad started for 2uro/e7 assu%ing t)at t)e 'renc) ai%ed for $adi63 )e3 too3 sailed in t)at direction. But fro% t)e ca/tain of a frigate t)at c)anced to o&ser+e t)e 'renc) fleet en route3 t)e Britis) ad%iralty found out Villeneu+es true course and sent eig)t +essels to strengt)en d%iral $alder at 'errol3 (it) orders to /atrol too %iles to t)e (est(ard to interce/t Villeneu+e. In ordering $alder to take a (est(ard /osition to %eet t)e 'ranco#S/anis) fleet far fro% 'errol3 t)e Britis) ad%iralty took an effecti+e ste/ to /re+ent a conDunction of Villeneu+es force (it) t)e 'errol s.uadron. 0)e S/anis) ad%iral at 'errol (ould ine+ita&ly learn of Villeneu+es /ro-i%ity too late. In fact3 )is /osition ga+e $alder interior lines &et(een t)e t(o forces3 t)oug) t)e +aria&ility of t)e (ind could %itigate t)e ad+antage. n offs)ore (ind3 for e-a%/le3 could &ring out t)e 'errol s.uadron &ut gi+e it a (ind(ard /osition and /re+ent $alder fro% attacking. But t)e sa%e (ind (ould )old &ack Villeneu+e and fa+our $alders concentration against )i%. n on# s)ore (ind (ould &ottle u/ t)e 'errol s)i/s &ut )andica/ an attack against Villeneu+e. Ne+ert)eless3 t)e distance &et(een t)e t(o ene%ies (ould do %uc) to /re+ent t)eir concentration unless Villeneu+e could sli/ /ast $alder into 'errol. 5n 8uly 22nd3 a (eek after a reinforce%ent of eig)t s)i/s )ad &roug)t )is s.uadron to fifteen7 $alder sig)ted Villeneu+es t(enty s)i/s off $a/e 'inisterre. lt)oug) t)e (ind ca%e fro% t)e (est3 $alder3 an ade.uate co%%ander ()o clearly gras/ed t)e situation3 took t)e lee(ard /osition3 ()ic) &locked Villeneu+es a//roac) to 'errol3 a na+al analog of situating an ar%y on an ene%ys line of retreat. Ne+ert)eless3 $alder took t)e offensi+e3 and3 (it) &ot) fleets %anoeu+ring in t)e traditional lines3 )e soug)t to attack t)e rear of t)e 'renc) s.uadron. But ()en Villeneu+e )ad t)e )ead s)i/ lead )is line around on t)e o//osite course t)e fore%ost /arts of t)e t(o lines foug)t an indecisi+e engage%ent in a dense fog. 0)oug) )e )ad ca/tured t(o s)i/s of )is o//onent3 $alder3 conser+ati+e in )is a//roac) and concerned a&out )is /ri6es and t)e 'errol fleet3 a+oided furt)er action in t)e ne-t t(o days3 and Villeneu+e3 e.ually relie+ed to a+oid &attle3 finally /assed )i% and sailed for 'errol. Nelson )ad reac)ed *i&raltar t)ree days &efore $alder %et Villeneu+e and3 on ugust ?rd3 t)ree days after Villeneu+e entered 'errol3 Nelson set sail to t)e c)annel ()ere $alder )ad already gone. Na/oleons /lan )ad distracted Nelson3 &ut Villeneu+e )ad inade.uate ti%e to e-/loit it. !it) )is s.uadron enlarged to t(enty#nine s)i/s3 Villeneu+e sailed fro% 'errol on ugust 1?t) in res/onse to t)e 2%/erors orders to go to Brest and t)en around Ireland and Scotland to unite (it) t)e 1utc) fleet. !it) t(enty#nine s)i/s3 )e (ould )a+e to face in t)e c)annel t)e t(enty#se+en Britis) %en# of#(ar3 ()ic) )ad a central /osition &et(een )is and t)e t(enty#one in Brest. Nelson sailed to(ard t)e c)annel (it) t(el+e. fter fi+e days at sea3 t)e discouraged and an-ious Villeneu+e3 ()o kne( t)at t)e S/anis) s)i/s in )is s.uadron (ere e+en less fit t)an t)e 'renc)3 a&andoned t)e /lan and sailed for $adi63 intending to return to t)e Mediterranean. If t)e Brest fleet )ad esca/ed to t)e !est Indies or Villeneu+e )ad dis/layed t)e energy and confidence c)aracteristic of so %any 'renc) Mars)als3 Na/oleons /lan %ig)t )a+e (orked. But t)e su/erlati+e co%&at skill of t)e +eteran Britis) sailors and ca/tains (ould +ery likely )a+e ?>>

nullified e+en suc) )y/ot)etically +igorous 'renc) leaders)i/ and a strategy good enoug) to distract Nelson. Na/oleon did not rene( t)e na+al ca%/aign &ecause3 &efore t)e end of ugust3 )e /re/ared to launc) one on land t)at (ould lead )i% to 4l% and usterlit6. !it) t)e end of t)e in+asion t)reat3 t)e Britis) resu%ed t)eir &lockades. fter t)e %enace of )a+ing t)e 0oulon and $adi6 fleets unite in t)e !est Indies3 t)e task see%ed routine. But Villeneu+es effort to return to t)e Mediterranean and re#esta&lis) a /o(erful 'renc) na+al /resence ena&led t)e Britis) to assu%e t)e offensi+e (it) a co%&at strategy. fter Villeneu+e left $adi63 Nelson engaged )i% in &attle off $a/e 0rafalgar3 ()ere )e destroyed )alf of Villeneu+es fleet. fter t)e %e%ora&le year of 1B><3 t)e 'renc) na+y no longer seriously t)reatened t)e Britis) &lockade nor an in+asion of t)e 4nited 9ingdo%. Na/oleon t)en used )is co%%and of %ost of 2uro/es %aDor sea/orts to &lockade t)e Britis)3 closing t)ose )e controlled to Britis) s)i/s and goods. 0)e Britis) t)en for&ade neutral s)i/s to trade in t)ose Ports unless t)e neutral s)i/s first ca%e to Britis) )ar&ours3 /aid for a license to trade (it) Na/oleonic /orts3 and /aid a duty on t)eir cargoes. Na/oleon retaliated &y treating as Britis) any neutral s)i/s t)at co%/lied (it) t)is Britis) rule. Na/oleons %easures seriously )urt Britis) trade3 e+en (it) a great e-/ansion in s%uggling. But ()en t)e Britis) gained t)e %erican and sian %arkets of t)e &lockaded 'renc) and 1utc)3 t)eir trade and e-/orts increased and t)eir flouris)ing co%%erce )el/ed finance t)eir long (ar against Na/oleon3 including t)e /ro+ision of crucial su&sidies to t)eir continental allies. 0)e cri//ling of 'renc) co%%erce corres/ondingly (eakened Britains o//onent. Na/oleons logistic strategy t)us failed ()ile t)at of t)e Britis) (orked as (ell as it could3 gi+en t)e e-isting state of international trade. 0)e Britis) na+y found its ot)er /rinci/al use in t)e su//ort of co%&at o/erations in S/ain and Portugal3 ()ere it trans/orted and reinforced t)e Britis) ar%ies and su//lied t)e% and t)eir Portuguese and S/anis) allies. Better sea su//ly routes and t)e o//ortunity to retreat &y (ater ga+e Na/oleons ene%ies an i%/ortant ad+antage in S/ain. Back

TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND DOCTRINAL STA"ILITY, !(!) !'!*

(he Continuation of the Na'oleonic (radition in )adet2ky%s *ictories
In s/ite of significant tec)nological /rogress t)at c)anged %issile (ea/ons and logistics3 nineteent)#century (arfare retained t)e essential c)aracter of t)e 'renc) Re+olution and Na/oleon. 0)e infantry%an (it) )is &ayonet#ti//ed %usket re%ained t)e /redo%inant (ea/on syste%. $a+alry continued to )a+e a role in co%&at3 relying largely on s)ock action (it) t)e sa&re3 and ke/t its strategic %issions of reconnaissance and raiding co%%unications. In strategy3 t)e ne( ca/a&ilities e+ident in Na/oleons ca%/aigns %anifested t)e%sel+es as t)e tactical syste% of de/loy%ent3 and t)e articulation3 dis/ersion3 and nu%erical strengt) of ar%ies continued to reflect t)e %et)ods of t)e (ars t)at &egan t)e century. 0)e ca%/aigns of 1B4B and 1B4@ in Italy clearly e-)i&it t)is consistency. %i-ture of largely Sardinian regular troo/s and )astily asse%&led Italian +olunteers atte%/ted to take ad+antage of tur%oil in ustria to dri+e t)e ustrian ar%y fro% Milan and t)e old territory of Venice. 'aced (it) /o/ular re&ellions in Milan and else()ere3 t)e ustrians fell &ack to t)e Mincio and a(aited additional forces fro% ustria. $)arles l&ert3 t)e 9ing of t)e Italian state of Sardinia3 a +acillating %an of %ediocre a&ilities3 co%%anded t)e Italian forces. 2-ce/t for s)o(ing e-ce/tional &ra+ery during a siege in )is yout)3 t)e 9ing lacked any %ilitary e-/erience. :et )is ar%y )ad good ?>1

training3 and all of t)e forces )e led east(ard against t)e ustrians )ad great 6eal for t)e /o/ular cause of e-/elling t)e ustrians fro% Italy. !it) so%e largely ra( +olunteers and forces su//lied &y Na/les and t)e Po/e3 )e outnu%&ered t)e ustrians. 0)e Italians faced ustrian regulars ()o )ad e-cellent training under a co%%ander t)e %en re+ered as 'at)er Radet6ky. 'ig)ting in all of t)e (ars since 1C@13 Radet6ky )ad ser+ed (it) distinction as Sc)(ar6en&ergs c)ief of staff in 1B1? and 1B14. In 1B?4 )e )ad assu%ed t)e Italian co%%and and t(o years later3 at age se+enty3 recei+ed /ro%otion to 'ield Mars)al. "e )ad e-/ertly trained )is co%%and and fostered its %orale7 no(3 aged eig)ty#t(o3 )e faced t)e great o//ortunity of )is career3 dis/laying undi%inis)ed %ental ca/acities and so %uc) /)ysical +igour t)at )is staff )ad trou&le kee/ing t)eir )orses u/ (it) )is. 0)e 'ield Mars)al3 ser+ed &y an e-cellent staff3 (ould s)o( t)at )e )ad not forgotten t)e Na/oleonic tradition in (arfare. !)en 9ing $)arles l&ert led )is ar%y o+er t)e Mincio at *oito and ad+anced to Verona3 Radet6ky3 ()ose reinforce%ents )ad co%e3 )alted )i%. 0)e 'ield Mars)al t)en %arc)ed nort)east to Vicen6a ()ere3 using )is interior lines &et(een t)e t(o ene%y forces and concentrating ?>3>>> %en )e dro+e &ack 2>3>>> Pa/al and Nea/olitan troo/s. &le no( to concentrate )is aug%ented ar%y against $)arles l&ert3 Radet6ky took ad+antage of t)e Sardinian dis/ersal o+er a forty#fi+e# %ile front to concentrate in t)eir centre3 defeat t)e% at $usto66a3 and dri+e t)e% &ack to t)e frontier3 retaking Milan and ending t)e ca%/aign for t)e year. Strauss cele&rated t)e +ictory of $usto66a &y co%/osing t)e Radet6ky Marc). In Marc) 1B4@ $)arles l&ert concentrated )is ar%y near No+ara3 /re/aratory to a crossing of t)e 0icino in an effort to reca/ture Milan. 0)e 'ield Mars)al asse%&led )is troo/s east of Pa+ia3 gi+ing t)e i%/ression )e again intended to retreat. Radet6ky )ad C>3>>> %en3 )is o//onent =<3ooo7 large forces to o/erate on a t)irty#%ile front along t)e 0icino. !it) t)e Sardinians concentrated on t)e nort) side of t)e t)eatre of (ar and t)e ustrians on t)e sout)3 eac) ar%y )ad t)e o//ortunity to turn t)e ot)er &y %arc)ing /ast its flank and taking u/ a /osition in its o//onents rear. 2ac) )ad a force large enoug) to &lock )is ene%ys retreat and co%/el )i% to assu%e t)e tactical offensi+e to reco+er )is co%%unications and &ase area. 0)oug) ()ic)e+er %o+ed first and fastest could e-/ect to turn t)e ot)er3 Radet6ky )ad t)e %ore fa+oura&le /osition &ecause3 e+en e-clusi+e of )is route of (it)dra(al sout) of t)e Po3 )e )ad %ore distance &et(een t)e Sardinians and )is line of co%%unications and retreat t)an $)arles l&ert )ad se/arating )is rear fro% t)e ustrians. 0)e 'ield Mars)al3 /lanning to %ake t)e %ost of t)is o//ortunity3 )ad ke/t t)e forces of )is strong left (ell to t)e east of Pa+ia so as nor to arouse t)e 9ings a//re)ensions. 0)e first Sardinian di+ision crossed t)e 0icino and ad+anced to(ard Milan (it)out o//osition. Radet6ky %arc)ed )is troo/s ra/idly to Pa+ia3 su//le%ented its &ridge (it) t(o on /ontoons3 and crossed t)e ri+er .uickly. *eneral Ra%orino3 t)e co%%ander of t)e Sardinian di+ision left to delay t)e ustrians s)ould t)ey cross at Pa+ia3 /ro%/tly +iolated )is orders and retreated sout) of t)e Po G fter t)e (ar t)e Sardinian ar%y court#%artialled and s)ot )i%H. Since t)e ustrian ad+ance to t)e sout) /resented a %ore serious t)reat to t)e Sardinians t)an $)arles l&erts in t)e nort) to Radet6ky3 t)e Sardinians /ro%/tly %o+ed sout) to for% a front against t)e ustrians. 0)e ar%ies ca%e into inter%ittent contact along t)e eig)t %iles &et(een Vige+ano and Mortara7 $)arles l&erts ar%y )eld its o(n until an ustrian cor/s ca/tured Mortara. Its /osition turned3 t)e Sardinians fell &ack on No+ara3 offering &attle sout) of t)e city

,adet1$y"s Turning Mo%ement

Back

?>2

0)oug) /us)ing nort) to(ard No+ara3 Radet6ky directed one cor/s to(ard Vercelli to &lock t)e Sardinian retreat. t No+ara t)ree of t)e four ustrian cor/s %et t)e Sardinians in an essentially frontal &attle t)at )ad ended &efore t)e ustrian cor/s directed to(ard Vercelli arri+ed to turn t)e Sardinian flank. Victory &elonged to t)e ustrian rank and file ()o (ere &y t)en &attle#seasoned as (ell as t)oroug)ly trained. Success ele+ated t)eir %orale # as did t)eir (ell#/laced confidence in t)eir 'ield Mars)al. "is ar%y +an.uis)ed3 dri+en off its line of (it)dra(al and (it) its &ack to(ard t)e foot)ills of t)e l/s3 $)arles l&ert a&dicated in fa+our of )is son3 ()o concluded an ar%istice /re/aratory to a /eace. 0)e for%er 9ing ()o )ad s)o(n suc) infle-i&le de+otion to Italian li&erty3 died t)ree %ont)s later in a Portuguese %onastery. 0)e +ictorious Radet6ky died nine years later3 .uite infir% &ut still on acti+e duty. Radet6kys ca%/aigns do not differ fro% t)ose of t)e Na/oleonic era. In 1B4B )e )ad used )is interior lines to defeat one of t)e t(o forces o//osed to )i%. 0)en3 turning against t)e ot)er3 )e )ad e-/loited t)eir e-cessi+e dis/ersion to &eat t)e% in &attle and dri+e t)e% &ack (est(ard across nort)ern Italy. In 1B4@ )e )ad carried out a turning %o+e%ent t)at3 after )e )ad foug)t a successful engage%ent to dri+e t)e ene%y ar%y fro% its co%%unications3 )ad /laced )i% at)(art t)e Sardinian line of retreat. Suc) a conclusi+e +ictory and strategic /osition (it)in t)e &orders of a s%all country insured /eace on t)e li&eral ter%s t)e ustrians offered. Back

(he Mid-Century%s New nfantry Wea'ons

Radet6kys &attles resulted in fe( casualties3 &arely 4 /ercent for t)e +ictor and =.< /ercent for t)e defeated. 0)e /rinci/al (ea/on re%ained t)e %u66leloader3 i%/ro+ed in relia&ility &y t)e su&stitution of t)e /ercussion ca/ for t)e flintlock. But ar%ies already )ad a rifle suita&le for %ilitary use. 4sing an o&long &ullet s%aller t)an t)e &arrel3 t)e rifle loaded easily &ecause t)e /roDectile )ad a s%aller dia%eter t)an t)e &arrel. 0)is si%/le Mini; &ullet )ad a )ollo(ed out rear so t)at ()en t)e force of t)e e-/losion of t)e /o(der entered t)e )ollo(3 t)e rear of t)e &ullet e-/anded to gri/ t)e rifling as t)e &ullet tra+elled out of t)e &arrel. 0)is %ade a gas#tig)t fit3 and allo(ed t)e rifling to i%/art a sta&ilising s/in to t)e &ullet. 0oget)er t)e tig)t fit and t)e s/in dou&led &ot) t)e range and t)e accuracy of t)e %u66le#loading rifle as co%/ared (it) t)e traditional s%oot)&ore. :et &ecause t)e &ullet easily slid do(n t)e &arrel3 t)e rifle )ad a rate of fire e.ual to t)e unrifled (ea/on. In 1B<@3 ()en 'rance and ustria foug)t3 t)e 'renc) took t)e offensi+e against t)e ustrian rifles. :et t)e 'renc) (on t)e largely frontal &attles in ()ic) co%%anders on &ot) sides dis/layed neit)er t)e co%/etence nor su&tlety of Radet6ky. 0)e 'renc) regulars3 (it) good training and full of

?>?

confidence3 follo(ed t)eir doctrine for co%/ensating for t)e inferiority of t)eir (ea/ons &y closing (it) t)e ene%y as ra/idly as /ossi&le and &ested t)e ustrians. 0)e 'renc) doctrine of 1B<@ did not really +ary %uc) t)e tactics t)at ar%ies )ad institutionalised after t)e Na/oleonic (ars. Recognising t)at line and lig)t infantry (ere interc)angea&le3 t)e altered tactical doctrine ga+e a greater i%/ortance to skir%is)ing. 'or%erly skir%is)ers )ad si%/ly /receded t)e line7 &y %id#century t)ey assu%ed t)e %ain &urden of t)e attack3 (it) t)e for%ed troo/s )eld &ack to su//ort t)e%. 0)e initiati+e of t)e indi+idual and s%all unit leaders /layed a greater role3 ()ic) t)e skilfully trained and confident 'renc) regulars could carry out easily. In s/ite of t)e )ard#foug)t &attles and t)e let)al ustrian (ea/on3 t)e +ictorious 'renc) lost only 1> /ercent of t)eir force3 t)e defeated ustrians less t)an 1C /ercent. Reflecting t)at t)e 'renc) assu%ed t)e tactical offensi+e3 t)eir killed and (ounded a//ro-i%ately e.ualled t)ose of t)e ustrians3 /risoners accounting for t)e difference in losses. In co%&at &et(een t)ese /rofessional ar%ies3 casualties )ad declined &elo( t)e le+el e-/erienced during t)e eig)teent) century and t)e Na/oleonic (ars. 2-cellent drill and disci/line3 toget)er (it) i%/ro+ed articulation and tactics3 dou&tless e-/lain t)is furt)er decrease in t)e /ercentage of %en killed3 inDured3 or ca/tured. 0)e introduction of t)e &reec)#loading rifle dou&led t)e rate of fire of t)e infantry3 and soldiers )ad al(ays set a )ig)er +alue on t)e rate of a soldiers fire t)an on its accuracy. 'ollo(ing a long delay3 due to t)e lack of (ork%ans)i/ ade.uate to %ake a &reec) ca/a&le of containing t)e gases of t)e e-/losion3 t)e Prussians de+elo/ed a &arely satisfactory &reec)loader (it) ()ic) t)ey gradually e.ui//ed t)eir ar%y in t)e 1B4>s and 1B<>s. In addition to its greater rate of fire3 t)e &reec)loader ena&led t)e soldier to fro% a /rone /osition since )e no longer )ad to (ork a ra%rod and did not re.uire t)e aid of gra+ity to load )is /o(der. Instead )e /laced t)e entire cartridge in t)e &reec)3 and t)e )a%%er and firing /in e-/loded t)e /ercussion ca/ and ignited t)e integral /o(der c)arge. 0)e a&ility to fire ()ile /rone auto%atically ga+e t)e defender a su&stantially aug%ented ad+antage o+er t)e attacker3 for t)e defender no longer needed field fortifications to gain considera&le /rotection fro% t)e attackers fire. 0roo/s in a /rone /osition could not use t)eir &ayonets to defend t)e%sel+es against ca+alry. But since a &reec)loading rifle )ad at least dou&le t)e rate and t(ice t)e accuracy of fire as (ell as dou&le t)e range of t)e s%oot)&ore %u66leloader3 rifle%en could defend t)e%sel+es (it) t)eir fire/o(er alone. $a+alrys s)ock action )ad +ery little o//ortunity against t)is re+olution in infantry fire/o(er. ,ong t)e (eaker (ea/on syste% against t)e &ayonet#ar%ed %usketeer3 ca+alry lost %ost of its tactical +alue ()en soldiers (ere e.ui//ed (it) &reec)loading rifles. 0)e ne( rifle also de+alued artillery. No longer could artillery unli%&er (it)in ?>> yards and s)oot at t)e infantry (it) relati+e i%/unity. Not only could rifles sig)ted to 13>>> yards s)oot t)e gunners3 &ut also soldiers in a /rone /osition /ro+ided /oor targets for canister s)ot. But s)ra/nel s)ells ga+e artillery a %eans to retrie+e t)e role t)at canister s)ot )ad gi+en it in t)e Na/oleonic (ars. 0)ese s)ells3 filled (it) s%all /roDectiles3 contained a /o(der c)arge e-/loded &y a ti%e fuse. 0)is e-/losion &urst t)e s)ell3 scattering s%all /roDectiles7 t)e for(ard %otion of t)e s)ell carried t)e s%all /roDectiles for(ard3 stre(ing t)e% fro% a&o+e o+er a su&stantial area of t)e ground &elo(. But t)e fuses of %id nineteent)#century s)ra/nel lacked enoug) accuracy to insure t)at t)e s)ra/nel (ould e-/lode in t)e air a&o+e t)e troo/s at ()ic) t)e gunners ai%ed3 e+en if t)e gunners )ad correctly gauged t)e range. 0)e 'renc) created a ne( (ea/on3 t)e %itrailleuse3 to furnis) t)e offensi+e fire/o(er t)at artillery and its canister could no longer /ro+ide and s)ra/nels inaccuracy %ade too uncertain. Built at t)e direction of Na/oleon III3 an aut)or of a (ork on artillery3 t)e %itrailleuse3 consisted of a &undle of t(enty#fi+e rifle &arrels %ounted on an artillery gun carriage. 'ired %ec)anically in ra/id succession and .uickly reloaded si%ultaneously &y a cre(3 its &arrels could fire 12< s)ots /er %inute3 deli+ering ai%ed fire for al%ost t(o %iles. 4sed in 1BC> to /re/are t)e (ay for an infantry ?>4

assault3 it failed to )a+e %uc) effect against /rone troo/s and since Na/oleon III )ad ke/t it a secret and not issued it to t)e ar%y3 t)e artillery%en (ere unfa%iliar (it) its use and t)e ene%y artillery %ade it a s/ecial target. si%ilar (ea/on3 t)e *atling gun3 (as used3 too3 &ut it only functioned to aug%ent infantrys already a(eso%e fire/o(er. By t)e 1B=>s tec)nological alterations )ad reinforced c)anges t)at )ad taken /lace (it) t)e introduction of t)e flintlock and &ayonet. 0)e ne( (ea/ons consolidated t)e su/re%acy of t)e %issile infantry%an and furt)er de+alued s)ock ca+alry as a (ea/on syste%. rtillery ac.uired rifled and &reec) loaded &arrels3 &ut t)ese i%/ro+e%ents only counter&alanced t)e ne( defensi+e strengt) of /rone infantry (it) &reec)loaders3 lea+ing artillery still a /o(erful &ut relati+ely i%%o&ile %issile (ea/on syste%3 indis/ensa&le for sieges &ut ot)er(ise far %ore for%ida&le in defence t)an offence. Back

(he !russian Staff and Man'ower System

8ust as t)e 'renc) regulations of 1C@1 contri&uted to creating /rofound alterations in tactics and strategy3 t(o funda%ental c)anges in t)e use of %an/o(er )ad a %aDor effect on t)e scale of o/erations and t)e %anage%ent of ar%ies in t)e nineteent) century. 5ne3 t)e /erfection of t)e co%%anders staff3 +astly i%/ro+ed t)e conduct of %ilitary o/erations. 2+ol+ing o+er se+eral centuries3 t)e .uality and significance of t)e staff )ad recei+ed a strong i%/etus in t)e ar%ies of Na/oleon7 t)e ne-t stride in its i%/ro+e%ent ca%e in t)e Prussian ar%y. By t)e eig)teent) century t)e .uarter%aster (as an i%/ortant staff officer3 (it) c)arge of t)e su//ly and %o+e%ent of ar%ies. In t)e Prussian ar%y t)is res/onsi&ility lad to t)e .uarter%asters taking on +irtually t)e entire &urden for t)e conduct of o/erations3 and3 as t)e Prussian ar%y e+ol+ed3 )e carried out )is duties so (ell t)at )is staff assu%ed3 +ery /ro/erly3 a significance )it)erto unkno(n. !it) )uge forces dis/ersed o+er considera&le areas3 ar%ies needed &etter %anage%ent t)an t)e old organisations could su//ly. 0)e staff needs of a co%%ander of a concentrated ar%y of 4>3>>> differed %arkedly fro% t)ose co%/osed of 2>3>>> s/read o+er a (ide area. 0)e Prussian ar%y de+elo/ed a large staff co%/osed of %en ()o )ad recei+ed unifor% training3 so t)at all )ad t)e sa%e doctrine and +oca&ulary. Ser+ing on t)e staffs of ar%y and cor/s co%%anders3 t)ese officers understood one anot)er readily and ga+e t)eir co%%anders consistent reco%%endations. $oordinated &y a c)ief ()o could re/resent t)eir +ie(s to t)e co%%ander3 t)e staff could /ro+ide counsel and carry out t)eir co%%anders orders. s ad+isers and e-ecutants3 t)e staff ca%e to re/resent t)e co%%ander and ga+e orders in )is na%e. $oordination and %anage%ent i%/ro+ed &ecause of )ar%ony and co%%unication &et(een t)e staffs at different co%%and le+els. By t)e %iddle of t)e nineteent) century t)e Prussian staff fully a//lied t)ese /rinci/les and3 as a cor/s of s/ecially trained %en ()o alternated staff and troo/ duty3 e-ecuted its tasks +ery (ell. 0)e staff %ade /lans3 issued orders and su/er+ised t)eir e-ecution3 and %anaged all as/ects of t)e ar%y and su&ordinate units3 including o/erations3 intelligence3 /ersonnel3 su//ly and %o+e%ents. 0)e e-cellence of t)e Prussian staff3 t)oug) not al(ays t)eir .uarter%aster#&ased organisation3 &eca%e a %odel t)at ar%ies (orld(ide &egan to e%ulate. By t)e t(entiet) century all 2uro/ean ar%ies )ad a trained3 ade.uately staffed %anage%ent tea% to assist t)e line co%%ander in )is traditional duties of /lanning3 fig)ting3 %arc)ing and caring for t)e %en )and )orses. 8ust as t)e Prussian staff re/resented a %aDor ste/ for(ard3 so also did t)e Prussian inno+ation in /ro+iding %an/o(er. 0)e Prussian syste% )ad suc) distincti+eness t)at it differed in kind rat)er t)an degree fro% %ost %ilitias and ot)er si%ilar syste%s t)at %any ar%ies e%/loyed. 0)e Prussian ar%y of 'rederick t)e *reat3 containing %any foreigners to a+oid taking Prussians fro% /roducti+e e%/loy%ent3 )ad also dra(n in rural citi6ens ()o3 after recei+ing training3 )ad returned to t)eir +illages on furloug). Recalled /eriodically for additional training and to &ring t)eir co%/anies u/ to full strengt) for %anoeu+res3 t)ese soldiers3 t)oug) lacking t)e training and es/rit ?><

of long#ser+ice regulars3 )ad econo%ised t)e states resources in a tangi&le (ay: t)ey did not re.uire /ay ()en on furloug) and t)eir +illages did not lose all of t)eir la&our. !)en Na/oleon defeated and i%/osed /eace on t)e 9ing of Prussia3 )e li%ited Prussias ar%y to 423>>> %en and for&ade any reser+e. But t)e Prussians uno&trusi+ely furloug)ed fro% eac) co%/any a fe( %en eac) %ont) and filled t)eir /laces (it) untrained %en. Bet(een 1B>B and 1B1?3 ?=3>>> Prussians not on acti+e duty )ad recei+ed training. !)en (ar ca%e again3 t)ese trained reser+ists reDoined t)eir co%/anies3 &ringing t)e% to (ar strengt). 0)ese %en differed %arkedly fro% %ilitia or t)e large nu%&er of green recruits fro% ()o% t)e Prussians created t)e &ulk of t)e ar%ies for t)eir (ar (it) Na/oleon. 0)e ?=3ooo trained %en recalled to duty ser+ed in t)e regular unit in ()ic) t)ey )ad trained and under /rofessional co%%issioned and non# co%%issioned officers alongside of soldiers already a /art of t)e unit. In addition3 t)ese reser+ists /artici/ated significantly in t)e culture of t)e unit &ecause t)ey )ad trained t)ere and kne( %ost of t)eir officers3 sergeants3 and %any of t)e /ri+ates (it) ()o% t)ey ser+ed. 0)us3 t)ese ci+ilian soldiers nearly dou&led t)e si6e of t)e Prussian regular ar%y (it)out a//recia&ly diluting its .uality. t t)e end of t)e Na/oleonic (ars3 Prussia funda%entally altered its old syste% of a long#ser+ice /rofessional force3 only t)e officers and non#co%%issioned officers re%aining career /rofessionals. Instead3 t)e ar%y conscri/ted 4>3>>> %en eac) year3 kee/ing t)e infantry%en for t)ree years3 t)e ca+alry%en and artillery%en for longer /eriods. 2ac) year t)e ar%y &roug)t in all drafted %en at t)e sa%e ti%e3 si%ultaneously disc)arging t)ose ()o )ad co%/leted t)eir ser+ice. fter disc)arge3 t)e conscri/ts entered t)e reser+e for a /eriod of t(o years. $alled u/ eac) su%%er for %anoeu+res3 t)ey &roug)t t)eir units to (ar strengt) and )ad t)e sa%e ad+antages of fa%iliarity (it) t)eir leaders and fello( soldiers t)at )ad c)aracterised t)e reser+ists trained &et(een 1B>B and 1B1?. 0)e Prussians furt)er reinforced t)is unit s/irit &y gi+ing eac) regi%ent a geogra/)ical region fro% ()ic) to dra( t)eir recruits3 so t)e %en enDoyed anot)er co%%on &ond t)at su//orted t)eir %orale and %oti+ation. 0)e Prussians syste%atic3 uni+ersal a//lication of t)e /lan used to /re/are to fig)t Na/oleon )ad its origins in t)e old syste% of furloug)ing nati+e Prussian soldiers. 0)e Prussians also )ad a %ilitia3 t)e ,and(e)r3 and t)ey re.uired a reser+ist ()o )ad co%/leted )is t(o years of reser+e ser+ice to s/end se+en in t)e ,and(e)r. 0)e ,and(e)r and t)e acti+e ar%y and its reser+es constituted t)e Prussian field ar%y. 2-clusi+e of /rofessional officers and non# co%%issioned officers3 ()o /ro+ided t)e cadre of t)e acti+e ar%y3 and t)e reser+e officers3 ()o led t)e ,and(e)r3 t)e Prussian ar%y (ould )a+e )ad t)e strengt) s)o(n in t)e ta&le &elo(3 if all )ad ser+ed t)ree years and no soldier died3 e%igrated3 or suffered disa&ility. 0)e Prussians also )ad anot)er for%ation in ()ic) %en disc)arged fro% t)e ,and(e)r ser+ed for eig)t years. 0)ey did not intend t)at t)ese older %en take t)e field &ut e-/ected t)e% to garrison fortresses3 )el/ resist in+asion3 and /ro+ide a /ool of trained %an/o(er for re/lace%ents in a long (ar.

The 'nitial Prussian )adre5 ,eser%e and Militia #or(e Back

?>=

0)is syste% of reser+es increased t)e nu%&er of acti+e ar%y /ri+ates &y 4> /ercent (it)out significantly di%inis)ing unit .uality &ecause t)e reser+es returned to t)e unit in ()ic) t)ey )ad ser+ed for t)eir /eriod of acti+e duty. 0)us3 t)e ar%y re%ained essentially a long#ser+ice force3 for /rofessionals su//lied all of t)e leaders. 5n t)e ot)er )and3 t)e ar%y also )ad %uc) of t)e c)aracter of a %ilitia or citi6en force3 &ut one co%/osed of t)oroug)ly trained %en and led &y a cadre of regulars. Besides t)e ad+antage of /rofessional leaders)i/ for t)e acti+e ar%y and its reser+es3 t)e Prussians )ad %any of t)e &enefits t)at long3 continuous ser+ice ga+e to regular forces. lt)oug) not all %en )ad ser+ed toget)er3 %any )ad3 and (it) a local &asis for recruiting %any %ore kne( eac) ot)er in ci+ilian life. 'or t)ese reasons Prussian units enDoyed %ost of t)e %orale3 sense of co%%unity3 and co)esion c)aracteristic of long#ser+ice /rofessorial soldiers. lt)oug) it lost so%e unit es/rit and co%/etence &y using reser+es3 t)e Prussian ar%y gained far %ore in t)e large aug%entation of its nu%&ers at a tri+ial cost. 0)is %et)od also econo%ised on t)e &udget3 &ecause t)e go+ern%ent did not )a+e to /ay t)e conscri/ts t)e (age necessary to &id t)e% a(ay fro% ci+ilian e%/loy%ent. 5f course3 t)e econo%y )ad to do (it)out t)e la&our of t)e acti+e soldiers3 &ut neit)er t)e econo%y nor t)e ar%ys &udget suffered any conse.uential loss &ecause of t)e reser+es3 ()o follo(ed t)eir ci+ilians /ursuits for %ost of t)e year. 0)e ,and(e)r3 ()ic) /ro+ided t)e ot)er )alf of t)e field ar%y3 also )ad t)e ad+antage of a negligi&le /eaceti%e cost. s a %ilitia3 t)e ,and(e)r )ad great effecti+eness &ecause all its %e%&ers )ad undergone a su&stantial /eriod of e-tended acti+e#duty training. 0)e ,and(e)r officers3 dra(n fro% t)e educated classes3 )ad recei+ed one year of training &efore assu%ing t)eir duties as %ilitia officers. lt)oug) actual /ractice +aried so%e()at fro% t)e %odel3 Prussia )ad /ro+ided itself (it) a trained %ilitary force of nearly )alf a %illion soldiers at a %odest cost. S%aller and less /o/ulous t)an t)e ot)er continental %ilitary /o(ers3 t)e Prussians in t)eir syste% )ad a %ilitary force co%/ara&le to t)ose of )er /o(erful neig)&ours. But at %id#century3 ()en Prussia %o&ilised to face internal and e-ternal crises3 t)e ,and(e)r /ro+ed a serious disa//oint%ent. ,acking a /eaceti%e e-istence3 t)e ,and(e)r (as a confused %ass3 t)e officers ignorant of t)eir duties and t)e %en not kno(ing t)eir /laces. 0)e Prussians t)en concluded t)at only a force e-isting in /eace and &ased on a cadre of /rofessionals could effecti+ely take t)e field in (ar. In 1B=1 t)ey refor%ed t)eir ar%y3 taking account of /o/ulation gro(t) &y e-/anding t)e annual conscri/t contingent to =?3>>>3 and3 %ore significantly3 increasing t)e reser+e ser+ice to fi+e years. 0)ey ga+e t)e ser+ice in t)e ,and(e)r an au-iliary role only. 0)e ne( %odel of t)e Prussian ar%y relied al%ost entirely on a cadre#&ased field force G&elo(H.

The Prussian )adre and ,eser%e #or(e Back

?>C

s a result of t)is refor% t)e acti+e ar%y and its reser+es e.ualled in nu%&ers and far e-ceeded in .uality t)e old acti+e ar%y and ,and(e)r toget)er. In addition3 Prussia i%/ro+ed t)e ,and(e)r &y assigning to it regular officers and re/lacing t)e% (it) so%e reser+e offices in Dunior /ositions In t)e %o&ilised acti+e ar%y. In its acti+e ar%y and its reser+es t)e Prussians )ad successfully co%&ined t)e c)aracteristics of /rofessionals (it) t)e lo( cost and large nu%&ers of a %ilitia and retained %ost of t)e &enefits of eac) syste%. By t)e de+elo/%ent of an effecti+e reser+e for its acti+e ar%y3 Prussia )ad /rofoundly affected t)e logistics of its o(n %an/o(er3 )a+ing a %ono/oly of t)e a//lication of t)is syste% on suc) a large scale and (it) suc) effecti+eness. But all nations i%%ediately felt t)e effect of t)e electric telegra/) and t)e stea% rail(ay. $)ea/er and %ore ra/id and relia&le t)an t)e $)a//e +isual telegra/)3 &y t)e iB=os t)e electric telegra/) )ad linked all %aDor /oints in 2uro/ean countries. 0)e result %eant al%ost instant co%%unication &et(een ar%ies and &et(een co%%anders and t)eir )ead.uarters. 0)e telegra/) also e-/edited %o&ilisation once co%%unities (it) reser+ists or %ilitia )ad t)at ty/e of co%%unication. By t)e 1B=>s t)e stea% railroad /ro+ided ra/id and ine-/ensi+e co%%unication &et(een all %aDor cities in !estern 2uro/e. It not only facilitated t)e %o&ilisation and concentration of ar%ies &ut also could su//ly ar%ies fro% a &ase3 long a %ono/oly of (ater trans/ort.

Steam ,ailroad and Telegra h Back

In 1B<> t)e ustrians used t)e rail(ay to trans/ort to Bo)e%ia C<3>>> %en ()o3 /er)a/s toget)er (it) t)e i%/ending arri+al of 'ield Mars)al Radet6ky to take co%%and3 )ad )el/ed t)e Prussians decide not to /it t)eir ar%y and i%/erfectly functioning ,and(e)r against ustrias seasoned regulars and for%ida&le 'ield Mars)al. fe( years later3 in t)eir &rief (ar (it) ustria3 t)e 'renc) %o+ed3 in t)ree %ont)s3 o+er =>>3>>> %en and 12@3>>> )orses &y train. :et t)e railroad3 like t)e telegra/)3 (as fragile and could not i%%ediately ser+e an ar%y in+ading a )ostile country t)at )ad disa&led its railroads and telegra/)s as its ar%ies retreated. Back

?>B

(he New !russian #rmy in #ction against #ustria

0)e ne( Prussian %an/o(er syste% recei+ed a t)oroug) test in 1B== ()en Prussia foug)t t)e ustrians in Bo)e%ia. 0)e co%/etently /lanned %o&ilisation of Prussian reser+ists (ent s%oot)ly3 and t)e ar%ies concentrated .uickly and effecti+ely using t)e railroad. 0)e e-cellent Prussian staff )ad /lanned skilfully and su/er+ised t)e strategys e-ecution e.ually (ell. 'or c)ief of t)e general staff 9ing !illia% I of Prussia )ad (isely c)osen )is sons for%er aide#de#ca%/3 "el%ut) +on Moltke. 0)is e-traordinary soldier )ad %ade )is (ay u/ t)roug) t)e /eaceti%e Prussian ar%y. 0)at )e re%ained a second lieutenant for t(el+e years reflected no lack of confidence in )i%3 for )is su/eriors )ad sent )i% t)roug) t)e t)ree#year (ar sc)ool and a//ointed )i% to t)e general staff. 0)e sc)olarly Moltke )ad /u&lis)ed se+eral )istorical (orks and one no+el and )ad &roadened )is &ackground &y ser+ice in t)e 0urkis) ar%y. "is taciturn %anner and co%/lete %astery of social graces %asked a /rofound understanding of %ilitary o/erations gained t)roug) )is e-cellent education and tireless inde/endent study. 9ing !illia%3 a co%&at +eteran of t)e last years of t)e Na/oleonic (ars3 largely left %ilitary o/erations to )is c)ief of staff Dust as )e de/ended in /olitics and di/lo%acy on )is su/er& c)ancellor3 Bis%arck. In t)e ustrian ar%y Moltke faced a &asically long#ser+ice /rofessional force (it) a )ig)er /eaceti%e strengt) t)an Prussias and re.uiring far less aug%entation &y %o&ilisation. 2%/)asising s/eed of %o&ilisation3 t)e Prussian staff concentrated its forces in t)ree ar%ies co+ering t)e 2>> %iles fro% Silesia to t)e &orders of ustrias ally3 Sa-ony. 0)e Prussians t)us )ad to ad+ance into Bo)e%ia on e-terior lines3 a situation ()ic) t)e ustrians3 /lagued (it) su//ly difficulties and /oor staff (ork3 %ade no effort to e-/loit. 0)e ustrian co%%ander3 Benedek3 t)oug) )e )ad /layed an )onoura&le /art in t)e ustrian defeat at t)e )ands of t)e 'renc) in 1B<@3 dis/layed a lack of energy and (as al%ost des/ondent a&out t)e ca%/aign. 0)e t(o (estern%ost Prussian ar%ies soon united3 and in a (eek t)e t(o forces )ad dra(n (it)in su//orting distance. 0)ey t)en %o+ed se/arately against t)e ustrians3 Doining toget)er on t)e &attlefield of 9UniggrWt63 ()ere one force )eld t)e ustrians in front ()ile t)e ot)er attacked t)e flank. But t)e ustrians3 (it) a (ell#articulated ar%y of +eteran regulars3 succeeded in (it)dra(ing in good order3 ulti%ately directing t)eir troo/s to Vienna ()ere t)ey %et reinforce%ents fro% Italy. 0)e (ar (ould )a+e continued )ad not /olitical difficulties as (ell as t)e initial defeat /ro%/ted t)e ustrian 2%/eror to acce/t t)e +ery li%ited /olitical concessions soug)t &y t)e Prussians and t)eir Italian allies. "ostilities lasted only se+en (eeks. 0)e (ar de%onstrated t)e effecti+eness of t)e Prussian ar%y of conscri/ts led &y a cadre of regulars. Ine-/erienced in &attle and facing ustrian co%&at +eterans ()o )ad a %ini%u% enlist%ent of se+en years3 t)e Prussians )ad foug)t (ell. 0)eir staff )ad %anaged t)e %o&ilisation ca/a&ly and co%/etently directed t)e %o+e%ents of t)e ar%ies and t)eir constituent cor/s and di+isions. 0)oug) outranged &y t)e ustrian %u66le#loading rifle3 t)e Prussian &reec)loader /ro+ed its (ort). In s/ite of )a+ing )alf t)e range of t)e ustrian rifle and suc) a /oor seal at t)e &reec) t)at it could e%it a flas) t)at %ig)t de/ri+e t)e soldier of sig)t in one eye3 its )ig)er rate of fire co%/le%ented t)e co+er /ro+ided &y firing in t)e /rone /osition to de%onstrate its decisi+e /redo%inance o+er t)e %u66leloader and t)e ustrian soldiers ()o )ad to stand to reload. s in t)e earlier &attles &et(een t)e 'renc) and ustrians3 t)e skir%is) line do%inated t)e offensi+e de/loy%ent and gradually a&sor&ed t)e for%ed troo/s. 0)e Prussians3 )a+ing su&stituted t)e co%/any for t)e &attalion colu%n for %anoeu+re3 found t)at t)ey )ad %ade a (ise c)oice. But e+en (it) t)ese s%all3 relati+ely o/en for%ations3 t)ey disco+ered t)at on %any occasions soldiers a dis/layed an an-iety to go for(ard and Doin t)e skir%is) line ()ere t)ey could seek co+er and return fire. 0)e &reec)loader si%/lified t)is de+elo/%ent &ecause it ena&led t)e Prussian skir%is)ers to fire /rone ()en t)ey could find no &etter co+er.

?>@

rtillery de%onstrated its +alue on t)e defence ()en t)e /roficiently ser+ed ustrian guns /ro+ided e-cellent /rotection for t)eir ar%y as it e-tricated itself fro% its difficult /osition at t)e end of t)e Battle of 9UniggrWt6. Back

+ecisive (urning Movements in the Franco-!russian War

0)e Prussian ar%y contrasted s)ar/ly (it) t)e 'renc) ar%y in t)e (ar of 1BC>. 0)oug) &ot) ar%ies )ad ade.uate co%&at e-/erience3 t)e Prussian ar%y )ad &reec)loading artillery3 ()ic) )ad t)e ad+antage o+er t)e 'renc) ar%ys %u66le loading guns. 5n t)e ot)er )and3 t)e 'renc)3 ()o )ad attri&uted Prussias +ictory o+er ustria to t)e &reec)loader3 )ad ar%ed its %en (it) a %uc) su/erior &reec)loading rifle. !it) a rifle (it) a longer range and an e-cellent seal at t)e &reec)3 'renc) soldiers )ad no te%/tation to e%ulate t)e Prussians and fire fro% t)e )i/ to sa+e t)eir eyesig)t. 0)e 'renc) ar%y3 t)oug) it )ad so%e reser+es3 re%ained a long#ser+ice /rofessional force si%ilar to ustrians. It (as intangi&les %ore t)an (ea/ons and %an/o(er syste%s t)at se/arated t)e t(o ar%ies. Not only did t)e Prussians )a+e an inco%/ara&ly &etter staff &ut also its %e%&ers )ad recei+ed an education t)at ga+e ade.uate attention to t)e conduct of large#scale o/erations. 0)e 'renc) ar%y3 unlike t)e intellectually acti+e force of t)e /re+ious century3 stressed courage and s%all#unit leaders)i/. Military education )ad decreased in .uality3 and fe(er officers )ad attended t)e sc)ools. 0)e ar%y /ro%oted %any officers fro% t)e ranks3 so%e of ()o% (ere3 and re%ained3 illiterate. ,ong successful in colonial (ars3 t)e 'renc) e%/)asised t)e +irtues re.uired in t)ose o/erations3 neglecting t)e %astery of logistics and strategy needed for t)e conduct of %aDor ca%/aigns. Success in t)e $ri%ea against Russia and in Italy against ustria3 ac)ie+ed in s/ite of /oor staff (ork and uni%aginati+e ca%/aigning3 confir%ed t)e +ie( of %ost of its leaders t)at t)e ar%y (orked (ell enoug). !it) a &etter rifle and e-cellent %orale3 t)e ar%y and nation &elie+ed t)at t)e trained 'renc) /rofessional soldier (ould triu%/). But ()en (ar ca%e t)e 'renc) ar%y lacked t)e organisation and /lanning to &egin a ca%/aign /ro%/tly. It )ad dis/ersed its regi%ents around t)e country3 se/arated fro% s/arse reser+es3 and ke/t its su//lies in a fe( large de/ots. 'or acti+e o/erations t)e %ediocre staff )ad si%ultaneously to asse%&le acti+e and reser+e forces3 co%&ine t)e% into di+isions3 cor/s3 and ar%ies3 distri&ute su//lies3 and concentrate t)e %en for t)e ca%/aign. 2+en (it) e-cellent /lans t)is (ould )a+e /ro+en +irtually insu/era&le3 &ut t)e staff lacked ade.uate /lans. In Prussia eac) cor/s )ead.uarters controlled a region and %o&ilised t)e troo/s (it)in it3 t)e cor/s dra(ing t)eir reser+es fro% t)e i%%ediate +icinity. !it) %en3 %ateriel3 and su//lies in t)e region and under cor/s control3 %o&ilisation took /lace .uickly3 and eac) cor/s %o+ed to its /lace in t)e concentration according to a /lan /re/ared and ad%inistered &y t)e general staff of t)e ar%y. 0)e railroad and t)e telegra/) assured t)at t)is /rocess occurred si%ultaneously and relati+ely s%oot)ly t)roug)out Prussia and its *er%an confederates. 0)e Prussian ar%y )ad %any %ore %en t)an four years earlier ()en it foug)t ustria. In t)e interi% it )ad disc)arged four additional annual contingents of =?3>>> %en into t)e reser+e3 %aking t)e ne( syste% ado/ted in 1B=1 fully effecti+e. So3 on t)e frontier &et(een t)e R)ine and ,u-e%&ourg3 9ing !illia% of Prussia and *eneral Moltke concentrated o+er 4<>3>>> %en7 t)e 'renc)3 under 2%/eror Na/oleon III3 )ad only )alf t)at nu%&er to resist t)e Prussian ad+ance against t)e /art of t)e 'renc) frontier t)at (as uno&structed &y t)e R)ine or t)e Vosges Mountains. 0)oug) interested in %ilitary affairs3 t)e ailing 'renc) 2%/eror )ad little taste or talent for ar%y co%%and and lacked &ot) an effecti+e general staff and a &rilliant c)ief to direct )is ca%/aign. 0)e 2%/eror3 an astute /olitician and /ossessed of %any good .ualities3 did not /ossess eit)er t)e te%/era%ent or t)e )ealt) to lead an ar%y. But since a Na/oleons /lace %ust &e (it) t)e ar%ies3 )e took t)e field in /erson3 ill#ser+ed &y inade.uate su&ordinates.

?1>

"a+ing concentrated t)e &ulk of )is forces along t)e frontier east of Met63 Na/oleon III3 finding )is su//lies in a tangle and )is ar%y unready to take t)e offensi+e3 (aited for t)e Prussians to act. Moltke3 (it) )is ar%ies closer toget)er &ut ot)er(ise arranged %uc) as in t)e Bo)e%ian ca%/aign four years earlier3 e-/ected to (it)stand a 'renc) attack (it) )is central ar%y ()ile seeking to en+elo/ t)e 'renc) (it) t)e ot)er t(o. 0)e failure of t)e 'renc) ad+ance to %aterialise and t)e necessity of %aking t)e first %o+e did not alter t)e &asic conce/t t)at )e intended t)e &road distri&ution of )is larger forces to facilitate. But on ugust =t) *eneral Steint%et63 t)e o+erly aggressi+e and insu&ordinate co%%ander of t)e s%all 'irst r%y on t)e Prussian rig)t3 attacked t)e 'renc) at S/ic)eren3 ()ere t)ey not only )ad a strong /osition &ut also greater nu%&ers (it)in reac) of t)e &attlefield. 'or %uc) of a day3 Prussian assaults failed so conclusi+ely t)at *eneral 'rossard3 t)e 'renc) co%%ander3 did not call +ery urgently for reinforce%ents. But 'rossard )ad e-)austed )is reser+es at )and ()en at last a Prussian turning colu%n a//eared and forced t)e 'renc) to (it)dra(. 0)e *er%ans3 in s/ite of t)eir )ea+y casualties3 cele&rated +ictory3 e+en t)oug) it &ore no relation to +on Moltkes strategic o&Decti+es. 'renc) %orale suffered corres/ondingly &ecause3 t)oug) t)ey )ad successfully resisted frontal attacks3 t)ey )ad retreated. s%all action at t)e frontier to(n of !isse%&ourg3 ()ere t)ree Prussian ar%y cor/s3 totalling <>3>>> %en3 sur/rised and defeated =3>>> 'renc) troo/s3 )ad a si%ilar effect on t)e %orale of &ot) sides. Bot) engage%ents e-)i&ited t)e tactical /o(er of t)e &reec)loader in t)e defence and t)e +alue in t)e attack of t)e Prussian rifled artillery (it) s)ells t)at e-/loded on i%/act. But3 si%ultaneously (it) t)e ugust =t) Battle of S/ic)eren3 t)e Prussian $ro(n Princes 0)ird r%y on t)e Prussian left forced its (ay t)roug) t)e Vosges Mountains in a &attle at 'roesc)(iller &roug)t on &y cor/s co%%anders against t)e $ro(n Princes desires. In t)e rugged terrain of t)ese frontier %ountains Mars)al MacMa)ons 'renc) ar%y occu/ied a /osition so strong t)at3 confident t)e Prussians (ould not attack3 )e )ad not directed )is troo/s to entrenc). In MacMa)on3 a +eteran of (arfare in lgeria3 t)e $ri%ea3 and Italy3 t)e 'renc) )ad a solid &ut not &rilliant Mars)al. But3 contrary to t)e (ill of eit)er co%%ander3 a &attle &egan ()en3 one Prussian cor/s after anot)er )a+ing in+ol+ed itself in attacks on t)e 'renc)7 t)e $ro(n Prince )ad to inter+ene to gi+e for% to a &attle t)at )ad e+ol+ed fro% t)e inde/endent decisions of su&ordinates. 2+entually su/erior nu%&ers ena&led t(o Ba+arian cor/s to engage and outflank t)e 'renc) di+ision on t)e Prussian rig)t ()ile /ersistent3 unsuccessful frontal assaults continued to engage t)e 'renc) centre. 5n t)eir left t)e Prussians )ad concentrated an entire cor/s to cross t)e ri+er and attack t)e 'renc) occu/ying terrain ill ada/ted to t)e defence. Soon t)e 'renc) sa( Ja &lack s(ar% of Prussians e%erging at t)e run fro% t)e *unstett Bridge (it) e+ery a//earance of disorder. 'ro% t)is ant#)ea/3 as if &y %agic3 co%/any colu%ns s)ook t)e%sel+es out and ra/idly and (it)out )esitation took u/ a /erfectly regular for%ation.L Soon t)e 'renc) rig)t flank )ad to (it)dra( to a+oid en+elo/%ent. Mars)al MacMa)on e-tricated )is t)reatened ar%y (it) difficulty and retreated sout)east. 5f )is 423>>> infantry )e lost 113>>> killed and (ounded and @3>>> /risoners. 5f t)eir B@3>>> infantry t)e Prussians lost only 1>3<>>3 all killed and (ounded. s ,anc)esters t)eory (ould suggest3 greater Prussian nu%&ers inflicted a +ery )ig) le+el of casualties on t)eir (eaker o//onent3 in s/ite of t)e &enefits t)at t)e defensi+e offered t)e 'renc). 0)is %aDor &attle s)o(s t)e e-cellence of t)e 'renc) /rofessional ar%y. 5ne regi%ent3 for e-a%/le3 did not retreat until it )ad lost 13CC< killed and (ounded of its original strengt) of 232>>. Prussian infantry3 at a disad+antage (it) t)eir inferior rifle3 dis/layed su/er& training in %anoeu+ring and attacking in co%/any colu%n. :et soon t)e Prussian attacking for%ations dissol+ed into a skir%is) line in ()ic) t)e %en lay /rone or soug)t co+er to return fire. !it)

?11

&reec)loading rifles %en no longer stood (it)in 1>> yards and fired at eac) ot)er until one side (it)dre(. But una&le to kee/ %en toget)er in for%ation3 officers could no longer e-ercise t)e sa%e control of t)e attack. In de+elo/ing tactics to co%&at t)e ustrian rifle3 t)e 'renc) )ad altered t)eir tactics to rely %ore on indi+idual initiati+e and less on for%ations res/onding to )ig)er co%%and3 t)us re.uiring Dunior officers and non#co%%issioned officers to /lay a %ore /ro%inent role in tactics. 0)e Prussians )ad t)e sa%e e-/erience as t)eir for%ations &eca%e skir%is) lines and t)e initiati+e and leaders)i/ /assed to su&ordinates. 0)e increased strengt) of t)e defence ga+e t)e artillery a %ore i%/ortant role in t)e offence. 0)e Prussians )ad i%/ro+ed t)eir gunnery after its /oor /erfor%ance against ustria four years earlier and co%/leted t)e re#e.ui/%ent of t)eir artillery (it) steel3 &reec)loading3 rifled guns. 'iring s)ells t)at e-/loded on i%/act3 Prussian guns )ad /ro+ed &etter t)an t)e &ron6e3 %u66le#loading 'renc) rifled cannon in range and rate of fire. 0)e /rinci/al 'renc) disad+antage3 )o(e+er3 ste%%ed fro% t)eir /oor c)oice of a%%unition. 0)ey initially relied e-clusi+ely on s)ra/nel s)ell3 ()ic) )ad a ti%e fuse t)at3 in addition to its erratic /erfor%ance3 /er%itted no &urst &et(een 13C>> and ?3?>> yards. 0)oug) t)e 'renc) later s(itc)ed to /ercussion#fused a%%unition3 t)ese deficiencies )ad ena&led Prussian artillery to silence t)e 'renc) guns and inflict serious casualties u/on t)e un#entrenc)ed defending 'renc) infantry. 0)e ca+alry on eac) side /layed little role3 t)e Prussian )orse%en for t)e %ost /art staying off t)e rifle#do%inated &attlefield. 'renc) ca+alry attacked on t(o occasions3 co%%itted on unfa+oura&le terrain as a last resort to )el/ co+er a retreat. 0)e first c)arge initially looked irresisti&le3 &ut t)e Prussian infantry3 already &e)ind )edges3 (alls3 and trees3 &roug)t t)e )orse%en under ra/id3 accurate fire. 0)e atte%/t ended in an unsuccessful effort to get t)roug) t)e streets of a +illage. 0)e second try3 o+er e+en (orse ground3 fared no &etter3 t)e infantry s)ooting t)e ca+alry fro% co+er. Pro&a&ly no sa&re cut any infantry%an and no infantry%an )ad occasion to defend )i%self (it) )is &ayonet. 0)e era of s)ock action in t)e traditional sense see%ed to )a+e ended3 and ca+alry3 a large target in any case and usually una&le to take co+er3 )ad lost its tactical role. !it) t)e introduction of t)e &reec)loading rifle3 only one (ea/on syste% e-isted on t)e &attlefield3 t)e lig)t or %issile infantry%an3 ()o no longer e+en needed a &ayonet or )ad to stand and for% s.uares to resist ca+alry. 0)e rifle%ans tactics increasingly rese%&led t)ose long custo%ary for lig)t infantry. Soldiers left t)eir for%ations to fig)t as skir%is)ers3 increasing t)eir security (it)out di%inis)ing t)eir fire/o(er. Before t)e (ar Moltke )ad (ritten: Jit is a&solutely &eyond dou&t t)at t)e %an ()o s)oots (it)out stirring )as t)e ad+antage of )i% ()o fires ()ile ad+ancing3 t)at t)e one finds /rotection t)e ground3 ()ereas in it t)e ot)er finds o&stacles3 and t)at3 if to t)e %ost s/irited das) one o//oses a .uiet steadiness3 it is fire effect3 no(adays so /o(erful3 ()ic) (ill deter%ine t)e issue.L 0)e initial &attles de%onstrated t)e trut) of )is Dudg%ent3 for t)e tactical results dis/layed t)e traditional /re/onderance of t)e defence in co%&at &et(een si%ilar (ea/on syste%s. Si%ilar to &ut less %o&ile t)an t)e infantry in its &attlefield role3 t)e i%/ro+ed artillery still /ro+ed stronger in t)e defence t)an on t)e offence. In lieu of a diagra% s)o(ing t)e su/re%acy of infantry o+er ca+alry3 t)e follo(ing sc)e%atic &est e-)i&its t)e tactical realities of 1BC>.

The +ominan(e of &ight infantry and the +efen(e Back

But tactical realities did not deter%ine t)e ca%/aign. "ig) a&ility o//osed to gross inco%/etence readily ga+e t)e decision to strategy. !)en Na/oleon III learned of t)e defeats of )is ar%ies on

?12

ugust =t)3 )e co%/letely lost )is ner+e. lready ill (it) kidney stories and no( faced (it) e+ents t)at %ig)t cause t)e o+ert)ro( of )is s)aky regi%e3 )e s)o(ed t)e effects of )is &urdens3 officers ()o ca%e into contact (it) )i% during t)is /eriod descri&ing )i% as J%uc) aged3 %uc) (eakened3 and /ossessing none of t)e &earing of t)e leader of an ar%y.L t first directing )is ar%y to %o+e (est as far as $)Wlons3 )e counter%anded )is order ()en )e realised t)e /olitical i%/act of suc) a (it)dra(al. Because )e felt uneasy a&out unco+ering Paris3 t)e 2%/eror reDected a %arc) sout) to Doin MacMa)ons retreating ar%y and t)e forces at Belfort3 a flank /osition fro% ()ic) t)e concentrated 'renc) could )a+e %enaced any %arc) on t)e fortified city of Paris. So t)e ar%ies along t)e frontier fell &ack to t)e fortress of Met6. Na/oleon did decide to turn o+er t)e control of o/erations to one of )is %ars)als and selected Mars)al $anro&ert ()o )ad co%%anded in t)e $ri%ea. But3 ()en $anro&ert3 understanding )is li%itations3 declined3 t)e 2%/eror selected Mars)al Ba6aine. Rising front t)e ranks in t)e foreign legion3 Ba6aine )ad dis/layed a&ility and great courage as a Dunior officer. "e )ad foug)t in t)e $ri%ea and Italy and )ad )is first inde/endent assign%ent in an essentially colonial (ar in Me-ico. 4nfit for leaders)i/ of a large ar%y3 Ba6aine e-e%/lified t)e Peter Princi/le in action: )e )ad risen (ell a&o+e t)e le+el at ()ic) )e could /erfor% co%/etently. "e aggra+ated t)e situation &ecause3 %iffed (it) t)e 2%/erors c)oice of a c)ief of staff for )i%3 )e ignored )is staff and tried to run t)e ar%y (it) )is aides. 'urt)er3 )e )ad trou&le acting as if )e )ad control &ecause t)e 2%/eror re%ained near&y and %ade suggestions. 0)e 'renc) ar%y %o+ed slo(ly to Met6 &ecause3 follo(ing security %easures learned co%&ating insurgents in frica3 it closed u/ its colu%ns e+ery nig)t3 instead of &i+ouacking along t)e road and resu%ing t)e %arc) t)e ne-t day. 2+en t)e ca+alry follo(ed t)e lgerian /ractice3 kee/ing concentrated close to t)e infantry3 and so did little reconnaissance to ascertain t)e /osition of t)e Prussians. Mean()ile3 Mars)al MacMa)on3 intent on kee/ing a(ay fro% t)e Prussians after )is defeat at 'roesc)(iller3 %o+ed )is ar%y east(ard ignoring directions to dra( close to t)e forces concentrating at Met6. By ugust 1>t) )e )ad reac)ed a railroad and used it to send )is ar%y to $)Wlons. By ugust @t) t)e Prussians )ad learned t)e directions of t)e 'renc) retreats3 and Moltke ordered an ad+ance of all t)ree ar%ies on a fifty#%ile front. Moltke )ad no s/ecific /lan3 &ut )is &road distri&ution (ould ena&le )i% to turn t)e 'renc) ()en )e %et t)e%3 )is e-cellent staff could ra/idly concentrate )is forces against a /oint of 'renc) (eakness. "is directi+e sent one to(ard Met6 and t(o3 t)e Second and 0)ird ar%ies3 on routes t)at led t)e% sout) of t)e fortress and s%all city. 2+entually all of t)e )uge Prussian force follo(ed on a &road front. !it) reinforce%ents sent to Met6 &y rail3 t)e 'renc) )ad 1B>3>>> %en3 t)e Prussians 2.< ti%es as %any. By ugust 1?t) Prussian infantry fro% t)e Second r%y )ad crossed t)e Moselle sout) of Met63 and t)ree days later t)e 0)ird r%y infantry )ad done t)e sa%e. Moltkes (ide dis/ersion t)en /resented an o//ortunity for a turning %o+e%ent. Na/oleon III )ad long realised t)is /ossi&ility and )ad already )ad /ontoon &ridges constructed o+er t)e Moselle at Met6 ()en )e urged an i%%ediate (it)dra(al fro% t)e fortress on ugust 1?t). In s/ite of t)e t)ree /er%anent &ridges3 Mars)al Ba6aine delayed )is retreat until ugust 14t) &ecause )ig) (ater )ad da%aged t)e /ontoon &ridges7 t)en Ba6aine3 %anaging %atters )i%self3 forgot to use one of t)e &ridges. Mo+ing suc) a )uge ar%y t)roug) t)e streets of a s%all to(n and o+er si- &ridges took %ore t)an a day3 and t)e Prussians interru/ted t)e (it)dra(al (it) an assault. gain Prussian su&ordinate co%%anders attacked (it)out orders and3 t)oug) t)e 'renc) rear guard easily3 re/ulsed t)e%3 Ba6aine sus/ended )is retreat for t(el+e )ours. !)en t)e 'renc) ar%y finally /assed t)roug) Met63 its /rogress continued slo(ly. Still ignoring )is staff3 Ba6aine directed it (est(ard using only one road3 e+en for&idding t)e use of a second road. But des/ite t)e slo( ad+ance and t)e /resence of a fe( Prussian ca+alry /atrols3 t)e road ?1?

(est still re%ained o/en on ugust 1=t). :et t)e al%ost lackadaisical Ba6aine failed to order a resu%/tion of t)e retreat until t)e afternoon of t)e 1=t). $o%forta&le (it) )is artillery all concentrated and feeling secure ()en near t)e /o(erful fortress of Met63 Mars)al Ba6aine failed to e-)i&it any feelings of urgency or to take t)e %ost ele%entary ste/s to e-tricate )is ar%y fro% ()at )ad &eco%e a %ost dangerous situation. Beginning to gras/ t)e ene%ys +ulnera&ility on ugust 1<t)3 Moltke ordered t)e Second r%y to ad+ance ra/idly nort) and (est to attack t)e retreating 'renc) ar%y. But assu%ing t)at t)e 'renc) %ust already )a+e reac)ed Verdu%3 t)e Second r%y co%%ander sent %ost of )is troo/s (est. Ne+ert)eless3 (it) t)e 'renc) +irtually inert outside of Met63 t)is /ro+ed e-actly t)e direction needed to co%/lete a turning %o+e%ent suc) as Na/oleon I )ad acco%/lis)ed at 4l%. :et3 as (it) Radet6kys turning %o+e%ent at No+ara3 t)e Prussians (ould re.uire a &attle to consolidate t)eir decisi+e strategic /osition. Ba6aines ar%y ne+er &egan its afternoon %arc) (est &ecause t(o Prussian di+isions attacked t)e% as t)ey (aited along t)e Verdun road. 0)e aggressi+e and a&le Prussian co%%ander3 una&le to &elie+e t)at t)e 'renc) (ould %o+e so slo(ly3 soug)t to cut off ()at )e su//osed (as t)e 'renc) rearguard. Reinforced &y t(o %ore di+isions in t)e afternoon3 )e %aintained )is assault all day along t)e road fro% Re6on+ille to Mars#la#0our. Mars)al Ba6aine3 ()o )ad greater nu%&ers3 (it) t(o cor/s engaged and t(o in reser+e3 could readily )a+e e-tended )is rig)t to t)e (est and defeated t)e Prussians ()ile o/ening t)e road to Verdun. But t)e Mars)al ke/t t)e &ulk of )is %en concentrated on )is t)reatened left to /rotect )is connection (it) Met6. "e did not (ant to lose t)e safety of (it)dra(al into t)e fortress. fter a &loody3 all#day &attle3 in ()ic) t)e 'renc) lost al%ost 143>>> and t)e Prussians nearly 1=3>>> %en3 t)e 'renc) re%ained in t)eir /ositions3 &ut t)e Prussians )ad &locked t)e road (est in t(o /laces. :et t(o to t)ree %iles nort) lay anot)er road for t)e retreat to t)e (est. Still Ba6aine3 un(illing to lea+e t)e security of Met63 decided to s/end ugust 1Ct) failing &ack to a line of &attle facing (est. 'ro% )ere3 after )e )ad re/lenis)ed )is a%%unition and su//lies fro% t)e stocks in Met63 )e /lanned to resu%e )is (it)dra(al later. !)ile t)e 'renc) used t)e 1Ct) to %ake t)eir slo( retreat to(ard Met63 Moltke issued orders to e-/loit t)e situation. Not realising t)at t)e 'renc) (ere falling &ack east(ard as if to e-/edite t)eir entra/%ent3 and so only )o/ing to /us) t)e 'renc) nort) to(ard t)e ,u-e%&ourg &order3 Moltke &roug)t t)e 'irst r%y across t)e Moselle sout) of Met6 and t)e entire Second r%y nort) to(ard t)e site of t)e /re+ious days &attle. 0)e co%%ander of t)e Second r%y3 ignorant of t)e ()erea&outs of Ba6aine3 ordered )is ar%y nort) on t)e 1Ct)3 realising t)at J()et)er it (ill &e e+entually necessary to %ake a ()eeling %o+e%ent to t)e rig)t or t)e left cannot &e decided at /resent.L $ertain t)e 'renc) )ad already esca/ed (est(ard3 t)e co%%ander3 e-/ecting to %eet a rearguard3 )ad ordered )is %en to Jset out to%orro( %orning to(ard t)e nort) to find t)e ene%y and fig)t )i%.L But once again Ba6aines ti%id inertia )ad confused t)e Prussians. Insofar as t)e Prussians needed a &attle to kee/ Ba6aine fro% lea+ing Met63 t)ey )ad foug)t it on ugust 1=t) &et(een Re6on+ille and Mars#la#tour. :et t)ey &egan anot)er engage%ent any(ay3 al%ost as if t)ey e-/ected to )a+e to fig)t to ac)ie+e ()at Ba6aine )ad gi+en t)e% gratis &y &acking )is ar%y to(ard Met6. cross t)e 'renc) line of retreat and ready to )a+e t)e ad+antage of t)e tactical defensi+e if t)e ene%y tried to esca/e3 1BB3>>> *er%ans attacked 1123>>> entrenc)ed 'renc)%en in a contest t)at o/ened ()en t)e 'renc) returned fire. *er%an officer re/orted: J2+ery()ere3 along t)e ()ole range3 guns sent out flas)es and &elc)ed fort) dense +olu%es of s%oke. )ail of s)ell and s)ra/nel3 t)e latter tracea&le &y t)e little ()ite clouds3 looking like &alloons3 ()ic) re%ained sus/ended in t)e air for so%e ti%e after &ursting3 ans(ered t)e (ar#like greeting fro% our side. 0)e grating noise of t)e %itrailleusees (as )eard a&o+e t)e tu%ult3 dro(ning t)e ()ole roar of t)e &attle.L 1uring t)e day t)e Prussians and t)eir *er%an allies %ade a nu%&er of assaults. 5ne of ?14

t)e%3 seen fro% t)e Prussian side3 re+ealed J%asses of infantry3 ca+alry and artillery cro(ding into t)e ra+ine3 so%e of t)e% /ressing on to t)e front3 ot)ers failing &ack under /ressure of t)e ene%ys fire as t)e range got s)orter3 (ounded and un(ounded %en3 infantry in order and in disorder strea%ing in o//osite directions and Du%&led toget)er3 t)e ec)o of t)e s)ells as t)ey &urst in t)e (ood or a&o+e t)e trees3 t)e ()istling of t)e &ullets fro% eit)er side as t)ey rus)ed o+er)ead3 and o+er t)e ()ole3 a colu%n of dust ()ic) darkened t)e sun.L 0)e nu%erically su/erior Prussians3 &y e-tending t)eir line and turning t)e 'renc) rig)t flank3 dro+e Ba6aine into t)e security of Met63 ()ere )e )ad yearned to go all along. 0)e Battle of *ra+elotte#St. Pri+at again de%onstrated t)e tactical /o(er of t)e defence. !)en t)e Prussian *uard3 an elite unit of al%ost ?>3>>> infantry3 attacked in for%ation3 it lost B3>>> killed and (ounded in t)e little o+er t(enty %inutes &efore t)e aristocratic guards%en fell into t)e /rone /osition3 returned fire3 and refused to ad+ance fart)er to(ard t)e 'renc) line. 0)e 'renc) suffered negligi&le casualties in re/elling t)is assault3 and t)eir infantry3 firing t)eir e-cellent &reec)loaders3 accounted for t)e &ulk of t)e losses of t)e Prussian *uard. Strategically redundant3 t)e &attle cost t)e Prussians 2>3>>> %en and t)e 'renc) 123>>>3 eac) losing a little o+er 1> /ercent of t)e forces engaged. Ba6aine /ro%/tly fell &ack (it)in t)e safety of t)e fortress of Met6. !it) %ost of t)e Prussian troo/s east of t)e Moselle3 Ba6aine could fairly easily )a+e %arc)ed out of Met6 to t)e sout)east7 &ut3 insofar as )e )ad any /lan to lea+e3 )e (ired t)e 2%/eror t)at after gi+ing )is troo/s rest for a cou/le of days3 )e intended to %o+e nort)(est in t)e direction ()ere t)e Prussians )ad su&stantial strengt). But Ba6aine %ade no effort to esca/e front Met6 in any direction. 0)us Ba6aine lost )alf of t)e 'renc) ar%ies. In addition to illustrating t)e Peter Princi/le and dis/laying t)e /rofound influence t)at an inco%/etent /erfor%ance could )a+e on )istory3 Ba6aine s)o(ed a general (ilting under t)e res/onsi&ility of co%%and. "e )ad &eco%e ()at t)e 'renc) call fatigu6. 5+erco%e (it) res/onsi&ility and ad+ersity3 )e lost t)e /o(er of decision and readily clung to t)e fa%iliar fortifications of Met6 and t)e te%/orary refuge t)at t)ey offered. Pro%/tly organising t)e &lockade of Met63 Moltke sent a force (est. It %o+ed a&reast of t)e 0)ird r%y in t)e sout) t)at3 after defeating MacMa)on at 'roesc)(iller3 )ad re%ained sout) of Met6 not /artici/ating in t)e &ottling u/ of Ba6aine. Moltke directed t)ese t(o ar%ies on $)Wlons.

Molt$e"s Turning Mo%ement Back

fter +acillating3 t)e 'renc) at $)Wlons decided t)at t)e ar%y under Mars)al MacMa)on s)ould %arc) nort)east to(ard Met6 to relie+e t)e un(illing Ba6aine. MacMa)ons route3 c)osen to ena&le )i% to dra( su//lies fro% t)e railroad3 led )i% to(ard t)e Belgian &order3 ()ic) )e (ould )a+e to skirt on )is route to Met6 to %eet Ba6aines )y/ot)etical &ut unatte%/ted sortie to t)e nort)(est. Realising )is /eril3 MacMa)on (is)ed to turn &ack &ut continued to %o+e for(ard in res/onse to an e%/)atic telegra% fro% Paris t)at (arned of re+olution if t)e ar%y a&andoned

?1<

Ba6aine. MacMa)on t)en /us)ed on3 taking (it) )i% Na/oleon III3 sick3 fatigu63 and e-/ressing )is reser+ations a&out suc) a %o+e. !)en Moltke realised t)e direction of t)e %arc) of MacMa)ons force3 )e e-/loited )is interior lines &et(een t)e inert Ba6aine and t)e ad+ancing MacMa)on and turned )is t(o ar%ies to t)e rig)t and )eaded t)e% nort) to turn t)e ene%y and /ress MacMa)on against t)e Belgian frontier. 0)is )e successfully did3 co%/elling t)e surrender of t)e 'renc) 2%/eror and o+er 1>>3>>> %en at Sedan3 t)eir retreat cut off on t)ree sides &y t)e ene%y ar%ies and on t)e fourt) &y t)e Belgian frontier. t(o to one nu%erical /redo%inance and a )ig) ratio of force to s/ace si%/lified a task t)at Na/oleon I )ad found arduous (it) relati+ely fe( %en in t)e Marengo ca%/aign. MacMa)on )ad kno(n ()at )e risked &y )is %arc) to Sedan3 &ut leaders in Paris3 a(are of t)e /olitical dangers yet failing to a//reciate %ilitary realities3 )ad ordered t)e ar%y to its doo%. gain t)e Prussians )ad ac)ie+ed a strategic +ictory co%/ara&le to 4l%. 0)e surrender of t)e 2%/eror and t)e ar%y &roug)t t)e o+ert)ro( of t)e e%/ire and t)e /rocla%ation of a 'renc) re/u&lic. 0)e re/u&lic /ursued t)e (ar (it) +igour7 conscri/ting )undreds of t)ousands of %en3 e.ui//ing t)e% (it) ne(ly %anufactured (ea/ons and (it) i%/orts t)roug) /orts ke/t o/en &y t)e /o(erful 'renc) na+y. 0)e su&se.uent o/erations cantered on t)e Prussian siege of Paris and t)e efforts of t)e 'renc) to raise t)e siege. 0)e Prussians faced a difficult assign%ent in &lockading t)e /o/ulous3 )ea+ily fortified city (it) its )uge garrison. t t)e sa%e ti%e t)ey )ad to fend off t)e relief atte%/ts &y t)e large3 t)oug) i%/ro+ised3 'renc) ar%ies. Ba6aines surrender of 1C?3>>> %en at Met6 at t)e end of 5cto&er aug%ented t)e forces for co+ering t)e siege of Paris and for co/ing (it) t)e attacks &y irregular units on Prussian co%%unications. 0)e fall of Paris3 at t)e end of 8anuary 1BC13 its food su//lies e-)austed3 &roug)t a /eace in ()ic) t)e 'renc) ceded t(o /ro+inces to t)e ne( *er%an 2%/ire and /aid all enor%ous su% of %oney.

'nterior &ines and Turning Mo%ement Back

'renc) efforts to raise t)e siege of Paris )ad no c)ance of success. 0)e Prussians not only )ad t)e ad+antage of t)e tactical defensi+e against &ot) t)e Paris garrison and t)e relie+ing ar%ies &ut also t)e su/eriority gi+en t)e% &y t)eir training and t)e i%/ro+e%ent in t)eir %ilitary skills t)roug) ca%/aigning and co%&at. gainst trained soldiers and co%%anders (it) &attle e-/erience and staffs t)at )ad /erfected t)eir %et)ods in t)e o/ening ca%/aigns3 t)e 'renc) /itted i%/ro+ised ar%ies. !it) al%ost all of t)e regular troo/s surrounded in Met6 or surrendered at Sedan3 t)e 'renc) lacked any significant cadre of regulars u/on ()ic) to &uild ne( ar%ies. In s/ite of using sailors and retired officers3 t)ey could not create o+ernig)t forces ca/a&le of taking t)e offensi+e against t)oroug)ly trained and e-/ertly led Prussian co%&at +eterans. 0)us t)e +ictories at Met6 and Sedan decided t)e (ar. 5+er 23>>> years &efore3 an inco%/etent Ro%an co%%ander )ad gi+en "anni&al t)e o//ortunity to destroy t)e Ro%an force at $annae. :et

?1=

t)is &attle )ad not decided t)e (ar &ecause t)e Ro%ans raised ne( ar%ies and t)e &ulk of t)e Italian /o/ulation continued to resist t)e $art)aginians. nd t)e 'renc) res/onded in t)e sa%e (ay. But a %aDor difference lay in t)e ratio of force to s/ace. In trying to do%inate a&out one#t)ird of 'rance3 t)e Prussians dealt (it) an area a&out )alf again t)e si6e of t)e /art of Italy "anni&al soug)t to control. 0)e Prussians )ad enoug) force to /ursue a co%&at /ersisting strategy3 for t)ey )ad nearly a %illion %en. 0)e Prussians )ad a force ade.uate to do%inate enoug) of 'rance to ac)ie+e t)eir /olitical o&Decti+es. s did t)e $art)aginians3 t)e Prussians )ad li%ited goals7 if3 as Na/oleon )ad in S/ain3 t)e Prussians )ad soug)t to control all of t)e )uge country and i%/ose on its /eo/le a Prussian 9ing3 t)ey dou&tless (ould )a+e encountered /ro&le%s si%ilar to t)ose Na/oleon )ad3 including t)e inter+ention of foreign /o(ers t)at (ould )a+e o&Dected to suc) a radical s)ift in t)e &alance of /o(er. Back

# Summary of the (actics. "ogistics. and Strategy of the Franco-!russian War

In t)e &attles &et(een t)e trained Prussian and 'renc) troo/s t)e +ictors lost @.4 /ercent of t)eir forces3 t)e defeated Dust o+er 1= /ercent. Bot) of t)ese /ercentages re/resent a su&stantial reduction fro% t)e nu%&ers c)aracteristic of t)e eig)teent) century and t)e (ars of Na/oleon. 0)is decline in casualties occurred in s/ite of t)e )eig)tened let)ality of t)e (ea/ons used3 nu%erous Prussian frontal attacks3 and t)e de%onstrated increase t)at t)e &reec)loading rifle ga+e to t)e /o(er of t)e tactical defence. 0)e good doctrine and training /ro+ided t)e troo/s3 toget)er (it) t)e tactics e%/loyed3 %ost likely offer t)e /rinci/al e-/lanation for t)is significant c)ange. 0)e Prussians3 ()o al%ost al(ays assu%ed t)e offensi+e3 used t)eir s%all co%/any colu%ns to take ad+antage of t)e ground and usually de/loyed at a considera&le distance. 0)e attackers soon all &eca%e skir%is)ers3 and ad+ances took /lace as a series of rus)es &y /arts of t)e line. 0)ese offensi+e tactics3 also used &y t)e 'renc)3 di%inis)ed t)e e-/osure of troo/s to t)e %ore deadly ne( (ea/ons. 0)e attackers3 like t)e defenders3 also secured /rotection fro% t)e /rone /osition t)at t)e &reec)loader %ade /ossi&le. da/tation to t)e ne( (ea/ons3 as (ell as t)e greater o//ortunity for co+er t)at t)ey offered t)e troo/s3 resulted in reduced casualties for &ot) attackers and defenders. %/le training3 i%/ro+ed articulation3 and unit co)esion )el/ account for t)e lo( casualties a%ong t)e defeated. ,ogistics c)anged +ery little during t)e 'ranco#Prussian !ar3 t)e Prussian and3 to a large e-tent3 t)e 'renc) ar%ies li+ing on t)e country in t)e traditional %anner. 0)e rail(ays3 )a+ing e-/edited Prussian %o&ilisation and concentration3 contri&uted +ery little to su//ly. 'renc) fortresses &locked t)e rail(ay lines3 and not until 8anuary 1BC13 ()en t)e (ar )ad nearly ended3 did t)e Prussians get a second rail line (orking &et(een t)e *er%an frontier and t)e Paris siege. 0)e one line t)at &egan o/eration in late Se/te%&er did )el/ feed t)e &esiegers of Paris3 trans/ort t)e siege artillery3 and ena&le t)e accu%ulation of a%%unition for a &o%&ard%ent of t)e 'renc) ca/ital. :et su//ly for t)e )uge ar%ies of Prussia and its *er%an allies rested /ri%arily on t)e dense /o/ulation and great agricultural /roducti+ity of 'rance. Beginning t)e ca%/aign at t)e )ar+est season )el/ed Moltkes ar%ies3 &ut ()en t)ey faced t)e traditional dile%%a of feeding a &esieging ar%y3 t)e Prussian soldiers utilised t)eir agricultural &ackground &y digging /otatoes and )ar+esting and %illing ()eat. Re.uisition3 /urc)ase3 and so%e contri&utions /laced t)e /roduce of 'rance at t)e dis/osal of t)e Prussians. 2+en ()en ar%ies )ad access to a railroad3 t)e su//ly organisation )ad not sol+ed eit)er t)e /ro&le% of storing at t)e rail)ead t)e large .uantity of su//lies t)at t)e railroad could deli+er or of trans/orting t)e% to t)e troo/s. In s/ite of t)e increased rate of fire of rifles and field guns3 a%%unition su//ly did not ta- t)e logistical organisation. Prussian s%all#ar%s a%%unition e-/enditure for t)e (ar a+eraged only fifty#si- rounds /er %an3 less t)an eac) soldier carried3 and artillery used only 1@@ rounds /er gun3 a consu%/tion t)at only slig)tly e-ceeded t)at &orne &y t)e gunners and t)e additional rounds

?1C

con+eyed &y t)e cor/s. %%unition use re%ained essentially at its custo%ary le+el and3 as al(ays3 /resented no )ards)i/ for su//ly. 0)e strategy of t)e (ar e-)i&ited Na/oleonic ele%ents to a degree t)at sur/assed in e-tent and co%/ression in ti%e any t)at Na/oleon )ad e+er ac)ie+ed. "is triu%/) o+er t)e Prussians at 8ena and o+er t)e ustrians at 4l% )ad %uc) in co%%on (it) t)e t(o Prussian successes3 &ut Moltke acco%/lis)ed t(o suc) +ictories in only a %ont)s ti%e. 0)e e-cellence of t)e Prussian staff in %anaging ar%ies of un/recedented si6e contri&uted to ca/turing t(o for%ida&le ar%ies3 as did Moltkes Na/oleonic %et)od of s/reading )is forces so t)at t)ey )ad an o//ortunity to turn an o//onent. Nu%erical /redo%inance of at least t(o to one %ig)t easily )a+e /ro+ided a decisi+e factor in %aking /ossi&le suc) strategic turning %o+e%ents. But all of t)ese toget)er could not )a+e /roduced %o%entous defeats of t)is kind )ad Mars)al Ba6aine not dis/layed suc) e-e%/lary Inco%/etence3 co%/lete failure of ner+e3 and t)e ina&ility to &ear t)e res/onsi&ility of co%%and. Success in colonial (ars and su&ordinate co%%and )ad failed to e.ui/ t)e Mars)al for )ig) co%%and3 e+en t)oug) t)ese )ad a%/ly e-)i&ited )is &ra+ery and )is ca/acity to lead %uc) s%aller units. 0)e lack of ade.uate training in strategy and large#unit co%%and furnis)ed no re%edy for Ba6aines li%ited and ina//ro/riate &ackground. lt)oug) Mars)al MacMa)ons disaster at Sedan o(es %uc) to /olitical %oti+es deter%ining t)e strategy for all ar%y3 t)e Mars)al s)ould )a+e resigned )is co%%and rat)er t)an lead )is %en on suc) a dangerous3 doo%ed %arc). 0)e 'renc) ar%y t)at failed in 1BC> differed %arkedly front t)at of t)e eig)teent) century3 ()ic) )ad de+elo/ed t)e regulations of 1C@1. $uriously enoug)3 t)e Royal ar%y t)at reser+ed )ig) co%%and for t)e %ore e-alted aristocrats far out/erfor%ed t)e I%/erial one t)at o/ened its )ig) ranks to talent. 0oo %uc) success )ad dou&tless %ade t)e 'renc) %ilitary and ci+ilian leaders co%/lacent and o+erconfident3 &ut t)e a&sence &ot) of t)e intellectual fer%ent of t)e eig)teent)# century ar%y and of t)e Prussian study of )istory and strategy distinguis) t)e force t)at failed to )a+e ade.uate co%%anders in 1BC>. Na/oleon III %ust also assu%e &la%e for so dra%atic a failure. But 'renc) failures s)ould not di% t)e lustre of Prussian success7 e+en Na/oleon and "anni&al )ad re.uired ine/t o//onents to (in great +ictories. Back

(he Strategy of the #merican Civil War

0)e %erican $i+il !ar of 1B=1#=< e-)i&ited t)e degree to ()ic) 2uro/eans in t)e !estern "e%is/)ere could e%/loy continental %ilitary %et)ods in a (ar on a 2uro/ean scale. In seeking to esta&lis) t)eir inde/endence3 t)e Sout)erners or $onfederates created an ar%y t)at reac)ed al%ost ?>>3>>> %en. 0)is /ro+ed a %atc) for t)e 4.S. or 4nion forces t)at in t)e a&sence of a large regular ar%y also created a %odern force fro% ci+ilian %aterial and ulti%ately3 fielded o+er =>>3>>> %en. *uided &y a tiny cadre of (ell#educated /rofessional officers3 &ot) &eca%e co%/ara&le to t)e &est of 2uro/e3 and generals on &ot) sides )ad co%/etence e.ual to or greater t)an t)at of Radet6ky or Moltke. 0)e o/erations of t)e (ar not only e-)i&ited t)e generals %astery of Na/oleonic (arfare &ut also %ade e-e%/lary use of t)e telegra/) and t)e rail(ay to control and carry out strategic %o+e%ents. !)ereas t)e 'renc) )ad used t)e rail(ay for su//ly and %o+e%ents to t)e front in 1B<@ and t)e Prussians and 'renc) )ad used it for %o&ilisation and concentration3 t)e %ericans3 /articularly t)e $onfederates3 utilised trains for %aDor strategic concentrations. 5n t)ree occasions t)ey %o+ed large forces )undreds of %iles &y rail to reinforce an ar%y and to carry out a %aDor offensi+e. 0)e rail(ays and t)e ri+ers na+igated &y stea%s)i/s /ro+ided ne( and significant lines of o/erations. 0)e first of t)ese $onfederate %o+e%ents3 t)e S)ilo) ca%/aign3 illustrates clearly t)e use of t)e rail(ay and t)e telegra/) in t)e dis/ersal and concentration of troo/s o+er an un/recedented area. 0)e $onfederates foug)t on t)e strategic defensi+e3 and t)is ca%/aign )as its clearest /arallel (it) ?1B

Na/oleons defence of )is Mantua siege against 'ield Mars)al !ur%sers first ad+ance. In Marc) 1B=2 t)e 4.S. co%%ander in t)e !est3 ". !. "alleck3 a t)oroug) student of Na/oleonic (arfare3 )ad sent an ar%y under t)e energetic 4.S. *rant u/ t)e 0ennessee Ri+er. "alleck3 fearing a $onfederate concentration against *rant3 urged t)e deli&erate *eneral Buell to e-/edite )is %arc) fro% Nas)+ille to Doin *rant and telegra/)ed *rant a&out t)e /ossi&ility of an attack. Mean()ile3 t)e $onfederates in t)e !est )ad &egun concentrating t)eir scattered forces in nort)ern Mississi//i. 0)ey used t)e telegra/) to order troo/s fro% t)e Mississi//i Ri+er3 eastern 0ennessee3 and rkansas to t)is /oint. Mean()ile3 $onfederate President 8efferson 1a+is3 ()o sa( t)e o//ortunity to strike *rant &efore Buell )ad Doined )i%3 ordered troo/s fro% $)arleston3 Mo&ile3 and Ne( 5rleans. ll of t)ese forces used railroads3 or a co%&ination of railroad and ri+er stea%ers3 for t)eir %o+e%ents3 e-ce/t t)ose fro% rkansas3 ()ic) arri+ed too late. 0)e s%allest and %ost distant force3 t)at fro% $)arleston3 also failed to arri+e in ti%e in s/ite of t)e use of trunk#line rail(ays. 0)e $onfederates t)en carried out a Na/oleonic ca%/aign. 0)ese ar%ies concentrated near *rants (it)out )is kno(ledge and in early /ril carried out a sur/rise attack3 t)e Battle of S)ilo). 0)e $onfederates )ad little c)oice &ut to %ake an a%ateuris) frontal assault3 since *rant )ad )is &ack to t)e ri+er3 t)us securing )is flanks. 5n t)e first day of t)e &attle *rant sta+ed off t)e Sout)erners and on t)e second day %ade a strong counterattack3 aided &y reinforce%ents fro% Buell ()o )ad reac)ed t)e 0ennessee Ri+er only a fe( %iles do(n strea% fro% *rant. 0)e interest of t)is ca%/aign lies in its all#e%&racing strategic conce/t in an area so +ast t)at only t)e telegra/)3 rail(ay3 and stea%er %ade its i%/le%entation /ossi&le. $learly &ot) /artici/ants )ad so fir% a gras/ of t)e Na/oleonic %et)od t)at t)ey could e-/and it in accord (it) t)e /ossi&ilities of t)e ne( %odes of co%%unication. 0)ese u/#to#date %eans of co%%unication and trans/ortation /ro+ed /articularly i%/ortant for su//ly. $o%/ared to 2uro/e3 t)e %erican Sout) )ad a s/arse /o/ulation t)at engaged in agriculture of lo( intensity and initially )ad %uc) of its /roduction de+oted to cotton and to&acco. 0)us t)e large stale%ated ar%ies &eca%e a&solutely de/endent on (ater or rail trans/ortation. Besides ada/ting t)e railroad and t)e telegra/) to t)e e-/loitation of concentration on a single line of o/erations3 t)e contestants also dis/layed a /articular affinity for t)e strategic turning %o+e%ent3 as e-e%/lified &y Na/oleons Marengo and 4l% ca%/aigns. lt)oug) t)ey often atte%/ted to reac) t)eir o//onents rear3 t)ey al%ost al(ays failed. :et lack of force did not cause t)ese failures &ecause3 in s/ite of t)e +ast si6e of t)e t)eatre of (ar3 eac) ar%y )ad enoug) %en to &lock t)e ene%ys retreat. Rat)er3 t)e intrinsic difficulty of e-ecuting suc) a %anoeu+re against an alert o//onent accounted for t)e general lack of success.

4a oleon"s Situation -efore Wurmser"s #irst ,elief of Mantua Back

?1@

Analogous Strategi( Situation in Mar(h 789: Back

4a oleon"s (on(entration against ;uasdono%i(h Back

?2>

)onfederate (on(entration against Grant Back

4a oleon dri%es -a($ ;uasdono%i(h and Turns against Wurmser Back

?21

Hy otheti(al Out(ome if )onfederates Had +efeated Grant -efore .uell <oined Him Back

4.S. *rant3 general in c)ief in t)e last year of t)e (ar3 succeeded t(ice in e-ecuting suc) a %anoeu+re. *rant )ad /ro+en an a/t /u/il in t)e sc)ool of e-/erience and kne( )o( to use ca/a&le su&ordinates. In t)e first instance )e faced an o//onent )olding Vicks&urg3 a fortified city on t)e Mississi//i Ri+er. "a+ing failed in an earlier effort to turn t)is /osition ()en $onfederate ca+alry )ad &roken )is rail co%%unications3 *rant stuck to t)is secure ri+er line. "e finally carried out )is turning %o+e%ent &y %arc)ing do(n t)e ri+er&ank o//osite Vicks&urg3 using t)e na+y to cross

?22

&elo( t)e city3 and )eading nort) to its rear. t t)is /oint t)e $onfederate co%%ander3 Pe%&erton3 after a &attle (it) *rants ar%y3 (it)dre( to Vicks&urg and s)ut )i%self u/ (it)in its fortifications. ,ike Ba6aine in Met63 Pe%&erton ulti%ately surrendered3 losing )is ar%y as (ell as t)e /lace. In calling Pe%&erton )is &est friend3 *rant ga+e t)e $onfederate )is due credit3 &ut t)e 4nion generals fine conce/tion and e-ecution /lace t)is ca%/aign a%ong t)e &est e-a%/les of t)e strategic turning %o+e%ent. *rant carried out anot)er at t)e end of t)e (ar ()en )e /ursued *eneral Ro&ert 2. ,ees ar%y as it retreated fro% t)e $onfederate ca/ital3 Ric)%ond. 4na&le to reac) )is &ase &y retreating directly a(ay fro% *rants %uc) larger force3 ,ee )ad to %o+e diagonally3 ()ic) ena&led *rant to kee/ u/ (it) )i% on a /arallel route al(ays staying &et(een ,ee and )is &ase. 0)en *rant dis/layed t)e %ericans gras/ of t)e role of ca+alry &y sending )is %ounted force a)ead to delay ,ee &y fig)ting dis%ounted. *rant t)en %o+ed in front of ,ee and3 at t)e little to(n of //o%atto-3 concluded t)e ca%/aign (it) ca/itulation. Because ,ee (as t)e $onfederacys /re%ier general and )is ar%y its largest3 /eace follo(ed. ,ee )i%self )ad an e-e%/lary %astery of t)e art of (ar and astutely used t)e strategic turning %o+e%ent on t)e defensi+e. In t)e Second Bull Run3 ntieta%3 and *ettys&urg ca%/aigns3 )e )ad forced )is o//onent &ack &y t)reatening )is rear. 5n all t)ree occasions a &attle resulted3 &ut3 in at least t)e first t(o3 ,ee )ad intended to a+oid a contest3 (is)ing rat)er to use t)e %anoeu+re not to &lock t)e ene%ys retreat &ut to force )i% &ack (it)out t)e losses an engage%ent (ould entail. In )is ntieta% and *ettys&urg ca%/aigns3 ,ee lacked t)e line of co%%unications necessary to )old t)e area into ()ic) )e )ad ad+anced and %ade a &rilliant use of t)e turning %o+e%ent on t)e defensi+e. In eac) case )is t)reat of reac)ing t)e rear of t)e %uc) stronger o//osing ar%y forced t)e ene%y &ack. 0)us ,ees %anoeu+re to %enace t)e )ostile rear3 really a raid3 functioned as a distraction7 it differed little fro% one of *usta+uss or !allensteins raids or t)e 9ings atte%/ted use of a t)reat to 'rankfort to dra( 0illy a(ay front Magde&urg. ,ees %astery of t)e turning %o+e%ent for defensi+e as (ell as offensi+e /ur/oses3 like )is use of interior lines3 /laced )i% in t)e forefront of $i+il !ar soldiers in )is a&ility to a//ly t)e &est ele%ents found in t)e Na/oleonic re+olution in strategy. In tactics3 too3 t)e ar%ies of t)e Nort) and Sout) e-)i&ited t)eir de&t to 'rance3 &ut )ere t)e %ericans %odified t)e lessons. lt)oug) t)e co%&atants )ad fe( &reec)loading or %aga6ine rifles3 t)ey did ulti%ately e.ui/ t)e%sel+es al%ost e-clusi+ely (it) %u66le#loading rifles.

Grant Turns =i($s-urg Back

?2?

)ontinuous Turning Mo%ement Back

Se(ond .ull ,un Turning Mo%ement #or(es Po e .a($ Back

Gettys-urg Turning Mo%ement #or(es Hoo$er .a($ Back

r%ies on t)e offensi+e as (ell as defensi+e entrenc)ed %ore and %ore as t)e (ar /rogressed. 0)e range of t)e rifle i%/elled soldiers to seek co+er ()en t)ey a//roac)ed t)e ene%y3 t)e increased +ulnera&ility of attackers and t)e en)anced security of t)e defenders %arkedly aug%enting t)e /o(er of t)e tactical defensi+e. By t)e end of t)e (ar &ot) entrenc)ed3 and t)e often#stale%ated

?24

ar%ies fre.uently faced eac) ot)er for se+eral (eeks in situations re%iniscent of t)e long confrontation of VendU%e and 2ugene at ,u66ara. 0)e rail(ay )el/ed /er%it t)ese large ar%ies to re%ain i%%o&ile so long. 0)e engineering orientation of t)e 4.S. Military cade%y3 ()ic) leaders on &ot) sides )ad attended3 and t)e doctrine taug)t t)ere reinforced t)is stress on field fortifications3 ()ic)3 in turn3 (as a res/onse to t)e e-/anded danger of %en e.ui//ed (it) rifles. So3 as e-/erience aug%ented training3 t)e ar%ies &eca%e al%ost Ro%an in t)eir outlook3 if not in t)eir s/ecific use of t)e entrenc)ed ca%/. 0)e %ericans co%/letely a+oided t)e 2uro/ean %isconce/tion t)at )ea+y ca+alry still )ad a role on t)e &attlefield3 o(ing t)is insig)t to t)e (eak ca+alry tradition of t)eir forested country and t)eir realisation t)at ca+alry could not c)arge rifle#ar%ed infantry. Ne+ert)eless3 &ot) sides )ad %uc) ca+alry3 t)e $onfederates e-ceeding t)eir o//onents. !)en confronting infantry3 ca+alry custo%arily dis%ounted to fig)t. By e.ui//ing t)ese %en (it) rifles3 in addition to /istols and sa&res3 t)e %ericans )ad restored to t)eir nineteent)#century ca+alry t)e dis%ounted defensi+e /o(er lost ()en t)e ca+alry ga+e u/ t)e lance. 4nlike t)e lance3 soldiers could attac) a rifle to t)eir saddle3 lea+ing t)eir )ands free for reins and sa&re or /istol. Strategically3 t)ese +ersatile %ounted infantry%en readily filled t)e role of lig)t ca+alry. In addition to reconnaissance3 t)is %ounted force /ro+ed /articularly +alua&le as raiders. 0)e e-cellent Sout)ern ca+alry so effecti+ely e-/loited t)e +ulnera&ility of railroads and t)e de/endence of t)e ar%ies on t)e%3 t)at t)ey )alted t(o ad+ances &y %aDor 4nion ar%ies si%/ly &y raids against t)eir rail co%%unications. 0)ese ar%ies t)us suffered t)e sa%e fate as t(o of 'redericks Prussian ar%ies3 +icti%s of t)e skilful logistic strategy of t)e ustrian 'ield Mars)als3 0raun and 1aun. In s/ite of successful ca%/aigns3 es/ecially in t)e !est3 ()ere t)eir ar%oured stea%ers controlled t)e i%/ortant na+iga&le ri+ers3 t)e 4nion )ad little success in do%inating a country greater in si6e t)an 'rance3 *er%any3 and t)e ustrian 2%/ire toget)er. 'aced (it)3 in addition to ca+alry raids3 a )ostile /o/ulation3 ()ic) engaged in guerrilla (arfare against t)e in+aders co%%unications3 t)e 4nited States )ad to use a t)ird of its forces to garrison t)e 2>>3>>> s.uare %iles it )ad occu/ied &y 1B=?. 0)us3 t)e 4nions /ersisting strategy &eca%e funda%entally a logistic strategy of occu/ying t)e country to (eaken t)e $onfederates &y de/ri+ing t)e% of recruits and agricultural and industrial resources. But co%&ating guerrilla (arfare and t)e raids of t)e $onfederate ca+alry a&sor&ed so %any 4nion troo/s as to defeat t)is logistic strategy. 0)e 4nion needed too %any %en to control t)e country in +ie( of t)e /olitical o//osition in t)e occu/ied areas. So t)e 4nited States )ad a %ilitarily ade.uate ratio of force to s/ace &ut not enoug) force to %eet t)e re.uire%ents i%/osed &y t)e /olitical situation. nd t)oug) t)e 4nion forces )ad sei6ed far %ore land in t)e $onfederacy t)an t)e Prussians (ould later con.uer in 'rance3 t)ey still )ad not taken enoug) to e-c)ange t)e land for t)eir (ar ai%s: t)e e-tinction of t)e $onfederacy and t)e a&olition of sla+ery. In 1B=4 t)e 4nion soug)t to o+erco%e t)e a//arently insu/era&le o&stacles of t)eir inade.uate ratio of force to s/ace &y resorting to a strategy of raids3 i%/le%enting a raiding rat)er t)an a /ersisting logistic strategy. 0)ese raids3 ai%ed at &reaking t)e Sout)s rail(ays3 ()ic) su//lied t)e $onfederate ar%ies (it) food3 clot)ing3 and %unitions. 0)e first raid &y an ar%y of =>3>>> %en3 led &y t)e &rilliant3 inno+ati+e3 and /olitically astute *eneral !. 0. S)er%an3 %arc)ed %ore t)an 2<> %iles fro% t)e inland city of tlanta to %eet t)e 4nion fleet on t)e tlantic coast at Sa+anna). Initially uncertain as to S)er%ans /ur/ose3 t)e $onfederate co%%ander3 *eneral *. 0. Beauregard3 s)o(ed )is gras/ of %ilitary )istory as (ell as )is understanding of t)e inade.uacy of S)er%ans force to control t)e region &et(een tlanta and

?2<

t)e sea &y e-)orting )is su&ordinates &y telegra/) to Jado/t 'a&ian syste%L and re%inded t)e% t)at J"anni&al )eld )eart of Italy for si-teen years and t)en (as defeated.L But S)er%an and *rant understood t)e situation as (ell as Beauregard and intended a raid only. 0)is and follo(ing raids succeeded at t)e sa%e ti%e t)at t)e 4.S. ar%y and na+y finally closed t)e /orts t)roug) ()ic) %erc)ant s)i/s )ad long %anaged to e+ade t)e 4nion &lockading s.uadrons. But t)e 4nions logistic strategy ne+er )ad a c)ance to de%onstrate its effecti+eness3 nor did t)e 4nion ar%y e+er )a+e to test its a&ility to o+erco%e guerrilla resistance. In s/ite of t)e Nort)s unli%ited /olitical o&Decti+e Gt)e su&Dugation of t)e Sout)H t)e $onfederacy colla/sed rat)er suddenly ()en ()olesale desertion struck its forces and t)e attenuated ar%ies t)e%sel+es ca/itulated. 0)e 4nion /resident3 &ra)a% ,incoln3 contri&uted to t)is &y %itigating t)e )ars)ness of )is unconditional surrender &y in+iting t)e re&elling states &ack into t)e 4nion (it)out any /olitical /enalties ot)er t)an t)at t)ey a&olis) sla+ery. lt)oug) t)e Sout) )ad left t)e 4nion /ri%arily to conser+e sla+ery3 it realised t)at a continued struggle (ould furt)er under%ine race relations. Most &lack sla+es (elco%ed t)e 4nion ar%ies3 and %any (illingly enlisted in t)e in+ading ar%ies. continued (ar3 es/ecially one relying /ri%arily on t)e acti+ities of guerrillas3 could only /it 4nion troo/s aided &y sla+es against t)e Sout)erners and destroy any se%&lance of t)e social organisation of t)e races t)at sla+ery )ad e-e%/lified. 0)e raiding forces3 es/ecially S)er%ans ar%y3 also s)o(ed t)e $onfederates3 as general S)er%an )ad antici/ated3 t)at t)ey )ad lost t)eir territorial integrity and t)e de/redations of t)e raiders )ad %uc) of t)e effect of t)e traditional raid to e-tract /olitical concessions. Suc) a strategy )ad failed to defeat 'rance in t)e "undred :ears !ar3 &ut it )ad )el/ed (ring concessions fro% t)e 9ing of 'rance. It /ro+ed effecti+e also in t)e %erican $i+il !ar3 de/ressing t)e %orale of t)e sout)ern /o/ulace. So t)e $onfederates surrendered. Sla+ery3 ()ic) al%ost alone )ad se/arated t)e t(o sections3 /ro+ed an inade.uate &asis for continuing a costly struggle against an ene%y not so distinct e-ce/t in its attitude to(ard sla+ery. 0)us t)e Nort) )ad faced an al%ost i%/ossi&le %ilitary assign%ent in su&duing suc) a )uge and )ostile country3 a task not %uc) easier t)an t)at encountered earlier &y t)e Britis) in t)e %erican Re+olution. By directing raids against factories and foundries as (ell as railroads3 t)e 4nion )ad ado/ted a %ost effecti+e logistic strategy3 ()ic) relie+ed its forces of t)e need to occu/y t)e country3 an insu/era&le o&stacle to t)eir original /ersisting3 logistic strategy. Suc) a raiding strategy (ould )a+e co%/elled t)e dis&and%ent of t)e Sout)s /rinci/al ar%ies &ut (ould )a+e left t)e% in e-istence as s%aller forces dis/ersed t)roug)out t)e $onfederacy. 0)e 4nion (ould not )a+e controlled %ore territory t)an it occu/ied and could still )a+e faced a situation co%/ara&le to t)at of t)e 'renc) in S/ain3 %itigated3 )o(e+er3 &y t)e lack of need to kee/ large forces concentrated to o//ose )ostile ar%ies. But t)e Sout)s a&andon%ent of t)e (ar /re+ented t)e (orking out of t)ese %ilitary conse.uences. 0)e 4nions successful ca%/aigns and its raids in t)e end )ad an effect %ore co%/ara&le to le-anders +ictories o+er 1arius3 ()ic) ga+e )i% t)e Persian 2%/ire3 t)an to "anni&als %ilitary triu%/)s o+er t)e Ro%ans3 ()ic) failed of decisi+e result due to Ro%an /olitical strengt). Back

(wo nstances of Combating the )aiding Strategy of Guerrilla Warfare

In t)e nineteent) century3 in &uilding and retaining t)eir (orld(ide e%/ires3 !estern nations foug)t %any (ars against o//onents ()o utilised a raiding strategy or guerrilla resistance. t t)e end of t)e century t)ey conducted t(o of t)ese against /eo/le 2uro/ean in culture. In an effort to retain control of its old colony of $u&a3 S/ain (aged suc) a (ar against insurgents ()o (ere S/anis) in language and culture3 and t)e 4nited 9ingdo% faced guerrilla resistance in sout)ern frica after it )ad defeated (it) a /ersisting strategy t)e t(o re/u&lics t)ere esta&lis)ed &y Boers3 ?2=

descendants of 1utc) settlers. Bot) countries conducted t)eir o/erations against o//onents ()o e%/loyed a guerrilla (arfare of raids against (eak detac)%ents of t)e occu/ying forces and also directed t)eir raids at railroads and ot)er logistic o&Decti+es. S/ain and t)e 4nited 9ingdo% &ot) follo(ed t)e strategy of i%/eding t)e %o+e%ent of guerrillas. 0)e S/aniards di+ided $u&a into t)ree seg%ents &y &uilding t(o lines of forts and &lock)ouses. 0)ey t)en /lanned successi+e concentrations in eac) geogra/)ical co%/art%ent to attain t)e ratio of force to s/ace necessary to o+er()el% t)e guerrillas. Many difficulties3 including co%/lications (it) t)e 4nited States t)at ulti%ately led to (ar3 /re+ented t)e co%/letion of t)is strategy. 0)e Britis)3 in a far larger country &ut one c)aracterised &y o/en gra6ing land3 follo(ed t)e sa%e a//roac) on a %ore a%&itious scale3 like(ise an e-tension of le-anders %et)od in Bactria and Sogdiana and co%/ara&le to !illia% t)e $on.uerors in 2ngland. 0)e Boers3 skilled3 acti+e ad+ersaries3 al%ost in+aria&ly %ounted3 &roke Britis) rail(ay lines 22<> ti%es in t(el+e %ont)s. 0)ey conducted %any ot)er raids3 including one3 during t)e early3 /ersisting /)ase of t)e conflict3 in ()ic) t)ey ca/tured and )eld for t(enty#se+en days t)e (ater(orks of t)e %aDor city of Bloe%fonteine. 0)is /o(erful a//lication of logistic strategy forced t)e Britis) troo/s in t)e city to resort to /olluted (ells3 ()ic) constituted a %aDor factor in t)e su&se.uent dou&ling of t)e deat) rate fro% ty/)oid fe+er. 0)e Britis) res/onded &y &uilding across t)e country %any lines of &ar&ed (ire3 guarded &y &lock)ouses /laced close enoug) toget)er to kee/ t)e (ire lines under rifle fire. 0)ey facilitated t)is e-tensi+e /rogra% &y /roducing %o+a&le iron &lock)ouses3 ()ic) a cre( of t(o or t)ree# do6en soldiers and la&ourers could erect in a day. 4lti%ately t)e Britis) used @3>>> &lock)ouses to co+er a net(ork of <3>>> %iles of &ar&ed (ire lines3 ()ic) su&di+ided t)e e-tensi+e country into %any co%/art%ents. 0)ese lines effecti+ely in)i&ited t)e %o+e%ents of t)e raiders and %ade easier t)e (ork of %o&ile colu%ns t)at s(e/t t)e co%/art%ents3 ca/turing %any guerrillas. 0)e a%/le Britis) resources co%&ined (it) t)e conciliatory /olitical offer %ade to t)e Boers ena&led t)e% to o+erco%e adroit and deter%ined resistance in t(o years. In addition3 t)e Britis) and S/anis) used a logistic strategy against t)eir o//onents3 ()ose &ase area lay in t)e country t)ese /o(ers soug)t to su&due. 0)ey &urned far%s and cro/s and dro+e off cattle3 acting %uc) as !illia% t)e $on.ueror in )is de+astation of t)e nort) of 2ngland. But3 unlike !illia%3 eac) nation cou/led t)is (it) a /olicy of &ringing friendly ci+ilians3 %ainly (o%en and c)ildren3 into ca%/s and /ro+iding t)e% (it) food and )ousing. lt)oug) t)e ca%/s lacked an ade.uate su//ly of eit)er and recei+ed %uc) )u%anitarian criticis%3 t)is /ractice did /rotect %any ci+ilians fro% t)e full rigor of t)e logistic strategy and )ad t)e /olitical ad+antage of /artially s)ielding t)e su//orters of t)e S/aniards and Britis) fro% t)e effects of t)e /rogra% of terror i%/licit in suc) a logistic strategy. Back

-uro'ean Wea'ons. #rmies. and +octrine on the -ve of World War

'ro% t)e end of t)e 'ranco#Prussian !ar until 1@14 (ea/ons i%/ro+ed furt)er. 0)e &reec)loader &eca%e a %aga6ine rifle (it) ()ic)3 &y (orking a )andle3 t)e rifle%an could feed &ullets into t)e c)a%&er fro% a %aga6ine )olding fro% fi+e to ten rounds. trained soldier could fire si-teen ai%ed s)ots /er %inute fro% a rifle e.ui//ed (it) so%e +ersions of an eig)t#s)ot %aga6ine. In 1BB? Britis) in+estors &acked "ira% Ma-i%3 an %erican electrical engineer ()o in+ented an auto%atic gun. 0)e Ma-i%3 or %ac)ine gun3 used t)e recoil caused &y t)e first s)ot to reload and re#cock t)e gun3 allo(ing continuous firing at t)e rate of =>> s)ots /er %inute. clot) &elt carried t)e a%%unition3 and t)e gun )ad suc) a ca/a&ility for sustained fire t)at Ma-i%s %odel )ad a (ater Dacket to kee/ t)e &arrel cool. Intrinsically a lig)t and )andy (ea/on3 t)e %ac)ine gun (it) its (ater Dacket and e-tensi+e a%%unition su//ly (as a %o&ile rat)er t)an a /orta&le (ea/on3 and

?2C

ar%ies assigned only a fe( of t)ese for%ida&le guns to eac) &attalion3 as t)ey )ad t)e old &attalion guns. By t)e end of t)e century artillery )ad undergone a transfor%ation. 0)e steel &reec)loading cannon of t)e 'ranco#Prussian !ar )ad lacked a recoil %ec)anis%3 ()ic) %eant t)at t)e gun &ounced ()en fired and re.uired re#ai%ing after eac) s)ot. In addition3 t)e cannon carried no useful s)ield &ecause t)e gunners )ad to stand clear ()en t)e gun fired. By t)e end of t)e century cannon )ad a recoil %ec)anis% &ased on co%/ressing a s/ring or a gas3 and cus)ioning (it) a )ydraulic s)ock a&sor&er. 0)is ke/t t)e gun carriage steady &y allo(ing t)e &arrel to %o+e3 t)us dissi/ating t)e energy of firing and /er%itting re/eated s)ots (it)out re#ai%ing7 gunners could no( re%ain &e)ind a %otionless s)ield. 0)e ty/ical field gun )ad a &ore of t)ree inc)es and in a %inute could fire si-3 and in an e%ergency as %any as t(enty3 s)ells (eig)ing fifteen to eig)teen /ounds to a range as far as C3<>> yards. In addition to s)ells t)at e-/loded on contact3 guns fired s)ra/nel s)ells (it) /recise and relia&le fuses t)at /er%itted t)e s)ells to e-/lode o+er distant &odies of troo/s3 s)o(ering t)e% (it) s%all &ullets. ,ike t)e rifle and %ac)ine gun3 artillery )ad a s%okeless e-/losi+e t)at i%/ro+ed &attlefield +isi&ility and )el/ed to )ide t)e location of t)e (ea/on firing.

Ma*im"s Gun

Back

lt)oug) t)is increase in fire/o(er s)ould )a+e furt)er aug%ented t)e /o(er of t)e tactical defence3 soldiers tended to t)ink ot)er(ise. So%e &elie+ed t)at t)e fire/o(er of a larger nu%&er of attackers could o+er()el% t)e defenders3 o+erlooking Moltkes reaffir%ation of t)e defenders ad+antage in a fire#fig)t. 5t)ers sa( t)at since t)e defence (ould re.uire fe(er %en3 ar%ies could concentrate %ore troo/s for t)e decisi+e turning %o+e%ent t)at )ad /layed suc) a /ro%inent role in 1BC>. 0)e greater range and rate of fire of t)e ne( (ea/ons (ould3 t)ey &elie+ed3 %ake en+elo/%ent %ore effecti+e as con+erging fires o+er()el%ed t)e defenders. 'e(3 if any3 reasoned t)at3 if t)e strengt) of t)e defence ena&led t)e concentration of %ore for t)e turning %o+e%ent3 ar%ies needed fe(er %en to delay or )alt t)e turning force. 0)is defecti+e reasoning contri&uted significantly to t)e e%ergence in 2uro/ean ar%ies of a &elief in t)e offensi+e. realisation of t)e i%/ortance of %orale also )ad a %aDor role in t)is cult. "istorical e-a%/les a&ounded of nu%erically su/erior3 (ell#ar%ed troo/s defeated &y soldiers (it) confidence in t)eir a&ility to (in and /ress )o%e t)eir attack. l%ost (it)out casualties3 Ro%an +eterans )ad defeated larger ar%ies t)at lacked t)e skill and confidence of t)e legionnaires. But %any carried t)is +alua&le insig)t to an e-tre%e ()olly un(arranted in +ie( of t)e increase in fire/o(er.

?2B

Naturally eac) nation &elie+ed its soldiers /ossessed t)e &etter %orale and deter%ination needed to o+er%atc) its o//onents3 an outlook fostered &y t)e /re+ailing nationalistic3 racist3 1ar(inian3 and so%e()at ro%antic cli%ate of o/inion. So%e t)oug)tful officers and ci+ilians dissented and /ointed to t)e /o(er t)e defence e-)i&ited in t)e Boer and Russo#8a/anese (ars. But t)e offensi+e doctrine re/resented t)e do%inant culture3 and one e-tre%e de+otee of t)is sc)ool e+en dis/araged using interior lines to concentrate larger nu%&ers3 &elie+ing t)at Jt)e days of eig)teent) century tricks and stratage%s are /ast and done (it)... 0)e essence of successful leaders)i/ in t)e future (ill &e ... a ra/id and sustained ad+ance3 ()ic) (ill o+errun all o//osition &y its +ery %o%entu%.L 0)is state%ent )as a %edie+al fla+our and certainly dis/arages t)e conce/t of (inning (it) t)e least effort. 8ust as t)e arc)ety/ical %edie+al co%%ander3 conditioned &y Dousts3 tourna%ents3 and t)e culture of c)i+alry3 tended to see &attle in ter%s of t)e frontal c)arge &y ca+alry3 so %any early t(entiet)#century soldiers3 led astray &y t)e +alid and i%/ortant e%/)asis on %orale3 &y a %isinter/retation of t)e effects of aug%ented fire/o(er3 and &y t)e cli%ate of o/inion3 ca%e to t)e i%/licit assu%/tion t)at t)e tactical offensi+e )ad greater strengt) t)an t)e defensi+e ()en &ot) contestants e%/loyed t)e sa%e (ea/on syste%s. 0)oug) not ignoring t)e eig)teent)#century stratage%s of turning %o+e%ents and concentration on interior lines3 &y 1@14 ar%ies /lanned to assu%e t)e offensi+e in (ar. lt)oug) ar%ies deri+ed t)eir tactics fro% t)e e-/erience of t)e 'ranco#Prussian !ar3 a lack of realis% soon e%erged. Since co%%anders could not control an attack carried out &y skir%is)ers3 t)ey )ad a %oti+e to continue a role for &attalion and co%/any colu%ns. Nostalgia for t)e %ore dra%atic attacks of t)e /ast also affected tactical t)inking3 as did a &elief in t)e near in+inci&ility of a force con+inced of its do%inance and endo(ed (it) a &etter (ill to (in. !riters e+en %entioned s)ock action and infantry%en using &ayonets against eac) ot)er. So offensi+e tactics co%&ined3 in an unsatisfactory &lend3 t)e realis% of t)e 'ranco#Prussian !ar (it) older ideas. Not)ing &etter illustrates t)e delusi+e ele%ent in tactical t)inking t)an t)e continuation of large forces of ca+alry dedicated to s)ock action on t)e &attlefield. s late as 1@14 t)e *er%ans e+en ar%ed t)eir ca+alry (it) lances. r%ies3 recognising t)e i%/ortance of artillery and t)e effecti+eness of t)e /erfected s)ra/nel3 did3 )o(e+er3 /lan an artillery &o%&ard%ent to /re/are for t)e attack. 0)e i%/ro+e%ent in t)e rail(ay syste% and t)e e-tension of its lines affected logistics so%e()at &y increasing t)e rail(ays i%/act on %o&ilisation and %aking t)e su//ly of enor%ous ar%ies /ossi&le. lt)oug) t)e de+elo/%ent of t)e %otor truck +ery %uc) raised t)e efficiency of road trans/ort3 ar%ies %ade little use of t)is e-/ensi+e3 still relati+ely scarce3 and unrelia&le +e)icle and continued to de/end on t)e )orse. 0)e &icycle found so%e use in ine-/ensi+ely aug%enting t)e strategic %o&ility of infantry. 0)e (ireless telegra/) %ade /ossi&le significantly &etter co%%unications &et(een t)e units of dis/ersed ar%ies3 and t)e tele/)one i%/ro+ed t)e utility of (ire co%%unications. ll ar%ies )ad so%e dirigi&le airs)i/s and a fe( of t)e /ri%iti+e air/lanes t)en a+aila&le3 t)oug) not enoug) to carry out reconnaissance on t)e &road fronts en+isioned. 0)e ac)ie+e%ents of t)e Prussian staff led all ar%ies to ado/t a si%ilar syste%. 0)oug) +arying in t)eir effecti+eness3 all staffs could %anage t)e %o+e%ents of large nu%&ers of %en and coordinate t)eir in+ol+e%ent in co%&at. 5t)er nations soon a//ro/riated t)e Prussian %an/o(er syste% of a cadre of /rofessionals ()o trained conscri/ts t)at3 toget)er (it) t)eir reser+es3 constituted t)e acti+e ar%y. ll created %ilitia for%ations of trained %en %odelled so%e()at on t)e Prussian ,and(e)r. 0)e details +aried greatly3 &ut all countries e-ce/t Britain e%ulated t)is successful and ine-/ensi+e syste% of )a+ing large3 t)oroug)ly trained3 and /rofessionally led ar%ies ready for (ar. By 1@14 t)e t)ree /rinci/al continental ar%ies )ad enor%ous infantry forces3 di+ided into di+isions of t(el+e &attalions eac) Gsee &elo(H.

?2@

0)e *er%an and 'renc) ar%ies could %o&ilise fully and concentrate in t)ree (eeks7 t)e Russians3 (it) a far larger country3 re.uired %ore ti%e. 0)e 'renc) forces3 for e-a%/le3 )ad3 in addition to infantry (ea/ons and )orses for traction3 a//ro-i%ately 43<>> artillery /ieces3 231>> %ac)ine guns3 1@3>>> %otor +e)icles3 and 2>> air/lanes. 0)e &udgetary cost of t)e co%/letely %o&ilised forces a%ounted3 in 2>>2 2nglis) /ounds3 to a little o+er VC>> /er %an /er year and a&out VB> /er ca/ita /er year for t)e 4> %illion /eo/le in 'rance. 0)e ne( %an/o(er syste% created a )uge ar%y (it) un/recedented fire/o(er for a +ery %odest cost. 0)is lo( cost is all t)e %ore i%/ressi+e in +ie( of t)e ten ca+alry di+isions3 ()ic) like t)e ot)er /o(ers3 'rance ke/t at al%ost full strengt).

The Strength of the German5 #ren(h and ,ussian Armies in 7>7? Back

Re+olutions in industry3 agriculture3 and co%%erce %ade t)ese large forces realistic. 0)e gro(t) of t)e %arket3 %ade /ossi&le &y railroads3 stea%s)i/s3 and i%/ro+ed )ig)(ays3 /er%itted t)e efficiency of an e-/anded di+ision of la&our3 a /roducti+ity i%/ortantly aided &y suc) de+elo/%ents as stea% /o(er3 electricity3 and i%/ro+ed %etal (orking. Scientific and %ec)anised agriculture increased out/ut and t)e efficiency of la&our in food /roduction. !)ereas %aintaining ? /ercent of t)e /o/ulation under ar%s )ad ta-ed t)e resources of !estern 2uro/ean nations at t)e end of t)e eig)teent) century3 increased /roducti+ity and &etter financial institutions %ade 1> /ercent under ar%s a readily attaina&le goal in 1@14. 0)e &road de/loy%ent of ar%ies3 de+elo/ed in t)e Na/oleonic (ars and /racticed (it) suc) dra%atic success &y Moltke3 continued as t)e standard a//roac). Strategic +ie(/oints c)anged little3 &ut &y 1@14 generals &elie+ed t)at any (ar (ould end .uickly in a fe( decisi+e ca%/aigns. 0)e fait) in t)e /o(er of t)e offensi+e reinforced t)e /recedents set &y t)e s)ort (ars of t)e %iddle of t)e nineteent) century. "ad t)ey ade.uately e-a%ined t)e /rotracted %erican $i+il !ar3 2uro/ean %ilitary leaders %ig)t )a+e dra(n a different conclusion3 &ut %ost tended to dis%iss t)at (ar as a struggle &et(een a%ateurs in ()ic) a .uick decision (as &eyond t)e ca/acity of t)e ine/t co%&atants. 0)e results of 2uro/ean %ilitary t)inking &et(een 1BC1 and 1@14 contrast %arkedly (it) t)ose of t)e rationalist en+iron%ent of t)e eig)teent) century3 ()ic) )ad /roduced t)e ideas of *ui&ert and Bourcet and t)e 'renc) regulations of 1C@1. Many soldiers see%ed to )a+e o+erlooked t)e /rinci/le of (inning (it) t)e least effort and to )a+e forgotten t)e traditional ascendancy of t)e tactical defensi+e in co%&at &et(een si%ilar (ea/on syste%s. But t)e (ar t)at &egan in 1@14 (ould e-)i&it t)at neit)er t)e ne( (ea/ons nor t)e e%/)asis on %orale )ad a&rogated t)e lessons of t)e /ast. Back

(he )evolution in Naval Materiel and ts /se in the )usso-3a'anese War

0)e re+olution of stea%3 electricity3 and i%/ro+ed %etallurgy and %anufacturing affected trans/ortation and (arfare at sea as %uc) as it did logistics and (ea/ons on land. In fact3 t)e (ireless telegra/) )ad a greater i%/act at sea &ecause it ga+e s)i/s a long#distance %eans of co%%unication (it) t)e land and eac) ot)er t)at t)ey )ad )it)erto lacked. ??>

By t)e 1B?>s sailing s)i/s &egan to carry stea% engines3 first using side ()eels for au-iliary /ro/ulsion and gradually ado/ting t)e %ore efficient scre( /ro/eller. s stea% /ressures increased and engines &eca%e %ore efficient3 s)i/s could con+eniently carry enoug) fuel to rely entirely on stea% /ro/ulsion. By t)e t(entiet) century stea%ers )ad su/erseded sailing +essels for %o+ing %ost cargo and3 ()ere s/eed )ad %ore i%/ortance3 entirely in carrying /assengers. Stea%ers attained greater s/eed not only &ecause of t)e consistency (it) ()ic) t)ey could %aintain a gi+en s/eed &ut also &ecause of t)eir routes. Rat)er t)an taking detours to a+ail t)e%sel+es of fa+oura&le /re+ailing (inds or currents in t)e sea3 stea% +essels used t)e %ost direct route. 0)e increased s/eed of t)e stea%er as (ell as its %ore direct route and certainty of o/eration so aug%ented t)e celerity of t)e %o+e%ent of s)i/s and fleets t)at t)e re+olution in /ro/ulsion %arkedly aug%ented t)e ratio of na+al force to s/ace. !)en cou/led (it) t)e (ireless3 ()ic) transfor%ed co%%unication a%ong s)i/s at sea and facilitated scouting and t)e %o+e%ent and concentration of forces3 t)e alteration in t)e ratio of force to s/ace ga+e t)e do%inant sea /o(er far greater ad+antages t)an it )ad &efore. 0)is c)ange )ad an effect fully co%/ara&le to t)at (roug)t &y t)e transition fro% galleys to sail. It %eant t)at (ireless#e.ui//ed scouts needed only to o&ser+e a &lockaded )ar&our3 confident t)at t)ey could continue to o&ser+e a fleet atte%/ting to elude t)e &lockaders and use t)eir (ireless to call in t)eir &ig s)i/s to engage t)e s.uadron atte%/ting esca/e. 5n t)e ot)er )and3 stea% co%/licated t)e /ro&le%s of su//ly3 ()ic)3 in turn3 affected t)e ratio of force to s/ace in a (ay contrary to t)at of stea% /ro/ulsion itself. 1e/endence on a &ase for fre.uent re/lenis)%ent of coal %eant t)at a )ig)er /ro/ortion of a fleet (ould )a+e to de+ote itself to going to and fro% a su//ly /ort for fuel. 2+en t)oug) it could do t)is far %ore ra/idly t)an a sailing s)i/3 t)e stea%er o&+iously differed %arkedly in its de/endence on a &ase front a sailing s)i/3 ()ic) carried no fuel at all. 0)is3 in turn3 reduced t)e ratio of force to s/ace &y di%inis)ing t)e nu%&er of s)i/s on a /articular station. Bases t)us &eca%e far %ore critical &ecause o/erations +ery distant fro% a friendly /ort (ould far %ore drastically di%inis) t)e force of t)e do%inant /o(er t)an (ould )a+e &een t)e case in t)e age of sail. 0)e sa%e factors also in)i&ited co%%erce raiders3 %aking t)eir esca/e to t)e ocean %ore difficult and3 as %erc)ant s)i/s gradually e.ui//ed t)e%sel+es (it) (ireless3 ensuring t)at t)e cruisers of t)e /o(er (it) co%%and of t)e sea (ould learn front t)e last co%%unication of t)e +icti%s ()ere to searc) for t)e co%%erce raider. 'urt)er3 t)e co%%erce raider itself (ould find t)at stea% )ad de/ri+ed it of t)at inde/endence of &ases and su//lies t)at sailing s)i/s )ad enDoyed. 0)is not only %ade it far %ore de/endent on friendly /orts3 &ut /ro+ided anot)er o//ortunity for t)e do%inant /o(er to learn of its ()erea&outs. Iron and t)en steel /ro+ided anot)er source of en)anced efficiency in (ater trans/ort. Iron s)i/s (eig)ed less for a gi+en degree of strengt) and /ro+ed %ore dura&le and often less e-/ensi+e to re/air. Na+al arc)itects e+en %ade sailing +essels of iron3 ca/italising on one for% of efficiency ()ile designing a s)i/ to carry a cargo for ()ic) a slo( /assage (it) (ind for fuel constituted t)e least cost co%&ination. Better %ec)anical a//liances for setting t)e sails reduced cre( si6es and )el/ed to kee/ sailing s)i/s co%/etiti+e for so%e ser+ices. Railroads ena&led land trans/ortation to close t)e ga/ in costs &et(een land and (ater trans/ortation3 &ut (ater retained a su&stantial ad+antage. ll of t)ese c)anges affected (ars)i/s. But )ardly )ad na+ies added au-iliary stea% engines to t)eir s)i/s of t)e line and frigates ()en ad+ances in guns re+olutionised na+al arc)itecture. 0)e rifled cannon and t)e de+elo/%ent of an e-/losi+e s)ell %eant t)at t)e /roDectile could /ierce a (ooden s)i/ and &lo( u/ inside. 0)is3 toget)er (it) t)e longer range and %ore accurate fire of artillery3 %ade t)e (ars)i/s of t)e /ast too +ulnera&le. !ooden sides3 t)icker at t)e (aterline3 no longer sufficed to /rotect +essels ade.uately. In 1B<@ t)e 'renc) launc)ed a s)i/ (it) its (aterline and /art of t)e sides /rotected &y (roug)t#iron ar%our /late al%ost fi+e inc)es t)ick. 2-ce/t for

??1

t)is %etal ar%our and stea% engines t)at ga+e )er a s/eed of t)irteen knots3 s)e differed little front /re+ious +essels. 0)e Britis) re/lied t)e ne-t year (it) a si%ilar s)i/3 &ut &uilt entirely of iron. Bot) )ad ar%our ade.uate to resist any gun t)en a+aila&le3 &ut t)e ordnance designers soon /roduced %ore /o(erful guns and na+al arc)itects t)en fitted t)icker ar%our. 0)ere follo(ed t)ree decades of e-/eri%entation3 (it) ar%oured (ars)i/s %ounting increasingly /o(erful guns and t)icker ar%our. 1esigners i%/ro+ed t)e .uality of ar%our first &y &acking a )ard3 &rittle /late (it) one of softer3 toug)er (roug)t iron and t)en &y &onding a )ard /late to a resilient steel /late. 'inally3 &y t)e end of t)e century3 steel%akers )ad /roduced single /lates3 )ardened on t)e face &ut gradually containing less car&on until its &ack consisted of resilient steel t)at resisted cracking. r%our /late for s)i/s c)anged little t)ereafter. 0)e &reec)#loading cannon ca%e to do%inate na+al ordnance3 ne( &reec) designs /er%itting ra/id o/ening and closing and a gas#tig)t seal. Slo(er#&urning e-/losi+es %ade longer &arrels %ore useful3 t)ese e-/losi+es gi+ing to t)e /roDectile a continuous i%/etus at a relati+ely constant /ressure. Since raising +elocity contri&uted %ore to /iercing ar%our t)an raising /roDectile (eig)t3 guns &eca%e s%aller in &ore &ut (it) a longer tu&e3 t)us &oosting t)e s)ells +elocity and ca/acity for /enetration. 0)e (ell#te%/ered steel /roDectiles3 designed to &reak t)roug) ar%our3 carried a relati+ely s%all3 &ut still .uite for%ida&le3 &ursting c)arge3 fused to e-/lode after /iercing ar%our. 1esigners %ounted &ig guns in turrets3 or t)eir e.ui+alent3 t)e stationary &ar&ettes (it)in ()ic)3 co+ered &y an ar%oured )ood3 t)e gun %o+ed. 0)ese could rotate to fire o+er an arc of as %uc) as a full circle. Battles)i/s tended to carry t)eir s%aller guns in case%ates on eit)er side. By t)e end of t)e century3 =#inc) guns3 firing 1>>#/ound s)ells3 and t)ose of s%aller &ore could fire si- or %ore s)ots a %inute3 larger guns (it) )ea+y a%%unition and cu%&erso%e e-/losi+e c)arges firing as slo(ly as one round a %inute. By t)is ti%e t)e ne( s)i/s of t)e line3 called &attles)i/s3 dis/laced fro% 1>3>>> to 1<3>>> tons3 a&out fi+e ti%es t)e dis/lace%ent of t)e (ooden s)i/s of a century earlier. Britis) +essels carried four 12#inc) guns3 firing BC>#/ound s)ells. 0)e &attles)i/s %ounted t)ese in /airs in a &ar&ette at t)e &o( and t)e stern3 ena&ling t(o guns to fire a)ead or astern3 and four on eit)er &roadside. 0)ese s)i/s %ounted t(el+e =#inc) guns in case%ates3 si- on eac) side. r%our as t)ick as t(el+e inc)es /rotected t)e &ig guns3 si- inc)es t)e s%aller3 and t)e (aterline )ad as %uc) as t(el+e inc)es (it) a second slo/ing /late &e)ind3 an inc) or %ore t)ick. 0)is t)ick side ar%our did not e-tend to t)e ends3 &ut (as o+er t)e area &et(een t)e &ar&ettes ()ere it /rotected t)e %aga6ines and engines. 0)e &attles)i/s )ad a s/eed of eig)teen knots and filled t)e role of t)e s)i/s of t)e line. 0)eir design still re.uired fig)ting &roadside to &roadside3 and t)e increased range of t)e guns o&+iated t)e /er/endicular a//roac) used &y Nelson so effecti+ely at t)e Battle of 0rafalgar. If an attacking fleet a//roac)ed a defending line /er/endicularly in line a&reast3 it could only use )alf of its guns. If t)e defenders &egan firing at =3>>> yards3 t)e attackers %ust recei+e ten &roadsides3 re/lying (it) only )alf as %any guns. d%irals realised t)at in s/ite of t)e ra%s t)at still e.ui//ed all s)i/s3 t)ey %ust return to t)e co%&at in /arallel lines. 0)e a&ility of &ar&ette or turret#%ounted guns to fire +ery o&li.uely (ould ena&le %ost3 if not all3 guns on s)i/s in a line to &ear on )ostile s)i/s %aking a /er/endicular a//roac) and follo(ing one anot)er. Not only (ould t)is a&ility to concentrate fire at long range rule out suc) an attack3 &ut it %ade ad%irals )o/e for an o//ortunity to lead t)eir +essels across t)e )ead of an ene%y line ()ere t)ey could concentrate t)e fire of %any s)i/s on t)e ene%ys lead &attles)i/s. !)ereas in t)e days of (ooden sailing s)i/s t)e frigates and s%aller s)i/s )ad &een little %ore t)an s%aller re/licas of t)e s)i/s of t)e line3 t)e s%aller +essels in t)e age of stea% and steel3 called cruisers3 carried no ar%our &eyond a deck t)at cur+ed do(n at t)e sides &elo( t)e (aterline to gi+e

??2

so%e /rotection to engines and %aga6ines. Instead of )a+ing ar%oured &ar&ettes3 cruisers /laced t)eir guns on /edestal %ounts3 often (it) s)ields3 on t)e deck. !it) s/eeds of t(enty#one to t(enty#t)ree knots3 cruisers ranged in si6e fro% 23>>> tons to al%ost t)at of &attles)i/s. *uns of four to si- inc)es /redo%inated. t t)e turn of t)e century an inter%ediate ty/e of (ars)i/ &eca%e i%/ortant. 0)e ar%oured cruiser ranged in si6e fro% B3>>> tons u/ to t)at of t)e larger &attles)i/s and3 (it) ar%our a&out )alf as t)ick as t)at of &attles)i/s3 could rely on resisting t)e s)ells of cruisers. !it) guns as large as ten inc)es3 %ounted like t)ose on &attles)i/s in &ar&ettes and case%ates3 it could count on s%as)ing ot)er cruisers. By %aking t)ese large s)i/s relati+ely narro( and gi+ing t)e% great /o(er3 t)e designers )ad also gi+en t)e% t)e s/eed of s%aller cruisers. S%aller t)an cruisers3 tor/edo &oats de/ended on )ig) s/eed and t)e tor/edo. 1e+elo/ed in t)e latter /art of t)e nineteent) century3 t)e tor/edo really a%ounted to a tiny &oat a&out t(enty feet long t)at3 using co%/ressed air or stea%3 ran under (ater at a /redeter%ined de/t). i%ed at s)i/s as %uc) as a %ile a(ay and tra+elling at a s/eed of t(enty#fi+e or %ore knots3 it struck t)e s)i/ &elo( t)e (aterline3 detonating a su&stantial e-/losi+e c)arge. Because it struck t)e +ulnera&le under(ater /art of a +essel3 it (as so dangerous t)at in t)e 1BB>s t)e 'renc) na+y actually considered de/ending /ri%arily on tor/edo &oats. 'or t)e first ti%e in )istory a s%all s)i/ could attack t)e largest (it) so%e /ros/ect of success. But t)ese &oats ga+e rise to tor/edo &oat destroyers3 e.ually fast &ut larger and %ounting guns to destroy tor/edo &oats. By t)e end of t)e century tor/edo &oat destroyers3 &y t)en called si%/ly destroyers3 )ad %erged (it) tor/edo &oats3 gro(n in si6e3 and3 s%aller and faster &ut less sea(ort)y t)an cruisers3 )ad in /art Doined cruisers as scouts for t)e fleet and /rotectors of trade routes. But all s)i/s3 including &attles)i/s3 carried tor/edoes. 0)is entire re+olution in na+al arc)itecture and t)e transition front sail to stea% and (ood to steel )ad occurred (it)out any of t)e %aDor forces of ne( s)i/s engaging eac) ot)er in &attle. 0)e Russo#8a/anese !ar of 1@>4 and 1@>< sa( t)ese %odern fleets in &attle and e-)i&ited a decisi+e influence for interior lines of o/erations at sea ()en 8a/ans strategic /osition ena&led it to defeat t)e stronger Russian &attles)i/ force. t t)e &eginning of t)e conflict t)e Russians )ad3 in addition to se+eral &attles)i/s confined to t)e Black Sea3 fourteen %odern ca/ital s)i/s3 %ounting 1> or 12#inc) guns. 0)eir greater nu%&er of (ell#designed and ade.uately ar%oured +essels ga+e t)e Russians a decisi+e su/eriority o+er t)e 8a/anese3 ()o )ad only si- s)i/s3 alt)oug) all (ere ne(er3 faster3 and larger t)an t)e Russian ones and all (ere ar%ed (it) 12#inc) guns. 0)e 8a/anese &egan t)e (ar ()en t)e Russians )ad se+en of t)eir &attles)i/s in t)e Baltic and se+en at Port rt)ur3 t)eir &ase in Manc)uria. 0)is dis/osition /laced t)e 8a/anese fleet s.uarely &et(een t)e t(o )al+es of t)e Russian ca/ital s)i/ force. 0)e 8a/anese i%%ediately attained na+al su/re%acy in t)e 'ar 2ast (it) a sur/rise tor/edo &oat assault against t)e Port rt)ur fleet /rior to t)e declaration of (ar in 'e&ruary 1@>4. 0)e da%age resulting fro% t)is attack te%/orarily disa&led t)ree Russian &attles)i/s and ena&led t)e 8a/anese to &lockade t)e Russian s.uadron fro% t)eir adDacent &ases in 8a/an and 9orea. &le to use t)eir central /osition to concentrate against t)e Russian siatic fleet3 t)e 8a/anese atte%/ted to destroy it &efore t)e Russian s)i/s fro% t)e Baltic could arri+e. 0)e 8a/anese ar%y /ro+ided t)e /ri%ary %eans to acco%/lis) t)is t)roug) t)e a//lication of a logistic strategy analogous to t)at e%/loyed &y le-ander against t)e Persian na+y3 &ut t)e 8a/anese co%%and of t)e sea greatly facilitated t)e ar%ys task. In addition to ensuring efficient su//ly &y (ater3 t)e 8a/anese na+y3 like t)e Persian fleet in t)e Marat)on ca%/aign3 could gi+e t)e ar%y t)e initiati+e to

???

c)oose a%ong different landing /laces (it)out any a//re)ension t)at t)e Russians could cross t)e sea to attack t)e 8a/anese in 9orea or t)eir )o%e islands. 0)e 8a/anese landed an ar%y in Manc)uria3 on Port rt)urs /eninsula3 &et(een t)at &ase and t)e %ainland3 t)us cutting it off fro% t)e %ain Russian ar%ies. 0)e 8a/anese ar%y t)en %o+ed to &esiege Port rt)ur and3 &y ca/turing it3 t)us destroy t)e Russian fleet t)ere. !)ile t)e ar%y %o+ed slo(ly against /o(erful o//osition to &esiege and ca/ture t)e Russian fleets &ase3 t)e 8a/anese &attles)i/s &o%&arded t)e )ar&our to disa&le %ore s)i/s3 soug)t to sink s)i/s of t)eir o(n in t)e )ar&ours c)annel to &ottle u/ t)e Russian flotilla3 and laid %ines outside t)e /ort. Mean()ile3 t)e &rilliant and energetic Russian co%%ander3 d%iral Makaro+3 diligently e-ercised )is s.uadron to &ring its /roficiency u/ to a le+el co%/ara&le to t)at of t)e 8a/anese7 in t)is (ay t)e ad%iral /re/ared to engage it ()en )e )ad co%/leted t)e re/air of )is da%aged s)i/s.

Theatre of O erations in the ,usso/<a anese War Back

Soon t)e Russian coast defence guns forced t)e 8a/anese to gi+e u/ t)eir &o%&ard%ents and none of t)e sunken 8a/anese s)i/s (ere a&le to &lock t)e )ar&our entrance. 0)e Russian defenders )ad again de%onstrated t)e traditional /ri%acy of coastal fortifications o+er na+al attack. 5nly t)e %inefields succeeded ()en in /ril t)e %ines sank a Russian &attles)i/7 =>> %en3 including t)e irre/lacea&le d%iral Makaro+3 (ere lost. "is successor3 t)e co%/etent &ut /essi%istic d%iral Vitgeft3 re%ained on t)e defensi+e and concentrated on e%/loying t)e fleet to aid t)e ar%y in its defence against t)e &esieging 8a/anese forces. 1ou&tless d%iral Makaro+ (ould )a+e %ade t)e %ost of t)e i%/ressi+e success of t)e Russian %ine (arfare /rogra% t)at on May 1<t) sank t(o 8a/anese &attles)i/s (it)in a fe( %inutes of eac) ot)er. !it) a t)ird of t)e 8a/anese ca/ital s)i/s sunk and t)e t)ree da%aged Russian s)i/s re/aired3 t)e Russians )ad an ad+antage of si- to four in t)ese s)i/s of t)e line. But d%iral Vitgeft did not act until ugust ()en3 (it) t)e 8a/anese ar%y closing in on Port rt)ur3 )e felt )e )ad to lea+e to sa+e t)e fleet. 0)us t)e 8a/anese ar%ys siege co%/elled t)e na+y to fig)t # Dust as sieges )ad traditionally /laced intense /ressure on a relie+ing ar%y to assu%e t)e tactical offensi+e to raise a siege. Since t)e Russian ar%ies in Manc)uria lacked t)e strengt) to relie+e Port rt)ur3 t)e Russian ad%iral )ad to risk &attle.

??4

In s/ite of t)eir inferiority in ca/ital s)i/s3 t)e 8a/anese )ad to fig)t if t)ey (ere to e-/loit t)eir interior lines to /re+ent t)e ene%y fro% concentrating its t(o fleets. 0o allo( t)e Russians to stea% nort) to t)eir secure /ort of Vladi+ostok (ould concede o+er()el%ing /re/onderance to t)e Russians3 for Vitgefts s.uadron could securely a(ait t)e arri+al of t)e Baltic fleet t)at t)e Russians (ere a&out to send to t)e 'ar 2ast. 0o refuse to fig)t (ould constitute t)e first ste/ in gi+ing co%%and of t)e sea to t)e Russians and t)e cutting off of t)e 8a/anese ar%ies in Manc)uria and 9orea fro% t)eir &ase in 8a/an. 0o try to fig)t t)e Baltic fleet later3 ()ile &lockading Vladi+ostok3 (ould )a+e /laced t)e 8a/anese in t)e sa%e situation as d%iral $alder off 'errol ()en Villeneu+e a//roac)ed fro% t)e !est Indies # and (it)out t)e ad+antage of a /re+ailing (ind t)at %ig)t kee/ sailing fleets a/art. In e-/loiting t)eir interior lines3 t)e 8a/anese ar%y and na+y )ad concentrated against t)e Port rt)ur s.uadron. 0)e ar%ys costly siege and assaults )ad done t)eir /art7 no( t)e na+y %ust dri+e t)e fleet &ack into Port rt)ur to co%/lete its destruction ()en t)e /ort finally fell. d%iral 0ogo3 t)e e-cellent 8a/anese co%%ander3 as (ell as )is go+ern%ent co%/letely understood t)e strategic situation and ()at it re.uired. 0o co%/ensate for its (eakness in ca/ital s)i/s3 t)e 8a/anese &attle line did )a+e four ar%oured cruisers. 0)ese faster3 s%aller s)i/s %ounted less /o(erful guns and )ad t)inner ar%our: t)ree %ounted four B#inc) guns and one carried t(o B#inc) guns and one 1>#inc). 0)e 8a/anese &attles)i/s eac) %ounted four 12#inc) guns3 and four of t)e Russian ca/ital s)i/s carried four 12# inc) guns and t(o )ad four 1>#inc) guns. Since t)e s)ell of t)e 1>#inc) gun (eig)ed a&out t(ice t)at of t)e B#inc) and t)at of t)e 12#inc) a&out t)ree ti%es as %uc)3 t)e guns of t)e ar%oured cruisers )ad little /ros/ect of /iercing t)e ar%our of t)e &ig s)i/s nor could t)e cruisers ar%our3 less t)an )alf as t)ick as t)at on t)e &attles)i/s3 )a+e %uc) c)ance of resisting /enetration &y t)e &ig guns of t)e o//osing fleet. 5n ugust 1>t) 1@>43 t)e Russian s.uadron ca%e out7 at 12:?> /.%. t)e )ostile fleets sig)ted eac) ot)er. fter so%e co%/licated %anoeu+res3 in ()ic) t)e greater s/eed of t)e 8a/anese s.uadron ena&led d%iral 0ogo to atte%/t to stea% across t)e +ulnera&le )ead of t)e Russian line3 t)e 8a/anese found t)e%sel+es astern of t)e Russians (it) not)ing acco%/lis)ed. d%iral 0ogo t)en o+er)auled d%iral Vitgeft on a /arallel course and at <:?> /.%. o/ened fire at B3>>> yards3 a long range for t)e guns and fire control e.ui/%ent in use and a range t)at fa+oured t)e Russians &ecause of t)eir greater nu%&er of &ig guns. fter an )our of firing t)e co%&at see%ed indecisi+e. 0)e 8a/anese )ad s)ot &etter t)an t)e Russians and3 &ecause of t)is and t)eir greater nu%&er of guns3 scored %ore )its. But t)e )ea+y ar%our of d%iral Vitgefts s)i/s /rotected t)e% ()ile t)e Russian ar%our#/iercing s)ells disa&led fi+e of t)e se+enteen )ea+y guns in t)e 8a/anese fleet. Since 8a/anese fire )ad eli%inated only four of t)e t(enty#t)ree o/erational &ig guns in t)e Russian s.uadron3 it see%ed as if Russian )ea+y gun su/eriority (as3 as ,anc)ester later t)eorised3 gradually &eco%ing cu%ulati+e. But t)en t(o 8a/anese 12#inc) s)ells )it t)e control area of t)e Russian flags)i/3 killing t)e ad%iral3 Da%%ing t)e rudder3 and causing t)e s)i/ to turn. 0)ro(n into confusion &y t)e erratic &e)a+iour of t)e flags)i/3 t)e Russian s.uadron fled3 all s)i/s reac)ing Port rt)ur e-ce/t t)e da%aged flags)i/3 ()ic) stea%ed to a $)inese /ort. d%iral 0ogo3 )a+ing dri+en t)e ene%y fleet &ack into t)e ar%s of t)e ar%y3 )ad %ade no effort to destroy t)e fleeing Russian s)i/s ot)er t)an to launc) )is tor/edo &oats in an ineffectual attack. Rat)er t)an risk )is irre/lacea&le &attles)i/s in /rolonging t)e &attle in fading lig)t3 )e (as content3 as t)e By6antine Belisarius )ad counselled3 to rea/ t)e strategic fruits and conser+e )is fleet for its ine+ita&le co%&at (it) t)e Russian s)i/s fro% t)e Baltic. d%iral 0ogo dou&tless founded )is caution on )is realisation t)at t)e 8a/anese3 de/endent on (ater co%%unications for t)eir ca%/aign on t)e continent of sia3 could lose t)e (ar at sea7 t)e Russians could not.

??<

0)e (eakened Port rt)ur s.uadron3 not +enturing to sea again3 ca%e under fire of t)e 8a/anese ar%ys siege artillery in 1ece%&er and3 in 8anuary3 along (it) t)e ar%y3 t)e &attered re%ains surrendered to t)e 8a/anese land forces. 0)e Baltic fleet did not arri+e until May 1@><3 and it (as co%/letely inade.uate to co/e (it) t)e inco%/ara&le d%iral 0ogos refitted s)i/s and t)eir (ar#seasoned officers and %en. 'urt)er3 in a %isguided effort to strengt)en t)e s.uadron3 t)e Russian ad%iralty )ad &urdened it (it) a collection of na+al anti.uities. !)en so%e of t)ese Doined u/ in t)e 'ar 2ast3 t)ey re%inded an eye(itness of Jo(ls t)at )ad &een s)ooed out of t)eir trees into t)e &linding tro/ical suns)ine.L In addition3 sending so %any s)i/s )ad stretc)ed t)e a+aila&le skilled na+al %an/o(er so t)in t)at e+en t)e &est s)i/s )ad %any untrained %en and3 conse.uently3 +ery lo( /roficiency in gunnery and ot)er co%&at duties. "a+ing learned t)e location and course of t)e Russian fleet &y (ireless fro% )is scouts3 d%iral 0ogo /laced all eig)t of )is ar%oured cruisers in )is line of &attle and %et t)e slo(#%o+ing Russians in 0sus)i%a Strait. "e t)en used )is greater s/eed to force &attle relentlessly o+er a t(o# day /eriod and totally defeated t)e Russians3 sinking si- and ca/turing t(o &attles)i/s. 0)e fig)ting took /lace at ranges of 43>>> to B3>>> yards. 0)e 8a/anese na+y e-/loited t)eir interior lines to defeat first one ene%y fleet and t)en t)e ot)er3 &ut t)e ar%y )ad /layed a crucial role in destroying t)e Port rt)ur fleet. lt)oug) t)e Russo#8a/anese !ar little affected t)e t)inking of t)e offensi+e#%inded ar%ies of 2uro/e3 t)e na+ies learned a great deal. 0)e Britis) dre( t)e %ost influential conclusion3 seeing t)e &attles of s)i/s in /arallel lines at long range as confir%ation of t)eir +ie( t)at t)ey %ust /ress t)eir efforts3 already under(ay3 to i%/ro+e gunnery. ,ong )ad na+ies de/ended on t)e gunnery %et)od3 custo%ary (it) (ooden s)i/s of t)e line3 ()ic) relied on eac) gunners ai%ing )is o(n gun. But at long range3 ()en a gunner s)ot at a %o+ing target fro% a /latfor% t)at %o+ed3 rolled3 and /itc)ed3 t)is no longer sufficed. !is)ing to fire centrally controlled sal+os and to o&ser+e and correct t)eir fire as often as /ossi&le3 t)e Britis) introduced a s)i/3 t)e 1readnoug)t3 ()ic) fired eig)t 12#inc) guns on a &roadside. 'iring )alf t)e guns in eac) sal+o3 t)e 1readnoug)t could correct its ai% t(ice as often as a +essel (it) only four guns on a &roadside or fire t(ice as %any guns in eac) &roadside. By 1@14 all na+ies )ad ado/ted t)e 1readnoug)t ty/e and used on t)eir &igger s)i/s centralised ai%ing and control of guns3 aided &y co%/uters and relying on /o(erful range finders %ounted on stout %asts. 0)ey o&ser+ed t)e fall of t)eir sal+os3 correcting t)eir ai% after eac) grou/ of s)ells landed. 0)e Britis) also concluded t)at t)e ar%a%ent of =#inc)3 ra/id#firing guns could contri&ute little to a long#range &attle &et(een ar%oured s)i/s. So on t)e 1readnoug)t t)ey eli%inated t)is ar%a%ent3 kee/ing only a nu%&er of ?#inc) guns to co/e (it) tor/edo &oats. 5t)er na+ies3 ()ic)3 like t)e Britis)3 )ad &een enlarging t)e s%aller guns carried3 generally follo(ed t)e Britis) lead in relegating t)e s%aller guns to t)e role of dealing (it) t)e tor/edo attacks of tor/edo &oats and destroyers. t t)e sa%e ti%e3 t)e Britis) introduced a ne( ty/e of s)i/3 t)e &attle cruiser. ,ike t)e 1readnoug)t3 it concentrated its fire/o(er in a larger &attery of &ig guns3 t)us attaining t)e gunnery ad+antages of %ore &ig cannon. !)ereas t)eir ar%oured cruisers )ad carried guns of =3 C.<3 and @.2#inc) guns t)e ne( &attle cruisers )ad 12#inc) guns. But since t)e Britis) did not /ro+ide t)eir &attle cruisers (it) ar%our any t)icker t)an t)at on ar%oured cruisers3 t)ey )ad s)i/s not ar%oured to resist t)e guns of co%/ara&le s)i/s. 0)is ne( s)i/ %ade ar%oured cruisers o&solescent and ga+e t)e Britis) an ad+antage as long as t)ey /ossessed t)e only &attle cruisers. But a ri+alry (it) t)e *er%ans &egan3 and t)e *er%ans /ro+ided t)eir &attle cruisers (it) ar%our al%ost as t)ick as t)at on &attles)i/s.

??=

0)e decade &efore t)e out&reak of (ar in 1@14 (itnessed a na+al race &et(een t)e Britis) and *er%ans3 in ()ic) &attles)i/s increased in si6e &y => /ercent and t)e Britis) e+entually %ounted on t)eir &attles)i/s 1<#inc) guns firing s)ells (eig)ing 13@2> /ounds. But t)is race did not include t)e su&%ersi&le tor/edo &oat or su&%arine. 0)is +essel su&%erged &y letting (ater into tanks and surfaced &y e-/elling t)is (ater (it) co%/ressed air. lt)oug) originally stressed &y 'rance &ecause of t)e t)reat su&%arines /resented to a Britis) &lockading s.uadron3 all na+ies &uilt t)e%. In accord (it) t)eir /olicy of )a+ing t)e largest na+y3 t)e Britis) )ad t)e largest nu%&er3 follo(ed &y t)e 'renc). Perfected &y 1@143 a su&%arine dis/laced se+eral )undred tons and carried a&out a do6en tor/edoes3 four of ()ic) it could fire si%ultaneously &y ai%ing t)e &oat. It also carried a gun of t)ree or four inc)es. diesel engine /ro/elled it on t)e surface at as %uc) as t(el+e knots3 and t)e &atteries3 rec)arged on t)e surface &y a diesel engine3 could /ro/el it su&%erged as fast as nine knots for a &rief /eriod. su&%arine could su&%erge to 2>> feet3 &ut to fig)t it %ust re%ain close to t)e surface to use t)e /erisco/e to see its target and ai% its tor/edoes.

The &arge .attle )ruiser H.M.S. Tiger Back

lt)oug) na+ies )ad no %eans of attacking a su&%erged su&%arine3 t)ey did not kno( )o( effecti+e a su&%arine %ig)t &e3 e+en t)oug) t)e i%/ro+ed %odels a+aila&le at t)e start of t)e (ar could cruise on t)e surface long enoug) to re%ain at sea for t(o (eeks. 0)e su&%arines tactic (as to s/ot its target ()ile cruising on t)e surface and t)en su&%erge to %ake an attack. But its slo(er s/eed once su&%erged and t)e fact t)at its tor/edo (as +isi&le fro% t)e attacked s)i/3 ()ic) could t)en c)ange its course3 %eant t)at %ost na+al aut)orities &elie+ed t)at t)e su&%arine (ould /ro+e relati+ely ineffecti+e. Back

THE A%OGEE OF THE DEFENCE+ WORLD WAR !, !'!* !(

(he German Concentration on nterior "ines and -ffort to (urn the French
1n 1@14 Britain3 'rance3 and Russia (ent to (ar (it) *er%any and ustria. ll 2uro/ean ar%ies )ad e-cellent staffs and +irtually t)e sa%e (ea/ons and doctrine. 5nly Britain retained a s%all /rofessional force (it)out significant reser+es or a large trained %ilitia. In t)e ca%/aign in 'rance and Belgiu% t)e Britis) ar%y dis/layed t)e )ig) .uality attaina&le (it) a long#ser+ice /rofessional force. But t)e Britis) ar%y (as so %inute co%/ared (it) t)e continental ones t)at ()en asked earlier ()at )e (ould do if t)e Britis) landed on )is coast3 *er%an $)ancellor Bis%arck su//osedly said t)at )e (ould )a+e t)e% arrested. 0)e Britis) )ad &ot) a /o(erful field gun and a good )o(it6er for )ig)#angle fire3 es/ecially useful in siege (arfare. 0)e 'renc) field gun3 t)e C<#%il%eter3 )ad ele%ents of su/eriority o+er t)e Britis) gun3 including &arely t(o t)irds of its (eig)t. 0)e 'renc) ar%y )ad yet to recei+e any of its /o(erful ne( 1><#%illi%eter )o(it6ers. 0)e *er%an field gun lacked t)e range and /o(er of t)e Britis) and 'renc) guns and its )o(it6ers also co%/ared unfa+oura&ly (it) t)ose of t)e allies7 still

??C

t)e *er%ans )ad t)eir 1><#%illi%eter )o(it6er in a%/le nu%&ers. 0)e ar%ies3 )o(e+er3 )ad suc) great fire/o(er t)at differences in (ea/ons %attered little. 0)eir a(eso%e fire/o(er not(it)standing3 all co%&atants /lanned to take t)e offensi+e3 &ut t)e *er%ans )ad t)e %ost so/)isticated strategy. Na%ed for its c)ief of staff ()o de+ised it3 t)e Sc)lieffen Plan e-/loited *er%anys interior lines &et(een Russia and 'rance to concentrate first against 'rance ()ile ustria )eld t)e Russians at &ay. 0)e /lan also relied on Russias +ast si6e to slo( its %o&ilisation and /re+ent t)e Russians fro% using all of t)eir forces until t)e *er%ans )ad defeated t)e 'renc) and could use t)eir railroads to re#concentrate against t)e Russians. 0o defeat t)e 'renc)3 Sc)lieffen )ad relied on a gigantic turning %o+e%ent re%iniscent of Na/oleons 4l% ca%/aign. Instead of t)e less t)an 2>>3>>> %en used &y Na/oleon3 t)e *er%ans en+isioned t)e use of fi+e ar%ies totalling one %illion %en (it) four of t)e% %arc)ing t)roug) neutral Belgiu%. 5ne (ould circle (est of Paris3 anot)er Dust to t)e east3 and t)e re%aining t)ree (ere to ad+ance to %ake a front t)at (ould %o+e (est3 t)en sout)3 and finally east. 2-/ecting3 as did Na/oleon against Mack and t)e rc)duke 'erdinand3 to attain strategic sur/rise3 t)e *er%ans intended for t)ese fi+e ar%ies to reac) t)e ene%ys rear and co%/el t)e 'renc) forces along t)e 'renc)#*er%an frontier to attack to reco+er t)eir co%%unications. 'aced (it) *er%an ar%ies and fortifications to t)e east and3 in t)eir rear3 t)e t)ree#fourt)s of t)e total of t)e a+aila&le *er%an forces t)at )ad carried out t)e turning %o+e%ent3 t)e 'renc)3 so t)e *er%an staff antici/ated3 could not esca/e. But t)e /lan )ad t(o i%/ortant difficulties. Parts3 a large3 fortified city3 /resented a serious o&stacle to t)e turning forces. In addition3 feeding t)e enor%ous nu%&er of %en and )orses in t)e turning force de/ended3 in t)e long run3 on t)e railroad ser+ice a+aila&le fro% *er%any t)roug) Belgiu% into 'rance. 2+en fertile 'rance could not su//ort suc) a +ast )orde and its %any )orses necessary to carry out t)e ca%/aign. 0)e 'renc)3 )o(e+er3 )ad t)e ad+antage in co%%anders. Moltke3 t)e si-ty#si-#year#old c)ief of t)e *er%an staff3 &ore t)e na%e of )is fa%ous uncle &ut lacked )is )ig) a&ility. careful staff officer3 )e )ad %odified t)e Sc)lieffen Plan to reduce t)e si6e of t)e turning force to one %ore consonant (it) logistic realities. 0)e 'renc) generalissi%o3 8ose/) 8offre3 a si-ty#t(o#year#old engineer officer3 )ad &een engaged in &uilding railroads in Senegal ()en t)e 'renc) occu/ied 0i%&uktu. *i+en co%%and of a s%all force to %arc) to 0i%&uktu3 MaDor 8offre /ressed on (it) ty/ical deter%ination3 e+en ()en )e learned of t)e defeat of t)e 'renc) detac)%ent t)ere and t)e deat) of its colonel. "e led )is %en nearly <>> %iles u/ t)e Niger Ri+er3 restored t)e situation3 and consolidated 'renc) control of 0i%&uktu. 0)ereafter )e recei+ed line as (ell as engineer a//oint%ents. So3 like Mars)al Ba6aine3 )e )ad seen %uc) colonial ser+ice3 &ut in e+ery ot)er res/ect t)e /ortly 8offre e%erged as t)e antit)esis of Ba6aine. 0)roug)out t)e ca%/aign )e dis/layed a decisi+eness and i%/ertur&a&ility in t)e face of ad+ersity t)at s)ould al(ays c)aracterise a co%%ander faced (it) i%/ortant res/onsi&ilities. ,ike Moltke3 8offre )ad an e-cellent staff. In less t)an t)ree (eeks t)e 'renc) and *er%an ar%ies )ad %o&ilised and concentrated3 and t)e *er%ans %o+ed t)roug) Belgiu%3 o+er()el%ing t)e tiny Belgian /rofessional ar%y and o+erco%ing fortifications (it) ?><# and 42>#%illi%eter siege %ortars. 0)e 'renc) co%/leted t)eir concentration on t)eir frontier and3 as t)ey )ad /lanned3 attacked to gain t)e initiati+e and reco+er t)e territory ceded to *er%any in 1BC1. "ere t)e aug%ented /o(er of t)e defence first de%onstrated itself ()en t)e *er%ans re/ulsed t)e 'renc) assaults and t)e 'renc) sto//ed t)e *er%an counterattacks. 5ne 'renc) di+ision3 regulars of t)e 'oreign ,egion3 lost 113>>> of its 1C3>>> %en in its unsuccessful c)arges and ()en s)ra/nel fire on a &ridge cut off its retreat.

??B

2arly in t)e t)ird (eek of ugust3 as )is attacks on t)e frontier failed3 8offre &egan to realise t)e %agnitude of t)e *er%an turning %o+e%ent t)roug) Belgiu%. 0)e 'renc) )ad antici/ated t)is /ossi&ility and )ad stationed t)e 'ift) r%y3 eig)t infantry di+isions of t(el+e &attalions eac)3 to /rotect t)eir left flank. In addition3 t)e four regular infantry di+isions of t)e Britis) 2-/editionary 'orce took /osition on t)e left of t)e 'ift) r%y. But clearly t)is force could not co/e (it) t)e *er%an %o+e3 e+en after 8offre )ad added t)ree di+isions to t)e 'ift) r%y. 0)e *er%ans )ad nu%&ered t)e fi+e ar%ies of t)eir turning force one t)roug) fi+e fro% t)e flank in(ard. 0)e t(o inner%ost3 t)e 'ift) and 'ourt)3 faced and )ad re/ulsed t)e attacks of t)e 'renc) 'ourt) and 0)ird ar%ies3 adDacent to t)e 'ift) guarding t)e 'renc) flank. 0)e re%aining t)ree *er%an ar%ies3 e%erging fro% Belgiu%3 readily dro+e &ack t)e 'renc) 'ift) and t)e Britis) 2-/editionary 'orce. 8offre no( ordered a retreat (est and sout)3 in ()ic) t)e Britis) o//osed t)e *er%an 'irst r%y3 t)e 'renc) 'ift) o//osed t)e *er%an Second3 and t)e 'renc) 'ourt)3 di+ided into t(o ar%ies3 retreated &efore t)e *er%an 0)ird and 'ourt).

O ening Turning Mo%ement of World War ' Back

Mean()ile3 t)e 'renc) generalissi%o &roug)t %ore of )is o(n units (it)out cadres into t)e field and used t)e railroad to %o+e troo/s fro% )is rig)t to left. 0)oug) lacking a su&tracted force )eld &ack in reser+e3 8offre could find reser+es in troo/s not ine-trica&ly in+ol+ed in co%&at (it) t)e *er%ans and3 Dust as did Na/oleon in )is first defence of Mantua3 /ro%/tly called t)e% to t)e t)reatened /oints. 8offre &ased )is res/onse on t)e i%/ortant strategic %o&ility t)at /ossession of t)e e-cellent 'renc) rail(ays ga+e )i%. !)ereas t)e *er%an turning forces found only destroyed rail(ays as t)ey ad+anced3 8offre used )is rail(ays to create a ne( ar%y3 t)e Si-t)3 ()ic) )e /laced at Paris. 0)e intact rail(ays t)us /ro+ided t)e defending 'renc) general (it) strategically offensi+e troo/s3 and )e used t)is ca/a&ility to /re/are a counteroffensi+e. 0actically offensi+e troo/s3 as e-e%/lified &y ca+alry3 re.uired &ot) &etter %o&ility and t)e a&ility to go into action (it)out delay to attack t)e ene%ys flank or rear. But in a %o+e%ent e-clusi+ely for strategic /ur/oses3 offensi+e troo/s needed only &etter %o&ility &ecause only tactical conditions re.uired .uick de/loy%ent. 0o create a strategic concentration of force or to reac) t)e ene%ys strategic flank3 greater %o&ility3 suc) as t)e rail(ay /ro+ided3 sufficed to gi+e t)e ad+antages t)at under tactical conditions necessitated t)eir i%%ediate e-/loitation &y a /ro%/t attack3 one not )eld u/ &y any ela&orate re.uire%ents for de/loy%ent. ??@

<offre E* loits His Strategi( Mo-ility Back

s t)e )uge *er%an turning %o+e%ent ad+anced ra/idly in /ursuit of t)e retreating 'renc) and Britis)3 t)e *er%ans turned sout) and /assed all of t)eir ar%ies east of Paris3 ()ere t)ey left on t)eir flank t)e ne( 'renc) ar%y3 t)e Si-t). 0)e strategic %o&ility /ro+ided &y t)e rail(ay )ad t)us ena&led t)e 'renc) to turn t)e turning %o+e%ent. fter nearly t(o (eeks of falling &ack3 8offre counterattacked to(ard t)e Marne Ri+er on Se/te%&er =t). lt)oug) t)e *er%an 'irst r%y faced so%e units to co+er its rig)t flank against t)e attack of t)e 'renc) Si-t) r%y3 t)e +igour of t)e allied attack and a ga/ &et(een t)e *er%an 'irst and Second ar%ies &roug)t a&out a *er%an (it)dra(al on Se/te%&er @t). !it)in a (eek t)e *er%an 'irst3 Second3 0)ird3 and 'ourt) ar%ies fell &ack t(enty#fi+e to t)irty %iles and &egan3 like t)e co%&atants of t)e %erican $i+il !ar3 to entrenc) t)eir defensi+e /ositions as did all *er%ans fro% t)eir 'irst r%y east(ard to t)e S(iss frontier. !)en allied assaults failed to dri+e &ack t)e *er%an 'irst and Second ar%ies3 8offre atte%/ted to outflank t)e *er%an line7 &ut 'alken)ayn3 t)e ne( *er%an co%%ander3 soug)t to do t)e sa%e and (it)in a fe( (eeks &ot) 'renc) and *er%an flanks )ad reac)ed t)e Nort) Sea. 0)e *er%ans attacked near t)e coast and t)e allies counterattacked3 &ot) (it)out %uc) effect on t)e &attle lines t)at &ot) co%&atants )ad no( entrenc)ed fro% S(it6erland to t)e sea. Back

.attle of Marne and Aftermath Back

?4>

(he (actical. "ogistical. and Strategic Conditions of the War

0)e tactics of t)e ca%/aign confir%ed t)e e-/erience of 1BC>#C13 e-ce/t t)at tactical defence )ad increased its su/re%acy. 5n one occasion Britis) regulars3 e-/ertly trained in %arks%ans)i/ (it) rifles )olding ten s)ots3 )ad defeated a *er%an attack at a range of @>> yards. In anot)er instance t)e Britis) )ad turned &ack so %any *er%an c)arges t)at t)eir rifles &eca%e so )ot t)at %any (ould not function. But at t)at /oint *er%an courage or %an/o(er failed3 and t)e *er%ans did not %ake t)e attack t)at %ig)t )a+e o+errun t)e Britis). In t)e first %ont) t)e allies )ad suffered 2<>3>>> casualties3 t)e *er%ans so%e()at %ore. !it) %illions of %en entrenc)ed fro% S(it6erland to t)e 2nglis) $)annel neit)er side )ad a flank t)at its o//onent could turn. 'rontal attacks3 if t)ey could &reak t)roug)3 re%ained t)e only %eans t)at (ould create flanks t)at could t)en &e turned. 0)e %ac)ine gun de%onstrated its (ort)3 and all ar%ies increased t)e nu%&ers of t)e relati+ely i%%o&ile (ater#cooled3 &elt#fed %odels and added lig)t3 /orta&le auto%atic rifles. lt)oug) t)e latter3 relying on air#cooling3 could not %aintain sustained fire3 t)eir &rief &ursts at a )ig) rate aug%ented t)e infantrys fire/o(er. S)ra/nel /ro+ed so effecti+e t)at ar%ies e+entually ado/ted steel )el%ets in defence. But t)e dee/ trenc)es ga+e suc) increased /rotection fro% s)ra/nel t)at artillery ca%e increasingly to rely on )ig)#e-/losi+e s)ells3 ()ic) could (reck t)e trenc)es. Bar&ed (ire &eca%e an effecti+e defence3 taking t)e /lace of t)e ditc) and (ooden (he%au*/de/frise o&stacles of old. 0)ick &arriers of &ar&ed (ire soon secured t)e entrenc)%ents3 t)e &road &elts of resilient (ire re.uiring %any )ig)# e-/losi+e s)ells to o/en ga/s for attacking infantry. In ugust 1@14 t)e soldiers of t)e )uge *er%an turning force )ad found enoug) to eat in t)e fertile and densely /o/ulated area of 'rance in ()ic) t)ey ca%/aigned. But t)e )orses (ere less fortunate3 as soldiers found relati+ely little )ay. By early Se/te%&er t)e )orses of so%e of t)e artillery could no longer kee/ u/ (it) t)e ad+ance. 0)e Battle of t)e Marne occurred Dust as t)e )orses in t)e *er%an ar%y )ad reac)ed t)e li%it of t)eir endurance. %%unition /resented a serious su//ly /ro&le%. 0)e ar%ies used artillery s)ells at four ti%es t)e rate in 1BC> and consu%ed t(el+e ti%es as %uc) s%all ar%s a%%unition as in 1BC>. Railroads trans/orted t)e a%%unition to t)e /oint at ()ic) Belgiu% or 'rance )ad disa&led t)e railroads3 and fro% t)ere it %o+ed to t)e *er%ans &y road. 0)e +ery s/eed of t)e ad+ance3 ()ic) constantly &roug)t t)e troo/s into unforaged areas3 %eant t)at (agons could not )a+e gone ra/idly enoug) to

?41

%eet t)e e-traordinary de%ands for a%%unition. s%all grou/ of *er%an %otor trucks3 toget)er (it) re.uisitioned %otor +e)icles3 %aintained a%%unition su//lies. But &y t)e ti%e of t)e Battle of t)e Marne3 => /ercent of t)e %otor trucks )ad &roken do(n3 casualties of )ard usage. In +ie( of t)e state of t)e )orses and %otor trans/ort in t)e *er%an ar%ies and t)e long distance fro% *er%an rail)eads3 it is dou&tful t)at t)e *er%ans could )a+e continued t)eir ad+ance %uc) &eyond t)e Marne. 0)e 2-)austion of t)e troo/s after so long a %arc) also tended to %ake furt)er ad+ances difficult. Most of t)e soldiers3 ci+ilians &arely a %ont) &efore3 )ad /erfor%ed e-traordinarily3 &ut t)e e-/erience of one unit s)o(ed t)e effect of t)ree (eeks of uninterru/ted %arc)ing. n officer (rote: JBefore t)e (ar I s)ould )a+e regarded suc) /o(ers of endurance as &eyond t)e ca/acity of t)e %ost ro&ust /easant lads... )o( t)e %ens feet )a+e suffered. 'ro% ti%e to ti%e (e )ad to e-a%ine t)e%7 and it (as no /leasure to look at t)e infla%ed )eels3 soles and toes of %y (retc)ed young lads3 ()ole /atc)es of skin ru&&ed off to t)e ra( fles).L But e-ce/t for t)e fatigue of t)e %arc)ing3 t)e 'renc) did not suffer fro% t)ese logistical difficulties: t)ey al(ays fell &ack onto t)eir o(n ela&orate rail(ay net(ork3 ()ic) ta//ed su//lies of food3 fodder3 and a%%unition. 0)e a%&itious effort to carry out a turning %o+e%ent (it) a %illion %en )ad failed. 2+en if t)e logistical /ro&le%s created &y so %any soldiers )ad not doo%ed it3 its success (ould )a+e de/ended on t)e ene%y co%%and. 0)e taciturn 8offre not only %aintained )is ner+e3 &ut continued to slee/ ten )ours a nig)t and take ti%e to dine (ell. 5n one occasion3 after enDoying a su%/tuous re/ast3 8offre recei+ed a re/ort t)at t)e *er%ans )ad ca/tured an i%/ortant to(n. //arently .uite un/ertur&ed3 t)e generalissi%o3 /atting )is a%/le sto%ac)3 only re%arked t)at it contained one t)ing t)e *er%ans (ould not ca/ture. "is e-cellent staff and )is o(n ti%ely and decisi+e res/onses %eant t)at )e sa(3 and /ro%/tly %o+ed to co/e (it)3 t)e danger /resented &y t)e *er%an turning %o+e%ent. In e-ercising )is co%%and3 8offre dis/layed a rut)lessness t)at &elied )is &enign a//earance. In t(o %ont)s )e re%o+ed eig)ty co%%anders of di+isions and )ig)er units7 so%e (ere /ro%oted3 &ut %ost (ere %o+ed to %ake (ay for ot)ers )e regarded as %ore a&le. 0)e +ery nu%&ers of soldiers3 ()ic) created logistical /ro&le%s for t)e *er%ans and (ould )a+e gi+en t)e% an ade.uate ratio of force to s/ace to &lock t)e retreat of t)e 'renc) )ad t)e *er%an turning ar%ies reac)ed t)eir ene%ys rear3 %ay also )a+e ensured a deadlock. !it) ca+alry al%ost irrele+ant3 t)e tactical /o(er of t)e defence at an a/ogee3 and an un/recedented ratio of force to s/ace3 a decisi+e ca%/aign %ay (ell )a+e &een &eyond t)e reac) of t)e contestants. Because of so %any %en (it) suc) a large a%ount of defensi+e fire/o(er3 a deadlock %ay )a+e &een ine+ita&le3 &arring e-traordinary inco%/etence. nd t)oroug)ly trained3 effecti+e staffs (ould )a+e %ade it difficult e+en for a Ba6aine to )a+e %is%anaged enoug) to insure disaster. 0)e ratio of force to s/ace )ad long /layed a %aDor role in deter%ining t)e outco%e of %ilitary o/erations. In ca%/aigns fro% t)e 'renc) Re+olution t)roug) t)e 'ranco#Prussian !ar t)e co%&atants )ad )ad a ratio of force to s/ace great enoug) to attain a .uick decision ()en at least one contestant )ad dis/ersed its ar%ies3 used its ca/acity to %arc) ra/idly ()en near t)e ene%y3 and %ade t)e %ost of its a&ility to de/loy .uickly fro% colu%n to line. !it) a ratio of force in relation to s/ace too lo(3 t)e ne( ar%ies and ne( strategy could not co%/el an ene%y eit)er to fig)t or to retreat directly to its rear. 0)us3 ()en Na/oleon entered Russia3 t)e t)eatre of o/erations )ad so %uc) s/ace in relation to )is forces t)at )e could not %ake t)e Russians fig)t against t)eir (ill. 0)e )ig) ratio of force to s/ace do%inated o/erations in 'rance during t)e four years of !orld !ar I and3 along (it) t)e un/aralleled /ri%acy of t)e defence3 strongly influenced e+ents in ot)er t)eatres. 8ust as too little force to s/ace could render o/erations indecisi+e3 so did too %uc)3 as o/erations in t)e fortified Net)erlands )ad long de%onstrated. !it)out flanks3 t)e /ri%acy of t)e tactical defensi+e o+er frontal attacks asserted itself and /roduced a stale%ate. 0)e nu%&ers ?42

engaged3 t)e constant contact on long fronts3 and t)e frontal attack as t)e only tactical e-/edient greatly increased casualties. 0)e 'renc)3 for e-a%/le3 usually on t)e offensi+e against t)e *er%ans3 lost %ore t)an one %illion %en killed and (ounded a year. 'or t)e four years of (ar t)e &attle deat)s nu%&ered 13?B<3>>> for t)e 'renc) e%/ire3 @4C3>>> for t)e Britis)3 13C>>3>>> for t)e Russians3 and 13B>B3>>> for t)e *er%ans. Italy lost 4=>3>>>3 t)e 4nited States 11<3>>> dead. 5f t)e =< %illion %o&ilised &y all &elligerents3 t)e killed and (ounded in &attle a//roac)ed 2@ %illion. Many of t)ese i%%ense casualties resulted fro% +ain attacks3 often conducted &y 'renc) and Britis) generals against entrenc)ed *er%an defenders. In retros/ect t)ese see%3 and fre.uently (ere3 foolis)3 &ut t)e co%/etent soldiers ()o conducted a nu%&er of t)e% found it difficult to gras/ t)e al%ost a&solute su/re%acy of t)e entrenc)ed defensi+e3 so at +ariance (it) /re#(ar conce/tions. Nor could t)ey easily gi+e u/ t)e idea t)at greater nu%&ers could not /re+ail3 /ierce t)e front3 and e%anci/ate t)e ar%ies fro% t)e tyranny of t)e siege (arfare ()ic) so fa+oured t)e defensi+e. Back

(he German -$'loitation of nterior "ines and a (urning Movement to +efeat the )ussians
In defending 2ast Prussia against a Russian attack3 t)e *er%ans conducted a ca%/aign &ased on t)e &rilliant success of t)ose ele%ents t)at )ad c)aracterised Na/oleons o/erations. "olding 2ast Prussia (it) s%all forces and facing a coordinated Russian ad+ance &y Rennenka%/fs ar%y fro% t)e (est and Sa%sono+s fro% t)e sout)3 t)e *er%an co%%ander3 Pritt(it63 /lanned to utilise )is interior lines first to dri+e &ack Rennenka%/f and t)en to turn against Sa%sono+ ()o (as ad+ancing %ore slo(ly. 0)e Russians3 (it) larger nu%&ers and e-/ecting )is %o+e3 /lanned for Sa%sono+ to reac) Pritt(it6s rear and &lock )is retreat. !)en )is attack against Rennenka%/f failed on ugust 2>t)3 Pritt(it6 /anicked and tele/)oned su/re%e )ead.uarters )is intention to (it)dra( to t)e Vistula Ri+er3 t)us a&andoning %ost of 2ast Prussia. *eneral Moltke /ro%/tly relie+ed Pritt(it6 and sent *eneral Paul +on "inden&urg3 a +eteran of 9Uniggrat6 and t)e 'ranco#Prussian !ar3 to re/lace )i%. "inden&urg )ad ser+ed on t)e general staff and on t)e faculty of t)e !ar $ollege and )ad co%%anded a cor/s during /eace. "inden&urg &roug)t to co%%and a cal%ness and resolution not unlike 8offres. Moltke sent 2ric) ,udendorff3 a forty#nine#year#old career staff officer3 as "inden&urgs c)ief of staff. ,udendorff )ad Dust distinguis)ed )i%self &y lea+ing t)e Second r%y staff to )ead t)e &rigade t)at ca/tured t)e /o(erfully fortified Belgian city of ,i;ge. *eneral ,udendorff3 a keen3 sensiti+e3 &rilliant staff officer3 dis/layed a %astery of o/erations and do%inated t)e tea% ()ile "inden&urg su//lied sta&ility in ad+ersity and a &alance in a relations)i/ t)at "inden&urg descri&ed as a )a//y %arriage. By t)e ti%e "inden&urg and ,udendorff arri+ed3 Pritt(it6s staff )ad %ade a ne( /lan. Its aut)or3 ,t. $olonel "off%an3 kno(ing t)at Rennenka%/f and Sa%sono+ (ere )ostile to one anot)er3 &elie+ed t)at t)e *er%ans could safely ignore Rennenka%/f and concentrate t)eir forces against Sa%sono+s %enacing %arc) to(ard t)eir rear. Interce/tion of unencoded Russian (ireless %essages confir%ed t)at Rennenka%/f /lanned no ra/id ad+ance. "inden&urg and ,udendorff a//ro+ed t)e /lan. It %o+ed *eneral 'rancoiss cor/s &y rail fro% its /osition o//osite Rennenka%/f all t)e (ay to Sa%sono+s left flank ()ile t)e ot)er t(o cor/s %arc)ed sout) to(ard Sa%sono+s centre and rig)t flank. 0)e *er%ans left only a ca+alry di+ision and si- &attalions of infantry to )old &ack Rennenka%/f. 0)e t(o cor/s t)at %arc)ed sout) e-/loited t)e traditional strategic situation of interior lines. 'rancoiss cor/s3 ()ic) used t)e railroad to reac) Sa%sono+s left3 tra+elled a circuitous route and %o+ed %uc) fart)er. But rail trans/ort %ore t)an co%/ensated for t)e additional distance to reac) a strategically i%/ortant /osition. s (it) 8offres re#concentration of )is force and creation of t)e Si-t) r%y on t)e ?4?

*er%an flank3 t)e railroad ga+e t)e defending co%%ander strategically offensi+e troo/s3 ena&ling )i% to concentrate %ore ra/idly and turn t)e attackers.

German Use of 'nterior &ines and ,ailway for Turning Mo%ement Back

5n ugust 1<t) t)e *er%ans &egan t)eir ad+ance3 t)e forces fro% t)e nort) striking Sa%sono+s rig)t and 'rancois attacking )is left. !)en t)e Russian cor/s o//osing 'rancois (it)dre( to t)e sout)3 t)e energetic and aggressi+e 'rancois /us)ed for(ard into t)e Russian rear3 distri&uting )is ar%y to &lock t)eir retreat. 0o %ake )is turning %o+e%ent effecti+e3 )e co+ered a t)irty#se+en#%ile front (it) only t(enty#fi+e &attalions. But ()en t)e disorganised Russians soug)t to (it)dra(3 t)e fire/o(er of t)is t)in screen /ro+ed ade.uate to contain t)e Russians. s a result of t)is ca%/aign at 0annen&erg *eneral Sa%sono+ surrendered 12<3>>> %en and <>> guns. "e )i%self did not surrender &ut (alked into t)e (oods and s)ot )i%self. 0)e *er%ans t)en turned against Rennenka%/f ()o3 ()en )e realised t)e *er%ans t)reatened to turn )is flank3 retreated /ro%/tly and ra/idly east(ard. 2-cellent *er%an co%%anders and staffs3 (it) t)e aid of interior lines and t)e first#rate %o&ility t)at t)e railroad ga+e t)e defender3 )ad defeated in t)e Na/oleonic %anner t)e %ediocre leaders)i/ of an essentially i%/ro+ised Russian offensi+e. Back

(he 0'ening Naval Cam'aigns

lt)oug) t)e entrenc)ed deadlock on land re/resented sta&ility only in ter%s of /re#(ar e-/ectations3 t)e allied /redo%inance on t)e surface of t)e sea confor%ed to t)e sailors /re#(ar antici/ations. gainst a <> /ercent Britis) su/eriority in 1readnoug)t#ty/e &attles)i/s and a t(o# to#one do%inance in older &attles)i/s3 t)e *er%an fleet stayed in its &ases. !it) a strong force of cruisers3 t)e Britis) %aintained a &lockade of &ot) t)e *er%an fleet and co%%erce &y kee/ing t)eir %ain &attle fleet in its &ase. Because of t)eir nearness to *er%any3 t)e Britis) Isles ga+e t)e na+y a%/le near&y &ases3 t)us conferring on it all of t)e ad+antages of t)e increase in t)e ratio of force to s/ace &roug)t a&out &y stea% and (ireless &ut (it) none of t)e logistical disad+antages of t)e de/endence on distant &ases for fuel. !it) t)e Britis) Isles t)e%sel+es3 &y t)eir geogra/)ical /osition3 &lockading *er%any3 t)e Britis) easily %aintained t)eir /ersisting logistic strategy of &lockade at a distance fro% *er%an /orts. 0)e 'renc) fleet3 %ore t)an a %atc) for t)ose of ustria#"ungary and Italy e+en (it)out Britis) aid3 controlled t)e Mediterranean7 a task %uc) si%/lified ()en Italy at first re%ained neutral and t)en Doined t)e 'renc) and Britis) in t)e s/ring of 1@1<. 0)e *er%ans and t)e Britis) eac) )ad na+al forces stationed (orld(ide at colonial &ases. 0)e Britis) na+y i%%ediately addressed t)e task of tracking do(n and destroying t)ese *er%an s)i/s to /re+ent t)eir attacking Britis) co%%erce. 0)is t)ey essentially co%/leted &y t)e end of 1@14.

?44

0)ese o/erations sa( t)e ne( classes of cruisers in action and again (itnessed t)e c)anges stea% and steel )ad (roug)t in na+al (arfare. In t)e fall of 1@14 t)e *er%an siatic s.uadron of fi+e cruisers crossed to t)e coast of $)ile ()ere3 off $oronel in early No+e%&er 1@143 it %et a Britis) force of four cruisers. 0(o %odern ar%oured cruisers3 eac) (it) t)e /o(er of t)eir &roadsides concentrated in si- 21>#%illi%eter guns3 constituted t)e &ack&one of t)e *er%an s.uadron. 0)e Britis) also )ad t(o ar%oured cruisers of an older3 t)oug) faster3 design t)at toget)er )ad a &roadside of only t(o @.2#lnc) guns and %any =# inc). In s/ite of t)is inferiority and (it) a large nu%&er of reser+ists a%ong )is cre(s3 t)e aggressi+e3 one#eyed Britis) ad%iral3 $raddock3 soug)t to engage3 &elie+ing t)at )e follo(ed orders. *lad to o&lige3 t)e /erce/ti+e *er%an d%iral S/ee led )is s)i/s on a course /arallel to $raddocks3 &ut t)e Britis) s)i/s (ere sil)ouetted &y a setting sun &e)ind t)e% and )is (ere o&scured &y darkness3 accentuated &y a s.uall. In an )our )e )ad sunk &ot) Britis) ar%oured cruisers (it) all )ands7 t)e *er%ans suffered only si- )its and +irtually no da%age to t)eir s)i/s. lt)oug) d%iral $raddock )ad acted in t)e tradition of t)e Britis) na+y3 )e no longer enDoyed t)e &enefit t)at t)e Britis) )ad so often e-/loited in t)eir co%&ats (it) t)e 'renc) and S/aniards. Instead of &ringing a sea#seasoned force against an ene%y long in /ort3 )e led reser+ists in old s)i/s against t)oroug)ly ready and %ore %odern *er%an s)i/s t)at )ad (on a gunnery /ri6e ()ile ser+ing on t)e $)ina station. In addition3 &y 1@14 t)e s)i/s and t)eir (ea/on syste%s )ad relati+ely %ore i%/ortance t)an t)e %en ()en co%/ared (it) conditions at t)e Battle of 0rafalgar for e-a%/le. Sus/ecting3 correctly3 t)at d%iral S/ee (ould )ead for t)e tlantic3 t)e Britis) ad%iralty took drastic ste/s. Instead of asse%&ling a %ore nu%erous fleet of ar%oured cruisers3 it took t)e c)ief of t)e (ar staff3 t)e /roficient &ut /edantic Vice d%iral Sturdee3 and sent )i% to t)e sout) tlantic (it) t(o &attle cruisers. !)en )e reac)ed t)e 'alkland Islands off t)e rgentine coast3 Sturdee3 ()o )ad early fa+oured sending t)e &attle cruisers3 Doined t)ree Britis) ar%oured cruisers as (ell as t(o s%all3 unar%oured cruisers and an old3 slo( &attles)i/ t)at $raddock )ad dro//ed fro% )is s.uadron. 5+er t)e /rotests of )is engine roo% staff3 ()o (is)ed to /erfor% %aintenance (ork3 d%iral Sturdee ke/t all of )is s)i/s3 e-ce/t t)e &attles)i/3 ready to raise full stea% in only four )ours. !)en3 on an early 1ece%&er %orning3 S/ee ca%e to reconnoitre t)e 'alklands anc)orage3 )e did not sus/ect t)e concentration of force3 e+en ()en )e could see clouds of s%oke &eginning to s)roud t)e )ar&our. 0)is s%oke resulted fro% d%iral Sturdees frantic efforts to raise stea% for full s/eed ()ile t)e old &attles)i/ soug)t to kee/ t)e *er%ans at &ay (it) inaccurate s)ots fired at t)e *er%ans o+er an inter+ening s/it of land. !)en Sturdee )ad stea% enoug) for fifteen knots3 )e led )is &attle cruisers out of t)e )ar&our. s t)ese &ig s)i/s e%erged fro% t)e )ar&ours s%oke and S/ee could see t)e c)aracteristic tri/od %asts of &attle cruisers3 )e kne( t)at )e (as doo%ed. Signalling )is t)ree s%all cruisers to scatter3 t)e courageous S/ee /re/ared to co+er t)eir flig)t &y using )is t(o ar%oured cruisers to engage t)e t(o &attle cruisers. "e faced t)e insu/era&le odds as s)o(n in t)e ta&le &elo(. Sturdee signalled to t(o of )is ar%oured cruisers and )is t(o s%aller cruisers to /ursue t)e s%aller *er%an s)i/s ()ile3 (it) )is &attle cruisers and t)e )arnar%on (it) four C.<#inc) guns )is strongest ar%oured cruiser3 )e follo(ed t)e *er%an ar%oured cruisers. 'or t)eir task t)e Britis) )ad clear (eat)er3 a cal% sea3 and t)e long day c)aracteristic of t)e %ont) of t)e su%%er solstice. Reac)ing t(enty#fi+e knots and easily o+ertaking t)e *er%ans3 Sturdee slo(ed and3 seeking a su/erfluity of su/eriority3 (aited for t)e une-/ectedly slo(#stea%ing )arnar%on to catc) u/. fter a+ailing )i%self of t)e o//ortunity to gi+e )is %en an early lunc)3 d%iral Sturdee ga+e u/ on t)e )arnar%on3 and3 (it) (ell#fed %en3 t)e suita&ly na%ed ad%iral3 in )is a//ro/riately c)ristened

?4<

flags)i/ 'n%in(i-le3 increased s/eed again and engaged t)e *er%ans at 123>>> yards3 a range at ()ic) t)eir 21>#%illi%eter guns could )ardly /ierce )is ar%our.

)om arison of Shi s at the .attle of the #al$land 'slands Back

In a fe( %inutes )is )ea+y guns )ad s%as)ed t)e &ar&ettes and case%ates of t)e *er%an s)i/s3 slo(ed t)eir s/eed3 and rendered t)e% literally inoffensi+e. But to sink suc) s)i/s /ro+ed difficult &ecause of t)e su&di+ision of t)e )ulls into nu%erous (ater#tig)t co%/art%ents and t)e difficulty of )itting t)e (aterline. In order to sink &ot) t)e *er%an s)i/s3 t)e Britis) )ad to e-/end => /ercent of t)eir 12#inc) gun a%%unition. ,ike t)e Britis) at $oronel3 t)e *er%an s)i/s left fe( sur+i+ors3 d%iral S/ee going do(n (it) )is flags)i/. 0)e Britis) s)i/s de%onstrated t)eir in+ulnera&ility at long range: t)e 'n%in(i-le sustained t(enty#t(o )its &ut suffered only one sailor (ounded. !)ile Sturdee engaged S/ee and )is ar%oured cruisers3 t)e ot)er Britis) ar%oured cruisers o+ertook t(o of t)e s%aller *er%an cruisers3 t)oug) one of t)e Britis) s)i/s )ad to &urn %uc) of its (ood(ork to gain a )otter fire and a little %ore stea%. 0)e s%all *er%an cruisers suffered a fate si%ilar to t)e ar%oured cruisers ()en ?3?>>#ton3 unar%oured s)i/s (it) 1><#%illi%eter guns faced ar%oured s)i/s of @3B>> tons (it) =#inc) guns. 0)e t)ird *er%an cruiser esca/ed. 0)e actions at $oronel and 'alkland Islands e-)i&ited t)e /ri%acy of %ateriel in t)e na+al (arfare of stea% and steel. In t)eir %any conflicts (it) t)e 'renc) in t)e late se+enteent) and eig)teent) centuries t)e Britis) )ad foug)t (it) inferior s)i/s3 &ut t)eir far greater skills gained in constant ser+ice at sea far o+er&alanced t)e &etter .uality of t)e 'renc) +essels. By 1@143 )o(e+er3 all na+ies could gain in /ort and in /eaceti%e e-ercises %ore of t)e skills needed to o/erate range finders3 %aster %ec)anically aided gun#loading routines3 and o/erate stea% engines. Battles in /arallel lines )ad /ro+en decisi+e at $oronel and use of $raddocks deter%ination to use )is )ig)er s/eed to engage a %ore /o(erful force and3 as (it) t)e 8a/anese in t)eir second &attle (it) t)e Russians3 &ecause of Sturdees use of )is greater s/eed at t)e 'alkland Islands to engage S/ees (eaker and reluctant s.uadron. But ()en t)e *er%an and Britis) &attles)i/ fleets %et in t)e traditional lines3 t)e *er%ans s)o(ed t)at t)ey could e%ulate t)e 'renc) of old and esca/e. Back

#llied Naval !redominance Confirmed, (he 1attle of 3utland

0)e Battle of 8utland took /lace on May ?1st 1@1=. 0)e *er%an &attles)i/ fleet %o+ed to co+er an attack on Britis) s)i//ing to Nor(ay at t)e sa%e ti%e t)at d%iral Sir 8o)n 8ellicoes Britis) fleet %ade one of its /eriodic s(ee/s in t)e Nort) Sea. 0)e Britis) )ad t(enty#eig)t 1readnoug)t#ty/e &attles)i/s3 t)e *er%ans si-teen. 0)e Britis) +essels tended to &e larger and faster t)an t)e *er%an and )ad greater fire/o(er. Britis) s)i/s )ad &roadsides of eig)t 12#inc) or ten 1?.<#inc) guns3 t)oug) one )ad a &roadside of fourteen 12#inc) guns and si- )ad &roadsides of eig)t 1<#inc) guns. *er%an +essels )ad &roadsides of eig)t 11#inc) or eig)t to ten 12#inc) guns and )ad so%e()at t)icker ar%our t)an t)e Britis)3 &etter fire#control e.ui/%ent3 and %ore effecti+e ar%our#/iercing a%%unition7 &ut Britis) ar%our /late offered %ore resistance t)an *er%an /late of t)e sa%e t)ickness.

?4=

0)e Britis) )ad nine &attle cruisers3 t)e *er%ans fi+e. 0)e Britis) s)i/s )ad )ig)er s/eed and &igger guns &ut %uc) t)inner ar%our t)an t)e *er%an s)i/s. 0)e ()ole Britis) force )ad %uc) greater s/eed t)an t)e *er%an &ecause3 in an effort to co%/ensate for t)eir %arked inferiority in nu%&ers of 1readnoug)ts3 t)e *er%ans &roug)t (it) t)e% si- slo( /re#1readnoug)ts carrying four guns on a &roadside. 0)e fleets disco+ered eac) ot)er ()en t)e *er%an scouting s.uadron3 including all fi+e of its &attle cruisers3 %et t)e Britis) scouting force (it) si- of its nine &attle cruisers. 0)e &attle cruisers &egan firing at eac) ot)er at a range of o+er l=3>>> yards. 0)e engage%ent de%onstrated t)e fla( in e-/osing Britis) s)i/s (it) ar%our suita&le for ar%oured cruisers to t)e *er%an 11# and 12#inc) guns: one of t)e s%aller Britis) &attle cruisers &le( u/3 a s)ell )a+ing a//arently /ierced a &ar&ette3 igniting a %aga6ine. Soon after3 one of t)e largest Britis) &attle cruisers suffered a si%ilar fate3 &reaking in )alf as t)e e-/losion of )er %aga6ines sent a cloud of s%oke %ore t)an 13>>> feet in t)e air. 0)e afternoon engage%ent led t)e aggressi+e Britis) &attle cruiser s.uadron to(ard t)e *er%an &attles)i/s3 &ut ()en t)e Britis) &attle cruisers ca%e in range of t)e *er%an &attles)i/s3 t)ey turned and t)e *er%ans t)en &eca%e t)e /ursuers. 0)e Britis) &attle cruisers )o(e+er3 led t)e unsus/ecting *er%ans to(ard t)e Britis) &attles)i/s3 ()ic) t)e careful d%iral 8ellicoe )ad de/loyed fro% si- s.uadrons a&reast into a single line t)at )eaded across t)e /at) of t)e *er%an &attles)i/ fleet3 also in line. !)en t)e *er%an &attle line ca%e (it)in range3 t)e *er%ans found t)e far %ore nu%erous Britis) fleet in a /osition to concentrate its fire on lead *er%an s)i/s3 ()ic) (ere una&le to re/ly (it) t)eir full &roadsides. 0)e *er%ans3 )o(e+er3 )ad /racticed a %anoeu+re to e-tricate t)e%sel+es fro% suc) a /redica%ent3 and eac) +essel turned 1B> degrees and &egan stea%ing a(ay fro% t)e Britis). Still3 t)e course of t)e Britis) fleet carried it &et(een t)e *er%an fleet and its &ase. s t)e *er%ans turned to(ard )o%e to esca/e fro% t)e une-/ected and un(anted &attle3 t)ey again stea%ed t)eir line directly to(ard t)e Britis) and again its s)i/s %ade t)eir 1B>#degree turns. 5n its ne( course t)e *er%an line con+erged to(ard t)e Britis)3 &ut ()en *er%an +essels sa( t)e Britis) in t)e fading lig)t of e+ening3 t)ey turned a(ay. Reluctant to fig)t at nig)t ()en tor/edoes and %ines as (ell as c)ance %ig)t nullify )is /re/onderance3 t)e /rudent 8ellicoe did not /ress )is ad+antage. (are t)at )e )ad not)ing to gain strategically &y defeating t)e *er%ans and %uc) to lose Ge+en3 )y/ot)etically3 allied na+al /redo%inance and3 conse.uently3 t)e (ar itselfH )e dis/layed a co%%enda&le caution in follo(ing t)e sa%e reasoning as )ad d%iral 0ogo after )is +ictory on ugust 1>t) 1@>4. So t)e &attered *er%an fleet /assed 8ellicoes rear during t)e nig)t and reac)ed its &ase. 0actically t)e *er%ans secured a +ictory3 sinking t)ree Britis) &attle cruisers at a cost of only one &attle cruiser and one old &attles)i/. 0)e Britis) loss of t)ree ar%oured cruisers and t)e *er%an loss of four s%all cruisers )el/ed raise tonnage of s)i/s forfeited to 1113@B> for t)e Britis) and =2.2?? for t)e *er%ans. But as after so %any &attles (it) t)e 'renc)3 t)e Britis) /re/onderance re%ained undi%inis)ed3 and t)e results of t)e &attle did not te%/t t)e *er%ans to fig)t again. 0)e Britis) ga+e /ro%/t attention to i%/ro+ing t)eir fire#control e.ui/%ent3 t)eir a%%unition3 and t)e security of t)eir %aga6ines against e-/losions in a &ar&ette. Back

(he Submarine as a Commerce )aider

0)roug)out t)e (ar t)e *er%ans found t)e%sel+es in an analogous situation to t)at e-/erienced &y t)e 'renc) in t)eir nu%erous (ars (it) t)e Britis). But (it) fast3 (ireless#e.ui//ed Britis) stea%ers o&ser+ing t)e sea#lanes outside of t)e defences and %inefields of *er%an )ar&ours3 t)e *er%ans faced a far %ore stringent &lockade t)an any t)at t)e 'renc) )ad to contend (it). 'urt)er3 t)e industrial transfor%ations t)at %ade /ossi&le t)e ne( s)i/s also %ade t)e *er%an econo%y ?4C

de/endent on o+erseas co%%erce to an e-tent not i%agined in t)e eig)teent) century. In addition3 t)e *er%ans found t)at t)e c)anged circu%stances /re+ented any e%ulation of t)e de+astating logistic strategy of raids against Britis) co%%erce at ()ic) t)e 'renc) )ad long e-celled. 0)e relati+e inde/endence of (ind and (eat)er enDoyed &y t)e &lockading s)i/s %ade it far %ore difficult for a co%%erce raider to sli/ out into t)e tlantic3 as 'renc) s)i/s )ad so often done in t)e /ast. nd t)e reliance of co%%erce raiders on coal3 rat)er t)an (ind3 furt)er cri//led t)e *er%an effort to /ursue a traditional raiding strategy. Moreo+er3 t)e greater effecti+eness of t)e &lockade %ade it +irtually i%/ossi&le to return to a *er%an /ort (it) ca/tured Britis) s)i/s3 an induce%ent and a gain t)at )ad long )el/ed 'renc) co%%erce raiding. 0)e su&%arine /ro+ided t)e %eans for t)e *er%ans to continue t)e (eaker na+al /o(ers a//lication of t)e logistic strategy &y %eans of raids. 0)e su&%arine &egan t)e (ar (it) a s/ectacular success. Sig)ting a s.uadron of t)ree Britis) ar%oured cruisers of 123>>> tons eac)3 a *er%an su&%arine su&%erged and tor/edoed one s)i/. s it slo(ly sank3 t)e ot)er t(o stood &y to /ick u/ sur+i+ors. 0)is un(ise act ena&led t)e *er%an su&%arine ca/tain to %ake a second and t)en a t)ird successful attack3 sinking ?=3ooo tons of /o(erful surface +essels. But (ars)i/s /ro%/tly learned to counter su&%arines &y kee/ing a s)ar/ lookout for tor/edoes3 %aintaining a )ig) enoug) s/eed to /re+ent t)e su&%arine fro% closing in3 and ado/ting an erratic course to %ake it unlikely t)at a su&%arine could count on a tor/edos course intersecting t)at of t)e target +essel. If (ars)i/s s/otted a tor/edo a//roac)ing t)e%3 t)ey often not only a+oided it &ut also turned to(ard its source and soug)t to ra% t)e su&%arine &efore it could di+e to a safe de/t). 5n t)e ot)er )and3 in a largely une-/ected de+elo/%ent3 %erc)ant s)i/s /ro+ed +ulnera&le to su&%arines. 5n t)e surface su&%arines used t)eir deck guns to force t)e surrender of %erc)ant +essels. 0)e s%all su&%arine3 )o(e+er3 could not carry enoug) sailors to %an ca/tured s)i/s3 and e+en if t)ey could3 t)e tig)t &lockade +irtually /recluded taking t)eir /ri6es &ack to *er%any. So su&%arines sank t)eir ca/tures3 allo(ing t)e cre(s to esca/e in life&oats. 0)e Britis) t)en resu%ed t)e old /ractice of ar%ing t)eir %erc)ant s)i/s. lt)oug) ci+ilian sea%en did not co%/are (it) *er%an sailors as gunners and t)e %erc)ant +essels carried an assort%ent of often#o&solete guns3 t)e fragility of t)e su&%arine %ade it )a6ardous for one to engage in &attle (it) an ar%ed %erc)ant s)i/. In addition3 t)e Britis) e.ui//ed so%e %erc)ant s)i/s (it) concealed %odern guns and %anned t)e% (it) na+al cre(s. 0)ese +essels3 %istaken &y *er%an su&%arine ca/tains for unar%ed %erc)ant +essels3 easily sank t)e su&%arines. Since *er%an ca/tains could not tell ()et)er %erc)ant s)i/s carried /o(erful concealed guns %anned &y trained cre(s3 t)ey &egan tor/edoing so%e %erc)ant s)i/s3 (it)out (arning. 0)is /ractice )ad t)e disad+antage not only of using u/ tor/edoes3 and su&%arines could carry only a fe( of t)ese &ulky /roDectiles3 &ut also defied t)e long tradition and acce/ted international la( of not attacking ci+ilians. Since neutral +essels carried i%/ortant cargoes and offered +alua&le targets3 t)e *er%ans attacked t)e% also. Because t)is (arfare in+ol+ed t)e *er%ans in dis/utes (it) t)e 4nited States3 t)e only great /o(er still neutral3 t)e *er%an go+ern%ent +acillated in t)e rigor (it) ()ic) it a//lied t)is /olicy. 0)e *er%ans .uickly realised t)at t)e su&%arine offered a +ery effecti+e na+al (ea/on against t)e /redo%inant sea /o(er of t)eir o//onents3 and t)ey set to (ork to a//ly +igorously t)e logistic strategy of su&%arine raids against co%%erce. Beginning t)e (ar (it) only t(enty#eig)t su&%arines3 co%/ared (it) fifty#si- for t)e Britis)3 &y 8anuary 1@1< t)e *er%ans )ad 1=> under construction or on order. Sinking only ?3?B2 tons of %erc)ant s)i/s in 1@143 t)e *er%an and ustro#"ungarian su&%arines sank 131@?3>>4 tons of %erc)ant s)i/s in 1@1<3 a loss t)at t)e allies essentially re/laced &y ne( construction. 0)e *er%ans &egan 1@1= (it) si-ty#eig)t su&%arines Gco%/ared (it) t(enty#four at t)e &eginning of 1@1<H3 )a+ing %ore t)an re/laced t)e t(enty#t)ree

?4B

t)ey )ad lost since 1@14. In 1@1= t)e *er%ans sank 232>@3C>@ tons of s)i//ing3 %ore t)an dou&le t)e ne( tonnage added &y t)e allies. So t)e *er%ans )ad created a force to attack allied co%%erce t)at e.ualled or sur/assed t)e &est successes of t)e 'renc) co%%erce raiders in t)e se+enteent) and eig)teent) centuries. Back

(he +ominance of #rtillery in Siege Warfare on "and

'aced (it) siege (arfare3 eac) co%&atant reacted .uickly to aug%ent )is su//ly of t)e sieges /re%ier (ea/on # artillery. ll rus)ed old (ea/ons to t)e front7 t)oug) t)ese old cannon )ad slo( rates of fire and /ri%iti+e recoil %ec)anis%s3 t)ey filled t)e ga/ until factories could deli+er ne( ones3 and t)ey a%/ly de%onstrated t)at o&solete (ea/ons could kill ene%y soldiers .uite effecti+ely. 0)e &elligerents also stri//ed unt)reatened fortresses of t)eir guns. Initially t)e *er%ans )ad a distinct ad+antage in )o(it6ers3 ()ic) )ad es/ecial +alue for siege (ork &ecause of t)eir (eig)tier /roDectiles and suita&ility for )ig)#angle3 indirect fire at distant targets t)at t)e gunners could not see. But t)e 'renc) rus)ed t)eir 1@1?#%odel )o(it6er into /roduction and %anufactured a )uge +ariety of t)e )ea+ier (ea/ons so +alua&le in attacking field fortifications. 0)e 'renc) )ad /articular good fortune in t)e nu%&ers and ty/es of t)eir coast#defence artillery. In esta&lis)ing t)eir coast defences3 t)ey )ad /ro+ided a larger nu%&er of guns on a c)ea/ %ounting rat)er t)an c)oosing a fe( (ell#/rotected guns on e-/ensi+e %ounts. 0)ey /ositioned t)e guns %ount on a cur+ed rail(ay track3 t)e %otion of t)e carriage along t)e track /ro+iding &ot) t)e %aDor /art of t)e ai%ing in a6i%ut) and t)e a&sor/tion of so%e of t)e recoil. Since t)ey )ad intended t)eir coast artillery largely for defence against t)e Britis) na+y3 t)ey .uickly re%o+ed t)e guns and &roug)t t)e% to t)e front3 ()ere t)e ado/tion of t)e si%/le rail(ay#track ty/e of %ounting and t)e greater nu%&er of guns originally %ade /ossi&le &y t)e ine-/ensi+e %ount /ro+ed t)e /erfect c)oice to /ro+ide su/er )ea+y siege artillery for t)e unantici/ated kind of (ar t)at )ad de+elo/ed. 0)e Britis)3 ()o relied for defence on t)eir na+y3 )ad no fortresses or coast defences fro% ()ic) to (it)dra( artillery. 0)is3 and t)eir initially s%all ar%y3 %eant t)at for %uc) of t)e (ar t)e ra/idly e-/anding Britis) ar%ies suffered fro% a lack of artillery as %anufacturing continually lagged &e)ind need. S)ortages of a%%unition /lagued all of t)e &elligerents3 es/ecially t)e 'renc) and Britis) ()o attacked on t)e %ore artillery#intensi+e (estern front in 'rance. Not until 1@1= did t)e ar%ies )a+e a%/le nu%&ers of )ea+y guns and t)e necessary su//lies of a%%unition to go (it) t)e%. Russia3 (it) forces +ery large in relation to its industrial /roducti+e ca/acity3 ne+er ade.uately /ro+ided for its ar%ies (it) res/ect to t)e ne(3 enlarged re.uire%ents for artillery. 0)e e-/ansion of t)e artillery in si6e (as /er)a/s %ore i%/ressi+e t)an its increase in nu%&ers. gun )ad t)e longest &arrel3 %ore t)an t)irty ti%es t)e &ore7 ne-t3 a )o(it6er3 t(enty to t)irty ti%es t)e &ore in lengt)7 and last3 %ortars3 (it) a lengt) of less t)an t(enty ti%es its &ore. 0)e (eig)t of a cannon (as /ro/ortional to its lengt)3 t)e s)orter3 lig)ter +ersions (eig)ing less3 firing a s)ell of t)e sa%e (eig)t as t)e longer &ut at a lo(er %u66le +elocity and3 conse.uently3 a s)orter distance. 0)e s)orter guns3 t)e %ortar and t)e )o(it6er3 )ad t)eir /rinci/al use in deli+ering )ig)#angle fire o+er inter+ening )ills and against entrenc)%ents. 0)e longer#range guns )ad great utility for s)ooting at targets in t)e ene%y rear3 suc) as rail(ay lines and su//ly installations.

Paris Gun Back

?4@

In 1@1B t)e *er%ans introduced a gun t)at could s)oot C< %iles3 al%ost four ti%es t)e range of t)e &iggest guns. 0)ey acco%/lis)ed t)is &y %odifying a ?B>#%illi%eter gun to fire a 21>#%illi%etre s)ell and adding a long s%oot) &ore e-tension to t)e &arrel. 0)e long &arrel3 lig)t s)ell3 and /o(erful c)arge ga+e a %u66le +elocity dou&le t)at of a con+entional gun3 ()ic) ena&led t)e s)ell to reac) t)e li%ited (ind resistance of )ig) altitude to attain its e-traordinary range. But it )ad only enoug) accuracy to )it a target t)e si6e of a city. 0)ey used t)is gun to &o%&ard Paris3 an attack (it) /syc)ological rat)er t)an %ilitary significance. 0)e Paris gun created a sensation and t)e 'renc) and Italians &egan (ork on suc) guns3 ()ic) t)ey did not co%/lete in ti%e for use in t)e (ar.

Some World War ' Artillery Back

?<>

0)e a&o+e ta&le o%its t)e Paris gun &ut su%%arises %ost of t)e ot)er artillery used &y t)e 'renc) and *er%ans during t)e (ar. 0)e %easure%ents of t)e &ore are in %illi%etres. 0)e C<# and CC# %illi%eter field /ieces accounted for a&out )alf of all t)e cannon on eac) side. 0)eir s)ells (eig)ed fro% 1? to 1C /ounds. 0)e s)ell in t)e <2>#%illl%eter )o(it6er (eig)ed 23B>> /ounds. 0)e larger cannon re.uired rail(ay %ounts. Back

(he +evelo'ment and /tility of #ir Forces

'lying )ad de+elo/ed in t)e decade &efore t)e out&reak of t)e (ar. *as#filled airs)i/s )ad ad+anced t)e %ost ra/idly3 e+en engaging in carrying /assengers3 and ar%ies and na+ies )ad recognised t)eir +alue for reconnaissance. 0)eir a&ility to re%ain aloft for se+eral days %ade t)e% es/ecially +alua&le for t)is task3 t)e *er%ans3 in /articular3 de+elo/ing t)is s/eciality. But t)eir utility (as li%ited during (ar: t)e dirigi&les (ere +ulnera&le to ground fire and so%eti%es /o(erless to %aintain t)eir course in t)e face of ad+erse (inds. 0)e *er%ans e+entually used t)e% to carry t(o tons of &o%&s to dro/ on Britis) cities. 0)ese air raids /ro+ed to &e no %ore t)an a nuisance &ecause t)e Pe//elin dirigi&le airs)i/s3 flying at nig)t for greater safety3 often %issed t)e cities entirely3 dro//ing t)eir loads in o/en country. 4lti%ately t)e *er%ans su&stituted air/lanes

?<1

in t)ese raids and t)en a&andoned t)ese attacks altoget)er. i%ed at Britis) ci+ilian %orale3 t)ese raids deli+ered ?>> tons of &o%&s and killed 134>> /eo/le3 fe( of t)e% soldiers or sailors. !inged aircraft /ro+ed of greater %ilitary significance during t)e (ar. By 1@1? a /lane )ad flo(n 12= %iles an )our and anot)er )ad ascended to 1<3>>> feet7 t)e Russians )ad &uilt a four#engine air/lane (it) a ca&in t)at could carry si-teen /assengers. But t)e fe( )undred aircraft t)at t)e &elligerents /ossessed at t)e outset of t)e (ar )ad %ore %odest ca/a&ilities. Intended essentially for reconnaissance3 t)eir s/eeds rarely e-ceeded se+enty %iles an )our3 and so%e could cli%& no )ig)er t)an ?3>>> feet. But since t)ey /ro+ed easy and ine-/ensi+e to &uild and rat)er si%/le to learn to fly3 ar%ies .uickly e-/anded t)e nu%&er of t)eir aircraft. 0)e allies enDoyed su/eriority in t)e air &ecause of 'renc) leaders)i/ in t)e de+elo/%ent of t)e air/lane and &ecause t)e allies %anufactured far %ore aircraft t)an *er%any and its allies. $o%/ared to *er%an /roduction of a&out 4B3>>> /lanes3 t)e 'renc) &uilt a//ro-i%ately <13>>>3 t)e Britis) around <23>>>3 and Italy3 ()o Doined (it) t)e allies in 1@1<3 a&out 2>3>>>. 0)e 'renc) %anufactured @23>>> engines3 %any of ()ic) (ent to t)eir allies. Russia and ustria#"ungary %ade +ery fe(. 0)e 4nited States /roduced 1<3>>>3 &ut /ractically none of t)ese reac)ed co%&at. In 1@1B t)e co%&atants )ad as o/erational aircraft a&out < or = /ercent of t)eir total /roduction during t)e (ar. 0)e allies )ad so great a /re/onderance in 1@1B t)at in 'rance t)e 'renc) )ad 2=o s.uadrons and t)e Britis) 1>> co%/ared (it) 2>> for t)e *er%ans. $a/ti+e &alloons3 used as far &ack as t)e 'renc) Re+olution3 /ro+ided t)e &asic %eans of aerial o&ser+ation for artillery7 &ut aircraft su//le%ented t)ese3 e+entually carrying (ireless telegra/)s to co%%unicate (it) t)e artillery. More ty/ically3 t)e air/lanes /ro+ided reconnaissance to o&ser+e ene%y troo/ and artillery %o+e%ent and concentrations. In a (ar (it) continuous fronts3 /lanes /erfor%ed t)e reconnaissance duties traditionally reser+ed for t)e lig)t ca+alry. ir&orne ca%eras and su&se.uent e-/ert study of t)e /)otogra/)s %ade for effecti+e o&ser+ation &y t)e ne( lig)t ca+alry of t)e air. In Se/te%&er 1@14 t)e 'renc) created t)e first unit of air/lanes de+oted to &o%&ing. 2+en t)oug) t)e ar%ies )ad studied air &o%&ing and t)e Italians )ad used it as (ell as air reconnaissance in t)eir 1@11 (ar (it) t)e 0urks3 t)e 'renc) (ere not ready and )ad to i%/ro+ise &o%&s fro% @># %illi%eter artillery s)ells. Soon all co%&atants &egan &o%&ing and de+elo/ed s/ecialised aircraft. 0y/ically t)ey &o%&ed o&Decti+es3 suc) as rail(ay ter%inals3 &eyond t)e range of artillery and attacked troo/s and artillery (it) &o%&s and %ac)ine guns. Planes assisted ground offensi+es &y attacking targets t)at t)e artillery )ad %issed3 &ut t)e inaccuracy of aerial &o%&ing %ade t)ese efforts relati+ely ineffecti+e. ircraft (it) %ac)ine guns did /ro+e useful against troo/s in t)e o/en and t)us fulfilled t)e tactical role of lig)t ca+alry as (ell. 0)e 'renc) also %ade a %aDor effort at strategic &o%&ing3 ai%ing for t)e iron ore of Briey Basin. $a/tured &y t)e *er%ans in 1@143 t)is region su//lied t)e ra( %aterial *er%any needed to %ake steel. In a sustained t(o#year effort t)e 'renc) &o%&ed t)e rail(ay ter%inals t)roug) ()ic) t)e ore tra+elled. In t)e course of t)e ca%/aign t)ey dro//ed 13B>> tons of &o%&s3 si- ti%es as %uc) as t)e *er%ans dro//ed on 2ngland. But after t)e (ar t)e 'renc) found t)at t)eir effort )ad )ad no effect. 5f 13?>> &o%&s dro//ed on one railroad station3 only 1>> )ad )it t)e target3 and t)ese )ad not i%/eded ore trans/ort. 0)e 'renc) concluded t)at t)ey (ould )a+e )ad to dro/ 1B>3>>> tons to &lock rail transit fro% t)e Briey &asin unless3 of course3 t)ey )ad &o%&ed %ore accurately. But during t)e (ar3 una(are of t)e ineffecti+eness of t)eir &o%&ing3 t)e &elligerents constantly enlarged and i%/ro+ed t)eir &o%&ers. By 1@1B t)e *er%ans )ad a /lane t)at could dro/ a one#ton &o%& t)irteen feet long on ,ondon. 0)e )uge Britis) four#engine "andley#Page G()ic) did not see actionH could carry =3@>> /ounds of &o%&s on a s)ort flig)t.

?<2

1efence against &o%&ers relied /ri%arily on attacking t)e% (it) ot)er aircraft. Bo%&ers t)en attacked at nig)t3 ()en t)e defending /lanes )ad s%all c)ance of seeing t)e% and e+en less of attacking. But dro//ing &o%&s at nig)t furt)er reduced t)e already dis%al accuracy of t)e &o%&ardiers. 5ne of t)e first effecti+e uses of antiaircraft fire occurred ()en a 'renc) infantry unit s)ot do(n a *er%an air/lane (it) a +olley of rifle fire. Soon %ac)ine guns %ounted for )ig) single fire /ro+ided defence against lo(#flying aircraft and si%ilarly %ounted field guns engaged targets at )ig) altitude. But antiaircraft (ea/ons failed to )a+e %uc) success against targets %o+ing in t)ree di%ensions. 2+en (it) searc)lig)ts3 t)ey (ere less effecti+e at nig)t. 1efending aircraft and t)e inaccuracy of t)e &o%&ers3 not antiaircraft guns3 /ro+ided t)e &est defence against an air strike.

Pusher Air lane Back

So3 early in t)e (ar3 /lanes foug)t eac) ot)er. In s/ite of t)e no+elty of co%&at &et(een aircraft3 t)e &asic /attern de+elo/ed rat)er .uickly. Pilots and o&ser+ers in reconnaissance aircraft ar%ed t)e%sel+es first (it) /istols and rifles and t)en (it) air#cooled %ac)ine guns. Planes (it) t)e engine &e)ind /us)ing and an o&ser+er ar%ed (it) a %ac)ine gun in front /ro+ed t)e &est co%&at aircraft &ecause of t)e (ide3 uno&structed field of fire o/en to t)e o&ser+er. But t)e lig)ter single#seat /lanes (it) t)e engine and /ro/eller in front )ad greater s/eed and %anoeu+ra&ility t)an t)e t(o#%an /us)er /lanes. 'renc) /ilot3 after trying unsuccessfully to sync)ronise a %ac)ine gun to fire t)roug) t)e /ro/eller3 /laced steel /lates on )is /ro/eller7 t)ese deflected t)e &ullets t)at )it t)e% fro% t)e for(ard#firing %ac)ine gun. Since %ost &ullets %issed t)e /ro/eller3 )e could use t)e faster3 %ore %anoeu+ra&le tractor /lane for co%&at and ai% )is %ac)ine gun &y ai%ing t)e /lane. 0)e *er%ans t)en de+elo/ed a (orka&le sync)ronising gear3 ()ic) ena&led t)e %ac)ine gun to fire t)roug) t)e /ro/eller. 0)is &eca%e t)e standard ty/e of co%&at or fig)ter or /ursuit aircraft &y t)e %iddle of t)e (ar. By 1@1B fig)ter /lanes )ad t(o rifle#cali&re3 air#cooled %ac)ine guns firing t)roug) t)e /ro/eller and could attain s/eeds of 1?> %iles an )our. 0)e reconnaissance air/lane (as si%ilar3 e-ce/t t)at it carried an o&ser+er and3 (it) its greater (eig)t3 )ad less s/eed and %anoeu+ra&ility. Most &o%&ers )ad %uc) in co%%on (it) reconnaissance /lanes3 t)oug) a fe( )ad t(o3 t)ree3 or e+en four engines. 0)us air (arfare ca%e to rese%&le t)e na+al (arfare of ancient ti%es ()en lig)t3 %anoeu+ra&le galleys ai%ed t)e s)i/ to sink t)eir o//onent &y ra%%ing. Instead of a ra%3 t)e aircraft directed a strea% of %ac)ine gun &ullets at its o//onent. 0)e %et)od of fig)ting also /ut greater e%/)asis on indi+idual co%&at3 a c)aracteristic altered only so%e()at &y t)e organisation of /lanes into s.uadrons. !)en s.uadrons foug)t eac) ot)er3 a %elee resulted. In t)e air fig)ting of !orld !ar I &o%&ing and reconnaissance aircraft /layed a %aDor role. 0)eir greater si6e and (eig)t and slo(er s/eed ga+e t)ese /lanes so%et)ing in co%%on (it) t)e %erc)ant s)i/s of old. lt)oug) t)e o&ser+er )ad a %ac)ine gun and later &o%&ers and o&ser+ation /lanes )ad for(ard#firing %ac)ine guns3 t)ese (ea/ons did not /ro+ide all#around /rotection.

?<?

'ig)ter /lanes used t)eir greater s/eed and %anoeu+ra&ility to attack t)e slo(er air/lanes fro% an un/rotected angle Dust as a galley (ould )a+e ra%%ed t)e side of a %erc)ant s)i/. nd &o%&ers3 (it) t)eir cargo of e-/losi+es3 (ere3 in a sense3 t)e ar%ed %erc)ant s)i/s of t)e skies.

So with )amel5 Tra(tor with Syn(hronised Ma(hine Guns Back

Since only &o%&ers and o&ser+ation /lanes could carry out t)e funda%ental /ur/ose of aircraft3 fig)ter /lanes /layed a defensi+e role in attacking t)e% and also )ad an offensi+e %ission in escorting t)e %ore +ulnera&le air/lanes3 %uc) as escorts )ad /rotected %erc)ant con+oys. In ter%s of tactical success fro% attrition in co%&at3 t)e defenders )ad an ad+antage &ecause t)ey could attack t)e +ulnera&le &o%&ers and reconnaissance /lanes. 5ften defending fig)ters )ad anot)er defensi+e ad+antage3 fig)ting closer to t)eir o(n air/orts. 0)is ena&led t)e% to go into co%&at (it) %ore fuel and so fig)t longer &efore )a+ing to return to t)eir &ase. lso t)e /ilot and t)e air/lane )ad a c)ance of seeing action again if do(ned o+er t)eir o(n territory. But t)e da%age done &y &o%&ing and t)e infor%ation gat)ered &y reconnaissance also constituted a tactical &enefit as (ell as t)e strategic result t)at t)is offensi+e action %ig)t yield. In s/ite of t)eir /re/onderance in nu%&ers3 t)e allied air forces did not gain co%%and of t)e air in t)e (ay t)at t)eir fleets controlled t)e sea. 0)e *er%ans )ad too %uc) strengt)3 and t)eir aircraft (ere too elusi+e for a &lockade to succeed. 2fforts to kee/ a constant /atrol a&o+e an ene%y air/ort3 for e-a%/le3 re.uired constant relays of aircraft3 a difficulty sailing s)i/s did not encounter in %aintaining a close &lockade of a /ort in earlier ti%es. Suc) relays usually %eant t)at t)e &lockading air force )ad so fe( aircraft a&o+e an air/ort at a ti%e t)at t)e inferior air force could easily ac)ie+e su/eriority o+er its o(n airfields. ir attacks against aircraft on t)e ground /ro+ed effecti+e &ut difficult to e-ecute (it)out t)e ene%ys kno(ing of t)e attack and )a+ing fig)ters in t)e air. ntiaircraft defences of %ac)ine guns and field guns ada/ted for )ig)#angle fire also )el/ed t)(art suc) attacks &y a stronger air force. 0)us3 strategically3 t)e (ar in t)e air in+ol+ed &ot) raids and defence against raids7 t)e stronger air forces conducted %ore raids. 0)e allies co%/le%ented t)eir offensi+e on t)e ground (it) an offensi+e in t)e air. 0)is caused t)e% to sustain )ea+ier losses t)an t)e *er%ans3 in s/ite of t)eir greater nu%&ers t)at in t)e uno&structed co%&at area of t)e air s)ould )a+e gi+en t)e% a decisi+e ad+antage as t)ey (ould )a+e %ore guns s)ooting at fe(er targets. Po/ular attention fi-ed itself on t)e fig)ter /ilot and usually ignored t)e %ore /rosaic &o%&er /ilot and )is cre(. 0)e )erois% i%/lied &y single co%&at attracted /o/ular i%agination and /ro+ided t)e )eroes t)at t)e &utc)ery of t)e static trenc) (arfare see%ed to deny. 1u&&ed Jaces3L t)ese /ilots counted t)e nu%&er of ene%y aircraft s)ot do(n. 0)ese re.uired confir%ation &y anot)er o&ser+er or &y finding t)e (recked /lane on t)e ground. Ine-/erienced /ilots3 often inade.uately trained3 /ro+ed easy +icti%s for t)ose ()o )ad sur+i+ed long enoug) to ac.uire skill in flying and co%&at %anoeu+re. 0)us3 t)e leading *er%an ace3 Manfred +on Ric)tofen3 s)ot do(n eig)ty ene%y /lanes &efore )e )i%self3 e-)austed &y constant co%&at3 succu%&ed. 2d(ard Mannock3 t)e %ost successful Britis) ace3 accounted for se+enty#t)ree ene%y aircraft &efore )e died. !illia% . Bis)o/3 a $anadian3 do(ned se+enty#t(o ene%y /lanes and sur+i+ed t)e (ar3 as did t)e leading 'renc) ace3 Ren; 'onck3 ()o &agged se+enty#fi+e. Back

?<4

(he (actics of (rench Warfare

0)e *er%ans3 standing on t)e defensi+e in 'rance in 1@1<3 fortified t)eir front (it) care. It consisted of a line of trenc)es. 0)e fire of t)e infantry and %ac)ine guns of t)e first trenc) co%%anded t)e terrain &efore it and t)en connected to a second trenc) line3 2>> yards &e)ind it. Se+en )undred to 13>>> yards in t)e rear t)e *er%ans /laced anot)er line of %ac)ine gun /osts /rotected &y concrete. 0)e *er%an doctrine3 laid do(n &y t)e solid3 %et)odical c)ief of staff3 'alken)ayn3 re.uired a defence of t)is line at all costs3 (it) counterattacks to reco+er any loss. lt)oug) t)is constituted t)e standard res/onse in defending a siege of a city3 it )ardly )ad %uc) rele+ance ()ere t)e *er%ans )ad &e)ind t)e% t)ousands of s.uare %iles of ca/tured territory. In t)e s/ring of 1@1< t)e Britis) tried to &reak t)roug) (it) a sur/rise t)rust follo(ing a t)irty# to forty#%inute &o%&ard%ent. In one instance t)ey got t)roug)3 &ut reser+es and t)e line of %ac)ine gun /osts t)en )eld u/ t)e ad+ance until %ore reser+es arri+ed and created a ne( front. 0)e Britis) %ig)t )a+e ad+anced fart)er3 &ut t)ey delayed ()ile t)ey a(aited orders fro% t)e generals in t)e rear. By t)e ti%e %essengers carried &ack re/orts and returned (it) orders3 t)e situation )ad c)anged. 4sually lacking any +antage /oint3 like a )ill3 fro% ()ic) t)ey could o&ser+e3 and co%%anding a &attle o+er a front se+eral %iles long3 generals )ad neit)er ade.uate kno(ledge of e+ents nor t)e a&ility to co%%unicate .uickly enoug) to control t)e fig)t. 1efenders faced t)e sa%e difficulties. *radually co%%anders learned t)at trenc) (arfare re.uired decentralisation of co%%and3 (it) %ore aut)ority gi+en to s%all#unit co%%anders. In anot)er assault t)e Britis) infantry )ad to ad+ance only t)e 2>> yards fro% t)e attackers to t)e defenders trenc)lines. 0)ey %o+ed for(ard in si- successi+e lines or (a+es (it) t)e %en t)ree /aces a/art. 0)e *er%an infantry and a fe( %ac)ine guns s)ot do(n t)e first t)ree (a+es3 and *er%an artillery3 firing on t)e Britis) trenc)3 s)ot t)e fourt) as it cli%&ed o+er t)e to/ to &egin its c)arge. 0)e last t(o (a+es failed to attack at all. In t)is and a su&se.uent rene(al t)e Britis) lost =3?4> %en3 t)e *er%ans only @>2. 0)e attack in (a+es reflected a linear syste% traditional since t)e se+enteent) century. Pre#(ar doctrine in all 2uro/ean ar%ies )ad stressed t)e need for t)e attackers to esta&lis) fire su/re%acy o+er t)e defenders7 %a-i%u% fire/o(er re.uired t)is linear array. 0)e doctrine )ad en+isioned ad+ances in rus)es after /rone infantry )ad o+er()el%ed t)e defenders fire3 &ut since it )ad also assu%ed ad+ances fro% greater distances3 t)e actual assault fro% 2>> yards re/resented t)e final rus). Instead of running3 )o(e+er3 t)e attacking infantry (alked ad+ancing at a /redicta&le rate to allo( t)e artillery to kee/ t)e defending /ositions under fire until t)e last %o%ent. Pre#(ar doctrine )ad neit)er reckoned on suc) t)oroug) entrenc)%ents nor realised t)e +olu%e and effecti+eness of t)e defending fire. 0)e Britis) use of %any troo/s and officers only recently enlisted and (it)out /re#(ar training3 %ade t)eir tactics cu%&erso%e and rigid. In &ot) attacks t)e artillery failed to i%/air t)e *er%an /osition or e+en seriously da%age t)e &ar&ed (ire3 e+en t)oug) t)e Britis) )ad one gun for eac) se+en yards of t)e front on t)e narro( sector on ()ic) t)ey %ade t)e assault. Most of t)e Britis) artillery consisted of field guns firing eig)teen#/ound s)ells3 ()ic) lacked t)e /o(er to da%age seriously t)e *er%an field fortifications in so s)ort a &o%&ard%ent. 0)e inaccuracy of t)e fire of t)e guns constituted a %ore i%/ortant cause of failure. Most s)ells %issed t)e trenc)es and t)e &ar&ed (ire &ecause eac) gunner )ad not registered3 t)at is3 fired on t)e target &efore and o&ser+ed and adDusted its fire to &e sure to )it its %ark. But t)e registration of =>> guns takes ti%e. !it)out registration t)e &o%&ard%ent lacked accuracy7 (it) registration t)e attack (ould not )a+e )ad t)e ele%ent of sur/rise. Instead of relying on a sur/rise infantry assault3 t)e 'renc) a//roac)ed t)e /ro&le% of attacking t)e entrenc)ed *er%an /ositions as if it (ere a siege. 8offre3 an engineer officer3 /rescri&ed t)e solution as one of artillery con.uering and infantry occu/ying t)e ground. "e a&andoned sur/rise to attain t)e ad+antages of t)e /rolonged &o%&ard%ent c)aracteristic of sieges. But since 8offres ?<<

long &o%&ard%ent re.uired i%%ense stocks of a%%unition3 )is offensi+es )ad to (ait until )e )ad accu%ulated t)ese. fter unsuccessful efforts in t)e (inter and s/ring of 1@1<3 in t)e autu%n )e atte%/ted t(o %aDor efforts3 one in coo/eration (it) t)e Britis) in t)e nort). In t)e second3 in $)a%/agne on an eig)teen#%ile front3 8offre concentrated t(enty infantry di+isions for t)e attack (it) eig)t infantry and si- ca+alry di+isions in reser+e to e-/loit a &reakt)roug). 0)e *er%an defenders )ad only fi+e di+isions. In addition to an enor%ous nu%&er of field guns3 t)e 'renc) )ad B<> of )ea+ier cali&re for a t)ree#day &o%&ard%ent t)at o&literated t)e *er%an trenc)es. 0)e infantry attack &roke t)roug) t)e *er%an trenc) line on a&out )alf t)e front3 and on eig)t %iles of t)ese t)e t)rust carried t)e% t)roug) t)e line of concrete %ac)ine gun /ositions. But t)e *er%ans3 aided &y t)e ti%e /ro+ided &y t)e t)ree#day &o%&ard%ent3 )ad strengt)ened t)eir defence &y &uilding anot)er line in t)e rear3 13<>> to ?3>>> yards &e)ind t)e first line. 0o attack t)is3 t)e 'renc) )ad to delay to %o+e u/ t)eir artillery to conduct anot)er &o%&ard%ent. 0)is ne( *er%an line /ro+ed less +ulnera&le to artillery fire &ecause t)e *er%ans )ad located it on t)e far side of )ills. !)en t)ey )ad &uilt t)eir original line3 t)ey )ad /laced it on t)e for(ard slo/es of t)ese )ills3 assu%ing t)at t)e infantry needed a good field of fire to re/el an attack. But t)ey )ad learned t)at t)eir fire/o(er could )alt infantry (it) only a fe( )undred yards as a field of fire. 0renc) lines on t)e far slo/es offered e-cellent /rotection fro% t)e fire of t)e )ostile artillery &ecause t)e /osition offered t)e *er%ans s)elter fro% direct fire and )indered t)e 'renc) o&ser+ers ()o (ere trying to correct t)e fall of t)e s)ells fro% )o(it6ers and ot)er (ea/ons e%/loying indirect fire. 0)e 'renc) also attacked in (a+es3 &ut (it) t)eir &etter trained troo/s and %ore /rofessional officers and non#co%%issioned officers3 t)ey ga+e %ore initiati+e to su&ordinates to %anoeu+re and to e-/loit (eaknesses in t)e *er%an /osition3 /rocedures also .uite in consonance (it) t)e traditions of siege (arfare. :et t)eir ()ole conce/t tied t)e infantry to t)e artillery and t)us ine+ita&ly introduced a /onderousness and rigidity into t)eir offensi+e efforts. 0)is /recaution of using t)e far slo/es differed little fro% t)at used in t)e Na/oleonic !ars &y t)e 1uke of !ellington to /rotect )is infantry fro% 'renc) artillery. In addition3 t)e *er%ans i%%ediately &egan digging t(o ne( defensi+e lines in t)e rear of t)eir second line. 0)ey did not need t)ese )o(e+er3 &ecause t)eir ad+antageously located second line su//orted &y t)eir artillery re/elled t)e rene(ed 'renc) assaults. 0)e 'renc) attacks in t)e nort) fared no &etter3 nor did t)ose of t)e Britis) ()o3 (it)out t)e 'renc) ad+antage of an a%/le su//ly of )ea+y artillery3 tried t)e long#&o%&ard%ent tec)ni.ue. 2+en t)oug) t)is killed %any defenders and s%as)ed t)e *er%an entrenc)%ents3 t)e defence3 )a+ing &asically redundant fire/o(er3 could turn &ack an infantry c)arge (it) only a fraction of its force intact. 5ne *er%an %ac)ine gun3 for e-a%/le3 fired 123<>> rounds in one afternoon. 0)is occurred in an attack in ()ic) t)e Britis) suffered o+er B3>>> casualties in s/ite of a &o%&ard%ent t)at lasted four days and used o+er 2<>3>>> s)ells. In t)ese autu%n offensi+es t)e Britis) lost <>3>>> %en3 t)e *er%ans 2>3>>>. gainst t)e 'renc)3 t)e *er%ans lost 12>3>>> to 1@23>>> for t)e 'renc). 0)e *er%an counterattacks and t)eir insistence on not a&andoning any territory cost t)e% )ea+ily against t)e %ore skilful and /o(erfully ar%ed 'renc). 0)e allies ke/t ca+alry di+isions in reser+e to e-/loit t)e &reakt)roug) t)at ne+er ca%e. t a later date Britis) ca+alry c)arged t)e entrenc)ed /ositions in t)e %istaken &elief )e *er%ans (ere retreating. *er%an (rote: J!e could scarcely &elie+e our eyes ()en 2nglis) s.uadrons rode to(ards us.L "e e-/lained t)at *er%an soldiers Jstood u/ as on a rifle range and3 laug)ing3 greeted t)is rare target (it) a )all of &ullets. 0)e sur+i+ors turned and gallo/ed &ack (it) %any e%/ty

?<=

saddles.L t anot)er /oint t)e ca+alry ga+e t)e *er%ans no s/orting o//ortunities3 for3 as t)e *er%an soldier added3 J fe( &atteries fired into a %ass of ca+alry and our %ac)ine guns co%/leted t)eir destruction. $ountless riderless )orses gallo/ed o+er t)e &attlefield and (e ca/tured %any.L Back

(he War in 7=78 and 7=7:

0)e logistics of t)is (ar differed fro% all /re+ious (ars in t)at rail trans/ortation /ro+ided t)e food3 fodder3 and enor%ous .uantities of a%%unition t)e stationary ar%ies re.uired. Sieges )ad al(ays /resented su//ly /ro&le%s3 &ut (it)out t)e railroads t)e ar%ies could not )a+e re%ained i%%o&ile3 &esieging eac) ot)er. 0)e &elligerents )arnessed t)eir industrialised econo%ies to furnis) t)e needs of %ore t)an 1> /ercent of t)eir /o/ulations under ar%s. 0)ese ar%ies could not3 for t)e %ost /art3 li+e at t)e ene%ys e-/ense and re.uired a%%unition and ne( and re/lace%ent (ea/ons in un/recedented .uantities. llied strategy res/onded to t)is ne( relations)i/ &et(een (ar and t)e econo%y ()en t)e Britis) &lockaded *er%any. 0)is logistic strategy could not decide t)e (ar &ecause *er%any )ad industry3 a su&stantial agriculture3 coal and iron3 and land connections (it) 2astern 2uro/e as (ell as (ater co%%unications (it) Scandina+ia. But t)e &lockade did li%it *er%an food su//lies and suc) o+erseas i%/orts as cotton3 ru&&er3 and oil. *er%any ar%ed its soldiers and fed its ar%ies and ci+ilian /o/ulations &ut not (it)out su&stitutions3 incon+enience3 so%e )ards)i/3 and da%age to %orale. 0)e allies3 on t)e ot)er )and3 used t)eir co%%and of t)e sea3 o+erseas in+est%ents3 and credit to i%/ort la+is)ly t)e re.uire%ents of t)eir industries3 ar%ies3 and ci+ilian /o/ulations. 0)e *er%ans continued to %ake t)e %ost of t)eir interior lines. In 1@1< t)ey (ent o+er to t)e defensi+e in 'rance and concentrated against Russia. "ere t)e o//osing ar%ies co+ered a front of a&out C>> %iles3 o+er dou&le t)at fro% S(it6erland to t)e sea3 and eac) )ad forces funda%entally co%/ara&le in strengt) to t)ose in t)e !est. 0)e 1@14 Russian and ustrian offensi+es )ad collided )ead#on3 and3 after a Russian ad+ance3 t)e front of t)e Russians against t)e *er%ans and ustrians )ad sta&ilised in t)e late autu%n. 0)e *er%ans and ustrians intended for t)eir 1@1< offensi+es to &eat &ack and (eaken t)e Russians3 re%o+ing t)e t)reat to ustria. 'irst distracting t)e Russians &y an offensi+e on t)e nort)ern e-tre%ity of t)e front3 in early May t)e *er%ans and ustrians attacked fart)er sout) ()ere only si- Russian di+isions )eld a front of t(enty#eig)t %iles. !it) only a single trenc) line3 t)e Russians faced fourteen ustrian and *er%an di+isions su//orted &y 13<>> guns. Sur/rised and t)eir entrenc)%ents seriously da%aged &y a skilfully /lanned and accurately ai%ed &o%&ard%ent lasting four )ours3 t)e Russians ga+e (ay3 and t)eX ustro#*er%an troo/s /us)ed for(ard eig)ty %iles in t(el+e days. Since t)is ad+ance t)reatened t)e flank and rear of neig)&ouring forces3 t)e Russians fell &ack on a 2<>#%ile front3 re#esta&lis)ing t)e%sel+es (it) a ne( line of entrenc)%ents.

)entral and Eastern Euro e (shading shows Germany and its allies as of early 7>7@! Back

?<C

0)e lo(er ratio of force to s/ace on t)e Russian front /er%itted t)e &reakt)roug)s t)at )ad eluded allied co%%anders in 'rance. !it) a succession of suc) offensi+es t)e *er%ans and ustrians dro+e t)e Russian ar%ies fro% Poland3 inflicting )ea+y casualties. 0)e *er%ans and ustrians t)en turned against Ser&ia in t)e late autu%n3 occu/ying its territory7 t)oug) its ar%y esca/ed to t)e driatic ()ere it &oarded allied s)i/s. 0)inking t)ey )ad destroyed Russias offensi+e ca/acity3 *er%any t)en turned against 'rance3 fig)ting a long3 costly3 and indecisi+e struggle at Verdun in t)e (inter and s/ring of 1@1=. 0)e allies soug)t to secure concentration in ti%e ()en 8offre called a conference in 1ece%&er 1@1< ()en Russia and Italy as (ell as 'rance and Britain agreed to si%ultaneous offensi+es for 8une 1@1=. But t)e allies failed to e-/loit t)eir o(n interior lines. In t)e autu%n of 1@14 t)e 5tto%an 2%/ire )ad entered t)e (ar on t)e side of *er%any and ustria. Its territory included /resent#day 0urkey3 Syria3 ,e&anon3 Ira.3 Palestine3 and ra&ia. Britis) and Russian forces soon engaged t)e 0urks. Since in early 1@1< &elligerent Ser&ia as (ell as neutral Bulgaria se/arated t)e 5tto%an 2%/ire fro% ustria and *er%any3 t)e allies )ad t)e e.ui+alent of interior lines &ecause t)ey could concentrate eit)er against t)e *er%ans and ustrians or against t)e 0urks. !it) t)eir /redo%inance at sea3 t)e allies could readily )a+e &roug)t o+er()el%ing forces against t)e 5tto%an 2%/ire and dri+en it fro% t)e (ar. Suc) a success (ould t)en )a+e released t)e resources e%/loyed against t)e 0urks t)roug)out t)e (ar for use against *er%any and ustria. Instead3 t)e allies atte%/ted to o/en t)e straits into t)e Black Sea (it) t)eir na+ies and3 ()en t)at failed3 landed troo/s ()ere t)e 0urks e-/ected t)e% in an atte%/t to ca/ture t)e *alli/oli Peninsula and o/en t)e 1ardanelles straits. !)en t)is too failed3 ending in an entrenc)ed siege like t)e (estern front3 t)e llies (it)dre( t)eir troo/s3 landing so%e of t)e% at Salonika in ?<B

*reece. Mean()ile3 Bulgaria entered t)e (ar on t)e side of *er%any and ustria and /artici/ated in t)e defeat of Ser&ia3 t)us o/ening railroad co%%unication &et(een *er%any and ustria and t)e 5tto%an 2%/ire o+er ()ic) flo(ed *er%an %unitions and assistance. 0)e allies t)us lost t)eir central /osition &et(een t)e 0urks and *er%ans and ustrians. 0o )a+e defeated t)e (eak 5tto%an 2%/ire first and t)en concentrated all resources against t)e stronger ustro#*er%an co%&ination (ould )a+e &een an ort)odo- a//lication of t)e conce/t of interior lines. 'irst acco%/lis)ing t)e easier task of defeating t)e (eaker antagonist (ould )a+e increased t)e /o(er &roug)t against t)e %ore for%ida&le o//onent. $lause(it63 t)e Dustly reno(ned *er%an aut)ority on (ar3 stated t)e argu%ent against t)is a//roac) ()en )e /ointed out t)at one s)ould ai% at t)e ene%ys %ain /o(er. 5nly an attack on *er%any %et t)is re.uire%ent3 for ustria as (ell as t)e 5tto%an 2%/ire %ust fall if t)e allies +an.uis)ed *er%any. But t)e o+ert)ro( of t)e 5tto%an 2%/ire (ould neit)er defeat *er%any nor end t)e (ar. 0)e argu%ent &ased on interior lines does see% stronger3 )o(e+er3 since initial concentration against t)e 5tto%an 2%/ire (ould ulti%ately ena&le t)e concentration of larger forces against *er%any. 0o con.uer t)e (eaker o//onent first (ould )a+e re.uired t)e least effort3 a factor of es/ecially great i%/ortance in +ie( of t)e o+er()el%ing tactical /ri%acy of t)e defence. But suc) a de&ate did not deter%ine allied strategy. Rat)er3 t)e do%inant /osition of 'rance and its desire to e-/el *er%an ar%ies fro% its soil %eant t)at t)e allies (ould focus t)eir efforts t)ere3 e+en t)oug) t)ey )ad te%/orarily di+erted rat)er large land forces to o/en t)e 1ardanelles and ke/t significant forces in t)e Balkans facing Bulgarian and *er%an ar%ies t)roug)out t)e (ar. 0)e 1@1= si%ultaneous offensi+es did /ut /ressure on *er%any ()en t)e Russian offensi+e in 8une seriously defeated t)e ustrians Dust as ot)er ustrian ar%ies (ere engaged in an offensi+e against Italy3 and t)e *er%ans still found t)e%sel+es in+ol+ed in t)eir /rotracted offensi+e against 'rance at Verdun. t t)e end of 8une t)e 'renc) and Britis) co%/leted t)e si%ultaneous o/erations &y Doining t)e fray (it) a co%&ined attack in 'rance along t)e ri+er So%%e. 0)is So%%e offensi+e turned out to &e anot)er costly3 inclusi+e struggle3 ()ic) lasted fi+e %ont)s. 0)e Britis) &ore t)e /rinci/al &urden3 attacking on a fourteen#%ile front3 t)e 'renc) on only nine %iles. 0)e Britis) )ad created large ar%ies fro% +olunteers during t)e /eriod since 1@14. 0)ese %en )ad t)e ad+antage of ent)usias% &ut t)e disad+antages of ine-/erience and of fe( regular co%%issioned or non#co%%issioned officers to lead t)e%. 0)e Britis) &egan (it) a &o%&ard%ent t)at lasted se+en days and consu%ed o+er 1.= %illion s)ells. 0)e *er%an defences3 (it) tele/)one (ires &uried si- feet dee/ and dugouts for t)e %en t(enty to t)irty feet in t)e ground3 rig)tly %erited so %uc) attention fro% t)e Britis) artillery. 0)e &ar&ed (ire3 strung on steel stakes and fra%es3 consisted of t(o se/arate &elts3 eac) t)irty yards &road. 0)e s)elling e+entually de%olis)ed all of t)is3 e+en ca+ing in %any of t)e dee/ s)elters3 often suffocating t)e %en. But t)e colossal &o%&ard%ent (ould )a+e sacrificed sur/rise3 e+en if t)e ela&orate Britis) /re/arations )ad not already (arned t)e *er%ans. 0)e defenders t)us )ad a%/le notice to %o+e reser+es to t)e t)reatened /oint and &egin t)e construction of additional lines of defence. nd ()en t)e assault ca%e3 t)e re%aining *er%ans ca%e out of t)eir dugouts and set u/ a defence line in t)e s)ell )oles. 0)e attackers3 co%ing in (a+es3 t)us %et rifle and %ac)ine gun fire deadly enoug) to inflict on t)e Britis) on t)e first day <C3>>> casualties3 a&out 4> /ercent of t)e %en engaged. Suc) assaults )ad restored losses to t)e le+el of t)e eig)teent) century ()en 'rederick suffered 4? /ercent casualties in )is unsuccessful offensi+e &attle at 9olin and losses o+er ?> /ercent in t)ree ot)er &attles. 2+en in s)ell )oles t)e defenders )ad co+er t)at co%/letely neutralised t)e nu%erical ad+antage of t)e attackers. If all %en in &ot) forces could )a+e fired on eac) ot)er3 t)e N#s.uare la( s)ould con+ert t)e t)ree#to#one nu%erical su/eriority of t)e attackers into a /redo%inance of nine to one3

?<@

assuring t)e ra/id eli%ination of t)e defenders. But t)e co+er /ro+ided &y )oles in t)e ground %ore t)an counter&alanced greater nu%&ers. 0)e attacking troo/s lost %ore )ea+ily. 0)e terrain also aided t)e *er%ans3 one conte%/orary o&ser+ing Jal%ost in e+ery /art of t)is old front our %en )ad to go u/ )ill to attack... 0)e ene%y )ad lookout /osts3 (it) fine +ie(s o+er 'rance3 and t)e sense of do%ination. 5ur %en (ere do(n &elo(3 (it) no +ie( of anyt)ing &ut strong)old after strong)old3 Dust u/ a&o+e3 &eing %ade stronger daily.L So t)e *er%an /ositions ga+e t)e% a /syc)ological as (ell as a /)ysical ad+antage. 0)e allies really )ad no )o/e of a &reakt)roug) &ecause t)e *er%an second line3 23>>> yards in t)e rear3 )ad as great strengt)3 including co%/lete &elts of &ar&ed (ire3 as t)e first and ?3>>> yards &e)ind t)is second line t)e *er%ans )ad a reser+e line already constructed. In addition3 *eneral 'alken)ayn )ad not rela-ed )is deter%ination to yield no ground. "e )ad /acked t)e front line (it) %en and3 (arned &y t)e long &o%&ard%ent3 )ad reser+es at )and to counterattack. "e )ad reaffir%ed )is /rinci/le t)at Jnot one foot of ground %ust &e gi+en u/3 and if lost %ust &e retaken &y i%%ediate counter attack at all $osts.L 0)is defensi+e /)iloso/)y caused )ea+y *er%an losses &y kee/ing large nu%&ers of %en under t)e fire of t)e %ore /o(erful )ostile artillery3 and losing %any %ore in counterattacks. In t)e fi+e# %ont) &attle3 really a siege3 t)e Britis) lost a&out 42535553 t)e 'renc) a&out 2>>3>>>3 and t)e *er%ans3 ()ose losses are uncertain3 /ro&a&ly so%e()at less t)an =>>3>>>. 0)e territory of 'rance t)at t)e *er%ans foug)t so )ard to retain )ad cost t)e% dearly3 going far to nullify t)e great ad+antages t)at t)e tactical defensi+e ga+e t)e% in any conflict in ()ic) only attrition could %easure t)e outco%e. *reater allied strengt) in infantry and artillery and *er%an e-/osure to t)e &o%&ard%ent and in counter#attacks offset to so%e degree t)e /o(er of t)e tactical defence to inflict greater casualties. Back

(he Search for a (echnological Solution to the (actical +eadlock

lt)oug) generals lost literally %illions of %en in struggles in ()ic) t)ey often %easured t)e results in ter%s of a fe( s.uare %iles gained or lost3 t)ey faced a situation un/recedented in t)e )istory of (ar. 'or )undreds of years generals )ad li+ed (it) and understood stale%ates &ased on t)e strengt) of castles or fortresses and on t)eir ina&ility to force &attle on an ene%y endo(ed (it) a%/le s/ace in ()ic) to elude a co%&at#inclined ad+ersary. 0)en for a century3 (arfare see%ed to confor% to t)e Na/oleonic %odel ()ere t)e attacker could force on t)e defender eit)er &attle or retreat. But suddenly generals faced a deadlock &roug)t on &y a )uge increase in t)e ratio of force to s/ace and an aug%entation of t)e /o(er of t)e tactical defence. Soldiers found it difficult to a&andon t)e t)inking of a lifeti%e3 one reinforced &y t)e /re#(ar illusions t)at fire/o(er )ad en)anced t)e /o(er of t)e offensi+e and t)at %orale and t)e deter%ination to (in could i%/ose ones (ill on t)e ene%y and attain +ictory. J'ire/o(er kills3L t)e a/)oris% of 'renc) *eneral P;tain3 see%s in retros/ect only to dis/lay )is %astery of t)e o&+ious. But it %ade sense in !orld !ar I as an antidote to t)e /re#(ar o+ere%/)asis on %orale and t)e (ill to (in. *er%an officer fig)ting t)e Russians dis/layed t)e reorientation of +ie( needed ()en )is unit re/elled a Russian attack. "is %en3 elderly reser+ists3 o+er(eig)t3 &alding3 and not dis/laying %any soldierly .ualities3 )ad s)ot do(n t)e Russians in s/ite of +ision corrected &y s/ectacles. !)at /articularly s)ocked t)e *er%an officer (as t)at t)e Russians carried out t)eir attack (it) guard units3 elite forces (it) %ore aristocratic officers and %ore courageous and /)ysically ro&ust %en. 0)e cli%ate of o/inion t)at )ad gi+en credence to t)e conce/t of sur+i+al of t)e fittest )ad difficulty ada/ting to t)e unfit (it) %ac)ine guns %o(ing do(n t)e fit. In s/ite of t)e natural difficulties in co/ing (it) t)e une-/ected and un/recedented tactical conditions t)ey faced3 staffs and indi+iduals soug)t solutions to t)e tactical /ro&le%. rtillery%en3 for e-a%/le3 suddenly ele+ated in i%/ortance3 )ad not e-/ected t)e situations t)ey confronted. ?=>

Most )ad /lanned to use t)eir field guns to s)oot at targets t)ey could see7 instead3 t)ey found t)e%sel+es engaged in siege (arfare3 firing at targets t)ey could not see and de/endent on o&ser+ers distant on t)e ground or aloft in an air/lane or &alloon. 'ro% t)e siege artillery3 t)e artillery%en readily learned t)e tec)ni.ue of indirect fire and t)en turned to t)e issue of dis/ensing (it) registration. If t)e artillery could eli%inate registration3 t)e gunners could su//ly t)e infantry (it) a sur/rise and /recise &o%&ard%ent3 ()ic) t)ey could kee/ &rief &ecause it (ould )a+e great accuracy. 0o do t)is t)ey faced t)e /ro&le% of eac) guns )a+ing a different %u66le +elocity3 de/ending on )o( %any rounds it )ad fired and s%all +ariations in %anufacture. 0)e te%/erature of t)e e-/losi+e also affected t)e %u66le +elocity3 cool e-/losi+es of a cool day )a+ing a different /ro/ulsion /o(er t)an t)e (ar% e-/losi+es of a (ar% day. 0)e (ind aloft and t)e density of t)e air affected t)e flig)t of t)e s)ell once fired. 0)e 'renc) artillery%en learned fro% t)e coast artillery )o( to deal (it) t)ese /ro&le%s. 0)ey deter%ined t)e %u66le +elocity of all /ieces3 calculated t)e effect of su&se.uent (ear3 deter%ined t)e result of t)e te%/erature of t)e e-/losi+es3 and learned to send aloft s%all &alloons to disco+er air density3 (ind +elocity3 and direction. !it) e-cellent %a/s and a sur+eyors location of eac) gun3 t)e artillery could calculate in ad+ance t)e ai%ing of a gun (it) a kno(n %u66le +elocity under +arious conditions of te%/erature3 (ind3 and air density. !it) t)is ne( skill3 additional artillery could secretly %o+e to t)e area of a /roDected offensi+e and calculate )o( t)ey (ould )it t)eir targets (it) t)e first s)ot. By 1@1B artillery%en could dis/ense (it) registration and could gi+e t)eir co%%ander a sur/rise &o%&ard%ent of great /o(er and accuracy3 /ro+iding t)e ene%y did not detect t)e arri+al of t)e ne( artillery &atteries. Ne( (ea/ons /ro+ed useful &ut did not alter t)e tactical &alance. 0)e )and grenade3 t)e fla%e# t)ro(er3 and t)e s%all /orta&le trenc) %ortar /ro+ed +alua&le and /ro&a&ly aided t)e attack %ore t)an t)e defence. But t)e /roliferation of t)e lig)t3 /orta&le3 air#cooled %ac)ine gun ga+e %ore fire/o(er to t)e defence. 0)e *er%ans introduced /oison gas on a large scale and3 in /art &ecause of t)e /re#e%inence of t)eir c)e%ical industry3 ke/t a lead in de+elo/ing %ore let)al +arieties. 1is/ensed at first fro% cylinders in t)e attackers trenc)es and later in artillery s)ells3 /oison gas turned out to &e a deadly &ut tricky (ea/on. Its use de/ended on t)e (ind. Soldiers soon )ad %asks t)at /rotected t)e% fro% t)e as/)y-iating gas3 and gas did not /ro+e decisi+e. If used as a sur/rise in great .uantities in an ade.uately su//orted attack3 it could dou&tlessly )a+e /ro+ided a &ig &reakt)roug)3 &ut t)e *er%ans o+erlooked t)is o//ortunity. In fact3 gas see%ed so unlikely to alter t)e &alance of strengt) against a /re/ared o//onent t)at no &elligerents used it in !orld !ar II. 0)e 'renc) and Britis) &ot) &egan early to seek a (ay to a//ly t)e /rinci/le of t)e "olt agricultural tractor to trenc) (arfare. 0)e "olt tractor ran on a track3 ()ic) ena&led it to o/erate off roads3 a ca/a&ility t)at t)e ar%oured car lacked. Initially3 t)e Britis) and 'renc) took different a//roac)es and did not s)are t)eir acti+ities (it) eac) ot)er. ,t. $olonel S(inton of t)e Britis) ar%y suggested t)e idea of a tracked %ac)ine gun +e)icle t)at could cross trenc)es3 ()ile in t)e Britis) d%iralty t)e ,ands)i/ $o%%ittee )ad designed one. Produced in early 1@1<3 t)e lands)i/ (eig)ed t(enty#eig)t tons and )ad a lengt) of t(enty#si- feet. lo6enge#s)a/ed3 ar%oured &o-3 its track ran all around it to gi+e it %a-i%u% trenc)#crossing ca/acity. 5n eac) side3 %ounted in s/onsons3 it carried eit)er a %ac)ine gun and a na+y <C# %illi%eter gun or t(o %ac)ine guns. If ar%ed (it) a <C#%illi%eter gun on eac) side3 t)e Britis) called it a %ale7 if %ac)ine guns instead3 a fe%ale7 and if it )ad a si- /ounder on one side and %ac)ine guns on t)e ot)er3 it (as called a )er%a/)rodite7 all ty/es carried t(o %ac)ine guns in addition to t)ose in t)e s/onsons. !it) first a 1><# and t)en a 1<>#)orse/o(er engine3 it )ad a to/ s/eed of four to fi+e %iles /er )our. Since t)e designers of t)e "olt tractor intended it to /ull

?=1

/lo(s3 t)e track design did not lend itself to )ig) s/eed3 regardless of t)e a%ount of /o(er t)e lands)i/ )ad. !)en first s)i//ed to 'rance3 for security reasons it (as called a (ater reser+oir3 soon s)ortened to tank. 0)e 'renc) tank also )ad its origin in t)e autu%n of 1@143 t)e idea of $olonel 2stienne. n artillery%an3 t)e colonel (is)ed to ena&le t)e artillery to follo( t)e infantry in t)e attack. Bot) of )is %odels3 de+elo/ed &y different %anufacturers3 consisted of a C<#%illi%eter field gun in an ar%oured &o- on a "olt tractor. 5ne %odel (eig)ed fifteen tons3 t)e ot)er t(enty#fi+e. Bot) )ad %ac)ine guns and a s/eed of a&out fi+e %iles /er )our. 0)e 'renc) design s)o(ed less i%agination &ecause t)e &o- e-tended &eyond t)e tracks3 li%iting its a&ility to cross trenc)es or negotiate une+en terrain. Rat)er t)an a trenc)#crossing %ac)ine3 t)e 'renc) )ad really /roduced a self# /ro/elled gun.

Prototy e &andshi

Back

0)e t(o allies ke/t secret fro% eac) ot)er3 as (ell as fro% t)e *er%ans3 t)eir tank de+elo/%ents. 0)e 'renc) dis/layed %ore ent)usias% t)an t)e Britis) for t)ese tracked +e)icles3 ordering B>> &efore t)ey )ad e+en seen an e-/eri%ental %ac)ine3 and /lanned to accu%ulate a large nu%&er to e%/loy in a %aDor sur/rise offensi+e. But t)e Britis) (arned t)e ene%y of t)eir e-istence ()en t)ey used a fe( of t)eirs in t)e latter /art of t)e So%%e offensi+e. 'ortunately3 t)e *er%ans /ro+ed as sce/tical of t)e% as %ost Britis) co%%anders and %ade no significant effort to /ro+ide t)e%sel+es (it) tanks. 2+en if t)ey )ad3 *er%any (ould )a+e (orked at a se+ere disad+antage &ecause 'rance )ad led in t)e de+elo/%ent and %anufacture of t)e %otor car3 only recently losing to t)e 4nited States its /osition as t)e (orlds leading auto%o&ile %anufacturer. Since t)e Britis) also )ad a large auto%o&ile industry3 t)e allies )ad an o+er()el%ing /redo%inance of %anufacturers t)at could easily con+ert to fa&ricating tanks. Mean()ile3 $olonel 2stienne (orked (it) t)e Renault auto%o&ile co%/any to /roduce an ar%oured +e)icle entirely different fro% t)e lands)i/ or t)e self#/ro/elled gun. !eig)ing only siand one#)alf tons3 t)e ne( tank )ad a track t)at e-tended &eyond its &ody in front gi+ing it good trenc)#crossing ca/a&ilities for its s%all si6e. ,o(er t)an eit)er t)e Britis) or earlier 'renc) %ac)ines7 it )ad on to/ a turret3 ()ic) could tra+erse ?=> degrees. 0)e turret carried eit)er a ?C# %illi%eter gun3 for s)ooting at %ac)ine gun e%/lace%ents3 or a %ac)ine gun. 0)e tactical /lan en+isioned one tank (it) a cannon (orking (it) t(o ar%ed (it) %ac)ine guns. Most tanks )a+e follo(ed t)ese design /rinci/les e+er since3 and t)e 'renc)3 realising t)ey )ad t)e rig)t conce/t3 ordered 43>>> of t)ese Renault tanks. Bot) t)e Britis) and 'renc) )ad large nu%&ers ready for use in 1@1B3 )ad organised and trained %en to o/erate t)e%3 and )ad a fairly clear idea of t)eir role in an attack. Back

(he German >uest for *ictory through a "ogistic Strategy /sing Submarines
By 8anuary 1@1C t)e *er%an na+y )ad 111 su&%arines co%/ared (it) si-ty#eig)t in early 1@1=. 0)eir na+y &elie+ed t)at if it disregarded any restrictions on tor/edoing %erc)ant s)i/s3 it could sink =>>3>>> tons of s)i//ing /er %ont). 0)is (ould dri+e t)e Britis) fro% t)e (ar &ecause t)e su&%arines could sink so %any %ore s)i/s t)an t)e allies could &uild and t)us interru/t t)e i%/orts and e-/orts necessary to kee/ Britains industries going3 its /eo/le e%/loyed3 and its ar%ies ?=2

/ro+ided for. $onse.uently3 at t)e end of 8anuary 1@1C3 *er%any resu%ed unrestricted su&%arine (arfare against %erc)ant s)i/s3 realising t)at it (ould /ro&a&ly &ring t)e 4nited States into t)e (ar. But if *er%any closed t)e sea#lanes3 4.S. /artici/ation (ould )a+e little %eaning3 and t)e %erican na+y3 strong in &attles)i/s and ar%oured cruisers &ut (eak in t)e destroyers useful against su&%arines3 could do little to co%&at t)e su&%arine. 0)e *er%an su&%arine strategy3 sound in its calculations3 foundered on t(o related +aria&les3 one tactical3 and t)e ot)er strategic. By 1@1C t)e Britis) na+y3 could track a %o+ing su&%arine (it) a )ydro/)one3 ()ic) could )ear t)e /ro/ellers and gi+e an a//ro-i%ate location of t)e su&%arine. It could also attack t)e su&%arine (it) de/t) c)arges. 0)e attacking destroyer dro//ed t)ese cylinders filled (it) e-/losi+es in an area ()ere t)ey &elie+ed t)ey )ad located a su&%arine3 setting t)e% to e-/lode eit)er at t)e likely de/t) of t)e su&%arine or at +arious de/t)s. de/t) c)arge did not need a direct )it to disa&le a su&%arine &ecause (ater3 an inco%/ressi&le fluid3 readily trans%itted to t)e su&%arines )ull t)e /ressure created &y t)e e-/losion.

The Su-marine War5 7>7A/7>78 Back

0)e con+oy3 long ago used &y t)e Britis) na+y to /rotect %erc)ant s)i/s against t)e co%%erce raiders of 'rance and ot)er o//onents3 /ro+ided t)e strategic %eans to /rotect t)e %erc)ant s)i/s and to &ring t)e (ars)i/s (it) )ydro/)ones and de/t) c)arges into contact (it) t)e su&%arines t)at %ust attack s)i/s in con+oy if t)ey attacked at all. 0)e data on s)i/ sinkings reflect &ot) t)e realis% of *er%an e-/ectations Ginitial sinkings far e-ceeded Britis) construction out/utH and t)e effecti+eness of t)e Britis) res/onse # sinkings of %erc)ant s)i/s declined and su&%arine losses increased Gsee a&o+e ta&leH. Back

(he New German Method of +efence

t t)e end of 1@1= t)e 'renc) go+ern%ent )ad re%o+ed 8offre3 t)e re/eated failures and enor%ous casualties of )is offensi+es di%%ing t)e lustre of )is ac)ie+e%ents in 1@14. 0o dis/ose of 8offre in a genteel %anner3 t)e re/u&lic re+i+ed for )i% t)e old royal and i%/erial rank of Mars)al of 'rance3 t)e conDunction of its ancient glory and 8offres real ac)ie+e%ents %aking t)is a felicitous %eans of laying )i% on t)e s)elf and of gi+ing real dignity to t)e rank3 its se+en#star insignia3 and t)e ne( Mars)al.

?=?

0)e go+ern%ent re/laced )i% (it) Ni+elle3 a confident Dunior general ()o &egan a ne( offensi+e in /ril3 su//osedly (it) a ne( %et)od. But it fell dis%ally s)ort of antici/ations3 in s/ite of )a+ing o+er <3>>> cannon for a t(enty#fi+e %ile front3 al%ost one gun for e+ery eig)t yards of t)e assault frontage. 0)e contrast &et(een t)e e-/ectations t)at Ni+elle )ad raised and t)e e%/)atic failure of )is offensi+e de%oralised 'renc) soldiers3 ()o said t)ey (ould defend &ut no longer attack. 0)e go+ern%ent t)en ga+e t)e co%%and to *eneral "enri P)ili//e P;tain3 ()o )ad &egun t)e (ar in ugust as a colonel &ut &y 5cto&er 1@14 )ad so e-celled t)at 8offre )ad /ro%oted )i% to co%%and of a cor/s. In 1@1< P;tain recei+ed an ar%y co%%and and in 1@1= successfully conducted t)e defence of Verdun and )ad t)e re(ard of an ar%y grou/. 8ust &efore )is si-ty#first &irt)day P;tain3 a /erce/ti+e student of t)e co%&at realties of t)e (ar3 took o+er t)e 'renc) ar%y. &elie+er in t)e su/re%acy of fire/o(er and t)e /ri%acy of t)e defence and acting /ro%/tly and (isely3 )e gradually restored t)e %orale of t)e ar%y. 0)us t)e 'renc) ar%y )ad a s%all offensi+e role in 1@1C and3 &ecause rigid security ke/t t)eir crisis of %orale fro% t)e *er%ans3 no %aDor defensi+e tasks. But t)e *er%ans )ad to face attacks fro% t)e Britis)3 ()o )ad %arkedly strengt)ened t)eir artillery and aug%ented t)e .uality and .uantity of t)eir a%%unition. Beginning t)eir &o%&ard%ent in early May3 t)e Britis)3 )a+ing a si-#to#one su/eriority in aircraft against ()ic) e+en Baron +on Ric)tofens s.uadron of red#/ainted air/lanes could not /re+ail3 %ade e-tensi+e use of artillery o&ser+ation fro% aircraft. 0)e steadily accelerating s)elling &y o+er 23?>> cannon o&literated t)e *er%an /ositions. 0)e *er%an garrisons3 (it) t)e realistic fear of &eing ento%&ed in t)eir dugouts3 took refuge in s)ell )oles3 ()ere t)ey li+ed a /recarious and unco%forta&le e-istence ()ile Britis) artillery de%olis)ed t)e e%/ty trenc)es. fter a final se+en#day &o%&ard%ent in ()ic) o+er ? %illion s)ells landed on a si-#%ile front3 t)e Britis)3 ()o3 like &esiegers of old3 )ad s/ent a year tunnelling under t)e Messines Ridge3 e-/loded nineteen dee/ %ines under t)e *er%an lines. 0)e force of t)e 1 %illion /ounds of e-/losi+e3 felt t(enty %iles a(ay3 ena&led t)e Britis) to take Messines Ridge3 t)e *er%ans losing %ore %en t)an t)e assaulting Britis). Before t)e Britis) resu%ed t)eir attack to(ard near&y Passc)endaele3 t)e *er%ans introduced a ne( syste% of defence3 ()ic) t)ey )ad /erfected during t)e %ore t)an t)ree %ont)s t)at t)is Passc)endaele ca%/aign lasted. 0)e %et)od )ad already recei+ed t)e endorse%ent of t)e ne( leaders of t)e *er%an ar%y3 'ield Mars)al "inden&urg and )is associate3 *eneral ,udendorff3 t)e +ictors of 0annen&erg and arc)itects of +ictories against t)e Russian ar%ies. !)ereas *eneral 'alken)ayn3 ()o% t)e go+ern%ent )ad re%o+ed in t)e su%%er of 1@1=3 )ad insisted on )olding e+ery inc) of territory3 "inden&urg and ,udendorff encouraged an elastic defence. Instead of cra%%ing t)e front trenc)es (it) %en to &e casualties of a &o%&ard%ent # t)e ne( *er%an doctrine /rescri&ed an out/ost line of a fe( s.uads (it) lig)t %ac)ine guns to )old t)e front. s soon as a &o%&ard%ent &egan3 t)e troo/s in &ot) t)e out/ost and t)e second line3 23>>> yards &e)ind3 (ere to lea+e t)eir trenc)es and underground dugouts to take refuge in s)ell )oles. In fact3 t)e tre%endous /o(er of Britis) artillery )ad %ade t)e trenc)es3 dugouts3 and concrete %ac)ine gun /ositions useful only to attract ene%y artillery fire. Be)ind t)e out/ost and second line3 t)e *er%ans )ad t)ree additional lines (it) a si-t) on ()ic) t)ey )ad &egun construction. But t)ey /lanned to )alt t)e attack in t)e 6one &et(een t)e second and t)ird lines in ()ic) t)eir reser+es (ould conduct counterattacks. !ell could t)e *er%an ar%y grou/ co%%ander confide to )is diary: JMy %ind is .uite at rest a&out t)e attack3 as (e )a+e ne+er dis/osed of suc) strong reser+es3 so (ell trained for t)eir /art3 as on t)e front attacked.L 0)e Britis) &egan t)e3 rene(ed dri+e on a fifteen#%ile front (it) an artillery &o%&ard%ent &y 23?>> guns t)at e-/ended = %illion s)ells a%ounting to =<3>>> tons of %etal. s t)e Britis) slo(ly ground t)roug) t)e *er%an defences3 t)e defenders gradually /erfected t)e tec)ni.ue of a lig)tly )eld front line to a&sor& t)e s)elling and of troo/s dis/ersed in s)ell )oles to a+oid acting as t)e

?=4

targets of t)e Britis) gunners. 0)e *er%ans also i%/ro+ed t)eir use of artillery in t)e defence and conducted t)eir counterattacks eit)er /ro%/tly3 &efore t)e ad+ancing Britis) )ad dug in3 or after a day or t(o ()en *er%an artillery could gi+e /ro/er su//ort. In any case3 t)e Britis) (ould )a+e )ad to %o+e slo(ly &ecause eac) ad+ance of 23>>> or %ore yards usually re.uired a )alt of as %any as t)ree days ()ile t)e artillery /roceeded for(ard to /ositions fro% ()ic) it could &o%&ard t)e ne-t *er%an /osition. 0)roug)out t)is four#%ont) struggle t)e t)oroug)ly cratered and .uite soggy ground i%/eded t)e %o+e%ent of t)e guns and t)e /ro+ision of an ade.uate su//ly of a%%unition. gain t)e terrain fa+oured t)e *er%ans3 t)is ti%e &ecause t)e ela&orately drained3 lo(#lying ground .uickly &eca%e a %orass ()en artillery fire destroyed t)e drainage. Be)ind t)e lines t)e Britis) soldiers )ad to lay /lank (alk(ays to /rotect t)e%sel+es fro% sinking into t)e %ud. 5n at least one occasion a soldier %issed )is ste/ and (ent into t)e %ud ()ere )e &egan to sink into t)e %ud3 )is co%rades )el/less to sa+e )i%. s t)e %ud (as a&out to s(allo( )i% )e a//ealed to )is fello(s to s)oot )i%3 a deat) )e t)oug)t /refera&le to suffocation. 0)e )ig)er co%%anders often re%ained .uite ignorant of t)ese terrain conditions3 ()ic) so )andica//ed t)e offensi+e. Britis) officer fro% )ead.uarters3 for e-a%/le3 co%ing to t)e front to(ard t)e end of t)e long ca%/aign3 first &eca%e a//re)ensi+e t)at )is auto%o&ile %ig)t &eco%e stranded and t)en3 gras/ing t)e real nature of t)e terrain3 &urst into tears and e-clai%ed: J*ood *od3 did (e really send %en to fig)t in t)atKL s a result of t)eir successful e-/erience (it) t)is for% of defence3 t)e *er%ans /rescri&ed it for all units on t)e (estern front. Ironically3 t)e 'renc)3 ()o usually assu%ed t)e offensi+e and3 on t)e defence3 soug)t to /rotect t)eir o(n soil3 )ad first ado/ted t)is %et)od of elastic defence. s originally constituted3 it )ad used as a %ain line of defence a syste% of strong/oints /laced 2>> yards a/art and organised for all#around defence. )ead of t)ese strong/oints t)e 'renc) %aintained an out/ost line and3 &e)ind3 a t)ird line (it) s)elters for t)e reser+es t)at (ould counterattack. $onstrained &y 'alken)ayn3 t)e *er%ans )ad not used suc) a /rocedure until 1@1C3 and ()en t)ey did t)ey ela&orated it in de/t)3 t)oroug)ness3 and so/)istication. 0)e ne( *er%an defensi+e arrange%ents fully /ro+ed t)e%sel+es. 0)e t)inly )eld front line of troo/s3 dis/ersed in s)ell )oles once t)e &o%&ard%ent &egan3 significantly reduced *er%an losses in s/ite of t)e a(eso%e /o(er and ner+e#racking lengt) of t)e Britis) &o%&ard%ent. But t)is front line still /ro+ed for%ida&le and inflicted )ea+y casualties on t)e attackers. 0)e %ain &urden of t)e defence3 )o(e+er3 fell on an area of one to t)ree %iles in de/t) &et(een t)e second and t)ird lines. "ere3 on terrain usually /rotected &y )ills fro% direct Britis) o&ser+ation3 (it) defensi+e /ositions ade.uately ca%ouflaged against air reconnaissance3 and at t)e li%it of Britis) lig)t artillery t)e *er%ans %ade t)eir %ain defensi+e effort. In addition to %ac)ine guns3 %any in concrete e%/lace%ents3 t)e *er%ans used t)eir artillery3 ()ic) enDoyed e-cellent fire control and co%%unications in areas (it) ()ic) t)ey )ad t)oroug) fa%iliarity. 0)ey counted on de/t)3 eac) regi%ent de/loying its t)ree &attalions one &e)ind t)e ot)er. Be)ind t)is &attle 6one t)ey )ad a furt)er defensi+e line3 occu/ied &y eac) regi%ents rear%ost &attalion3 to /rotect t)eir artillery3 and ot)er lines fart)er to t)e rear laid out if not already &uilt. In addition to t)e strengt) su//lied &y de/t)3 t)e /o(er of (ell#directed artillery3 and t)e sur/rise t)at faced attackers fro% ca%ouflaged defensi+e /ositions3 t)e *er%an defence /laced a funda%ental reliance on counterattacks. 0)eir t)in front ena&led t)e% to %aintain large reser+es3 far &e)ind t)e /rinci/al area of t)e Britis) &arrage. 0)e sufficient notice of attack /ro+ided &y t)e long &o%&ard%ent ena&led t)e *er%ans to strengt)en t)ese reser+es %ost a%/ly. Since t)e counterattack )ad suc) a funda%ental role in t)is ne( *er%an conce/t of t)e defence3 t)e reser+es /racticed t)eir a//roac) %arc)es to t)eir counterattacking /ositions.

?=<

s an ideal res/onse3 t)e *er%ans en+isioned all al%ost i%%ediate counterattack t)at (ould take t)e attacking Britis) &y sur/rise and find t)e% disorganised &y t)eir offensi+e efforts. 0o assure t)e ti%eliness of t)is assault as (ell as t)e res/onsi+eness of t)e ()ole defence3 t)e co%%ander of t)e regi%ents fore%ost &attalion co%%anded t)e sector3 including t)e &attalions &e)ind. 0)e front# line di+ision co%%ander e-ercised si%ilar control o+er di+isions co%%itted in )is sector. 0)us t)e *er%ans secured e-cellent decentralisation of co%%and3 a c)ange de%anded &y trenc) (arfare. If t)e i%%ediate counterattack failed in s/ite of t)e ad+anced /re/arations and e-cellent artillery control3 t)e *er%ans /re/ared a %ore deli&erate assault (it) %ore troo/s and artillery3 ()ic) still (ould enDoy t)e ad+antages of &etter organisation o+er t)e allied forces t)at )ad to occu/y and fortify t)eir ne(ly (on territory3 e+en if t)ey (ere not gi+ing t)eir /rinci/al attention to continuing t)eir offensi+e. But t)ese counterattacks did not )a+e as t)eir /ri%ary o&Decti+e t)e reco+ery3 of territory3 t)oug) retaining t)eir fa+oura&le terrain3 fortified 6one3 and esta&lis)ed artillery /ositions did indeed constitute an i%/ortant ad+antage of )olding territory. Successful counterattacks against un/re/ared foes not only3 defeated t)e assault &ut also inflicted ad+erse attrition on t)e defenders3 often netting t)e *er%ans %any /risoners. By t)eir decentralisation of co%%and3 t)e *er%ans i%/ro+ed t)e effecti+eness of t)eir already (ell#articulated units. $o%&at in ()ic) s%all grou/s occu/ied se/arate defensi+e /ositions or s)ell )oles re.uired a decentralisation and articulation (it)in a &attalion not antici/ated &efore t)e (ar. Not only did t)e co%/anies of t)e &attalion and t)eir ca/tains and t)e co%/anys /latoons and t)eir lieutenants ac.uire undrea%ed of autono%y and res/onsi&ility3 &ut also t)e sergeants of t)e /latoons su&di+isions )ad significant o//ortunity for %anoeu+ring t)eir units of a do6en %en and dis/laying all initiati+e .uite foreign to earlier ideas of a sergeants res/onsi&ility. Suc) /erfected articulation strengt)ened t)e resilience of t)e &attalion and3 on t)e defence3 ena&led it to concentrate against t)e strengt) of t)e ene%ys attack as (ell as3 in t)e counterattack3 to concentrate to e-/loit Britis) (eakness. 0)e tele/)one and t)e ela&oration and decentralisation of t)e %eans of artillery control ena&led t)e guns to /lay a role on t)e defensi+e essentially co%/ara&le to t)at in t)e /ast ()en t)ey could fire canister against attacking lines t)ey could see. 0)e guns could /artici/ate in t)e counterattack +ery effecti+ely &ecause t)e assaulting ene%y troo/s )ad already co%e close to t)e guns3 %eaning t)at t)e counterattacking *er%ans (ould not likely ad+ance &eyond t)e su//ort of t)eir artillery. "o(e+er different t)is kind of (arfare see%ed fro% t)at of t)e eig)teent) and nineteent) centuries3 it &ut constituted a logical e-tension of t)e trends &egun in t)e 'renc) ar%y in t)e latter /art of t)e eig)teent) century. Back

(he New German +octrine for #ttack

In 1@1C t)e *er%ans ado/ted a ne( %et)od of attack3 ()ic) also o(ed so%et)ing to 'renc) ins/iration. 0)e initial 'renc) syste%3 ()ic) t)e *er%ans e%/loyed and t)e Britis) )ad ado/ted3 in+ol+ed using attacking infantry in successi+e lines or (a+es of %en. 0)ese often ad+anced according to a /redeter%ined ti%eta&le3 t)e use of lines or (a+es facilitating control &y )ig)er )ead.uarters as (ell as t)e coordinating of t)e %o+e%ents of t)e infantry (it) t)e fire /lan of t)e artillery. 4lti%ately3 t)e artillery fired a &arrage t)at /laced a curtain of e-/loding s)ells &efore t)e attacking infantry7 t)e curtain also %o+ed for(ard according to a /re#esta&lis)ed ti%eta&le3 and &e)ind it t)e infantry ad+anced3 follo(ing t)e artillerys sc)edule. Suc) a su&ordination of infantry to artillery e-e%/lified 8offres siege (arfare /rinci/le t)at artillery con.uered and infantry occu/ied. $a/tain ,affargue3 a 'renc) officer ()o e-/erienced t)is attack in its %ost /ri%iti+e for% in early 1@1<3 /ro%/tly (rote a /a%/)let. "e alluded to t)e +alue of infantry in line: J0o )a+e e-/erienced t)e influence of an align%ent in t)ose first critical %inutes of an assault is to a//reciate its ca/ital

?==

i%/ortance.L It (orked Jto drag on (it) it any )esitating indi+iduals3 to restrain t)e too i%/etuous and to gi+e to all t)at (ar% and co%forting feeling of %utual confidence.L Ne+ert)eless3 )e fa+oured using s%all grou/s ar%ed (it) %ac)ine guns and grenades t)at (ould go a)ead of t)e line and /us) t)roug) (eak s/ots and t)us &e a&le to attack ene%y %ac)ine gun /ositions fro% t)e rear and /enetrate dee/ into t)e )ostile /osition. In a sense tactics using lines3 dictated in /art &y t)e role of artillery and t)e difficulty controlling its fire3 )ad re+erted to t)e linear syste% of t)e late se+enteent) and t)e eig)teent) centuries ()en &attalions in line ke/t contiguous to and aligned (it) t)eir neig)&ours. ,affargue ad+ocated a /arallel to t)e ado/tion of t)e &attalion colu%n3 ()ic) could %anoeu+re on t)e &attlefield and concentrate against t)e (eak /oints in t)e ene%y line. 5f course3 )e en+isioned a s.uad of skir%is)ers3 &ut t)e sa%e /rinci/les G&etter articulation and t)e a&ility to concentrate against (eaknessH ani%ated )is ideas. 'renc) )ead.uarters /rinted and distri&uted ,affargues /a%/)let &ut did not i%/le%ent its /rinci/les as t)eir &asic offensi+e doctrine. ,affargues %et)od re.uired decentralisation of co%%and do(n to s.uad leaders and furt)er de/ri+ed generals of control o+er t)e &attle3 a co%%and t)at t)ey still /artially e-ercised t)roug) t)e artillerys fire /lan and infantry in (a+es. 5n t)e defence3 t)e *er%ans )ad disco+ered t)e sa%e need for initiati+e and control on t)e /art of t)e lo(#le+el co%%anders. ,affargues ideas also contradicted 8offres siege (arfare a//roac) in ()ic) t)e infantry follo(ed t)e artillery. In 1@1= t)e *er%ans o&tained a co/y of ,affargues /a%/)let and3 &ecause its ideas fit so nicely (it) t)ose t)ey already (ere e+ol+ing3 translated and diffused it (it)in t)e ar%y. By 1@1C t)e *er%an ar%y3 ()ic) )ad ne+er fully concei+ed of t)e offensi+e as siege (arfare3 &egan using infiltration tactics like ,affargues as t)e doctrine for infantry in t)e offensi+e. 8ust as (it) t)eir ne( syste% of defence ()ere defenders foug)t in s)ell )oles rat)er t)an field fortifications and reser+es soug)t to %ake sur/rise counterattacks3 t)e *er%an offensi+e doctrine %ade use of /rinci/les a//lica&le to o/en rat)er t)an siege (arfare and refused to let artillery su&ordinate t)e infantrys action to its needs. 0)e defences3 ()ic) dis/osed troo/s in de/t) and3 in s/ite of a reliance on trenc) lines3 consisted of a series of strong /oints3 lent t)e%sel+es to /enetration &y infiltration tactics. 0)e strong /oints3 co+ering ga/s (it) fire3 de/ended on o&ser+ation3 ()ic) in turn could suffer i%/air%ent fro% fog3 s%oke3 and gas as (ell as fro% artillery fire t)at could dri+e o&ser+ers to co+er. Infiltration tactics a&andoned (a+es in fa+our of grou/s t)at /us)ed t)roug) (eak s/ots. Instead of delaying t)e ad+ance of a (a+e until t)e assaulting force )ad o+erco%e a defending strong /oint3 t)e attackers infiltrated t)e defence3 /us)ed for(ard3 and left t)e con.uest of t)e strong /oints to t)e troo/s t)at ca%e &e)ind. 0)e old ideas of concentration against (eakness and of turning and en+elo/ing )ostile forces ani%ated t)ese tactics. 0)e *er%ans indoctrinated troo/s (it) t)e /rinci/le and drilled t)e% in t)e a//lication of t)e ne( for% of attack3 s/ending t)e (inter of 1@1C# 1B retraining a large /art of t)eir ar%y. 0)e &asic ele%ent of attack &eca%e a&out a do6en %en (it) lig)t %ac)ine guns. 0)ey di+ided t)eir units into t)ose co%/osed of t)e %ore and t)ose of t)e less co%/etent and (ell %oti+ated. $oncentrating t)eir offensi+e training on t)e &etter %en3 t)e *er%ans created %any di+isions of trained assault troo/s3 lea+ing t)e %en (it) less enter/rise3 courage3 and skill to )old defensi+e /ositions. 'ifty#si- of t)e 1@2 di+isions t)en on t)e (estern front &eca%e attack di+isions. 0)e soldiers of 1@1B )ad steel )el%ets to /rotect t)e% fro% s)ra/nel and t)e s/linters of )ig)# e-/losi+e s)ells. 0)ey carried %aga6ine rifles and )and grenades. 0)ey could )url t)ese s%all &o%&s3 ()ic) )ad a s)ort ti%e fuse &efore t)ey e-/loded to t)ro( anti/ersonnel frag%ents. 0)e grenades re/roduced3 in %iniature3 t)e ca/a&ilities of t)e )o(it6er. So%e soldiers )ad grenade

?=C

launc)ers to gi+e increased range. In t)e *er%an ar%y /latoons )ad sections of a&out a do6en %en. In eac) section one s.uad of fi+e ser+ed and su//orted a lig)t air cooled %ac)ine gun. 0)e ot)er s.uad consisted of infantry%en only3 (it) t)e %ac)ine gun usually /ro+iding fire and t)e infantry%en often constituting t)e %anoeu+re or offensi+e ele%ent of t)e section. In t)e infiltration tactics t)e &attalion still co%/rised t)e assault for%ation3 and it )el/ed t)e infantry section (it) (ater#cooled %ac)ine guns3 fla%e#t)ro(ers Ga 'renc) inno+ation t)at /roDected &urning /etroleu% under /ressureH and /orta&le %ortars t)at (ere like grenades &ut %ore accurate and /o(erful. 5ften engineers e.ui//ed to &uild lig)t &ridges /re/ared t)e (ay for %en3 artillery3 and +e)icles follo(ing. 0)e &attalion also )ad its o(n artillery3 t)e ar%ys older3 s)orter3 and lig)ter field /ieces. 0)ese3 t)e ar%ys %ost easily %o+ed artillery3 acco%/anied t)e &attalion in t)e ad+ance. In t)e attack t)e first grou/ of infantry located t)e ene%y /ositions3 t)e second found and /us)ed t)roug) t)e (eak s/ots3 and t)e t)ird su//orted t)e second and /rotected its flanks. 0)e re%ainder of t)e di+ision follo(ed3 reducing t)e &y/assed strong /oints &y using t)e ga/s %ade to en+elo/ t)e%. 0)e lead units ke/t u/ t)eir ad+ance (it)out res/ite3 constantly /ro&ing for and e-/loiting (eak s/ots in t)e ene%y defences. 0)e ()ole offensi+e doctrine )ad t)e goal of &reaking co%/letely t)roug) t)e allied defensi+e 6one. ircraft /layed a %aDor role in t)is offensi+e. ,ike t)e infantry and artillery3 secretly concentrated in sufficient nu%&ers to )a+e nu%erical su/eriority3 t)e /lanes ai%ed to /rotect t)eir o(n troo/s3 to kee/ a(ay allied o&ser+ation aircraft3 and to su//le%ent t)e artillery and attack targets of o//ortunity3 es/ecially allied reser+es in %otion on t)e roads. In t)e latter /art of 1@1C t)e *er%ans )ad %ade se+eral trials of t)e ne( tactics. 5f one of t)ese3 a co%/etently /re/ared counterattack against t)e Britis) in No+e%&er3 t)e .ritish Offi(ial History said t)at t)e *er%ans ad+anced Jin s%all colu%ns &earing %any lig)t %ac)ine guns3 and3 in so%e cases3 fla%e t)ro(ers. 'ro% o+er)ead lo( flying air/lanes in greater nu%&ers t)an )ad &een seen3 &o%&ed and %ac)ine#gunned t)e Britis) defenders3 causing furt)er casualties and3 es/ecially3 distraction at t)e critical %o%ent.L 0)e Offi(ial History also /ointed out t)at fe( strong /oints Ja//ear to )a+e &een attacked fro% t)e front3 t)e assault s(ee/ing in &et(een to en+elo/ t)e% fro% flanks and rear.L 0)e %ating of t)e infiltration tactics (it) ot)er %easures to secure an effecti+e offence &eca%e kno(n as t)e "utier syste%3 for t)e %et)ods )ad (orked (ell in an attack &y *eneral 5skar +on "utier in an offensi+e against t)e Russians in Se/te%&er 1@1C. 0)e attack relied on sur/rise. 0)e a&ility of t)e artillery to fire accurately (it)out gi+ing a(ay its /resence or location /er%itted a sur/rise concentration of artillery. 0)e accuracy of t)e fire3 %ade /ossi&le &y t)e i%/ro+ed artillery %et)ods3 rendered a long &o%&ard%ent unnecessary in order to da%age t)e defences seriously. 0)e s)ort3 intensi+e &o%&ard%ent used in t)e +on "utier syste% also relied on a large /ro/ortion of gas and s%oke s)ells. Not only did t)ese reduce t)e effecti+eness of t)e defenders3 ()o )ad to (ear %asks3 and o&scure o&ser+ation3 &ut also t)e s%all c)arge in gas and s%oke s)ells li%ited distur&ance of t)e ground and destruction of roads3 t)us facilitating t)e %o+e for(ard of *er%an artillery3 reinforce%ents3 and su//lies. fter t)e initial &arrage3 t)e artillery su//orted t)e infantry and confor%ed its fire to t)e infantrys %o+e%ents7 t)e infantry con.uered (it) t)e aid of t)e artillery rat)er t)an t)e artillery con.uering and t)e infantry occu/ying. In t)is (ay t)e artillery integrated its doctrine (it) t)e ne( infiltration tactics t)at3 (it) sur/rise3 lay at t)e )eart of +on "utiers success. !it) t)e failure of t)e su&%arine#&ased logistic strategy3 t)e *er%ans /lanned to (in t)e (ar in 1@1B (it) co%&at strategy. 0)e Russians )a+ing left t)e (ar3 t)e ustrians concentrated against t)e Italians3 and t)e *er%ans3 rat)er t)an Doining in a concentration to dri+e Italy fro% t)e (ar3 t)re(

?=B

t)eir ()ole force against t)e nglo#'renc) ar%ies. Instead of a+oiding attack and trusting to t)e /ro+en /o(er of t)e defence and t)e e-/loitation of t)e resources of Russia and 2astern 2uro/e3 t)e *er%ans c)ose t)e offensi+e &ecause t)e 4ntied States (as creating a large ar%y +ery ra/idly. !it) a /o/ulation nearly dou&le t)at of *er%any3 )uge financial3 industrial3 and agricultural resources3 and (ea/ons and e-/ert guidance fro% t)e 'renc) and Britis)3 t)e 4nited States see%ed as if it could field +irtually in+inci&le ar%ies in 1@1@. ,udendorff did not &ase )is &elief in a successful co%&at strategy on )is greater nu%&ers: )e )ad for o/erations in 'rance only 1>C di+isions against t)e llies 1=@3 all di+isions t)en nu%&ering nine rat)er t)an t(el+e &attalions. "e counted on )is ne( tactical %et)ods and on /itting fres)3 retrained di+isions co%/osed of )is &est %en against tired allied troo/s3 de/leted &y four years of unsuccessful offensi+es. Back

(he Cam'aigns of 7=7? on the Western Front

0)e *er%an offensi+e in Marc) 1@1B ai%ed at t)e Doint &et(een t)e 'renc) and Britis) fronts. *eneral ,udendorff directed t)e %ain effort against t)e Britis)3 &ecause )e &elie+ed t)at t)e 'renc) (ould offer a stronger resistance due to t)eir %ore /o(erful artillery and e-cellent tactical skill. "is dri+e soug)t to force t)e Britis) &ack to(ard t)e coast. "e distracted t)e ene%y &y /re/aring t)ree additional attacks3 t(o against Britis) forces and one against t)e 'renc). ,udendorff )eld &ack )is reser+es at so great a distance t)at )e could co%%it t)e% any()ere. But )e )ad asse%&led =3>>> guns on a forty#t)ree#%ile front3 %o+ing t)e% in at nig)t (it) t)e noise of t)eir ()eels %uffled &y (ra//ings of &urla/. 8ust &efore t)e offensi+e3 t)e reser+es ca%e u/3 %arc)ing at nig)t. !)en t)e assault &egan early on t)e %orning of Marc) 21st t)e *er%ans )ad si-ty#t)ree di+isions on t)is forty#t)ree#%ile front. 0)e attack (as al%ost a co%/lete sur/rise3 t)e Britis) only learning of it (it) certainty t)e nig)t &efore. %ist aided t)e s%oke and gas s)ells of t)e fi+e#)our3 intense &o%&ard%ent3 and t)e "utier syste% (orked su/er&ly3 es/ecially on t)e t)inly )eld front of *eneral *oug)s 'ift) r%y. 0)e /o(er and accuracy of t)e &o%&ard%ent inflicted se+ere casualties3 tore ga/s in t)e &ar&ed (ire3 and (recked field fortifications. 'ollo(ing t)eir %o+ing &arrage3 t)e e-ce/tionally trained *er%an assault troo/s took ad+antage of t)e i%/aired +isi&ility to infiltrate /ast t)e da6ed Britis) defenders. In a nu%&er of /arts of t)e line t)ey %ade +ery dee/ /enetrations3 turning t)e strong /oints t)at )eld out and in /laces going all t)e (ay t)roug) t)e defences and reac)ing t)e o/en country &e)ind. 0)e successful attack o+er()el%ed t)e 'ift) r%y3 t)e *er%an ca/ture of 2 %illion &ottles of ()isky /ro/erly illustrating t)e e-tent of its +ictory. ctually3 t)e su%/tuousness of Britis) su//ly di+erted as (ell as nouris)ed *er%an troo/s. In 1@1= a diarist noted t)at t)e %en looked for(ard to an offensi+e &ecause of Jt)e /ros/ect of loot... /ot of 2nglis) %ar%alade or a ra6or is %ore i%/ortant t)an a Britis) officers note&ook.L By Marc) Britis) o/ulence )ad &eco%e .uite de%oralising. 0)e diarist noted t)at t)e troo/s )ad co%e to feel t)at Jt)e 2nglis) %ade e+eryt)ing out of eit)er ru&&er or &rass3 since t)ese (ere t)e t(o %aterials (e )ad not seen for t)e longest ti%e.L 0o t)e sout) of t)e Britis) 'ift) r%y t)e *er%an offensi+e e%&raced a 'renc) ar%y3 against ()ic) t)e attack (ent sur/risingly (ell. :et ,udendorffs /lan en+isioned dri+ing t)e Britis) &ack to(ard t)e coast3 and )e needed success in t)e nort)3 ()ere t)e Britis) 0)ird r%y of t)e ca/a&le *eneral Byng )eld u/ t)e *er%an ad+ance. Mean()ile3 in t)e sout) against t)e re%ains of *oug)s ar%y and t)e retreating 'renc)3 t)e *er%ans )ad ad+anced nearly forty %iles in si- days. fter sending reser+es against Byng (it)out o+erco%ing )is stu&&orn defence3 ,udendorff &egan to reinforce t)e flouris)ing effort in t)e sout).

?=@

0)us3 &elatedly ,udendorff &egan to a//ly to strategy t)e /at)#of#least#resistance /rinci/le3 ()ic) &ad ani%ated t)e infiltration tactics. 0)is )e )ad already enunciated &y ackno(ledging t)at tactics and t)e /o(er of t)e defence %ust deter%ine strategy ()en )e (rote t)at Jtactics )ad to &e considered &efore /urely strategic o&Decti+es3 ()ic) it is futile to /ursue unless tactical success is /ossi&le.L But stiffening Britis) resistance and t)e /o(er of a 'renc) defence reinforced &y se+enteen infantry and four ca+alry di+isions fro% *eneral P;tain )alted t)e &elated effort to reinforce and e-/loit t)e initial success in t)e sout). By t)e end of Marc) t)e *er%ans no longer )ad any c)ance of se/arating t)e allied ar%ies. 0)e *er%ans )ad (on suc) a decisi+e +ictory t)at t)e defenders suffered greater casualties t)an t)e attackers. *er%an troo/s )ad &roken clear t)roug) t)e defences and reac)ed o/en country on a &road front. But t)e offensi+e )ad failed. 0o a large e-tent logistical li%itations /re+ented *er%an tactical success fro% yielding t)e strategic results t)at one (ould e-/ect fro% t)e &reakt)roug) &y a )uge concentration of tactically skilful fres) troo/s. "andica//ed &y &roken ground3 destroyed &ridges3 t)eir +ast nu%&ers3 and large re.uire%ents for a%%unition3 t)e *er%an reser+es3 artillery3 and su//lies could not kee/ /ace (it) t)e tactical success of t)e &reakt)roug). Be)ind t)e allied front lay t)e 'renc) rail(ays3 ()ic) /ro+ided su//lies and &roug)t u/ t)e 'renc) reser+es sent &y P;tain. 8ust as in 1@143 access to functioning rail(ays ga+e to t)e defending allies greater strategic %o&ility. 0)e defenders )ad rail#&orne3 strategically offensi+e troo/s ()ile t)e attackers la&oured (it) largely )orse#dra(n trans/ort on an inade.uate net(ork of da%aged roads. :et ,udendorff /erse+ered3 assailing t)e Britis) fart)er nort) in t)e second and t)ird (eeks of /ril. "e attained so%e tactical triu%/)s &ut %ade no &reakt)roug). But )is +ictories )ad gi+en t)e allies t)eir first unified co%%and ()en *eneral 'erdinand 'oc)3 t)e 'renc) re/resentati+e on an allied co%%ittee3 recei+ed first a coordinating assign%ent and t)en co%%and of t)e allied ar%ies. for%er %e%&er of t)e !ar $ollege faculty3 'oc) )ad risen fro% cor/s co%%and to ar%y grou/ co%%ander in 1@14. S)el+ed along (it) 8offre3 at age si-ty#se+en )e &eca%e t)e allied co%%ander. ,acking t)e realis% and o/erational skill of ,udendorff and still a de+otee of t)e conce/t of t)e su/re%acy of %orale and t)e offensi+e3 'oc) ne+ert)eless suited t)e needs of t)e %o%ent. "is con+iction t)at +ictory &elonged to t)e co%%ander ()o (ould not ad%it of t)e /ossi&ility of defeat3 )is o/ti%is%3 )is an-iousness to resu%e t)e offensi+e3 )is co%/re)ensi+e +ie(3 and )is a&ility to (ork (it) t)e allied co%%anders all %ade )i% t)e rig)t %an for t)e /lace and ti%e. Still /ursuing t)e o&Decti+e of dri+ing t)e Britis) to t)e 2nglis) $)annel3 ,udendorff ne-t attacked t)e 'renc) to dra( allied reser+es sout)3 /re/aratory to )is final dri+e against t)e Britis) in t)e nort). 0)e *er%ans again /racticed t)oroug) and effecti+e security %easures3 once %ore de/loying troo/s at nig)t and %uffling t)e ()eels of t)eir artillery as t)ey %o+ed t)e guns into concealed /ositions under co+er of darkness. 0)ey e+en took air /)otogra/)s of t)eir o(n /ositions to ins/ect t)e efficacy of t)eir ca%ouflage. !)en 'renc) reconnaissance disco+ered no signs of an offensi+e3 It confir%ed t)eir con+iction t)at t)e *er%ans (ould ne+er attack against t)e for%ida&le terrain of t)e $)e%ins des 1a%es ridge. 1ue to t)eir certainty t)at t)e *er%ans (ould again strike in t)e nort) and &ecause of t)e strengt) of t)e terrain3 t)e 'renc) )eld t)e 6one +ery lig)tly3 ele+en di+isions on a fifty#fi+e %ile front3 and )ad %ost of t)eir %en concentrated in t)e for(ard defences to %ake t)e %ost of t)e ad+antages offered &y t)e ridge and t)e s(a%/ in front of it. 5nly on t)e e+ening &efore t)e *er%an assault did t)e local co%%ander learn fro% a /risoner of t)e i%/ending attack. In ordering distant di+isions to(ard t)e t)reatened sector3 t)e 'renc) took t)e only counter%easure a+aila&le. 5n t)e %orning of /ril 2Ct) after t)e usual )urricane of s)ells3 t)e *er%ans3 (it) forty#one di+isions on a forty#%ile front3 &roke co%/letely t)roug) t)e s)allo( 'renc) defences3 ad+ancing

?C>

t)irteen %iles in one day. 0)e effect of t)e (ell#ai%ed &o%&ard%ent on t)e strongly )eld for(ard trenc)es accentuated t)e effect of infiltration tactics against a line t)inly )eld and (it) little de/t). Sur/rised &y )is ac)ie+e%ent3 ,udendorff /us)ed for(ard3 creating a dee/ salient &efore )is su//ly difficulties and t)e arri+al of 'renc) reser+es &y rail recreated an entrenc)ed front. 0)e une-/ected and i%/ressi+e *er%an success resulted in t)e relie+ing of t)e 'renc) ar%y grou/ co%%ander and t)e go+ern%ents decision3 later re+ersed3 to re/lace *eneral P;tain. 'or ,udendorff )is dee/ salient3 (it) +ulnera&le co%%unications3 /ro+ed an e%&arrass%ent. "e could not (it)dra( &ecause t)e ac.uisition of so %uc) territory constituted e+idence of +ictory. So )e tried to connect it (it) )is large salient created in Marc). 0)ese efforts acco%/lis)ed little. "e t)en /lanned to e-tend )is ne( con.uest east t)roug) an atte%/t to take t)e city of Rei%s. 0)is attack (ould dra( %ore allied reser+es a(ay front t)e nort) and (ould &e )is last offensi+e &efore returning artillery nort) for t)e final assault against t)e Britis)3 ()ic) )e /lanned for ugust. But ,udendorffs successi+e attacks consu%ed )is reser+es of fres) troo/s trained for offensi+e action. "e )ad enDoyed tactical +ictories in t)ree of )is four offensi+es3 &ut strategic ac)ie+e%ent eluded )i% and )ad to continue to esca/e )i% &ecause of t)e greater %o&ility of allied reser+es. 0)e &etter co%%unications enDoyed &y t)e retreating forces ensured t)at t)e allies could reconstitute t)e front and restore t)e entrenc)ed stale%ate after any tactical defeat. 0)e course of o/erations reinforced 'oc)s confidence3 an attitude s)ared &y t)e ade.uate Britis) co%%ander3 'ield Mars)al Sir 1ouglas "aig3 ()o (it) an i%/ro+ed staff ga+e an e-cellent /erfor%ance in 1@1B. 0)e arri+al of significant 4.S. forces in 'rance sustained t)e %orale of t)e allied rank and file ()ile ,udendorffs offensi+es de/leted t)e confidence of )is &est %en e%/loyed in t)e front ranks of t)ese successi+e dri+es. *er%an security %easures for t)eir attack on eit)er side of Rei%s lacked t)e care of earlier offensi+es3 as allied air o&ser+ation noted increased troo/ %o+e%ents and air /)otogra/)s re+ealed &adly ca%ouflaged a%%unition su//lies. 'oc) %o+ed fifteen di+isions into t)e area and alerted anot)er eig)t. 0)ese )e ke/t in reser+e under )is o(n control. "e also added nine s.uadrons of aircraft to t)ose a+aila&le. In addition to t)eir role in allied reconnaissance and in)i&iting *er%an air o&ser+ation3 allied aircraft )ad attacked co%%unications links (it) &o%&s and used t)eir %ac)ines guns to s)oot troo/s %arc)ing or de/loyed in t)e o/en. 0)e %agnetic and co%&ati+e *eneral *ouraud3 co%%anding t)e 'renc) 'ourt) r%y3 %ade t)e &est use of t)e intelligence of a *er%an concentration. 0)e red#&earded general /lanned3 reluctantly3 to follo( a +ersion of t)e *er%an defensi+e %odel and lea+e only a fe( %en in )is first line ()en t)e *er%ans attacked. "e su//le%ented )is air reconnaissance (it) aggressi+e /atrolling. 5n 8uly 14t) a raid &roug)t in t(enty#se+en /risoners3 one of ()o% re+ealed t)at t)e attack (ould take /lace t)e follo(ing day3 t)e &o%&ard%ent to &egin ten %inutes after %idnig)t. 0)e /risoners an-iety to kee/ )is gas %ask con+inced )is interrogators t)at )e &elie+ed )is story of a "utier &o%&ard%ent )ea+y in gas s)ells soon3 and *eneral *ouraud %ade /lans accordingly. t %idnig)t3 ten %inutes &efore t)e /risoner said t)e *er%an &o%&ard%ent (ould &egin3 'renc) artillery &egan firing on t)e areas ()ere t)e gunners e-/ected t)e attacking *er%an troo/s to asse%&le. 0)en3 as e-/ected3 t)e *er%an &o%&ard%ent &egan (it) one gun for e+ery eig)t yards of front3 firing ra/idly. In Paris3 1>> %iles a(ay3 citi6ens could )ear t)e roar of t)e guns and t)e noise of t)e e-/loding s)ells7 in t)e streets of $)Wlons near t)e front t)e flas)es so illu%inated t)e sky t)at nig)t see%ed day. fter four )ours of s)elling3 t)e *er%an infantry %o+ed for(ard and easily o+erran t)e first line. Vaguely uneasy o+er t)e fe( 'renc) casualties t)ey found &ut not realising t)at t)e 'renc) )ad essentially e+acuated t)eir first line3 t)ey /us)ed on to e-/loit t)eir +ictory. ,ate in t)e %orning3 at t)e li%it of t)e range of t)eir field artillery3 t)ey reac)ed t)e strongly )eld 'renc) second line

?C1

()ere3 &e)ind t)eir &ar&ed (ire3 t)e 'renc) o/ened fire (it) rifles3 %ac)ine guns3 lig)t %ortars3 and 13<>> cannon. 0)e *er%ans suffered )ea+y losses &efore t)ey could retreat to t)e s)elter of t)e 'renc) first line. 0)e ot)er *er%an attackers did not encounter t)e sa%e e%/)atic failure3 &ut t)e offensi+e failed to %ake a real i%/ression on t)e 'renc) defences. t t)is /oint3 8uly 14t)3 'oc) used )is reser+es to $ounterattack on t)e (est side of t)e salient created at t)e end of May. !it)out ela&orate /re/arations and (it) only a +ery &rief &o%&ard%ent3 t(enty#one di+isions attacked ne(ly &uilt *er%an defences3 %anned &y units fro% ()ic) t)e *er%ans )ad culled %any of t)e %ore courageous and &etter#%oti+ated %en to create t)e for%ida&le units used on t)e offensi+e. 0)e attack (ould dou&tless )a+e succeeded any(ay3 &ut t)e 'renc) use 5f C>> of t)e s%all Renault tanks and 12> of t)e large self#/ro/elled field#gun %odels ensured t)at t)e 'renc) easily o+erran t)e *er%an first line. 0anks )ad enDoyed success earlier. In t)e autu%n of 1@1C t)e Britis)3 dis/ensing (it) a /re/aratory &o%&ard%ent3 )ad (on at $a%&rai ()en infantry coo/erating (it) 2>> of t)eir lands)i/s )ad &roken t)roug) t)e defences of t)e sur/rised *er%ans (it) co%/arati+e ease. No(3 as at $a%&rai3 infantry and tanks (orked toget)er3 t)e tanks flattening &ar&ed (ire and t)eir cannon destroying %ac)ine gun /ositions ()ile t)e coo/erating infantry /rotected t)e tanks fro% infantry. 5ne 'renc) (riter descri&ed )is s%all unit as co%ing o+er a rise in t)e ground and seeing a 'renc) tank surrounded &y *er%an soldiers ()o )ad )alted t)e tank &y (edging a /iece of (ood in t)e tracks. 0)e tank could not fire on t)e infantry &ecause t)ey (ere too close and t)e *er%an soldiers (ere seeking to /ry o/en t)e tank (it) t)eir &ayonets and trying to insert a )and grenade in t)e tanks +entilator. 0)e a&sor&ed *er%an soldiers did not notice t)e a//roac)ing 'renc) infantry ()o o/ened fire on t)e *er%ans around t)e tank3 killed or (ounded %ost of t)e%3 and rescued t)e tank. 0o /ro+ide /rotection against infantry3 'renc) tank doctrine /rescri&ed /latoons of t)ree tanks3 t(o (it) %ac)ine guns to /rotect eac) ot)er and t)e t)ird3 to use its cannon against *er%an %ac)ine gun /ositions. 0oget)er t)e 'renc) tanks and infantry in 'oc)s &ig counterattack o+erran t)e *er%an /ositions until t)ey reac)ed t)e line of t)e field#gun &atteries. "ere t)e tanks sto//ed3 t)eir t)in ar%our +ulnera&le to t)e fire of )ig)#e-/losi+e s)ells fro% t)e *er%an CC#%illi%eter field gun. But t)e turning %o+e%ent against t)e salient caused a ra/id *er%an retreat fro% %ost of t)e gains of t)eir May success. 'oc) i%%ediately /lanned %ore offensi+es3 not ai%ing at t)e knockout &lo( to ()ic) ,udendorff as/ired3 &ut to /us) &ack t)e *er%ans fro% t)e lateral rail(ays. $o%/ared to earlier offensi+es3 t)ose of 1@1B %ore realistically soug)t li%ited o&Decti+es. 0)e allies discontinued t)e% ()en t)ey )ad attracted t)e ene%ys reser+es and /ro%ised to settle into t)e %ould of t)eir earlier /rotracted and costly offensi+es. So 'oc)s ne( a//roac) a+oided t)e earlier3 /rolonged indecisi+e struggles t)at )ad /itted a (ell#organised defence against a /o(erful offence. 5n ugust Bt) 'oc)s second3 an allied &ut largely Britis)3 offensi+e &egan. ttaining co%/lete sur/rise3 relying on o+er 4>> tanks rat)er t)an a long &o%&ard%ent3 and using 13C>> aircraft3 t)e allied forces )ad &rilliant success against t)e under#strengt) and so%e()at de%oralised di+isions t)at t)e *er%ans used on t)e defensi+e. ssisted &y t)e tanks3 allied tactics relied on ideas and /ractices fro% t)e *er%an infiltration %et)od. 0)e une-/ected and triu%/)ant offensi+e co%/letely de%oralised ,udendorff3 ()o declared t)at *er%any %ust %ake /eace. 0)e 'renc) %ade t)e sa%e esti%ate ()en3 after )is second +ictorious offensi+e3 t)ey ele+ated 'oc) to t)e rank of Mars)al of 'rance. ,ess t)an t(o (eeks after t)e conclusion of t)e Britis) and 'renc) offensi+es in t)e nort)3 t)e 4.S. ar%y successfully attacked t)e *er%an salient sout) of Verdun. nd al%ost i%%ediately after t)e conclusion of t)is offensi+e3 4.S. forces Doined t)e 'renc) in anot)er attack. In &arely t(o %ont)s3

?C2

*er%any3 its ar%ies &eset &y Mars)al 'oc)s offensi+es3 dri+en fro% 'rance3 and deserted &y colla/sing allies3 soug)t an ar%istice. Back

# (urning Movement through Su'erior Mobility, (he Megiddo Cam'aign

0)e *er%an retreat &efore 'oc)s se.uence of offensi+es in 'rance coincided (it) a series of allied +ictories on ot)er fronts. n Italian offensi+e dro+e &ack t)e de%oralised arid disintegrating ustro#"ungarian troo/s3 and a 'renc)3 Britis)3 Italian3 and Ser&ian co%&ined ar%y under a 'renc) general dro+e Bulgaria fro% t)e (ar3 ad+anced to t)e 1anu&e3 and /re/ared to in+ade ustria# "ungary against only token o//osition. :et t)e success of s%all forces in Palestine3 ()ic) led to t)e (it)dra(al of t)e 5tto%an 2%/ire fro% t)e (ar3 )ad t)e greatest %ilitary significance. 0)e Britis) co%%ander3 Sir 2d%und llen&y3 ()o )ad &egun t)e (ar in 'rance as a di+ision co%%ander in 1@14 and succeeded to cor/s and ar%y co%%and &efore )is transfer to Palestine3 e-ecuted a ca%/aign of +irtually unsur/assed &rilliance t)at e%&odied al%ost all of t)e classic ele%ents of decisi+e +ictory. In Se/te%&er 1@1B *eneral llen&y (it) <C3>>> infantry )eld a line si-ty %iles long running fro% t)e Mediterranean east(ard to t)e 8ordan Ri+er and sout) along t)e 8ordan to t)e 1ead Sea. "e faced ?13>>> entrenc)ed infantry3 largely 0urkis)3 led &y a ca/a&le *er%an3 *eneral ,i%an +on Sanders. llen&y )ad o+er()el%ing air su/re%acy and 123>>> ca+alry against only 43>>> %ounted 0urks. Because an attack on t)e east of t)e line o+er fa+oura&le terrain against t)e 0urkis) rail co%%unications see%ed t)e o&+ious %o+e3 llen&y encouraged t)is su//osition ()ile /lanning to attack t)e 0urks (estern flank. 0o su//ort )is /lan t)e Britis) general )ad engaged in a %ost ela&orate and successful ga%e of distraction. ll su%%er )e ke/t )is ca+alry &e)ind t)e eastern /art of )is front3 and ()en )e %o+ed t)e% (est(ard3 )e re/laced t)e% (it) du%%ies t)at at a distance see%ed to &e gra6ing )orses. 0roo/s +isi&ly %arc)ed east &y day and &ack (est at nig)t3 re/eating t)e /rocess again t)e follo(ing day. !)en )ills concealed t)e road3 %ules dre( sledges east &y day to raise dust and si%ulate %arc)ing troo/s. 1u%%y ca%/s )oused t)ese /)oney reinforce%ents for )is eastern flank. 0o add +erisi%ilitude to t)e i%/ression created &y t)ese crude %easures3 llen&y )ad agents east of t)e 8ordan &uy forage3 /resu%a&ly for )is ca+alry in an offensi+e on t)e east flank7 )e esta&lis)ed acti+e (ireless nets linking none-istent )ead.uarters t)at )ad no troo/s3 and )e reser+ed and a//arently occu/ied a suite in a 8erusale% )otel to indicate t)at )e )ad %o+ed )is )ead.uarters east(ard. ttenti+e also to )is security3 )e set u/ a tele/)one net(ork to (arn of *er%an reconnaissance /lanes and )ad )is air force on alert to s)oot do(n any t)at %ig)t o&ser+e &e)ind )is lines. 0o co%/lete t)e assurance of t)e interdiction of air o&ser+ation3 Britis) aircraft %aintained /atrols o+er *er%an airfields to kee/ all aircraft grounded3 essentially a &lockade of t)eir air/orts. By Se/te%&er 1Bt) llen&y )ad a four#to#one nu%erical /redo%inance on t)e (estern%ost fifteen %iles of )is line7 t)e 0urks outnu%&ered t)e Britis) on t)e re%aining forty#fi+e %iles of t)e front. !it) suc) a concentration and t)e relati+ely lo( ratio of force to s/ace along t)e ()ole front3 llen&y could e-/ect a &reakt)roug)3 e+en t)oug) )is <4> artillery /ieces ga+e )i% nine guns for eac) %ile of t)e entire front. 2arly in t)e %orning of Se/te%&er 1@t)3 after a fifteen #%inute &o%&ard%ent3 Britis) troo/s attacked and in t)ree )ours &roke t)roug) t)e 0urkis) front3 dri+ing t)e retreating 0urks nort) and east. 0)is o/ened a door t)roug) ()ic) llen&y sent )is ca+alry. !it)out infantry to sto/ t)e%3 t)e ca+alry rode u/ t)e coast and turned east(ard near Megiddo3 riding into t)e 0urkis) rear. 5ne di+ision rode t)e se+enty %iles to Beisan on t)e 8ordan in t)irty#four )ours.

?C?

!)en t)e ca+alry%en reac)ed t)e 0urkis) rear3 t)ey dis%ounted and3 using rifles and %ac)ine guns carried on /ack#)orses3 &locked t)e retreat of t)e 0urks. llen&y3 a ca+alry%an3 used )is )orse%en as %ounted infantry3 standard doctrine in t)e Britis) ar%y. 0)e Britis) o(ed %uc) to t)eir study of t)e %erican $i+il !ar3 ()ere t)e ca+alry of &ot) ar%ies %arc)ed on )orse&ack &ut usually foug)t as infantry. :et t)is tactic3 and t)e strategy t)at de/ended on it3 also relied on t)e /orta&le rifle3 ()ic) t)e ca+alry%an could carry attac)ed to )is saddle3 and on t)e su/re%acy of t)e defensi+ely do%inant infantry%an e.ui//ed (it) it. 1uring t)e ?>> years ()en t)e /istol and sa&re )ad /ro+ided t)e /rinci/al ca+alry ar%s3 dis%ounted ca+alry%en3 so%e of ()o% )ad %uskets to fig)t as lig)t infantry3 could not )a+e ade.uately co/ed (it) )ostile infantry and3 /articularly3 ca+alry7 to )a+e resisted a ca+alry c)arge3 t)ey (ould )a+e needed t)eir &ayonets and t)e t)oroug) drill and +olley firing tec)ni.ues of t)e )ea+y infantry. But t)e rifle )ad restored to ca+alry its dis%ounted defensi+e strengt)3 ena&ling t)e Britis) troo/s3 dou&tless (it)out realising it3 to e%ulate an as/ect of t)e 2nglis) tactics of t)e "undred :ears !ar in ()ic) t)e knig)ts )ad left t)eir )orses to offer a stronger defence as infantry. :et llen&y )ad done %ore t)an %ake )is ca+alry %ore effecti+e in co%&at &y dis%ounting t)e%. In )is offensi+e )e )ad used t)e su/erlati+e strategic %o&ility of ca+alry Greally %ounted infantryH to turn t)e ene%y. "e )ad used ca+alrys latent ca/a&ility as strategically offensi+e troo/s to carry out a turning %o+e%ent and3 Dust as Na/oleon in )is Marengo ca%/aign3 )ad reac)ed t)e ene%ys rear3 &locking )is line of (it)dra(al and co%/elling )i% to assu%e t)e tactical offensi+e. 0)e large si6e of )is ca+alry force and its great fire/o(er as infantry ena&led &un to &lock /artially t)e retreat of t)e 0urks to t)e nort) and secure t)e surrender of %any of t)e%. But &y attacking on t)e 0urks (est flank ()ere t)ey least e-/ected it &ecause t)ey (ere less +ulnera&le t)ere # )e )ad failed to &lock t)e 0urkis) route of (it)dra(al fully. But as t)e 0urks fled (est(ard t)roug) t)e %ountains3 llen&ys aircraft attacked. In t)e dee/ gorge fro% Na&lus to t)e 8ordan3 t)e aircraft used %ac)ine guns and s%all &o%&s against t)e retreating 0urks. 0)e aircraft killed artillery%en and trans/ort ani%als t)at t)en o&structed t)e road. 0)e i%%o&ile colu%n %ade an e-cellent target. 0)e de%oralised 0urks3 una&le to re/ly to t)e attack of t)e aircraft3 (ere an-ious to surrender. "a+ing used an ela&orate and effecti+e distraction to create a (eak /oint against ()ic) to concentrate3 llen&y )ad /ierced t)e 0urkis) line. "e t)en used t)e )ig)er strategic %o&ility of tactically innocuous ca+alry to take ad+antage of )is &reakt)roug) to carry out a turning %o+e%ent against t)e 0urks. 0)is )e could ad+antageously e-/loit &y con+erting )is tactically ineffecti+e ca+alry into defensi+ely for%ida&le infantry. 4sing )is ca+alry on t)e strategic offensi+e to turn t)e 0urks and as infantry on t)e resulting tactical defensi+e3 llen&y )ad %ade t)e %ost of )is old# fas)ioned ca+alry. In co%/leting t)e +ictory3 )is ne(#%odel lig)t#ca+alry &i/lanes )ad s)o(n )o( effecti+ely t)ey could e%ulate t)e tactics of t)e Part)ian3 0urkis)3 and Mongolian lig)t ca+alry of old.

Allen-y"s +istra(tion5 .rea$through5 and Turning Mo%ement Back

?C4

s a result of t)e ca%/aign of Megiddo3 t)e Britis) ad+anced ?=> %iles in less t)an si- (eeks3 taking C<3>>> /risoners at a cost of <3>>> casualties. *eneral llen&y Dustly &eca%e 'ield Mars)al Viscount llen&y of Megiddo. Back

Summary of the Changes in Wea'ons. (actics. and "ogistics

0actics )ad c)anged during t)e (ar as infantry in a skir%is) line3 ()ic) /layed suc) a role in t)e 'ranco#Prussian !ar3 &eca%e articulated t)roug) t)e use of a s.uad of a&out a do6en rifle%en3 one of ()o% )ad a lig)t(eig)t /orta&le %ac)inegun. 0)e ne( for%at co%&ined s.uads into a /latoon under an officer3 and /latoons co%&ined into t)e constituent co%/anies of t)e &attalion. 0)is organisation e-tended t)e articulation t)at ar%ies )ad long /ossessed fro% t)e &attalion u/(ard to ar%y )ead.uarters as (ell as %ade t)e skir%is)ers into an articulated and &etter#controlled force. 0)is ne( structure3 like infiltration tactics3 &eca%e standard in all ar%ies after t)e (ar. 0)is ne( organisation incor/orated in t)e &attalion t)e /rinci/le t)at *ui&ert )ad enunciated for t)e ar%y do(n to t)e &attalion. 0)us t)e co%/onent /arts of t)e &attalion could concentrate and act on t)e offensi+e to take ad+antage of t)e ene%ys (eakness in a (ay t)at Na/oleonic ar%ies )ad used &attalions and larger units. 0)is conce/t a//lied on t)e defence also3 for3 in t)e /erfected *er%an %et)od of defence3 *er%an doctrine e-/ected t)e s%all grou/s occu/ying s)ell )oles3 for e-a%/le3 to e-ercise initiati+e to %o+e to anot)er )ole ()en &roug)t under artillery fire and to %o+e as (ell to take u/ t)e %ost e-/edient /ositions to re/el t)e attack of t)e )ostile infantry. 0)e e%/loy%ent of %o&ility and concentration on t)e defence /ro+ed %ore difficult &ecause of greater ene%y nu%&ers and artillery. 0)is ne( doctrine increased t)e res/onsi&ilities3 initiati+e3 and co%/etence e-/ected of non# co%%issioned as (ell as Dunior co%%issioned officers. $orres/ondingly3 it de/ri+ed )ig)er co%%anders of control of a &attle t)at t)ey usually could not3 in any case3 o&ser+e (ell enoug) to co%%and3 as )ad )ig)er officers in /re+ious generations. lt)oug) t)is %arked i%/ro+e%ent in tactics and organisation a//eared in res/onse to t)e increase in fire/o(er3 it confor%ed to /rinci/les nearly as old as (arfare itself and used %et)ods t)at ar%ies )ad e-/licitly a//lied for %ore t)an a century.

?C<

0)e en)ance%ent of fire/o(er )ad %ade field fortifications standard /ractice3 troo/s on t)e offensi+e as (ell as t)e defensi+e digging in /ro%/tly and t)en steadily ela&orating t)eir defences. 0)e continuous trenc) or &reast(ork of t)e traditional defence gradually ga+e (ay to a succession of strong /oints (it) t)e inter+als co+ered &y %ac)ine gun fire and3 if t)e defenders )ad ti%e to arrange it3 &y t)e fire of t)eir o(n artillery. 0)e lig)t /orta&le %ac)ine gun gre( in nu%&ers3 and gradually t)e rifle &eca%e a su//le%ent to t)e %ac)ine gun rat)er t)an t)e re+erse. 0)e e-/ansion in nu%&ers of t)ese /orta&le %ac)ine guns is /ri%arily res/onsi&le for t)e gro(t) in t)e nu%&er of %ac)ine guns of all kinds in t)e 'renc) ar%y de/loyed against t)e *er%ans fro% 231>> in 1@14 to =<3>>> in 1@1B. !it) a )ig) ratio of force to s/ace3 real siege (arfare )ad resulted. 0o )a+e enoug) strengt) to co%/el t)e ene%y to resort to siege %et)ods3 co%%anders liked to )a+e one di+ision for e+ery t)ree %iles of t)e front t)ey %ust defend. 0)is %eant t)at t)ey )ad a&out 43>>> %en /er %ile )olding t)e line (it) reser+es at )and for reinforce%ent3 counterattack3 or3 at (orst3 t)e reconstitution of t)e front s)ould t)e attack attain a &reakt)roug). 0)is nu%&er a%ounted only to a&out a fourt) of t)e a+erage strengt) arrayed for a Na/oleonic &attle3 t)oug) t)is e-aggerates t)e dis/arity &y e-cluding aircraft as (ell as t)e reser+es at )and to su//ort t)e !orld !ar I di+isions. 'urt)er3 t)e co%/arison neglects t)e ela&orate field fortifications t)at Na/oleonic ar%ies lacked. 5f course t)e t)inner defence in %en )ad an a&ility to deli+er a far greater +olu%e of %uc) %ore accurate fire. 0o o+erco%e suc) )ig) ratio of fire/o(er to s/ace and t)e field fortifications associated (it) it3 one for%ula called for t)e attackers to )a+e t)ree ti%es as %any %en3 si- ti%es as %uc) artillery3 and eig)teen ti%es as %uc) a%%unition as t)e defenders. But unless t)e attackers ac)ie+ed sur/rise3 t)e defenders (ould lay out a succession of defence lines in t)eir rear and &uild t)e% as ra/idly as t)e attackers foug)t t)eir (ay t)roug) t)e initial lines. 0)e necessity of %o+ing for(ard and /ro/erly e%/lacing t)eir essentially siege artillery %eant t)at in t)e a&sence of sur/rise and a &reakt)roug) t)e attack %ust )alt e+ery 23>>> or ?3>>> yards. lt)oug) tactics re/resented an e-tension of t)e i%/lications of t)e a&solute su/re%acy of t)e lig)t or %issile#ar%ed infantry%an3 t)e introduction of t(o ne( (ea/on syste%s3 t)e air/lane and t)e tank3 constituted t)e (ars real re+olution in tactics3 e+en t)oug) neit)er )ad affected t)e course of o/erations in a %aDor (ay. t t)e &eginning of t)e eig)teent) century3 ()en t)e %usketeer ac.uired a &ayonet3 )e &eca%e +irtually i%%une to frontal attack &y ca+alry. !it) )is &ayonet )e could resist t)e s)ock action of t)e ca+alrys sa&re and (it) )is %usket )e could defeat t)e ca+alrys /istol. But &y t)e end of !orld !ar I3 )is %ore for%ida&le3 %aga6ine rifle#ar%ed successor )ad &eco%e co%/letely susce/ti&le to inDury &y a ne( kind of ca+alry: t)e tank. "is rifle and &ayonet %ade no i%/ression on t)e tank3 ()ic) could c)arge )i% like t)e )ea+y ca+alry of old and destroy )i% (it) its %ac)ine gun and ar%oured in+ulnera&ility. ,ike(ise3 )e found )is rifle +irtually useless against t)e ra/idly %o+ing target of t)e aircraft3 ()ic) &o%&ed )i% or s)ot )i% (it) its %ac)ine guns3 kee/ing3 like t)e lig)t ca+alry of old3 its distance and relying on its %issiles. In t)e early 1C>>s t)e &ayonet#ar%ed %usketeer )ad e%&odied3 (it) res/ect to t)e ca+alry3 t)e ca/a&ilities of &ot) lig)t and )ea+y infantry. 0(o centuries later )e )ad neit)er3 )a+ing no %ore defence against t)e c)arge of t)e tank t)an lig)t#infantry &o(%en against t)e ar%oured ca+alry of old3 and &eing no &etter a&le to co/e (it) t)e aircraft t)an Ro%an s(ords%en (it) Part)ian )orse arc)ers. In t)e siege (arfare of t)e (estern front t)e field artillery )ad sto//ed t)e tanks3 &ut only after t)e tanks )ad o+er()el%ed t)e infantry of t)e for(ard defensi+e 6one. 0)e (ar )ad not /ro+ided e+en t)e *er%ans3 ()o alone )ad faced tanks3 (it) %uc) ti%e to consider )o( to co/e (it) t)e%. 0)e aircraft3 on t)e ot)er )and3 early attracted a defensi+e %easure consisting usually of %ac)ine guns

?C=

or field artillery %ounted to fire at aircraft. But t)e difficulties of firing at a ra/idly %o+ing target %ade suc) anti#aircraft (ea/ons relati+ely ineffecti+e. !)en t)e (ar ended3 t)e tank and t)e aircraft )ad an a//arent tactical su/re%acy o+er t)e infantry (it) ()ic) ar%ies )ad not )ad to deal during t)e (ar itself. lt)oug) ar%ies )ad not fully a//reciated t)e /ossi&ilities of t)e ne( (ea/ons nor gras/ed )o( &est to use t)e%3 t)e gro(t) of t)e 'renc) ar%ys aircraft fro% a&out 2>> in 1@14 to ?3?>> in 1@1B reflects a fait) in t)eir utility as does its 43=>> tanks at t)e end of 1@1B. But3 as (it) t)e lig)t and )ea+y ca+alry of t)e /ast3 not all terrain suited t)e use of aircraft and tanks. 8ust as t)e forests of Syria )ad t)(arted t)e Part)ian ca+alry3 t)us also did forests )andica/ &ot) t)e %o+e%ent of tanks and o&ser+ation fro% aircraft. Mountains )ad an al%ost e.ually in)i&iting effect3 t)e tanks )a+ing to kee/ to t)e +alleys and t)e aircraft )a+ing difficulty finding suita&le targets on t)e une+en and often (ooded slo/es of %ountains. 0)is resulted in li%iting t)e /otential Su/re%acy of t)e ne( (ea/on syste%s to le+el terrain. In t)e sa%e (ay t)at %ountains ena&led t)e r%enians to %aintain t)eir inde/endence against t)e ar%oured ca+alry and skilled )orse arc)ers of t)e Part)ians3 so also (ould terrain li%it tanks and aircraft. ided &y t)eir %ountains3 S(iss %ilitia3 (it)out ar%our and only e.ui//ed (it) )al&erds3 )ad /rotected t)e%sel+es against t)e for%ida&le /rofessional ca+alry of t)eir lo(land neig)&ours7 in s/ite of /ri%iti+e (ea/ons and fig)ting on foot3 t)e !els)3 Iris)3 and Scots )ad long confined t)eir /o(erful %ounted in+aders to t)e lo(lands7 so also could t)e terrain again &ifurcate (arfare. 0)e ne( (ea/ons could do%inate le+el terrain ()ile t)e rifle%an3 t)e %ac)ine gunner3 and artillery%an3 t)e /re%ier (ea/on syste% of t)e nineteent) century3 (ould continue su/re%e in t)e %ountains and forests. 0)e rail(ay naturally do%inated t)e logistics of t)e concentrated3 stationary ar%ies on t)e (estern front and controlled all of t)e large ar%ies else()ere. But t)e %otor truck )ad s)o(n its +alue in su//lying t)e *er%ans (it) a%%unition in 1@14 and e-)i&ited its /otential later ()en t)e 'renc) used trucks in great nu%&ers to su//ly Verdun in t)e a&sence of a railroad. In Se/te%&er 1@1B t)e 'renc) used trucks at nig)t to trans/ort o+er a t)ird of a %illion 4.S. troo/s fifty %iles in si- days. Recognising t)eir +alue3 t)e 'renc) increased t)eir nu%&ers of trucks fro% 1@3>>> in 1@14 to BB3>>> in 1@1B. $learly t)ey )ad /ro+ed t)eir logistical +alue during t)e (ar and )ad /ro+ided +alua&le su//le%ent to t)e railroad in %eeting t)e enor%ous su//ly re.uire%ents of t)e )uge stationary ar%ies as (ell as dis/laying t)e /otential for strategic %o+e%ent of troo/s. s t)e early o/erations in 2ast Prussia s)o(ed3 not)ing a&out t)e increase in fire/o(er since t)e 'ranco#Prussian !ar /recluded ca/italising on interior lines or e-ecuting t)e kind of turning %o+e%ent t)at )ad c)aracterised o/erations since Na/oleons Marengo ca%/aign. In fact3 t)e increase in fire/o(er3 &y en)ancing t)e /o(er of t)e defence3 )ad i%/ro+ed t)e /otentiality of t)e turning %o+e%ent3 relying as it did on forcing t)e ene%y to assu%e t)e tactical offensi+e to reco+er )is co%%unications. !)en3 in t)e 0annen&erg ca%/aign. *eneral 'rancoiss cor/s )ad reac)ed t)e Russian rear3 )is t)inly s/read forces3 an a+erage of a &attalion e+ery %ile and a )alf3 )ad /re+ented t)e retreat of %any ti%es as %any Russians. 5f course3 so fe( could not )a+e )eld &ack a deli&erate attack &y so %any3 &ut t)e disorganised Russians3 &eset on t)e east and nort)3 could not %ount suc) an attack. Ne+ert)eless3 t)e disa//earance of flanks on %ost fronts /recluded t)e e-/loitation of t)e &enefits t)at t)e aug%ented /o(er of t)e defence ga+e t)e turning %o+e%ent. *eneral llen&ys &rilliant Megiddo ca%/aign e-)i&ited t)is ad+antage again3 an o//ortunity t)at )e created &y )is inno+ati+e use of ca+alry as strategically offensi+e troo/s and )is e-/loitation of t)eir /o(er on t)e tactical defensi+e ()en dis%ounted.

?CC

Still %ost &attles )ad only tactical significance3 t)eir attrition %easuring t)e outco%e as it )ad in %uc) of /re#Na/oleonic (arfare. 5ften al%ost incredi&le in e-tent and duration3 fe( &attles on t)e (estern front /roduced t)e strategic result of a &reakt)roug) and a t)reat to t)e defenders flanks t)at forced (it)dra(al. !)en (estern frontal &attles attained a &reakt)roug)3 t)e /enetration failed to )a+e %uc) strategic i%/ortance. In t)eir strategy t)e *er%ans %ade t)e %ost of t)eir interior lines3 a situation %agnified &y t)e &enefit of fig)ting a /oorly coordinated coalition t)at could not take ad+antage of t)e concentration in ti%e %ade /ossi&le &y si%ultaneous ad+ances. fter concentrating against first Russia and t)en Ser&ia in 1@1<3 t)e *er%ans launc)ed a %aDor ca%/aign against 'rance in early 1@1=. 0)e allied o/eration on t)e So%%e3 ustrian in+ol+e%ent in an attack in Italy3 and t)e successful Russian offensi+e in t)e su%%er did not /re+ent t)e *er%ans fro% a&andoning t)eir Verdun o/eration3 standing on t)e defensi+e and concentrating against and defeating Ro%ania ()en it entered t)e (ar in t)e su%%er of 1@1=. In 1@1C *er%any and ustria again %ade use of t)eir interior lines to concentrate against and strike Italy a nearly cri//ling &lo(. 2-ce/t against suc) a (ell#conducted o/eration on e-terior lines as t)e allies )ad (aged against Na/oleon in 1B1?3 interior lines of o/erations clearly conferred a %eaningful strategic ad+antage3 es/ecially ()en fig)ting a coalition. 0)e railroad strengt)ened t)e strategic defence not only &ecause its destruction co%/licated t)e logistics of an ad+ancing ar%y &ut also &ecause control of undestroyed rail(ays3 &y conferring su/erior %o&ility3 ga+e strategically offensi+e troo/s to t)e defenders. 0)e *er%ans de%onstrated t)is in t)eir 0annen&erg ca%/aign ()en t)ey used t)eir 2ast Prussian railroad to %o+e a cor/s not Dust fro% one ar%y to anot)er &ut to t)e far flank of Sa%sono+s ar%y3 to carry out t)eir turning %o+e%ent. 8ust as t)e *er%ans %ade t)is strategic %anoeu+re &y rail3 so 8offre %ade e.ually good use of )is co%/ara&le ad+antage to create a ne( ar%y at Paris in a /osition ()ere it could turn t)e *er%an turning %o+e%ent. 5/erations in 1@1B again e-)i&ited t)e critical ad+antage t)e defence gained &y its railroad %o&ility ()en t)e allies /ro%/tly3 concentrated t)e necessary troo/s to seal a &reakt)roug) t)at t)e *er%ans soug)t to e-/loit on foot and (it) )orse#dra(n artillery and su//ly +e)icles. ircraft affected strategy &ecause it /erfor%ed lig)t ca+alrys role of reconnaissance as (ell as i%/ro+ed on it t)roug) t)e aerial /)otogra/). In fact3 in t)e siege (arfare of fronts &ut no flanks3 ar%ies (ould )a+e )ad no reconnaissance at all (it)out aircraft and &alloons since ca+alry could not reconnoitre under t)ose conditions. ircraft could also re/lace lig)t ca+alry in conducting long# distance raids. Reliance on inaccurate &o%&s arid t)e air/lanes li%ited carrying ca/acity for e-/losi+es %eant t)at da%age &y aircraft failed to )a+e t)e t)oroug)ness of destruction &roug)t a&out &y %en on t)e ground. Raiding aircraft also could not li+e at t)e ene%ys e-/ense3 nor could t)ey &ring off &ooty7 ne+ert)eless3 rail(ays /ro+ed +ulnera&le to &o%&ing3 and aircraft %ac)ine guns as (ell as t)eir &o%&s could attack troo/s and +e)icles on roads and trains in %otion. $learly3 aircraft /ro+ed an ad%ira&le re/lace%ent to carrying out t)e strategic roles of lig)t ca+alry. !it) a %a-i%u% s/eed of fi+e %iles an )our and a range of only fifteen to t(enty#fi+e %iles3 tanks )ad no strategic role. Since t)ey re.uired rail trans/ortation for t)eir strategic %o+e%ents3 t)eir %o&ility )ad tactical significance only. 0)e fragility of t)eir tracks and t)eir lia&ility to %ec)anical &reakdo(ns furt)er li%ited t)eir %o+e%ent under t)eir o(n /o(er. *as3 ()ic) )ad /ro+ed so let)al3 continued to &e a concern of all ar%ies3 &ut ne+er again sa( %aDor use. In t)e t(o decades &et(een t)e (orld (ars %ilitary t)inkers &alanced t)e lessons of t)e siege (arfare of 1@14#1B (it) t)e /ossi&ilities in)erent in t)e /resence of t(o ne( (ea/on syste%s. lt)oug) t)e e%ergence of t)e su&%arine and t)e aircraft )ad eac) %o+ed sea (arfare into a t)ird di%ension3 t)e sailors )ad fe(er c)anges to digest. In fact3 t)e (ar )ad de+elo/ed t)e ca/a&ilities of t)e su&%arine rat)er fully3 ()ic)3 in turn3 )ad sti%ulated t)e in+ention and use of )ydro/)ones

?CB

and de/t) c)arges. In s/ite of defects in ar%our /lace%ent3 t)e design of (ars)i/s and t)eir %et)od of gunnery control )ad /ro+en funda%entally sound. Na+ies )ad e+en /ioneered t)e use of aircraft at sea &efore t)e (ar3 and t)e Britis)3 ()o )ad &egun (ork on a sea/lane carrier &efore 1@143 con+erted ot)er s)i/s during t)e conflict3 one into a s)i/ on ()ic) /lanes could land as (ell as take off. ircraft at sea3 as on land3 (ould see su&stantial de+elo/%ent and contro+ersy as to t)eir /otential during t)e ensuing t(o decades. 0)e e-/ansion of t)e scale and intensity of land o/erations and t)e greatly aug%ented econo%ic drain of t)is effort ga+e sea#/o(er added i%/ortance3 gi+en t)e role of sea&orne co%%erce in /ro+iding /roducts needed to su//ort t)e %ore industrialised contest of 1@14 to 1@1B. In for%er (ars Britis) &lockades )ad )urt 'rances econo%y so%e()at &ut )ad ne+er )ad t)e effect t)at t)e &lockade )ad on *er%any3 of reducing food consu%/tion and )andica//ing industry &ecause it )ad di%inis)ed or s)ut off t)e su//ly of suc) critical su//lies as oil or co//er. Ne+er3 too3 )ad 'rances raiding strategy of attacking 2nglis) s)i/s co%e as near seriously %enacing t)e Britis) econo%y and a&ility to carry on t)e struggle as )ad t)e *er%an su&%arine ca%/aign against t)e allies. 0)e na+ys logistic strategy )ad ac.uired a ne( and /er)a/s decisi+e /o(er in t)e industrial age. Back

%RELUDE TO RENEWED CONFLICT, !'!' ,'

(he Full +evelo'ment of Four New Wea'on Systems
1uring t)e /eriod &et(een !orld !ars I and II3 no %aDor 2uro/ean /o(er engaged in large#scale (arfare (it) an o//onent co%/ara&le in /o(er. Ne+ert)eless3 t)e era sa( %any c)anges3 and all %aDor ar%ies and /ri+ate %anufacturers /ursued t)e de+elo/%ent of t)e (ea/on syste%s introduced in !orld !ar I. 0)ese ta-ing and difficult decades of econo%ic de/ression3 dictators)i/3 and a//re)ension of (ar sa(3 like t)e dissi%ilar /eriod &efore t)e out&reak of t)e (ars of t)e 'renc) Re+olution3 t)e e%ergence of ne( ideas3 as soldiers co/ed (it) understanding t)e lessons of t)e (orld (ar and t)e i%/lication of t)e ne( (ea/on syste%s. !orld !ar II (ould test t)e ideas and t)e i%/ro+ed %ateriel. ircraft ad+anced ra/idly3 in /art &ecause its co%%ercial /ossi&ilities3 often su//orted &y go+ern%ent su&sidies3 encouraged de+elo/%ent. 0)e re/resentati+e fig)ter air/lane of 1@1B )ad an engine of 2>> )orse/o(er and a s/eed of 1?> %iles an )our. By 1@?@ /o(er )ad increased fi+efold3 and so%e aircraft could tra+el o+er ?<> %iles /er )our. 0)is increase in +elocity resulted not only fro% %ore /o(er &ut also fro% t)e reduced (ind resistance of one3 rat)er t)an t(o3 (ings and retracta&le landing ()eels. 5t)er %easures3 suc) as t)e use of a t(el+e#cylinder V#ty/e engine (it) its narro( cross section3 rat)er t)an t)e &ulkier rotary or radial3 also di%inis)ed (ind resistance on fig)ters. Metal )ad largely re/laced (ood and fa&ric3 and t)e aircraft )ad &eco%e &igger and )ea+ier. lt)oug) t)ey lacked t)e %anoeu+ra&ility of t)e old &i/lanes t)e ne( fig)ters co%/ensated &y t)eir far greater s/eed and fire/o(er. !)ereas 1@1B fig)ters )ad t(o rifle#cali&re %ac)ine guns3 t)e 1@?@ %odels &oasted as %any as eig)t or t)eir e.ui+alent in larger#&ore (ea/ons. Most fig)ters could also carry a fe( s%all &o%&s. Bo%&ers follo(ed si%ilar de+elo/%ent3 e+ol+ing into lig)t3 %ediu%3 and )ea+y (it) one to four engines and &o%& loads u/ to se+eral tons. 'ig)ters )ad a to/ s/eed <> to 1>> %iles /er )our greater t)an &o%&ers. 0)e di+e#&o%&er s/ecialised in di+ing to(ard its target at a stee/ angle and dro//ing its &o%& %ore accurately &ecause of t)e /ro-i%ity to t)e target. lt)oug) aircraft )ad %uc)#i%/ro+ed &o%&sig)ts3 e+en di+e#&o%&ing re%ained inaccurate ()en co%/ared (it) artillery fire3 ()ic) custo%arily dealt (it) kno(n ranges and gun ca/a&ilities and could usually correct t)e ai% of successi+e s)ots. 5&ser+ation /lanes continued as a s/ecialised ty/e3 &ut often s%aller &o%&ers /erfor%ed t)eir duties.

?C@

$ountering aircraft fro% t)e ground3 ()ic) )ad &egun e+en &efore !orld !ar I3 continued during t)e conflict3 and reac)ed a %easure of /erfection in t)e inter(ar /eriod. 'or )ig)#flying /lanes3 t)e air defences tended to use a )ig)#+elocity gun of &et(een ? and 4 inc) &ore3 usually firing s)ra/nel s)ells ti%ed to e-/lode at t)e )eig)t of t)e aircraft. But ai%ing at a target %o+ing in t)ree di%ensions at an unkno(n s/eed and range /resented a difficult /ro&le%. ir defence counted on )earing t)e engines of t)e a//roac)ing /lane &y %eans of recei+ers t)at an o/erator could %o+e until )e found t)e e-act direction of t)e sound. 0)is /er%itted t)e ai%ing of an o/tical range finder3 and at nig)t also searc)lig)ts3 in t)e /ro/er direction. !)en t)e range finder tracked t)e target3 a /ri%iti+e %ec)anical co%/uter3 kno(ing t)e range3 calculated s/eed and direction and t)e /oint at ()ic) t)e artillery s)ould s)oot3 so t)at its s)ra/nel s)ells (ould interce/t t)e aircraft and e-/lode at t)e rig)t %o%ent. !it) t)is infor%ation trans%itted to t)e guns3 t)e gunners set t)eir ti%e fuses3 ai%ed t)eir (ea/ons3 and &egan firing. !it) good +isi&ility t)e syste% /ro+ed +ery effecti+e against /lanes at )ig) altitude3 &ut it )ad no a//lica&ility for defending against a fast a//roac)ing lo(#le+el attack3 suc) as t)at ()ic) Britis) aircraft )ad used against t)e retreating 0urkis) troo/s during t)e Megiddo ca%/aign. 'or defence against lo(#flying aircraft3 t)e infantry )ad used %ac)ine guns during !orld !ar I. 0)is defensi+e solution#+olu%e3 rat)er t)an accuracy3 of fire3 continued as t)e line of de+elo/%ent after t)e (ar3 (it) t)e addition of larger %ac)ine guns of 2.> to <> %illi%etres s)ooting &ullets t)at e-/loded on i%/act. 0)ese lig)ter antiaircraft (ea/ons and t)e s%aller#&ore %ac)ine guns3 often %ounted in grou/s3 dis/atc)ed a )ig) +olu%e of &ullets +ery let)al to aircraft. 'or ai%ing t)ey de/ended eit)er on a gunsig)t and t)e gunners eye and Dudg%ent or on a rudi%entary fire control syste%. 0)ey co%/ensated for t)is inaccuracy &y t)e nu%&er of rounds fired and &y t)e aid of tracer &ullets3 ()ic) t)e gunners could see as t)ey /assed t)roug) t)e air to(ard t)e target. r%ies to(ed suc) (ea/ons or %ounted t)e% on %otor trucks or tracked carriers. If it c)ose to /ro+ide %any antiaircraft guns3 a na+y or an ar%y could /rotect itself (it) an antiaircraft defence so for%ida&le as to Dustify t)e continued +alidity of t)e old /rinci/le t)at t)e %an on foot )ad t)e ad+antage o+er t)e %an %ounted. $onsidering t)e great cost of t)e /lane3 its )ig)ly trained /ilot3 and t)e necessary su//ort of its s/ecialised ground cre(3 t)e antiaircraft guns did not )a+e to s)oot do(n %any aircraft to )a+e t)e &est of t)e engage%ent on t)e &asis of attrition. But aircraft did not (is) to attack antiaircraft guns any %ore t)an in earlier ti%es lig)t ca+alry (is)ed to attack lig)t infantry7 like t)e lig)t ca+alry of old3 t)e air/lanes ai%ed at +ulnera&le and defenceless (ea/on syste%s and logistical e.ui/%ent and installations. 0o co/e (it) t)e Mosle% )orse arc)er3 t)e $rusaders )ad used t)e cross&o(. 0)e antiaircraft guns fulfilled t)e role of t)e cross&o( &ut (it) less effecti+eness and (it) t)e +ery serious dra(&ack of lack of %o&ility. !)ereas t)e cross&o(%an )ad all of t)e %o&ility of an infantry%an3 no infantry%an could carry a useful antiaircraft (ea/on. 0o gi+e %o&ility to an antiaircraft gun ca/a&le of defending against lo(#flying aircraft re.uired to(ing or %ounting it on a truck or tracked +e)icle. 0)is a&ility to %o+e could e-ceed t)at of t)e infantry on foot &ut at a su&stantial cost in resources and fle-i&ility. &attery of /o(erful guns for defence against )ig)#altitude attack and its associated co%/le- fire#control a//aratus could not go into action as /ro%/tly as could self# /ro/elled antiaircraft %ac)ine guns acco%/anying troo/s on t)e %arc) or de/loyed. 0)e inaccuracy of )ig)#altitude &o%&ing did3 )o(e+er3 su&stantially %itigate t)e difficulties of defending troo/s against t)is danger. 4nlike t)e situation (it) t)e cross&o(%an3 t)e (ea/ons a+aila&le li%ited antiaircraft /rotection for troo/s in %otion to defence against lo(#flying aircraft and only succeeded in doing t)is &y e%/loying costly %otorised %ounts or traction. Not sur/risingly3 %any ar%ies acted as if t)ey underesti%ated t)e tactical %enace /resented &y t)e lig)t ca+alry of t)e air.

?B>

0)e .uality and ca/a&ilities of tanks also %ade su&stantial /rogress during t)e inter(ar years. 0)e 'renc) stayed (it) t)e successful design of t)eir Renault3 and Britis) ar%s /roducers3 ()o did a considera&le e-/ort &usiness3 follo(ed t)e 'renc) in /roducing s%all tanks (it) a turret )a+ing a ?=>#degree tra+erse. Soon %anufacturers turned out dura&le tracks and sus/ension syste%s3 ()ic) /er%itted s/eeds of 2> and t)en ?> %iles an )our. 0anks usually (eig)ed &et(een si- and t(el+e tons and )ad %ac)ine guns and a gun not unlike t)e ?C %illi%etre originally used on t)e Renault. r%our3 usually &et(een 1> and 2> %illi%etres t)ick3 /ro+ided a co%forta&le %argin of /rotection against s%all#ar%s fire. r%ies tended to di+ide tanks into t(o classes3 intending to use slo(er ones (it) t)icker ar%our to assist infantry in t)eir assaults and faster ones (it) t)inner ar%our to /lay a /art +aguely analogous to ca+alry. :et3 in relation to t)e lig)t infantry rifle%an and %ac)ine gunner3 &ot) /layed t)e role of )ea+y ca+alry. s did na+al arc)itects3 tank designers faced a su&stitution relations)i/ &et(een s/eed3 ar%our3 and fire/o(er. !it) greatly increased dura&ility and %ec)anical relia&ility and road s/eeds of t(enty %iles an )our3 t)e tank of t)e 1@?>s )ad a greatly aug%ented tactical +alue as (ell as real strategic %o&ility. 0o counter t)is en)anced /otential3 all ar%ies soug)t a defence. 8ust as Ro%an ar%ies3 %edie+al %ilitias3 and S(iss infantry )ad ado/ted /ikes to /rotect t)e%sel+es against t)e c)arge of )ea+y ca+alry3 ar%ies searc)ed for t)e /ro/er (ea/on to deal (it) t)e tank. 0)ey soug)t a gun (it) greater %o&ility3 less cost in ter%s of cre( si6e3 %ore %odest traction re.uire%ents3 and greater ease of entrenc)%ent and conceal%ent t)an t)e field gun. 1uring !orld !ar I t)e *er%ans )ad introduced an enlarged rifle (it) a &ore a&out t(o#t)irds greater t)an t)eir standard infantry rifle. Bearing a&out t)e sa%e relation to t)e infantry rifle as t)e S/anis) %usket to t)e ar.ue&us3 one %an could fire t)is (ea/on3 t)oug) (it) difficulty3 and t)e )ig) +elocity of its steel &ullet ena&led it to /ierce tank ar%our. But t)e t)icker ar%our of t)e /ost# (ar tanks soon rendered t)is solution o&solete. 0)e a&ility of a &ullet to /ierce ar%our de/ended on t)e &ullets energy3 a /roduct of its (eig)t and t)e s.uare of its +elocity and3 to a degree3 t)e si6e of t)e )ole it %ust %ake. Since a &igger /roDectile %ust %ake a larger )ole in t)e ar%our /late and so encountered greater resistance3 a s%aller3 lig)ter /roDectile at a )ig) rate of s/eed /erfor%ed t)is task &etter t)an a larger3 )ea+ier %issile at a lo( rate of s/eed t)at )ad t)e sa%e a%ount of energy. But a )ig) +elocity re.uired a long3 )ea+y &arrel and a carriage strong enoug) to take t)e recoil of t)e e-/losi+e c)arge to create t)e +elocity.

Small/.ore5 High/=elo(ity German Antitan$ Gun Back

5nly a s%all cannon could /ro+ide t)ese c)aracteristics. Most ar%ies ado/ted a lo(3 easily entrenc)ed3 s)ielded gun 5f 2< to <> %illi%etres3 lengt)ening its &arrel and %u66le +elocity or enlarging its &ore and (eig)t of s)ell as t)e ar%our on tanks i%/ro+ed. But e+en t)e earlier and s%aller %odels of t)is cannon (eig)ed fro% a .uarter to a )alf ton and re.uired a truck3 tracked +e)icle3 or a )orse to to( it. s (it) t)e antiaircraft gun3 t)e antitank gun /ro+ided good /rotection ?B1

&ut at a sacrifice of tactical %o&ility for t)e infantry e+en greater t)an t)at i%/osed &y t)e undrilled %edie+al ur&an %ilitia. But3 (it) direct fire3 t)e antitank gun could s)oot accurately and ra/idly at its cons/icuous target and /resented3 e+en unentrenc)ed3 a difficult target for t)e tank gun to )it. ,ess costly3 so%e()at easier to e%/lace3 and slig)tly %ore %o&ile t)an field guns3 t)e antitank gun still in+ol+ed essentially t)e sa%e )ig) costs to %o+e and ti%e to /lace into action as t)e antiaircraft gun. So in creating t)eir defences against aircraft and tanks3 ar%ies3 )ad )ad to resort to t)e use of artillery3 )andica//ing t)eir tactical %anoeu+ra&ility (it) %o&ile (ea/on syste%s rat)er t)an t)e /orta&le cross&o( and /ike of earlier ti%es. !it) %issile (ea/ons3 %o&ility )ad +aried in+ersely (it) (eig)t t)at in turn3 )ad +aried directly (it) /o(er. $ross&o(s used in sieges3 for e-a%/le3 )ad +astly e-ceeded in force t)ose carried in t)e field &ut re.uired ani%al traction to %o+e t)e%. 0)us /o(er and %o&ility )ad an in+erse ratio Gsee &elo(H. 0)e ar.ue&us &elongs on t)e u//er /art of t)e cur+e (it) t)e S/anis) %usket3 *usta+uss lig)t regi%ental gun3 and +arious )ea+ier /ieces fitting in order &elo( it on t)is cur+e of t)e su&stitution relations)i/ &et(een %o&ility and /o(er. Various antitank guns (ould fall along t)is cur+e as (ould antiaircraft guns and artillery fro% t)e lig)t#(eig)t field gun to t)e )ea+iest rail(ay /ieces.

Su-stitution ,elationshi -etween Mo-ility and Power Back

0)e a+aila&le defences against t)e tank and t)e air/lane ad%ira&ly suited t)e siege (arfare of t)e (estern front of !orld !ar I. But for %o&ile (arfare3 t)ese guns re.uired traction or self# /ro/ulsion like artillery3 suffered fro% t)e sa%e disad+antages of delay in getting into action3 and3 &ecause of t)eir %ission to co%&at (ea/on syste%s of %uc) greater %o&ility3 )ad t)eir /rinci/al utility on t)e defence only. 0)e antiaircraft and antitank guns )ad so %uc) in co%%on in t)eir &allistic c)aracteristics t)at t)ey could )a+e readily e-c)anged targets &y using eac) ot)ers a%%unition. But t)e gun %ountings /recluded t)e )a//y solution of a co%%on (ea/on syste% t)at could concentrate its fire against t)e %o%entarily %ore %enacing of its t(o %o&ile o//onents. !)ereas t)e antiaircraft gun necessitated a tall %ounting to /er%it )ig)#angle fire3 t)e direct#fire antitank (ea/on re.uired little ele+ation and needed3 instead3 to &e as lo( as /ossi&le so as to /resent a s%all target to tank gunners and to facilitate easy entrenc)%ent. Ne+ert)eless3 es/ecially (it) an o//ortunity for %ore ela&orate entrenc)%ent3 antiaircraft (ea/ons could ser+e +ery effecti+ely against tanks3 and )ea+y antiaircraft guns also %ade good field artillery. So t)e traditional %atri- of four (ea/on syste%s G&elo( O 0raditional !ea/on Syste% Matri-H )ad returned in a different for%. 0)e 1@2>s and 1@?>s )ad /erfected t)at s)o(n Gfollo(ing &elo( O 1@?>s !ea/on Syste% Matri-H.

Traditional Wea on System Matri* Back

?B2

Initially tanks and aircraft could not fig)t eac) ot)er at all. 0)e tank guns could not fire at aircraft3 and t)e tank /resented an un/ro%ising target for aircraft. s%all target3 and t)erefore )ard to )it (it) a &o%& e+en ()en not in %otion3 t)e tanks ar%our /rotected it fro% t)e aircrafts %ac)ine gun. 2+en t)oug) tanks usually only carried t)in ar%our on t)e roofs of t)eir )ull and turret3 t)e acute angle at ()ic) &ullets fro% aircraft struck t)e roofs ena&led t)e% to deflect t)e &ullets fro% t)e aircraft.

7>BC"s Wea on Systems Matri* Back

But in t)e early 1@?>s t)e situation c)anged. 0)e 'renc) %ounted a 2>#%illi%etre cannon on a fig)ter air/lane. 0)is (ea/on could /ierce a tanks )ori6ontal ar%our. By 1@?@ t)e 'renc)3 *er%ans3 and Russians3 ()o %ost closely tied t)eir air forces to t)e re.uire%ents of t)eir ar%ies3 )ad ar%ed t)eir fig)ter /lanes (it) at least one 2>#%illi%etre cannon. 0)is c)ange in aircraft ena&led t)e% to attack t)e tank3 and t)e tank3 e-ce/t for a %ac)ine gun fired in t)e o/en fro% t)e to/ of t)e turret3 could not defend itself against a di+ing aircraft s)ooting its cannon. 8ust as Mosle% lig)t ca+alry could kee/ a(ay fro% By6antine or $rusader )ea+y ca+alry%en and destroy t)e% (it) t)eir &o(s3 so also could aircraft no( deal (it) tanks. 1uring t)e later Middle ges t)e four (ea/on syste%s )ad &orne t)e relations)i/s to one anot)er s)o(n in t)e sc)e%atic &elo( G0raditional !ea/on Syste%s $a/a&ilitiesH3 in ()ic) M1 stands for t)e a&ility to defend against an attack and M t)e a&ility to attack successfully3 &ot) in t)e direction of t)e arro(. By t)e late 1@?>s four ne( and fully de+elo/ed (ea/on syste%s )ad ac.uired al%ost e-actly corres/onding relations)i/s Gsee furt)er &elo( O 1@?>s !ea/on Syste% $a/a&ilitiesH. 0)is diagra% does o+erstate t)e sy%%etry &et(een t)e %edie+al and %odern situations in t)at3 for e-a%/le3 tanks (ould rarely )a+e t)e need or o//ortunity to attack antiaircraft guns in t)e (ay %edie+al )ea+y ca+alry (ould ride do(n cross&o(%en. It also ignores t)e a&ility of antiaircraft guns3 ()en /ro/erly alerted and /ositioned3 to defend against tanks. rtillery )as no for%al /lace in t)is diagra% &ut (as +ery definitely /resent and )ad facilities su/erior to aircraft for attacking antitank guns. Insofar as )ea+y antiaircraft guns could function as field artillery3 t)ey could attack antitank guns. 0)e a//earance of t)e air/lane and tank also restored t)e original differentiation of %ounted troo/s into )ea+y and lig)t3 a distinction eli%inated in t)e si-teent) century &y t)e ado/tion of t)e /istol and sa&re. 0)is re+ersion to t)e old dic)oto%y ga+e t)e tank t)e o//ortunity to )a+e t)e sa%e ad+antage on t)e defensi+e against ot)er tanks enDoyed &y t)e dis%ounted %edie+al knig)t ()en )e

?B?

defended against ca+alry. 0)e e.ui/%ent of so%e 'renc) tanks (it) ?C# or C<#%illi%etre cannon and %any Britis) tanks (it) a <C#%illi%etre gun ga+e t)e early tanks a (ea/on ca/a&le of /iercing t)e ar%our of anot)er tank.

Traditional Wea on Systems )a a-ilities Back

fter t)e (ar t)e continuation of gun ar%a%ent on %ost tanks confir%ed for t)e ne( )ea+y ca+alry a defensi+e /o(er co%/ara&le to t)e dis%ounted )ea+y ca+alry of old. 0)e stationary tank defending against a %o+ing o//onent )ad t)e defences traditional &enefit of c)oice of ground and use of co+er as (ell as a good field of fire and t)e o//ortunity to s)oot deli&erately3 ()ic) ga+e o+er()el%ing /redo%inance to rifle%en defending against t)e sa%e (ea/on syste%. 5f course3 t)e less e-/ensi+e antitank gun enDoyed t)e sa%e ad+antages o+er t)e attacker3 &ut3 like t)e defensi+e su/eriority of 9ing 2d(ards dis%ounted knig)ts o+er !els) s/ear%en (it) less &ody ar%our t)an knig)ts3 t)e %ore costly3 fully ar%oured tank could gi+e a &etter /erfor%ance t)an an antitank gun t)at )ad only a s)ield and a lo( sil)ouette. 0)is a&ility of tanks to defend against ot)er tanks gradually led designers to ar% al%ost all tanks in addition to %ac)ine guns3 (it) a )ig)er +elocity gun ca/a&le of /iercing tank ar%our as (ell as firing e-/losi+e s)ells at infantry %ac)ine gun /ositions.

7>BC"s Wea on Systems )a a-ilities Back

?B4

5n t)e ot)er )and3 aircraft lacked t)e a&ility to dis%ount # t)e defensi+e3 ()ic) )ad c)aracterised t)e lig)t ca+alry of old. !)ereas %ounted &o(%en could lea+e t)eir )orses and take defensi+e ad+antage of t)e terrain and t)e su/eriority of t)e %an on foot o+er t)e %ounted %an or assu%e t)eir /lace as &o(%en on t)e (alls of cities or fortifications3 aircraft lacked t)e old +ersatility of fig)ting dis%ounted3 ()ic) t)e tank )ad gi+en &ack to t)e )ea+y ca+alry3 and all ca+alry )ad /ossessed if ar%ed (it) a rifle in addition to sa&re and /istol. s in t)e Middle ges3 t)e sc)e%atic of (ea/on syste% ca/a&ilities is rele+ant only to terrain suita&le for fig)ting %ounted in aircraft and tanks. In (ooded or %ountainous territory3 unsuita&le for %ounted (arfare3 t)e infantry%an (it) )is rifle3 %ac)ine gun3 and %o&ile field artillery still reigned su/re%e Dust as )e )ad in t)e nineteent) century. But if3 on le+el and uno&structed terrain3 suc) a nineteent)#century ar%y s)ould %eet a force largely co%/osed of aircraft and tanks3 it (ould suffer t)e fate of t)e Ro%ans at $arr)ae ()en Part)ian lig)t ca+alry used its &o(s to deci%ate t)e Ro%ans. Suc) an ar%y of rifle#ar%ed infantry (ould fare e+en (orse t)an t)e Ro%ans unless t)eir artillery could /rotect t)e% fro% tanks t)e (ay Ro%an )ea+y infantry ke/t at &ay t)e Part)ian )ea+y ca+alry. But in territory a//ro/riate for %ounted co%&at3 co%%anders faced &asically t)e sa%e /ro&le% as %edie+al soldiers7 t)at of uniting t)e +arious (ea/on syste%s to /rotect against t)eir +ulnera&ilities and accentuate t)eir strengt)s. $o%%anders )ad (restled (it) t)is dile%%a until3 in t)e si-teent) century3 t)ey )ad reac)ed t)e co%&ined#ar%s synt)esis of /ike%en aided &y ar.ue&usiers (it) ca+alry at )and to fill t)e role of offensi+e troo/s. $o%%anders and %ilitary t)inkers )ad &arely t(o decades to sol+e t)is co%&ined#ar%s /u66le &efore t)ey took t)eir ne( (ea/ons syste%s into anot)er (orld (ar. 2+en if soldiers )ad /ro%/tly disco+ered t)e rig)t co%&ined#ar%s synt)esis for t)e ne( (ea/ons3 t)e e-istence of t)e ne( (ea/on syste%s en)anced t)e /o(er of t)e offence &ecause again3 on suita&le ground3 generals co%%anded )eterogeneous ar%ies co%/osed of (ea/on syste%s eac) of ()ic) )ad an intrinsic /re/onderance o+er one of t)e ene%ys and an inferiority (it) res/ect to anot)er in t)e ene%y ar%y. 2+en if &ot) ar%ies )ad de+ised t)e /erfect array3 t)e /resence of different (ea/on syste%s /ro+ided occasions t)at )ad not e-isted for o+er t(o centuries3 o//ortunities fro% ()ic) e-ce/tional talent on one side or &lundering on t)e ot)er could create an ad+antage for t)e offence a&sent ()en )o%ogeneous ar%ies )ad struggled indecisi+ely against eac) ot)er during !orld !ar I. 0)e e-istence of a (ea/on syste% t)at )ad a su/eriority o+er anot)er3 as t)e antitank gun )ad o+er t)e tank3 assured t)e continued tactical /ri%acy of t)e defence3 &ut t)e re.uire%ents of co%&ination3 t)e +ulnera&ilities created &y t)e lack of co%&ination3 and circu%stances /roduced &y +arious concentrations of different (ea/on syste%s )ad clearly furnis)ed t)e tactical offensi+e (it) a sco/e t)at it )ad lacked since t)e early si-teent) century. 0)e radio increased co%%anders control and i%/ro+ed articulation. By t)e late 1@?>s aircraft3 tanks3 and troo/s in t)e field all carried radios. 0)ey not only )ad %uc) %ore (ides/read use t)an t)e (ireless telegra/) t)e 'irst !orld !ar3 &ut also t)e +oice co%%unication of t)e radio en)anced t)e utility of co%%unication (it)out (ire. In t)e 1@?>s %ost nations disco+ered )o( to reflect a radio &ea% &ack fro% an o&Dect to deter%ine its location. $alled radar3 it )ad its /ri%ary use in searc)ing for aircraft. Because of i%/ro+e%ents during !orld !ar II it su&stituted in air defence first for t)e aural syste% of detecting t)e a//roac) of aircraft and t)eir a//ro-i%ate location and t)en for t)e o/tical syste% of ranging and ai%ing. lt)oug) radar )ad greater accuracy and could function at nig)t (it)out searc)lig)ts3 aircraft could &efuddle it &y t)ro(ing out stri/s of %etal foil t)at (ould reflect &ack t)e radio &ea%. But radar /ro+ided a &etter air defence t)an t)e sound3 o/tical3 and searc)lig)t %et)od.

?B<

rtillery and s%all ar%s re%ained %uc) as t)ey )ad since t)e turn of t)e century. 2-ce/t for antiaircraft and antitank (ea/ons and &etter co%%unications3 ar%ies entered !orld !ar II ar%ed +ery %uc) as t)ey )ad ended !orld !ar I. Back

(he French in Morocco, New Wea'ons and 0ld Strategy

But t)e ne( (ea/on syste%s of !orld !ar I )ad trials during t)e inter(ar /eriod fro% ()ic) so%e soldiers gleaned lessons a&out t)eir /otential. 'renc) o/erations in e-tending 'rances control o+er Morocco furnis)ed &ot) t)e %ost sustained and %ost li%ited use of t)e ne( (ea/ons. 0)e 'renc) ca%/aigned in Morocco for t(enty#si- years3 using an a//roac) t)at t)ey )ad /erfected during t)eir nineteent)#century colonial con.uests. 0)eir initial entry into frica3 )o(e+er3 in lgeria in 1B?>s3 )ad &een +ery &rutal. In t)eir efforts to su&due lgeria in t)e 1B?>s and 1B4>s3 t)e 'renc) )ad i%/ro+ed t)e %o&ility of t)eir forces &y dis/ensing (it) artillery3 lig)tening t)e loads of t)e infantry%en3 and using /ack %ules instead of (agons. But e+en &y raising t)e %o&ility of t)eir colu%ns to t)at of t)eir o//onents and ado/ting t)e /ractice of trying to surround t)e%3 t)ey still found t)e guerrillas too elusi+e. 0)is si%/ly confir%ed t)e e-/erience of t)eir co%%ander in lgeria3 0)o%as#Ro&ert Bugeaud3 ()o )ad ser+ed in S/ain during t)e 'renc) occu/ation in t)e Na/oleonic (ars and )ad foug)t t)e S/aniards in t)e contest t)at )ad gi+en guerrilla (arfare its na%e. So Mars)al Bugeaud ado/ted an e-traordinarily rut)less yet i%/ressi+ely effecti+e strategy. Marc)ing )is %ore /o(erful forces t)roug) t)e country3 )e not only destroyed grain stocks3 including t)ose secreted underground3 &ut also took li+estock3 &urned t)e fields at )ar+est ti%e3 and cut do(n fruit trees. lt)oug) )e t)us used a raiding logistic strategy against )is ene%ys &ase area G()ere )e &urned tents and d(ellings and destroyed furniture and utensilsH3 )e e%/loyed counter# raids t)at3 like t)e strategy of t)e ancient *reeks3 soug)t to secure /olitical o&Decti+es t)roug) destructi+e raids. In t)is case3 Bugeaud soug)t t)e su&%ission of t)e c)iefs of t)e different tri&es7 t)roug) ()o% t)e 'renc) (ould rule t)e country. 0)e c)iefs ()o ac.uiesced and /aid ta-es recei+ed /olitical su//ort fro% t)e 'renc) as (ell as t)e courtesy and status a//ro/riate to t)e dignity of /artners in t)e rule of t)e country. But t)ose ()o refused to co%/ly or su&se.uently re+olted3 t)e Mars)al treated (it) %erciless se+erity. 0)e logistical and /olitical strategy of raids /ro+ided t)e re.uisite rigor &ecause Bugeaud3 not e%/loying t)e later /olicies of t)e S/anis) in $u&a and t)e Britis) in Sout) frica3 did not)ing to s)ield ci+ilians fro% t)e cruel effects of )is logistic strategy. So t)ese raids differed little fro% t)ose e%/loyed &y t)e 0urks in natolia after t)eir +ictory at Man6ikert. 0)e logistic strategy itself /roduced tragedies3 a 'renc) general o&ser+ing3 in a return to a de+astated +illage3 J)ea/s of &odies )uddled toget)er3 fro6en to deat) during t)e nig)t.L But suc) an e+ent accorded (it) t)e intentional3 syste%atic e%/loy%ent of terroris% t)at )ad %uc) in co%%on (it) t)at of t)e Mongols in t)e 9)(ari6%ian 2%/ire. 5ne 'renc) officer c)aracterised t)e /olicy as to Jkill all t)e %en o+er t)e age of fifteen # and de/ort (o%en and c)ildren. In a (ord3 anni)ilate e+eryone ()o does not cra(l at our feet like dogs.L !)en se+eral )undred nati+es took refuge in a ca+e3 t)e 'renc) co%%ander &uilt a fire at t)e %out) and as/)y-iated t)e%. ,ater anot)er co%%ander (alled u/ t)e %out) of a ca+e filled (it) /eo/le. 5ne 'renc) soldier )ad (ritten t)at t)e &ar&arous %et)ods used in lgeria (ould J%ake t)e )air on t)e )ead of an )onest &ourgeois stand straig)t u/.L nd t)is /ro+ed true ()en t)e 'renc) /ress re/orted t)e atrocities and t)e kind of (arfare (aged in lgeria. Mars)al Bugeaud t)en resigned after si- years of co%%and3 &ut )is %et)od )ad con.uered %uc) of t)e country. !it)in anot)er t(enty years t)e 'renc) )ad consolidated t)eir rule. But in e-tending t)eir colonial e%/ire in t)e nineteent) and t(entiet) centuries3 t)e 'renc) did not a//ly Bugeauds re/ugnant %odel. 0)oug) t)ey retained t)e Mars)als e%/)asis on %o&ility for

?B=

forces and )is /olitical a//roac) of rule t)roug) local c)iefs and /rinces3 t)ey used a strategy %ore )u%ane and3 ()en skilfully a//lied3 a//arently little less effecti+e. 0)ey de+elo/ed t)eir strategy of con.uest during t)e later nineteent) century in t)e course of su&duing Indo#$)ina and Madagascar. 0)ey a//lied t)ese %et)ods in t)e t(entiet) century in Morocco under t)e leaders)i/ of *eneral ,yautey3 a deter%ined and resourceful soldier and astute ad%inistrator (it) a talent for self#ad+ertise%ent. In )is long co%%and in Morocco )e s)o(ed t)at )e )ad /rofited fro% )is ser+ice in Indo#$)ina and )is res/onsi&le /osts in Madagascar and lgeria. Beginning t)eir o/erations in Morocco in 1@>B3 t)e 'renc) &egan a %et)odical a//lication of %et)ods of con.uest t)at )ar%onised (it) t)e ideals of t)eir &ourgeois re/u&lic and furnis)ed a good %eans of reconciling t)e /eo/le to t)eir rule. 0)e 'renc) forces3 re/resenting t)e sultan ()o% t)ey controlled3 e-tended t)eir do%ination &y a syste% of slo( /enetration. In doing t)is t)ey de/ended on ruling t)roug) t)e local aut)orities and e-/loiting t)e di+isions or factions a%ong t)e /eo/le of t)e region t)ey soug)t to control. t t)e sa%e ti%e t)ey follo(ed a /olicy of res/ect for local la(s3 religion3 and custo%s3 and3 to %ake t)eir rule attracti+e3 relied on t)e sale of goods at artificially lo( /rices3 t)e /ro+ision of free %edical care3 and constructing +alua&le /u&lic (orks suc) as roads and (ells. 0)ese econo%ic incenti+es )el/ed to reconcile t)e /o/ulace to 'renc) rule &ut failed to counter&alance %oti+es for resistance. 0o /er%it t)ese /olitical and econo%ic %easures to (ork3 t)e 'renc) usually e%/loyed %ilitary action first. 0)ey custo%arily concentrated large forces against a relati+ely s%all3 unsu&dued area t)at t)ey often soug)t to surround and o+er()el% &y an une-/ected ad+ance fro% all sides. !)en t)e concentration of force )ad secured t)e su&%ission of t)e nati+e aut)orities3 t)e 'renc) %aintained a )ig) ratio of force to s/ace3 aug%ented &y t)e construction of strong /oints3 and /atrolled t)e ne(ly con.uered territory ()ile gi+ing t)eir /olitical and econo%ic %easures an o//ortunity to reconcile t)e +an.uis)ed to t)e rule of t)e 'renc) and t)e sultan. 0)is %et)od of con.uest3 in its %ilitary strategy so like t)at of t)e 2nglis) in !ales centuries &efore3 e%/loyed a /ersisting strategy t)at e%&odied3 in its gradual di%inution of t)e area under ene%y control3 a large logistic ele%ent. lso3 as in !ales3 t)e lo(lands )ad greater /roducti+ity t)an t)e )ig)lands3 ()ic) /er%itted t)e a//lication of a logistic strategy to su&Dugate s/ecific areas. 5ften indigenous ar%ed forces d(elt in %ountainous areas &ut %aintained t)e%sel+es &y gra6ing cattle in t)e lo(lands and le+ying ta-es or tri&ute on t)e agricultural and co%%ercial /o/ulation of t)e lo(lands. 'renc) %astery of t)e lo(lands often +an.uis)ed t)e forces in t)e near&y %ountains3 cutting off t)e /asturage and t)e su//lies t)at t)e %ountaineers )ad dra(n front t)e sedentary3 /o/ulation. 0)is syste% of con.uest also relied on recruiting and training troo/s in t)e regions already su&dued and using t)e% to garrison t)is territory as (ell as to /lay a %aDor role in t)e su&Dection of ne( areas. 0)e 'renc) under ,yautey3 ele+ated to Mars)al in 1@213 )ad used t)is /rocess of slo( su&Dugation for o+er a decade and a )alf ()en in 1@2< t)ey confronted &d#el#9ri%3 ()o controlled t)e Riff Mountains in t)e nort)ern or S/anis) /art of Morocco. "a+ing earlier defeated t)e S/aniards3 (i/ing out %any of t)eir /osts and +irtually destroying a force of 2>3>>> %en3 &d#el#9ri% )ad de+elo/ed a regular ar%y (it) %ac)ine guns3 artillery3 and e+en a fe( aircraft. !it) t)is force )e %o+ed sout) and attacked t)e nu%erically inferior 'renc) along an e-tended front sout) of and /arallel to t)e frontier &et(een t)e 'renc) and S/anis) 6ones of Morocco. &d#el#9ri% dro+e &ack t)e outnu%&ered 'renc)3 ca/turing t(o#t)irds of t)eir fortified /osts in t)is %ountainous region3 &ut )e failed to /us) t)eir forces &ack +ery far. 0)e 'renc) o(ed %uc) to t)eir su/erior artillery3 t)eir %et)odical a//roac)3 and t)eir disci/line3 training3 and co%&at e-/erience. 0)eir greater nu%&er of /lanes also aided t)eir defence3 &ut e+en t)oug) a raid &y t)ree s.uadrons of &o%&ers /layed a key role in t)e successful e+acuation of one /ost3 t)e fe( aircraft a+aila&le did not %ake a %aDor contri&ution to t)e triu%/)ant defence. 0)ey did occasionally /ro+e ?BC

useful in su//ly3 dro//ing (ater in t)e for% of &locks of ice to t)e garrison of one &eleaguered /ost and3 on anot)er occasion3 &ringing a .uantity of %edals to t)e front so t)at a general could raise %orale &y a(arding t)e% on t)e s/ot. &d#el#9ri%s ac)ie+e%ents &roug)t /ro%/t reinforce%ents fro% 'rance and a co%&ined 'ranco# S/anis) ca%/aign in ()ic) Mars)al P;tain3 t)e co%%ander of t)e +ictorious 'renc) ar%ies in 1@1B3 took t)e field in /erson as did *eneral Pri%o de Ri+era3 t)e S/anis) Pri%e Minister. Mars)al P;tain &roug)t %ore %en3 aircraft3 )ea+y artillery3 and tanks. In t)e autu%n of 1@2< and s/ring of 1@2= t)ese /o(erful forces o+er()el%ed &d#el#9ri%s ar%y and took )i% /risoner. !arfare returned to t)e slo( /enetration %odel t)at t)e 'renc) )ad follo(ed syste%atically since 1@11. 'or t)is (ar tanks /ro+ed of li%ited +alue &ecause t)e 'renc) )ad already o+errun %ost of t)e le+el areas ()ere t)ese +e)icles could )a+e %ade a significant contri&ution. 0)e 'renc) )ad &ased t)eir original con.uest of t)e lo(lands on t)eir &etter training3 disci/line3 and organisation3 i%/ortantly aided &y t)eir +irtual %ono/oly of %odern rifles. By t)e ti%e t)e Moroccans ac.uired %odern rifles and )ad %astered co%&at as skir%is)ers Ga situation in ()ic) tanks (ould )a+e )el/ed i%%enselyH t)e 'renc) )ad already (on %ost of t)e suita&le terrain3 and t)e %aDority of t)e rest of t)e o/erations took /lace in %ountains as )ig) as 1>3>>> feet3 ()ere tanks could not (ork effecti+ely. In one desert ca%/aign at an oasis3 )o(e+er3 tanks did /ro+e t)eir +alue in s/ite of t)e o&struction /resented &y nu%erous /al% trees. In 1@?43 at t)e conclusion of t)e ca%/aigns to /acify Morocco3 t)e 'renc) successfully used %otor trucks. In t)e sout) ()ere t)e fir%3 le+el3 treeless land &ordered t)e S/anis) colony of Rio de 5ro3 1>> %otor trucks3 eac) carrying fourteen %en3 %ade u/ t)e %ain force of a colu%n t)at included %otorised %ac)ine guns and ?C#%illi%etre and C<#%illi%etre guns. In a sudden3 sur/rise ad+ance t)is colu%n %o+ed o+er t)e s%oot) ground to carry out a turning %o+e%ent against nati+e troo/s %ounted on )orses. Mo+ing for(ard at t)e al%ost leisurely /ace of si-ty %iles a day3 t)e 'renc) took /osition sout) of t)eir o//onents3 cutting off t)eir retreat across t)e S/anis) &order and co%/elling t)eir surrender ()en t)e nati+es found t)e%sel+es )e%%ed in &et(een %otorised forces in t)e sout) and foot#%arc)ing infantry ad+ancing fro% t)e nort). Su&stituting %otor trucks for )orses to secure t)eir greater strategic %o&ility3 t)e 'renc) )ad re/roduced llen&ys Megiddo turning %o+e%ent and again s)o(n t)e i%/ortance of %ounted infantry ar%ed (it) ra/id#fire3 rifled (ea/ons. Since t)e %ountains usually lacked any tree co+er3 aircraft %ade a significant contri&ution t)roug) one of t)e traditional strategic %issions of lig)t ca+alry3 reconnaissance. erial /)otogra/)s %ade /ossi&le t)e careful /lanning &efore se+eral of t)e c)aracteristic .uick3 sur/rise ad+ances in ()ic) co%/arati+ely large forces engulfed a s%all area. ir attacks against t)e ene%y troo/s (ould )a+e /layed a s%all role &ecause t)e 'renc) (ere relying on %ini%u% force3 seeking to /acify rat)er t)an destroy t)e foe. But in one instance3 ()en an ene%y force entrenc)ed on a )ig) %ountain )ad re/elled an attack and easily )eld out against a %ont)#long siege and &o%&ard%ent3 air reconnaissance did contri&ute in a %eaningful (ay to co%&at. ircraft aided t)e searc) for t(o secret s/rings u/on ()ic) t)e &esieged de/ended for t)eir (ater su//ly and )el/ed t)e artillery s)ell t)e%. In an a//lication of logistic strategy re%arka&ly like and ulti%ately %uc) %ore successful t)an t)at of t)e Persians at Plataea3 t)e 'renc) co%/elled t)e &esieged Moroccans to surrender after t)ey lost t)eir s/rings and t)eir (ater. Back

(actical and Strategic /se of #ircraft

In t)e Italian (ar against 2t)io/ia in 1@?<#?= aircraft /layed a /re%ier role. 'or attack on su//ly routes and troo/s t)e Italians )ad %odern tri#%otor &o%&ers3 so%e (it) to/ s/eeds of 2>> %iles /er )our and t)e ca/acity to carry %ore t)an 23=>> /ounds of &o%&s. Italian /lanes scored t)eir greatest co%&at success ()en t)ey attacked 2>3>>> defeated 2t)io/ian troo/s retreating o+er flat3 o/en

?BB

ground. Italian aircraft s/rayed t)e )ungry and de%oralised 2t)io/ians (it) &lister gas and dro//ed se+enty#t)ree tons of &o%&s3 t)e e.ui+alent in (eig)t to %ore t)an 1>3>>> C<#%illi%etre s)ells. 0)e uncounted cor/ses of t)e 2t)io/ians nu%&ered in t)e t)ousands. !it)out antiaircraft guns3 t)e 2t)io/ians /ro+ed as defenceless as Ro%ans or $rusaders on foot ()en assailed &y )orse arc)ers and3 (it)out ar%our3 e+en %ore +ulnera&le. Italian tanks /ro+ed useful in t)e (ar3 &ut t)e Italians greater nu%&ers and i%%ense /re/onderance in fire/o(er /ro+ided t)e decisi+e ele%ent in t)eir +ictory and con.uest of t)e key centres of t)e )uge country. 'or t)e final /us) to t)e 2t)io/ian ca/ital o+er 123>>> Italian troo/s tra+elled t)e 1>> %iles in 13CB< auto%o&iles and trucks. But da%age to t)e road so delayed t)e %otorised colu%n t)at t)e trek took ten days. In t)e S/anis) $i+il !ar go+ern%ent &o%&ers and fig)ters /ro+ided %aDor3 if not crucial assistance in turning &ack an ad+ance &y t(o largely %otorised Italian di+isions acco%/anied &y fifty tanks. $onfined to t)e roads &y )ea+y rains3 t)e colu%ns of t)e ad+ancing %otorised forces /resented a /erfect target for t)e go+ern%ent air/lanes near *uadalaDara in 1@?C. In s/ite of &ad (eat)er3 &o%&ers and fig)ters carrying &o%&s effecti+ely assaulted t)e road#&ound Italians. 1a%aged and de%oralised &y t)e air attacks and )alted &y stiffening resistance in front3 t)e Italians )ad difficulty retreating &ecause of t)eir da%aged +e)icles. &locked road Dunction cratered &y &o%&s and &locked &y de%olis)ed trucks3 (as /articularly effecti+e in i%/eding t)e retreat. 0)e soldiers a&andoned t)eir +e)icles and (alked across t)e %uddy fields7 %ost %ade good t)eir esca/e3 &ut ot)ers3 %o+ing in s%all grou/s3 /resented e-cellent targets for fig)ter /lanes ()ose four %ac)ine guns %o(ed t)e% do(n3 Dust as 0urkis) lig)t ca+alry s)ot $rusaders %arc)ing t)roug) sia Minor. Back

# )ussian Cannae
In 1@?@ on t)e le+el3 treeless terrain on t)e &order of Manc)uria and Mongolia3 8a/anese and Russian troo/s clas)ed o+er a s%all /iece of dis/uted territory. Bot) forces3 in ar%y cor/s strengt)3 )ad a su&stantial nu%&er of aircraft and tanks as (ell as antiaircraft and antitank guns. 2ntrenc)ed in t)e area for nearly t(o %ont)s3 t)e contestants de%onstrated t)e /o(er of t)e antitank gun as &ot) sides )alted t)e assaults of t)e ot)ers tanks. In one unsuccessful attack t)e 8a/anese lost )alf of t)eir se+enty#t)ree tanks3 and t)e 8a/anese ?C#%illi%etre antitank gun /ro+ed .uite ca/a&le of defeating t)e larger Russian tanks t)at3 t)oug) t)ey (eig)ed as %uc) as t)irteen tons3 )ad ar%our less t)an an inc) t)ick. 0)e Russians3 (it) %ore troo/s3 e+entually defeated t)e 8a/anese3 ()o )ad not &elie+ed t)at t)e Russians (ould concentrate suc) /o(erful forces <>> %iles fro% a railroad. But (it) o+er 43>>> %otor trucks3 t)e Russians su//lied <C3>>> %en. :et suc) a su/re%acy in infantry s)ould )ardly )a+e /ro+ed decisi+e against ?>3>>> entrenc)ed 8a/anese3 (ell e.ui//ed (it) %ac)ine guns and artillery. 0)e Russian success de/ended on t)e (ise use of t)eir 4@B tanks and ?4= ar%oured cars against ()ic)3 at t)is stage in t)e /rolonged &attle3 t)e 8a/anese could only contend (it) t)eir field artillery and inade.uate nu%&ers of antitank guns. 0)e Russians (on ()en t)ey concentrated t)eir tanks on eit)er flank and3 o+er()el%ing t)e 8a/anese defences3 /us)ed t)roug) into t)e rear and en+elo/ed t)e defending 8a/anese infantry. 0)e tank forces t)us surrounded a su&stantial /art of t)e 8a/anese forces. 0)is &attle at 9)alkin *ol )ad %uc) in co%%on (it) "anni&als +ictory at $annae in t)at t)e en+elo/%ent of t)e Ro%ans &y t)e $art)aginian )ea+y ca+alry /layed t)e %ost significant /art in "anni&als +ictory. 8a/anese killed and (ounded in t)e ()ole ca%/aign nu%&ered 1C3>>>3 nearly dou&le t)ose of t)e Russians. Back

?B@

(he Navies% )es'onse to the New Wea'ons

fter !orld !ar I na+al arc)itects realised t)at t)eir s)i/s )ad totally inade.uate ar%our against long#range gunfire. 0)e stee/ angle of descent of s)ells fired fro% 1<3>>> to 2>3>>> yards ena&led s)ells to /ierce decks /rotected only against /roDectiles striking at a s)allo( angle. 0)e re%edy in+ol+ed not only t)ickening t)e decks &ut also using face#)ardened ar%our instead of t)e ordinary steel3 ()ic) )ad initially see%ed a//ro/riate for deflecting glancing &lo(s. Na+al arc)itects also i%/ro+ed t)e e-tent and t)e so/)istication of t)e defence of all (ars)i/s against under(ater e-/losions. 5t)er(ise3 t)e all#&ig#gun s)i/s )ad stood t)e test of t)e (ar. Reconstruction of e-isting &attles)i/s as (ell as ne( construction e%&odied t)ese lessons. Ne( &attles)i/s3 ()ic) rose in dis/lace%ent to o+er 4>3>>> tons3 carried a )ig)er /ercentage of t)eir (eig)t in ar%our and increased in s/eed fro% t(enty to t(enty#one knots to t(enty#se+en to t)irty# one knots. Since %any cruisers )ad no greater s/eed t)an t)irty#one knots3 t)e ne( ca/ital s)i/s &lurred if t)ey did not a&olis) t)e distinction &et(een &attles)i/s and &attle cruisers. 1esigners altered t)e secondary ar%a%ent on &attles)i/s3 originally intended to /rotect against tor/edo &oats3 to add antiaircraft guns and3 in so%e instances3 to %ake t)e secondary guns dual#/ur/ose3 suita&le as )ea+y antiaircraft guns as (ell as for defence against destroyers. 0)e c)ange t)at safeguarded s)i/s against tor/edoes and long#distance gunfire also /ro+ided ad%ira&le /rotection against aircraft attack. 1ecks strong enoug) to (it)stand t)e /lunging fire of ar%our#/iercing /roDectiles offered a%/le defence against conte%/orary &o%&s3 and i%/ro+ed under(ater defence against tor/edoes and %ines did %uc) to s)ield s)i/s against t)e %ining effect of &o%&s t)at %issed t)e s)i/ &ut landed alongside. $on+erting t)e secondary ar%a%ent into antiaircraft guns or adding )ea+y antiaircraft guns ga+e an a%/le %easure of security against t)e inaccurate &o%&ing of )ig)#flying aircraft3 and t)e auto%atic 2># to 4>#%illi%etre guns t)at t)e ar%ies used against lo(#flying /lanes su//lied t)e sa%e kind of safety for s)i/s. But ad%irals failed to gras/ t)e really enor%ous nu%&er of s%all guns t)at !orld !ar II (ould re+eal t)at s)i/s needed to offer t)e a%ount of fire to defend ade.uately against t)e far %ore %enacing attack of lo(#flying aircraft. 1uring t)e inter(ar /eriod cruisers and destroyers all ado/ted t)e turret %ounting3 usually t(o or t)ree guns toget)er. $ruisers3 ty/ically (it) a s/eed of a&out t)irty#t(o knots and ranging in si6e fro% <3>>> to 1>3>>> tons3 +aried little fro% &attles)i/s in t)eir essential conce/t of si- or %ore guns3 usually si- or eig)t inc)3 and a secondary ar%a%ent of dual#/ur/ose guns to deal /rinci/ally (it) aircraft and also (it) tor/edo &oats. 0)ey carried t)in ar%our &ut dis/osed it %uc) like &attles)i/s. 1estroyers )ad increased in si6e and ranged fro% 13>>> to 23<>> tons3 (it) a&out 13B>> tons ty/ical. 0)ey looked like s%all cruisers and3 e-ce/t for t)eir lack of ar%our and t)eir )ig)er s/eed of t)irty#fi+e or %ore knots3 differed +ery little fro% cruisers. 0)eir turret guns3 usually four to fi+e inc)3 could engage aircraft as (ell as surface targets. 0)ey3 too3 carried s%aller antiaircraft guns for dealing (it) lo(#flying aircraft. In s/ite of so%e s/ectacular tests conducted in t)e 4nited States3 t)e &o%&ing of s)i/s3 es/ecially in %otion3 &y aircraft at )ig) altitudes (ould /ro+e ineffectual. Most na+ies t)us relied on t)e di+e# &o%&er and t)e tor/edo air/lane. 1uring !orld !ar I t)e Britis) )ad successfully launc)ed a tor/edo fro% an aircraft to sink a 0urkis) %erc)ant s)i/. $learly t)is %eans of attacking t)e &uoyancy of t)e s)i/ offered se+eral ad+antages o+er )itting ar%our /late (it) &o%&s. !)ile di+e# &o%&ers engaged t)e attention of a s)i/s air defences and t)eir &o%&s da%aged t)e s)i/s antiaircraft ar%a%ent3 t)e slo(#flying3 +ulnera&le tor/edo air/lanes fle( in lo( and launc)ed t)eir let)al under(ater %issiles. Bo%&s3 )o(e+er3 (ould /ro+e effecti+e against unar%oured s)i/s. But t)e aircraft carrier (roug)t t)e real re+olution in na+al (arfare. s de+elo/ed ()en t)e Britis) con+erted to carriers t)ree ?o#knot s)i/s of 1B3>>> tons3 t)e aircraft carrier )ad a flat deck o+er all or +irtually all of its ()ole surface on ()ic) /lanes could land and fro% ()ic) t)ey could take off. ?@>

!)en a ?>#knot s)i/ stea%ed into t)e (ind3 an air/lane flying into t)e (ind could )a+e +ery little %otion in relation to t)e deck ()en landing or taking off. s /lanes increased t)eir s/eed3 ca&les stretc)ed across t)e deck engaged a )ook on t)e aircraft and arrested its /rogress during landing. 0)e aircraft outranged t)e s)i/s guns. t a distance of u/ to 1>> %iles3 a fast3 unar%oured aircraft carrier could launc) its /lanes against any surface s)i/s (it)out )a+ing to fear engage%ent &y t)e ene%ys guns. 0)e reliance on %issile (ea/ons for sea (arfare )ad not c)anged3 and t)e greater range of aircraft fro% a carrier ga+e it a /otential su/eriority o+er t)e gun. 0)e Britis) /ro+ided t)e%sel+es (it) se+en aircraft carriers3 )alf as %any as t)ey )ad &attles)i/s7 t)e 4nited States and 8a/an3 t)e ot)er %aDor na+al /o(ers3 also )ad se+en and 'rance3 one. In t)e %id# 1@?>s3 ()en t)e Britis) &egan to %odernise t)eir fleet3 t)ey /lanned an e.ual nu%&er of ne( carriers and &attles)i/s3 fi+e of eac). 0)at /lanes fro% land could fly far out o+er t)e sea also altered t)e na+al situation3 and t)e larger3 land#&ased aircraft )ad longer range t)an t)ose on carriers3 often /erfor%ed &etter3 and3 (it)out t)e need for an e-/ensi+e s)i/ as a &ase3 lo(er cost. stride t)e Mediterranean3 Italy felt no need for carriers. 8ust as t)ey underesti%ated t)e need for air defence against lo(#flying aircraft3 so also did ad%irals fail fully to gras/ t)e e-tent to ()ic) t)e aircraft carrier could alter (ar at sea. Insofar as t)e range of t)e carriers aircraft and t)eir reconnaissance ca/a&ilities %ade t)e% essentially different fro% &attles)i/s or cruisers3 for t)e first ti%e since t)e galley and t)e te%/orary co#e-istence of )ea+y gun tactics (it) &oarding tactics3 na+ies )ad )eterogeneity in t)e (ea/on syste%s. 8ust as ar%ies (ere returning to )eterogeneity fro% t)e era of t)e single (ea/on syste% Gt)e rifle#ar%ed infantry%anH3 so na+ies3 too3 faced t)e /ro&le% of understanding t)e interrelation of t(o rat)er distinct (ea/on syste%s. It is not sur/rising t)at t)e sailors3 like t)e soldiers3 )ad difficulty in i%%ediately finding t)e &est doctrine. In antisu&%arine (arfare na+ies %ade a significant ad+ance3 introducing a de+ice t)at sent out an under(ater sonic (a+e t)at3 ()en reflected fro% t)e su&%arines )ull3 ga+e its range and direction. $alled asdic &y Britain and sonar &y t)e 4nited States3 t)is de+ice could find stationary as (ell as %o+ing su&%arines and corres/ondingly increased t)e /o(er of surface s)i/s to co/e (it) t)eir undersea ene%y. Radar could also )a+e +alue against su&%arines3 ()ic) still )ad to re%ain on t)e surface %ost of t)e ti%e. 5&ser+ation at nig)t &y radar ga+e surface s)i/s anot)er ad+antage in detecting t)e su&%arine. !)en carried in air/lanes during !orld !ar II3 radar e-tended its reconnaissance a&ility. But radar not only )ad &enefits for reconnaissance7 it soon ac.uired sufficient so/)istication and accuracy for use in fire control for t)e %ain ar%a%ent as (ell as t)e antiaircraft guns. Na+ies e%&raced radar (it) ent)usias%. Back

+octrinal +iversity
lt)oug) ar%ies )ad %uc) t)e sa%e co%/osition as in 1@1B3 ideas a&out (arfare )ad c)anged. 0)e ent)usiasts for t)e tank insisted t)at it could and s)ould /lay a far different role t)an it did in 1@1B3 ()en it /ri%arily )el/ed t)e infantry o+erco%e t)e %ac)ine gun. !)ile ort)odo- t)inking continued to +ie( t)e tank as a slo(#%o+ing )ea+y ca+alry%an )el/ing t)e lig)t infantry3 tank t)eorists en+isioned a co%/letely %otorised force of infantry and artillery in ()ic) a large nu%&er of tanks (ould /ro+ide t)e striking /o(er. lt)oug) Britis) (riters including 8. '. $. 'uller and B. ". ,iddell "art and t)e s%all Britis) ar%y /ioneered t)ese ideas and t)oug) t)e 'renc) also created a %otorised di+ision (it) tanks in 1@??3 t)e *er%an ar%y i%/le%ented t)e ne( t)eories on a large scale and incor/orated t)e% into t)eir ar%ys doctrine.

?@1

In 1@?< t)e *er%ans created t)eir first Pan6er3 or ar%oured3 di+ision3 ()ose organisation initially called for o+er <>> tanks3 t(o &attalions of infantry carried in %otor trucks3 and %otorised artillery and antitank guns. 0)e large nu%&er of tanks3 aided &y t)e infantry and artillery3 /ro+ided a /o(erful tactical offensi+e ca/a&ility for &reaking t)roug) a defence. 0)e %otorisation of t)e entire unit ga+e it a strategic %o&ility to e-/loit t)e /enetration of t)e ene%ys defences. If /lanning a relentless /us) into t)e ene%ys rear3 &y/assing o&stacles3 or o+er()el%ing t)e% (it) t)e offensi+e /o(er of so %any tanks3 t)e Pan6er di+ision could strike t)e ene%ys co%%unications and disru/t t)e %o+e%ent of su//lies and reser+es. 0)e doctrine of t)e tank ent)usiasts en+isioned t)e strategic coo/eration of t)e air force in attacking t)e defenders co%%unications3 troo/ %o+e%ents3 and )ead.uarters and its tactical assistance in &attle3 (it) di+e#&o%&ers aug%enting or re/lacing artillery fire. 0)e radio (ould /er%it co%%and and coordination of t)e air as (ell as t)e ground forces. 0)us t)e *er%ans en+isioned a Part)ian ar%y3 aided &y )ea+y and lig)t infantry3 %ounted for strategic %o&ility. 0)e *er%ans created additional Pan6er di+isions in succeeding years3 e+en t)oug) t)e )ig)er co%%anders of t)e ar%y )ad %isgi+ings and lacked any clear idea of ()at (ould &e t)e conse.uences of t)eir e%/loy%ent. !ell %ig)t soldiers )esitate3 for no co%/ara&le co%&at for%ation )ad e-isted since t)e Middle ges. !)en knig)ts /ursued Viking raiders %ounted on stolen )orses3 t)e e.ui+alent of t)e tank and t)e %otorised infantry ele%ents of t)e Pan6er di+ision )ad e-isted &ut in t)e o//osing forces. 2nglis) ar%ies raiding in 'rance )ad3 in addition to t)eir )ea+y ca+alry3 long&o(%en and e+en a fe( s/ear%en %ounted for strategic %o&ility. But t)ese concentrated forces3 %inute in relation to t)e s/ace in ()ic) t)ey o/erated3 controlled no territory &eyond t)eir ca%/ and su//lied t)e%sel+es &y %o+ing fro% /lace to /lace. Not)ing in t)eir use )ad any relation to t)e /ur/oses t)at Pan6er di+ision /ro/onents /ro/osed for co%/ara&le3 &ut %uc) larger3 t(entiet)#century forces. 0)e Russians3 ()o )ad ado/ted and t)en te%/orarily discarded a si%ilar t)eory of tank (arfare3 )ad successfully e%/loyed tanks during t)eir undeclared (ar (it) 8a/an. 0)e &attle at 9)alkin $ol )ad e-)i&ited t)e /o(er of tanks as an offensi+e (ea/on under ot)er circu%stances t)an t)e siege (arfare of t)e (estern front in 1@1C and 1@1B. 0)e tanks offensi+e c)aracteristic of greater %o&ility and t)e ca/acity to fig)t (it)out ti%e#consu%ing de/loy%ent )ad ena&led t)e% to en+elo/ t)e 8a/anese forces and attack t)eir flank and rear. $learly3 after any &reakt)roug) of a front3 tanks could use t)e sa%e for%ida&le offensi+e attri&utes t)ey )ad dis/layed at 9)alkin *ol and return to t)e offensi+e t)e /o(er t)at le-ander t)e *reats )ea+y ca+alry and )is &rilliant doctrine for its e%/loy%ent )ad endo(ed it. But t)e &attle at 9)alkin *ol only e-)i&ited t)e tactical +irtuosity of tanks7 it said not)ing a&out strategy and t)e i%/act of t)e dee/ /enetration so%e en+isioned for Pan6er di+isions. 0)e 'renc)3 ()o )ad3 for %ost of t)e /eriod &et(een t)e (ars3 t)e strongest and %ost %odern ar%y3 dis/layed e+en %ore sce/ticis% a&out any role for t)e tank ot)er t)an as an aid to t)e artillery and infantry in t)e siege (arfare3 ()ic) t)ey e-/ected again to c)aracterise t)e o/erations of large forces along t)eir frontiers. 0)ey3 too3 for%ed ar%oured di+isions3 &ut in fe(er nu%&ers t)an t)e *er%ans and (it) fe(er tanks in eac) di+ision. Ne+ert)eless3 t)ey )ad si%ilar ideas for t)eir use3 &ut at least an e.ual lack of clarity a&out t)e result. 4nlike t)e *er%ans3 ()o allocated all of t)eir tanks to Pan6er di+isions3 t)e 'renc) ke/t o+er )alf of t)eir a%/le su//ly of tanks for assign%ent to infantry di+isions to aid in t)eir attacks or counterattacks. ,ike t)e *er%ans3 t)e 'renc) %otorised a fe( of t)eir di+isions3 carrying infantry in trucks and to(ing artillery (it) %otor +e)icles. ,ike t)e *er%ans3 t)e &ulk of t)e 'renc) ar%y re%ained unc)anged fro% 1@1B3 consisting of %arc)ing infantry (it) )orse#dra(n artillery and %uc) )orse#dra(n trans/ort. 0)e %ore drastic ent)usiasts for t)e air/lane did not see it as a (ea/on syste% t)at restored lig)t ca+alry to t)e ar%y and3 at sea3 &ecause of its long range3 re/laced t)e na+ys &ig gun. Rat)er t)ey

?@2

/ercei+ed t)e aircraft as a uni.ue and all#/o(erful (ea/on syste% t)at could (in (ars +irtually unaided. 0)e t)eorists of t)e su/re%acy of t)e air/lane3 led &y t)e Italian *iulio 1ou)et3 soon e+ol+ed a clear doctrine for its use. 0)ese radical ad+ocates of t)e /ri%acy of a+iation &elie+ed in t)e &o%&er and usually in t)e futility of any defence against it. Since so%e &o%&ers (ould al(ays reac) t)eir target3 only a /assi+e defence of s)elters %ade sense3 t)e /rinci/al counter%easure lying in taking t)e offensi+e (it) ones o(n &o%&ers. But t)e &o%&ers3 rat)er t)an ai%ing at t)e )ostile ar%y or na+y3 (ould strike at t)e ene%ys industries and /o/ulation centres. Suc) attacks (ould3 1ou)et &elie+ed3 (in t)e (ar unaided3 rendering t)e co%&at of ar%ies and na+ies redundant and any di+ersion of air/o(er to attack t)e% a foolis) dis/ersal of effort. 0)is doctrine (as essentially a logistic strategy of using aircraft to destroy t)e econo%y t)at %aintained t)e ene%ys ar%ed forces. It also e%&odied a /olitical /rogra% in t)at t)e e-tre%e ad+ocates of air /o(er &elie+ed t)at t)e &o%&ing of large cities (ould terrorise t)e citi6ens and &ring a de%and for /eace. 0)us t)e strategy for +ictory t)roug) air /o(er alone unconsciously e%ulated t)at used &y t)e lig)t ca+alry /o(ers of old7 t)at of t)e 0urks and 8eng)i6 9)an. 0)eir raiding3 logistic strategy )ad ai%ed at killing %uc) of t)e )ostile /o/ulation3 t)us de/ri+ing t)e defenders of %an/o(er for t)eir ar%ies and &asing t)eir /olitical /rogra% on t)e terror ins/ired &y t)eir raids. 0)e 0urks )ad t)us con.uered sia Minor fro% t)e By6antines3 using raids &y t)eir )orse arc)ers in %uc) t)e sa%e (ay t)at t)e %any air /o(er ad+ocates /ro/osed to use t)eir3 &o%&ers. 0)ese radical ideas do%inated no air force or strategy3 &ut t)ey )ad great strengt) in Italy3 Britain3 and t)e 4nited States. In 'rance3 *er%any3 and Russia3 ()ere t)e ar%y )ad t)e do%inant role in national defence3 t)e air force re%ained strongly tied to t)e %ission of ser+ing as t)e ar%ys lig)t ca+alry. 0)us t(o decades of /eace )ad i%/ro+ed t)e (ea/ons a+aila&le in 1@1B and )ad gi+en soldiers and %ilitary e-/erts an o//ortunity to assess and de+ise doctrines for t)e tank and air/lane. But t)e soldiers )ad found no consensus3 and !orld !ar II (ould act as a /ro+ing ground for different ideas rat)er t)an3 as in !orld !ar I3 a gra+eyard for t)e consensus. Back

THE CLIMA- OF MODERN WORLD WARFARE+ W.r/0 War II, !',' *)

(he German *ictory over !oland
!orld !ar II &egan on Se/te%&er 1st 1@?@. *er%any initially foug)t 'rance3 Britain3 and Poland. 0)e *er%ans re/roduced t)eir strategy of 1@14 &ut e-/loited t)eir interior lines to concentrate first against t)e (eaker Polis) ar%y to ac)ie+e a .uick +ictory ()ile 'rance (as %o&ilising. 0)e *er%ans )ad forty#eig)t acti+e di+isions against t)e Polis) ar%ys t)irty acti+e di+isions and ten for%ed in t)e %anner of ,and(e)r. 0)e *er%ans )ad a far greater nu%&er of tanks3 and t)e Poles )ad fe( antitank guns. Since t)e *er%an#Polis) frontier stretc)ed for 13C<> %iles3 t)e Poles did not )a+e a ratio of force to s/ace ade.uate to create e+en a tenuously sta&le front3 co%/ara&le to t)at on t)e eastern front in !orld !ar I3 %uc) less an entrenc)ed stale%ate3 like t)at on t)e (estern front in t)e sa%e (ar. Better trained and ar%ed and (it) %ore co%/etent staffs3 t)e *er%ans secured concentration in ti%e on Se/te%&er 1st 1@?@3 &y ad+ancing si%ultaneously fro% t)e (est and t)e nort). !it) %uc) of t)e Polis) ar%y )eld &ack to counterattack3 t)e fully de/loyed *er%ans initially %ade ra/id /rogress. In t)e sout)3 ()ere t)e *er%ans )ad concentrated and t)e Poles )ad t)eir (eakest forces3 ?@?

t)e *er%ans reac)ed t)e Vistula Ri+er3 sout) of !arsa(3 an ad+ance of 14> %iles3 in nine days. 0)is ena&led t)e% to turn nort) along t)e (est &ank of t)e Vistula and3 %eeting t)eir ar%ies dri+ing sout)3 reac) t)e rear of t)e &ulk of t)e Polis) troo/s. 0urning t)e ene%y fro% &ot) sides3 t)e *er%ans carried out a strategic en+elo/%ent. 0)e *er%ans in t)e Polis) rear readily resisted t)e disorganised attacks of t)eir ad+ersaries3 ()o soug)t to reco+er t)eir co%%unications and reac) !arsa(. 0)e ca%/aign ended on Se/te%&er 1Ct) ()en3 &y /rearrange%ent3 t)e Russians ad+anced fro% t)e east to clai% t)eir s)are of Poland.

German Strategi( En%elo ment with Simultaneous Ad%an(es Back

5n Se/te%&er 1Ct) t)e 'renc) ar%y co%/leted its %o&ilisation and concentration3 ready to face a force of largely ,and(e)r#ty/e *er%an di+isions aided &y good /er%anent fortifications strengt)ened &y antitank &arriers. 0)e defeat of Poland and t)e inter+ention of Russia caused 'rance to discard any intention for an offensi+e to aid Poland and to take u/ a defensi+e Posture instead. lt)oug) t)e ar%ies faced eac) ot)er3 t)ey did not entrenc) (it)in a fe( )undred yards and engage in skir%is)ing and e-c)ange of artillery fire. Instead3 as ar%ies not acti+ely ca%/aigning )ad done for t)ousands of years3 t)ey ke/t a(ay fro% eac) ot)er. 0)e 'renc) %ade t)e %ost of t)is o//ortunity to train t)eir %en. $onditioned &y t)e e-/erience of !orld !ar I3 t)e ne(s/a/ers c)ristened t)is /eriod of inacti+ity and a&sence of contact a J/)oney (ar.L In t)e ca%/aign in Poland3 *er%an tanks )ad /ro+ed in+alua&le3 e-)i&iting a far greater utility t)an allied tanks )ad dis/layed in 1@1B against t)e dee/ and ela&orately fortified *er%an defences and t)eir dense concentrations of field guns. 0)e +astly larger and %uc) &etter *er%an air force carried out (ell t)e traditional strategic duties of lig)t ca+alry3 not only in reconnaissance &ut also in disa&ling Polis) rail(ays and in effecti+e attacks on )ig)(ay traffic. 0)e *er%an use of %otor +e)icles for su//ly and for t)e %o+e%ent of troo/s contri&uted to t)eir ra/id +ictory3 and t)eir fourteen ar%oured or fully %otorised di+isions /layed a %aDor role3 t)e significance of ()ic) %any o&ser+ers at t)e ti%e failed to a//reciate. Back

(he French and German #rmies

"a+ing (on in t)e 2ast3 t)e *er%ans no( faced t)e 'renc) in a ca%/aign t)at did not &egin until May 1@4>. 0)e /eace treaty of 1@1@ )ad li%ited t)e *er%an ar%y to 1>>3>>> %en3 and so t)e *er%ans lacked t)e 'renc) reser+es of (ea/ons and trained %an/o(er. But t)e *er%ans )ad used

?@4

t)is interlude for training and for%ing ne( di+isions3 and ()en t)e ca%/aign o/ened3 t)ey )ad 1?= di+isions3 including ten Pan6er di+isions3 de/loyed against t)e 'renc). $onstrained &y Italys )ostile neutrality3 t)e 'renc) de/loyed only ninety#four of t)eir 11> di+isions against *er%any. But in %any essential res/ects t)e *er%ans faced %uc) stronger forces. Belie+ing in t)e tactical /o(er of t)e defence3 t)e nglo#'renc) allies &ased t)eir strategy on t)e assu%/tion of a long (ar3 t)e effect of a logistic strategy founded on t)e &lockade3 and ()en t)e Britis) )ad sufficiently e-/anded t)eir air force3 t)e &o%&ing of *er%an industrial centres. In no case did t)e 'renc) /lan an offensi+e until t)e Britis) )ad gone t)roug) t)e sa%e /rocess of creating a large ar%y3 ()ic) )ad taken t)e% t)e first year and a )alf of !orld !ar I. nd t)e 'renc) t)e%sel+es )ad %uc) to do to &ring t)eir ar%y u/ to an acce/ta&le standard. 0)e *er%an occu/ation of a s%all /art of nort)ern 'rance in 1@14 )ad de/ri+ed 'rance of %uc) of its steel industry. 0o a+oid t)e (orkings of suc) an unintended logistic strategy3 t)e 'renc) stressed /rotection of t)eir territory. Since conser+ation of %an/o(er )ar%onised (it) t)is strategy3 t)e 'renc) fortified t)eir ne( frontier (it) *er%any3 one t)ey )ad not occu/ied since t)e 'ranco# Prussian !ar. In t)is case t)ey not only /lanned to su&stitute t)e ca/ital re/resented &y t)e fortifications for t)e la&our of additional troo/s to defend t)e &order &ut also to sa+e t)e li+es of 'renc)%en ()o (ould )a+e died defending t)e &order )ad t)ey lacked /er%anent fortifications. Strengt)ening t)e defences against *er%any /ro+ed easy in t)e east ()ere t)e Vosges Mountains lay (est of t)e &arrier of t)e R)ine Ri+er3 &ut t)e &oundary fro% t)e R)ine to ,u-e%&ourg offered no suc) easily defensi&le o&stacles. So 'renc) %ilitary engineers lined %uc) of t)is stretc) of t)e &order (it) for%ida&le fortresses t)at e%&odied all of t)e lessons of !orld !ar I. 0)us 'rance )ad fortified its entire *er%an frontier3 t)e %ore +ulnera&le /arts in greater strengt). Since in 1@14 t)e /lunging fire of )ea+y )o(it6ers )ad /ierced t)e gun turrets on Belgian fortifications3 t)e ne( ones )ad turrets (it) ar%our as %uc) as fifteen inc)es t)ick. 0o /rotect t)e turrets fro% t)e %ining effects of t)e near %iss of a )ea+y /roDectile3 t)e engineers surrounded t)e% (it) rock and concrete and /a+ed t)is (it) &locks of cast iron one#%etre s.uare. Because of %ec)anical aids for a%%unition %o+e%ent and loading3 t)e fortress guns )ad a sustained rate of fire %uc) )ig)er t)an t)at of field artillery. !it) ela&orate underground )a&itation for t)e garrison3 t)e gas#/roof defences co+ered &ar&ed (ire and antitank &arriers (it) interlocking fire of (ea/ons fro% %ac)ine guns t)roug) 1?<#%illi%eter guns. 0)ese defences %erely /ro+ided t)e first and second line for troo/s t)at (ould dig in a%ong and to t)e rear of t)e forts. Since no e-isting artillery could seriously da%age t)ese steel and concrete defences3 t)e 'renc) could3 in effect3 %an t)eir first line strongly3 secure against %ost of t)e effects of t)e intense sur/rise &o%&ard%ent c)aracteristic of t)e "utier syste% of offence. ny effort to /ierce t)is line3 na%ed after t)e %inister of (ar3 ndr; Maginot3 %ust &eco%e a /rotracted struggle in ()ic) t)e defender )ad t)e ad+antage and /ri%acy in artillery (ould deter%ine t)e outco%e. 0)e 'renc) de/ended on t)eir artillery3 )a+ing a&out 113>>> field guns3 a//ro-i%ately <> /ercent %ore guns /er di+ision t)an t)e *er%ans. Bot) ar%ies still used %ainly !orld !ar I artillery (it) so%e i%/ro+ed /ieces3 retaining t)e field gun as (ell as t)e )o(it6er. dded to t)eir <3=>> C<# %illinieter field guns3 t)e 'renc) )ad =3>>> 1<#%illi%eter antitank guns. !it) a %u66le +elocity of a&out ?3>>> feet /er second3 t)is gun could fire a s)ot t)at (ould /ierce any *er%an tank. 0)ey su//le%ented t)is antitank gun (it) %ore t)an 13>>> ne( 4C#%illi%eter antitank guns3 /o(erful enoug) not Dust to /enetrate t)e ar%our of any *er%an tank &ut3 )y/ot)etically3 for t)e /roDectile to continue its traDectory and /ierce t)e ar%our again on its (ay t)roug) t)e ene%y tank. 0anks /ro+ided anot)er ele%ent in 'renc) su/re%acy. gainst a&out 13=>> *er%an tanks t)e 'renc) de/loyed a//ro-i%ately ?3>>>. In addition3 t)ey &ad <>> reno+ated !orld !ar I Renault

?@<

tanks and so%e tankettes (it) %ac)ine guns. Bot) sides )ad ar%oured cars3 t)e *er%ans so%e()at %ore t)an t)e 'renc). 'renc) tanks tended to &e larger t)an t)e *er%an counter/arts3 t)e increased si6e /ro+iding %uc) t)icker ar%our and a %ore /o(erful gun at so%e sacrifice in s/eed. $onsider t)is co%/arison of t)e *er%an lig)t tank (it) t)e 'renc) R#?< lig)t tank3 s)o(n in t)e ta&le &elo(. 0)e s%all *er%an gun )ad a %uc) )ig)er %u66le +elocity t)an t)e larger 'renc) one &ut )ad less c)ance of /iercing t)e t)icker ar%our of t)e 'renc) tank t)an t)e slo(#%o+ing /roDectile fro% t)e 'renc) gun )ad of /enetrating t)e *er%ans t)inner /rotection. Bot) tanks under(ent i%/ro+e%ents and (eig)t increases &efore /roduction ceased. 0)e 'renc) )ad anot)er lig)t tank (it) )ig)er s/eed and so%e()at t)inner ar%our3 so%e of ()ic) )ad a )ig) +elocity gun and ar%our co%/ara&le to t)e R# ?<.

)om arison of #ren(h and German &ight Tan$s Back

0)e co%/arison of %ediu% tanks does not differ3 ()en one %atc)es t)e *er%an %odel III (it) t)e 'renc) S#?< Gta&le &elo(H. In 1@?@ t)e *er%ans &egan e.ui//ing t)eir ne( %odels of t)is tank (it) a s)ort <>#%illi%eter gun si%ilar in /o(er to t)e 'renc) 4C#%illi%eter gun3 t)ickened t)e ar%our3 ?>#%illi%eters3 and increased t)e s/eed to 2< %iles /er )our.

)om arison of #ren(h and German Medium Tan$s Back

0)e 'renc) also )ad t)e $)ar#B3 a )ea+y tank (eig)ing ?2 tons3 (it) a s/eed of 1C %iles /er )our3 ar%our => %illi%etres t)ick3 and an ar%a%ent of a 4C#%illirneter gun in a turret and a C<# %illi%eter )o(it6er in t)e )ull. 0)e *er%ans )ad not)ing co%/ara&le in (eig)t3 t)oug) t)ey did )a+e an 1B#ton %ediu% tank (it) a C<#%illi%eter )o(it6er in t)e turret.

)har/. Tan$ Back

?@=

0)ese co%/arisons o%it a great deal. 'or e-a%/le3 t)e ar%our on 'renc) tanks )ad %ore slo/e and t)erefore %ore resistance t)an t)e ar%our on t)e *er%an tanks. But t)e 'renc) decision to econo%ise on %an/o(er and )a+e s%aller cre(s in t)eir tanks )ad a %aDor effect on t)eir fig)ting ca/acity. 0)e turrets on t)e *er%an tanks3 larger and t)erefore %ore +ulnera&le3 /ro+ided (orking s/ace for a cre( to %an t)e gun7 in 'renc) turrets only t)e co%%ander could (ork t)e gun3 a difficult task3 es/ecially ()ile trying to co%%and and direct t)e tank. lt)oug) *er%an and 'renc) doctrine3 like t)eir (ea/ons3 )ad far %ore si%ilarities t)an differences3 t)ey did +ary significantly. !)ereas t)e *er%ans clung fait)fully to3 and soug)t to i%/ro+e3 t)eir decentralised infiltration tactics of 1@1B3 t)e 'renc) retained a /reference for centralisation of co%%and and control3 including t)e selection of artillery targets. 'or e-a%/le3 t)e 'renc) +ersion of t)e infiltration tactics ke/t su&ordinate units %ore res/onsi+e to )ig)er )ead.uarters &y )a+ing t)e attacking units en+elo/ and attack strong /oints rat)er t)an &y/ass t)e% in a dri+e into t)e )ostile rear. 0)e 'renc) /reference for a tig)tly controlled3 %et)odical &attle reflected t)eir con+iction3 &ased on t)eir e-/eriences in 1@1B3 t)at an attacker could not %ake a strategic /enetration of an ene%y front &ecause t)e defender could al(ays use t)e &etter %o&ility of )is reser+es to re#esta&lis) t)e entrenc)ed line of defence7 t)e *er%ans3 on t)e ot)er )and3 continued to stri+e for a &reakt)roug) like t)ose t)ey )ad ac)ie+ed in 1@1B3 after ()ic) t)ey /ro/osed to ai% at JSu&se.uent o/erations of encircle%ent.L So 'renc) offensi+e doctrine3 ()ic) s)o(ed links (it) Mars)al 8offres siege (arfare a//roac)3 lacked t)e /rogressi+eness e+ident in t)eir %ateriel. 0)oug) t)e 'renc) )ad not renounced t)e offensi+e3 t)ey clearly recognised t)e /ri%acy of t)e defensi+e and tied t)eir offensi+e doctrine to t)e do%inance of fire/o(er3 ()ic) !orld !ar I )ad taug)t. 0)e *er%ans did not3 of course3 discount eit)er t)e su/erior /o(er of t)e defensi+e or t)e a(eso%e fire/o(er on ()ic) t)e 'renc) ar%y relied and (it) ()ic) t)ey )ad so a%/ly su//lied t)e%sel+es. nd3 in addition to t)e 'renc)3 t)e *er%ans (ould )a+e to fig)t t)e nine di+isions of t)e Britis) /rofessional ar%y3 ()ic) )ad o+er =>> tanks. Because of its e-cellent training and (ea/ons3 t)is force3 like its %uc) s%aller counter/art in 1@143 could %ake a dis/ro/ortionate contri&ution. !)en t)e 'renc) and *er%an ar%ies foug)t in May 1@4>3 &ot) rese%&led t)eir 1@1B /redecessors in t)at %ost of t)eir di+isions %arc)ed on foot and )orses dre( t)eir artillery. 2ac) ar%y )ad se+en fully %otorised infantry di+isions in ()ic) all soldiers could ride. 0)e *er%ans also )ad ten Pan6er di+isions (it) 2>> to ?>> tanks eac). 0)e 'renc) )ad t)ree lig)t %ec)anised di+isions de+elo/ed &y t)e ca+alry3 t)ree ar%oured di+isions created under t)e aus/ices of t)e infantry3 and one %ore of eac) of t)ese in t)e /rocess of for%ation. Bot) kinds )ad a&out 2>> tanks. But t)e 'renc) also )ad fi+e ca+alry di+isions3 ()ic) )ad so%e tanks3 tankettes3 ar%oured cars3 and %otorised infantry as (ell as )orse ca+alry. ltoget)er t)e *er%ans )ad se+enteen and t)e 'renc) eig)teen fully %otorised di+isions3 t)e 'renc) )a+ing a )ig)er /ro/ortion &ecause of t)eir s%aller ar%y. In addition3 eac) 'renc) ar%y )ad so%e tanks t)at it could e%/loy to attac) to infantry di+isions or

?@C

use as a unit7 t)e *er%ans3 on t)e ot)er )and3 )ad reser+ed all of t)eir li%ited nu%&er of tanks for t)eir Pan6er di+isions. 0)e different *er%an conce/t of t)e use of t)e tank )ad %ore i%/ortance t)an +ariations in t)e .uality and .uantity of t)e %aterial. Many of t)e 'renc) leaders continued to +ie( t)e tank as t)ey )ad in !orld !ar I3 as a )el/er for t)e infantry and artillery in %aking a &reakt)roug). 0)e 'renc)3 ()o /lanned on using t)eir ar%oured di+isions in t)is (ay on t)e offensi+e against an entrenc)ed defence3 did en+ision a %ore +ersatile role for t)e ca+alrys lig)t %ec)anised di+isions3 including ra/id e-/loitation of a &reakt)roug). But t)e (it))olding of o+er 13>>> tanks fro% t)ese t(o ty/es of ar%oured di+isions reflected t)e do%inance in t)eir t)inking of t)e conce/t of t)e tank as t)e /artner of t)e infantry and artillery in a %et)odical attack. 0)e *er%ans3 "o(e+er3 )ad concentrated all of t)eir tanks in ten /o(erful Pan6er di+isions. 0)oug) t)e *er%an )ig)er co%%anders3 ()o )ad t)us concentrated t)eir tanks3 )ad no +ery clear idea of t)e /otentiality of t)ese di+isions3 t)eir su&ordinates did3 and t)e e-istence of t)ese di+isions and t)eir concentration in cor/s /ro+ided t)e *er%an tank forces (it) an entirely different /otential t)an t)at of t)e 'renc). In t)e air t)e *er%ans did enDoy su/eriority in %ateriel. 0)e 'renc) )ad not stressed t)eir air force as long as )ad t)e *er%ans and )ad aggra+ated t)eir delay in re&uilding it &y a reluctance to /lace a %odel in /roduction3 kno(ing t)at t)ey could )a+e a &etter air/lane if t)ey (aited. 0)is %eant t)at t)e 'renc) foug)t (it) inferior nu%&ers of largely out#of#date aircraft. 0)e 'renc) )ad a&out 2>> &o%&ers co%/ared to 13C>> *er%an &o%&ers3 for e-a%/le. In reconnaissance and fig)ter aircraft t)e 'renc) )ad a&out se+en for e+ery *er%an ten. Most 'renc) fig)ter s.uadrons )ad old air/lanes &arely ca/a&le 5f ?>> %iles an )our co%/ared (it) ?<> %iles an )our for t)e *er%an fig)ters. ircraft fro% t)e large (arti%e /roduction of %odern fig)ters only &egan reac)ing t)e o/erational s.uadrons Dust as t)e 1@4> s/ring ca%/aign co%%enced. Britis) aircraft in 'rance %ore t)an dou&led t)e nu%&er of allied &o%&ers and added a&out 2> /ercent to t)eir fig)ter strengt) and so%e()at %ore to t)eir .uality. By t)e s/ring of 1@4> Britis) aircraft /roduction e-ceeded t)at of *er%any3 &ut t)e allies (ould need a year &efore t)is /re/onderance in /roduction could create /arity in t)e air. 0)e clai%s of t)e air ent)usiasts and t)e scoffing of t)e sce/tics )ad created uncertainty a&out t)e effect of aircraft on (ar. Inferiority in t)e air caused great unease for %any allied co%%anders3 e+en t)oug) t)ey )ad no definite ideas a&out t)e conse.uences of t)is dis/arity. 0)e 'renc) did not e-/ect t)e *er%ans to attack along t)eir frontier3 antici/ating t)at3 as in 1@143 t)ey (ould atte%/t a turning %o+e%ent t)roug) Belgiu%. But at t)e sa%e ti%e t)e 'renc) did not ela&orately fortify t)eir Belgian frontier3 e+en t)oug) a %aDor 'renc) industrial region &ordered Belgiu%. Rat)er t)an %ake t)is i%/ortant area a &attleground3 t)e 'renc) /lanned to %o+e t)eir forces for(ard ra/idly into Belgiu% and engage t)e *er%ans as far as /ossi&le fro% t)e 'renc) &order. Not only did t)is strategy /rotect t)e 'renc) industrial region3 &ut also it assured t)e %a-i%u% su//ort of Belgian industry and t)e /o(erful ar%y of %ore t)an t(enty di+isions t)at Belgiu% )ad created in t)e /eriod &et(een t)e (ars. If3 as t)e 'renc) sus/ected3 t)e *er%ans also %o+ed t)roug) "olland3 *er%any (ould face ten 1utc) di+isions. 2-clusi+e of t)e 1utc)3 allied dis/ositions /ro+ided a&out one di+ision for e+ery t(o %iles of t)e ga/ &et(een nt(er/ and t)e rugged country of t)e rdennes. 0)e e-/erience of !orld !ar I )ad s)o(n t)at suc) a )ig) density of force could3 if not sur/rised3 resist a &reakt)roug)3 e+en if t)e ene%y )ad a t)ree#to#one /redo%inance in artillery # and t)e allies )ad stronger artillery3 nearly t(ice t)e *er%an strengt) (it)out counting t)e artillery in Belgian forts. 0)e *er%an generals /lanned to do e-actly ()at t)e 'renc) e-/ected7 re/eat t)eir 1@14 /lan of a giant turning %o+e%ent t)roug) Belgiu%. "a+ing a )ealt)y res/ect for allied fire/o(er and t)e tactical strengt) of t)e defence3 t)ey %ade t)eir /lan (it)out %uc) ent)usias%3 c)oosing it &ecause ?@B

a struggle against t)e Maginot line see%ed e+en less desira&le. By &ringing in t)e 1utc) and Belgians3 t)is /lan (ould increase t)e strengt) of t)eir o//onents to at least 1?= di+isions3 a force e.ual to t)eir 1?= di+isions &ut greater in artillery and tanks and )a+ing t)e ad+antage of t)e defensi+e and of Belgian and 1utc) fortifications. But t)e *er%ans )ad one &enefit3 ()ic) t)ey )ad underesti%ated: t)eir ar%y /ossessed &etter %orale and far greater tactical skill t)an t)at of t)eir o//onents. Part of t)is /ri%acy rested on a c)ange in t)e 'renc) ar%y. In t)e 1@2>s3 in /art for /olitical and ideological reasons3 t)e 'renc) )ad ceased to rely on an acti+e ar%y cadre filled (it) reser+es on %o&ilisation and instead )ad created a regular force to train conscri/ts and anot)er to for% a skeleton of regulars u/on ()ic) %ost of t)e reser+es (ould for% ()en acti+ated. 0)is syste% /ro+ided a far less satisfactory organisation t)an an ar%y in ()ic) t)e units trained t)eir o(n reser+es and to ()ic)3 ()en recalled3 t)e %en returned and found fa%iliar leaders and co%rades. 5n %o&ilisation t)e acti+e 'renc) di+isions3 co%/osing a little o+er )alf of t)e di+isions not s/ecialised to )olding fortifications3 ga+e u/ t(o#t)irds of t)eir officers3 re/lacing t)e% (it) reser+ists. But t)ey retained t(o#t)irds of t)eir non#co%%issioned officers and << /ercent of t)eir /ri+ates3 filling t)ese +acancies (it) reser+ists. If t)ese di+isions could )a+e an o//ortunity to train toget)er after %o&ilisation3 t)eir effecti+eness (ould soon co%e close to t)at of t)e acti+e di+isions of 1@143 in s/ite of t)e +ery )ig) /ro/ortion of reser+e officers. In addition to t)ese di+isions3 t)e 'renc) ar%y for%ed a&out a .uarter of its field di+isions fro% 2? /ercent regular officers3 dra(n fro% t)e acti+e di+isions3 and 1C /ercent career non#co%%issioned officers fro% t)e sa%e source7 reser+ists constituted t)e re%ainder. Reser+ists su//lied +irtually all of t)e /ri+ates. second#class reser+e di+ision3 %uc) like t)e old *er%an ,and(e)r3 co%/osed a&out a fift) of t)e ar%ys %o&ile di+isions. 0)ese3 e-ce/t for a&out < /ercent regular officers3 )ad only reser+ists3 t)e oldest of t)e reser+ists ()o )ad recei+ed t)e &riefest acti+e duty training long &efore. 0)ese for%ations also lacked t)e e-/erience of ser+ing toget)er and (ell#trained leaders)i/. In addition3 &ecause of t)e lo( &irt) rate during !orld !ar I3 &et(een 1@?< and 1@?B t)e 'renc) ar%y )ad trained and disc)arged to t)e reser+e only )alf as %any %en as it )ad in t)e co%/ara&le years &efore !orld !ar I. 0)e larger nu%&ers disc)arged in earlier years )ad recei+ed only one year of training rat)er t)an t)e t(o ado/ted in 1@?4 and custo%ary fro% 1@>< to 1@1?. So%e reser+ists ser+ing in t)e ar%y )ad originally recei+ed t)eir training as sailors or air%en. 0)us t)e organisation and training of t)e 'renc) forces in 1@?@ fell significantly &elo( t)eir standards in 1@14. 0)e *er%ans3 on t)e ot)er )and3 t)oug) t)ey )ad &arely fifty acti+e di+isions3 )ad recruited3 trained3 and for%ed t)ese in t)e traditional %anner on a regular cadre and dra(n t)e %en fro% t)e sa%e geogra/)ical region. Most of t)ese )ad also ser+ed in t)e Polis) ca%/aign. 0)us3 none of t)ese 'renc) di+isions3 not e+en t)e acti+e ones3 )ad t)e .ualities of t)e con+entional *er%an di+ision. 'renc) soldiers )ad all recei+ed at least one year of training3 &ut usually t)ey )ad not drilled nor ser+ed %uc) (it) one anot)er &efore t)eir 1@?@ %o&ilisation and did not kno( t)eir leaders. nd t)e reser+ists ()o su//lied t(o#t)irds of t)e officers of t)e acti+e di+isions did not )a+e t)e skill of regulars nor t)e fa%iliarity (it) t)eir fello( officers or non#co%%issioned officers. 0)e 'renc) acti+e di+isions3 t)oug) co%/osed of seasoned %en3 )ad defects not often e-/erienced since t)e se+enteent) century3 ()en %ilitary contractors still asse%&led forces of +eterans ()o often did not kno( eac) ot)er or t)eir co%%anders. nd t)e 'renc) ar%y largely lacked t)e co)esion /ro+ided &y regional recruiting ()ose +irtues a 'renc) Re+olutionary soldier )ad e-tolled t)us: J!e (ould like to ser+e altoget)er3 for ()en a soldier is kno(n and lo+ed3 defeats are less disastrous and successes %ore flattering.L

?@@

In addition to all of t)e defects of t)e acti+e di+isions3 t)e first le+el of reser+e di+isions3 (it) al%ost all reser+e /ri+ates and less t)an a .uarter acti+e officers and non#co%%issioned officers3 )ad fe(er e-/erienced leaders and3 /er)a/s %ore i%/ortant3 fe(er /rofessional soldiers as (ell as reser+ists ()o )ad not ser+ed in t)e sa%e unit toget)er. ,ack of /rior ser+ice toget)er (ould )andica/ t)e officers (orking (it) eac) ot)er as (ell (it) t)e ot)er ranks. In addition to all of t)e foregoing fla(s3 t)e second le+el of reser+e units )ad an al%ost total a&sence of t)oroug)ly trained and e-/erienced leaders)i/. So t)is syste% of se/arating training fro% t)e co%&at for%ation de/ri+ed a unit3 ()en %o&ilised3 of a sense of co%%unity deri+ed eit)er fro% /re+ious ser+ice or fro% t)eir recruit%ent fro% t)e sa%e +illage or region. 4/on acti+ation3 t)e units of t)e 'renc) ar%y )ad no unit es/rit or co)esion7 (ere unfa%iliar (it) t)eir fello(s7 and )ad a%ateurs filling t)e %aDority of co%%and and leaders)i/ /ositions. 0)e 'renc) )ig) co%%and realised t)ese (eaknesses of an ar%y c)aracterised &y t)eir c)ief of staff as initially Jco%/osed of +ery e-cita&le reser+istsL and )ad resol+ed t)at t)e ar%y %ust li%it its o/erations to t)e defensi+e until t)e %en )ad seen enoug) ser+ice to gi+e t)e co%%anders and soldiers ade.uate co%/etence and t)e units a sense of co%%unity. 0)e 'renc) ar%ys doctrine for t)e offensi+e %ini%ised t)e effects of t)ese deficiencies in t)eir ar%ys /ersonnel &ecause t)ey sa( t)ese o/erations as %et)odically and deli&erately e-ecuted3 controlled &y di+ision and )ig)er )ead.uarters3 and de/endent on t)e artillery t)at3 firing fro% t)e rear against targets not seen3 relied %ore t)an t)e infantry on /roficiency ac.uired t)roug) training and less on tactical e-/erience and unit %orale. 5f course3 t)e lessons of !orld !ar I )ad taug)t t)e /ri%acy of t)e defence and t)e need for t)e carefully /lanned3 artillery#de/endent attacks3 &ut t)e %an/o(er syste% of t)e 'renc) ar%y reinforced t)ese doctrinal decisions &y gi+ing t)e )ig) co%%and little alternati+e at t)e outset of o/erations and al%ost i%/osing an initial defensi+e stance. 0)e J/)oney (arL /ro+ided t)e 'renc) (it) an in+alua&le interlude to /re/are t)eir ar%y. Ser+ing and training toget)er3 t)e soldiers and t)eir leaders %ade %arked /rogress in de+elo/ing t)eir skill3 t)eir a&ility to (ork toget)er3 and t)eir unit co)esi+eness. Still3 t)e units )ad only a &rief ti%e co%/ared to t)ose3 in t)e *er%an ar%y3 ()ic) )ad e-isted for a long ti%e and )ad gi+en t)eir reser+ists t)eir initial t(o years of instruction. 0)e *er%ans also used t)is ti%e (ell. l%ost )alf of t)e di+isions t)e *er%ans e%/loyed in t)e s/ring ca%/aign )ad recei+ed t)e &ulk of t)eir training in a /rogra% e-tending fro% 5cto&er 1@?@ into /ril 1@4>. 0)e ne( units did )a+e a nu%&er of &attle#seasoned officers and non# co%%issioned officers transferred fro% t)e forces t)at )ad foug)t in Poland. Not only did t)e *er%ans rely on t)e lessons learned in Poland to ani%ate t)e training of t)e ne( units3 &ut also t)e +eteran for%ations (ent t)roug) a rigorous /rogra% of instruction and /ractice to re%edy t)e deficiencies noted in co%&at (it) t)e Polis) ar%y. But t)e additional instruction %erely increased t)e +alue of an inco%/ara&le asset: $o%&at in Poland. 0)at ca%/aign acco%/lis)ed training t)at e+en t)e %ost ela&orate %anoeu+re could not a//ro-i%ate. In addition to t)e co%&at kno(ledge gained &y t)e front#line soldiers3 co%%anders and staffs gained e-/erience %o+ing and fig)ting large nu%&ers of %en in actual conditions. Manoeu+res can test co%%unications (ell and su//ly arrange%ents so%e()at3 &ut a ca%/aign on a large front against a deter%ined foe nearly e.ual in nu%&ers and in+ol+ing o//osed ad+ances of 2<> %iles tested and educated e+ery ele%ent in t)e *er%an forces. 0)e co%&at (it) t)e Polis) ar%y3 ()ic) cost t)e *er%ans ?>3>>> killed and (ounded3 /ro+ided an o//ortunity t)at training )ad )ad increasing difficulty in si%ulating. rtillery%en found /eaceti%e /ractice of )ig) +alue &ecause t)ey s)ot at targets t)ey could not see3 e-actly as t)ey (ould in co%&at. But t)e infantry3 ()ic) %anoeu+red &y s.uad3 /latoon3 and co%/any3 could not so nearly

4>>

si%ulate co%&at in training. In t)e )eyday of t)e linear syste%3 'rederick t)e *reats infantry3 carefully and t)oroug)ly /re/ared &ut (it)out /re+ious co%&at3 de%onstrated its su/eriority o+er ustrian +eterans. But /ractice of firing3 of for%ing3 and of %arc)ing in align%ent /resented fe( differences fro% co%&at ()en co%/ared (it) t)e un#stereoty/ed res/onse needed for attack (it) infiltration tactics and in a defensi+e relying on so%e %o+e%ent. $o%&at (it) t)e Poles t)us /ro+ided an occasion for ac.uiring skill una+aila&le in any ot)er (ay. 0)e t(o ar%y grou/ co%%anders ()o )ad t)e /rinci/al res/onsi&ility in t)e ca%/aign against 'rance )ad led t)e *er%an ar%y grou/s in Poland and four of t)e fi+e co%%anders of t)e key ar%ies )ad t)e sa%e assign%ents in Poland. No 'renc) co%%ander )ad a co%/ara&le &ackground3 and t)is funda%ental difference affected all of t)e cor/s and di+isions t)at ser+ed in Poland. !)en t)e *er%ans attacked3 t)ey dis/layed a %uc) greater le+el of o/erational skill3 %uc) of it due to t)eir ca%/aign in Poland. :et t)e training t)e *er%ans recei+ed in actual co%&at (ould &e a /eris)a&le asset &ecause ()en t)ey foug)t in Belgiu%3 t)e allies (ould .uickly ac.uire t)e sa%e ad+antages3 an o//ortunity t)at t)eir strengt) and fire/o(er see%ed destined to assure t)e% &ecause t)ese a//eared certain to )alt t)e *er%an ad+ance. Back

French and German !lans

fter *er%any defeated Poland3 dolf "itler3 to t)e dis%ay of )is generals3 ordered an i%%ediate attack on 'rance t)roug) Belgiu% and "olland. !it) %any troo/s still inade.uately trained and %otorised e.ui/%ent undergoing re/air after t)e Polis) ca%/aign3 t)e leaders of t)e *er%an ar%y felt unready to take on t)e 'renc). By /ost/one%ents3 o&struction3 and /rocrastination3 and (it) t)e )el/ of so%e &ad (eat)er3 t)ey %anaged to defer t)e offensi+e until May 1@4>. 0)e /lan of ca%/aign dra(n u/ in t)e autu%n )ad en+isioned a li%ited o&Decti+e3 ()ic) t)ey (ould attain &y a dri+e into Belgiu% (it) t)e %ain forces /us)ing (est to(ard *)ent and t)e coast. It did not occur to t)e *er%an general staff to atte%/t a decisi+e ca%/aign3 suc) as t)eir 1@14 /lan )ad en+isioned. 0)e four years duration of !orld !ar I3 after o/ening o/erations (it) Sc)lieffens a&orti+e decisi+e ca%/aign3 an understanding of t)e su/re%acy of t)e defensi+e3 and an a//reciation of t)e strengt) of t)e 'renc) ar%y ke/t t)e *er%an staff fro% considering any initial o&Decti+e %ore a%&itious t)an a /us) to t)e coast and t)e occu/ation of %ost of Belgiu%. 'renc) /lans3 as finally /erfected &y *eneral Maurice *a%elin3 t)e 'renc) c)ief of staff3 /laced t)e ten )ig)#.uality di+isions of t)e 'renc) 'irst r%y on t)e t(enty %iles of t)e front nort) of Na%ur (it) t)e nine di+isions of t)e Britis) 2-/editionary 'orce and fourteen di+isions fro% t)e Belgian ar%y co+ering t)e re%aining distance3 o+er forty %iles3 to nt(er/. 5t)er Belgian di+isions3 retreating fro% for(ard /ositions3 could e-/ect to strengt)en t)is force. In addition3 t)e 'renc) Se+ent) r%y3 (it) se+en di+isions3 (ould ad+ance along t)e coast &eyond nt(er/3 ()ere it (ould link u/ (it) t)e 1utc) and )a+e a /osition on t)e flank of t)e *er%an ad+ance. Since *eneral *a%elin )ad ser+ed on Mars)al 8offres staff in 1@143 t)e role of t)e Se+ent) r%y %ay )a+e o(ed so%e of its ins/iration to 8offres creation of t)e Si-t) r%y and )is /lacing it on t)e flank of t)e *er%an ad+ance in 1@14. 2-/ecting t)e 'renc) forces to %o+e ra/idly to %eet t)e *er%ans as far east as /ossi&le3 t)e /lan called for t)e 'renc)3 Britis)3 and Belgian ar%ies to )old on t)e line of t)e 1yle Ri+er &et(een nt(er/ and Na%ur.

#irst #ren(h and German Plans Back

4>1

Sout) of Na%ur3 *a%elin /lanned for )is Nint) r%y to %o+e for(ard to )old t)e for%ida&le &arrier of t)e Meuse Ri+er fro% t)e 'renc) frontier nort) to Na%ur. "e e-/ected t)e *er%ans3 ad+ancing t)roug) t)e )illy and forested rdennes region3 to take %ore t)an a (eek to reac) t)e Meuse and to arri+e in +ery %odest force &ecause of fe( roads and t)e %ountainous and forested terrain of t)e rdennes. Since t)e Nint) r%y (ould face co%/arati+ely (eak o//osition and )a+e a%/le ti%e to entrenc) t)e line of t)e Meuse3 it )ad less t)an )alf t)e nu%&er of di+isions /er %ile allocated to t)e ot)er allied ar%ies ad+ancing to %eet t)e *er%ans. 0)e *er%ans as (ell as t)e 'renc) )ad long ackno(ledged t)at t)e terrain of t)e rdennes did seriously )andica/3 if not /reclude3 t)e %o+e%ent of large forces. 0)e 'renc) Second r%y3 already in /osition3 )eld t)e 'renc)#Belgian frontier3 for%ing a link &et(een t)e Nint) r%y and t)e soldiers /osted along t)e Maginot line on t)e ,u-e%&ourg &order. ll of t)e ar%ies for%ed t)e 'renc) first ar%y grou/ under *eneral Billotte. Most of t)e re%ainder of t)e 'renc) ar%y de/loyed against *er%any lined t)e 'renc)#*er%an frontier and (atc)ed for a /ossi&le *er%an %o+e t)roug) S(it6erland. 0)e distri&ution of %en did not suit *a%elins su&ordinate3 *eneral l/)onse *eorges3 ()o co%%anded t)e forces facing *er%any. 0)e t(o 'renc) generals3 *a%elin3 si-ty#eig)t years of age3 and *eorges3 si-ty#fi+e3 disagreed a&out *a%elins /lan and disliked eac) ot)er. 0)ey differed in ot)er res/ects3 too. *a%elin3 after )e )ad left Mars)al 8offres staff3 )ad successfully co%%anded a di+ision and &riefly a cor/s. *eorges3 on t)e ot)er )and3 )ad &een (ounded leading a &attalion 'rance in 1@14 and s/ent %ost of t)e (ar in staff assign%ents. !)ile *a%elins sc)olarly %anner and aloof air ke/t %any at a distance3 *eorges )ad a (ide circle of ac.uaintances and ad%irers. 0)e %en ()o kne( )i% regarded t)e energetic and outs/oken *eorges as (ell fitted for co%%and3 in s/ite of a near#fatal incident at Marseille in 1@?43 ()en *eorges and t)e 'renc) foreign %inister greeted t)e 9ing of :ugosla+ia. "a+ing %et t)e 9ing at t)e dock3 t)e t)ree dro+e slo(ly t)roug) t)e streets in an o/en car3 recei+ing t)e c)eers of t)e (elco%ing cro(d7 an assassin ste//ed u/ to t)e car and s)ot &ot) t)e 9ing and foreign %inister. !it) t)e car sto//ed3 *eorges courageously ste//ed out and3 ()en )e gra//led (it) t)e gun%an3 t)e %an s)ot )i% se+eral ti%es in t)e &ody. 0)e doctors sa+ed only *eorges3 and t)e general ne+er see%ed fully to reco+er. *eorges &elie+ed t)at t)e ar%y grou/ co+ering t)e Maginot line and t)e R)ine )ad too %any di+isions3 &ut ()en )e could not /ersuade t)eir ar%y grou/ co%%ander to /art (it) so%e3 )e did not order )i% to gi+e u/ any of )is di+isions. But *eorgess unease e-tended to t)e ()ole sc)e%e t)at co%%itted so %any troo/s and left so fe( for a su&tracted reser+e.

4>2

s a result of t)ese co%%it%ents3 *a%elin )ad t)ree di+isions t)at )e %ig)t e%/loy any()ere and *eorges )ad t(enty#one di+isions as a su&tracted reser+e. 'i+e of t)ese3 including an additional ar%oured di+ision in t)e /rocess of for%ation3 )ad not reac)ed a state of full co%&at readiness. 5f t)e t(enty#one3 t)e /lan /osted si- as a reser+e for t)e Belgian front and fi+e near S(it6erland in case t)e *er%ans s)ould atte%/t to turn t)e frontier fortifications &y entering t)at country. 0)is left only ten di+isions3 including one %otorised and t(o ar%oured3 /laced along t)e centre of t)e long line &et(een S(it6erland and t)e sea. *a%elin felt no a//re)ension &ecause t)e ()ole distri&ution of forces3 including ear%arking so %any reser+es3 recalled t)e occasion in !orld !ar I in ()ic) *a%elin )ad /layed a significant role at 8offres )ead.uarters in 1@14. "is e-/erience t)en )ad s)o(n )i% t)at e+ery soldier not irre+oca&ly co%%itted in co%&at constituted a reser+e3 a conce/t 8offre )ad used ()en )e %o+ed troo/s fro% t)e ,orraine and lsace fronts to o//ose t)e *er%an turning %o+e%ent and create t)e Si-t) r%y. 9no(ing t)at t)e rail(ays could trans/ort a di+ision any()ere in 'rance in four days and )a+ing )el/ed to e%/loy t)ese strategically offensi+e troo/s in 1@143 *a%elin a//arently dis%issed t)e concerns of a 1@14 &attalion co%%ander. nd *a%elins /lan fit t)e circu%stances. In a long (ar3 conser+ation of Belgian territory3 %an/o(er3 and resources (ould /ro+e i%/ortant3 and only /ro%/t action and strong ar%ies could do t)is. 0)e ot)er terrain suita&le for large forces3 t)at &et(een t)e R)ine and ,u-e%&ourg3 )ad t)e /o(erful fortifications of t)e Maginot line3 (ell su//orted &y t)e %o&ile ar%ies /osted t)ere. de.uate troo/s guarded t)e less )ea+ily fortified areas unsuita&le for large forces3 t)e R)ine frontier and t)e Vosges in t)e sout) and t)e rdennes region &et(een t)e Maginot line and t)e le+el3 /ros/ecti+e &attleground in Belgiu%. 0)at t)e *er%ans initially /lanned to do e-actly ()at *a%elin e-/ected and s)ared )is confidence in t)e a&ility of t)e 'renc) to defend successfully endorsed *a%elins /lan and (ould )a+e co%/letely &elied *eorgess %isgi+ings )ad t)e *er%ans not radically c)anged t)eir ()ole a//roac) to t)e ca%/aign. Back

(he New German 0ffensive !lan

0(o of t)e a&lest soldiers of !orld !ar II /layed a %aDor role in c)anging t)e *er%an /lan. !)en *eneral *erd +on Rundstedt3 co%%ander of t)e sout)ern ar%y grou/ in t)e Polis) ca%/aign3 took o+er r%y *rou/ facing t)e rdennes3 )e )ad as )is c)ief of staff *eneral 2ric) +on Manstein. In t)eir ser+ice in !orld !ar II3 &ot) %en esta&lis)ed (ell#deser+ed re/utations for great skill in o/erations. 0)e aristocratic Rundstedt3 recalled fro% retire%ent at age si-ty#t)ree to co%%and an ar%y grou/ in Poland3 )ad already dis/layed )is skill3 for ()ic) )is /eaceti%e career and !orld !ar I ser+ice as c)ief of an ar%y cor/s staff fig)ting t)e Russians )ad /re/ared )i%. lso a staff officer in !orld !ar I3 Manstein3 ten years Rundstedts Dunior3 )ad ser+ed on t)e general staff of t)e ar%y and as Rundstedts c)ief of staff in t)e Polis) ca%/aign during ()ic) t)eir ar%y grou/ )ad distinguis)ed itself. !)en Rundstedt and Manstein learned of t)e /lan for t)e offensi+e into Belgiu%3 Manstein /re/ared and Rundstedt signed a series of %e%oranda of /rotest3 /ro/osing to s)ift strengt) to r%y *rou/ and en+isioning t)e /ossi&ility of &reaking t)roug) to t)e sout) and (est and cutting off t)e allied forces in Belgiu%. In No+e%&er Manstein conferred (it) *eneral "ein6 *uderian3 ()o3 as a lieutenant on staff and sc)ool assign%ents in t)e 1@2>s3 )ad studied t)e role of tanks and de+elo/ed /rofound ideas a&out t)eir e%/loy%ent. "e &ad risen ra/idly in t)e 1@?>s3 )ad /u&lis)ed a &ook on tank (arfare in 1@?C3 and )ad &eco%e t)e *er%an ar%ys leading e-/onent of t)e role of t)e Pan6er di+ision. "a+ing &egun !orld !ar I in c)arge of a (ireless detac)%ent3 *uderian )ad ca/italised on t)is &ackground to ensure t)at *er%an tanks )ad an e-cellent syste% of radio co%%unication. 0)e 4>?

su/er& articulation3 ()ic) t)is assured3 )el/ed t)e Pan6er di+isions realise *uderians as/irations for t)e%. Initiating t)e conference to learn ()et)er Pan6er di+isions could %o+e t)roug) t)e rdennes3 infantry%an Manstein learned a great deal fro% *uderians +ision of t)e dee/ /enetration /ossi&le if Pan6er di+isions &roke t)roug). Mansteins ne( %e%oranda reflected ()at )e learned fro% *uderian3 &ut also led to t)e i%/ortunate c)ief of staffs reassign%ent to co%%and a distant cor/s. /iece of a//arent &ad luck )el/ed Manstein and t)e *er%ans. *er%an officer carrying /arts of t)e /lan for t)e ca%/aign into Belgiu% +isited t)e officers clu& at an air &ase and3 in t)e con+i+ial at%os/)ere of t)e &ar3 acce/ted an in+itation for air rat)er t)an rail trans/ortation to )is conference. ,ost in &ad (eat)er t)e ne-t %orning3 t)e officers lig)t /lane landed in Belgiu%7 ()en )is cigarette lig)ter did not lig)t3 )e failed to destroy all of )is /lans &efore t)e Belgian ar%y sei6ed t)e% and notified t)e 'renc). 0)is incident and its co%/ro%ise of t)e *er%an /lans )el/ed "itler decide to /ost/one )is offensi+e and ga+e t)e *er%an staff &ot) t)e ti%e and additional %oti+ation to study t)eir conce/t for t)e offensi+e. In t)eir re#e-a%ination3 Mansteins ideas looked &etter. t t)e sa%e ti%e3 "itler learned of Mansteins /ro/osals and /ro%/tly sent for t)e aut)or3 as "itler recognised a conce/t si%ilar to one )e )ad )ad for so%e ti%e &ut ()ic) t)e for%er 'irst !orld !ar cor/oral could not clearly for%ulate. 2%&racing Mansteins ideas3 "itler i%%ediately ordered t)e staff to dra( u/ an a//ro/riate o/erational /lan.

#inal #ren(h and German Plans Back

0)e no( rece/ti+e staff e-ecuted a design t)at concentrated forty#fi+e di+isions3 including se+en of t)e ar%ys ten Pan6er di+isions3 (it) r%y *rou/ o//osite t)e rdennes. r%y *rou/ B3 carrying out t)e original sc)e%e (it) only t(enty#nine di+isions3 /ro+ided a distraction to con+ince t)e 'renc) t)at t)e *er%ans (ere launc)ing t)eir %ain attack on t)e terrain nort) of Na%ur. 0)e ne( /lan de+oted %uc) attention to t)e .uestion of &reaking t)roug) along t)e Meuse3 ()ere t)e Pan6er di+isions (ould %eet 'renc) troo/s already dug in. Many *er%an generals did not &elie+e t)at t)ey could cross t)e Meuse unaided and t)oug)t t)ey (ould )a+e to (ait until t)e infantry co%/leted t)eir nine#day %arc) and3 (it) artillery su//ort3 could conduct an ort)odo&reakt)roug) of t)e kind /erfected during !orld !ar I. But ()ile %any *er%an generals t)us %ade t)e sa%e assu%/tions as *eneral *a%elin3 ot)ers3 like *eneral *uderian3 &elie+ed t)at t)e Pan6er di+isions could cross t)e Meuse in t)e face of entrenc)ed resistance.

4>4

In fact3 t)e staff )ad gi+en so %uc) attention to t)e sur/rise concentration and to sol+ing t)e /ro&le% of t)e &reakt)roug) t)at t)ey included not)ing a&out t)e action t)at (ould follo( success. In a (ay3 !orld !ar I )ad %ade t)e /enetration of t)e continuous front so difficult3 so elusi+e an ac)ie+e%ent3 t)at it )ad al%ost &eco%e an end in itself. 0)e forces carrying out t)e &reakt)roug) could turn sout) against t)e 'renc) ar%ies along t)e Maginot line3 or (est to(ard t)e 2nglis) $)annel3 or e+en dri+e to(ard Paris. But in t)e a&sence of e-/licit directions3 t)e Pan6er leaders e-/ected to follo( +on Mansteins original o&Decti+e and ai% for t)e coast. Back

(he German 1reakthrough in May 7=@;

2arly on May 1>t) 1@4>3 t)e *er%ans &egan t)eir offensi+e3 attacking "olland and Belgiu% according to t)e strategy /ainstakingly e+ol+ed during t)e /eriod since t)e Polis) ca%/aign. 1is%issing intelligence t)at t)e *er%ans )ad concentrated %ost of t)eir Pan6er and infantry di+isions o//osite t)e rdennes3 *eneral *a%elin ordered )is ar%ies for(ard into Belgiu%. 4nlike t)e gloo%y *eneral *eorges3 t)e s%ilingly confident *a%elin )u%%ed %ilitary %usic as )e ga+e t)e order to counter t)e *er%an offensi+e. 0)e %otorised units of t)e 'renc) Se+ent) and 'irst ar%ies reac)ed t)eir o&Decti+es t)e first day3 t)e foot troo/s %arc)ing slo(ly &e)ind3 (it) so%e tanks %o+ing on rail(ay flat cars. 0)e *er%an air force o/ened t)e ca%/aign &y striking fifty 'renc) airfields3 destroying four and da%aging si-ty 'renc) aircraft in addition to inflicting losses on Britis)3 Belgian3 and 1utc) /lanes. 0)e second days suc) assaults destroyed t)ree 'renc) /lanes and da%aged a fe( ot)ers. 0)ese attacks cost t)e *er%ans )ea+ily: one flig)t lost se+en of t(enty#one %ediu% &o%&ers to 'renc) fig)ters and one to antiaircraft fire. 0)e %ain *er%an air effort see%ed concentrated against t)e 1utc)3 as t)e allied troo/s ad+anced into Belgiu% un%olested. 0)e *er%an /lan to a+oid attack on t)e fortified 'renc) &order confined t)e initial fig)ting to co%&at (it) t)e 1utc) ar%y and to o+erco%ing Belgian frontier fortifications. 0)e %ain ar%ies (ould not %eet in Belgiu% until &ot) )ad reac)ed t)e 1yle line. 2+en less fig)ting occurred in t)e rdennes as %ost Belgian forces (it)dre( nort)(ard3 lea+ing t)e *er%ans a %arc) of as %uc) as si-ty#fi+e %iles fro% t)e Belgian &order to t)e Meuse Ri+er. 0)us t)e *er%ans faced no deter%ined o//osition in t)e une+en and forested rdennes3 terrain .uite unsuita&le for t)e large nu%&ers of tanks t)at led t)eir dri+e. Since se+en Pan6er3 t)ree %otorised3 and t)irty#fi+e infantry di+isions )ad to /ass t)roug) an area of inade.uate roads3 t)e *er%an staffs )ad /lanned (it) e-ce/tional t)oroug)ness3 and t)e e-cellently /re/ared units e-ecuted t)e %o+e%ent so e-/ertly t)at t)e t)ousands of +e)icles /roceeded on t)eir a%&itious sc)edule (it) fe( difficulties. 0)e *er%an colu%ns entering Belgiu% /resented a te%/ting target for t)e fe( allied &o%&ers3 and t)e Britis) /ro%/tly attacked at lo( altitude (it) t)eir o&solete single#engine 'airey Battle attack &o%&er. 5n May 1>t)3 t)e Britis) lost to antiaircraft or *er%an fig)ter /lanes t)irteen &o%&ers. 0)e ne-t day t)e Britis) s.uandered all eig)t of t)eir aircraft against t)e sa%e target3 and t)ey and t)e Belgians suffered )ea+y losses in strikes on *er%an colu%ns fart)er nort).

German Ad%an(e into .elgium Back

4><

5n May 12t) t)e e-/erience of si- 'renc) Breguet lig)t &o%&ers illustrated t)e difficulties of t)e attackers. $o%ing in at treeto/ le+el3 t)ese fast3 %odern aircraft assaulted a *er%an colu%n on t)e %arc). But (it) a torrent of s)ells *er%an 2># and ?C#%illi%eter auto%atic antiaircraft guns s)ot do(n fi+e of t)e si- and disa&led t)e one t)at succeeded in returning to its &ase. 5ne /lane dro//ed &o%&s on truckloads of *er%an soldiers3 and anot)er 'renc) &o%&er cras)ed into t)e *er%an colu%n. 0)e *er%an stress on air defence %ade t)eir colu%ns +irtually in+ulnera&le to allied air attack3 e+en (it)out t)e aid of t)e fig)ter /lanes t)at so successfully /rotected t)e )uge concentration %arc)ing into t)e rdennes. ,ater 'renc) raids fro% )ig)er attitude /ro+ed safer for t)e 'renc) &ut inflicted little da%age on t)e *er%ans. 0)e fig)ter air/lane co%/ounded t)e /ro&le%s of t)e &o%&er3 as t)e fate of t(el+e outdated *er%an 8#BC di+e#&o%&ers gra/)ically s)o(ed. 2ffecti+e as &o%&ers in s/ite of t)eir fi-ed landing gear and lo( s/eed3 t)ese /lanes3 ()en returning front a raid3 %et fi+e slo( 'renc) fig)ters. 0)e 'renc) fig)ters3 (it) a 1>>#%ile#an#)our su/eriority in s/eed and an ar%a%ent of a 2>#%illi%eter cannon and t(o %ac)ine guns3 s)ot do(n all of t)e e+en %ore out%oded *er%an &o%&ers and i%%ediately engaged and dro+e &ack a grou/ of out(ard#&ound di+e &o%&ers3 all (it)out t)e loss of a single fig)ter. lt)oug) t)ese incidents e-aggerate t)e /lig)t of air attackers3 t)ey do illustrate t)e effecti+eness of an ade.uate antiaircraft defence %anned &y (ell#trained gunners and confir% t)e analogy of lig)t infantry o//osing lig)t ca+alry. 0)ese air o/erations also reaffir%ed t)e e-/erience of !orld !ar I3 ()ic) )ad a%/ly de%onstrated t)e +ulnera&ility of &o%&ing and reconnaissance /lanes to attack &y fig)ters3 /lanes s/ecifically designed to fig)t ot)er aircraft. Mean()ile3 t)e %o+e%ents of t)e ar%ies of &ot) ad+ersaries de+elo/ed according to t)eir /lans3 e-ce/t t)at *er%an success against Belgian and 1utc) defences co%%itted 'renc) troo/s earlier t)an t)e 'renc) )ad e-/ected. 0o )old t)e *er%ans until t)e 'renc) 'irst r%y co%/letely closed u/ to t)e 1yle3 its t(o ar%oured di+isions /roceeded east of t)e 1yle ()ere t)ey engaged t)e first of t)e t(o stronger *er%an Pan6er di+isions /us)ing to(ard t)e 1yle. 0)e inconclusi+e result of t)is first %aDor &attle &et(een tanks )alted t)e *er%an %o+e%ent. gain3 defence e-)i&ited its /redo%inance in co%&at &et(een t)e sa%e (ea/on syste%s. 'art)er nort)3 ()en t)e 'renc)

4>=

Se+ent) r%y reac)ed 1utc) territory and found t)e 1utc) ar%y dri+en &ack3 it (it)dre( to(ard nt(er/3 ending *a%elins )o/e of )a+ing an ar%y in a flank /osition to t)reaten t)e *er%an ad+ance. But on May 1?t) and 14t)3 Belgian o/erations follo(ed *a%elins /lans (it) t)e 'renc) ar%oured di+isions falling &ack &efore t)eir stronger *er%an counter/arts &ut )olding t)e 1yle line until all of t)e 'renc) 'irst r%y )ad arri+ed on t)e 14t). !it) /o(erful allied forces digging in fro% nt(er/ to Na%ur3 t)e *er%ans )alted3 (it) t)eir initial3 tentati+e attacks re/ulsed. 0)e situation )ad a//arently sta&ilised. In t)e rdennes3 )o(e+er3 e+ents confor%ed to t)e *er%an /lan. Protected against allied aircraft3 t)e *er%an %arc) t)roug) t)e rdennes encountered only li%ited resistance fro% t)e fi+e 'renc) ca+alry di+isions sent to delay t)e /rogress of a force t)e 'renc) e-/ected &ut t)at t)ey )ad &elie+ed (ould consist largely of infantry in fairly li%ited nu%&ers. Basically reconnaissance units3 t)e ca+alry di+isions included artillery3 troo/s carried in trucks3 tankettes (it) %ac)ine guns3 and a fe( lig)t tanks as (ell as )orse ca+alry. 0)ese (eak for%ations delayed t)e *er%ans only &riefly3 largely &ecause t)e )uge %ass of Pan6er di+isions al%ost auto%atically turned or en+elo/ed any /ositions t)e 'renc) took u/. 'or e-a%/le3 tanks e-)i&ited t)eir tactically offensi+e .ualities ()en3 )alted &y 'renc) 1><#%illi%eter )o(it6ers3 t)ey /assed around t)e flank and attacked t)e rear of t)ese guns3 so dangerous to t)e s%all3 t)inly ar%oured *er%an tanks. 2+en in unsuita&le country3 tanks /ro+ed (ell ada/ted to e-ecuting t)e infiltration tactics *er%an infantry )ad learned so (ell. By t)e e+ening of May 12t)3 after t)ree days of %arc)ing3 t)e *er%ans )ad reac)ed t)e Meuse. 1uring t)e nig)t of May 12#1?t) t)e Pan6er di+ision +e)icles turned on t)eir )eadlig)ts and closed ra/idly to t)e ri+er3 /lanning to attack t)e ne-t day. 0(o Pan6er di+isions (ould reac) t)e Meuse in t)e nort) at 1inant3 t(o in t)e %iddle at Mont)er%;3 and t)ree in t)e sout) at Sedan. lt)oug) *eorges and *a%elin realised t)at t)ey faced a stronger t)an e-/ected force in t)e rdennes3 neit)er yet co%/re)ended t)e *er%an /lan. 5n May 11t) *eorges ordered )is reser+es for(ard as originally /lanned &ut did send fi+e infantry and t(o ar%oured di+isions to t)e Second r%y3 &asing t)is action on )is earlier %isgi+ings a&out t)e (eakness of t)e centre of )is array of ar%ies. "e )ad strengt)ened t)e Second r%y &ecause )e dou&tless assu%ed t)at t)e *er%ans (ould direct any turning effort to(ard t)e flank of t)e Second r%y3 (it) t)e o&Decti+e of reac)ing t)e rear of t)e forces facing t)e *er%an frontier3 t)us atte%/ting t)e sa%e %anoeu+re t)ey )ad tried in 1@14.

Pan1er +i%isions ,ea(h the Meuse Back

4>C

By )is co%%it%ent of )is reser+es3 *eorges &egan to strengt)en t)e sout)ern /art of t)e Meuse3 a /art of t)e front ()ere3 t)oug) *eorges did not realise it3 )e )ad e+en less force t)an /lanned. 0)e 'renc) )eld t)e area around Sedan3 to(ard ()ic) t)ree Pan6er di+isions %o+ed3 (it) t(o of t)eir second#class reser+e di+isions. Not only did t)e units )a+e a %ere t(enty regular officers3 &ut t)eir %orale and training )ad serious deficiencies. 0)e effecti+eness of &ot) of t)ese di+isions3 co%/osed of %en ()o )ad recei+ed only a year and a )alf of training %ore t)an a decade earlier3 de/ended on t)e success of t)e training /rogra% t)ey )ad undergone since t)eir %o&ilisation in Se/te%&er. 0)e .uality of t)ese /rogra%s +aried a%ong t)e different units3 and t)ose of t)e t(o di+isions at Sedan )ad failed to realise %ost of t)e /otential &enefit of t)e se+en %ont)s a+aila&le for training &efore May 1>t). In addition3 t)ese units did not )a+e t)eir full co%/le%ent of antitank and antiaircraft guns. 2+en )ad t)ey recei+ed good training3 t)ese for%ations )ad as t)eir only %ission t)e guarding of .uiet sectors of t)e front. 'art)er nort)3 near 1inant3 an acti+e %otorised di+ision connected t)e Nint) r%y (it) t)e rig)t of t)e 'irst r%y nort) of Na%ur and )ad t(o reser+e di+isions of t)e first class %arc)ing to take u/ /ositions on its rig)t. 0)ese &etter .uality reser+e di+isions )ad 2? /ercent regular officers and 1C /ercent regular non#co%%issioned officers. lt)oug) &ot) of t)ese di+isions )ad a long (ay to go to reac) t)eir destination3 t)ey )ad counted on a%/le ti%e3 since t)e 'renc) did not e-/ect t)e *er%ans on t)e Meuse &efore May 1=t) nor antici/ate t)at t)ey could launc) an attack until e+en later. But t)e *er%ans )ad arri+ed earlier3 and3 in s/ite of one di+isions rus)ing t(o of its &attalions for(ard &y truck3 all 'renc) troo/s )ad not arri+ed &y t)e ti%e t)e *er%ans reac)ed t)e Meuse. 5n t)e %orning of May 1?t)3 t)ree of t)e Nint) r%ys di+isions )ad only nineteen of t)eir t(enty#se+en &attalions on t)e Meuse3 ()ic) t)e 'renc) )eld (it) less t)an one di+ision for e+ery si- %iles of front3 e+en counting a (eak ca+alry di+ision3 a %ini%u% ratio of force to s/ace &y t)e standards of !orld !ar Is (estern front. 2-clusi+e of t)e ca+alry di+isions3 one di+ision )ad fifteen %iles to )old3 anot)er t(enty#one. 'renc) doctrine allo(ed no less t)an one di+ision for e+ery fi+e or si- %iles of front. gainst t)ese inade.uate forces at 1inant on a )astily and inco%/letely occu/ied line3 t)e t(o *er%an Pan6er di+isions gained an i%%ediate and i%/ortant +ictory. 2+en on t)e nig)t &efore t)eir assault on May 1?t)3 *er%an soldiers3 under t)e co%%and of t)e a&le and aggressi+e *eneral

4>B

2r(in Ro%%el3 )ad already crossed t)e ri+er. ll of May 1?t) t)e e-/ertly led3 co%&at#seasoned *er%ans /us)ed %en across t)e Meuse3 su//orting t)eir attacks (it) artillery and (it) t)e fire of tank guns fro% t)e ri+er &ank. $ourage3 co%/etence3 and /ersistence ena&led t)e *er%ans to esta&lis) t)e%sel+es on t)e far &ank7 t)e engineers &uilt /ontoons and &egan ferrying antitank guns and tanks to t)e ot)er side. By t)e end of May 1?t) t)e *er%ans )ad /us)ed t(o %iles inland front t)e Meuse and )eld t)ree %iles of t)e &ank3 t)oug) t)ey still )ad to co/e (it) /ockets of 'renc) resistance (it)in t)is /eri%eter. 0(o /oorly organised 'renc) counterattacks3 one (it) tanks fro% a ca+alry di+ision3 failed to dri+e &ack t)e *er%ans. 0)e ne-t day t)e *er%ans (it)stood anot)er fee&le counterattack ()ile e-/anding t)eir &ridge)ead and using t)eir ne(ly co%/leted /ontoon &ridge to &ring tanks across. 0)ree infantry di+isions t)en Doined t)e t(o Pan6er di+isions in enlarging t)e &ridge)ead to a de/t) of ten to t(el+e %iles. 2+en t)oug) t)e 'renc) )ad &roug)t u/ anot)er di+ision3 t)e s(elling of t)e &ridge)ead so e-tended t)eir lines t)at t)ey )ad &arely one di+ision for eac) ten %iles of front. "a+ing a&andoned t)e ri+er line at 1inant3 t)e t)inly stretc)ed 'renc) forces no( faced t)e %enace of a &reakt)roug) &y an ene%y ()ose t(o Pan6er di+isions included %ore t)an <>> tanks 0)e only reser+e at )and3 t)e 'renc) 'irst r%oured 1i+ision3 )ad %o+ed u/ slo(ly3 initially &ecause of delays i%/osed &y *er%an air attacks on t)e rail(ays3 t)en &y a (ait /ending a decision to co%%it it at 1inant or kee/ it in su//ort of t)e 1yle defenders3 and finally &y slo( staff (ork and clu%sy arrange%ents for fuel su//lies. By t)e e+ening of May 14t) t)e di+ision )ad reac)ed a /osition to counterattack t)e ne-t day3 &ut &y t)en it faced a stronger ene%y3 ()ic) )ad added to a +ictorious Polis) co%&at &ackground t)e daring and (ell#conducted crossing of t)e Meuse.

#ren(h #all .a($ from +inant Back

In contrast3 to t)e sout) around Mont)er%;3 e+ents confor%ed to t)e 'renc) /lan. "ere3 on May 1?t) one of t)e t(o *er%an Pan6er di+isions tried (it)out success to cross t)e ri+er7 it (as Doined on t)e I4t) &y t(o infantry di+isions Dust to t)e sout) ()ose efforts to cross also failed. 0)e 'renc) fortress di+ision3 an acti+e unit t)at )eld t)e %iddle sector of t)e Meuse3 )ad occu/ied its /osition since t)e &eginning of t)e (ar. 0)ese (ell#trained soldiers )ad t)e ad+antage of t)oroug) fa%iliarity (it) t)eir /ositions3 t)e aid of good fortifications along t)e ri+er &ank3 and e-cellent /oints of o&ser+ation for artillery. !)en t)e *er%an infantry tried to cross in ru&&er &oats3 'renc) %ac)ine guns and (ell#directed artillery fire turned t)e% &ack3 /uncturing t)eir &oats ()en it did not kill or (ound t)e occu/ants. In t(o days a fe( *er%ans reac)ed t)e far &ank &ut %aintained t)e%sel+es only /recariously against 'renc) artillery fire and counterattacks. ,acking sur/rise or su/re%acy in artillery3 t)e *er%ans e-/erienced no &etter success t)an soldiers in !orld !ar I in attacking ade.uately defended lines under si%ilar circu%stances. 1ug in (ell3 4>@

t)ese fe( 'renc)%en3 re/resentati+e of t)e acti+e di+isions in t)e 'renc) ar%y3 s)o(ed t)at on fa%iliar ground in a fortified defence3 soldiers sufficiently trained &ut lacking in co%&at e-/erience could /erfor% (ell. nd t)is t)ese defenders of t)e Meuse did ()en t)eir artillery follo(ed t)eir o&ser+ers directions and t)e %ac)ine gunners s(e/t t)e ri+er fro% concrete e%/lace%ents and (ell concealed3 entrenc)ed strong /oints. 0)e *er%an /ri%acy in tactical skill largely deri+ed fro% t)e Polis) ca%/aign3 a+ailed t)e% little. Neit)er could t)e nu%erous tanks of t)e *er%ans )el/ t)e% against t)e &arrier of t)e Meuse. But in t)e sout)3 near Sedan3 e+en greater success re(arded *er%an efforts t)an t)ey )ad enDoyed in t)e nort) near 1inant. "ere t)ree Pan6er di+isions /lanned to cross t)e ri+er against t)e resistance of t)e t(o /oorly trained second#class reser+e di+isions. 2ac) of t)e t)ree Pan6er di+isions /lanned assaults3 &ut t)e central di+ision3 t)e 'irst3 )ad an engineer and four infantry &attalions added to its t)ree infantry &attalions as (ell as t)e su//ort of artillery fro% t)e ot)er t(o di+isions. 5nly one of t)e 'renc) di+isions3 t)e 'ifty#fift)3 (ould recei+e t)e &lo( of all t)ree Pan6er di+isions3 ()ic) t)e cor/s co%%ander3 t)e ar%our s/ecialist3 *eneral *uderian3 /lanned for ?7>> /.%. on May 1?t). 0)e 'renc) cor/s co%%ander did not &elie+e t)at t)e *er%ans (ould attack on May 1?t) &ecause )e t)oug)t t)at t)ey (ould a(ait t)e arri+al of t)eir )ea+y artillery. But *eneral *uderian3 an e-/onent of tactical a+iation as (ell as of t)e Pan6er di+ision3 )ad t)e su//ort 5f ?>> )ig)#le+el &o%&ers3 2>> di+e#&o%&ers3 and 2>> fig)ters. Because )e could su&stitute t)ese for )ea+y artillery3 )e /lanned to e-ecute i%%ediately a classic !orld !ar I assault. gainst t)e ensuing3 /o(erful *er%an air effort3 t)e 'renc) )ad only enoug) fig)ter aircraft to fly 2<> sorties o+er t)e entire front of t)e Nint) and Second ar%ies3 losing t(el+e aircraft and &elie+ing t)at t)ey s)ot do(n t(enty# one *er%an air/lanes. Before t)e *er%an infantry atte%/ted to launc) its ru&&er &oats across t)e si-ty yards of t)e Meuse3 t)e *er%an %ediu% &o%&ers )ad &egun t)eir raids fro% a )ig) altitude at C:>> a.%. t noon 12> di+e#&o%&ers eac) dro//ed t(o <>>#/ound &o%&s. Since a <>>#/ound &o%& (eig)ed as %uc) as a 1>#inc) s)ell and contained far %ore e-/losi+e t)an t)e t)ick#(alled s)ell3 t)e aircraft su&Dected t)e 'renc) troo/s to a &o%&ard%ent e.ui+alent to t)at fro% %any &atteries of su/er# )ea+y artillery. 0)oug) t)e &o%&ers lacked t)e accuracy of t)e artillery3 t)eir )uge &o%&s did considera&le da%age3 raised clouds of dust3 /anicked %any of t)e older 'renc) reser+ists ()o co%/osed t)e di+ision3 and dro+e a large nu%&er of artillery%en to seek co+er rat)er t)an continue t)eir fire against t)e *er%ans concentrated on t)e east &ank of t)e Meuse. 0)is intensified air &o%&ard%ent continued for t)ree )ours and t)en s)ifted to(ard t)e rear of t)e 'renc) /ositions. 0)e ?:>> /.%. attack of t)e 'irst Pan6er di+ision %et (it) i%%ediate success. 5//osed only &y a fe( desultory artillery rounds and (eak %ac)ine gun fire3 t)e /roficient and skilfully led *er%an infantry crossed easily and .uickly o+er()el%ed t)e outnu%&ered and t)oroug)ly de%oralised defenders. By 4:>> /.%. *er%an engineers )ad a ferry in o/eration and )ad &egun t)eir &ridge a )alf )our later. 0)e assaults of t)e ot)er t(o Pan6er di+isions3 unsu//orted &y t)e air force3 failed to get %ore t)an a fe( %en across3 facing entrenc)ed defenders and strong artillery fire. But t)e 'irst Pan6er di+ision %ade suc) /rogress during t)e nig)t t)at t)e *er%ans )ad &ridge)eads t)ree %iles (ide and four to si- %iles dee/. 0)e *er%ans o(ed /art of t)eir ac)ie+e%ent to t)e disintegration of %uc) of t)e 'renc) 'ifty#fift) 1i+ision. 2ntering t)eir first co%&at (it) deficient %orale and co)esion and ineffecti+e training3 %any of t)e 'renc) soldiers fled in /anic during t)e nig)t after facing t)e /o(erful air &o%&ard%ent and t)e .uick triu%/) of t)e 'irst Pan6er 1i+isions attack. Mistaking t)eir o(n tanks for *er%an3 t)e fleeing soldiers of t)e 'ifty#fift) s/read de%oralisation in t)e rear and to t)e Se+enty#first 1i+ision on t)eir rig)t3 ()ic) )ad faced neit)er &o%&ard%ent3 attack3 nor defeat in its defence of t)e ri+er and )ad e+en used its reinforced artillery to )el/ t)e 'ifty#fift). 41>

!)ile t)e dis)eartened 'renc) troo/s fell &ack during t)e nig)t and early %orning of May 1?#14t)3 *eneral *eorges learned of t)e e-tent of t)e disaster. t ?:>> a.%. on t)e 14t)3 +isitors to )is )ead.uarters found )i% in tears at t)e realisation of t)e colla/se of t)e front3 a re+erse co%ing on to/ of t)e une-/ectedly ra/id *er%an ad+ances in t)e rdennes and in Belgiu% and "olland. 2+en t)oug) )e )ad Dust ordered t(o di+isions to t)e rig)t of t)e Nint) r%y and )ad accelerated t)e %o+e of t)e ar%oured di+ision already ordered3 )e kne( t)at t)ese and %ost of t)e reser+es /re+iously directed to t)e Second r%y could not inter+ene on May 14t). lt)oug) *eorges looked /)ysically sick on t)e 14t) and )is conduct &etrayed t)e strain )e felt3 )e and )is staff continued to function7 *eneral *a%elin3 ()o e%ulated Mars)al 8offres fa&led cal% de%eanour3 did not feel it necessary to interfere. 5n May 14t) *eorges3 )a+ing e-)austed t)e &ulk of )is reser+es3 ordered t)e (it)dra(al of a cor/s and a di+ision fro% t)e forces guarding t)e fortified 'ranco#*er%an frontier.

Pan1er .rea$through at Sedan Back

2+ents at t)e Sedan &ridge)ead on May 14t) fully Dustified *eneral *eorgess early %orning a//re)ensions3 e+en t)oug) t)e 'renc) cor/s co%%ander soon counterattacked (it) an Infantry regi%ent su//orted &y a tank &attalion. 0)e 'renc) initially succeeded against *er%an infantry and tanks3 &ut *er%an tanks counterattacked and dro+e &ack t)e 'renc) infantry and ar%our (it) )ea+y losses. nd t)is counterattack turned out to &e &ut a /relude to t)e &reak#u/ of t)e Se+enty# first 1i+ision3 ()ic)3 deserted &y its sick co%%ander3 %elted a(ay. *ras/ing t)e 'renc) (eakness3 t)e forceful and /ers/icacious *eneral *uderian ordered t(o of )is t)ree Pan6er di+isions to launc) an offensi+e (est(ard3 lea+ing )is infantry regi%ent and one Pan6er di+ision to /rotect )is &ridge)ead fro% a (eak counterattack &y local reser+es and t)e assault e-/ected fro% strong 'renc) forces t)at t)e *er%an air force )ad o&ser+ed )eading to(ard Sedan &y road and rail and ()ose %o+e%ent t)eir air strikes )ad failed to )alt. lt)oug) t)e Pan6er di+isions attacking (est(ard faced a second#class reser+e di+ision3 a colonial &rigade of /rofessional troo/s3 and a ca+alry di+ision t)at t)e 'renc) )ad /us)ed into t)is &reac)3 t)e *er%ans succeeded in /us)ing (est %ore t)an si- %iles3 and during t)e nig)t &ot) Pan6er di+isions co%/leted %o+ing u/3 ready to resu%e t)eir assault on t)e %orning of t)e 1<t). *uderians co%%anding officer3 an-ious a&out a 'renc) counterattack fro% t)e sout)3 de%urred at suc) a daring ad+ance3 &ut *uderian /re+ailed. !ell %ig)t t)e *er%an co%%ander )a+e dis/layed fear3 for t)e allied air forces )ad s)o(n during t)e day )o( seriously t)ey regarded t)e crossing of t)e Meuse at Sedan. 1uring May 14t) t)e allies carried out fi+e se/arate raids against t)e &ridges at Sedan3 one (it) si-ty#se+en o&solete single# engine Britis) &o%&ers3 )a+ing an escort of %ore t)an t)at nu%&er of allied fig)ters. But *er%an antiaircraft guns and fig)ter air/lanes inflicted terri&le losses3 destroying t)irty#t(o Britis) and se+en 'renc) &o%&ers and /ro&a&ly forty of t)e fig)ters in+ol+ed. 0)e &ridges (ere difficult to )it and sur+i+ed (it) only %inor da%age. 0)e losses of t)e day +irtually cri//led t)e allied &o%&er forces. Since3 (it) an a%/le out/ut of fig)ter aircraft3 t)ey could re/lace t)eir fig)ter losses3 allied

411

air ca/a&ilities &eca%e essentially one of defence against *er%an aircraft3 t)oug) t)e fig)ters3 /articularly t)e cannon#ar%ed 'renc)3 carrying s%all &o%&s3 could still attack +e)icles and troo/s on t)e roads. 5n May 1<t)3 t)e si-t) day of t)e *er%an offensi+e3 t)e 'renc) faced an entirely ne( situation3 (it) su&stantial *er%an foot)olds around &ot) Sedan and 1inant. 0)e e-/ansion of t)e &ridge)eads )ad t)inned t)e 'renc) defensi+e front and reduced t)eir ratio of force to s/ace3 and t)e *er%ans )ad all of t)e tanks of t)eir Pan6er di+isions o+er t)e ri+er3 B>> at Sedan and o+er <>> at 1inant. Suc) a concentration of tanks could not fail to o+er()el% a t)inly )eld front /rotected &y only t)e )astiest of entrenc)%ents3 fe( anti tank guns or %ines3 and no s/ecial /)ysical &arriers. 'urt)er3 (it) initiati+e and su/erior forces3 t)e *er%ans (it)in eac) &ridge)ead /ossessed interior lines and t)e a&ility to concentrate against one face of t)eir salients ()ile standing on t)e defensi+e on t)e ot)er t(o. t Sedan *eneral *uderian e-/loited t)is /osition to continue )is attack (est(ard on May 1<t)3 o+erco%ing deter%ined resistance. 1irectly in )is /at)3 t)e colonial &rigade resisted until It lost ?> /ercent of its %en3 t)e *er%ans killing t(o of its colonels and ca/turing t)e t)ird. 'art)er sout) an a&ly co%%anded3 t)oroug)ly trained 'renc) acti+e regi%ent3 /art of t)e reser+es dis/atc)ed t(o days earlier3 defended all day3 retreating only after losing a t)ird of its force and3 in disa&ling t(enty *er%an tanks3 and all of its antitank guns. In its defence it )ad t)e aid of t)ree i%%o&ilised 'renc) ?2#ton $)ar#B tanks3 al%ost t(ice t)e si6e of t)e &iggest *er%an tank3 ()ic)3 %any ti%es in t)e ca%/aign3 de%onstrated &ot) t)e (isdo% of t)e 'renc) /olicy of ar%ouring t)eir tanks (ell and t)e inade.uacy of t)e *er%ans ?C#%illi%eter antitank gun. 0)e defeat of t)ese units let t)e *er%ans t)roug)3 ena&ling t)e% to turn t)e line )eld to t)e nort) &y a second#class reser+e di+ision. gainst suc) co%/etently led co%&at +eterans (it) <>> tanks3 t)e t)in line of 'renc) defenders failed7 *eneral *uderians Pan6er di+isions &roke co%/letely t)roug) to t)e (est on May 1<t). t t)e sa%e ti%e t)at *uderians concentration /ierced t)e i%/ro+ised 'renc) defence3 )is re%aining forces )eld t)e sout)ern flank of )is &ridge)ead against a counterattack on ()ic) *eneral *eorges )ad insisted t)e day &efore. 0)is tardy offensi+e3 conducted &y a %otorised and an ar%oured di+ision t)at *eorges )ad ordered fro% )is reser+e on May 11t)3 (ould )a+e )ad little c)ance of success against a di+ision and a )alf of *er%an co%&at +eterans e+en if t)e 'renc) )ad not so %is%anaged it t)at t)e cor/s co%%ander relie+ed t)e general leading t)e ar%oured di+ision. Sc)ooled for /re/ared3 %et)odical attacks3 t)e 'renc) )ad difficulty i%/ro+ising. 5n May 1=t) a *er%an %otorised di+ision arri+ed to take o+er t)ese defensi+e duties3 releasing t)e Pan6er di+ision to Doin *uderians ot)er t(o and reinforce t)e dri+e (est(ard. 5n t)e 1<t)3 in t)e +icinity of 1inant3 t)e *er%ans enDoyed a +ictory si%ilar to t)eirs at Sedan as t)eir t(o Pan6er di+isions dro+e due (est ()ile t)eir t)ree infantry di+isions )eld t)e &ridge)ead. 0)ese Pan6er di+isions3 (it) t)e dyna%ic *eneral Ro%%el leading )is fro% t)e front3 conducted t)eir offensi+e against 'renc) forces t)at (ere in t)e /rocess of (it)dra(ing fro% t)e Meuse to esta&lis) a ne( line a&out fifteen %iles in t)e rear. But t)e Pan6er di+isions ad+anced so ra/idly t)at t)e lead *er%an di+ision caug)t t)eir %ost serious o//osition3 t)e 'renc) 'irst r%oured 1i+ision3 refuelling. Inflicting )ea+y losses on t)e 'renc) tanks of t)is acti+e di+ision3 t)e lead Pan6er di+ision /us)ed on3 lea+ing it to t)e follo(ing Pan6er di+ision to co%/lete t)e +irtual destruction of t)e 'renc) unit. 0)e 1<> 'renc) tanks /ro+ed for%ida&le3 &ut t)e %ore e-/erienced *er%ans3 (it) B>> tanks in t)eir t(o di+isions3 (on fairly easily3 suffering losses of less t)an 1> /ercent of t)eir tanks engaged co%/ared (it) nearly B> /ercent for t)e 'renc). In s/ite of facing 'renc) )ea+y tanks (it) &asically in+ulnera&le frontal ar%our3 t)e *er%ans e+ened t)e odds (it) t)eir e-ce/tional skill3 and t)e loss rates a//ro-i%ated t)ose e-/ected according to ,anc)esters N# s.uare la(.

412

German .rea$through Back

Mean()ile3 t)e 'renc) (it)dra(al fro% t)e Meuse o/ened t)e (ay for t)e t(o Pan6er di+isions3 ()ic) )ad &een sty%ied for t(o days trying to cross t)e central Meuse near Mont)er%;. 0)e 'renc) fell &ack to /rotect t)eir flanks3 and t)eir retreating infantry /ro+ed +ery +ulnera&le to t)e ad+ancing *er%an tanks. 8ust as )ea+y ca+alry of old could o+ertake and ride do(n lig)t infantry3 so did t)e *er%an tanks o+er()el% %arc)ing 'renc) infantry3 and (reck t)eir guns and trans/ort along t)e roads. 0)e s/eed of t)e ad+ance of t)e tanks and t)eir acco%/anying %otorised infantry and artillery constantly took t)e 'renc) &y sur/rise3 in t)e sa%e (ay as t)e tanks fro% t)e force /us)ing on front 1inant )ad caug)t t)e 'renc) tanks refuelling. In one day t)e *er%an force fro% t)e central Meuse %o+ed for(ard t)irty#se+en %iles. 8ust as *er%an aircraft )ad struck at 'renc) forces %arc)ing to reinforce t)e front3 so did t)e *er%an lig)t ca+alry of t)e air also attack retreating 'renc)%en and +e)icles (it) %uc) of t)e sa%e effecti+eness as t)e /ri%iti+e Britis) aircraft against t)e retreating 0urks in 1@1B. "a+ing dis/layed t)eir tactical +alue in attacking retreating troo/s after &attle and in t)eir &o%&ing at Sedan of 'renc) forces deficient in antiaircraft defences3 fro% t)e &eginning of t)e ca%/aign t)e *er%an air force carried out t)e traditional strategic role of lig)t ca+alry ()en t)ey /enetrated dee/ in t)e 'renc) rear to raid t)e rail(ays3 and soldiers and +e)icles using t)e roads. Back

(he Causes of the German 1reakthrough

0)e *er%ans acco%/lis)ed t)e crossing of t)e Meuse &y concentrating against t)e /oint of allied (eakness o//osite t)e rdennes3 a strategic sur/rise facilitated3 if not %ade /ossi&le3 &y t)e distraction /ro+ided &y t)e strong attack t)roug) "olland and Belgiu%. 5f course3 t)e con+iction3 initially s)ared &y &ot) )ig) co%%ands3 t)at t)e rdennes did not /ro+ide a suita&le route of in+asion also contri&uted to t)e une-/ected c)aracter of t)e %o+e. But t)e *er%an /lan de/ended on carrying out an assault against t)e Meuse (it) infantry under traditional !orld !ar I conditions of t)e /ri%acy of t)e defensi+e. !it)out o+er()el%ing /redo%inance in artillery or tactical sur/rise3 t)ey succeeded &ecause of t)e co%/arati+ely lo( density of 'renc) force to t)e lengt) of t)e front and t)e skill (it) ()ic) t)e *er%ans a//lied t)e

41?

/rinci/les of infiltration tactics against t)e strong /oints (it) ()ic) t)e 'renc) defended t)eir s)allo( line. "ere t)e s/lendid training of t)e *er%an troo/s and t)e co%&at e-/erience of %any of t)e% %ade a /er)a/s decisi+e contri&ution. lt)oug) aircraft /laying t)e role of artillery %ade /ossi&le t)e .uick +ictory at Sedan3 t)e forces at 1inant (on (it)out any significant )el/ fro% t)eir &o%&ers. 0)e only *er%an failure occurred on t)e %iddle on t)e Meuse line. "ere t)e *er%ans %et3 in (ell#/re/ared defensi+e /ositions3 a 'renc) acti+e di+ision t)at )ad a t)ird of its officers and a %aDority of t)e enlisted strengt) ser+ing toget)er on acti+e duty during /eace3 si%ont)s of training toget)er3 and t)oroug) fa%iliarity (it) its strong /osition. !)en t)e successful *er%an attacks )ad dri+en t)e 'renc) &ack se+eral %iles3 an i%/ressi+e ad+ance &y t)e standards of !orld !ar I3 t)e attackers did not3 as )ad t)eir fat)ers in 1@1B3 face t)e o&stacle of inferior %o&ility co%/ared (it) t)e defenders3 ()o )ad unda%aged roads and ready access to rail trans/ortation. Neit)er ela&orate trenc)es nor intense &o%&ard%ent )ad seriously i%/eded t)e attackers road %o&ility3 and t)e *er%ans )ad enoug) tracked and ()eeled trans/ort &ot) to %o+e and su//ly t)eir Pan6er di+isions. 0)us t)ey )ad %o&ility e.ual to or &etter t)an t)e defenders and (ould not re/eat t)eir !orld !ar I e-/erience of &reaking t)roug) only to find t)at t)e ene%y )ad %o+ed %ore .uickly and reconstituted t)e front. But t)e contrast (it) !orld !ar I did not end )ere. 5nce t)e *er%an infantry )ad ca/tured t)e far &ank of t)e Meuse and t)e engineers )ad &uilt a &ridge o+er t)at /erfect antitank &arrier3 t)e for%ida&le *er%an concentration of tanks on t)is front altered t)e tactical situation dra%atically. !it) so %any tanks on suc) narro( frontages t)e *er%ans could readily o+er()el% 'renc) antitank guns and field artillery3 unaided as t)ey (ere &y antitank &arriers or %ines. In addition3 tanks )ad ideal attri&utes to a//ly t)e /rinci/les of infiltration tactics &y concentrating against (eak /oints3 %aking dee/ tactical /enetrations3 &reaking t)e (ay for t)e infantry3 and taking strong /oints in t)e flank and rear. !it) t)eir su/er& %o&ility3 %ac)ine gun and cannon3 ?=>#degree tra+erse of t)e turret3 and t)eir a&ility to %o+e and fig)t in t)e sa%e for%ation3 tanks constituted t)e /erfect tactically offensi+e troo/s. Radio co%%unication a%ong t)e tanks ga+e t)e% an articulation )it)erto unkno(n in (ar. 0)e crossing of t)e Meuse &y t)e tanks of t)e *er%an Pan6er di+isions ga+e t)e *er%ans suc) an o+er()el%ing tactical ad+antage t)at t)ey &roke t)roug) t)e 'renc) front in t)ree /laces. 0)e ne-t day t)e *er%ans &egan to e-/loit a &reakt)roug) of t)e front. 0)ey )ad attained t)is in Marc) 1@1B &ut )ad ac)ie+ed no strategic result &ecause t)e allies )ad used t)eir greater strategic %o&ility to )alt t)e *er%an ad+ance e+en t)oug) it /enetrated forty %iles. 0)ere t)e 'renc) and Britis) )ad confronted t)e *er%ans (it) a ne( line created &y reser+es &roug)t &y rail. In May 1@4> t)e situation differed co%/letely. By t)e ti%e t)e *er%ans )ad esta&lis)ed t)e t(o &ridge)eads fro% ()ic) t)ey could readily ad+ance3 t)e 'renc) )ad not ordered any reser+es &y rail in nu%&ers ade.uate to deal (it) t)e strategic %enace t)e *er%ans /resented. nd t)e 'renc) )ad not directed e+en t)ose reser+es en route so t)at t)ey could resist t)e (est(ard#facing *er%an ar%oured cor/s. In addition to ()eel or track %o&ility for all of t)eir forces3 including t)e infantrys antitank and antiaircraft guns3 t)e *er%ans )ad t)e ad+antage of t)eir strategic situation (it) %ost of t)e unco%%itted 'renc) troo/s stationed to t)e east along t)e *er%an &order. Because 'renc) reser+es lay to t)e east of t)e (est(ard#ad+ancing *er%ans3 t)e reser+es (ould )a+e to co%e fro% a direction t)at co%/elled t)e% to o+ertake t)e *er%ans to o//ose t)e% in front. 0)is /ro+ed an i%/ossi&le task for t)e rail#&orne soldiers ()en t)e ene%y rode on /a+ed 'renc) roads. So 'renc) di+isions (ould arri+e not in front of t)e *er%ans &ut on t)eir flank. lt)oug) t)is /laced t)e% in a t)reatening /osition front t)e *er%an /oint of +ie(3 t)e 'renc) (ould )a+e to take t)e offensi+e to e-/loit it. In 1@1B t)ey )ad needed only to defend to t)(art t)e &reakt)roug). nd t)e 'renc)

414

co%%anders did not &elie+e t)at t)eir troo/s (ere yet /re/ared for a %et)odical3 %uc) less an i%/ro+ised3 offensi+e. 0)us t)e attackers &etter %o&ility and t)e dis/osition of t)e defenders reser+es doo%ed t)e 'renc) to e%/loying t)e tactical offensi+e rat)er t)an )a+ing it as t)eir ad+antage as in 1@1B. 0)is situation3 of course3 ty/ified t)at i%/osed on t)e defenders &y a strategic turning %o+e%ent. Back

(he German (urning Movement

!it) t)e dee/ *er%an ad+ances of May 1<t)3 t)e 'renc) )ig) co%%anders realised t)at t)ey faced a &reakt)roug). 0o reconstitute t)e front3 t)e 'renc) needed3 to kno( in ()at direction t)e *er%ans /lanned to %o+e. *enerals *eorges and *a%elin3 re%e%&ering !orld !ar I3 assu%ed t)at t)e *er%ans (ould /roceed to take in t)e rear t)e ar%ies facing t)e *er%an frontier. 'or t)is reason3 ()en )e )ad de/loyed )is reser+es3 *eorges )ad sent eig)t di+isions to t)e Second r%y sout) of Sedan &ut dis/atc)ed none to t)e Nint) r%y3 ()ic) faced east(ard on t)e Meuse. It is dou&tful3 )o(e+er3 t)at t)e reser+es could )a+e reac)ed t)e scene in ti%e. So on May 1=t)3 ()en t)e Pan6er di+isions resu%ed t)eir ad+ance (est(ard3 t)e *er%ans encountered little &ut t)e re%nants of t)e retreating Nint) r%y. *eorges ordered an additional t)ree di+isions fro% t)e forces facing *er%any3 &ut t)ese (ould take se+eral days to arri+e in t)e co%&at 6one. 5n May 1=t)3 t)e first day of t)eir strategic e-/loitation3 one *er%an Pan6er cor/s %o+ed for(ard forty %iles and anot)er al%ost fifty. gain3 in t)eir ad+ance t)e +ictorious Pan6er di+isions ca/tured or destroyed ene%y artillery and trans/ort. !)en one Pan6er di+ision ca/tured 1>3>>> /risoners and disa&led or ca/tured 2>> tanks3 t)e situation rese%&led &attles of t)e se+enteent) century and earlier ()en t)e +ictorious ca+alry )ad slaug)tered t)e defeated infantry. 0)e long ad+ance of May 1=t) took t)e Pan6er di+isions and %otorised and foot#%arc)ing infantry t)at follo(ed a good (ay to(ard turning t)e allied ar%ies on t)e 1yle in Belgiu%. "a+ing only Dust )alted t)e *er%ans on t)e 1yle3 t)e allied forces3 &ecause of t)is t)reat3 )ad to &egin a retreat (est(ard3 one done slo(ly to res/ond to t)e /ressure of t)e closely follo(ing *er%ans. In (it)dra(ing3 t)e allies did not desert t)e 1utc)3 ()o )ad already ca/itulated on May 14t). 5n t)e 1Ct)3 t)e *er%ans )alted for rest3 resu//ly3 and re/air of e.ui/%ent. 0)is delay also reflected t)eir an-iety a&out t)e e-/osed sout)ern flank t)eir %o+e )ad created and t)e need for t)eir foot#%arc)ing infantry to kee/ u/ and /rotect t)e rear of t)e ad+ancing Pan6er and %otorised di+isions. *er%ans faced continuing 'renc) local counterattacks. gain t)ey encountered /ro&le%s (it) t)e 'renc) )ea+y tanks3 one (it)standing t(enty#fi+e )its fro% *er%an antitank guns3 a t(enty#si-t) s)ot i%%o&ilising it &y &reaking its track. 0)e *er%ans finally defeated one counterattack &y using )ig)#+elocity BB#%illi%eter antiaircraft guns as antitank guns. But t)e ar%our on ot)er 'renc) tanks /ro+ed e.ually trou&leso%e3 a tank of less t)an )alf t)e si6e of t)e )ea+y tank (eat)ering forty#t(o )its &y *er%an antitank guns. But 'renc) counterattacks failed to dri+e &ack t)e *er%ans &ecause t)e dis/ersal of 'renc) reser+es around t)e /eri%eter of t)e *er%an &reakt)roug) %eant t)at no %ore t)an one ar%oured di+ision e+er struck at t)e sa%e /oint. If t)e 'renc) )ad (aited to concentrate t)eir ar%oured di+isions and su//ort t)e% (it) infantry di+isions3 t)e *er%ans (ould )a+e ad+anced al%ost uni%/eded. But t)e alternati+e counterassaults &y reser+es3 as t)ey arri+ed3 /ro+ed )ardly %ore effectual3 for t)e *er%ans )ad little difficulty re/elling t)ese (eak3 localised attacks. In t)e ne-t t)ree days3 May 1B#2>t)3 t)e *er%ans reac)ed t)e coast t)roug) a ga/ forty %iles (ide in ()ic) t)e 'renc) could /lace only a fe( troo/s to o//ose t)e *er%ans3 reinforced &y Pan6er and %otorised di+isions fro% t)e ar%y grou/ t)at )ad entered Belgiu% and "olland. Mo+ing slo(ly on t)e 1Bt) and 1@t)3 t)e *er%ans co%/leted t)e defeat of t(o 'renc) ar%oured di+isions and ca/tured 11>3>>> /risoners3 including an ar%y co%%ander and )is staff. ccelerating t)eir ad+ance to si-ty

41<

%iles on May 2>t)3 t)e Pan6er di+isions reac)ed t)e coast3 concluded t)eir turning %o+e%ent3 and enclosed t)e 'renc)3 Britis)3 and Belgian troo/s against t)e $)annel. 5n May 21st3 t)e 'renc) go+ern%ent re/laced *eneral *a%elin (it) *eneral Ma-i%e !eygand. 0)oug) se+enty#t)ree years of age3 !eygand looked and acted like a %an in )is fifties. "is /reference for 1>>#yard s/rints rat)er t)an Dogging e-e%/lified t)e energy (it) ()ic) )e a//roac)ed )is task of taking co%%and against t)e *er%ans3 and )is +igour and aggressi+eness s)o(ed )is de&t to )is %entor3 Mars)al 'oc)3 ()o% )e )ad ser+ed during !orld !ar I as c)ief of staff. *eneral !eygand faced circu%stances ty/ical of t)e co%%ander of a turned ar%y3 one like t)e ustrians &efore Marengo or in t)e 4l% ca%/aign and like t)at of Ba6aine in Met6. But !eygands situation differed in t)at )e )ad su&stantial forces t)at t)e *er%ans )ad not enclosed on t)e coast and so could t)reaten t)e turning *er%an di+isions fro% t)e sout) as (ell as t)e nort). So )e atte%/ted to organise counterattacks against t)e *er%an Pan6er turning force3 (it) ele%ents dri+ing against &ot) sides of t)e tenuous corridor t)at ran fro% t)e coast &ack to t)e Meuse. Vulnera&le as t)is line of co%%unications see%ed until infantry %arc)ing on foot s)ould arri+e to /rotect it3 t)e allies lacked t)e strengt) to e-/loit its (eakness. !it) %ost of t)eir ar%ies facing east against t)e *er%ans ad+ancing into Belgiu%3 t)e first attack fro% t)e nort) could %uster only one 'renc) and t(o Britis) di+isions3 and ()en it took /lace on May 21st3 only t(o Britis) infantry &attalions and less t)an 1>> tanks carried it out. later 'renc) assault fro% t)e nort) )ad no %ore /o(er. 0)ese a%ounted to no %ore t)an /in/ricks to t)e *er%ans. 0)e 'renc) attacks fro% t)e sout) ca%e e+en later3 de/endent on t)e arri+al fro% t)e east of di+isions &y rail t)at )ad to detrain3 organise3 and de/loy. 0)ese (eak assaults fro% t)e sout) enDoyed no %ore success t)an t)ose fro% t)e nort). So3 unlike t)e usual situation in a turning %o+e%ent3 t)e *er%ans did not )a+e to defend against a deter%ined effort &y t)e allied ar%ies to esca/e sout).

Strategi( Turning Mo%ement Back

0)e ca/itulation of t)e large Belgian ar%y soon furt)er cri//led t)e a&ility of t)ese ar%ies to counterattack to(ard t)eir rear. 2ngaged (it) t)e *er%an in+aders of Belgiu%3 t)e allies could &arely disengage enoug) forces to guard t)eir rear fro% t)e turning Pan6er di+isions t)at3 in turn3 )ad to /rotect t)eir o(n rear against t)e 'renc) ar%ies asse%&ling sout) of t)e% along t)e So%%e Ri+er. lt)oug) t)e 'renc) troo/s in t)e sout) arri+ed and took u/ t)eir /ositions so slo(ly t)at t)e Pan6er di+isions could )a+e used so%e of t)eir strengt) to attack successfully t)e rear of t)e allied troo/s retreating fro% Belgiu%3 t)e *er%ans (it)dre( %any of t)eir Pan6er di+isions fro% co%&at to rest t)e% and re/air t)eir e.ui/%ent to /re/are for t)e ensuing ca%/aign against t)e %ain /art of t)e 'renc) ar%y3 ()ic) first *eorges3 and t)en !eygand3 (as %o+ing nort)(ard to /ositions &et(een t)e Meuse and t)e 2nglis) $)annel.

41=

0)is turning %o+e%ent differed fro% t)at at 4l% in t)at t)e allies could atte%/t an e+acuation &y sea. Bad (eat)er3 %uc) s%oke3 and Britis) fig)ter aircraft fro% across t)e $)annel t)(arted t)e efforts of t)e *er%an air force to kee/ s)i/s fro% /icking u/ t)e troo/s at 1unkirk3 ena&ling t)e allies to e+acuate 22C3>>> Britis) and 11>3>>> 'renc) troo/s at a cost of t)e sinking of si- Britis) and t(o 'renc) destroyers and t)e loss of se+eral non#co%&atant s)i/s3 lea+ing &e)ind %any of t)e 'renc) soldiers ()ose fig)ting )ad ke/t t)e *er%ans at &ay. But t)ese e+acuated forces3 )a+ing a&andoned t)eir artillery and trans/ort3 could not i%%ediately re#enter co%&at. s soon as t)e last allied soldiers left &y sea or surrendered3 t)e *er%ans &egan an offensi+e against t)e 'renc) ar%ies3 %ost of ()ose soldiers de/loyed fro% t)e Meuse to t)e $)annel. 5utnu%&ered t(o to one and (it) only a&out fifty di+isions on a )astily entrenc)ed 21<#%ile front3 t)e 'renc) could not /re+ent concentrations of Pan6er di+isions fro% &reaking t)roug) and turning t)e defending ar%ies. In s/ite of &asically uns/ecified *er%an /olitical goals3 t)e 'renc)3 (it) Italy also entering t)e (ar on t)e *er%an side and attacking (it) t)irty#t(o di+isions3 asked for an ar%istice. defeat t)at dro+e t)e 'renc) sout) of Paris )ad a different result in 1BC> &ecause in t)e 'ranco# Prussian !ar only a s%all /art of t)e /otential %ilitary force of 'rance )ad suffered defeat ()en turned at Met6 and Sedan. In 1@4>3 (it) co%/lete %o&ilisation3 t)e *er%ans )ad o+erco%e all of t)e /otential as (ell as actual %ilitary forces of 'rance. nd (it) se+eral ti%es as %any soldiers as in 1BC>3 t)e *er%ans )ad an ar%y ade.uate to occu/y all of 'rance. 0)e 'renc)3 %ade co%/lacent &y t)e strengt) of t)eir ar%y and fortifications and &y t)e ackno(ledged /ri%acy of t)e defensi+e3 (ere so de%oralised &y t)eir ra/id defeat t)at t)ey felt no i%%ediate inclination to e%ulate t)e S/anis) against Na/oleon and offer guerrilla resistance. Instead3 like t)e Prussians ()o )ad also &elie+ed in t)e in+inci&ility of t)eir ar%y only to &e defeated &y Na/oleon in 1B>=#C3 t)e 'renc) yielded to t)eir con.ueror e+en %ore .uickly t)an t)e Prussians did to t)e 'renc) in 1B>C. Back

(he German *ictory, Na'oleonic Warfare with Four Wea'on Systems

$ould t)e 'renc) )a+e /re+ented t)eir defeatK If *eneral Billotte3 t)e 'irst r%y grou/ co%%ander3 )ad /ro%/tly and energetically used t)e Se+ent) r%y as a reser+e as soon as it fell &ack fro% "olland3 Doined it to )is o(n ar%oured di+isions3 and e+en )ad so%e access to Britis) and Belgian reser+es3 )e could )a+e )ad a for%ida&le force (it) ()ic) to counterattack or to &lock t)e /at) of t)e *er%an Pan6er turning %o+e%ent. But e+en if t)e +igour of t)e *er%an attack fro% t)e east )ad not /re+ented t)is or3 as it did3 )ad %ade *eneral Billotte &elie+e t)at it (as un(ise3 t)e Is /o(erful inter+ention /ro&a&ly could not )a+e c)anged t)e outco%e. Billotte (ould )a+e ine+ita&ly underesti%ated t)e s/eed of t)e *er%an ad+ance and3 failing to get a)ead of t)e Pan6er di+isions3 (ould )a+e faced t)e difficult /ro&le% of organising a counterattack rat)er t)an t)e far easier task of t)e defence. 0)e *er%ans )ad suc) a concentration of force and so %uc) tactical skill t)at it is difficult to concei+e t)at t)ey could not )a+e fended off suc) an attack ()ile at least t(o Pan6er di+isions co%/leted t)eir race to t)e sea. con+ersation &et(een *enerals *a%elin and !eygand i%/lies anot)er /ossi&ility. In )is &rief e-c)ange (it) *eneral !eygand ()en )e re/laced )i% in su/re%e co%%and3 *a%elin re/orted t)at !eygand said t)at )e /ossessed t)e secrets of Mars)al 'oc)s success. *a%elin t)oug)t of re/lying t)at )e )ad )ad t)ose of Mars)al 8offre3 &ut t)ey )ad not /ro+ed e.ual to t)e occasion. If *a%elin3 ()o )ad ser+ed ca/a&ly on 8offres staff in 1@143 )ad reacted (it) t)e /ro%/tness3 /erce/ti+eness3 and energy of t)e Mars)al3 (ould t)e ca%/aign )a+e turned out differentlyK *a%elin could )ardly )a+e gras/ed t)e *er%an /lan &efore t)e *er%ans )ad &egun consolidating t)eir Sedan and 1inant &ridge)eads on May 14t). In 1@14 8offre )ad allo(ed a (eek to create t)e Si-t) r%y and co%/lete )is re#dis/ositions and did not3 in fact3 &egin )is counteroffensi+e for ele+en days. Suc) a ti%eta&le for a res/onse3 ade.uate for 1@143 (ould )a+e &een too slo( for 1@4>: t)e *er%ans reac)ed t)e coast in si- days. 41C

Since *a%elin left t)e conduct of t)e ca%/aign to *eorges3 )is realisation of t)e &reaking of t)e Meuse front early on May 14t) constitutes t)e likely ti%e of a drastic 'renc) re#concentration of t)eir forces. But t)e strategic a%&iguity in)erent in a situation in ()ic) t)e *er%ans could use t)eir &reakt)roug) to turn eit)er flank of t)e 'renc) ar%y necessarily confused t)e ene%y. *eorges still &elie+ed t)at t)e *er%ans intended to turn t)e 'renc) ar%ies facing t)e *er%an frontier rat)er t)an t)e allied in Belgiu% and )ad t)us directed %ost of )is later reinforce%ents to t)e Second r%y facing nort) at Sedan. If )e )ad correctly gras/ed t)e *er%an o&Decti+e on May 14t) and ordered fifteen3 or e+en t(enty3 di+isions fro% t)ose &e)ind t)e frontier fortifications as (ell as redirecting3 as )e did3 reser+es already dis/atc)ed to t)e Sedan area3 could t)ey )a+e arri+ed in ti%eK Since t)e 'renc) allo(ed four days for a rail %o+e%ent3 t)ese fifteen or t(enty di+isions could3 )y/ot)etically at least3 )a+e )eaded off t)e das) of t)e Pan6er di+isions to t)e sea &ecause t)e *er%an air force )ad enDoyed little real success in significantly retarding t)e rail trans/ort of 'renc) troo/s. 0)e actual record of t)e %o+e%ent of di+isions laterally along t)e front su//orts t)is rate of trans/ort &y rail3 one di+ision getting one regi%ent into action as .uickly as t(o days after starting. But in con+eying troo/s (est &y rail3 t)e 'renc) )ig) co%%and detrained t)ese di+isions so%e distance fro% t)e ene%y in order to organise t)e% after t)eir Dourney and de/loy t)e% for action. 0)is /rocess took ti%e3 and clearly t)ese 'renc) troo/s could not )a+e inter/osed t)e%sel+es &et(een t)e Pan6er di+isions and t)e $)annel .uickly enoug) to co/e (it) t)e onrus)ing3 fully de/loyed3 and co%/letely %otorised Pan6er di+isions. But )ad *er%an air reconnaissance seen suc) a %assi+e troo/ %o+e%ent3 t)e a//re)ensi+e *er%an )ig) co%%and (ould likely )a+e )alted t)e ad+ance to t)e $)annel to a+oid e-/osing so e-tensi+e a flank to attack &y so for%ida&le a concentration of 'renc) troo/s. Still3 if t)e *er%an )ig) co%%and could )a+e dis/layed t)e courage of t)e con+ictions of *eneral *uderian and t)e ot)er Pan6er leaders3 t)ey could )a+e co%/leted t)eir turning %o+e%ent and )eld t)eir long sout)ern flank (it) t)e original &reakt)roug) force of se+en Pan6er di+isions and t(o %otorised di+isions. 0)e ne(ly arri+ed t(o Pan6er and one %otorised di+isions fro% t)e nort)ern ar%y grou/ s)ould )a+e sufficed to /rotect t)eir corridor fro% t)e forces in Belgiu%. "ence3 t)e original nine di+isions could )a+e t)us gi+en t)eir al%ost undi+ided attention to t)is flank &ecause t)e allied forces in Belgiu% could not )a+e disengaged enoug) %en fro% t)e *er%an ar%ies attacking t)e% fro% t)e east to o+erco%e t)e t)ree di+isions left to /rotect t)e nort)ern flank of t)e Pan6er corridor. 5n t)e defensi+e3 t)e *er%an %o&ile di+isions facing sout) could readily )a+e defended t)eir 1>>#%ile#long flank against t)e attack of t(enty infantry di+isions3 ()ic) )ad to face t)e &arrier of t)e So%%e o+er %uc) of t)is front. So e+en if a )y/ot)etically /rescient *eneral *eorges )ad reacted in a dra%atically e%/)atic (ay on May 14t)3 t)e 'renc) could )ardly )a+e &locked t)e ad+ance to t)e sea and t)e co%/letion of t)e *er%an turning %o+e%ent. In 1@14 Mars)al 8offre used t)e rail(ays to res/ond to a strategic sur/rise t)at itself )ad an inade.uate logistic &ase3 &ut in 1@4> t)e rail(ays could not /re+ail against t)e %otor +e)icle for %o+ing and su//lying %en and guns and t)e tank for /ro+iding a (ea/on syste% ascendant o+er t)e lig)t infantry ()ose defensi+e /o(er )ad do%inated t)e &attlefields of 1@14. 0)us t)e *er%ans founded t)eir success on t)e e-ce/tional strategic %o&ility of t)eir Pan6er di+isions. But t)is %o&ility e-tended far &eyond t)e traditional role of ca+alry as strategically offensi+e troo/s3 ()ic) )ad for se+eral centuries )el/ed to con+ince co%%anders of t)e need to ado/t t)e slo( and cu%&erso%e %et)od of %arc)ing in t)e &attle for%ation t)at in t)e late si-teent) century t)e 1uke of Par%a )ad used to foil 9ing "enry IVs ca+alry.

#inal German Offensi%e in #ran(e Back

41B

0)e large forces re/resented &y t)e Pan6er di+isions and t)eir a&ility to fig)t dis/ersed ga+e t)e% t)e ca/a&ility to carry out a strategic turning %o+e%ent. 0)eir ca%/aign )ad a recent and dra%atic /recedent ()en llen&y )ad used t)e greater %o&ility of a large nu%&er of ca+alry to turn t)e 0urks in )is Megiddo ca%/aign. 8ust as llen&y )ad used t)e )orse to %ake a strategic %o+e%ent of troo/s t)at arrayed t)e%sel+es tactically as infantry3 so t)e %otor truck and t)e tracked +e)icle %o+ed *er%an infantry and t)eir artillery3 antitank guns3 and antiaircraft guns3 an o/eration antici/ated3 ironically3 &y t)e 'renc) %otorised turning %o+e%ent in Morocco si- years &efore. 0)e Pan6er di+ision ca%e (ell e.ui//ed to take ad+antage of t)e tactical /ri%acy of fig)ting on t)e tactical defensi+e t)at t)e turning %o+e%ent traditionally conferred. 0)e Pan6er di+isions infantry3 artillery3 and antitank guns )ad %ade good use of t)ese defensi+e ca/a&ilities ()en t)ey turned &ack t)e %any s%all#scale 'renc) counterattacks launc)ed fro% t)e ti%e t)ey crossed t)e Meuse until after t)ey reac)ed t)e coast. In+alua&le tactically3 es/ecially in t)e initial &reakt)roug)3 t)e tank in one sense contri&uted less to t)e decisi+e strategic results t)at t)e ca%/aign /roduced t)an did t)e %otor truck and t)e tracked +e)icle. 0)ese +e)icles not only con+eyed t)e infantry and t)eir antitank and antiaircraft (ea/ons &ut also su//lied t)e Pan6er di+isions re.uire%ents for a%%unition and fuel. !it)out t)e logistical re+olution of t)e truck3 t)e tanks alone could not )a+e rea/ed t)e strategic )ar+est of t)eir tactical ca/a&ilities. 0rue3 t)e 1@4> tanks )ad t)e strategic %o&ility t)at t)e s)ort#range3 unrelia&le %ac)ines of 1@1B lacked. But (it)out t)e trucks to su//ly t)e%3 tanks could still )a+e %ade no dee/ strategic /enetration7 and e+en if t)ey )ad t)e trucks for t)eir logistic su//ort3 suc) a dri+e could )a+e a%ounted to not)ing %ore t)an a destructi+e raid3 suc) as "enry IV (is)ed to e-ecute against Par%a. 5nly (it) t)e truck and its defensi+ely /redo%inant infantry3 artillery3 and antitank and antiaircraft guns could tanks )a+e )ad t)e necessary defensi+e ca/a&ility and t)e ratio of force to s/ace to carry out a strategic turning %o+e%ent. nd only (it) t)e truck could t)e infantry and t)eir %o&ile (ea/on syste%s )a+e )ad t)e %o&ility needed to kee/ a)ead of 'renc) reser+es %o+ed &y rail. 0)e *er%an +ictory also de/ended on %any fa%iliar ele%ents in (arfare. 0)e strategic sur/rise %ade /ossi&le &y t)e di+ersion of t)e strong e+en ostentatious /us) into "olland and Belgiu% and a&etted &y t)e 'renc) confidence in t)e difficulties of t)e rdennes contri&uted %uc) to *er%an success. 0)e *er%ans tactical skill co%/le%ented t)eir organisation for strategic %o&ility and t)eir %asterful co%&ination of distraction and concentration against (eakness. Pan6er infantry3 largely +eterans of co%&at carried out t)e daunting crossings of t)e Meuse against troo/s lacking

41@

si%ilar e-/erience and co%/ara&le training and leaders)i/. t Sedan3 )o(e+er3 t)e *er%ans %ade use of an intrinsically su/erior (ea/on syste% ()en t)ey e%/loyed t)eir &o%&ers against 'renc) infantry t)at lacked enoug) antiaircraft guns. 0)e defending 'renc) reser+ists dis/layed t)e sa%e de%oralisation e-/ected of )ea+y infantry of old t)at3 ()en attacked &y )orse arc)ers or /istoleers3 could %ake no re/ly. !)en t)e Pan6er di+isions )ad crossed t)e &arrier of t)e Meuse3 t)ey re/eated again and again t)e t)e%e of t)e use of a /redo%inant (ea/on syste%. 'renc) di+isions )ad enoug) antitank guns to (it)stand a tank#su//orted infantry attack on a &road front3 suc) as )ad c)aracterised t)e +ictorious allied assaults in !orld !ar I. :et t)ey lacked t)e nu%&er of antitank (ea/ons needed to resist t)e enor%ous concentrations of *er%an tanks at t)eir t)ree &ridge)eads o+er t)e Meuse or often at t)e dis/osal of t)e *er%ans t)roug)out t)eir dri+e to t)e coast. 0)e /arallel t)at clarifies t)is as/ect of *er%an tactical success is t)e use of large &odies of )ea+y ca+alry against a %ass of lig)t infantry su//orted &y a fe( /ike%en and &y t)e occasional rus) of a fe( )ea+y ca+alry. Predicta&ly3 t)e )ea+y ca+alry slaug)tered t)e lig)t infantry in co%&at and during t)eir retreat. le-anders stirru/less )ea+y ca+alry enDoyed suc) success against t)e flank and rear of )ea+y infantry3 and it is )ardly sur/rising t)at t)e tank unit (it) radio co%%unication3 su/er&ly articulated and t)e ideal offensi+e troo/s o+er()el%ed t)e lig)t infantry. !)en t)ey faced %ore for%ida&le o//osition3 t)e conce/t of infiltration tactics ena&led t)e% to e-/loit t)eir %o&ility to take artillery and antitank guns in t)e flank and rear. !)en t)ey could not turn a /oint strong in antitank guns3 t)ey concentrated t)eir infantry and artillery to take t)e /osition3 t)us carrying out an o/eration (it) a /arallel to lig)t infantry defeating )ea+y infantry. nd *er%an attention to %aking t)e %ost of t)e ca/a&ilities of t)e ne( (ea/on syste%s e-tended to e.ui//ing t)e%sel+es (it) e+en %ore antitank guns t)an t)e 'renc). In t)is (ay t)ey )ad an a%/le nu%&er of a do%inant (ea/on syste% essential to a successful defence against t)e /o(erful 'renc) ar%oured forces. 0)e *er%an aircraft3 t)e lig)t ca+alry of t)e air3 /layed an i%/ortant &ut not decisi+e role. 0)ey scored )ig) in t)eir strategic role against %arc)ing troo/s &ut could not a//recia&ly slo(3 %uc) less /re+ent3 t)e strategic %o+e%ent of 'renc) troo/s &y road or rail. 0)e crossing of t)e Meuse at 1inant (it)out air su//ort against first#class reser+e di+isions indicates t)at *er%an infantry %ay not )a+e re.uired t)e tactical su//ort of aircraft to cross against t)e second#class reser+e di+isions at Sedan. $learly3 %any ot)er fa%iliar ele%ents contri&uted to t)e *er%an +ictory. 0)e use of aircraft in t)e crossing at Sedan3 ()et)er essential or not3 e-)i&ited t)e degree of concentration /racticed3 not Dust in &ringing se+en Pan6er di+isions against t)e Meuse &ut in t)e concentration re/resented &y t)e Pan6er di+ision itself. 0)e *er%ans skilfully e%/loyed t)e tank as a tactically offensi+e (ea/on syste% and articulated t)eir tank units (ell (it) radios. By co%&ining tanks (it) ot)er %otorised (ea/on syste%s in t)e Pan6er di+ision3 aided &y aircraft3 t)ey )ad created a strategically offensi+e ar%y (it) enoug) force to s/ace in t)e t)eatre of o/erations to carry out t)e strategic turning %o+e%ent. 0)us3 t)ey intelligently united t)e ne( logistic ca/a&ilities (it) t)e traditional %ounted (ea/on syste%s3 re+i+ed in t)e for% of aircraft and tanks3 and t)eir ne(3 un%ounted counter/arts3 t)e antitank and antiaircraft guns. !)en Doined (it) t)e conce/ts of Na/oleonic (arfare3 %ade al%ost o&solete &y t)e siege (arfare of !orld !ar I3 t)is resulting &lend of ne( and old ele%ents )ad /roduced a transfor%ation of (arfare co%/ara&le to t)at of Na/oleon. 0)us3 t)e *er%an ar%y o+ert)re( t)e tyranny of an e-cess of force to s/ace t)at )ad ruled in t)is region fro% 1@14 to 1@1B. So3 rat)er t)an a 'renc) failure t)e *er%an ar%ys co%/re)ensi+e %i-ture of old and ne( ele%ents accounted for t)e dra%atic outco%e of t)e ca%/aign. 0)at in a ca%/aign of a little o+er a

42>

%ont) t)e 'renc) lost a//ro-i%ately 2@>3>>> killed and (ounded and t)e *er%ans a&out 1?B3>>> indicates t)e le+el of effort re.uired for t)e *er%ans to attain t)eir e-traordinary +ictory. lt)oug) *eneral *eorges dis/layed t)e sy%/to%s of colla/se under /ressure3 )is /erfor%ance differed %arkedly fro% Ba6aines se+enty years earlier. "e continued to function as did )is staff. 0)e 'renc) did not o(e t)eir defeat to )i% or to *a%elins /lan or )is failure to inter+ene3 &ecause a %ore +igorous res/onse earlier (ould )ardly )a+e altered t)e outco%e. 5nce a &rilliant union of t)e classical ele%ents of distraction and concentration against (eakness )ad &roug)t t)e *er%ans across t)e Meuse3 t)e 'renc) faced t)e tactical inno+ation of a large nu%&er of tanks on a narro( front7 t)e strategic de/arture of t)e %o&ility of t)e Pan6er di+ision co%&ined (it) its great /o(er on t)e tactical offensi+e and defensi+e7 t)e logistic re+olution %ade /ossi&le &y t)e %otor truck7 t)e +alua&le tactical and strategic aid of larger nu%&ers of /o(erful aircraft7 and t)e strategic inno+ation of t)e concentration of Pan6er and %otorised di+isions to create a force of strategically offensi+e troo/s so /o(erful t)at it could carry out a %aDor strategic turning %o+e%ent. !it) traditionally i%/ortant factors added to suc) %aDor tactical and strategic de/artures3 surely no 'renc) co%%and could )a+e foreseen and co/ed (it) t)e ca%/aign of May 1@4>3 t)e full conce/t and i%/lications of ()ic) %any of its *er%an originators and e-ecutants )ad difficulty gras/ing fully. Back

#ir !ower in a +ecisive )ole, (he 1attle of 1ritain

!it) %uc) of t)e e.ui/%ent of its s%all ar%y left in 'rance3 Britain )ad deficient %eans to resist t)e +ictorious *er%an ar%y on t)e ground. Britains defence de/ended on t)e a&ility of t)e Britains na+y to interdict a /assage of t)e 2nglis) $)annel &y t)e *er%an ground forces. In ter%s of na+al /o(er alone3 t)is task /resented no difficulties &ecause t)e na+y )ad con+enient &ases and a large nu%&er of cruisers ar%ed (it) B# or =#inc) guns as (ell as 4#inc) antiaircraft guns. ll of t)ese (ea/ons could sink troo/ trans/orts3 as could t)e 4.C#inc) guns carried &y %ost destroyers. gainst s%all craft t)e s)i/s auto%atic antiaircraft guns firing 2#/ound e-/losi+e &ullets (ould /ro+e +ery effecti+e as (ell. 'aced (it) intensi+e /atrols &y suc) s)i/s3 t)e *er%ans )ad no c)ance of launc)ing an in+asion of t)e Britis) Isles. Na/oleon3 like t)e 'renc) on se+eral occasions &efore )i%3 )ad faced a si%ilar /ro&le% &ut one in ()ic) )e )ad t)e /otential of na+al su/re%acy if )e could concentrate %ore s)i/s in t)e $)annel t)an could t)e Britis). But co%/ared to t)e Britis)3 t)e *er%ans )ad a negligi&le na+y3 and e+en if t)e Italian fleet )ad /ro+en (illing and a&le to e%ulate t)e 'renc) Mediterranean fleets of old and co%e to t)e $)annel3 t)e *er%ans and Italians )ad no )o/e t)at t)eir co%&ined fleets eig)t &attles)i/s could %atc) t)e fourteen Britis) &attles)i/s and &attle cruisers. 0)e *er%ans3 )o(e+er3 )ad a %ore /o(erful air force and could use t)is to dri+e a(ay t)e Britis) fleet and o/en t)e (ay for t)e %o+e%ent of t)eir ar%y. 5/erating o+er t)e sea3 as o+er t)e land3 as lig)t ca+alry3 t)e *er%an &o%&ers could e-/ect to defeat t)e (ars)i/s. lt)oug) t)e s)i/s3 like ar%ies3 )ad antiaircraft defences3 t)e far %ore nu%erous aircraft could e-/ect to /re+ail. In t)e su%%er of 1@4> t)e *er%ans )ad a&out 13?>> &o%&ers a+aila&le to o/erate o+er t)e 2nglis) $)annel3 and a&out ?>> of t)ese (ere di+e &o%&ers t)at )ad t)e accuracy to )it t)e lig)tly ar%oured cruisers and unar%oured destroyers (it) )ea+y &o%&s. Suc) nu%erical ad+antage of aircraft against s)i/s (ould ensure *er%an %astery in an e-tended contest &et(een t)e sea and air forces &ecause t)e *er%ans could re/lace t)eir aircraft losses fro% t)e steady /roduction of ne( /lanes and a strea% of ne(ly trained /ilots. 0)e Britis) )ad no co%/ara&le flo( of ne( s)i/s. 1ou&tless suc) a contest (ould )a+e &een a long3 gruelling struggle (it) ad+erse (eat)er constantly )andica//ing t)e aircraft. 0)e Britis) also (ould likely )a+e ke/t %any s)i/s in /ort3 ready to sortie if t)e *er%ans )ad &egun to dis/atc) t)eir in+asion forces. "ere t)ey (ould )a+e /resented easier to )it stationary targets &ut (ould )a+e )ad t)e su//ort of ground#&ased 421

antiaircraft guns and greater access to /rotection &y fig)ter aircraft. 2+en (it) a +ictory against t)e Royal Na+y3 t)e *er%an in+asion +essels could not )a+e crossed co%/letely un%olested. fter t)ey ca%e as)ore3 t)e *er%ans (ould )a+e faced t)e /ro&le% of continuing to land and su//ly enoug) %en so as not to )a+e t)e Britis) ground forces )alt t)e% on t)e narro( landing fronts and &ottle t)e% u/ near t)e &eac)es (it)out a /ort for su//ly. But &efore t)e Britis) and *er%ans could (age t)ese ca%/aigns3 t)e *er%ans first )ad to deal (it) t)e Britis) aircraft. 0)e *er%an air force could not easily attack t)e Britis) na+y as long as t)e Britis) )ad a /o(erful fig)ter#/lane force a+aila&le (it) &ases t)at ena&led t)e% to fly o+er t)e $)annel. 0)e *er%ans )ad found t)is out ()en t)ey )ad tried to use t)eir air force to /re+ent t)e e+acuation of Britis) and 'renc) troo/s fro% t)e 'renc) coast near 1unkirk. 0)e Britis) fig)ters inter+ened fro% t)eir &ases in 2ngland and contri&uted a great deal to t)e success of t)e e+acuation. So t)e *er%an air force )ad first to defeat Britains air force &efore it could &egin its contest (it) t)e na+y. 'or t)is struggle fig)ters (ould /lay a crucial role3 and t)e *er%ans )ad a&out B>> of t)eir e-cellent Messersc)%itt 1>@ single#engine3 %ono/lane fig)ters. 0o counter t)ese t)e Britis) )ad a&out =>> %odern single#engine3 %ono/lane fig)ters. 0)e S/itfire3 a %atc) for t)e Messersc)%itt3 constituted less t)an )alf of t)ese Britis) aircraft. 0)e "urricane3 ()ic) /ro+ided t)e re%ainder3 )ad fire/o(er co%/ara&le to t)e Messersc)%itt or S/itfire &ut )ad a&out 1> /ercent less s/eed t)an t)ese ot)er t(o fig)ters7 t)is /laced it at a significant disad+antage in co%/arison (it) t)e *er%an /lane. Bot) air forces )ad co%&at e-/erience. 0)e *er%ans /lanned to co%/el Britains air force to fig)t &y &o%&ing t)eir airfields (it) &o%&ers )ea+ily escorted &y fig)ters. lt)oug) t)e Britis) ke/t %any fig)ters on fields out of reac) of t)e *er%ans3 t)is strategy (ould re.uire t)e Britis) to fig)t rat)er t)an )a+e t)eir aircraft attacked on t)e ground and t)eir ground installations &o%&ed. 0o co%&at t)ese raids and a+oid loss of /lanes on t)e ground3 t)e Britis) )ad radar as (ell as ground o&ser+ers to detect a//roac)ing )ostile aircraft and used control fro% land to direct t)e fig)ters to interce/t t)e *er%an &o%&ers. In addition3 t)e Britis) o&tained intelligence of *er%an intentions t)roug) decoding %essages. 0)us3 t)e Britis) aircraft could re%ain on t)e ground e-ce/t ()en actual co%&at t)reatened. In t)is contest Britains air force )ad a nu%&er of ad+antages. 0)oug) inferior in t)e nu%&er and .uality of its fig)ters3 it )ad al%ost ?>> in reser+e and a /roduction 5f 4C< /er %ont) co%/ared (it) *er%an out/ut of only 2>> /er %ont). Re/lacing /ilots at t)e rate of t)e loss of aircraft /resented a serious /ro&le%3 &ut one t)e Britis) sol+ed3 in /art &ecause in fig)ting o+er t)eir o(n territory %any of t)eir /ilots could /arac)ute to safety and fly again. In addition3 t)ey could dra( on t)e na+y3 use /ilots %anning t)eir fe( re%aining o&solete fig)ters3 and &egin retraining &o%&er /ilots into fig)ter /ilots. 'ig)ting on t)e strategic defensi+e /ro+ided anot)er &enefit &esides sa+ing /ilots: like stea% (ars)i/s o/erating far fro% t)eir &ases3 *er%an fig)ters3 in co%ing to engage t)e Britis) near t)eir o(n airfields3 used u/ %uc) of t)eir fuel and in so%e instances )ad only a&out t(enty %inutes of co%&at ti%e o+er Britis) territory. 'or t)e *er%ans3 a s)orter ti%e in t)e co%&at area e.uated to )a+ing fe(er /lanes. 0actically t)e Britis) )ad to act on t)e offensi+e. But since t)ey )ad as t)eir o&Decti+e t)e slo(3 +ulnera&le &o%&er3 an aircraft in %any (ays co%/ara&le to a %erc)ant s)i/ on t)e sea3 t)ey /itted t)eir su/erior fig)ter (ea/on syste%3 t)e galley of t)e air # against t)e inferior &o%&er. 0)e *er%an &o%&ers could rarely &ring %ore t)an one or t(o of t)eir defensi+e %ac)ine guns to &ear against t)e eig)t for(ard#firing %ac)ine guns of t)e s%all3 fast#flying S/itfire and "urricane. 0o control o/erations t)e Britis) )ad a good syste% of ground o&ser+ers and radar stations to (arn of t)e a//roac) and course of t)e *er%an aircraft. 0)is intelligence ena&led t)e% to concentrate fig)ter aircraft3 dis/ersed at %any different airfields3 against t)e )ostile for%ations re/orted and

422

located &y t)e (arning syste%. 0)e tactical offensi+e also ga+e Britis) fig)ters so%e ad+antage of t)e initiati+e against t)e *er%an fig)ters3 ()ic) )ad to stay close to t)eir &o%&ers to /rotect t)e%. 0)e Britis) tried to use t)eir slo(er "urricane fig)ters against &o%&ers and reser+e t)e S/itfires to engage t)e *er%an Messersc)%itts. 0)e "urricanes )ad a%/le s/eed and fire/o(er to deal (it) &o%&ers. fter a /eriod of attacks in less t)an full strengt)3 t)e *er%ans o/ened t)eir %aDor air ca%/aign on ugust 12t) 1@4>3 (it) raids on Britis) radar stations7 so%e (ere da%aged3 &ut only one (as disa&led. 0)e *er%ans &egan t)eir %ain offensi+e t)e ne-t day (it) flig)ts &y nearly 13<>> aircraft. 0)e Britis) fig)ters %et t)e% and s)ot do(n forty#fi+e3 losing only t)irteen. Bot) sides o+eresti%ated t)e ot)ers losses3 t)e *er%ans3 for e-a%/le3 &elie+ing t)at in a (eek t)ey )ad s)ot do(n ?>> Britis) /lanes instead of t)e @@ actually destroyed. fter a s%all effort on ugust 14t)3 t)e *er%ans attacked t)e ne-t day3 %aking <2> &o%&er flig)ts and 132C> &y fig)ters. 0)e Britis) lost ?4 aircraft to *er%an losses of C<. 0)e ne-t day t)e *er%ans again %ade a great effort3 13C>> flig)ts3 and lost 4< /lanes to 21 for t)e Britis). But t)e *er%ans3 again o+eresti%ating ene%y losses3 t)oug)t t)ey )ad reduced t)e total of Britis) fig)ters to ?>>7 in fact3 t)e Britis) still o/erated o+er =>> as t)ey s)o(ed on ugust 1Bt) ()en t)ey s)ot do(n C1 *er%an /lanes to t)eir loss of 2C. 'ro% ugust Bt) t)roug) 1Bt) t)e *er%ans lost ?=? aircraft and t)e Britis) 1B1 in t)e air and ?> on t)e ground. 1isa//ointed in t)eir e-/ectation of a .uick +ictory3 t)e *er%ans continued t)eir strikes on airfields3 including t)e ground control centres t)at directed t)e Britis) fig)ter effort. 'ro% ugust 24t) t)roug) Se/te%&er =t) t)e *er%ans %ade t)irty#t)ree large attacks and3 using a )ig)er /ro/ortion of fig)ters and fe( of t)eir +ulnera&le di+e#&o%&ers3 )ad lost ?B> aircraft co%/ared to 2B= for t)e Britis). Bot) air forces )ad lost )ea+ily3 and t)e %en )ad difficulty %aintaining t)e gruelling /ace of t)e ca%/aign. 5n Se/te%&er <t) t)e *er%ans &egan &o%&ing ,ondon in retaliation for a Britis) raid on Berlin. But &ad (eat)er li%ited t)e *er%an effort until Se/te%&er 1<t)3 ()en t)ey %ade al%ost 13>>> flig)ts o+er Britain3 losing => /lanes to 2= for Britains air force3 ()ic) )ad )alf its do(ned /ilots sur+i+e. t t)is /oint t)e *er%ans realised t)at t)ey could not defeat t)e Britis) fig)ters3 a&andoned t)eir /lans for an i%%ediate in+asion3 &ut continued t)e air offensi+e. 1uring t)e /eriod ugust 12t) t)roug) Se/te%&er ?>t)3 &ot) co%&atants lost )ea+ily3 &ut eac) t)oug)t t)ey )ad inflicted greater aircraft losses on t)e ene%y. 1uring t)e /eriod fro% ugust <t) to Se/te%&er 2>t) t)e *er%ans lost 131<< /lanes3 t)e Britis)3 ===. But t)e Britis) lost 422 /ilots killed3 (ounded3 and %issing and %aintained t)eir o/erational strengt) at a fairly constant le+el t)roug)out t)is ca%/aign3 called t)e Battle of Britain. 5n ugust <t) t)ey )ad ?C? "urricanes o/erational and 2<C S/itfires7 on Se/te%&er 2>t) t)ey )ad ?@1 "urricanes and 2?C S/itfires. ircraft /roduction and t)e /ro+ision of ne( /ilots )ad %atc)ed t)e losses. In +ie( of t)e Britis) skill in co%&at and o/erations and t)eir resources in %en and %ateriel3 t)e *er%ans clearly )ad little c)ance of (inning t)e Battle of Britain. 0)e attacker )ad lost %ore )ea+ily3 e+en (it) greater nu%&ers3 &ecause )e )ad to e-/ose )is &o%&ers to t)e fig)ter3 a &etter (ea/on syste%. If t)e *er%ans could )a+e /itted fig)ter against fig)ter3 eac) t)e sa%e distance fro% its &ase3 t)e *er%ans (ould )a+e )ad t)e &est of t)e contest &ecause t)ey )ad a slig)t ad+antage in nu%&ers and a significant one in t)e /re/onderance of t)e Messersc)%itts o+er t)e "urricanes7 t)e co%&at of fig)ters3 (it)out any ad+antage for t)e defence3 (ould )a+e occurred under t)e conditions for ()ic) ,anc)ester for%ulated )is N#s.uare la(. But t)e Britis) )ad no reason to acce/t a c)allenge to fig)t on suc) ter%s. 8ust as t)e ancient *reeks used to de+astate an ene%ys territory to co%/el )i% to fig)t or lose )is cro/s3 so t)e *er%ans )ad to attack airfields3 /orts3 or ,ondon to %ake Britains air force fig)t7 and suc) attacks re.uired t)e%

42?

to e-/ose t)eir +ulnera&le &o%&ers and e%/loy fig)ters far fro% t)eir airfields and o+er t)e ene%ys territory. "ad t)e Britis) lacked t)e S/itfire3 t)e *er%ans %ig)t )a+e /re+ailed. Slig)tly older in design t)an t)e S/itfire and a &ulkier aircraft &ut (it) t)e sa%e engine3 t)e "urricane fell enoug) s)ort in /erfor%ance of t)e &est *er%an fig)ter to /lace t)e /ilot at a serious disad+antage. 0)e Britis) (it)dre( it as a fig)ter during t)e (ar ()ereas t)e S/itfire3 like t)e Messersc)%itt3 continued in ser+ice until t)e end of t)e conflict3 recei+ing successi+e i%/ro+e%ents t)at increased its s/eed &y 1>> %iles /er )our. 0)e 'renc) air force )ad suffered se+erely fro% )a+ing older designs /redo%inate a%ong its aircraft3 and t)e Russians and t)e Italians (ould )a+e t)e sa%e /ro&le% at t)e outset of )ostilities. 0)e Russians reco+ered &y introducing ne( designs3 &ut t)e Italians did not. 8ust as d%iral Sturdee and )is &attle cruisers )ad easily sunk t)e *er%an ar%oured cruisers off t)e 'alkland Islands in 1@143 so a /ilot in a su/erior aircraft3 &ecause of a co%&ination of so%e or all of t)e attri&utes of s/eed3 rate of cli%&3 ar%a%ent3 or %anoeu+ra&ility3 (ould )a+e a si%ilar ad+antage. But t)e /ilot (ould o(e )is do%inance not to )a+ing a different ty/e3 as in &attle cruiser against ar%oured cruiser3 &ut to a %ore %odern design. s (ea/on syste%s gro( older3 t)ey )a+e tended to last longer as t)e rate of de+elo/%ent decreases. In !orld !ar I aircraft &eca%e o&solete in t(o years or less3 &ut in !orld !ar II so%e aircraft continued in ser+ice t)roug)out t)e (ar. S)i/s e-)i&ited t)e sa%e /)eno%enon3 %odernised !orld !ar I &attles)i/s doing good ser+ice in !orld !ar II. If t)e *er%ans )ad defeated t)e fig)ters of Britains air force3 t)ey (ould t)en )a+e )ad to turn t)eir e-)austed and de/leted forces to e-/loiting t)eir +ictory &y attacking t)eir ad+ersarys na+y. 0)e *er%ans a//arently &elie+ed t)at t)ey could &egin t)eir in+asion i%%ediately after defeating t)e ene%y fig)ters. But it is dou&tful t)at e+en un%olested *er%an &o%&ers could )a+e /re+ented Britis) (ars)i/s fro% interce/ting *er%an in+asion flotillas. 0)e enor%ous fire/o(er of cruisers and destroyers (ould )a+e found a %ultitude of +ulnera&le targets in a con+oy of troo/ trans/orts and &arges. 0)e *er%ans (ould /er)a/s )a+e dis/layed greater (isdo% to use t)eir )y/ot)etical air /re/onderance3 if t)ey )ad &een a&le to %aintain it in t)e face of greater Britis) fig)ter#/lane /roduction3 to %ount a sustained ca%/aign against ene%y (ars)i/s ()ile e-/anding t)eir nu%&er of in+asion craft and3 conse.uently3 t)e si6e of t)eir in+asion force and t)e &readt) of its front. 0)is dou&tless (ould )a+e in+ol+ed a delay until t)e s/ring ()en in+asion craft and air/lanes (ould )a+e )ad good (eat)er. But t)e increase in t)e (idt) of t)e *er%an in+asion frontage3 in %en in+ol+ed3 and in loss of Britis) (ars)i/s in t)e interi% (ould /ro&a&ly )a+e %ore t)an counter&alanced t)e larger nu%&er of defending troo/s t)e Britis) (ould )a+e )ad &y t)e s/ring. 0)e *er%ans3 )o(e+er3 %ig)t )a+e found t)at t)ey could )a+e %ade t)e &est use of t)eir air su/eriority &y e%/loying it to i%/le%ent a logistic strategy of &lockade &y attacking Britis) s)i//ing and /orts ()ile3 &y %aintaining t)e t)reat of in+asion3 continuing to di+ert ene%y (ars)i/s fro% t)e /rotection of con+oys against t)e attacks of *er%an su&%arines. Back

(he Strategic and (actical Conditions of the )usso-German War

0)e *er%an use of t)eir Pan6er and %otorised di+isions to turn t)e allied forces in Belgiu% /ro+ided t)e strategic %odel for t)e use of t)e %otor truck and t)e ne( (ea/on syste%s during t)e re%ainder of t)e (ar. 0)e *er%ans a//lied t)is %odel in 1@41 in t)eir (ar (it) Russia. 0o carry out t)is strategy t)e *er%ans increased t)eir nu%&er of %otorised di+isions to fourteen and3 &y reducing t)e nu%&er of tanks3 t)eir Pan6er di+isions to nineteen. 0)is significantly decreased t)e ratio of t)e )ea+y ca+alry tanks to t)e infantry3 artillery3 and antitank and antiaircraft guns and ga+e %ore e%/)asis to t)e ele%ent of strategic %o&ility in t)e Pan6er di+ision and less to its tactically 424

offensi+e3 )ea+y ca+alry ele%ent3 t)e tank. 8ust as le-anders $o%/anion ca+alry )ad constituted only a s%all /art of )is ar%y3 so tanks /ro+ided only a tiny fraction of t)e ()ole *er%an ar%y and3 no(3 a lesser /ro/ortion of t)e %otorised and ar%oured forces. 0)e *er%ans )ad an ar%y far different fro% t)e )ea+y#ca+alry#centred %edie+al %odel. 0o acco%/lis) t)eir no( t)oroug)ly understood turning %o+e%ent strategy3 t)ey /lanned to &reak t)roug) in t(o /laces3 rat)er t)an t)e one in 'rance3 ()ere t)e sea acted as a &arrier. 0)e t(o grou/s of Pan6er and %otorised di+isions (ould dri+e dee/ into t)e ene%y rear and unite &e)ind3 ()ile infantry di+isions on foot %arc)ed in t)e track of t)e %ec)anised and %otorised forces to furnis) ade.uate strengt) to &lock t)e retreat of t)e di+isions encircled &y t)e dou&le turning %o+e%ent3 often called a strategic en+elo/%ent. 0)e *er%ans faced less fa+oura&le conditions t)an t)ey )ad encountered in 'rance. 0)ey (ould )a+e a lo(er ratio of force to s/ace3 ()ic) (ould facilitate &reakt)roug)s Dust as it )ad in !orld !ar I &ut (ould i%/ose serious logistical /ro&le%s and %ake it %ore difficult to en+elo/ as great a /ro/ortion of t)e )ostile forces as t)ey )ad turned in May 1@4>. 'urt)er3 a lo(er ratio of force to s/ace (ould aug%ent t)e difficulty in &locking or containing t)e en+elo/ed forces. 0)e cli%ate (as difficult: %uc) of Russia lay nort) of 'rance and all of it far fro% t)e (ar%t) of t)e tlantic 5cean. In addition3 Russia /ossessed large ri+ers (it) %any tri&utaries. 0)e /o+erty of t)e country3 like its lo( /o/ulation density3 %eant t)e *er%ans (ould find less food and forage3 fe(er &ridges and roads3 and %ore un/a+ed roads3 undrained %ars)es3 and uncut forests. 0)ese terrain conditions (ould in)i&it &ut not /reclude t)e success of t)e *er%an %ounted (arfare u/on ()ic) t)ey de/ended for strategically decisi+e +ictories. 5n t)e ot)er )and3 t)e co%/arison (it) t)e *er%an ca%/aign against t)e 'renc) e-tended to t)e tactical le+el ()ere t)e *er%ans3 after t)eir o/erations in 'rance3 )ad %arkedly en)anced t)eir already )ig) le+el of tactical skill and t)e e-/erience and co%/etence of t)eir co%%anders and staffs. 0)e deficiencies of t)e Russians ()en co%/ared (it) t)e 'renc) intensified t)is contrast. Inferior to t)e 'renc) in !orld !ar I3 t)e Russian ar%y suffered al%ost total dissolution as a result of t)e conflict and t)e ensuing. Bols)e+ik Re+olution. !)en &y t)e late 1@?>s t)e Russians )ad re&uilt and rear%ed t)eir ar%y3 t)e Russian )ig) co%%and3 /urged of )ig) officers sus/ected of /olitical unrelia&ility3 lost a )ig) /ro/ortion of its %ore e-/erienced and &etter trained co%%anders. 0)e *er%ans )ad to rely on t)eir skills to offset Russian /redo%inance in artillery and tanks3 as t)e Russians )ad added to t)eir traditional /assion for large .uantities of /o(erful artillery an ent)usias% for ar%oured forces. lt)oug) %any of t)ese tracked +e)icles re/resented o&solete designs and a considera&le nu%&er (ere not ready for action and re.uired re/air3 t)e Russians certainly )ad a t)ree to one nu%erical ad+antage against t)e ?3<>> tanks in t)e *er%an ar%ies attacking Russia. 5ne of t)e %any Russian lig)t tanks3 t)e B0C3 co%/ared (it) t)e *er%an Model II lig)t tank as follo(s G&elo(H.

)om arison of the ,ussian and German &ight Tan$s Back

But t)e *er%ans )ad fe( of t)ese lig)t tanks3 t(o#t)irds of t)eirs &eing t(o si%ilar %odels of %ediu% tanks (eig)ing a&out t(enty tons. 0)e Russians )ad an e-cellent ne( %ediu% tank3 t)e 0# 42<

?43 in /roduction3 &ut )ad significantly fe(er of t)ese %ediu% tanks t)an t)e *er%ans. 0)e &est e-a%/le of eac) tank a+aila&le in 1@4> co%/ares as follo(s Gsee &elo(H. 0)e ar%our on t)e Russian tank slo/ed %uc) %ore s)ar/ly t)an t)e ar%our on t)e *er%an tanks3 and its gun )ad o+er dou&le t)e ar%our#/iercing /o(er of t)e %uc) s)orter C<#%illi%eter and so%e()at %ore t)an t)e longer#&arrelled <>#%illi%eter guns on t)e *er%an tanks. 0)e diesel engine on t)e Russian tank ga+e it t(ice t)e range of t)e gasoline#fuelled *er%an tank and reduced t)e )a6ard fro% t)e fuels catc)ing fire. 'or its si6e t)e Russian 0#?4 (as /ro&a&ly t)e &est tank of !orld !ar II.

)om arison of the ,ussian and German medium Tan$s Back

In addition3 t)e Russians )ad a )ea+y tank in /roduction3 t)e 4C#ton 9V (it) ar%our 11># %illi%eters t)ick on t)e %odels /roduced in 1@41. It3 too3 )ad a /o(erful C=#%illi%eter gun &ut a s/eed of only t(enty#one %iles /er )our. Ne+ert)eless3 it )ad %ore s/eed3 range3 fire/o(er3 and ar%our /rotection t)an t)e 'renc) )ea+y tank3 ()ic) t)e *er%ans )ad found so for%ida&le and ()ic) )ad con+inced t)e% to increase t)e ar%our on t)eir tanks and to %ount %ore /o(erful tank guns. But t)e Russians )ad altoget)er only a&out 13<>> of t)eir 0#?4 %ediu% and strong 9V )ea+y tanks. 0)e t(o ar%ies )ad a&out t)e sa%e strengt)3 t)e *er%ans )a+ing e-/anded t)eirs &y e.ui//ing eig)ty#eig)t di+isions (it) 'renc) (ea/ons. ,ea+ing al%ost fifty di+isions in su&Dugated countries3 ca%/aigning in frica3 and guarding against Britain3 t)e *er%ans de/loyed a&out 14< di+isions in t)e 2ast. 0)e Russians3 fully %o&ilised3 )ad a&out t)e sa%e nu%&er a+aila&le in t)eir (estern /ro+inces. 0)e Russians )ad %ore aircraft3 and t)eir /roduction (as greater3 &ut t)ey )ad older fig)ter /lanes. Bot) t)eir air and ground forces lacked t)e e-tensi+e *er%an o/erational and co%&at e-/erience. In doctrine3 t)e ar%ies differed little3 t)e Russians3 like t)e *er%ans3 kno(ing t)at tanks (ere not /ri%arily )el/ers of t)e infantry in o+erco%ing t)e %ac)ine gun. But t)e /urge of so %any )ig)er co%%anders )ad caused a reorganisation of Russian ar%oured forces3 and ()en t)e (ar &egan3 t)e Russian ar%y )ad yet anot)er restructuring under(ay3 one &asically intended to restore a dis/osition of ar%oured forces si%ilar to t)at of t)e *er%ans. 0)ey )ad not co%/leted t)ese c)anges3 and t)e out&reak of t)e (ar found t)eir ar%oured force unready. In attacking Russia (it) o+er ? %illion soldiers t)e *er%ans did not re/eat Na/oleons raid of 1B123 &ut t)ey did lack t)e forces necessary to con.uer t)e entire country. 0)eir situation )ad %uc) co%%on (it) t)e Prussian ca%/aign against 'rance in 1BC>#C1 in t)at t)ey )ad t)e troo/s to do%inate %uc) &ut not all of t)e country. 2uro/ean Russia )ad a&out eig)t ti%es t)e land area of 'rance3 and t)e *er%ans and t)eir Balkan allies )ad fi+e or si- ti%es as %any %en as t)ose a+aila&le to t)e Prussians and t)eir *er%an allies se+enty years earlier. If t)ey could defeat t)e Russian ar%ies3 t)ey could e-/ect to con.uer 2uro/ean Russia3 &eat &ack t)e counterattacks of i%/ro+ised ar%ies3 and i%/ose a /eace. But t)eir situation )ad %any o%inous +ariations fro% t)at of 1BC>. *er%any )ad Italy as an ally3 &ut Russia )ad Britain3 aided &y t)e 4nited States. Russia )ad %ore t)an dou&le t)e /o/ulation of *er%any3 ()ereas in 1BC> Prussia and its *er%an allies toget)er )ad a&out t)e sa%e /o/ulation as 'rance. In addition3 t)e Russians )ad still %ore %en of %ilitary age and considera&le reser+es of

42=

trained %an/o(er not re/resented in t)e ar%ies de/loyed against *er%any as (ell as t)e forces in t)e 'ar 2ast3 ()ic) )ad defeated t)e 8a/anese in suc) an e-e%/lary fas)ion at 9)alkin *ol. 'urt)er3 siatic Russia contained significant /o/ulation centres and a /o(erful )ea+y industry. If a co%/arison of force to s/ace included siatic Russia3 t)e country )ad forty ti%es t)e land area of 'rance3 /resenting an insu/era&le o&stacle to any con.uest not founded on a strong /olitical &ase or an e-ercise of t)e 0urko#Mongolian strategy of %assacre and terror o+er a )it)erto un/recedented land area. nd t)e *er%ans lacked a /olitical /rogra% to a//eal to t)e Russians3 e+en t)oug) %any Russians )ar&oured considera&le ill (ill to(ard t)e regi%e of 8ose/) Stalin. But dolf "itler ai%ed at t)e co%/lete o+ert)ro( of Stalins go+ern%ent and t)e anne-ation of a large /art of 2uro/ean Russia3 including t)e %ost /roducti+e agricultural3 industrial3 and %ining regions. 0)e *er%ans )ad o&Decti+es too a%&itious to &e attained &y t)e li%ited %ilitary action of 1BC>#C1. nd not only did t)ey )a+e no attracti+e /olitical /rogra% &ut also t)ey treated t)e con.uered Russian /o/ulation in a (ay ()ic) )el/ed to arouse t)eir ani%osity. lso3 curiously3 "itler could not rely on t)e /olitical strategy of terror or t)e logistic strategy of e-ter%ination of %ilitary %an/o(er. lt)oug) "itler )ad no a+ersion to slaug)tering t)e Russians3 ()o% )e regarded as racially su&)u%an3 )e (is)ed to conser+e t)e agricultural out/ut of t)e country as a resource for *er%any3 so%et)ing not /ossi&le if )e de/o/ulated Russia. It is dou&tful t)at *er%an %eans and %et)ods e.ualled t)e re.uire%ents of t)eir /olitical and econo%ic o&Decti+es in attacking Russia. In fact3 t)e al%ost unli%ited *er%an /olitical goals3 t)eir et)nic and ideological )ostility to t)e Russians and t)eir regi%e3 t)e &rutality t)e *er%ans earlier dis/layed3 and t)e e-a%/le of 'rance3 su/ine at t)e feet of *er%any3 %oti+ated t)e Russian leaders3 /eo/le3 and soldiers to offer a des/erate resistance. *er%an soldiers3 a(are of &ot) t)e de/t) of t)eir antagonists )atred and t)eir great strengt)3 kne( t)at t)ey3 too3 foug)t for t)eir +ery e-istence in an unli%ited (ar. 0)e su&se.uent nglo# %erican de%and for t)e unconditional surrender of t)eir o//onents %ade for%al ()at t)e *er%ans )ad already co%/re)ended. So co%&atants on &ot) sides in !orld !ar II foug)t not only (it) ideological and /atriotic 6eal &ut also (it) t)e kno(ledge t)at t)ey struggled for t)eir e-istence. Back

(he Strategic -nvelo'ments of the 7=@7 Cam'aign in )ussia

0)e *er%ans and Russians eac) dis/osed t)eir forces in t)ree ar%y grou/s. 0)e *er%ans clearly )ad t)e &etter leaders. In t)e nort) t)e aristocratic 'ield Mars)al ,ee& faced Mars)al Voros)ilo+7 &ot) (ere +eterans of !orld !ar I &ut Voros)ilo+s &ackground (as (it) t)e (ar %inistry and in /olitical /artici/ation3 ,ee&s3 t)e successful co%%and of an ar%y grou/ in 'rance. In t)e centre t)e t)in3 )ard#&itten 'ield Mars)al Bock3 ()o )ad )eaded an ar%y grou/ in &ot) Poland and 'rance3 %et t)e a&lest of t)e Russians3 Mars)al 0i%os)enko. In t)e sout) *er%anys &est leader3 'ield Mars)al Runstedt3 confronted Russias (eakest3 t)e colourful !orld !ar I ca+alry%an Mars)al Budenny3 noted %ore for )is i%/osing %oustac)e t)an )is a&ility to )ead an ar%y grou/. 0)e *er%an ad+antage in trained3 tested3 and co%/etent co%%anders e-tended do(n to t)e /latoon and s.uad le+el. t t)e a/e- &ot) "itler and Stalin e-ercised su/re%e co%%and3 aided &y good3 t)oug) on t)e Russian side inade.uately /re/ared3 staffs. s c)ief of staff3 Stalin )ad t)e decisi+e3 /erce/ti+e3 and inno+ati+e *eorgi P)uko+. !orld !ar I ca+alry%an turned ar%our e-/ert3 P)uko+ )ad %ade )is re/utation &y )is classic +ictory o+er t)e 8a/anese at 9)alkin *ol in 1@?@. "e li+ed u/ to )is early /ro%ise and &eca%e Stalins indis/ensa&le ad+isor and )is co%%ander in critical situations. But considering t)e strategic ca/a&ilities t)e *er%ans )ad e-)i&ited in 'rance3 Stalin3 in +ie( of t)e i%%ense s/ace at )is dis/osal3 (ould )a+e dis/layed %ore (isdo% )ad )e not concentrated )is forces so near t)e *er%an frontier.

42C

0)e *er%ans &egan t)eir offensi+e ca%/aign on 8une 22nd 1@413 t)e (eakest of t)e t)ree ar%y grou/s dri+ing nort)east to(ard ,eningrad3 t)e strongest east in t)e direction of Mosco(3 and t)e t)ird sout)east into t)e le+el3 fertile3 agricultural area of t)e 4kraine and east(ard to(ard t)e industrial region nort) of t)e $ri%ea. 0)ey )ad di+ided t)eir t)irty#t)ree Pan6er and %otorised di+isions into four grou/s3 assigning one eac) to t)e nort)ern and sout)ern ar%y grou/s and t(o to t)e central ar%y grou/3 ()ic) /osted one on eac) flank. 'acing an unde/loyed ene%y3 tactically sur/rised3 t)e t(o %ec)anised grou/s in t)e centre ad+anced nearly 2>> %iles in fi+e days3 %eeting at Minsk7 toget)er (it) t)e infantry %arc)ing in t)eir (ake3 t)ey encircled )uge Russian forces. lt)oug) )alf of t)e Russians esca/ed t)roug) t)e necessarily t)in lilies of t)e encircling forces3 t)e *er%ans took ?>>3>>> /risoners and ca/tured 23<>> tanks and 134>> artillery /ieces. 0)e *er%ans )ad (on a +ictory o+er t)e Russians co%/ara&le to t)at o+er t)e nglo#'renc) allies a year earlier. 0)ey )ad ac)ie+ed t)is (it)out analogous strategic sur/rise or a /osition si%ilar to t)at ()ic) t)ey )ad t)e year &efore on t)e flank of t)e allied ar%y in Belgiu%. 0)ey )ad acco%/lis)ed +ictory &y an e-/loitation of t)e tactically offensi+e .ualities of t)e tank and t)e strategically offensi+e ca/a&ilities of t)e Pan6er and %otorised di+isions. "a+ing co%/leted t)is o/eration3 t)e *er%ans /ro%/tly re/eated it3 dri+ing o+er 1>> %iles fart)er east3 ca/turing S%olensk3 and surrounding anot)er large Russian force &y 8uly 2=t). But at t)is /oint t)e ad+ance )ad to )alt for logistic reasons. lt)oug) t)e *er%ans dre( a large /art of t)eir su&sistence fro% t)e Russian countryside3 t)ey de/ended on %otor trucks to /ro+ide t)e )uge .uantities of a%%unition and t)e fuel t)at t)eir %otorised ar%ies re.uired. 0)e *er%ans )ad only enoug) trucks to su//ly t)e troo/s as far as S%olensk3 a situation aggra+ated &y t)e consu%/tion of fuel and a%%unition in resisting Russian counterattacks. Before t)e ar%y could resu%e its ad+ance3 t)e *er%ans )ad to restore rail(ay ser+ice3 a task co%/licated not Dust &y )a+ing to re&uild &ridges &ut also &y t)e necessity of altering Russian rail(ays to t)e narro(er *er%an gauge. 0)is c)ore3 and t)e o/eration of ca/tured seg%ents of Russian railroads3 /ro+ed )arder t)an antici/ated. 0)eir rail(ay troo/s3 inade.uate in any case3 encountered une-/ected o&stacles in suc) %undane %atters as (ater tank locations and t)e need to c)ange t)e gauges of sidings as (ell as t)e %ain lines. By/assed grou/s of Russian soldiers and ar%ed3 )ostile ci+ilians also caused /ro&le%s. 0)roug)out t)e su%%er and autu%n t)e failure of rail traffic to a//roac) needs )alted and delayed t)e *er%an ad+ance. !)ile t)e central ar%y grou/ gained suc) significant strategic +ictories3 t)e ar%y grou/ in t)e nort) initially %ade ra/id /rogress3 ad+ancing 4>> %iles &y t)e %iddle of 8uly. But t)e %o+e to(ard ,eningrad t)en )alted3 not only for logistic reasons &ut also &ecause of t)e /articular difficulties in t)e )ea+ily forested area of nort)ern Russia. "ere t)e tanks /ro+ed so ineffecti+e t)at t)e *er%an co%%and (it)dre( t)e %ec)anised grou/ in Se/te%&er. !it)out tanks t)e (ar in t)e nort) ca%e to rese%&le !orld !ar I3 and e+en e-ce/tional *er%an tactical skill could not ca/ture ,eningrad against t)e /o(er of t)e defence3 Russian deter%ination3 and t)e lack of any a%&iguity as to t)eir strategic o&Decti+e. In t)e sout)3 against t)e greater nu%&ers of t)e Russian ar%ies t)ere3 t)e *er%ans3 (it) t)e aid of t)eir Ro%anian and "ungarian allies3 /roceeded slo(ly in s/ite of t)e &etter terrain for tanks. But &y early ugust t)ey )ad encircled a large &ody of Russian troo/s and )ad reac)ed t)e 1nie/er Ri+er. 0)is ad+ance and t)at on t)e nort) to S%olensk )ad created a Russian salient e-tending as far east as 9ie+. 4sing one of t)e %ec)anised grou/s fro% t)e central ar%y grou/ to dri+e sout) and t)at fro% t)e sout)ern ar%y grou/ to dri+e nort)3 t)e *er%ans &roke t)roug) in late ugust and enclosed a )uge Russian force. In s/ite of counterattacks and t)eir o(n efforts to esca/e3 t)e Russians lost /art of fi+e ar%ies to t)e *er%ans ()o )ad taken o+er =>>3>>> /risoners &y t)e end of Se/te%&er. 42B

!)ile t)is &rilliantly successful o/eration took /lace3 t)e *er%ans so i%/ro+ed t)e su//ly situation of t)e central ar%y grou/ t)at3 strengt)ened to se+enty di+isions and (it) t)ree of t)e four %ec)anised grou/s3 it &egan a dri+e to(ard Mosco( at t)e end of Se/te%&er. gain &reaking t)roug) and sending for(ard t(o %ec)anised grou/s3 t)e *er%ans once %ore surrounded a large nu%&er of Russian troo/s ()en t)ey reac)ed Vya6%a on 5cto&er Bt). :et t)e li.uidation of t)ese stu&&ornly resisting forces and t)e ca/ture of an additional =>>3>>> /risoners took until t)e end of 5cto&er. 0)e ad+ance to Mosco(3 )o(e+er3 %eant long lines of road trans/ortation3 a situation aggra+ated &y t)e %ud of t)e /redo%inantly unsurfaced Russian roads. 4nlike (ealt)y and densely /o/ulated 'rance3 Russia )ad fe( surfaced roads3 and t)e in+ading ar%ies soon (ore t)ese out. 4ntil free6ing te%/eratures solidified t)e %ud3 %otor trans/ort encountered al%ost insu/era&le difficulties. nd t)e frost3 ()ic) ca%e early in No+e%&er and arri+ed in one area (it) a sudden dro/ to four degrees &elo( 6ero 'a)ren)eit3 co%/ounded t)e /ro&le%s of t)e still /oorly functioning rail(ays3 free6ing (ater /i/es on at least t(o#t)irds of t)e *er%an loco%oti+es. So a dra%atic decrease in rail trans/ortation offset i%/ro+ed road conditions. Ne+ert)eless3 t)e *er%ans /us)ed on to(ard Mosco( and3 dro+e &eyond t)e 1nie/er in t)e sout). But in early 1ece%&er t)ey %et strong Russian counterattacks3 coordinated &y P)uko+3 ()ic) t)reatened t)e flanks of t)e forces near Mosco(. 0)ese3 and counterattacks along t)e ()ole front3 co%/elled t)e *er%ans to assu%e t)e defensi+e during t)e (inter and caused t)e% to lose so%e ground to t)e Russians ()o3 dri+en &ack on t)eir intact rail(ays3 )ad sufficient su//lies and &etter strategic %o&ility. 0)e *er%an troo/s lacked ade.uate /ro+ision for (inter ca%/aigning3 a condition intensified &y t)e ina&ility of t)eir deficient trans/ort to su//ly s/ecial clot)ing and e.ui/%ent. In 1@41 t)e *er%ans3 a//lying a co%&at strategy3 )ad attained &rilliant tactical and strategic successes ()en t)ey )ad encircled se+eral %aDor Russian ar%ies. In fact3 /iercing a front3 a relati+ely easy task (it) an a+erage of only a&out one di+ision for eac) si- %iles of front3 al%ost ine+ita&ly led to a strategic disaster for t)e Russians ()ose troo/s could not retreat on foot as ra/idly as %otorised forces led &y tanks could ad+ance into t)e Russian rear. 5nly a large reser+e of Russian %otorised forces could )a+e &locked t)e ad+ance of t)e *er%an %ec)anised forces or counterattacked on t)eir +ulnera&le flanks. 0)e Russian co%%and )ad neit)er t)e understanding nor t)e ca/acity to create and use t)ese a//ro/riately.

German Su((esses at Mins$5 Smolens$5 and =ya1ma Back

42@

0)e *er%ans )ad dis/layed su/er& tactical and o/erational skills3 ()ic) )ad co%/letely o+er%atc)ed t)e ine-/erienced3 often &u%&ling leaders)i/ of t)e Russian ar%ies. But3 as in 'rance3 t)e *er%ans %et un/leasant sur/rises fro% ene%y %ateriel. In one case3 early in t)e ca%/aign of r%y *rou/ Nort)3 a %otionless Russian 4C#ton 9V tank co%%anded t)e road used &y *er%an su//ly +e)icles. 0o eli%inate t)is road&lock t)e *er%ans &roug)t u/ successi+ely a do6en of t)eir ne( <>#%illi%eter antitank guns3 a (ea/on (it) tri/le t)e /o(er of t)e ?C#%illi%eter gun t)at )ad /ro+en so ineffectual against 'renc) tanks. Not only did t)ese /ro+e una&le to /ierce t)e t)ick ar%our of t)e 9V3 &ut t)e Russian tank used its turret#%ounted C=#%illi%eter cannon to s%as) all t(el+e of t)e antitank guns firing on it and3 &efore it could fire a single s)ot3 a +ery /o(erful &ut +ulnera&le BB#%illi%eter antiaircraft gun. 0)e *er%ans ulti%ately fired on t)e tank fro% &e)ind (it) ar%our#/iercing a%%unition fro% anot)er antiaircraft gun. :et t)e already co%&at#)oned skills of t)e *er%ans usually co%/ensated for Russian /re/onderance in nu%&ers or .uality of %ateriel. 0)is /ro+ed e.ually true of t)e air force3 ()ere tactical sur/rise ena&led t)e *er%ans to (reck enor%ous nu%&ers of Russian aircraft on t)e ground. Ne+ert)eless3 t)ese losses of aircraft cost t)e Russians fe( of t)eir trained /ilots3 an i%/ortant factor &ecause t)e Russians (ere /roducing ne( )ig)#/erfor%ance fig)ters and &o%&ers at a greater rate t)an t)e *er%ans. By t)e end of 1@41 &ot) sides )ad lost )ea+ily3 and eac) )ad only a&out 13<>> aircraft o/erational. But t)e Russian air force reco+ered its strengt) %ore ra/idly and ca%e to )a+e a steadily increasing /ri%acy as it aug%ented its greater nu%&ers (it) i%/ro+ed aircraft and skill de+elo/ed in co%&at. 0)e Russians suffered a&out ?3>>>3>>> casualties in t)e 1@41 ca%/aign co%/ared to a&out B>>3>>> for t)e *er%ans. 0)e loss of B>>3>>> %en )ad dou&tless offset t)e *er%an gain in effecti+eness t)roug) additional co%&at e-/erience ()ereas t)e Russians ()o )ad sur+i+ed )ad learned +alua&le lessons and gained /ractical e-/erience and a gras/ of t)e *er%an tactical and strategic %et)od. !)en t)e *er%ans &egan t)e ca%/aign3 t)ey already )ad suc) a )ig) le+el of skill3 and t)e Russians so co%/arati+ely little /roficiency t)at t)e Russians ine+ita&ly &enefited far %ore fro% t)e fig)ting t)an t)e *er%ans.

4?>

0)oroug)ly organised Russian /roduction re/laced t)e guns and tanks in s/ite of factories forfeited to t)e *er%ans3 and t)e )uge /o/ulation still under Russian rule %eant Stalin could raise ne( ar%ies to re/lace t)ose destroyed. Most of t)e officers and %en of t)e ne( forces lacked e-/erience and ade.uate training3 &ut t)e )ig)er co%%anders3 ()o re/laced t)ose relie+ed for failure3 )ad a good understanding of t)e kind of (arfare t)e *er%ans )ad /erfected in 'rance and /racticed so (ell against t)e Russians. s t)e Russian co%%anders i%/ro+ed in a&ility3 t)e *er%ans &egan to lose t)e ad+antage t)ey )ad )ad (it) t)eir co%%anders. In fact3 t)e sa%e situation e-isted (it) t)e troo/s: sur+i+ing co%&at ga+e troo/s e-/erience and skills. !)en t)ey )ad t)eir greatest /redo%inance in t)e su%%er and fall of 1@413 t)e +ast si6e of t)e t)eatre of o/erations3 ()ic) )ad ena&led t)e Russians to retreat and to use ne(ly created units to strengt)en ne( fronts3 defeated t)e *er%ans &ecause of t)e logistical li%itations of t)eir ar%ies. century earlier e+en suc) gigantic ar%ies3 if in %otion in a country as large and (ell /o/ulated as Russia in 1@413 could /ro&a&ly )a+e found enoug) food and forage to )a+e li+ed off t)e country. But t)e fuel and a%%unition re.uire%ents of t)e *er%an %otorised forces %eant t)at t)ey )ad ulti%ately to de/end on t)e railroads for su//ly. 0)e continuation of o/erations in t)e (inter3 ()ic) /recluded dis/ersal to (inter .uarters3 also aggra+ated *er%an su//ly /ro&le%s. 1uring t)e su%%er and autu%n t)e need to reconstruct t)e railroads to su//ly t)e trucks3 ()ic) could su//ort t)e %ec)anised grou/s a&out ?>> %iles &eyond t)e rail)ead3 %eant t)at t)e *er%ans (ould )a+e )ad to ad+ance in a series of &ounds3 e+en if t)e %ud of t)e /ri%iti+e Russian roads )ad not in)i&ited t)eir %o+e%ent3 Dust as it )ad t)e )orse#dra(n trans/ort of t)e ar%ies of earlier ti%es. 0)us3 logistics circu%scri&ed t)e de/t) of *er%an /enetration in 1@41 and )ence li%ited t)e nu%&er of strategic encircle%ents t)at t)e *er%ans could e-ecute. Back

(he +ebacle of the German "ogistic Strategy of 7=@9 and the Conclusion of the )usso-German War
$o%&at strategy failed to &ring a decision in t)e +ast s/aces of 2uro/ean Russia3 and in 1@42 t)e *er%ans turned to a logistic strategy. Planning to use t)eir o/erational /ri%acy to carry out a dee/ ad+ance3 t)ey ai%ed to occu/y t)e Russian oil#/roducing areas in t)e region &et(een t)e Black and $as/ian seas. !it)out fuel and lu&ricants3 t)e Russian ar%ies (ould )a+e to re+ert to t)e su//ly and co%&at ca/a&ilities of a !orld !ar I ar%y3 lea+ing t)e *er%ans to enDoy t)e ad+antages of a %ono/oly of air3 ar%oured3 and %otorised forces &y 1@4?. In t)e /rocess t)e *er%ans (ould aug%ent t)eir o(n inade.uate stock of /etroleu%3 an o&Decti+e t)at actually )ad greater /riority (it) t)e *er%an co%%and t)an t)e i%/act of t)e sei6ure of t)e oil fields on t)e Russians. 0)e *er%ans did not &egin t)eir o/eration until 8une 1@423 &ecause t)ey )ad to reinforce t)eir ar%ies (it) %en and %ateriel to re/lace t)e losses of t)e /re+ious year and t)ose sustained co%&ating t)e Russian (inter and s/ring attacks. Since t)ey )ad )eld %ost of t)eir territorial gains in Russia3 t)ey did &egin t)eir offensi+e in a good /osition. 0)ey )ad acco%/lis)ed t)is &y a&andoning t)e conce/t of t)e continuous front3 ()ic) (as difficult to sustain (it) suc) a lo( ratio of force to s/ace. Instead t)ey &locked co%%unications routes (it) large3 )ea+ily fortified3 and +irtually i%/regna&le strong /oints fro% ()ic) t)ey could counterattack t)e flanks of Russian forces t)at /us)ed &et(een t)e%. 0)ose strong /oints t)at t)e Russians surrounded3 t)e *er%ans su//lied &y air. 0)is syste% of defence )ad so%et)ing in co%%on (it) t)at of fortified cities in t)e Net)erlands in t)e si-teent) and se+enteent) centuries3 ()ic) usually succeeded in t)(arting t)e offensi+e efforts of suc) co%%anders as l&a3 Par%a3 ,u-e%&ourg3 and Marl&oroug). In 8une a *er%an %ec)anised ar%y dro+e for(ard to t)e 1on Ri+er at Vorone6) and turned sout) ()ile anot)er ar%y3 fart)er sout)3 /us)ed east(ard and t)en also turned sout). 0)ese ad+ances en+elo/ed so%e Russians &ut not as %any as in 1@41. 0)e %ec)anised forces t)en /us)ed sout) to(ard t)e oil fields ()ile foot#%arc)ing troo/s %o+ed sout)east along t)e 1on to guard t)e flank

4?1

of t)e /rinci/al dri+e. By early ugust t)e %ec)anised forces )ad crossed 4>> %iles o+er le+el3 treeless terrain and )ad reac)ed t)e li%it of t)eir /us) until t)e *er%ans could reo/en t)e rail(ays for t)eir o(n use. 0)e %ec)anised forces )eading to t)e oil fields %ade so%e additional /rogress in t)e ensuing %ont)s3 &ut strong Russian resistance3 aided &y t)e tactical and strategic attacks of /o(erful &o%&er forces3 li%ited t)is *er%an dri+e. 0)e terrain also assisted t)e Russians3 t)e %ountainous to/ogra/)y of t)e $aucasus region in)i&iting t)e a&ility of t)e tanks to turn strong /oints and an area of forested %ountains /ro+iding an effecti+e s)ield for t)e *ro6ny oil fields. Mean()ile3 t)e *er%an forces guarding t)e flank )ad /assed t)e 1on and reac)ed t)e Volga near Stalingrad. "itler3 ()o increasingly e-ercised %ore control o+er *er%an o/erations3 %ade a /oint of t)e ca/ture of Stalingrad3 ()ic) lay on t)e (est &ank of t)e &road Volga. 0)e Russian co%%and %ade an e.ual /oint of )olding it3 and "itlers decision led to t)e co%%it%ent of large *er%an reser+es to attack t)e city3 a natural fortress since its %any %asonry &uildings lost none of t)eir +alue as fortifications or o&stacles ()en artillery fire or &o%&s )ad de%olis)ed t)e%. 0)e city itself lay on t)e (est &ank of t)e Volga Ri+er near t)e end of its 23<>>#%ile descent to t)e $as/ian Sea. 0)e ina&ility of t)e *er%ans to force a crossing of t)is for%ida&le o&stacle /rotected Stalingrads flanks. 0)is a&sor/tion of *er%an reser+es in an una+ailing effort to o+erco%e Stalingrad only accentuated t)e (eakness of t)e ()ole *er%an /lan3 an e-/ansion of t)e front and t)e creation of a ?>>#%ile#long flank fro% Vorone6) to Stalingrad. 0)e lengt)ening of t)e front co%/elled t)e *er%ans to )old t)is long flank of t)eir e-tended ad+ance (it) allied "ungarian3 Italian3 and Ro%anian troo/s. 0)ese forces lacked t)e /roficiency of t)eir *er%an counter/arts and did not )a+e t)e nu%&ers necessary for t)e task7 one di+ision )ad to )old a front of forty %iles. 0)e Russian co%%and3 noting t)is (eakness and finding t)e /oints of *er%an concentration .uite o&+ious3 %o+ed u/ its reser+es to /ositions along t)e 1on and sout) of Stalingrad. !it) "itler o&li+ious to t)is trans/arent %anoeu+re3 t)e Russian reser+es3 (it) t)e &rilliant and e-/erienced P)uko+ in co%%and3 attacked on No+e%&er 1@t) and 2>t)3 o+er()el%ing t)e Ro%anians on t)e nort) of Stalingrad and &reaking t)roug) t)e t)in *er%an line on t)e sout). 5n No+e%&er 1?t) t)e en+elo/ing %ec)anised forces %et &e)ind t)e *er%ans still &esieging Stalingrad. !)ile t)ese Russian forces stood on t)e defensi+e to kee/ t)e *er%ans fro% retreating3 a second grou/ dro+e in to create a ne( line to t)e (est(ard to fend off relief efforts. 0)e Russians )ad created strategic defensi+e lines of circu%+allation and contra+allations3 %uc) as t)e *er%ans )ad done on t)eir dri+e to t)e sea in 'rance and )ad e%/loyed against surrounded Russian forces t)e /re+ious year. 8ust as all unsuccessful *er%an relief offensi+e &egan in %id#1ece%&er3 t)e Russians unleas)ed anot)er offensi+e on t)e 1on east of Vorone6)3 ()ic) o+er()el%ed t)e t)in line of Italian defenders3 &ut failed to reac) t)e Black Sea and t)us turn &ot) t)e *er%an ar%ies still near t)e oil fields and t)ose seeking to o/en a route to t)e Stalingrad forces. 1es/ite furt)er Russian offensi+e efforts3 ()ic) %iscarried in /art &ecause of t)eir distance fro% t)eir o(n rail)eads3 t)e *er%ans near t)e oil fields %anaged to e-tricate t)e%sel+es. But t)e *er%an ar%y at Stalingrad could not esca/e and surrendered at t)e end of 8anuary 1@4?. 0)e *er%ans )ad tried to su//ly t)e tra//ed ar%y &y air &ut only lost %any of t)eir trans/ort aircraft to Russian fig)ters. 0)e *er%ans )ad lost a&out ?>>3>>> %en to t)e initial Russian counteroffensi+e3 one ()ic) e-/loited t)e (eakness of t)e *er%an /osition at Stalingrad3 and %any %ore /risoners as a result of t)e su&se.uent Russian offensi+es t)at took ad+antage of t)e un(ise *er%an ad+ance so far into sout)ern Russia. 2+en if t)e long flank along t)e 1on )ad not %ade t)e *er%an /osition )o/elessly e-/osed to strategic disaster3 t)e great e-tension of t)e *er%an front )ad so attenuated t)eir forces in relation to t)e lengt) of t)e line as to de/ri+e t)e% of t)e a&ility to use t)e /o(er of

4?2

t)e defence in anyt)ing a//ro-i%ating a continuous front. 0)e *er%an t)inly )eld line (ould )a+e little /o(er of resistance3 and any Russian attack (ould )a+e e-)i&ited its +ulnera&ility to /enetration and e-/loitation &y %ec)anised forces. fter (it)dra(ing during t)e (inter of 1@42#4? Gin t)e face of Russian offensi+esH to t)e starting line of t)eir 1@41 offensi+e3 t)e *er%ans atte%/ted to /inc) out a Russian salient at 9ursk in 8uly 1@4?. But since t)e Russians )ad /re/ared ela&orate entrenc)%ents and %inefields to defend against t)is o&+ious %o+e and )eld i%%ense reser+es at )and3 t)e offensi+e failed (it) )ea+y *er%an losses. &attle in ()ic) counterattacking Russian ar%our %et attacking *er%an ar%our resulted in co%&at in+ol+ing t)ousands of tanks. 0)ereafter3 *er%an#Russian o/erations took t)e for% of a series of Russian offensi+es in ()ic) %ec)anised forces %ade dee/ /enetrations until co%/elled to sto/ &y an ad+ance too far fro% t)eir rail)eads. ,ong )alts to re&uild co%%unications follo(ed eac) for(ard %o+e%ent. In s/ite of gro(ing *er%an (eakness3 increasing Russian skill3 and t)e /ro+ision of %any trucks &y t)e 4nited States3 t)e Russians ne+er succeeded in %aking any strategic en+elo/%ents of *er%an forces .uite co%/ara&le to t)ose t)at t)e *er%ans )ad carried out against t)e Russians in 1@41. Still3 t)e ar%oured and t)e %otorised di+ision )ad /rofoundly altered (arfare3 ()ic) still su/erficially see%ed to rese%&le !orld !ar I. ,arge concentrations of artillery and infantry attacks /layed a %aDor role in t)e Russian &reakt)roug)s conducted in t)e sa%e fas)ion as in !orld !ar I. But at t)at /oint t)e %ec)anised forces e-/loited t)e tactical success to %o+e for(ard as far as 4>> %iles. !it)out t)e %o&ility of ()eels and tracks3 %any of t)e ad+ances %ig)t (ell )a+e gone no fart)er t)an t)ose of t)e earlier (orld (ar. 0)e greater strengt) and %o&ility of t)e attacking %ec)anised forces co%/elled t)e *er%ans to fall &ack until a co%&ination of t)eir reser+es on t)e defensi+e3 counterattacks3 and full e-tension of t)e Russian line of %otorised co%%unication forced a )alt. Back

+istraction. Concentration. and (urning Movement #gain, (he "anding and Cam'aign in Normandy
!)en t)e Britis) returned to 'rance in 1@443 in co%/any (it) forces fro% t)e 4nited States of %erica and under an %erican general3 t)e organisation of t)e nglo %erican ar%ies and t)eir strategy confor%ed to t)e %odel /ioneered &y t)e *er%ans in 1@4> and a//lied &y t)e *er%ans and Russians. 0)e nglo# %erican allies )ad to lea+e Britain &y s)i/ and go as)ore on t)e defended coast of 'rance3 a %onu%ental logistical task in+ol+ing <3>>> s)i/s and re.uiring a large nu%&er of s/ecialised landing +essels and t)e su&se.uent construction of artificial )ar&ours on t)e 'renc) coast. !it) forty#fi+e di+isions a+aila&le3 t)e allies faced fifty#eig)t3 %ostly (eaker3 *er%an di+isions3 of ()ic) )alf consisted of i%%o&ile fortress di+isions and ten (ere under strengt) Pan6er di+isions. lt)oug) co%%and of t)e sea ga+e t)e nglo# %erican in+aders t)e sa%e strategic ad+antage of t)e initiati+e t)e Persians )ad enDoyed in t)e Marat)on ca%/aign and t)e 8a/anese )ad in t)eir landing to &esiege Port rt)ur3 t)ey could not %ake an untra%%elled c)oice &ecause t)e soldiers did not (is) to forego t)e /rotection offered &y t)eir fig)ter aircraft &ased in 2ngland. Ne+ert)eless3 &ecause of t)eir landing craft and /refa&ricated )ar&ours3 t)ey could e%ulate t)e Persians and land on t)e &eac)es. By effecti+e security %easures3 t)e allies ke/t t)eir /lans and dis/ositions secret. 0)ey created a +alua&le distraction &y using a radio net to fa&ricate t)e i%/ression of large forces in sout)#eastern 2ngland o//osite t)e 'renc) coast around $alais. 0)is di+ersion successfully confused t)e *er%an )ig) co%%and and aided t)e nglo# %erican landing furt)er (est.

4??

0)e *er%an co%%and could not agree on ()et)er to guard t)e coast )ea+ily or )old &ack large reser+es to concentrate against t)e landing area in a counterattack. 'ield Mars)al Ro%%el3 ()o )ad distinguis)ed )i%self in Nort) frican ca%/aigns3 )ad i%%ediate c)arge of t)e defence7 )e &elie+ed t)at t)e +astly &etter ene%y air forces could +irtually i%%o&ilise )is reser+es and c)ose to concentrate on /rotecting t)e coast. But ()en t)e attack ca%e on 8une =t) 1@443 *er%an troo/s /ro+ed inade.uate to /re+ent t)e dise%&arkations along a forty#%ile section of s)oreline &et(een t)e /orts of ,e "a+re and $)er&ourg. nd ()en *er%an reser+es arri+ed3 t)ey lacked t)e necessary strengt) to dri+e t)e allies &ack into t)e (ater. But t)ey did contain t)e in+ading forces after t)ey )ad esta&lis)ed a line stretc)ing 1>> %iles (est(ard fro% t)e coast near $aen to t)e sea and e%&racing $)er&ourgs /eninsula and t)e /ort itself3 ()ic) fell to t)e allies at t)e end of 8une. 0)e Britis) and $anadians )eld t)e eastern end of t)is line3 t)e %ericans t)e (estern. In early 8uly t)e nglo# %erican#$anadian ar%ies )ad t)irty#four di+isions7 t)e *er%ans )ad /ro&a&ly a t)ird as %uc) strengt) distri&uted in s%aller di+isions. 0)us t)e *er%ans )ad a lo( ratio of force to t)e lengt) of t)e front t)ey )eld. lt)oug) t)e )uge Britis) and %erican air forces )ad &roken t)e &ridges o+er t)e Seine and ot)er ri+ers and )ad t)us seriously )indered t)e %o+e%ent of *er%an reser+es3 t)e *er%ans could still tra+el &y road and )ad su&stantial nu%&ers of unco%%itted troo/s t)at t)ey )eld &ack on t)e $)annel coast near $alais to resist a feared second landing. So t)e *er%ans tended to t)ink t)at t)e landing in Nor%andy corres/onded to t)e distraction of t)e Persian landing at Marat)on3 ()ereas t)e radio net in 2ngland o//osite $alais3 toget)er (it) ot)er dece/ti+e %easures and *er%an /reconce/tions3 constituted t)e real allied distraction. 0)e *er%ans concentrated a larger nu%&er of %en on t)e eastern end of t)eir line3 ()ere an allied &reakt)roug) could turn t)eir entire /osition &y inter/osing t)e forces &reaking t)roug) &et(een t)e *er%an ar%y and t)eir )o%eland. 0)e e-/erienced *eneral Sir Bernard Montgo%ery3 t)e allied ground force co%%ander3 encouraged t)is concentration &y constant t)reats to $aen. In t)is o/eration t)e arrogant3 contro+ersial3 and .uite ca/a&le Montgo%ery s)o(ed a /erfor%ance e.ual to )is %et)odically gained +ictories against t)e *er%ans and Italians in Nort) frica. 5n 8uly 1Bt)3 after t)e Britis) and %ericans )ad eac) /us)ed for(ard slo(ly against strong o//osition3 Montgo%ery attacked on &ot) sides of $aen3 using in one attack t)ree Britis) ar%oured di+isions. s )ad t)e *er%ans in crossing t)e Meuse at Sedan in 1@4>3 )e su&stituted air &o%&ing for t)e )ea+y artillery &arrage3 23>>> )ea+y and %ediu% &o%&ers deluging a s%all area (it) &o%&s. 0)e noise so deafened t)e *er%ans ()o sur+i+ed t)at t)e Britis) could not interrogate so%e of t)eir /risoners for t(enty#four )ours. But t)e *er%ans )ad too %uc) de/t) in t)eir defensi+e /osition. 0)ey contained t)e assault t)at3 )ad it succeeded3 (ould )a+e sent t)ree ar%oured di+isions and t)e &ulk of t)e nglo#$anadian forces into t)e *er%an rear and into a /osition to &lock a *er%an retreat east. Still it acco%/lis)ed its ot)er /ur/ose O to dra( east(ard &ot) *er%an reser+es near t)e front and distract t)e attention of t)eir )ig) co%%and. 8ust as llen&y in )is Megiddo offensi+e of 1@1B )ad found it easy to con+ince t)e 0urko#*er%an co%%and t)at )e /lanned to attack on t)eir %ost +ulnera&le flank3 so did Montgo%ery )a+e t)e sa%e success in %id#8uly 1@44. 5n 8uly 2< 4.S. forces struck t)e t)inly )eld *er%an /ositions &efore t)e%3 also relying on an air &o%&ard%ent3 ()ic) dro//ed 432>> tons of &o%&s on an area of less t)an fi+e s.uare %iles. 0)e &o%&s dro//ed e.ualled in (eig)t 1C3>>> 1>#inc) s)ells or <>>3>>> s)ells fro% C<#%illi%eter guns and e-ceeded eit)er in /o(er &ecause t)e t)in#(alled &o%&s )eld far %ore e-/losi+es. 0)ree infantry di+isions acco%/lis)ed t)e &reakt)roug) of t)e *er%an /osition3 and one %otorised and t(o ar%oured di+isions /ro%/tly /us)ed t)roug) t)e ga/.

Montgomery"s +istra(tion Back

4?4

4.S. reser+es t)en /oured t)roug) t)e o/ening3 t)ree di+isions3 including t(o ar%oured3 dri+ing (est to(ard Brest and ot)ers going sout) and east. 0)is dis/ersal of force3 largely to ac.uire relati+ely undefended territory and to &esiege (ell garrisoned &ut /otentially significant /orts3 +aried fro% t)e *er%an /ractice3 ()ic) usually concentrated on turning t)e ene%y. :et t)e *er%ans3 alt)oug) t)reatened &y troo/s %o+ing to(ard t)eir rear3 %ounted counterattacks to reac) t)e sea and cut off t)e allies ()o )ad &roken t)roug). nd t)ey succeeded in &ringing reinforce%ents fro% t)e $alais area in s/ite of t)e acti+ity of t)e large and skilful nglo# %erican air forces and acco%/lis)ed t)is &y often li%iting t)eir %o+es to t)e nig)t3 a /ractice t)e 'renc) )ad used in 1@4> to /rotect t)eir %o+e%ents fro% t)e *er%an air/lanes. But t)e %ericans )olding t)e flank of t)e &reakt)roug) /ro+ed too strong on t)e defence3 and ()ile t)ey re/ulsed t)e *er%an counterattack3 t)e Britis) and $anadians %aintained unrelenting /ressure on t)e *er%an troo/s facing nort)(ard3 Dust as t)e %erican di+isions la//ed around t)e o/en flank of t)e counterattacking *er%ans3 reac)ing rgenten &y ugust 1?t). 0)e *er%ans e-tricated t)e%sel+es fro% t)is /ocket created &y t)e %erican turning %o+e%ent3 (it) o+er <>3>>> ca/tured. In s/ite of a +igorous /ursuit and t)e difficulties of crossing t)e Seine (it) allied troo/s rig)t &e)ind t)e% and air forces a&o+e t)e%3 %any esca/ed to t)e 'renc) frontier. Ne+ert)eless3 t)e *er%ans sustained enor%ous losses3 t)e e-tent of ()ic) a Pan6er ar%y re+ealed ()en it re/orted its strengt) at only t(enty#four tanks and 13?>> %en. *er%an casualties in %en fro% t)e landing until t)e end of t)e ca%/aign e-ceeded <>>3>>>. In fact3 allied successes +irtually denuded t)e *er%an frontier of troo/s3 &ut an ad+ance 5f ?>> %iles so stretc)ed su//ly lines3 e+en for t)e )ea+ily %otorised %erican3 Britis)3 and $anadian ar%ies3 t)at t)e *er%ans )ad ti%e to &ring u/ %en to reconstitute t)eir front.

.rea$out and Turning Mo%ement Back

4?<

0)us3 as in t)e /ast3 logistics e-ercised a constant s(ay o+er %ilitary o/erations. Rat)er t)an finding t)e%sel+es tra%%elled &y t)e need to kee/ %o+ing to find su//lies or to a+oid regions already (ell#foraged or of lo( /roducti+ity3 t)ose t)at ac)ie+ed t)e %aDor +ictory in Nor%andy found t)e%sel+es tet)ered &y su//ly lines to a &ase. In fact3 t)e need to o/en /orts to increase unloading ca/acity or to s)orten land co%%unication lines e-ercised an i%/ortant influence o+er strategic decisions %ade a&out su&se.uent o/erations as (ell as /lans for t)is ca%/aign itself. Back

(he 1ritish nauguration of Mounted Warfare in North #frica and the +efeat of the talians
Nort) frica /ro+ided t)e t)eatre for a so%e()at different kind of (arfare. Medie+al in its %ounted c)aracter and use of foot soldiers in fortified strong /oints3 it differed in t)at &ot) sides %ade e-tensi+e use of t)e lig)t ca+alry of t)e air. lo( ratio of force to t)e a+aila&le s/ace also distinguis)ed it fro% t)e (arfare in 2uro/e. 0)e Italians fro% t)eir colony in ,i&ya foug)t t)e Britis) ()o controlled 2gy/t. Mars)al *ra6ini3 ()o )ad dis/layed rut)lessness in )is +ictorious ca%/aigns against ,i&yan insurgents and in t)e 2t)io/ian (ar3 co%%anded t)e %uc) stronger Italians. In *eneral !a+ell t)e Britis) )ad as t)eir co%%ander a %ature3 sc)olarly soldier ()o understood )o( to reconcile )is i%%ense res/onsi&ilities (it) )is %eagre resources. 5/erations &egan in Se/te%&er 1@4> ()en B>3>>> Italians ad+anced a&out eig)ty %iles into 2gy/t to Sidi Barrani3 %eeting only out/osts of t)e Britis) ar%y concentrated (ell to t)e east(ard. 5n reac)ing Sidi Barrani3 t)e Italians )alted and dug in t)eir /redo%inantly infantry force into a grou/ of si- )ea+ily garrisoned strong /oints. !it)out control of t)e sea3 t)e Italians faced su//ly difficulties &ecause of t)e &arrenness of t)e country3 ()ic) included inade.uate (ater su//lies3 and t)eir s)ortage of %otor trans/ort. Neit)er contestant )ad first#class (ea/ons &ecause &ot) countries )ad relegated t)eir o&solete e.ui/%ent to t)e secondary t)eatre of frica. 0)e Britis) )ad ar%oured cars (it) %ac)ine guns only3 and &ot) ad+ersaries )ad si%ilarly ar%ed tankettes. 2ac) also relied on essentially co%/ara&le and .uite out#of#date &i/lane fig)ter aircraft of lo( s/eed and li%ited fire/o(er. 0)e Italian force at Sidi Barrani constituted t)e eastern%ost end of a series of strongly garrisoned Italian /osts t)at e-tended &ack to Beng)a6i3 %ore t)an ?>> %iles inside t)e ,i&yan &order. !)en t)e Britis) recei+ed reinforce%ents3 t)ey deter%ined to attack Sidi Barrani in s/ite of )a+ing only ?>3>>> %en against B>3>>> Italians. But t)e Britis) )ad recei+ed ne( %ono/lane fig)ters3 ()ic) ga+e t)e% air su/re%acy3 and fifty Matilda infantry su//ort tanks. t t(enty#si- tons3 t(ice as )ea+y as t)e &est Italian tank3 t)e fifteen#%ile#an#)our Matilda )ad essentially in+ulnera&le ?#inc) ar%our and %ounted a 4>#%illinieter antitank gun of e-ce/tional /o(er. More i%/ortant3 t)e Britis) )ad no foot#%arc)ing infantry3 t)eir forces consisting of only an ar%oured di+ision and a %otorised di+ision. *eneral !a+ell ga+e full latitude in carrying out t)is o/eration to )is su&ordinate3 t)e aggressi+e yet /rudent *eneral 5$onnor. Making a %oonlit %arc) across t)e desert in early 1ece%&er 1@4>3 5$onnors t(o di+isions %o+ed around t)e Italian fortified /ositions3 /assing Dust nort) of t)e outer%ost of t)ese. 0)e ar%oured di+ision reac)ed t)e coast easily in t)e %orning ()ere it o+erca%e a )ea+ily defended /ost t(enty %iles &e)ind t)e Italian /osition at Sidi Barrani. Mean()ile3 t)e infantry di+ision3 su//orted &y t)e Matilda tanks and field artillery3 struck t)e Italian Sidi Barrani strong /oints fro% t)e rear. 0urned3 caug)t una(are3 de%oralised &y attacks fro% t)eir rear3 and deficient in antitank guns3 t)e Italians surrendered 4>3>>> %en and 4>> guns.

4?=

Sur/rised &y and unready for t)eir easy +ictory3 t)e Britis) did not resu%e t)eir ad+ance until early 8anuary. 0)en 5$onnor re/eated )is turning %o+e%ent around t)e sout)ern flank against t)e Italians dug in to defend a /ass along t)e coast3 ca/turing 12@ tanks3 4<3>>> /risoners3 and 4=2 guns. si%ilar %anoeu+re later in t)e %ont) against t)e ne-t fort yielded ?>3>>> /risoners and BC tanks. t t)is /oint t)e Britis)3 t)eir forces %uc) de/leted &y %ec)anical &reakdo(ns and co%&at losses3 sent %ost of t)e re%aining ar%oured force (est to )ead off t)e retreat of t)e last Italians in eastern ,i&ya.

.ritish Turn Sidi .arrani Back

Sending in ad+ance a faster force of untracked +e)icles3 co%/osed of so%e ar%oured cars3 a fe( infantry in trucks3 and a s%all nu%&er of to(ed field and antitank guns3 5$onnors s%all ad+ance force reac)ed t)e coastal road a)ead of t)e Italians. Since t)e Italians )ad naturally concentrated t)eir strengt) at t)e rear of t)eir retreating colu%n3 t)e s%all Britis) contingent )eld u/ t)e Italians until t)eir tanks arri+ed. lt)oug) t)ey )ad used u/ t)eir Matilda tanks3 t)ey )ad a fe( fast3 t)inly ar%oured tanks also e.ui//ed (it) t)e /o(erful 4>#%illi%eter gun. 0)ese took /ositions &e)ind t)e crests of )ills3 ()ere t)ey could fire at t)e Italian tanks on t)e coastal )ig)(ay (it)out e-/osing any /art &ut t)e turret. 0)e ?3>>> %en in t)e Britis) %ec)anised force ca/tured 1>3>>> /risoners and 12> tanks. In t)is o/eration t)e infantry in trucks and t)e to(ed artillery and antitank guns /layed t)e %edie+al role of s/ear%en ()o %ounted t)e%sel+es on nags for strategic %o&ility &ut foug)t on foot. 0)e tanks3 ()en t)ey took u/ /ositions t)at e-/osed only t)eir turrets3 &e)a+ed in a %anner analogous to %edie+al ca+alry dis%ounted to fig)t as )ea+y infantry. In t)is instance3 t)e tanks functioned as e%/laced antitank guns. In catc)ing t)e Italians as t)ey atte%/ted to %ake t)eir (ay along t)e coast road3 t)e Britis) )ad /ressed t)e% against t)e sea as (ell as &locked t)eir retreat3 t)us e+en gi+ing so%et)ing of a %edie+al c)aracter to t)e turning %o+e%ent. 0)is o/eration )as /arallels not Dust (it) llen&ys ca%/aign and t)e 'renc) %otorised %o+e%ent in Morocco &ut also (it) t)e role of ca+alry in *rants successful /ursuit of ,ee to //o%atto-. 0)e su% of t)eir series of defeats inflicted on t)e Italians re/resented a stu/endous +ictory for ?>3>>> %en o+er an ar%y %any ti%es its si6e (it) co%/ara&le (ea/ons. lt)oug) t)e Britis) suffered less t)an 23>>> casualties3 t)e Italians lost 1?>3>>> as /risoners3 nearly 4>> tanks3 and o+er B>> guns. :et t)e &ulk of t)e Italian losses consisted of infantry fitted out (it) rifles3 %ac)ine guns3 and artillery3 a force (ell ada/ted to t)e siege (arfare conditions of !orld !ar I &ut of li%ited +alue t)e %ounted conflict t)at t)e Britis) )ad inaugurated. lt)oug) t)e Italians )ad %ore tanks t)an t)e Britis)3 t)ey ne+er concentrated t)e% nor se/arated t)e% fro% t)eir foot soldiers to e-/loit t)eir %o&ility3 as did t)e Britis). 0)e Italians did not concentrate t)eir antitank guns3 effecti+e against t)e t)in ar%our of %ost Britis) tanks. 0)e infantry ar%ed after t)e %anner of !orld !ar I )ad /layed a %aDor role in 2uro/e ()ere it denied territory to si%ilarly outfitted ene%y infantry. In Nort) frica3 ()ere t)e sea /rotected one flank3 and t)e ot)er3 in suc) a )uge country3 %ust necessarily re%ain o/en3 suc) infantry see%ed only to co%/licate logistics and /ro+ide casualties in defeat. Back 4?C

(he Warfare of the Mounted 1ritish and German #rmies

No sooner )ad t)e Britis) dri+en &ack t)e Italians and transferred so%e troo/s to anot)er t)eatre t)an *er%an Pan6er and %otorised forces arri+ed to aid t)e Italians3 ()o )ad reinforced t)eir frican ar%y (it) an ar%oured and a %otorised di+ision. ,ed &y *eneral Ro%%el3 ()o )ad distinguis)ed )i%self co%%anding a Pan6er di+ision in 'rance3 t)e *er%ans dro+e t)e sur/rised and unready Britis) &ack nearly to t)e 2gy/tian &order so .uickly t)at t)ey sur/rised and ca/tured *eneral 5$onnor. stale%ate ensued as &ot) strengt)ened t)eir ar%ies. *eneral Ro%%el3 ()o dis/layed das)3 daring3 and tactical skill3 controlled t)e o/eration of t)e Italian and *er%an forces. "e faced ca/a&le o//onents ()en t)e go+ern%ent re/laced !a+ell (it) Indias leading soldier3 t)e likea&le &ut /rickly *eneral uc)inleck3 in 1@41 and su//lanted )i% in 1@42 (it) t)e c)ar%ing and confident *eneral le-ander. 0)e Britis) (ere not so fortunate in t)eir o/erational co%%anders3 none nearly %atc)ing 5$onnor until *eneral Montgo%ery recei+ed t)e co%%and in t)e su%%er of 1@41. fter Ro%%els a//oint%ent and initial +ictory t)ere follo(ed an eig)teen#%ont) seesa( struggle in ()ic) *er%an and Italian forces3 largely ar%oured and %otorised3 successfully foug)t t)e usually stronger Britis). 0)e Britis) not only )ad %ore tanks &ut3 on t)e ()ole3 &etter e.ui/%ent. 0)eir ne(3 )ig)er#s/eed tanks )ad 4>#%illinieter ar%our co%/ared (it) t)e ?>#%illi%eter ar%our on *er%an tanks3 and t)eir e-cellent 4>#%iilll%eter tank and antitank guns )ad ar%our /enetrating /o(er co%/ara&le to t)e *er%an <>#%illil%eter gun. 0)e Britis)3 ()o continued to discri%inate &et(een t)eir fast tanks and t)ose designed to acco%/any infantry3 also )ad t)eir Matildas (it) C<# %illi%eter ar%our and a s%aller infantry tank (it) ar%our =<#%illi%eters t)ick. Bot) )ad t)e e-cellent 4>#%illi%eter gun. 0)e Italian tanks3 s%aller t)an t)e Britis) and *er%an3 )ad no %ore s/eed t)an Britis) infantry tanks and lacked t)eir t)ick ar%our. !)en t)e *er%ans i%/ro+ised t)icker ar%our on t)eir tanks and introduced a fe( (it) <>#%illi%eter ar%our3 t)e Britis) ac.uired an %erican 2B#ton tank (it) slo/ed ar%our <C#%illi%eter t)ick. 0)is tanks C<#%illi%eter gun also countered t)e i%/ro+ed <>#%illi%eter gun on a fe( of t)e ne( *er%an tanks. In addition3 t)e *er%ans )ad %ore lig)t tanks (it)out any effecti+e guns. 0)e *er%ans suffered inferiority in antitank guns3 too. Initially t(o#t)irds of t)eir antitank guns consisted of t)e ?C#%illi%eter3 ()ic) )ad /ro+en so inade.uate against t)e 'renc)3 could only /ierce t)e t)inly ar%oured fast Britis) tanks at close range3 and )ad little +alue against t)e slo( Britis) infantry tanks. !)en t)e *er%ans o&tained so%e of a su/erior <>#%illi%eter3 t)e Britis) )ad re#e.ui//ed %any units (it) t)eir ne(3 %ore /o(erful <C#%illi%eter antitank gun. 0)e *er%ans co/ed &y using t)eir BB#%illi%eter antiaircraft gun as an antitank gun. In s/ite of its &ulk3 occasioned &y its %ounting for )ig)#angle fire3 t)ey used it effecti+ely &y careful siting and e%/lace%ent. 0)is /o(erful3 )ig)#+elocity gun3 ()ic) )ad t)e sa%e &ore as one used on t)e I%/erial *er%an na+ys early destroyers3 fired a t(enty#/ound s)ell3 co%/ared (it) t)e 4.1S2# /ound s)ell of t)e <>#%illi%eter antitank gun3 and )ad +ery nearly t)e sa%e rate of fire. 0)e *er%ans )ad no %ono/oly on suc) an antiaircraft gun3 t)e Russians )a+ing an B<#%illi%eter3 t)e 'renc)3 %ericans3 and Italians a @>#%illi%eter3 and t)e Britis) a @4#%illi%eter antiaircraft gun3 all (it) c)aracteristics essentially si%ilar to t)e *er%an gun. But t)e *er%ans in frica )ad a need to %ake t)is e-/edient i%/ro+isation and did so +ery skilfully. In s/ite of great inferiority in nu%&ers and so%e in %ateriel3 t)e *er%ans and Italians )eld t)eir o(n. 0)ey o(ed %uc) of t)eir ac)ie+e%ent to t)e *er%ans first#rate tactical skill3 /articularly t)eir &etter gras/ of t)e i%/ortance of concentration of t)eir tanks and to t)eir a//reciation of t)e su/re%acy of t)e defence. !)ile t)e clic); of attacking and destroying t)e ene%y influenced Britis) doctrine and contri&uted to an al%ost e-clusi+ely offensi+e attitude in t)e Britis) ar%oured forces3 t)e *er%ans kne( )o( to co%&ine t)eir antitank guns (it) t)eir tanks and in+ite Britis) tank attacks against defensi+ely de/loyed tanks and antitank guns. 4?B

'or e-a%/le3 in 8une 1@42 Ro%%els ar%y carried out a turning %o+e%ent around t)e desert flank of t)e Britis) /osition3 a %anoeu+re t)at ty/ified al%ost e+ery offensi+e o/eration on eit)er side. !)en t)e resistance of Britis) tanks /ro+ed too strong to ena&le )i% to reac) t)e coast3 Ro%%el (ent on t)e defensi+e in a /lace t)at still t)reatened Britis) co%%unications. 0)e Britis) res/onded &y trying to dri+e )i% out (it) tank attacks. 0)e *er%ans re/ulsed t)ese (it) a co%&ination of t)e fire of tank and antitank guns. fter a /eriod on t)e defensi+e3 during ()ic) t)e *er%ans )ad inflicted a//alling losses on t)e Britis)3 t)ey could resu%e t)e offensi+e3 co%/lete t)eir turning %o+e%ent3 and dri+e t)e Britis) (ell &ack into 2gy/t. 0)e *er%ans )ad t)us e-/loited (it) t)eir tanks3 aided &y antitank guns3 t)e traditional ad+antage of t)e turning %o+e%ent of i%/osing on t)e turned force t)e disad+antage of assu%ing t)e tactical offensi+e. In t)is case t)e t)reat of co%/leting t)e turning %o+e%ent /ro+ed ade.uate to co%/el t)e Britis) to take t)e offensi+e. nd tanks on t)e defensi+e enDoyed su&stantial &enefits o+er t)ose attacking: t)e defender kne( )is field of fire3 and t)e cre( could gi+e t)eir undi+ided attention to t)e gunnery. In addition3 t)e defending tank al%ost in+aria&ly settled in &eyond t)e crest of a )ill or ridge so t)at it e-/osed only its co%/arati+ely s%all and (ell#ar%oured turret to t)e fire of its co%/letely +isi&le assailants. 0)us tanks on t)e defensi+e )ad t)e &enefit t)at dis%ounted )ea+y ca+alry )ad traditionally enDoyed in defence against a c)arge of %ounted )ea+y ca+alry. 0)e *er%ans3 rat)er t)an t)e Britis) G()o )ad e%/loyed t)is tactic so %asterfully against t)e 'renc) at t)e Battle of $r;cy and in t)eir last turning %o+e%ent against t)e ItaliansH3 %ade t)e %ost e-tensi+e use of t)is tactic of e%/loying tanks on t)e defensi+e3 su//le%ented &y t)e e%/lace%ent of to(ed antitank guns and t)eir for%ida&le BB#%illi%eter antiaircraft guns. 0)e Britis) soon &eca%e (ary of attacking or e+en /ursuing t)e *er%ans and learned to use t)e $r;cy tactic effecti+ely t)e%sel+es. 5n one occasion3 for e-a%/le3 t)e *er%ans o+er()el%ed Britis) defenders3 inflicting ?3>>> casualties3 &ut lost nearly )alf of t)eir tank force in t)e /rocess. ,ike Pyrr)us3 t)ey could not afford %ore suc) +ictories. Infantry /layed a role on t)e entrenc)ed defence3 so%eti%es in lines3 often in an array of strong /oints /re/ared for all#around defence. ntitank guns and field artillery /ro+ided /rotection against t)e tanks3 as did a li&eral use of land %ines. 0o guard one line3 for e-a%/le3 t)e Britis) /lanted <>>3>>> %ines to )alt tanks3 and t)ese defences /ro+ed deadly to *er%an and Italian ar%ies. In /articular3 ade.uate antitank guns s)o(ed t)eir %astery o+er &ot) Britis) and *er%an tanks3 four BB#%illi%eter guns destroying t(el+e of t)irteen attacking Britis) Matilda tanks in s/ite of t)eir t)ick ar%our. s in t)e stereoty/e of co%/letely %ounted %edie+al (arfare3 t)e struggles of tanks against tanks ()irled around castle#like fortified /ositions t)at defended %inefields and interdicted t)e &est routes for ()eeled +e)icles o+er t)e rugged desert terrain. 0)e o/erations also )ad so%e co%/ara&ility (it) t)e traditional association of )ea+y ca+alry (it) /ike s.uares on t)e &attlefield. But in daylig)t t)e aircraft /layed t)e role of lig)t ca+alry &y attacking (it) &o%&s and gunfire t)e ground forces3 su//ly +e)icles /ro+ing t)e %ost +ulnera&le. 0)e o/en flank3 ()ic) e-tended )undreds of %iles into t)e desert3 /ro+ided so %uc) s/ace for co%&at t)at t)e forces3 rarely %uc) %ore t)an <>3>>> %en and <>>3 tanks3 could not control t)e a+aila&le area. 5/erations (ould )a+e )ad %uc) in co%%on (it) t)ose of t)e distant /ast3 ()en ar%ies )ad t)e a&ility to a+oid action &y %o+ing to and fro in a t)eatre of (ar large in relation to t)eir si6e3 )ad logistics not tet)ered t)e forces in a (ay unkno(n to ar%ies ()ose )orses could gra6e as t)ey (ent fro% /lace to /lace. 0)e need for fuel as (ell as a%%unition3 food3 and (ater %ade t)ese ar%ies .uite sensiti+e to co%%unications and )ence una&le to %o+e as freely as t)e %ounted forces of old. 0)e s/eed at ()ic) t)e %ec)anised forces /rogressed )ad3 )o(e+er3 s)runk t)e area of o/erations ()en %o&ile forces %anoeu+red against one anot)er and t)is3 toget)er (it)

4?@

t)e greater distance at ()ic) co%&at took /lace3 %ade /ossi&le une-/ected engage%ents and t)e forcing of &attle u/on a )alted ene%y t)at (is)ed to a+oid fig)ting. 0)us control of t)e good coastal road3 and t)e /orts it linked toget)er3 do%inated t)e strategy of %ec)anised forces3 ()ic) de/ended on it to re/lenis) fuel. 0)e (arfare t)en )ad t)e older c)aracteristic of a lo( ratio of force to s/ace &ut3 )a+ing t)e constraint of co%%unications to defend3 still %ade t)e turning %o+e%ent and defence against it t)e do%inant strategic +aria&le. 0urning %o+e%ents traditionally de/ended on co%%unications Gor t)e e.ui+alentH &ecause co%%unications ga+e t)e turned force a rear and /ro+ided at least a strong incenti+e to take t)e offensi+e against t)e turning force to reco+er t)ose co%%unications. :et turning %o+e%ents also relied on t)e su/re%acy of t)e tactical defensi+e so t)at t)e turning force (ould gain tactical su/eriority3 a condition %et in Nort) frica &ecause tanks on t)e defensi+e as (ell as antitank guns )ad /re+ailed against tanks on t)e offensi+e. But turning %o+e%ents also &anked on an ade.uate ratio of force to s/ace3 so as to )a+e t)e a&ility to &lock t)e retreat of t)e turned3 as Na/oleons e-/erience in t)e Battle of Marengo3 ()ere )e )ad &roug)t to t)e &attle &arely enoug) force to (in and interdict t)e ustrian (it)dra(al3 de%onstrated. So in t)e Nort) frican ca%/aign turning %o+e%ents failed to tra/ t)e %ounted forces. 2-ce/tionally (ell articulated &ecause of radio co%%unication3 tanks and tank units constituted t)e ideal offensi+e troo/s3 for in t)e relati+ely large s/aces of t)e Nort) frican t)eatre3 tank forces /ro+ed /articularly elusi+e and )ard to contain. !it) &ot) contestants a+oiding t)e %istake of attacking tanks arrayed for t)e defence3 %ec)anised forces seeking to fall &ack used t)eir %o&ility to /ass around t)e flank of o//onents trying to &lock t)e%3 or t)ey e%/loyed t)eir ca/acity for ra/id concentration to o+er()el% (eak forces in t)eir /at). lt)oug) t)e *er%ans and Italians as (ell as t)e Britis) tried to rely on t)e /redo%inance of t)e tactical defence3 encounter &attles &et(een tank forces often c)aracterised t)e inter%ittent &ut intense co%&at. Bot) sides lost )ea+ily in tanks3 eac) of t(o %aDor struggles3 for e-a%/le3 reduced tank forces of t)e co%&atants &y o+er B> /ercent. In one /rolonged losing struggle3 t)e *er%ans lost 1?> of t)eir original 2=> tanks3 and in t)eir +ictory t)at carried t)e% into 2gy/t3 t)e *er%ans and Italians &egan t)e /rotracted &attle (it) <=> tanks &ut )ad only fifty#eig)t ()en t)ey crossed t)e 2gy/tian &order. 0)e Britis) suffered co%/ara&le losses in &ot) conflicts. 0)e tactical results of t)ese engage%ents3 t)at is3 t)e attrition inflicted and suffered3 )ad a /redo%inant role in deter%ining t)e strategic outco%e. r%ies could sustain t)eir %orale and continue fig)ting in s/ite of suc) catastro/)ic tolls &ecause t)e losses in tanks did not reflect casualties in %an/o(er. $re(s often esca/ed un)ar%ed fro% disa&led tanks3 and )ard usage and rugged terrain %eant t)at %ec)anical failures also /ro+ided a %aDor source of tank casualties. 0)e loss of tanks to da%age and &reakdo(ns %eant t)at /ossession of t)e &attlefield3 t)e traditional indicator of +ictory3 assu%ed a tactical i%/ortance as %eaningful as t)e ranso%ing of /risoners after a %edie+al &attle &et(een knig)ts. Since /ossession of t)e &attlefield ga+e t)e +ictor control of t)e disa&led tanks3 t)ey could re/air %any of t)e% and t)us significantly reduce t)eir casualties ()ile a//ro/riating so%e of t)e ene%ys derelict +e)icles. Back

New and m'roved Wea'ons

0)e (ar c)anged aircraft relati+ely little. Many air/lanes in ser+ice at t)e &eginning of t)e conflict continued3 (it) i%/ro+e%ents3 until t)e end. Increases in engine /o(er3 s/eed3 and carrying ca/acity re/resented t)e /rinci/al alterations. 0)e Britis) and t)e %ericans used e+er#greater nu%&ers of large3 four#engine &o%&ers of %odels t)at )ad e-isted earlier. 0)ey e%/loyed t)ese %ainly for strategic &o%&ing /rogra%s.

44>

,o(#le+el ground attack aircraft under(ent considera&le de+elo/%ent as t)e &elligerents /erfected %et)ods of attack ot)er t)an di+e &o%&ing. 'lying lo(3 /lanes (it) one and t(o engines dro//ed &o%&s on +e)icles3 railroad trains3 and &ridges and used rockets as (ell as %ac)ine guns and cannon against /ersonnel and +e)icles. 'ig)ters3 &igger and %ore /o(erful3 ar%ed (it) cannon and a&le to carry &o%&s or rockets3 easily &eca%e fig)ter#&o%&ers3 a&le to /erfor% &ot) tasks (it) e-cellent facility. 0)e Russians used t)ese and %ore s/ecialised ground attack aircraft in ()ic) t)ey %ounted a ?C#%illi%eter cannon3 ()ic) could /ierce t)e t)in )ori6ontal ar%our of e+en large tanks. !it) suc) cannon3 &o%&s3 and rockets3 air/lanes /ro+ed deadly to tanks in t)e o/en3 t)us resurrecting a lig)t ca+alry su/eriority3 ()ic) t)e 0urkis) )orse arc)ers )ad so decisi+ely de%onstrated against By6antine )ea+y ca+alry at Man6ikert. 0)e (ar altered tanks to an i%/ortant degree. t t)e &eginning of t)e conflict tanks of 1> to 1< tons (it) ?C#Milli%eter cannon of %odest %u66le +elocity re/resented t)e %aDority of %odern tanks in 2uro/ean ar%ies. By 1@4< suc) tanks found little use. Instead3 tanks of 2< to ?< tons (it) ?#inc)3 )ig)#+elocity guns /layed t)e %aDor role in all ar%ies3 and t)e *er%ans and Russians )ad tanks of %ore t)an 4> tons3 so%e %ounting )ig)#+elocity guns larger t)an ? inc)es. r%our /late &eca%e t)icker as (ell3 4 inc)es &eco%ing as co%%on as 1#1S2 inc)es (as at t)e out&reak of t)e (ar. S/eed c)anged little3 1> to ?> %iles an )our re%aining ty/ical. 0)ese %odifications in tanks3 es/ecially t)e %ounting of t)e larger3 )ig)#+elocity gun3 did not res/ond to t)e tanks original /ur/ose: attacking infantry and its %ac)ine guns. Rat)er3 t)e a&ility to defeat infantry &eca%e a &y#/roduct of a tank designed to fig)t ot)er tanks. 0)e use of tanks for counterattacks and e+en in defence %ade it essential to e.ui/ ar%ies (it) tanks t)at could defeat t)e ene%ys tanks. 0)e *er%ans and t)e Russians also ado/ted t)e self#/ro/elled gun3 essentially a turretless tank (it) a /o(erful gun %ounted in t)e )ull. 0)is gun t)us lacked %uc) tra+erse3 &ut it ena&led t)e c)assis of s%aller3 (ell#/ro+en tanks already in /roduction to carry guns and ar%our ca/a&le of dealing (it) t)e larger antitank tanks. r%oured cars continued in use3 and ar%oured /ersonnel carriers gre( in nu%&ers. 0)ese3 often )a+ing ()eels in front (it) tracks in t)e rear to /ro+ide cross#country %o&ility3 carried so%e of t)e infantry acco%/anying t)e tanks in ar%oured di+isions. Since %any of t)ese )ad so%e ar%our on t)eir sides and carried a %ac)ine gun3 t)ey could /erfor% so%e of t)e tanks %ission of attacking an infantry ar%ed only (it) rifles and %ac)ine guns. 0anks )ad e+ol+ed %uc) as )ad t)e ar%oured %edie+al )ea+y ca+alry%an. Because )ea+y ca+alry foug)t eac) ot)er3 t)e )orse%en )ad e-ce/tionally /o(erful (ar#)orses and /late ar%our3 e-/ensi+e i%/ro+e%ents not critical for riding do(n lig)t infantry (it) &o(s or successfully attacking t)e flank or rear of )ea+y infantry for%ations. So also tanks ac.uired guns of far greater /o(er t)an needed to attack %ac)ine gun /ositions7 t)ey &eca%e larger not only to carry t)ese &igger guns &ut also &ecause of t)e t)icker ar%our re.uired to resist t)e %ore /o(erful guns of t)e o//osing tanks and t)e infantrys antitank (ea/ons. 0)e de+elo/%ent of t)e t)ickly ar%oured antitank tank .uickly %ade e-isting antitank guns o&solete. 0)ree#inc) field guns /ro+ed useful as antitank guns as did )ea+y antiaircraft guns. 0)e /rogression in Britis) antitank guns (ell e-e%/lifies t)e gro(t) in /o(er of guns designed for t)e antitank role. Beginning t)e (ar (it) an effecti+e3 )ig)#+elocity gun firing a 2#lS2#/ound s)ot3 t)e Britis) /rogressed t)roug) one (it) a C# /ound /roDectile to end t)e (ar (it) a gun firing a 1C#/ound s)ot. Since t)ey acco%/anied t)is rise in /roDectile (eig)t (it) a s%all increase in %u66le +elocity3 t)ey )ad en)anced %u66le energy %ore t)an C ti%es. :et econo%ies of scale %eant t)at t)e (eig)t of t)e gun gre( only a little o+er 1#lS2 ti%es. Ne+ert)eless3 t)e resulting antitank gun (eig)ed %ore t)an t)e field guns of t)e sa%e &ore and (eig)ed as %uc) as t)e standard )o(it6ers firing a s)ell nearly t(ice as )ea+y. 0o co/e (it) t)e t)ick ar%our of t)e large antitank tank3 t)e antitank gun )ad &eco%e as )ea+y and i%%o&ile as t)e traditional artillery /iece.

441

But anot)er c)ange3 and an i%/ortant one3 carried t)e antitank (ea/on &ack to t)e %o&ility of t)e s)oulder#fired antitank rifle of !orld !ar I3 ()ic)3 in turn3 )ad differed little in /orta&ility fro% t)e /ike used long &efore to resist t)e c)arge of t)e )ea+y ca+alry. 5ne %an could carry3 and one or t(o %en could fire t)e antitank rocket3 nickna%ed t)e &a6ooka in t)e 4.S. ar%y. 0)is &eca%e a+aila&le during t)e %iddle of t)e (ar and /ro+ed effecti+e in /iercing tank ar%our. Since3 (it) its lo( +elocity3 t)e rocket#/o(ered /roDectile could not /enetrate tank ar%our3 t)e &a6ooka relied on a s/ecial ty/e of s)a/ed c)arge in its /roDectile. 0)e c)arge )ad a dee/ly conca+e figuration so t)at3 u/on co%&ustion3 t)e force of t)e e-/losion focused at t)e &ase of t)e +acant conical s/ace3 ()ic) (as at t)e /oint of t)e /roDectile. "ere t)e )eat of t)e e-/losion %elted t)e ar%our3 /iercing a s%all )ole t)roug) ()ic) /assed %uc) of t)e &last of t)e e-/losion toget)er (it) so%e /articles of t)e %elted ar%our. In t)e confined area of t)e inside of a tank t)is e-/losion often )ad a disastrous effect on t)e cre( and on interior co%/onents of t)e tank. 0)e /orta&ility of t)e &a6ooka rocket launc)er (it) its s/ecial /roDectile ena&led skilful and courageous soldiers to a%&us) tanks3 effecti+ely firing at t)e% fro% t)e sides (it) &a6ookas too s%all to /enetrate t)e tanks t)ick frontal ar%our. So infantry )ad regained an antitank ca/a&ility &y t)e end of t)e (ar3 ()ic)3 )o(e+er3 lacked sufficient /otency to render redundant for antitank defence eit)er t)e /o(erful3 )ig)#+elocity antitank artillery /iece or t)e %o&ile tank fig)ting fro% co+ered /ositions on t)e defensi+e in a role co%/ara&le to dis%ounted %edie+al ca+alry. In t)e recoilless cannon infantry gained a /orta&le3 flat#traDectory (ea/on to co%/le%ent t)e lig)t %ortar t)at it )ad ac.uired in !orld !ar I. By allo(ing so%e of t)e force of t)e e-/losion of t)e s)ells /ro/elling c)arge to esca/e fro% t)e rear of t)e s%all cannon3 t)e designers /ro+ided a gun in ()ic) t)e rear(ard esca/ing gases so e-actly nullified t)e recoil caused &y t)e eDection of t)e /roDectile fro% t)e &arrel t)at suc) a cannon )ad no recoil. Because t)e &arrel did not )a+e to contain t)e full force of t)e e-/losion3 t)e (ea/on )ad so little (eig)t t)at a gunner could fire a <C# %illi%eter +ersion fro% )is s)oulder3 t)e &ack &last eli%inating any recoil. Infantry t)us ac.uired a /orta&le or %o&ile cannon ()ose ca/acity for direct fire co%/le%ented t)e indirect fire of t)e infantrys si%ilarly lig)t#(eig)t %ortars. But recoilless cannon )ad a nu%&er of defects. 0)e esca/e of gases to t)e rear not only %ade t)e% dangerous to fire &ut also i%%ediately re+ealed t)eir location to t)e ene%y. 0)eir lo(#%u66le +elocity and li%ited range in)i&ited t)eir use as infantry (ea/ons3 /ri%arily &y de/ri+ing t)e% of %uc) ar%our /iercing a&ility in s/ite of so%e )a+ing &ores greater t)an four inc)es. So3 for use against tanks3 recoilless cannon )ad to rely on s)a/ed c)arges ()ose effect t)e rotation of t)e s)ell di%inis)ed. 0)e &a6ookas rocket3 sta&ilised in flig)t &y fins rat)er t)an t)e s/in c)aracteristic of t)e s)ell3 /ro+ed a &etter antitank (ea/on. Ne+ert)eless3 t)e infantry gained a +ersatile (ea/on t)at aug%ented its antitank ca/a&ility.

A@/mm ,e(oilless ,ifle Back

442

Rockets )ad %any ot)er uses3 for e-a%/le su//le%enting artillery ()en an area (as t)e target. 0)ey also )ad utility on aircraft3 as fig)ters e%/loyed t)e% against for%ations of &o%&ers3 and lo(#le+el &o%&ers and fig)ter#&o%&ers fired t)e% against targets on t)e ground. 0)e *er%ans also used a &allistic rocket3 called t)e V23 against 2nglis) targets. 0)is B#ton rocket3 ()ic) carried 13>>> /ounds of e-/losi+es and )ad a range of 2>> %iles3 rose to a )eig)t of eig)t %iles &efore descending at a s/eed t)at defied interce/tor aircraft or antiaircraft guns. It lacked accuracy3 a si6a&le city &eing t)e s%allest target at ()ic) it could ai% (it) %uc) /ros/ect of o&taining a )it. 0)e de+elo/%ent of s%all radar sets /er%itted t)eir installation in a s)ell3 t)e radar detonating t)e s)ell ()en it a//roac)ed an o&Dect. 0)is e-/ensi+e fuse i%/ro+ed t)e /erfor%ance of t)e s)ell &ut )ad greater +alue against )ig)#flying /lanes &ecause it eli%inated t)e need for /recise altitude calculations. If t)e s)ell (it) a radar#o/erated /ro-i%ity fuse could /ass close to t)e ene%y aircraft3 t)e fuse (ould e-/lode t)e s)ell at t)e rig)t ti%e and altitude. Most of t)ese c)anges i%/ro+ed on e-isting %et)ods. Radar for controlling antiaircraft guns3 for e-a%/le3 su&stituted for aural detection3 o/tical o&ser+ation and ranging3 and for searc)lig)ts. But t)e /ro+ision of infantry (it) /orta&le antitank (ea/ons3 /articularly t)e rocket3 %ade a significant c)ange in t)at it could e%anci/ate t)e infantry fro% de/endence on t)e /o(erful to(ed artillery /iece t)at t)e antitank gun )ad &eco%e. n i%/ro+ed &a6ooka could t)us gi+e &ack to t)e infantry t)e )ea+y infantry role t)at /ike%en )ad filled in resisting ca+alry fro% t)e late Middle ges until t)e ad+ent of t)e &ayonet.

,o($et &aun(her Back

0)e *er%an V2 &allistic %issile also re/resented an inno+ation in t)at3 (it) its range of 2>> %iles3 it reac)ed far &eyond ()at artillery could attain3 yet did so (it) t)e in+ulnera&ility of t)e artillery s)ell. But &ecause of its inaccuracy and its relati+ely s%all3 13>>>#/ound (ar)ead3 it lacked %uc) i%/ortance during t)e (ar. :et as a (ea/on in its infancy it3 like ot)er rockets used in t)e (ar3 )ad t)e /otential to e+ol+e. !orld !ar II co%/leted a transfor%ation of artillery. 5riginating in ancient ti%es as essentially static (ea/ons for aid in t)e attack and defence of fortified /laces3 artillery /layed a negligi&le role else()ere3 if only &ecause e+en artillery /ieces suc) as cata/ults and cannon3 ()ic) )ad a reasona&le degree of %o&ility3 could not %anoeu+re (it) t)e %o&ile lig)t infantry3 ar%ed (it) a less effecti+e &ut /orta&le +ersion of t)e sa%e (ea/on syste%. 2+en (it) t)e introduction of %uc) lig)ter and %ore %o&ile /ieces during t)e 0)irty :ears !ar3 artillery still /layed only a circu%scri&ed role on t)e offensi+e and could )ardly e%/loy t)e skir%is)ing tactics of t)e lig)t infantry.

44?

2ig)teent)#century i%/ro+e%ents in /o(er3 accuracy3 and %o&ility ena&led artillery to contri&ute %ore to t)e offence. !ell#/laced guns could /re/are an attack &y &ouncing cannon &alls diagonally t)roug) lines of defending infantry. 0)eir en)anced %o&ility ena&led aggressi+e gunners to /us) t)eir lig)ter /ieces for(ard in su//ort of t)e infantry or e+en )a+e t)e tea%s /ull t)e% to /ositions in front of t)e infantry and &ring t)e o//osing foot soldiers under fire (it) canister s)ot. 0)e defending infantry3 re%aining standing to resist a ca+alry attack and to &e ready to reload its %u66leloaders ra/idly suffered se+erely fro% t)e canister s)ot of artillery ()ose fire /ro+ed effecti+e e+en ()en deli+ered fro% &eyond t)e range of t)e s%oot)&ore %uskets. But nineteent)#century tec)nological de+elo/%ents again de+alued artillerys offensi+e ca/a&ilities. 0)e rifle so outranged t)e s%oot)&ore artillerys canister s)ot t)at t)e old s%oot)&ore artillery lost its offensi+e /otency once t)e infantry could s)oot t)e artillery%en. 0)e &reec)loader3 ()ic) ena&led infantry to fire faster ()ile lying /rone3 co%/leted t)e de/reciation of artillery3 for its gunners (ere left standing and e+en %ore +ulnera&le to an increased +olu%e of infantry fire. 0)e ne( long#range rifled artillery did not restore t)e &alance &ecause it )ad to rely on s)ra/nel s)ells. 0)ese /roDectiles3 filled (it) s%all %issiles and a /o(der c)arge to &urst t)e case and /ro/el t)e s)ra/nel do(n on t)e o//osing troo/s3 (ould )a+e /ro+ed effecti+e )ad t)ey /ossessed fuses accurate enoug) to assure t)e s)ells e-/loding a&o+e t)e ene%y troo/s. 0)is /ro&le% led t)e 'renc) in t)e 1B=>s to de+elo/ t)eir %ulti#&arrelled3 12<#s)ots#/er#%inute mitrailleuse to re/lace t)e canister. 'or t)is reason t)e 'renc) de/loyed t)e mitrailleuse (it) t)eir rifled artillery3 ()ic) could not s)oot +ery tellingly at rifle ar%ed infantry. But t)e mitrailleuse failed to /ro+ide t)e e-/ected offensi+e fire/o(er. Refine%ent in fuses &y t)e end of t)e century ena&led t)e rifled artillery to realise t)e full /ossi&ilities of s)ra/nel3 and3 (it) e-cellent recoil syste%s /er%itting a s)ield on t)e gun3 t)e ne( ra/id#fire artillery reco+ered t)e /o(er to attack infantry t)at it )ad enDoyed in Na/oleons day. Still3 in !orld !ar I t)e ne( artillery failed to utilise fully its reco+ered offensi+e /otential. Not only did t)e rifle &ullet dri+e t)e infantry underground and so gi+e t)e soldiers /rotection fro% artillery3 &ut also3 in t)e a&sence of %o&ile (arfare3 t)e ne( field guns could not use t)eir %o&ility. rtillery /layed a %aDor offensi+e role in t)e (ar3 of course3 &ut only in its oldest and %ost traditional c)aracter3 as t)e essential (ea/on in t)e siege (arfare t)at ty/ified %ost %aDor o/erations. Ne+ert)eless3 t)e /ercentage of casualties attri&uted to artillery fire far sur/assed t)e le+els of /re+ious eras. 0)e siege %ulti/lied )ea+y guns and /ro+ided t)e infantry (it) its o(n s%all3 %o&ile cannon3 grenade launc)ers3 and %ortars3 co%/leting t)e infantrys array of gun/o(der %issile (ea/ons &y gi+ing it e-/losi+e &ullets and indirect as (ell as direct fire. Most of t)ese (ea/ons functioned as /orta&le (ea/ons (it) ()ic) t)e infantry could %anoeu+re. 0)e aircraft of !orld !ar I acted as a ri+al or su//le%ent to artillery3 and aircraft certainly e-/anded t)is role as its s/eed and (eig)t#&earing ca/acity i%/ro+ed. Bo%&s carried a %uc) )ig)er /ro/ortion of e-/losi+es in relation to t)eir (eig)t t)an artillery s)ells3 &ecause t)ey did not )a+e to (it)stand t)e force of disc)arge fro% a cannon. 5n t)e ot)er )and3 &o%&s lacked t)e accuracy of artillery fire. 0)e di+ision of la&our t)at e+ol+ed &et(een artillery and aircraft during !orld !ar II %eant t)at ar%ies relied on &o%&s ()en ground units lacked artillery3 and &o%&s also su&stituted for !orld !ar Is )ea+y artillery and long#range guns. So t)oug) &o%&s often /layed a %aDor role in tactical situations3 aircraft nor%ally reser+ed t)eir tactical use of &o%&s for attacking tanks or infantry in t)e rear and for carrying out t)e strategic lig)t ca+alry role of raiding co%%unications and su//ly de/ots.

444

In t)e inter(ar years t)e s/read of %otorised traction for artillery increased its strategic %o&ility &ut not its tactical role. 0)e dra%atic c)ange ca%e ()en t)e tank c)assis furnis)ed self#/ro/elled %ounts for )o(it6ers3 ()ic) /ro+ided indirect fire ()ile kee/ing u/ (it) t)e infantrys tactical %o+e%ents. 0)ese self#/ro/elled )o(it6ers )ad enoug) ar%our to continue t)e s)ield tradition and gi+e cre(s /rotection fro% s%all#ar%s fire. 4sually t)ey carried a %ac)ine gun in addition to t)eir cannon. But t)e ty/e (as not (ell defined: for e-a%/le3 t)e Russians %ounted a rat)er )ig)# +elocity C=.2#%illinicter gun on a tank c)assis and ar%oured it (it) /late t)icker t)an necessary to resist s%all ar%s. Self#/ro/elled antitank guns and field guns for antitank use3 so%e as t)ickly ar%oured as tanks3 furt)er &lurred t)e distinction &et(een self#/ro/elled artillery and tanks. By t)e end of t)e (ar so%e tanks %ounted %ore /o(erful guns t)an %ost self#/ro/elled artillery7 one Russian tank )ad a )ig)#+elocity 122#%illii%eter gun for instance. 0)e 'renc)3 Britis)3 and %ericans /roduced aut)entic )y&rids3 tanks (it) a lig)t )o(it6er or gun in t)e )ull and an antitank gun in t)e turret. 0)ese tanks could function as self#/ro/elled artillery3 /articularly in /ro+iding direct fire at close range. ll of t)ese /ro+ided a great +ariety of self#/ro/elled artillery3 so%e (ell ada/ted for indirect fire and so%e useful only for direct fire. s suc) t)ey often )ad %ore tactical %o&ility t)an infantry and al(ays %ore unaided strategic %o&ility. 0)erefore3 t)ey do not fit neatly into t)e categories t)at )ad e-isted for centuries. If one defines t)e /ri%ary duty of )ea+y ca+alry as attack against lig)t infantry3 all of t)ese self# /ro/elled guns can &e seen as )ea+y ca+alry. But if )ea+y ca+alry %ust also fig)t ot)er )ea+y ca+alry3 t)en only t)ose (it) )ig)#+elocity guns constitute )ea+y ca+alry7 t)e self#/ro/elled )o(it6ers re%ain infantry. But if3 as is ine+ita&le3 )ea+y ca+alry %ust so%eti%es c)arge )ea+y infantry3 t)e fire of t)e self#/ro/elled )o(it6ers could /ro+e +alua&le against )ostile antitank guns. nd on t)e kind of &attlefield ()ere infantry3 ar%ed neit)er (it) antitank nor antiaircraft (ea/ons3 )ad no /lace3 t)e self#/ro/elled )o(it6er )ad great effect against t)e )ea+y infantry (it) antitank (ea/ons and %enaced e+en %ore t)e lig)t infantry (it) antiaircraft guns. $learly3 t)e usual categories no longer a//lied to self#/ro/elled artillery t)at under %any circu%stances could function in different grou/s. !)en )o(it6ers used indirect fire against antitank guns3 t)ey o/erated as did lig)t infantry (it) &o(s or ar.ue&uses against /ike%en. !)en t)ey fired at antiaircraft gunners3 t)ey /erfor%ed so%e()at as )ea+y ca+alry riding do(n t)e lig)t infantry. 0)ese t(o roles account for %uc) of t)e difficulty of fitting t)e% into a traditional %atri-. So t)e +ersatility of self#/ro/elled artillery de/ri+es t)eir classification of elegance and %ars t)e sy%%etry of t)e relations)i/ a%ong %odern (ea/on syste%s &ut easily e-/lains t)eir !orld !ar II and /resent /o/ularity3 e+en t)oug) t)ey are far %ore costly t)an t)e traditional to(ed gun. Back

(he nteraction of (echnology with Strategy

It is i%/ortant to resist e-/laining t)e outco%e of ca%/aigns (it) an inter/retation t)at &ases itself solely on t)e .uality and .uantity of t)ese ne( (ea/ons. $onsider t)e *er%an ca%/aign of May and 8une 1@4>. 'aced (it) an ene%y e.ual in nu%&ers (it) artillery of co%/ara&le .uality &ut far greater in .uantity3 t)e *er%ans (on. 5f t)e ne( (ea/ons3 t)e 'renc)3 Belgians3 and Britis) )ad an ade.uate stock of antitank guns3 ()ic) )ad a full %astery o+er *er%an tanks3 and a larger su//ly of tanks t)at (it) t)eir greater a+erage (eig)t generally )ad %ore /o(erful co%&at .ualities. 5nly in aircraft and antiaircraft guns did t)e *er%ans )a+e greater nu%&ers and enDoy su/erior /erfor%ance. :et air/lanes )ad no decisi+e effect and3 t)oug) useful tactically3 failed greatly to reduce 'renc) strategic %o&ility. 0)ey %ade a s/ectacular contri&ution to t)e crossing of t)e Meuse at Sedan3 &ut e+en )ad t)e *er%ans failed (it)out t)e%3 t)e troo/s crossing in t)e nort) at

44<

1inant could )a+e turned t)e ot)er t(o 'renc) /ositions on t)e Meuse3 Sedan as (ell as Mont)er%;. So *er%an tec)nological /ri%acy in t)e air did not deter%ine t)e results of t)e ca%/aign any %ore t)an did t)eir greater nu%&er of antiaircraft and antitank guns. 0ec)nologys /rinci/al i%/act ca%e t)roug) restoring t)e four &asic (ea/on syste%s t)at )ad so long conditioned tactics3 a /rocess co%/leted ()en t)e tanks of !orld !ar II ac.uired t)e strategic %o&ility c)aracteristic of )ea+y ca+alry and ()en aircraft )ad t)e necessary cannon and rockets to e%ulate t)e lig)t ca+alry of old to assail )ea+y ca+alry tanks. 0)e %otor truck added a ne( di%ension to !ar3 gi+ing %ounted strategic %o&ility to t)e infantry and its artillery and t)e ne( dis%ounted (ea/on syste%s3 t)e antitank and antiaircraft guns. In addition3 t)e truck sol+ed t)e /ro&le% of su//lying a%%unition3 fuel3 and food in %o&ile (arfare (it) a )ig) ratio of force to s/ace. 0)e return of t)e four (ea/on syste%s did not restore t)e (arfare of t)e re%ote /ast. 2arlier generals )ad /re/ared for &attles3 usually t)roug) Doint consent3 &y de/loying t)eir (ea/on syste%s on a &attlefield a %ile or %ore in (idt) so as to /lace t)e%sel+es in a %utually su//orting array. But t)e strategic situation in !orld !ar II Ga )ig) ratio of force to s/ace and a Na/oleonic dis/ersionH /recluded a return to t)e tactical as (ell as t)e strategic en+iron%ent of ancient or %edie+al ti%es or t)e 0)irty :ears !ar. 0)ese Na/oleonic conditions %ulti/lied t)e tactical /ro&le% of %aintaining t)e /ro/er %i-ture of (ea/on syste%s. 1is/ersion of forces3 introduced during t)e (ars of t)e 'renc) Re+olution and Na/oleon3 )ad occurred ()en ar%ies )ad infantry and )ea+y ca+alry only3 and t)e infantry )ad defensi+e /redo%inance o+er t)e ca+alry. 0)e situation differed %arkedly in 1@4>3 ()en t)e dis/ersal of ar%ies %eant t)at t)e ne( %ounted forces could concentrate on a narro( front and o+er()el% t)e defenders Dust as a large nu%&er of )ea+y ca+alry could )a+e s(a%/ed a fe( /ike%en or a %ultitude of 0urkis) )orse arc)ers could )a+e )ad t)e &est of a %uc) s%aller force of cross&o(%en. ,anc)esters insig)t a&out t)e ad+antage conferred &y nu%erical su/eriority ()en troo/s )a+e %issile (ea/ons )el/s e-/lain ()y greater nu%&ers of tanks3 for e-a%/le3 could /re+ail o+er fe(er antitank guns in s/ite of t)e &enefits conferred &y t)e i%%o&ile defence. Since generals could no longer count on fig)ting a &attle against an ene%y (it) a co%/ara&le %i-ture of (ea/on syste%s3 t)e strategic distri&ution of t)e +arieties of %ounted and dis%ounted forces assu%ed an i%/ortance t)at it )ad ne+er )ad in t)e /ast3 ()en ar%ies /ossessed a si%ilar co%/osition of t)e different +arieties of troo/s. !)en t)e *er%ans concentrated all of t)eir tanks to %ake a strategic tea% (it) fully %otorised infantry (ea/ons to create t)e Pan6er di+isions and t)en /ro+ided for coordination (it) t)eir air force3 t)ey created a strategically /o(erful union of %ounted forces (it) t)e dis%ounted antitank and antiaircraft guns3 for ()ic) t)ey )ad /ro+ided strategic %o&ility. 0)e 'renc) )ad done t)is3 too3 &ut t)e *er%ans used t)is co%&ination to i%/le%ent Na/oleons %ost i%/ortant %anoeu+re. *enerals al(ays found difficulty in e-ecuting a turning %o+e%ent ()en t)eir strategic %o&ility (as t)e sa%e as t)eir ad+ersaries. 0)is %eant t)at a /erce/ti+e and reasona&ly alert ene%y could al(ays a+oid a turning %o+e%ent. But Pan6er and %otorised di+isions concentrated toget)er ga+e *er%an generals t)e su/erior strategic %o&ility needed to turn a (ary ene%y. 0)ey /ioneered it in 'rance and /racticed it again and again in Russia3 using its strategic dou&le en+elo/%ent for%. 0)e Pan6er di+ision co%/le%ented its )ig) strategic %o&ility (it) t)e /resence of so %any tanks3 t)e tactically offensi+e )ea+y ca+alry ()ose decisi+e i%/act le-ander t)e *reat )ad de%onstrated. nd3 like le-anders ar%y3 a Pan6er di+ision /ossessed a good /ro/ortion of all four (ea/on syste%s. 0)e *er%ans kne( )o( to integrate t)ese tactically as (ell as )ad le-ander3 and3 in addition3 t)ey e%/loyed t)e dis/ersion of Na/oleonic &attles and /ossessed t)e )ig) le+el of articulation /erfected in !orld !ar I3 aug%ented &y t)e radio.

44=

0)ese Na/oleonic successes de/ended on t)eir ad+ersarys )a+ing large nu%&ers of soldiers lacking t)e strategic %o&ility of Pan6er and %otorised di+isions. In t)e initial conflicts in t)e Nort) frican desert3 t)e Britis) re/roduced t)ese turning %o+e%ents against Italian infantry. But ()en t)e *er%ans arri+ed and t)e Italians sent t)eir ar%oured and %otorised di+isions3 t)e (arfare of t)e reincarnated four (ea/on syste%s a//eared in its /urest for%. Infantry )ad little rele+ance a/art fro% its antiaircraft guns and t)e a&ility of its field3 antiaircraft3 or antitank artillery to defend against tanks and /lanes. 'urt)er3 all di+isions3 e-ce/t t)e garrisons of forts and cities3 )ad %ounted strategic %o&ility. :et3 alt)oug) neit)er side )ad &etter strategic %o&ility3 turning %o+e%ents did occur3 Dust as in t)e /ast generals )ad reac)ed t)eir o//onents rear (it)out t)e &enefit of &etter %o&ility. But t)e lo( ratio of force to s/ace /re+ented t)ese fro% )a+ing t)e decisi+e effect of &locking a retreat3 in s/ite of t)e ar%ies e-traordinary de/endence on co%%unications engendered &y t)e desert and t)e )ig) consu%/tion of fuel as (ell as a%%unition. 0)e +ast si6e of t)e t)eatre of (ar caused t)is lo( ratio of force to s/ace as did t)e s%all forces resulting fro% t)e secondary i%/ortance &ot) co%&atants assigned to co%&at in frica. But t)e )ig) relati+e cost of t)e %ounted (ea/on syste%s3 and t)e trucks and tracked carriers used to /ro+ide strategic %o&ility to t)e dis%ounted antitank and antiaircraft guns and t)eir gunners3 so raised t)e e-/ense of t)e forces t)at t)is i%/lied s%aller nu%&ers. 0)e %ounted ar%ies in Nort) frica )ad %uc) in co%%on (it) t)ose of t)e By6antines3 ()ic) )ad contrasted %arkedly in si6e (it) t)e larger3 essentially infantry forces of t)e earlier Ro%an 2%/ire. 5f course3 t)e ne( (arfare in eit)er its desert for% or t)at introduced in 'rance in 1@4> did not al(ays /re+ail. In t)e forested regions of nort)ern Russia3 for e-a%/le3 t)e terrain reduced t)e tank and air/lane to t)e role of au-iliaries. "ere (arfare did not differ %uc) fro% t)at of !orld !ar I. Back

Strategic 1ombing
0)e Britis) and t)e %ericans &ot) in+ested i%%ense resources in creating )uge )ea+y &o%&er forces (it) ()ic) to try to (in t)e (ar (it) t)e logistic strategy of cri//ling t)e ene%ys econo%y. But neit)er )ad enoug) aircraft ready ()en t)ey entered t)e (ar7 t)e Britis) )ad only a s%all nu%&er of t(o#engine )ea+y &o%&ers of li%ited carrying ca/acity. Bo%&ing &y t)e s%all Britis) long#range &o%&ers in 1@?@ and 1@4> re+ealed unantici/ated /ro&le%s in e-ecuting t)e air raids to i%/le%ent t)e strategy. ccuracy in dro//ing &o%&s /ro+ed +ery difficult to ac)ie+e3 and e+en finding t)e target city occasionally &eca%e too c)allenging. In addition3 unescorted &o%&ers3 in s/ite of t)eir defensi+e %ac)ine guns3 dis/layed an une-/ected and disastrous +ulnera&ility to fig)ter aircraft. In one early raid3 for e-a%/le3 in ()ic) t(enty#t(o Britis) &o%&ers took /art3 fifteen failed to return. 0)us Britis) &o%&ers )ad t)e sa%e e-/erience against fig)ters as )ad t)e *er%ans in t)eir attack on Britain in t)e su%%er of 1@4>. Since fig)ter /lanes lacked t)e range to acco%/any t)e &o%&ers3 t)e Britis) soon ado/ted t)e /lan of &o%&ing at nig)t ()en interce/tor aircraft lost %ost of t)eir effecti+eness and antiaircraft fire de/ended on t)e uncertain and fre.uently ineffecti+e assistance of searc)lig)ts. But &o%&ing at nig)t aggra+ated t)e /ro&le%s of finding t)e target and &o%&ing accurately once aircraft reac)ed t)eir destination. erial reconnaissance of early nig)t &o%&ing efforts re+ealed t)at only one &o%& in ten fell (it)in a %ile of t)e goal. Britis) &o%&ing s)o(ed little i%/ro+e%ent o+er 'renc) nig)t &o%&ing of t)e Briey Basin in !orld !ar I. 0)ese /ro&le%s led t)e Britis) to %odify t)eir /ur/ose in &o%&ing ene%y industry. Instead of stri+ing to )it s/ecific factories or rail(ay yards3 t)ey directed t)eir %issions at ()ole areas3 ai%ing t)eir attacks at t)e (ork force instead of t)e ca/ital # t)e &uildings3 %ac)inery3 and tools. 0)e cities3 %orale3 and li+es of t)e (orkers t)us &eca%e t)e logistic target of nig)t air raids.

44C

But t)is c)ange in logistic o&Decti+e also altered t)e c)aracter of t)e &o%&ing. Nig)t area &o%&ing necessarily tested t)e /olitical /art of t)e strategic &o%&ing t)eory # co%/elling t)e ene%y to a&andon t)e (ar t)roug) t)e terror of t)e raids. By destroying /ro/erty and killing ci+ilians3 %any e-/onents of air /o(er &elie+ed t)at t)e raids (ould3 as )ad t)e actions of t)e 0urks in sia Minor and t)e Mongols in 9)(ari6%3 terrorise t)e ene%y into surrender. But t)e *er%an air raids against Britis) cities in 1@4> )ad failed to )a+e t)is result. Instead3 Britis) ci+ilian %orale and deter%ination )ad3 if anyt)ing3 stiffened. 0)us3 t)e Britis) )ad no reason to e-/ect t)e *er%ans to react differently3 and3 in fact3 t)ey did not. By 1@4? t)e Britis) )ad t)e resources to /ursue t)e strategy of de%olis)ing cities. 0)eir /roduction of four#engine &o%&ers )ad e-/anded until t)ey )ad C>> to S>> &o%&ers a+aila&le. By t)e use of radar and radio &ea%s t)ey )ad so i%/ro+ed t)eir accuracy t)at instead of 2> /ercent of t)e &o%&s falling (it)in fi+e %iles of t)e ai%ing /oint as in 1@413 => /ercent fell (it)in t)ree %iles of t)e target in 1@4?. 0)is le+el of accuracy sufficed in &o%&ing a large city. 0)e Britis) )ad also ado/ted t)e /ractice of using a large /ro/ortion of 4#/ound incendiary &o%&s3 co%&ined (it) so%e )ig)# e-/losi+e &o%&s to (reck &uildings and %ake t)e city unsafe for fire fig)ters. 0)e Britis) also refined t)eir %et)ods ()en t)ey concentrated a nig)ts raid on one city and learned to &ring t)e entire force 5f 4>> or <>> aircraft o+er t)e city in t(o to t)ree )ours3 t)us securing concentration in ti%e as (ell as s/ace. In addition3 t)ey )ad stri/s of %etallic /a/er t)at3 ()en dro//ed front t)e aircraft3 (ould foil t)e *er%an radar &y cluttering t)e screen (it) reflections. 0)is tec)ni.ue seriously )andica//ed &ot) *er%an antiaircraft fire control and t)e direction of nig)t fig)ters fro% t)e ground. In t)e su%%er of 1@4? t)e Britis) &roug)t all of t)eir latest tec)ni.ues to &ear u/on t)e /ort and industrial city of "a%&urg3 *er%anys second largest %etro/olis. 5n t)e nig)t of 8uly 24#2<t)3 C@1 &o%&ers3 al%ost all four#engined3 attacked t)e city. 0)e Britis) lost only t(el+e /lanes. 0)ree nig)ts later CBC aircraft dro//ed 132>> tons of incendiary &o%&s as (ell as )ig) e-/losi+es. gigantic fire resulted in ()ic) air rus)ing in to feed t)e fla%es created (inds sufficient to u/root trees and s(ee/ %uc) into t)e fire3 including )u%an &eings. 0)e fire suffocated or killed (it) its )eat G()ic) e-ceeded 134>> degrees 'a)ren)eitH %any ci+ilians ()o (ould ot)er(ise )a+e &een secure in underground s)elters. 0)e raids and t)e ensuing fire o+er()el%ed t)e citys fire de/art%ent and ci+il defence ca/a&ilities. 0)e &o%&ings resulted in t)e o&literation of o+er nine s.uare %iles of t)e city and destruction of3 or da%age to3 ?>>3>>> )ouses. t)ird raid3 )andica//ed &y &ad (eat)er3 did little additional da%age. t "a%&urg t)e attack on cities3 ci+ilians3 and %orale )ad reac)ed a le+el close to /erfection. 'atalities due to t)e raid e-ceeded 4>3>>>3 al%ost all ci+ilians. :et t)is e-e%/lary a//lication of t)e /olitical strategy of terror3 and ot)ers like it on a %uc) s%aller scale3 failed to &ring /eace. 1ou&tless t)e &etter *er%an /re/aration and t)e %ore %odern construction of ot)er cities )el/ e-/lain lack of success of future raids in inflicting t)e )ig) rate of casualties of t)e "a%&urg e-/erience. 0)e failure of t)e %orale of t)e *er%an /u&lic to succu%& to t)e terror of t)e raids o(ed %uc) to t)e /o(er of t)e *er%an go+ern%ent3 its control of radio and ne(s/a/ers3 and its co%/etent efforts to influence /u&lic o/inion. 0)e unli%ited (ar ai%s of t)eir ad+ersaries undou&tedly contri&uted also. :et t)e outco%e does /resent a /u66ling contrast to t)ose attained &y t)e 0urks and Mongolians3 and t)e ans(er to t)e .uestion lies outside t)e li%its of t)is (ork. 0)e /ure logistic strategy recei+ed a second c)ance in 1@42 ()en 4.S. &o%&ers arri+ed. !it) a %ore accurate &o%&sig)t and &o%&ers (it) %ore defensi+e %ac)ine guns3 t)e %ericans e-/ected to ad)ere to t)eir original doctrine of accurate daylig)t &o%&ing to destroy critical logistic targets and to cri//le t)e ene%ys econo%y. So in early 1@4? t)e %erican &o%&ers &egan s%all#

44B

unescorted daylig)t raids into *er%any. 0)ese /lanes suffered )ea+ily3 one strike &y fourteen aircraft losing four. But in s/ite of continued )ea+y losses3 t)e 4.S. &o%&ers /ersisted3 &elie+ing t)at ()en t)ey )ad a large force3 t)e %ac)ine guns of t)e %any &o%&ers (ould /ro+ide ade.uate /rotection. 5n ugust 1st 1@4?3 14C aircraft assailed t)e Ro%anian oil fields &ut lost <4. 5n ugust 1Ct)3 ?1< /lanes attacked t(o %ore logistically +ital targets3 a Messersc)%itt aircraft (orks and a &all# &earing factory. Meeting antiaircraft fire and ?>> defending fig)ters3 t)ey lost => aircraft3 s)ooting do(n 2C *er%an /lanes. 0)e %erican &elief t)at t)ey )ad do(ned 2BB *er%an fig)ters /ro+ided t)e% (it) t)eir only encourage%ent. 0)e raids /ro+ed to )a+e inflicted little da%age on t)e targets3 in s/ite of t)e C24 tons of &o%&s dro//ed3 and suc) losses (ould soon )a+e eli%inated t)e %erican &o%&er force. In 5cto&er 2@1 4.S. &o%&ers %ade anot)er dee/ raid against t)e &all#&earing factory3 losing => aircraft and not significantly i%/eding *er%an /roduction. 0)is cul%inated a (eeks acti+ity t)at )ad already cost BB aircraft. 0)e doctrine of unescorted day air raids )ad a//arently failed again. nd alt)oug) t)e 4.S. &o%&er fleet gre(3 so did t)e *er%an fig)ter force3 increasing fro% 131>> fig)ters in early 1@4? to 13=>> at t)e &eginning of 1@44. nd t)e Britis) did not /ro+e a&le to re/eat t)eir "a%&urg success. 0)e *er%ans learned to co/e (it) t)e confusion caused &y t)e %etallic /a/er and t)eir antiaircraft guns reco+ered so%e of t)eir effecti+eness3 as did t)e ground control of nig)t fig)ters. 0)ese fig)ters3 directed to(ard a//roac)ing &o%&ers s/otted &y ground radar3 used t)eir o(n radar sets to close in on and s)oot do(n Britis) &o%&ers. Britis) losses in t)e fall of 1@4? a+eraged %ore t)an < /ercent /er raid3 t)us co%ing /erilously close to t)e C /ercent t)at Britains air force &elie+ed (ould /reclude continuing t)eir raids. 'urt)er3 t)e Britis) could not &urn %ore cities as t)ey )ad "a%&urg. n effort against Berlin failed &ecause t)e less co%/act citys %ore %odern &uildings resisted a firestor% like "a%&urgs. In 1@44 t)e nglo# %erican air forces di+erted %uc) of t)eir energy to su//orting t)e i%/ending landing of t)eir ar%ies on t)e continent. 0)eir reduced acti+ity dee/ o+er *er%any di%inis)ed t)eir losses3 es/ecially a%ong t)e %ericans3 &ut t)e Britis) continued to )a+e difficulties. In Marc) 1@443 for e-a%/le3 a Britis) raid of C@1 /lanes lost @43 and %any %ore aircraft recei+ed enoug) da%age to re.uire e-tensi+e re/airs. 0)e <<3>>> fatalities suffered during t)e (ar &y t)e Britis) &o%&er co%%and (ell attests to t)e )ea+y cost of nig)t &o%&ing. But in t)e s/ring of 1@44 t)e %ericans decisi+ely o+erca%e t)e *er%an daylig)t air defences &y escorting t)e 4.S. &o%&ers. 0)ey fit additional gasoline tanks to fig)ters7 t)e au-iliary tanks su//lying t)e fig)ters (it) fuel until t)ey dre( near t)e target. 0)e fig)ters t)en dro//ed t)e tanks3 engaged t)e *er%an fig)ters3 and /rotected t)e &o%&ers and inflicted )ea+y losses on t)e *er%an /lanes. 0)e nor%al fuel load of t)e fig)ters sufficed for t)e /eriod of co%&at and t)e return flig)t. By t)e su%%er of 1@44 t)e allies )ad increasingly large nu%&ers of four#engine &o%&ers to carry out regular raids. By t)en t)e nglo# %erican &o%&ers )ad dro//ed a&out t)ree#.uarters of a %illion tons of &o%&s on *er%any. :et *er%an ar%s /roduction )ad dou&led &et(een 1@42 and 1@44. 0)e %ore co%/lete %o&ilisation of t)e *er%an econo%y and t)e la&our of /risoners and foreigners )ad %ore t)an co%/ensated for t)e li%ited results of t)e &o%&ing. In Se/te%&er 1@44 t)e success of t)e ar%ies in t)eir ca%/aign in 'rance ena&led t)e nglo# %erican air forces to gi+e full attention to an undi%inis)ed and unre%itting attack on *er%any. lt)oug) t)e %ericans )ad3 to a degree3 ado/ted t)e Britis) outlook ()en t)ey co%/ensated for /oor +isi&ility &y &o%&ing cities &y radar3 t)ey still soug)t logistically i%/ortant targets. 0rans/ortation facilities and synt)etic oil /lants recei+ed consistent attention on t)e assu%/tion t)at t)e *er%an econo%y and ar%y could not do (it)out t)ese +ital logistical sine(s.

44@

0)e air forces )ad un/recedented resources for t)is ca%/aign. 0)e Britis) )ad 13>>> )ea+y &o%&ers and t)e 4nited States )ad 23>>> in t)e 4nited 9ingdo% and anot)er 131>> &ased in Italy. 0)ey /ossessed an a%/le su//ly of fig)ters to escort t)e %erican &o%&ers3 and t)e Britis) )ad air&orne electronic e.ui/%ent to /aralyse t)e nig)t air defence &y Da%%ing *er%an radars and radios. 0)e ca%/aign )ad a /o(erful effect. In t)e last %ont)s of 1@443 for instance3 t)e Britis) dro//ed four ti%es as %uc) &o%& tonnage as in t)e sa%e /eriod in t)e /re+ious year. 'ro% t)e %iddle of 1@44 until t)e end of t)e (ar t)e follo(ing s/ring3 t)e Britis) and %ericans dro//ed nearly 2 %illion additional tons of &o%&s. 0)e effort of t)e 4nited States to a//ly in daylig)t t)e original conce/t of t)e logistic strategy )ad /ro+ed no %ore significant t)an t)e s%as)ing of d(ellings and t)e killing of ci+ilians. 0)ey )ad tried &o%&ing *er%an aircraft factories &ut (it)out %uc) success due to t)e dis/ersed nature of t)e industry. *er%an aircraft out/ut reac)ed its /eak in Se/te%&er 1@443 ()en t)e industry /roduced ?3<?B aircraft3 and in t)e autu%n of 1@44 t)e factories reac)ed t)eir )ig)est /roduction for a co%/ara&le /eriod. But attacks on t)e ne( targets3 t)e rail(ays and synt)etic /etroleu% /lants3 did yield i%/ortant results. $oal s)i/%ents fro% t)e Ru)r %ines fell &y C< /ercent3 ()ic) reduced industrial /roduction3 including steel. 0)e &o%&ing3 toget)er (it) t)e loss of t)e Ro%anian oil fields3 caused t)e out/ut of gasoline to fall so disastrously t)at t)e *er%ans )ad to curtail flying ti%es in /ilot training and ulti%ately found all %ilitary o/erations seriously )a%/ered. 0)e /ure logistic strategy3 /ursued &y reasona&ly accurate &o%&ing in daylig)t fro% aircraft /rotected &y fig)ters (it) e-tended range3 did /ro+e effecti+e. But it ca%e at a ti%e ()en t)e allies )ad already defeated *er%any at sea and (ere co%/leting its defeat on land. :et it is difficult to see )o( t)e &o%&ing forces could )a+e i%/le%ented suc) an a%&itious logistic strategy sooner. 5nly t)e accuracy of day &o%&ing could )a+e secured t)e )its necessary to disa&le oil and trans/ortation targets. nd factories and rail(ays /ro+ed so resistant to destruction and so readily re/aired t)at only large#scale and continuing day &o%&ing could )a+e effecti+ely s%as)ed t)e%. But t)ese raids carried out earlier (ould )a+e )ad to face t)e undi%inis)ed +igour of t)e *er%an air defence3 and concentrating on t)ese targets (ould )a+e )el/ed t)e *er%ans to %ake a co%/ara&le concentration of t)eir air defences. 0)e nglo# %erican strategic &o%&ing forces3 as originally constituted3 /ro&a&ly lacked t)e resources to carry out t)is ca%/aign in 1@4?. 5nly a differently structured force3 one (it) fe(er &o%&ers &ut e%/)asising large nu%&ers of fig)ters (it) e-tended range3 could )a+e e-ecuted suc) a logistic &o%&ing ca%/aign in 1@4?. It t)en %ig)t )a+e a//recia&ly s)ortened t)e (ar. 0o a degree t)is &o%&ing ca%/aign /aralleled t)e &lockade at sea: (it)out na+al su/re%acy t)ere can &e no &lockade3 only raids t)at )ar% &ut rarely close sea lanes. In a final analysis3 t)e strategic &o%&ing /rogra% did not contri&ute %uc) to (inning t)e (ar. 0)e Britis) could /ro&a&ly )a+e %ade &etter use of so%e of t)e nearly one#t)ird of t)eir (ar effort t)at t)ey de+oted to strategic &o%&ing. 0)e 4nited States could )a+e %ade a si%ilar reduction in its large co%%it%ent to its air force. 0)ese sa+ings (ould dou&tless )a+e e-ceeded t)ose t)at t)e *er%ans could )a+e %ade fro% t)e resources de+oted to air defence and to re&uilding da%aged factories and rail(ays3 e+en t)oug) t)ese tasks a&sor&ed /er)a/s 2 %illion /eo/le and )alf of *er%anys air force. !it) t)e Britis) &uilding 4>3>>> aircraft in 1@443 including %any (it) t(o and four engines3 and t)e *er%ans and Russians eac) &uilding t)e sa%e nu%&er3 t)oug) (it) a far )ig)er /ro/ortion of s%aller3 single#engine aircraft3 Britain and Russia )ad ail ade.uate nu%&er of aircraft for tactical su/eriority (it)out dra(ing on t)e 2uro/ean t)eatres s)are of t)e 4.S. /roduction of 1>>3>>> aircraft t)at year.

4<>

co%/arison of t)e aircraft in+ol+ed illustrates t)e i%%ense effort re.uired for strategic &o%&ing. In 1@44 t)e Britis) and %ericans )ad 432>> four#engine &o%&ers for t)eir ca%/aign against 13=>> *er%an fig)ters. Since t)e &o%&er (eig)ed si- ti%es as %uc) as t)e fig)ter3 one %ay co%/are t)e t(o forces as )a+ing a resource cost ratio si%ilar to t)eir (eig)t3 2<2 to 1= or al%ost 1= to 1. 0rue3 t)e &o%&er )ad only four engines and a cre( of se+en or %ore3 &ut of less a+erage skill t)an t)e fig)ter /ilot. Since3 )o(e+er3 ?32>> of t)e &o%&ers )ad t(o cre(3 t)e 1= to 1 resource ratio %ay not +ary too %uc) fro% t)e actual. 5f course3 if only &ecause t)e *er%ans )ad an ela&orate antiaircraft defence and t)e Britis) and %ericans )ad fig)ter aircraft co%%itted to escorting t)e &o%&ers3 t)is ratio does not /retend to co%/are t)e total resources e%/loyed. But it does illustrate t)e i%%ense cost of t)e strategic &o%&ing /rogra%. In a sense3 t)e t(o ato%ic &o%&s dro//ed on 8a/an at t)e end of t)e (ar only did ()at ordinary e-/losi+es )ad already done in 8a/an and *er%any. !it) an e-/losi+e force of not %ore t)an t)e e.ui+alent 2>3>>> tons of t)at used in &o%&s3 one air raid (it) one aircraft acco%/lis)ed ()at earlier re.uired se+eral raids of 13>>> air/lanes. But t)e ato%ic &o%& stood for %ore t)an an increase in efficiency7 it &roug)t a&out so great a c)ange in degree t)at it re/resented a difference in kind. 0)e ra/id /ost#(ar gro(t) in t)e /o(er of nuclear &o%&s and t)e reduction in t)eir &ulk accentuated t)e difference in kind &et(een t)e ne( &o%&s and t)e old. Back

Combat at Sea with (wo (y'es of Ca'ital Shi's

In its %ain outlines3 !orld !ar II at sea differed little fro% t)at t(enty#fi+e years earlier. 'aced (it) Britains e+en greater su/re%acy in &attles)i/s3 t)e *er%ans %ade no effort to %aintain a &attle fleet. Instead3 t)e *er%an na+y used its &attles)i/s as raiders. Suc) raids /resented a serious %enace &ecause t)e great fire/o(er of a &attles)i/ could .uickly destroy a su&stantial nu%&er of %erc)ant s)i/s in con+oy. 0)e searc) for t)ese raiders s)o(s not only )o( stea% /ro/ulsion and t)e (ireless )ad aug%ented t)e ratio of force to s/ace &ut t)e degree to ()ic) t)e air/lane3 &ased on land as (ell as at sea3 )ad accelerated a trend &egun ()en t)e sailing s)i/ su/erseded t)e galley. 0)e %ost s/ectacular of t)ese raids occurred in 1@413 ()en t)e large3 ne( *er%an &attles)i/ .ismar($ stea%ed into t)e tlantic. Since t)e Britis) )ad t)irteen &attles)i/s and t)ree &attle cruisers3 a single *er%an &attles)i/ s)ould not )a+e /resented a serious t)reat to Britis) s)i//ing. But ele+en of t)e Britis) &attles)i/s dated fro% t)e era of !orld !ar I and )ad s/eeds of t(enty# four knots or less. 0)e t(o ne( s)i/s )ad s/eeds co%/ara&le to t)e .ismar($ Gt)irty knotsH3 &ut t)e s)i/yards )ad co%/leted t)e% so recently t)at t)e cre(s )ad not used t)eir guns enoug) for t)e %en or loading e.ui/%ent to %aintain a full rate of fire. In fact3 t)e Britis) )ad /lanned to de/end on t(o fast3 %odern 'renc) &attles)i/s to )el/ co/e (it) t)e .ismar($3 &ut t)e defeat of 'rance eli%inated t)is resource. So t)e Britis) )ad to rely on t)eir ne( s)i/s and t)eir &attle cruisers3 t)e only s)i/s (it) enoug) s/eed to engage t)e .ismar($. !)en3 in May 1@413 t)e Britis) kne( t)at t)e .ismar($ )ad gone to Nor(ay and (as ready to %ake a raid3 t)e Britis) created t(o s.uadrons to interce/t it and /rotect t)e ele+en con+oys at sea in t)e nort) tlantic. 0)ey /aired t)e ne( Ding George =3 (it) ten 14#inc) guns and 14#inc) ar%our3 (it) t)e &attle cruiser ,e ulse (it) si- 1<#inc) guns and @#inc) ar%our3 and t)en tea%ed t)e Prin(e of Wales3 so ne( t)at it /ut to sea (it) (ork%en on &oard3 (it) t)e &attle cruiser Hood (it) eig)t 1<#inc) guns and 12#inc) ar%our. 0)e Hood3 as large and fast as t)e .ismar($ and (it) side ar%our as t)ick3 re/resented a design originated during !orld !ar I and lacked ade.uate deck /rotection3 es/ecially against guns like .ismar($"s eig)t 1<#inc)ers. 0)e ,e ulse (it) its t)in ar%our could not face t)e .ismar($3 &ut3 on t)e assu%/tion t)at t)e *er%ans (ould concentrate t)eir fire on t)e George =3 t)e ,e ulse"s si- 1<#inc) guns could gi+e t)e t(o s%aller Britis) s)i/s fire /redo%inance. lt)oug) Britis) ad%irals kne( of t)e Hood"s deficiencies3 t)ey did not &elie+e t)at t)ey dis.ualified t)e Hood for fig)ting t)e .ismar($.

4<1

!)en t)e .ismar($ and a cruiser (ent to t)e coast of Nor(ay3 Britis) aircraft o&ser+ed t)e% en# route and later ascertained ()en t)ey de/arted. In d%iral 0o+ey t)e Britis) )ad a talented co%%ander ()o )ad earned co%&at distinction at t)e Battle of 8utland. 0)e ad%iral )i%self3 in t)e Ding George = acco%/anied &y t)e ,e ulse and t)e aircraft carrier =i(torious3 t)en co+ered t)e (aters east of Iceland and sent t(o cruisers to o&ser+e t)e /assage &et(een Iceland and *reenland3 &acking t)e% (it) t)e Hood and t)e Prin(e of Wales. 0)ese cruisers s/otted t)e .ismar($ and follo(ed it3 using radar to o&ser+e3 ()ile radioing its location. In t)e late afternoon of May 14t) 1@413 t)e Hood and t)e Prin(e of Wales interce/ted t)e .ismar($ and closed t)e range ra/idly &y taking an al%ost /er/endicular a//roac) to(ard t)e *er%an s)i/s. 0)e .ismar($ fired at t)e Hood3 t)e leading Britis) s)i/3 and )ardly )ad t)e action &egun ()en t)e Hood &le( u/ Dust as )ad t)ree Britis) &attle cruisers at t)e Battle of 8utland. Because of t)e end#on a//roac)3 it is likely t)at one of t)e .ismar($"s 1<#inc) s)ells struck a %aga6ine (it)out )a+ing to /ierce t)e t)ick side ar%our of t)e Hood &efore striking t)e t)in /lates &e)ind. 'iring )er ten 14#inc) guns slo(ly &ecause of )er &arely co%/leted condition3 t)e Prin(e of Wales /ro%/tly (it)dre(7 lea+ing t)e .ismar($ (it) a )it t)at /unctured an oil tank. ,eaking oil3 t)e *er%an ad%iral a&andoned )is cruise3 deciding to stea% sout) &efore turning to(ard t)e *er%an# )eld 'renc) coast. !it) t)e cruisers still follo(ing3 aircraft fro% t)e =i(torious kne( t)e .ismar($"s location and attacked (it) tor/edo &o%&ers. 0)ey secured at least one )it3 &ut t)e s%all tor/edo carried &y t)e o&solete Britis) carrier aircraft affected t)e .ismar($ +ery little. 0)e .ismar($ t)en eluded t)e s)ado(ing cruisers and stea%ed to(ard t)e 'renc) coast. 0)e Britis) continued t)eir searc) &ut did not locate t)e s)i/ until a land#&ased reconnaissance /lane found )er on t)e %orning of May 2=t). But t)e .ismar($ (as to t)e east of d%iral 0o+ey3 ()o )ad (it) )i% t)e George = and t)e slo( &ut /o(erful and (ell#ar%oured old &attles)i/ ,odney. 0)e Britis)3 )o(e+er3 )ad sent nort)(est fro% *i&raltar t)e %odern aircraft carrier Ar$ ,oyal and t)e old &attle cruiser ,enown3 like t)e ,e ulse .uite t)inly ar%oured. In s/ite of a )ea+y sea3 ()ic) caused t)e carriers deck to rise and fall as %uc) as fifty feet3 t)e aircraft carried out t(o attacks3 )itting t)e .ismar($ (it) t(o tor/edoes. 0)ese da%aged t)e .ismar($"s rudder and /re+ented )er fro% continuing )er course to(ard t)e 'renc) coast or stea%ing at %ore t)an ten knots. !)en d%iral 0o+ey o+ertook t)e .ismar($3 t)e ,odney /ro+ed t)e %ost for%ida&le antagonist as s)e %aintained a )ig) rate of fire (it) )er nine 1=#inc) guns. 0)e Britis) s)i/s soon (recked t)e .ismar($"s &ar&ettes3 and ()en t)e ,odney closed t)e range to <3>>> yards3 so%e of its 1=#inc) s)ells (ent t)roug) t)e unar%oured /ortions of t)e .ismar($ and landed in t)e (ater far &eyond. 5t)ers )it t)e ar%oured /ortions of t)e s)i/ and co%/leted t)e destruction of t)e .ismar($"s offensi+e /o(er. 0)e ,odney3 so old#fas)ioned s)e still carried tor/edoes3 actually struck t)e .ismar($ (it) one of t)e e-ce/tionally large ones fitted in t)is &attles)i/. Ne+ert)eless3 like t)e *er%an ar%oured cruisers at t)e Battle of t)e 'alkland Islands3 t)e Bis%arck3 t)oug) defeated3 /ro+ed difficult to sink (it) gunfire. tor/edo fro% a Britis) cruiser finally co%/leted t)e task. 0)e .ismar($ ca%/aign e-)i&its &ot) t)e i%/ortance and t)e li%itations of aircraft and aircraft carriers. Nort) tlantic (eat)er in t)e for% of large (a+es and &ad +isi&ility li%ited t)e utility of /lanes and t)eir carriers. !it) s%oot) sea and cloudless skies3 t)e carriers =i(torious and Ar$ ,oyal3 eac) trans/orting as %any as si-ty aircraft3 could3 )y/ot)etically3 )a+e found and sunk t)e .ismar($ ()ile kee/ing (ell out of range of )er guns. But t)e cli%atic conditions ke/t t)e carriers fro% su/erseding t)e &attles)i/. Ne+ert)eless3 t)e land#&ased reconnaissance /lanes and t)e successful attack &y t)e Ar$ ,oyal"s tor/edo &o%&ers /layed an essential role in t)e destruction of t)e .ismar($. 0)at t)e Ar$ ,oyal )ad t)e &attle cruiser ,enown as an escort also s)o(ed t)e interde/endent nature of t)e aircraft and gun s)i/s. If t)e /o(erful *er%an cruiser t)at acco%/anied t)e .ismar($ )ad found t)e Ar$ ,oyal3 t)e carrier (ould )a+e needed t)e &attle cruiser for /rotection.

4<2

In t)e Mediterranean3 t)e sea and t)e cli%ate fa+oured aircraft carriers3 &ut (it) so %any o/erations occurring close to Italian territory3 land#&ased /lanes also /resented a serious t)reat. 4nlike t)e ar%oured &attles)i/3 t)e unar%oured aircraft carrier )ad no /assi+e defence ot)er t)an (atertig)t co%/art%entation of its )ull to /rotect it fro% tor/edoes and %ines. 0)e ne( Britis) aircraft carriers did )a+e ar%oured flig)t decks3 &ut fe( of t)ese s)i/s (ere a+aila&le during t)e critical 1@4>#41 /eriod. In addition3 t)e Britis) rarely )ad %ore t)an one carrier a+aila&le (it) t)eir Mediterranean fleet. "o(e+er3 t)ey did %ake good use of t)eir old3 slo( &attles)i/s3 ()ic) (it) eig)t 1<#inc) guns %ade t)e% &etter t)an t)e old3 s%aller3 &ut %uc) faster Italian &attles)i/s t)at %ounted ten ?2>#%illi%eter guns and not %uc) inferior to t)e t(o ne(3 fast Italian &attles)i/s t)at carried nine 1<#inc) guns. 0)us3 t)e Italians )ad ascendancy in s.uadron s/eed3 t)e Britis) in &attles)i/s and carriers3 of ()ic) t)e Italians )ad none. 0)e Italians enDoyed a central /osition &et(een t)e Britis) s.uadron &ased at *i&raltar and t)e larger Britis) force in 2gy/t. Since t)e (eaker Britis) force did not re%ain in t)eir /orts3 t)e Italians )ad an o//ortunity to use t)eir interior lines3 greater strengt)3 and t)e )ig)er s/eed of t)eir s)i/s to concentrate against t)e Britis) and inflict a crus)ing defeat. But t)e i%/ro+e%ent in o&ser+ation %ade /ossi&le &y aircraft and radar %eant t)at e+en t)e slo(er Britis) fleet (ould )a+e ade.uate (arning of t)e Italians a//roac) and could3 as (it) ar%ies3 refuse action &y retreating3 a task %ade easier &y t)e Britis) carrier#&orne aircraft. :et t)e na+al (ar did not de+elo/ in t)is (ay3 eac) fleet instead gi+ing /ri%ary consideration to /rotecting t)e lines of su//ly of its ar%ies fig)ting in frica and attacking t)ose of t)e ot)er. So neit)er co%&atant controlled t)e sea3 eac) %enacing t)e ot)ers key su//ly routes. 0)ese intersected7 t)e Britis) route t)roug) t)e Mediterranean to su//ly forces in 2gy/t crossing t)e Italian route across t)e sea to su//ort its forces in ,i&ya. 0)e fleets %et to attack and defend con+oys. Initially3 t)e Britis) )ad t)e old carrier Eagle (it) a fleet &ased in 2gy/t. 0)is s)i/ o/ened o/erations &y sinking an Italian destroyer and freig)ter in a Nort) frican /ort and t)en su//orted t)e Britis) fleet ()en it %et t)e Italian one3 eac) fleet at sea to escort a con+oy. ircraft fro% t)e Eagle attacked &ut failed to )ar% any Italian s)i/s. Italian land#&ased &o%&ers struck t)e Britis) s)i/s at )ig) altitude &ut only one &o%& scored a )it on a cruiser and ot)ers slig)tly da%aged (it) near %isses t)e carrier Eagle. 'ortunately for t)e Italians3 t)e )ig)#altitude assaults /ro+ed ineffecti+e7 t)eir air%en )ad %istakenly attacked t)eir o(n fleet as (ell as t)e Britis). ,ater3 t)e single Britis) carrier sank four %ore Italian destroyers &efore it %ade /er)a/s t)e greatest cou/ of t)e (ar. 0)e calculating &ut audacious Britis) d%iral $unning)a%3 Britains /re%ier d%iral of t)e (ar3 deter%ined to take t)e offensi+e against )is %ore /o(erful o//onent. 0o nullify t)e stronger Italian air force3 )e /lanned to use )is carrier aircraft at nig)t. So3 launc)ing its aircraft far fro% land3 on t)e nig)t of No+e%&er 11t)3 a single carrier assailed t)e Italian fleet in its fortified anc)orage at 0aranto. In t(o (a+es3 (it) flares to illu%inate t)e )ar&our3 tor/edo &o%&ers scored t)ree )its on a &ig3 ne( Italian &attles)i/ and one eac) on t(o of t)e older &ut t)oroug)ly %odernised Italian &attles)i/s. 0)e tor/edoes sank t(o and disa&led a t)ird3 cri//ling )alf of Italys &attles)i/ strengt) (it) a loss of only t(o aircraft.

Tor edo Plane Back

4<?

0)e successful air strike against t)e Italian fleet in 0aranto "ar&our acco%/lis)ed t)e /ur/ose of a na+al &o%&ard%ent (it)out e-/osing &attles)i/s to /o(erful coast defence guns. 1uring !orld !ar II coast defence guns )ad %aintained t)eir long#esta&lis)ed do%inance o+er sea attack &ecause t)eir guns still )ad t)e ad+antage of firing fro% a fi-ed /latfor% and3 &efore radar3 t)e &enefit of &etter range deter%ination as (ell as strong /rotection against )ostile fire # easier to /ro+ide on land ()ere (eig)t did not e-ercise t)e sa%e constraint as at sea. lt)oug) o+er t)e centuries3 na+ies )ad successfully carried out sur/rise nig)t attacks against defended )ar&ours3 t)e +ictory &y t)e Britis) tor/edo &o%&ers differed fro% ones ac)ie+ed &y surface +essels sli//ing /ast defenders guns in t)e dark. Rat)er3 t)e aircraft c)allenged an entirely different order of defences3 t)e antiaircraft guns and fig)ter aircraft of t)e defenders of t)e /ort. 2+en )ad sur/rise and darkness not rendered t)ese ineffecti+e3 t)e Britis) attack (ould )a+e altered t)e circu%stances t)at )ad so long /re+ailed7 instead of e-/osing ca/ital s)i/s to s)ore gunfire to strike at t)e s)i/s in t)e anc)orage3 as t)e 8a/anese )ad done at Port rt)ur3 t)e Britis) risked only t)e readily re/laced aircraft in an attack t)at disa&led )alf of t)e ca/ital s)i/s in t)e Italian fleet. 5f course3 t)e Italians could )a+e counterattacked against t)e carrier and its escorts &ut t)is (ould )a+e re.uired not only a sufficient force of di+e and tor/edo &o%&ers ada/ted to t)is task3 &ut also sufficient reconnaissance aircraft to find t)e distant Britis) s.uadron3 no longer +isi&le to o&ser+ers in t)e gun /ositions on s)ore. So t)e aircraft carrier3 a co%/anion to t)e &attles)i/ as a ca/ital s)i/3 )ad /ierced t)e +irtual in+ulnera&ility of a fortified /ort (it)out3 )o(e+er3 co%/letely o+ert)ro(ing t)e /ri%acy of a /ro/erly /re/ared defence nor eli%inating t)e attackers risk of losing ca/ital s)i/s to an attack &y aircraft stationed to defend t)e /ort. Still3 t)e e%ergence of t)e carrier )ad %arkedly increased t)e cost of defending a na+al &ase ()ile reducing t)e resulting security. 5n t)e ot)er )and3 (arning of an i%/ending attack could ena&le t)e defenders to a+ail t)e%sel+es of t)e a&ility of s)ore#&ased aircraft to concentrate ra/idly to strengt)en t)e /orts air defences and strike at t)e )ostile aircraft carriers. But t)e Britis) %ade t)e %ain use of t)eir carriers in t)eir o/erations against t)e /o(erful Italian fleet ()en t)ey found it at sea. ,ess t)an a (eek after t)e +ictory at 0aranto3 as t)e Britis) *i&raltar s.uadron escorted a con+oy3 its /lanes o&ser+ed an Italian s.uadron3 and ()en t)e aircraft fro% t)e single carrier attacked3 t)e Italians (it)dre( (it)out loss. In Marc) 1@413 ()en t)e Britis) (ere con+oying troo/s and su//lies to *reece3 t)e Italian fleet sortied to strike t)ese con+oys3 &ringing out fourteen destroyers3 eig)t cruisers3 and its only o/erational &attles)i/3 t)e %odern3 ?o#knot =ittorio =eneto3 ar%ed (it) nine 1<#inc) guns. 0)is force see%ed ade.uate in +ie( of t)e Britis) (eakness in cruisers and gi+en t)e Italian &elief t)at t)e ene%y )ad only one &attles)i/ a&le to /ut to sea. (are t)at t)e Italians (ould attack so +alua&le a target as troo/ con+oys3 d%iral $unning)a% ordered four cruisers and four destroyers fro% *reece to %eet )is fleet fro% 2gy/t sout) of $rete. !it) )i% d%iral $unning)a% )ad nine destroyers3 a carrier3 and t)ree3 not one3 old 24#knot &attles)i/s3 eac) ar%ed (it) eig)t 1<#inc) guns. 0)e Britis) ca/tains and %en3 ins/ired &y t)eir &old and +ictorious ad%iral3 a//roac)ed &attle (it) 6eal and confidence. Britis) carrier aircraft s/otted a s.uadron of t)e Italian cruisers Dust as a sea#/lane launc)ed &y t)e Italian &attles)i/ o&ser+ed t)e Britis) cruisers. 2ac) sa( only /art of t)e ot)ers fleet. !)en t)e Britis) cruisers sig)ted t)e Italian cruisers3 ()ic) )ad t)e ad+antage in nu%&ers and in si6e of guns3 t)e Britis) cruisers retreated to(ard t)eir ad+ancing &attles)i/s. 0)e Italians /ursued3 until3 a//re)ensi+e a&out Britis) aircraft &ased on $rete3 t)ey turned &ack7 t)e Britis) cruisers follo(ed until t)ey %et t)e =ittorio =eneto. s t)e Britis) cruisers retired3 co+ered &y a s%oke screen3 t)e first of t)e attacks &y t)e Britis) carrier aircraft took /lace. lt)oug) it failed to )ar%

4<4

t)e =ittorio =eneto3 it con+inced t)e Italian ad%iral of t)e (isdo% of setting a course &ack to Italy3 ()ic) )e /ro%/tly did at )ig) s/eed3 follo(ed &y t)e Britis) cruisers and3 at a considera&le distance and a slo(er s/eed3 t)e t)ree Britis) &attles)i/s. 0)e Italians (ould )a+e esca/ed t)e stronger Britis) s.uadron )ad not a second strike &y carrier tor/edo /lanes )it t)e =ittorio =eneto and slo(ed its s/eed to nineteen knots7 and a t)ird attack3 in early e+ening3 +irtually sto//ed t)e 1>3>>>#ton cruiser Pola. 0)e Italian ad%iral continued )is retreat &ut sent &ack in t)e dark t(o ot)er cruisers like t)e Pola to aid t)at stricken s)i/. !it)out radar3 t)e t)ree Italian cruisers3 eac) (it) eig)t B#inc) guns3 did not detect t)e nig)t a//roac) of t)e t)ree Britis) &attles)i/s3 eac) (it) eig)t 1<#inc) guns and ar%our +irtually i%/er+ious to B#inc) guns. 0)e Italian s)i/s first learned of t)e /resence of t)e Britis) ()en searc)lig)ts illu%inated one of t)e Italian cruisers and s)e (as )it (it) t(o si%ultaneous &roadsides of 1<#inc) guns fired fro% only 43>>> yards a(ay. !)en t(o &attles)i/s )ad t)us .uickly de%olis)ed one cruiser and t)e t)ird &attles)i/ anot)er3 t)e t)ree s)i/s o/ened fire on t)e t)ird Italian cruiser3 )itting it (it) at least fifteen &ig#gun s)ells. In addition to destroying t)ree cruisers in t)is nig)t action3 t)e Britis) s)i/s also sank t(o destroyers. fter t)is disastrous &attle off $a/e Mata/an3 t)e Italian fleet ga+e u/ all efforts to attack Britis) con+oys3 lea+ing t)is task to t)e Italian and *er%an air forces. In t)e su&se.uent o/erations *er%an land#&ased di+e &o%&ers /ro+ed t)eir effecti+eness3 seriously da%aging four carriers in air strikes and sinking t)ree cruisers and a nu%&er of destroyers and da%aging ot)ers. So t)e /resence of *er%an and Italian land#&ased aircraft3 t)e telling Britis) use of t)eir old &attles)i/s3 and t)e /aucity of Britis) carriers %eant t)at t)e na+al o/erations in t)e Mediterranean follo(ed t)e %odel e-e%/lified in t)e cruise of .ismar($. Since neit)er &attles)i/s nor carriers )ad /ri%acy3 t)ere ceased to &e a single s)i/ of t)e line. If s)i/s of t)e line3 or ca/ital s)i/s3 are si%/ly t)e strongest s)i/s3 t)en &ot) carriers and &attles)i/s constituted ca/ital s)i/s. 0)e fragile carrier3 ()ic) /ro+ided reconnaissance and t)e a&ility to strike at a range far greater t)an t)e &iggest gun3 co%/le%ented t)e stout3 (ell#/rotected &attles)i/ and its a&ility to o+er()el% any ot)er class of s)i/ t)at ca%e (it)in range of its /o(erful guns. 0)e Britis) succeeded in consistently defeating t)e Italian fleet &ecause of t)eir /re/onderance in &ot) ty/es of ca/ital s)i/s. lt)oug) t)ey ne+er )ad %ore t)an t)ree or four of t)eir old &attles)i/s3 t)e Britis) %aintained t)eir /ri%acy o+er t)e four faster &ut (eaker old Italian &attles)i/s and near /arity3 e-ce/t in s/eed3 (it) t)e t(o ne( Italian s)i/s. 0)eir (illingness to risk t)eir old s)i/s also contri&uted to t)eir success. nd a single carrier G()en t)eir o//onent )ad none3 and only +ery ineffecti+e aid fro% its land#&ased aircraftH ga+e t)e Britis) a co%/ara&le /redo%inance in carriers too. In t)e Pacific3 )o(e+er3 t)e carrier rarely )ad to s)are (it) t)e &attles)i/ t)e distinction of &eing t)e ca/ital s)i/. In t)e large s/aces of t)at great ocean3 (it) %uc) of its cli%ate congenial to air o/erations3 t)e greater range of t)e carriers aircraft3 as co%/ared (it) a s)i/s guns3 %ade it t)e ca/ital s)i/. Since &attles)i/s %et only t(ice3 t)e co%&at of t)e carriers3 in ()ic) t)e aircraft ai%ed at t)e o//osing carriers3 decided t)e co%%and of t)e Pacific and t)e outco%e of t)e na+al (ar. s in t)e tlantic and t)e Mediterranean3 t)e tor/edo#carrying aircraft /ro+ed t)e key (ea/on for attacking ar%oured s)i/s in t)e Pacific. 5riginally designed for launc)ing fro% a tor/edo &oat on t)e surface3 t)e tor/edo3 t)oug) still for%ida&le in its original role3 )ad far greater Influence on na+al (arfare ()en launc)ed &y a su&%ersi&le tor/edo &oat3 t)e su&%arine3 or &y an aircraft3 an air&orne tor/edo &oat. 0)e aircraft carrier also c)anged t)e nature of t)e /rotection of ca/ital s)i/s. 2+en (it) t)eir ar%oured flig)t decks3 Britis) aircraft carriers3 like t)eir unar%oured 4.S. counter/arts3 de/ended

4<<

/ri%arily on t)e acti+e defence of t)eir antiaircraft guns rat)er t)an t)e ar%our /late of t)e &attles)i/ or3 earlier3 t)e t)ick sides of t)e s)i/ of t)e line. Muc) %ore +ulnera&le &ecause of t)e a&sence of t)e /assi+e defence of ar%our3 t)e carriers gained in defensi+e /o(er &ecause ot)er s)i/s could aid t)e%. 0)e antiaircraft ar%a%ent of destroyers3 originally intended to co%&at surface tor/edo &oats3 )el/ed /rotect carriers fro% air#attack3 as did t)e antiaircraft ar%a%ent of cruisers. 0)e Britis) and 4.S. na+ies e+en )ad antiaircraft cruisers. In addition3 t)e carriers also )ad fig)ter /lanes t)at )el/ed to /rotect t)e% and ot)er fleet units fro% t)e attacks of carrier /lanes. Back

(he German Submarine Cam'aign

nd aircraft also /layed a %aDor role in t)e (ar against t)e su&%arine3 ()ic)3 as in !orld !ar I3 constituted t)e na+al struggle in ()ic) t)e issue (as really in dou&t. 0)e !orld !ar II su&%arine ca%/aign &egan ()ere t)at of t)e first left off3 e-ce/t for t)e asdic or sonar su&%arine detecting de+ice3 ()ic) /ro+ed far &etter at finding su&%arines t)an t)e )ydro/)one of 1@1B. 0)e *er%ans3 after initial difficulties (it) faulty tor/edoes3 &enefited fro% an electric tor/edo3 ()ic) left no (ake3 and fro% )o%ing tor/edoes3 ()ic) )ad %agnetic and acoustic de+ices. 0)e ty/ical *er%an su&%arine dis/laced a&out <>> tons3 could di+e al%ost to <>> feet3 and )ad a 1=#knot surface s/eed and a cruising range of o+er B3>>> %iles. But as at t)e &eginning of !orld !ar I3 t)e *er%ans3 (it) only fifty#si- su&%arines3 not all of ()ic) (ere (ell suited to tlantic o/erations3 lacked t)e force to strangle Britis) co%%erce3 and t)e Britis) needed %any %ore escort +essels to &affle t)e *er%an attacks. Ne+ert)eless3 in t)e first si- %ont)s of t)e (ar3 t)e *er%ans sank an a+erage of o+er 14>3>>> tons of s)i//ing /er %ont). 0)is a%ounted to a&out )alf of t)e a+erage %ont)ly loss fro% all causes in 1@1B. Most su&%arine successes ca%e against single s)i/s3 t)ose t)e Britis) e-cluded fro% con+oys &ecause t)ey )ad too %uc) s/eed to need /rotection or so little3 t)at3 in t)e interest of trans/ort efficiency3 t)e Britis) ad%iralty &arred t)e% fro% con+oys. In Marc)3 /ril3 and May of 1@4> losses dro//ed a&out => /ercent &ecause *er%any co%%itted %any of its su&%arines to su//ort of t)eir in+asion of Nor(ay. But in 8une of t)at year3 (it) a force of fifty#se+en su&%arines a+aila&le and %ost of t)e% re/lenis)ed and sent to sea si%ultaneously3 s)i/ losses a%ounted to o+er ?<>3>>> tons. 5t)er (ea/on syste%s3 suc) as surface raiders3 aircraft3 and %ines3 /us)ed t)is total to nearly =>>3>>> tons. 0)is ca%/aign o(ed /art of its success to a ne( strategy introduced &y d%iral 1onit63 t)e co%%ander of t)e *er%an su&%arine forces. !orld !ar I su&%arine co%%ander3 1onit6 )ad assu%ed co%%and of *er%an su&%arines in 1@?<. fine leader and /rescient /lanner and strategist3 )e )ad early decided to res/ond to t)e concentration of t)e defence in t)e con+oy (it) a concentration &y t)e su&%arines. So3 ()en a su&%arine sig)ted a con+oy3 did not attack &ut radioed its /osition. 5t)er su&%arines3 often ordered fro% t)e s)ore &y d%iral 1onit6 )i%self3 t)en asse%&led3 and all attacked toget)er. In one /articularly successful a//lication of t)is strategy3 se+en su&%arines sank se+enteen s)i/s fro% a con+oy of t)irty#four t)at )ad an inade.uate escort of only four (ars)i/s.

German Su-marine Back

4<=

0)e *er%ans also e%/loyed t)e ne( and +ery effecti+e tactic of striking at nig)t on t)e surface. 0)is ga+e t)e su&%arines a far &etter o//ortunity to o&ser+e and t)e ad+antage of )ig) surface s/eed3 a&out dou&le t)e rate of /rogress of t)e a+erage con+oy. Not only did t)e su&%arines s%all conning to(er %ake t)e su&%arine difficult to see3 &ut also surface o/eration nullified t)e asdic. Better tactics co%/le%ented &etter strategy to cause t)e allies to lose 1.< %illion tons of s)i//ing in t)e /eriod 8une t)roug) 5cto&er 1@4>. 1uring t)is ti%e t)e *er%ans also &egan to rea/ t)e i%/ortant3 long#ter% &enefit of )a+ing &ases on t)e Nor(egian and 'renc) coasts3 ()ic) ena&led su&%arines to %ake s)orter +oyages to and fro% t)e s)i//ing routes3 t)us increasing t)e nu%&er of *er%an su&%arines attacking %erc)ant s)i/s. But sinkings declined as t)e Britis) strengt)ened con+oy escorts after t)e t)reat of a *er%an in+asion (aned and t)e *er%an su&%arines sent out in 8une )ad to return for re/lenis)%ent. 0)e Britis) also increased aircraft /atrols. 2+en slo(3 lu%&ering flying &oats /resented a serious %enace to su&%arines &ecause t)e aircraft carried de/t) c)arges or &o%&s and t)e su&%arines )ad (eak antiaircraft ar%a%ent. In addition3 often an e+en slig)tly da%aged su&%arine could not safely su&%erge. 0)us air /atrols forced su&%arines to su&%erge and %ade it )ard for t)e% to track con+oys. In 1@41 t)e su&%arine (ar against co%%erce follo(ed t)e /attern esta&lis)ed late in 1@4>. 0)e %ont)ly toll in 1@41 a%ounted to a little less t)an 2>>3>>> tons. 0)e *er%ans )ad lost only t)irty# one su&%arines since t)e (ar &egan3 &ut t)ey )ad so neglected to accelerate &uilding t)at t)ey )ad &arely re/laced t)eir casualties. 0)e Britis) offset t)e addition of Italys fleet and t)e increase in t)e nu%&er of *er%an su&%arines during 1@41 &y &uilding still %ore escort +essels3 ac.uiring fifty old destroyers fro% t)e 4nited States3 and securing so%e direct escort aid fro% t)e 4.S. na+y. 0)is ena&led t)e% to strengt)en escorts and e-tend con+oying all t)e (ay across t)e tlantic rat)er t)an li%it it to eit)er end of t)e +oyage. In 1@423 all allied s)i/ losses to su&%arines surged to t(o and one )alf t)at of t)e 1@41 %ont)ly a+erages3 t)oug) t)ey still fell a&out 2>>3>>> tons s)ort of t)e C>>3>>> tons /er %ont) t)at t)e *er%ans )ad calculated (ould gi+e t)e% +ictory. 0)e *er%an na+y o(ed its success in /art to a gro(t) in t)e nu%&er of su&%arines. t t)e &eginning of 1@41 t)e *er%ans )ad 14@ su&%arines (it) @1 o/erational7 at t)e end of t)e year t)ey )ad 212 o/erational out 5f ?@? a+aila&le. 0)e &uilding /rogra% and cre( training toget)er )ad dra%atically aug%ented *er%an na+al strengt). d%iral 1onit6s (inning strategy of concentration against (eakness /ro+ided t)e ot)er factor in t)e increase in sinkings. s soon as t)e 4nited States entered t)e (ar3 1onit6 dis/atc)ed su&%arines to t)e Nort) %erican coast ()ere t)ey found a )a//y )unting ground of uncon+oyed s)i/s. !)en t)e 4.S. na+y organised con+oys3 t)e d%iral s)ifted )is +essels to t)e $ari&&ean and t)en again concentrated on t)e Nort) tlantic sea#lanes3 (eakened to /ro+ide escorts for t)e ne( con+oy routes. ,ate in t)e year3 )e sent significant forces to t)e Sout) tlantic3 using so%e ne( 4<C

long#range su&%arines and large su//ly su&%arines t)at rende6+oused at sea to /ro+ide t)e s%aller co%&at su&%arines (it) fuel and su//lies. gainst t)is /o(erful offensi+e t)e Britis) re/lied (it) i%/ro+ed radar t)at could detect an o&Dect as s%all as a su&%arine conning to(er. 0)e Britis) also &uilt a radar set co%/act enoug) to fit into an air/lane. Su&%arines t)us &eca%e +ulnera&le to disco+ery on t)e surface at nig)t7 aircraft could attack at nig)t &y using an B>#%illion#candle/o(er searc)lig)t to illu%inate a su&%arine originally found (it) radar. 0)e *er%ans res/onded &y %ounting on t)eir su&%arines a recei+er3 ()ic) could detect t)e /resence of radar. 0)is ena&led t)e su&%arine to di+e in t)e /resence of radar#e.ui//ed aircraft or s)i/s. 0)e Britis) res/onded in t)e autu%n (it) a radar of a different (a+elengt)3 ()ic) defeated t)e detector. Surface tra+el re%ained )a6ardous for t)e su&%arines3 es/ecially as t)e Britis) continually added to t)e nu%&er of t)eir air /atrols and t)e sco/e of t)eir co+erage. 0)e year 1@4? /ro%ised to &e a continuation of 1@42 for t)e *er%ans. 0)oug) t)ey )ad lost eig)ty#se+en su&%arines in 1@423 t)ey )ad increased t)eir total nu%&ers fro% 24@ to ?@?. 0)is gro(t) %eant t)at enoug) *er%an cre(s and co%%anders sur+i+ed to aug%ent t)eir /roficiency in s/ite of t)e %ultitude of ne(ly trained %en re.uired to %an a force t)at )ad e-/anded so ra/idly. But in t)e steadily gro(ing nu%&ers of allied escort +essels3 skill ad+anced %ore .uickly &ecause3 co%/ared to su&%arines and con+oyed s)i/s3 escort +essels suffered negligi&le losses. So3 co%/arati+ely3 t)e skill of t)e defending s)i/s increased %ore t)an t)at of t)e attackers. s 1@4? &egan3 t)e *er%ans )ad a reasona&le e-/ectation of greater success as t)ey no( /roduced t)irty su&%arines /er %ont). In %id#Marc) t(o allied con+oys a//roac)ed se+eral *er%an su&%arine grou/s3 called (olf/acks3 toget)er totalling %ore t)an forty su&%arines. In a fi+e#day struggle t)e su&%arines sank t(enty#one s)i/s aggregating 1413>>> tons. In Marc) t)e *er%an su&%arines sank 4@>3>>> tons of s)i//ing in t)e nort) tlantic alone. But t)is %arked t)e )ig) /oint7 i%/ro+ed nglo# %erican skill and %et)ods3 toget)er (it) %ore escorts3 )encefort) o+er%atc)ed t)e *er%ans. 0)e Britis) )ad carried a fe( aircraft (it) con+oys &y using t)e long3 uno&structed surfaces of grain or oil s)i/s to launc) and reco+er a co%/le%ent of t)ree or four old3 slo( S(ordfis) single# engine carrier aircraft. But as early as 1ece%&er 1@41 t)ey )ad /ut into action a freig)ter con+erted into an aircraft carrier. It carried only a&out a do6en aircraft3 ()ic) it )ad to launc) (it) a cata/ult3 &ut it /ro+ided /lanes to aid a con+oy. 0)e first of t)ese carriers3 t)e Auda(ity3 Doined t(el+e ot)er escorts to &ring a t)irty#t(o#s)i/ con+oy fro% *i&raltar to t)e 4nited 9ingdo%. Nine su&%arines attacked and sank t)e Auda(ity and a destroyer3 &ut t)e con+oy lost only t(o s)i/s and t)e escort sank fi+e of t)e su&%arines. By /ril 1@4? t)e Britis) and %ericans )ad se+eral escort carriers3 ()ic) ena&led %any con+oys to )a+e air /rotection e+en in t)e %id# tlantic area too far for land aircraft to /atrol. In addition3 t)ey )ad for%ed su//ort grou/s of si- to eig)t escorts t)at3 rat)er t)an /rotecting a /articular con+oy3 could co%e to t)e assistance of any con+oy %eeting t)e attack of a (olf/ack. 0)ese su//ort grou/s ena&led t)e Britis) and 4nited States na+ies to e%/loy t)e defenders /rinci/le of concentration against strengt) to counter 1onit6s offensi+e (olf/ack concentration against a single con+oy. In early May 1@4? o+er t(enty su&%arines attacked a con+oy ()ose defenders )ad t)e aug%entation of a su//ort grou/. 0)e su&%arines succeeded in sinking t(el+e s)i/s &ut at a cost of se+en su&%arines. !)en t)e su&%arines t)en concentrated against anot)er con+oy3 t)ey sank t)ree s)i/s &ut lost one su&%arine to t)e /lanes of t)e escort carrier .iter3 anot)er to a land#&ased aircraft3 and a t)ird to t)e co%&ined action of an escort and a land#&ased aircraft. su&%arine concentration against a t)ird con+oy %et t)e .iter3 sent to aid t)at con+oy3 and t)e *er%ans sank only t(o s)i/s3 at a loss of t(o su&%arines sunk and ot)ers da%aged. not)er con+oy3 attacked &y

4<B

four different (olf/acks3 suffered no casualties &ut t)e attackers lost fi+e &oats. In a /eriod in May3 t(el+e con+oys crossed t)e nort) tlantic3 losing only fi+e s)i/s7 &ut t)e *er%ans lost t)irteen su&%arines. 0)is re/resented t)e /attern of t)e future3 as en)anced nglo# %erican skill3 aircraft fro% land &ases and escort carriers3 and ade.uate nu%&ers of escorts defeated t)e *er%an offensi+e. !)en t)e Britis)3 &y enlarging t)e si6e of con+oys3 )ad /ro/ortionately e-/anded t)e si6e of t)e escort3 t)ey /ro+ed again to )a+e strengt)ened t)e defence &ecause t)e increased nu%&er of s)i/s +ulnera&le to sinking )ad not3 as it turned out3 corres/ondingly aug%ented t)e defenders tasks or t)e attackers o//ortunities. In May t)e *er%ans sank less t)an a .uarter of a %illion tons of s)i//ing &ut lost forty#one su&%arines. 0)ereafter3 t)e rate of loss of %erc)ant s)i/s fell as t)e defence )ad clearly triu%/)ed. In all of 1@4? t)e *er%ans sank &arely 2.< %illion tons of s)i//ing in a year in ()ic) t)eir ene%ies reac)ed a &uilding rate of o+er 14 %illion tons a year. 0)e *er%ans )ad suffered defeat in t)e raiding (ar against co%%erce3 Dust as t)e 'renc) )ad t(o centuries &efore. 0ec)nological ad+ances /layed a role unkno(n to t)at struggle as did3 )ere and else()ere3 t)e Britis) a&ility to deci/)er %essages encoded &y t)e *er%an ci/)er %ac)ine. In fact3 t)e *er%an su&%arines (ere really on t)e defensi+e against t)e air /atrols of radar# e.ui//ed land # or carrier#&ased aircraft. ,and#&ased aircraft relentlessly )arassed *er%an su&%arines in t)e Bay of Biscay off t)e 'renc) coast3 finding t)e% (it) radar and attacking (it) &o%&s and de/t) c)arges. 0)e *er%ans tried running su&%erged e-ce/t to rec)arge t)eir &atteries and3 ()en detected on t)e surface3 eit)er di+ing or fig)ting &ack (it) an aug%ented antiaircraft ar%a%ent. Neit)er %et)od of defence /ro+ed effecti+e enoug) to /re+ent t)e loss of fifteen su&%arines in a fi+e#(eek /eriod in 8uly and ugust 1@4?. 0)e aircraft3 t)e lig)t ca+alry of t)e air3 /ro+ed /otent at sea against a s)i/ t)at lacked t)e surface s)i/s array of antiaircraft (ea/ons and t)e ar%oured s)i/s /rotection. But t)e /lanes did not o(e t)eir success solely to t)e s/eed of t)eir a//roac)7 aircraft (it) radar )ad a s/ecial ad+antage o+er a s)i/ e.ui//ed only (it) a detector ineffecti+e against t)e radars fre.uency. 0)e *er%ans res/onded &y de+elo/ing t)e snorkel3 an air intake a&o+e t)e surface &ut s%all enoug) to elude radar o&ser+ation. 0)is ena&led t)e su&%arine to o/erate its diesel engines ()ile su&%erged. Still3 t)is only constituted a defensi+e %easure and consistent su&%erged o/eration reduced cre( %orale and li%ited t)e su&%arines o&ser+ation. 0o(ard t)e end of t)e (ar t)e *er%ans introduced a larger co%&at su&%arine ca/a&le of si-teen knots under (ater. :et t)is did not alter t)e &alance of /o(er &et(een t)e su&%arine and t)e escort nor3 dou&tless3 (ould t)e su&%arine t)e *er%ans )ad de+elo/ed3 ()ic) )ad a )ydrogen /ero-ide engine and needed no snorkel. 0)e su&%arine suffered defeat in !orld !ar II for t)e sa%e reason it )ad in t)e first: t)e con+oy. *er%anys ene%ies lost 23CC< s)i/s3 &ut only 2C /ercent of t)ese (ere stea%ing in con+oy ()en sunk. Su&%arines destroyed 143<C?3>>> tons of s)i//ing at a cost 5f CB1 *er%an and B< Italian su&%arines. In !orld !ar I t)e *er%ans lost 1CB su&%arines and t)e allies al%ost as %any tons of %erc)ant s)i/s. 0)e *er%ans )ad %ade a &igger effort &ut secured /ro/ortionately s%aller results. 0)eir ene%ies3 too3 )ad co%%itted %ore resources to t)e defence. 1efensi+e (ea/ons )ad i%/ro+ed %ore t)an t)ose of t)e offensi+e3 asdic /ro+ing %ore telling t)an t)e )ydro/)one and aircraft and radar so adding to t)e /o(er of t)e defenders t)at t)ey could go to t)e offensi+e against t)e su&%arines. Better tor/edoes and su&%arines could not counter&alance t)ese. 0)e *er%ans )ad used an effecti+e strategy ()en t)ey concentrated successi+ely against ene%y (eakness # uncon+oyed areas in t)e central tlantic3 t)e Nort) %erican coast3 t)e $ari&&ean3 t)e Sout) %erican and frican coasts3 and e+en t)e Indian 5cean. 4sing t)e (olf/ack to counteract

4<@

t)e con+oys /ro+ed a good strategy3 &ut it failed to /re+ail against stronger escorts aided &y aircraft and radar and3 later3 &y t)e defensi+e concentration of su//ort grou/s. Skill also )ad a /art in t)e defeat of t)e su&%arines. 0)e *er%ans lost so %any su&%arines3 2?C in 1@4? alone3 t)at t)ey )ad constantly to send into &attle co%%anders and cre(s ()o lacked %uc) actual e-/erience. But &ecause t)ey ai%ed to sink t)e %erc)ant s)i/s rat)er t)an t)eir escorts3 t)eir escort s)i/ and aircraft o//onents suffered negligi&le losses. Increasingly t)e *er%an su&%arines faced +eterans#co%%anders3 sailors3 and aircraft /ilots (it) successful e-/erience sinking su&%arines. 0)e &alance of forces c)anged during t)e su&%arine (ar and ne( (ea/ons3 tactics3 and strategy /layed a role. 4nlike t)e surface na+al (ar in ()ic) initial fleet strengt) and &uilding /rogra%s decided t)e result3 t)e &elligerents )ad to fig)t t)is crucial (ar to deter%ine its outco%e. So t)e *er%ans failed in t)eir effort to a//ly a logistic strategy t)at could not only )a+e /ro+ed decisi+e against t)e 4nited 9ingdo% &ut also could )a+e esta&lis)ed a &lockade sufficient to /re+ent t)e 4nited States fro% su//orting ar%ies in 2uro/e. 0)e Britis)3 on t)e ot)er )and3 %asterfully a//lied t)eir logistic strategy of &lockade3 &ut3 as in !orld !ar I3 it did not /ro+e decisi+e. 0)e *er%an access to t)e resources of 2uro/e3 including t)e oil fields of Ro%ania3 and t)eir reliance on su&stitutes ena&led t)e% to %aintain t)eir (ar effort in s/ite of t)e &lockade. In sia3 )o(e+er3 logistic strategy )ad %ulti/le triu%/)s. Not only did 4.S. su&%arines )a+e i%/ressi+e success against 8a/anese co%%erce3 &ut also3 at t)e end of t)e (ar ()en t)e 8a/anese )ad already lost t)e &ulk of t)eir %erc)ant %arine fleet3 t)e 4.S. na+y esta&lis)ed a fairly effecti+e &lockade of t)e 8a/anese islands. Suc) a &lockade3 if total3 (ould )a+e reduced 8a/anese steel /roduction to a trickle and3 in t)e a&sence of increased food /roduction3 reduced 8a/anese daily food consu%/tion to 132>> calories /er ca/ita. But suc) a /o(erful a//lication of a logistic strategy against an island nation did not suffice7 t)e 4.S. air force added t)e logistic strategy of strategic &o%&ing. :et in s/ite of t)e success of t)e na+ys logistic strategy and t)e destruction (roug)t &y t)at of t)e air force3 t)e 4nited States also /lanned to attain +ictory &y t)e co%&at strategy of in+asion as (ell. But 8a/an %ade /eace &efore t)at ca%/aign &egan. Back

AFTER THE WORLD WARS+ CONSOLIDATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, !'*) ()

Changes in Wea'ons
0)e /eriod since !orld !ar II )as (itnessed a ra/id gro(t) in ne( and i%/ro+ed (ea/ons as go+ern%ents s/onsored and li&erally su//orted t)eir syste%atic de+elo/%ent. Most of t)e (ea/ons e+ol+ed fro% t)ose originated &efore or during !orld !ar II. 0)e %ature ones under(ent t)e least %odifications7 artillery3 s)i/s3 and tanks seeking furt)er i%/ro+e%ent rat)er t)an drastic alteration. Nuclear /o(er for su&%arines constituted t)e e-ce/tion )ere3 &ecause it %ade su&%arines relati+ely inde/endent of need for contact (it) t)e surface to o/erate air#&reat)ing engines. 0)is a&ility ga+e su&%arines t)e %eans to attain greater s/eeds &ecause t)ey could use full /o(er under t)e surface. Routine under(ater o/eration ena&led na+al arc)itects to design t)eir s)i/s for %a-i%u% su&surface s/eeds. 5f course3 nuclear su&%arines also )ad great range &ecause t)eir nuclear fuel lasted for years3 and t)e s)i/s could carry enoug) o-ygen for t)e cre(s to re%ain su&%erged for long /eriods of ti%e. n early nuclear su&%arine de%onstrated its ca/a&ilities &y cruising to t)e Nort) Pole under t)e ice.

4=>

rtillery c)anged little3 &ut3 (it) t)e a&andon%ent of )orse traction and t)e ste//ed#u/ usage of self#/ro/elled tracked %ounting3 ar%ies e%/loyed larger &ore )o(it6ers t)an t)ose used in t)e (orld (ars and a&andoned t)e !orld !ar I field gun entirely. 0)e Det engine3 introduced &y t)e *er%ans and t)e Britis) at t)e end of t)e (ar3 dra%atically increased t)e s/eed of aircraft. 'ro% 4<> %iles an )our for fig)ters (it) reci/rocating engines at t)e end of t)e (ar3 Det fig)ter and &o%&er aircraft soon routinely fle( at =<> %iles an )our3 and %any fig)ters could attain s/eeds %ore t)an dou&le t)is. Planes gre( larger until fig)ters ri+alled %any !orld !ar II &o%&ers in si6e7 &o%&ers t)e%sel+es gre( /ro/ortionately &igger. 2-ce/t for t)e re+olution in su&%arine ca/a&ilities3 t)ese c)anges (ere of degree only. s (it) %ost ot)er (ea/on syste%s3 t)e /rogress in infantry e-tra/olated earlier trends. 0)e .uest for a greater rate of fire3 a c)aracteristic since t)e %u66leloader3 reac)ed its a/e- ()en ar%ies e.ui//ed e+ery soldier (it) a s%all3 lig)t %ac)ine gun.

<et Air(raft Back

But t)e /ost#(ar /eriod &eca%e t)e age of t)e rocket7 it actually &egan during !orld !ar II3 (it) t)e use of rockets in aircraft3 to su//le%ent artillery3 and (it) t)e *er%an de+elo/%ent of t)e V2 long#range &allistic rocket. By t)e 1@=>s &allistic rockets )ad ac)ie+ed greater accuracy and e-tended t)eir range to o+er <3>>> %iles. Suc) %issiles still defied antiaircraft defence and could carry a nuclear (ar)ead far %ore /o(erful t)an t)e t(o &o%&s dro//ed in !orld !ar II. 0)is /ro+ided Britain3 'rance3 Russia3 t)e 4nited States and /ro&a&ly ot)er states (it) an irresisti&le offensi+e (ea/on for strategic attack against /o/ulation centres. It %ade fully effecti+e t)e original conce/t of a strategic air attack t)at (ould cri//le a countrys (ar#%aking /otential and terrorise its /eo/le into su&%ission. Su&se.uent i%/ro+e%ents en)anced accuracy and ena&led a single rocket to carry se+eral inde/endently targeta&le (ar)eads. ccuracy reac)ed t)e le+el ()ere /lanners en+isioned t)e /ossi&ility of attacking ene%y rockets &efore t)ey could fire. 0)e guiding of s%aller rockets )ad a %aDor i%/act on traditional %odes of co%&at. 0)e antiaircraft defence against )ig)#altitude attack3 for e-a%/le3 su&stituted a %issile for cannon to fire at )ig)# flying targets. 0)e radar found and tracked t)e ene%y /lane in t)e sa%e (ay it )ad controlled cannon3 &ut3 instead3 t)e defenders s)ot a %issile containing an e-/losi+e c)arge of se+eral )undred /ounds. n additional radar set tracked t)is %issile and3 fro% a co%/uter3 sent co%%ands t)at %o+ed t)e %issiles directing fins3 guided it to interce/t t)e attacking aircraft3 and t)en ordered it to e-/lode ()en near t)e aircraft. No Det /lane could fly )ig)er or faster t)an t)is rocket#/o(ered %issile. 5t)er syste%s of guidance ai%ed a radio &ea% at t)e target3 a rocket tra+elling along t)e &ea% until it interce/ted t)e %o+ing aircraft. 5t)er %issiles directed t)e%sel+es &y seeking a )eat source3 suc) as a Det aircrafts e-)aust. Still ot)ers %ade use of tele+ision i%ages. rocket could use %ore t)an one syste% of guidance in se.uence3 recei+ing direction3 for e-a%/le3 until near enoug) to )o%e in on a source of )eat.

Antiair(raft ,o($et Back

4=1

Soldiers could use suc) %issiles to fire at one anot)er3 and aircraft could fire t)e% at ground targets. But t)ese %issiles )ad /articularly great utility for air defence and for co%&at &et(een /lanes3 ()ic) could no( engage one anot)er at distances too great for t)e %ac)ine guns or cannon of !orld !ar II. S)i/s could co%&at eac) ot)er (it) flying %issiles t)at could re%ain al%ost in+isi&le to radar and difficult to s)oot do(n as t)ey tra+elled a fe( feet a&o+e t)e surface of t)e (ater. ircraft could launc) suc) %issiles against s)i/s. Missiles c)anged aircraft little3 &ut %issiles and t)e aircraft carrier (roug)t a /rofound %odification in (ars)i/s. 0)e e-/ectation of co%&at at great ranges3 (it) aircraft or (it) %issiles3 led to t)e gradual de%ise of t)e gun as t)e /ri%ary ar%a%ent of s)i/s and of t)e ar%our needed to gi+e /rotection against gunfire. !ars)i/s &eca%e unar%oured +essels loaded (it) antiaircraft and3 often3 antisu&%arine (ea/ons3 toget)er (it) t)e large a%ount of electronic e.ui/%ent needed to guide t)eir %issiles and detect t)e ene%y. By t)e standards /re+ailing for nearly a century3 (ars)i/s )ad &eco%e incredi&ly fragile as t)ey de/ended on t)e acti+e defence of t)eir %issiles and t)eir associated detection and guidance e.ui/%ent rat)er t)an t)e traditional /assi+e defence of ar%our /late3 /rotecti+e decks3 and sturdy construction. 0)e li%ited na+al co%&at occurring since !orld !ar II confir%ed t)is fragility. 0)e aircraft carrier3 so do%inant in t)e Pacific in !orld !ar II3 re%ained t)e ca/ital s)i/ of t)e 4.S. na+y3 &ut no ot)er country contested its su/re%acy in t)is kind of (arfare. 5t)er nations relied al%ost e-clusi+ely on attack (it) %issiles and defence against %issiles and aircraft. ir forces continued to de/end on &o%&s and su//lied guidance to so%e of t)ese. But3 unlike t)e (ars)i/s3 t)e large3 stoutly &uilt Dets )ad %ore resistance t)an t)eir !orld !ar II counter/arts. In s/ite of t)e great /roliferation of so/)isticated electronic sur+eillance e.ui/%ent and rockets (it) co%/le- guidance syste%s3 (arfare on land c)anged little. In fact3 t)e rocket reinforced so%e of t)e c)anges t)at )ad originated during !orld !ar II &y increasing t)e infantrys ca/acity to resist t)e %ounted (ea/on syste%s. 0)e i%/ro+e%ent of t)e &a6ooka antitank rocket and t)e recoilless cannon en)anced t)e infantrys a&ility to deal (it) tanks. In t)e 1@<>s t)e 'renc) used a %issile guided &y co%%ands sent along a (ire /layed out &y t)e %issile as it %o+ed to(ard t)e target. 0)is a//arently /ri%iti+e a//roac) assured continuous contact (it) t)e %issile and allo(ed t)e o/erator to direct it against a %o+ing target. !it) a s)a/ed c)arge3 t)is (ire#guided %issile /ro+ed effecti+e against tanks at a range greater t)an a %ile. 0)e s%aller %odels of t)ese (ea/ons (ere /orta&le. 0)e infantry ac.uired a /orta&le antiaircraft %issile t)at a soldier could fire fro% t)e s)oulder. "eat#seeking guidance ai%ed a s%all3 rocket#/o(ered %issile to(ard t)e e-)aust of t)e attacking aircraft. 0)us infantry ac.uired its o(n significant /rotection against lo(#le+el air attackers and could /lay t)e role of $rusader cross&o(%en in fending off t)e lig)t ca+alry of t)e air.

4=2

0)is /ro+ision of infantry (it) econo%ical3 /orta&le (ea/ons ga+e t)e% t)e ca/acity to fulfil t)e roles of t)e lig)t and )ea+y infantry of old3 &ut it did not &ring a&out a ree%/)asis on t)e function of t)e infantry. In s/ite of t)e +alue of t)e /orta&le3 )eat#seeking antiaircraft %issile3 t)e %o&ile3 radar#directed (ea/ons3 including t)e s%all auto%atic cannon so effecti+e in !orld !ar II3 still see%ed needed for air defence. nd t)e greater effecti+eness of t)e tank in an antitank role3 cou/led (it) its +ersatility3 %ade soldiers /refer t)is /o(erful (ea/on syste%. 8ust as dis%ounted 2nglis) knig)ts )ad (it)stood 'renc) )ea+y ca+alry at t)e Battle of $r;cy3 so stationary defending tanks /ro+ed su/erior to %o+ing tanks in t)e attack. In t)e fourteent) century t)e 2nglis) could )a+e o&tained t)e sa%e results (it) !els) s/ear%en ()o% t)ey could )a+e gi+en strategic %o&ility &y %ounting on ine-/ensi+e )orses. But a co%/ara&le resistance to 'renc) ca+alry (ould )a+e re.uired %ore s/ear%en t)an dis%ounted %en at ar%s3 and t)e s/ear%en lacked any ca/a&ility to act as ca+alry. So Dust as )ad t)e 2nglis) centuries &efore3 ar%ies /laced %ore reliance u/on tanks and stro+e to reac) t)e ideal of all#%ounted forces. In fact3 t)e (arfare of t)e Nort) frican desert see%s to )a+e forecast t)e future3 as 2uro/ean ar%ies ca%e %ore and %ore to rese%&le t)e largely %ounted By6antine ar%y (it) its costly ar%oured ca+alry e.ui//ed also (it) &o(s. So ar%ies %ounted a )ig) /ro/ortion of t)eir soldiers in aircraft3 tanks3 or self#/ro/elled artillery. 0)ey also %ade e-tensi+e use of tracked3 ar%oured carriers for %o+ing infantry3 +e)icles t)at could fig)t and fill t)e role of t)e )orses used to carry !els) s/ear%en. ,ike t)e By6antine )ea+y ca+alry3 t)e tanks of t)e 2uro/ean ar%ies could c)arge (it) great /o(er or ca/a&ly conduct t)e tanks e.ui+alent of t)e )orse%ans dis%ounted defence against a )ea+y ca+alry c)arge of ene%y tanks. Rat)er t)an )a+ing antiaircraft (ea/ons /laced on tanks in i%itation of t)e &o(s carried &y By6antine )ea+y ca+alry3 self#/ro/elled antiaircraft guns acco%/anied t)e tanks. 0)e ar%ies retained infantry &ut often as %ounted infantry3 carried in lig)tly ar%ed and ar%oured trans/ort carriers3 deri+ed fro% t)e )alf#tracked +e)icles t)at carried t)e ar%oured#di+ision infantry of !orld !ar II. 1is%ounted3 t)ese infantry%en could use t)eir antitank rockets3 %ac)ine guns3 %ortars3 and recoilless cannon to attack or defend against ot)er infantry and so /rotect t)eir o(n or o/erate against ene%y tanks and ot)er +e)icles3 t)us &lending nineteent)#century co%&at (it) /ost#1@4< %ounted (arfare. :et t)e e%/)asis on guided rockets for infantrys co%&at against aircraft and tanks and t)e use of rockets in co%&at &et(een aircraft re+ersed a longstanding tradition in !estern (arfare. 'or centuries soldiers )ad +alued +olu%e of fire o+er accuracy3 &ut3 in s/ite of t)e e-tension of t)is trend to t)e e.ui/%ent of all soldiers (it) auto%atic rifles3 t)e guidance of rockets e%/)asised accuracy at t)e e-/ense of rate of fire3 and t)e cost of t)e a%%unition /recluded a resort to a )ig) +olu%e of fire. r%ies /laced suc) great stress on ne( or i%/ro+ed (ea/ons3 greater accuracy3 and %ore effecti+e electronic sur+eillance t)at it often see%ed as if t)e .uality and so/)istication of (ea/ons (ould deter%ine t)e outco%e of &attles. But in t)e %any s%all conflicts t)roug)out t)e (orld in t)e /ost# !orld !ar II era3 leaders)i/ and training3 toget)er (it) skill gained in co%&at3 still %ade t)e sa%e contri&ution to +ictory t)at t)ey )ad al(ays %ade. 0)is occurred in s/ite of t)e gro(t) in t)e auto%atic attri&utes of (ea/ons t)at reduced t)e %anual skill de%anded for t)eir %ost /roficient use. No longer3 for e-a%/le3 did soldiers re.uire strengt) and e-/ertness to s)oot long&o(s3 (ell# )oned and slo(ly ac.uired facility for reloading %u66leloaders3 or e+en de-terity in (orking t)e &olt of a rifle and &ringing t)e (ea/on /ro%/tly &ack on t)e target7 rifle%en needed only to ai%3 /ull t)e trigger3 and e-c)ange full for e%/ty %aga6ines. But ne( (ea/ons de%anded a )ig)er le+el of logistic co%/etence. 0)e co%/le- (ea/ons3 /articularly electronic guidance and sur+eillance e.ui/%ent3 necessitated kno(ledgea&le re/air%en to kee/ t)e% (orking. nd3 in s/ite of t)is attention3 t)e ne( and relati+ely untried a//aratus /ro+ed unrelia&le. In one as/ect3 ar%ies )ad returned to t)e day of t)e %atc)lock ()en only )alf of

4=?

t)e (ea/ons fired ()en t)e ar.ue&usiers /ulled t)e triggers. But3 unlike t)e %atc)lock3 %odern (ea/ons t)at failed to function /ro/erly /erfor%ed &elo( t)eir designed ca/acity and so co%/elled t)e ar%ies to /ro+ide co%/etent re/air%en.

Heli(o ter Back

In t)e )elico/ter ar%ies ac.uired t)eir o(n lig)t ca+alry. &le to rise and descend +ertically and )o+er in t)e air3 t)e )elico/ter al%ost e-actly re/roduced t)e ca/a&ilities of traditional lig)t ca+alry. r%ed (it) %ac)ine guns and rockets3 it /ro+ed e-tre%ely effecti+e against infantry and3 /articularly ()en ar%ed (it) (ire#guided antitank %issiles3 deadly to tanks. It could also carry a do6en or %ore soldiers. But t)e slo( &ulky )elico/ter (as at least as +ulnera&le to antiaircraft fire as lig)t ca+alry to t)e lig)t infantry of old3 so %uc) so in fact t)at it )ad little co%&at use against forces /ro+ided (it) antiaircraft defences. But its logistic +alue in furnis)ing ra/id %o+e%ent3 o+erco%ing difficult terrain or /assing o+er (ater3 and flying o+er ene%y territory not defended &y antiaircraft (ea/ons %ade it .uite +alua&le nonet)eless. Back

(he #ll-Mounted #rmy

r%ies also )ad tactical nuclear (ea/ons (it) (ar)eads s%all enoug) to fit into field artillery /roDectiles. Suc) great /o(er in a s%all &ulk (ould )a+e conse.uences )ard to calculate3 es/ecially in +ie( of t)e radiation inse/ara&le fro% suc) e-/losions. single nuclear s)ell or &o%& could re/roduce t)e effects of a +irtually un/recedented concentration of artillery. Since for nearly t(o centuries suc) concentrations )ad /layed a %aDor role in t)e offensi+e3 tactical nuclear (ea/ons o&+iously ga+e t)e offensi+e an o//ortunity for sur/rise &ecause it could dis/ense (it) a concentration of artillery3 al(ays trou&leso%e to conceal. But since offensi+e action )ad traditionally re.uired concentration of forces3 t)e defensi+e rea/ed a %aDor ad+antage fro% t)e ne( (ea/on in t)at it could /ro%/tly deli+er a nuclear (ea/on against t)e ene%y concentration. 0)us t)e defence3 e+en if caug)t una(are3 )ad no need to carry out a counter#concentration to deal (it) an ene%y offensi+e. Since t)e increases in fire/o(er in t)e nineteent) and t(entiet) centuries )ad usually strengt)ened t)e relati+e /o(er of t)e defence3 it see%s logical to assu%e t)at t)e addition of nuclear (ea/ons (ould )a+e t)e sa%e outco%e. But 2uro/ean ar%ies did not /lan routinely to )a+e recourse to tactical nuclear (ea/ons on t)e defensi+e. 0)e a//re)ension t)at suc) tactical e%/loy%ent could lead to strategic use3 and t)e resulting destruction of cities and killing of %illions of ci+ilians3 %ade ar%ies /lan to fig)t (it)out t)e% as (ell. 0)e /ossi&ility3 )o(e+er3 of t)e e%/loy%ent of tactical nuclear (ea/ons ga+e added i%/etus to t)e trend to t)e all#%ounted force. Increased %o&ility (ould %ake it easier to seek safety t)roug) t)e dis/ersal of forces &ecause %ounted forces could re#concentrate %ore ra/idly t)an t)ose on foot. 0)e /rotection fro% a nuclear e-/losion offered &y a tank or an ar%oured carrier also %ade t)ese (ea/on syste%s %ore attracti+e.

4=4

0)e ne( %ounted ar%ies stressed tanks to a degree un/recedented in !orld !ar II and not seen since %edie+al ar%ies /laced co%/ara&le e%/)asis u/on )ea+y ca+alry. 0)ey follo(ed %ore closely t)e $rusader or By6antine %odel rat)er t)an t)e 0urkis) lig)t#ca+alry ar%y of t)e Middle ges3 in /art &ecause cost ratios )ad c)anged dra%atically. 2.ui//ing t)e ar%oured )ea+y ca+alry%an and )is ro&ust (ar)orse a%ounted to a great deal %ore t)an outfitting t)e lig)t ca+alry%an (it) )is si%/ler e.ui/%ent and less e-/ensi+e )orse. But &y t)e 1@=>s3 )o(e+er3 a Det fig)ter &o%&er cost a&out ten ti%es as %uc) as a tank and )ad greater re.uire%ents in skill for t)e /ilot and for logistical and %aintenance facilities. 0)e )ea+y ca+alry tank )ad &eco%e so %uc) less e-/ensi+e t)an t)e lig)t ca+alry of t)e air t)at tanks /roliferated in s/ite of t)e greater security aircraft offered against tactical nuclear (ea/ons. 0)e %o&ile ar%ies (it) %any e-/ensi+e fig)ter &o%&ers3 +ast nu%&ers of large3 so/)isticated tanks3 self#/ro/elled artillery3 and ar%oured carriers for infantry )ad far fe(er %en t)an t)e ar%ies of t)e 2uro/ean /o(ers on t)e e+e of t)e !orld !ar II. Auantities of electronic sur+eillance and guidance syste%s and costly a%%unition added to t)e ca/ital intensi+e nature of t)ese ar%ies in ()ic) %illions of trained reser+es no longer /layed t)e +ital role t)ey )ad in 1@14 and 1@?@. 0)is3 too3 constituted a rational res/onse to econo%ic realities in one of t)e (ealt)iest /arts of t)e (orld. 0)e )ig) cost of la&our3 &ecause of its /roducti+e ci+ilian alternati+e uses3 %ade ca/ital#intensi+e ar%ies sensi&le. In one area3 )o(e+er3 2uro/ean /o(ers neglected ca/ital in+est%ent in defence. 0)e tradition of /er%anent fortifications3 ()ic) )ad suc) great i%/ortance in !estern 2uro/e since t)e castle and t)e (alled to(n3 suffered neglect in t)e defensi+e /lanning of t)e *er%ans and 'renc). 2+en t)e for%ida&le underground fortifications of t)e Maginot line languis)ed un)eeded3 in s/ite of t)e defence t)ey offered against e+en nuclear &lasts and radiation. Back

(he sraeli--gy'tian War of 7=AB

0)e 2uro/ean and %erican %ounted (ay of (ar and t)e u/#to#date %issile oriented (ea/on syste%s )ad a nu%&er of trials in t)e Middle 2ast in t)e (ars &et(een t)e ra&s and t)e Israelis. 0)ese )ad not only s)o(n t)e ne( (ea/ons in action &ut also /ro+ed t)at %odern tec)nology )ad not de+alued skill and co%&at e-/erience. 0)e tendency to a//ly a tec)nological deter%inis% to /redict +ictory recei+ed its re&uttal fro% t)e easy successes of t)e Israeli ar%y. But one ca%/aign3 in ()ic) t)e antagonists (ere fairly e+enly %atc)ed3 ga+e t)e ca/a&ilities of t)e (ea/ons and t)e c)aracteristics of t)e doctrines an o//ortunity to dis/lay t)e%sel+es (it)out t)e &ias of distinctly su/erior tactical skill on one side. By 1@C? %ost of t)e contending ar%ies in t)ese Middle 2ast (ars )ad a%/le su//lies of %odern (ea/ons and t)e doctrine3 training3 and co%&at e-/erience to use t)e% (ell. s t)e Russians su//lied t)e &ulk of t)e ra& (ea/ons3 t)e 4nited States /ro+ided t)e %aDority of Israels ar%a%ents3 and %ost )ad so%e Britis) and 'renc) e.ui/%ent also. 2ac) ar%ys (ea/ons differed degree &ut not in funda%ental c)aracteristics. But 4.S. tanks did tend to )a+e greater si6e3 t)icker ar%our3 and a s%aller gun t)an t)e Russian tanks. Since Israel lay &et(een 2gy/t on its (est and Syria and 8ordan on t)e east3 t)e 2gy/tians and Syrians carefully coordinated t)eir une-/ected inauguration of )ostilities to offset Israels interior lines &y a concentration in ti%e t)roug) a si%ultaneous attack. 0)ey succeeded3 securing tactical sur/rise &ut3 in +ie( of t)eir strategic situation and o&+ious o&Decti+es3 attained no strategic sur/rise. 0)e contest of t)e 2gy/tian and Israeli ar%ies (ell e-)i&ited &ot) t)e c)anges in (arfare %ade /ossi&le &y ne( (ea/on syste%s and t)e continuity in tactics and strategy t)at see%s ine+ita&ly to c)aracterise at least so%e as/ects of o/erations in any era. Bot) ar%ies )ad suc) large nu%&ers of tanks t)at alt)oug) eac) retained t)e ar%oured di+ision3 &ot) distri&uted tanks a%ong all of t)eir di+isions3 %uc) as t)e 'renc) )ad done in 1@4>. But all di+isions &ad %otor trans/ort3 and %any infantry%en rode in t)inly ar%oured tracked carriers. 0)e Sue6 $anal3 at all /oints at least 2>>

4=<

yards (ide3 di+ided t)e 2gy/tian and Israeli forces. Bot) ar%ies )ad fortified t)is (ater(ay3 eac) side )a+ing erected an eart)en e%&ank%ent at least fifty feet )ig) along t)e &ank of its side. 0)ese see%ingly arc)aic fortifications /ro+ided a /)ysical &arrier to soldiers and +e)icles3 /rotection for t)e road &e)ind3 and a co%%anding location for guns or strong /oints. 0)ey (ere difficult to da%age (it) artillery fire. But3 for defence of t)e canal line3 t)e Israelis relied /ri%arily on tank and %otorised infantry forces /osted &e)ind t)eir e%&ank%ent. 0)oug) t)e Israelis )ad a road net(ork to facilitate t)eir lateral %o+e%ent and concentration3 tracked and e+en ()eeled +e)icles could /ass o+er %ost of t)e treeless terrain near t)e canal. 5n t)e afternoon of 5cto&er =t) 1@C?3 t)e 2gy/tians and Syrians &egan )ostilities against Israeli ar%ies t)at (ere (it)out t)eir reser+es. In a (ell#/lanned o/eration3 guided &y an e-cellent staff3 B3>>> 2gy/tian infantry used s%all &oats to cross t)e canal on a fifty#%ile front3 a+oiding only t)e s(a%/ region in t)e nort) and t)e lakes in t)e sout). 0)e 2gy/tian soldiers )ad t)e su//ort of al%ost 43>>> guns3 including t)ose in tanks3 ()ic) fired o+er 1>3>>> s)ells in t)e first %inute of t)e attack. !it) ladders t)e soldiers cli%&ed t)e slo/ing sides of t)e Israeli &ank and /us)ed &eyond it a little o+er a )alf %ile. 2ac) soldier /ulled a little cart to )el/ )i% carry )is rifle and /rinci/al (ea/on syste%. So%e soldiers carried (ire#guided antitank %issiles (it) a range as great as 131>> yards3 and ot)ers carried antitank rocket launc)ers3 like &a6ookas3 (it) a %a-i%u% range of a&out 2>> yards. If ene%y tanks s)ould a//roac) too close for t)e guided %issiles3 t)ey (ould )a+e reac)ed t)e effecti+e range of t)e rocket launc)ers. 0)e syste% of defence )ad %uc) in co%%on (it) t)at of t)e S(iss ()en t)ey ar%ed t)eir outer ranks (it) long /ikes and t)e inner ranks of t)eir s.uare (it) )al&erds to co%&at knig)ts ()o got /ast t)e /ikes. In addition3 %any of t)e 2gy/tian infantry carried a )eat#seeking antiaircraft %issile effecti+e against lo(#flying aircraft. 'or defence against a )ig)#le+el attack t)e 2gy/tians )ad radar# controlled3 long#range antiaircraft %issiles close to t)eir &ank of t)e canal3 ()ic) could readily /rotect t)eir infantry as long as t)ey re%ained near t)e canals far &ank. !it) t)e de+elo/%ent of /orta&le antitank and antiaircraft (ea/ons3 infantry )ad reco+ered t)e ca/a&ilities t)at t)ey )ad /ossessed centuries &efore. 8ust as /ike%en could defend against )ea+y ca+alry and cross&o(%en could inflict serious casualties on )orse arc)ers3 so t)e 2gy/tian infantry3 (it) t)e aid of t)e stationary antiaircraft %issiles east of t)e canal3 could resist t)e Israelis ()o3 %uc) like t)e Part)ians or Mongols of old3 fa+oured %ounted (arfare. Because co%&at )ad e-/anded to t)ree di%ensions3 t)e 2gy/tians could ado/t an unco%/licated array3 t)e soldiers (it) antiaircraft %issiles taking t)eir /osition &e)ind t)ose (it) t)e antitank (ea/ons. s t)e 2gy/tians steadily reinforced t)eir ar%y on t)e far &ank of t)e canal3 t)e su/erlati+e Israeli air force attacked3 losing )alf of its /lanes to t)e air defences. 0)e antiaircraft %issiles carried &y t)e soldiers /ro+ed accurate &ut often failed to disa&le t)e aircraft &ecause its s%all (ar)ead e-/loded ()ere t)e )ot gasses of t)e Det left t)e engine. But t)e e-/losion inflicted su&stantial da%age and t)e co%/arati+e cost of t)e t(o (ea/on syste%s3 infantry%an (it) a s%all %issile and a /ilot (it) an e-/ensi+e air/lane3 %eant t)at da%age to t)e aircraft constituted a %aDor tactical +ictory. In one attack3 B> /ercent of t)e Israeli /lanes suffered da%age. !)en t)e 2gy/tians &roug)t o+er self#/ro/elled3 four#&arrelled3 2?#%llliineter radar#directed auto%atic antiaircraft guns3 t)ey )ad a co%/lete air defence3 ()ic) reinforced t)e decision of t)e Israeli air force to a+oid attacks on t)e 2gy/tians east of t)e canal. 0)e assaults of t)e Israeli ar%oured forces suffered a si%ilar fate ()en t)ey c)arged t)e infantry. 0)e (ell#trained and confident 2gy/tian soldiers (it)stood a nu%&er of s%all tank attacks during t)e afternoon in ()ic) t)e counterattacking Israelis lost al%ost all of t)eir tanks. Mean()ile3 t)e 2gy/tians reinforced t)eir infantry (it) recoilless rifles and B<# and 1>>#%illi%eter antitank guns.

4==

0)ey also )ad s%all3 lig)tly ar%oured +e)icles t)at carried antitank %issiles3 one )a+ing a s%all antitank gun. Stronger Israeli tank assaults in t)e e+ening and t)e follo(ing day suffered t)e sa%e fate as t)ose launc)ed i%%ediately3 one losing @> /ercent of t)e assaulting tanks in ten %inutes. 0)e ar%oured di+ision %aking t)ese attacks lost t(o#t)irds of its strengt). 0)e ne-t day3 5cto&er Bt)3 t)e Israelis3 reinforced to t)ree di+isions3 %ade a rene(ed counterattack. 5+erconfident and %isled &y t)e lack of intelligence caused &y t)e 2gy/tians antiaircraft defences li%iting air reconnaissance3 t)e Israelis3 su//orted &y only four artillery /ieces3 launc)ed counterattacks of inade.uate strengt) and (it) confused o&Decti+es. 5nly one di+ision actually /artici/ated3 and it lost )alf its tanks. In t)ese local counterattacks t)e Israelis lost as %any as 2<> tanks. fter t)is t)ey ke/t t)eir distance and re%ained on t)e defensi+e. But t)e 2gy/tians %ade no effort to e-/loit t)eir successes3 instead staying close to t)e canal3 &uilding &ridges3 &ringing o+er B>> tanks and nine di+isions3 and dee/ening t)eir &ridge)ead only +ery circu%s/ectly. In s/ite of t)eir great su/eriority3 t)ey ado/ted t)is essentially defensi+e /osture &ecause t)e success attained and t)e ground gained %et t)eir /olitical o&Decti+es for t)e ca%/aign. "a+ing /ro+ed t)eir defensi+e %ig)t3 t)ey (ere reluctant to ad+ance and engage in t)e kind of %ounted (arfare in ()ic) t)e seasoned Israelis e-celled. !)ile t)e 2gy/tians &uilt u/ t)eir strengt) on t)e east &ank of t)e canal3 t)ey )ad tried to retard t)e arri+al of additional Israeli troo/s &y sending a force of s%all a%/)i&ious tanks o+er t)e canal and east(ard to &lock /asses. But Israeli tanks reac)ed t)e /ositions first and easily defeated t)ese fragile 2gy/tian tanks. 0)irty 2gy/tian )elico/ters3 eac) carrying a&out t(enty#fi+e soldiers3 landed %en (ell east of t)e canal. r%ed (it) antitank rockets3 t)ese units &locked t)e %ain roads to delay Israeli reinforce%ents. But t)e s%all 2gy/tian detac)%ents i%/osed only &rief delays on t)e /o(erful Israeli forces ()en t)ey a//eared. 0)e )elico/ters /erfor%ed t)eir function (ell3 e+en t)oug) t)e Israelis s)ot do(n a nu%&er ()en t)ey %ade later flig)ts to reinforce t)e &locking units. 0)e loss of t)ese )elico/ters confir%ed t)eir +ulnera&ility ()en o//osing ar%ies )ad ela&orate antiaircraft defences. ntici/ating t)is3 &ot) co%&atants generally li%ited t)eir use of )elico/ters to logistic tasks. If t)is 2gy/tian Dudg%ent in fa+our of t)e defensi+e needed any su//ort3 it recei+ed it fro% t)e e-/erience of one force t)at )ad /us)ed a dee/ t)rust into Israeli territory. 0)ree &attalions (it) a&out 2>> +e)icles3 including tanks3 trucks3 and ar%oured carriers for infantry3 )a+ing ad+anced ten %iles fro% t)e canal3 recei+ed Israeli air strikes t)at3 toget)er (it) t)e resistance of an infantry &attalion and t(enty tanks3 destroyed )alf t)e 2gy/tian +e)icles &efore t)ey returned to t)e canal. But t)e distress of t)e Syrians ()o faced a successful Israeli offensi+e concentration induced t)e 2gy/tians to a&andon t)e defensi+e and to carry out on 5cto&er 14t) an offensi+e against t)e Israelis ()o3 t)oug) inferior in nu%&ers3 )ad B>> tanks. Bringing across t)e canal so%e of t)e radar#guided antiaircraft %issiles and reinforce%ents of infantry and tanks3 t)e 2gy/tians attacked all along t)e front in ()at /ro+ed to &e little %ore t)an a de%onstration. !it)out any concentration of troo/s3 t)ey %et t)e Israelis in essentially e.ual force e+ery()ere3 t)eir attacks s)o(ing t)e effecti+eness of tanks on t)e defence. Israeli tanks occu/ied /re+iously selected defensi+e /ositions3 including so%e e-ca+ated for t)e /ur/ose3 and3 e-/osing only t)eir turrets and guns3 )ad a great ad+antage o+er t)e fully +isi&le and +ulnera&le 2gy/tian tanks %aking t)e attack. 0)e Israeli tanks gained added security fro% t)e 2gy/tian )o(it6ers and artillery &y %o+ing fro% one /re+iously c)osen /rotected /osition to anot)er. 0)e Israeli tanks also counterattacked against t)e flanks of t)e ad+ancing 2gy/tian tanks and dis/layed t)eir do%inant tactical skill in %anoeu+ring and s)ooting (it) t)eir tank guns. 'or t)e days unsuccessful attacks t)e 2gy/tians lost 2=> of t)eir 13>>> tanks3 t)e Israelis less t)an one# fourt) as %any3 t)e %aDority of ()ic) t)ey soon re/aired.

4=C

Mac)ine guns /ro+ed in+alua&le in co/ing (it) t)e 2gy/tian infantry ar%ed (it) (ire#guided %issiles. Mac)ine gun fire %ade it difficult for t)e 2gy/tian infantry (it) %issiles to %o+e and e+en )arder for t)e soldier to kee/ )is )ead e-/osed to guide t)e %issile to its target. Israeli field artillery3 too3 ser+ed t)is /ur/ose and also dis/layed its +alue against t)e t)inly ar%oured +e)icles t)at carried %issiles. In s/ite of /rogress &y so%e of t)eir colu%ns3 all of t)e 2gy/tians fell &ack to t)eir starting /oints &y t)e follo(ing day. 0)e Israeli air force3 ()ic) )ad already attacked so%e of t)e %ost ad+anced for%ations3 /ro+ided one %oti+e for t)is (it)dra(al3 t)e 2gy/tian co%%and t)us ad)ering to t)e old By6antine rule of not se/arating t)e )ea+y ca+alry fro% t)e lig)t infantry. ,i%ited e-/ectations for suc) an offensi+e (it)out any concentration of force %ust )a+e constituted anot)er reason. 5nly /art of t)e 2gy/tian ar%y )ad engaged3 t)ose )eld &ack e.ualling t)e nu%&er t)at )ad originally resisted t)e Israeli counterattacks. soldier as astute and ort)odo- as *eneral Is%ail3 t)e 2gy/tian co%%ander in c)ief3 could )ardly )a+e entertained ot)er e-/ectations fro% t)e kind of offensi+e undertaken3 (it) t)e li%ited troo/s engaged3 t)an t)e fe( %odest gains %ade and t)e casualties incurred. 0)e Israelis atte%/ted no /ursuit3 carefully a+oiding t)e for%ida&le 2gy/tian antitank and antiaircraft defences along t)e canal. But t)e Israelis did /lan a counterattack against a s/ot ()ere t)ey found a s%all ga/ in t)e 2gy/tian line east of t)e canal. 0)is (eak /oint3 nort) of t)e larger lake3 coincided (it) one of t)eir o(n /re# /lanned crossing /oints ()ere t)ey )ad %ade a less for%ida&le e%&ank%ent on t)e canal and near ()ic) t)ey )ad stored &ridging e.ui/%ent (it) a designated route for it to t)e crossing site. $oncentrating t)eir forces3 t)e Israelis reac)ed t)e canal &ank &efore t)e sur/rised 2gy/tians could /re+ent t)e%. 0)ere ensued a struggle of se+eral days in ()ic) t)e 2gy/tians used t)eir /o(erful infantry and tank forces nort) of t)e lake to counterattack and t)e Israelis3 in turn3 struck to t)e nort) in an effort to /rotect t)eir flank to and to clear t)eir route to t)e canal &ank. Muc) fig)ting occurred in an area kno(n as t)e $)inese far%. But t)eir &lo( to t)e nort) also )ad created t)e i%/ression t)at t)ey (is)ed to dri+e nort)3 east of t)e canal3 to assault t)e flank of t)e 2gy/tian Second r%y defending t)e east &ank of t)e canal &et(een t)e lake and t)e s(a%/y area on t)e nort) end of t)e canal. 0)is distraction (orked (ell3 t)e 2gy/tian co%%and discounting t)e /ossi&ility of a crossing e+en ()en t)ey detected Israeli troo/s on t)e (est side of t)e (ater(ay. 0)e Israelis /re+ented disco+ery of t)e e-tent of t)e forces t)at )ad crossed &y concealing t)eir infantry in t)e +egetation on t)e (est side of t)e canal and /lacing %ost of t)eir tanks in ca/tured aircraft )angars. 0)eir failure to install t)eir %o&ile &ridges as .uickly as t)ey e-/ected also contri&uted to o&scuring t)eir o&Decti+e &ecause t)e 2gy/tians kne( t)at t)e Israelis could not su//ort a %aDor force (est of t)e ri+er only (it) ferries on t)e canal. :et t)is Israeli offensi+e /resented a %aDor t)reat to t)e 2gy/tians ()o3 in order to conduct t)eir a&orti+e one#day offensi+e3 )ad su&stantially di%inis)ed t)e /o(erful ar%oured reser+es t)at t)ey )ad originally ke/t (est of t)e canal. !)ile t)e Israelis struggled to dri+e nort) against t)e 2gy/tians east of t)e (ater(ay to continue t)e distraction3 e-/and t)e corridor to t)eir &ridge)ead3 and clear a (ay for a /refa&ricated &ridge3 t)e s%all Israeli force (est of t)e canal sent out so%e of its tanks to attack t)e stationary &ut un/rotected antiaircraft %issiles esta&lis)ed t)ere3 destroying t)ree and forcing anot)er to %o+e in )aste. 0)us3 t)ey &egan to /re/are t)e (ay for t)e later e%/loy%ent of t)e Israeli air force &y attacking t)e (ea/on syste% deadly to aircraft &ut defenceless against tanks and ot)er ground forces. &attery of long#range 1C<#%illi%eter guns3 &roug)t across t)e canal for t)is /ur/ose3 fired at t)e near&y antiaircraft %issile sites3 causing so%e da%age and co%/elling t)e 2gy/tians to %o+e t)e %issiles. $oncentrating t)ree di+isions at t)is /oint3 t)e Israelis /lanned to use one to stand on t)e defensi+e to defend t)eir co%%unications and t)e ot)er t(o to carry out a turning %o+e%ent against t)e 4=B

2gy/tian 0)ird r%y3 ()ic) )ad %ost of its %en de/loyed on t)e east side of t)e canal sout) of t)e lakes. !it) t)e canal &ridged and t)e turning forces crossing on t)e nig)t of 5cto&er 1Ct)3 t)e Israelis (ere ready to &egin t)eir strategically decisi+e %o+e%ent t)e follo(ing day. 0)e situation )ad %uc) in co%%on (it) t)e *er%an crossing of t)e Meuse in May 1@4>. 0)e 2gy/tian )ig) co%%and3 like t)e 'renc)3 focused t)eir attention on a false %enace Gt)e Israeli t)reat to /us) nort) on t)e east &ank of t)e canalH Dust as in 1@4> t)e *er%an /us) into Belgiu% )ad distracted *enerals *eorges and *a%elin. But in 1@C? t)e 2gy/tian ar%y3 )a+ing a%/le %otorised troo/s3 did not face an ene%y (it) su/erior strategic %o&ility3 as did *a%elin and *eorges. 5n 5cto&er 1Bt) t)e initial Israeli di+ision dro+e due (est and3 des/ite strong resistance fro% 2gy/tian tanks in defensi+e e-ca+ations su//orted &y antitank %issiles3 %anaged to /us) far enoug) to )a+e a sufficiently secure /osition to turn sout) t)e ne-t day. 0)e Israelis also destroyed t)ree %ore %issile sites and fended off air strikes on t)eir &ridges3 including one in ()ic) t)ey s)ot do(n t)e fi+e attacking )elico/ters. Mean()ile3 *eneral Is%ail3 a(are of t)e Israeli &ridges3 sent )is c)ief of staff to t)e front to in+estigate. 5n 5cto&er 1Bt) t)e c)ief of staff +isited t)e front and for%ed a gloo%y esti%ate of t)e Israeli %enace. 5n 5cto&er 1@t)3 as t)e lead Israeli di+ision dro+e sout) until /o(erful 2gy/tian o//osition )alted it after an ad+ance of a&out si- %iles3 t)e 2gy/tian c)ief of staff re/orted suc) a serious Israeli t)reat t)at )e reco%%ended t)e (it)dra(al of all forces (est of t)e canal. *eneral Is%ail reDected t)is ad+ice and ordered )is t(o ar%ies to dri+e &ack or at least )alt t)e Israeli ad+ance. "e did not3 )o(e+er3 esta&lis) a se/arate )ead.uarters to coordinate forces fig)ting on t)e (est &ank of t)e canal nor order any s/ecific concentration of troo/s. 0)e follo(ing day t)e lead Israeli di+ision &y/assed t)e strong /oint t)at )ad sto//ed it t)e /re+ious day and /us)ed sout) fifteen %iles. Since t)e 2gy/tians )ad (it)dra(n %ost of t)eir stationary antiaircraft %issiles to /re+ent t)eir loss to t)e ad+ancing Israelis and still )ad %ost of t)e infantry#carried %issiles for lo(#altitude defence (est of t)e ri+er3 t)e Israeli air force could render e-cellent assistance to t)e ad+ance t)at day. But t)e dri+e sout) on 5cto&er 21st3 %eeting t)e resistance of t(o#t)irds of an ar%oured di+ision3 co+ered only a fe( %iles. 0)e second Israeli di+ision3 follo(ing in t)e rear3 o+erca%e t)e resistance of t)e 2gy/tian strong /oints t)at t)e lead di+ision3 in a//lying t)e /rinci/le of t)e infiltration tactics3 )ad &y/assed on its /us) sout)(ard. 5n t)e follo(ing day3 des/ite )ea+y o//osition and only t)roug) /assing around %uc) of it3 t)e lead di+ision turned east and arri+ed at t)e (est &ank of t)e s%aller lake3 )a+ing t)us reac)ed a s/ot as far sout) as ten %iles fro% t)e sout)ern %out) of t)e canal. 5n 5cto&er 2?rd t)e lead Israeli di+ision3 reinforced &y infantry fro% t)e Syrian front3 dro+e sout) to t)e s)ores of t)e *ulf of Sue6 as did ele%ents of t)e follo(ing di+ision /us)ing sout) fart)er to t)e (est. 0)us3 t)e Israelis )ad &ot) an outer and inner ring around t)e rear of t)e 2gy/tian 0)ird r%y3 ()ic) (as )olding t)e to(n of Sue6 on t)e (est &ank of t)e canal as (ell as t)eir &ridge)ead on t)e east. 0)e Israelis )ad tra//ed t(o infantry di+isions and /arts of t(o ot)ers3 a total of a&out 4>3>>> %en. 0)is final3 decisi+e day of t)e ca%/aign occurred ()en t)e co%&atants )ad agreed to a cease#fire3 /ro+ed difficult to enforce &ecause of t)e inter%ingling of units resulting fro% t)e Israeli tactic of &y/assing 2gy/tian strong /oints. In si- days t)e Israelis )ad dri+en o+er fifty %iles to co%/lete t)e turning of t)e 2gy/tian ar%y. 0(o di+isions )ad o+erco%e t)e /ersistent and continuing o//osition of at least e.ual forces3 including /ortions of t(o di+isions strong in tanks. 0)ey )ad succeeded not only &ecause of t)eir co%&at#)oned tactical skills &ut also &ecause of t)e do%inance and su//ort of t)eir air force3 t)e disorganisation of t)eir unconcentrated ene%y ()o )ad to i%/ro+ise a defence3 and t)e dis/atc) &y t)e 2gy/tian forces (est of t)e canal of t)eir antitank %issiles to units on t)e east &ank.

4=@

0)e Israelis )ad /re+ailed3 Dust as )ad t)e *er%ans in 1@4>3 &ut a %ore for%ida&le task lay a)ead of t)e% t)an faced t)e *er%ans in 1@4>. 0)e city of Sue6 and t)e canal s)ielded t)e rear of t)e 2gy/tian 0)ird r%y and its (ell de+elo/ed defensi+e /ositions /rotected its eastern front. nd t)e 0)ird r%y3 (it) ade.uate su//lies of food and a%%unition3 differed greatly fro% t)e allied forces in Belgiu% in 1@4>. Instead of an ar%y co%/elled to retreat &ecause of t)e t)reat to its rear and deserted &y its Belgian allies3 t)e 2gy/tian 0)ird r%y3 (it) t)e soldiers %orale ele+ated &y t)eir &rilliantly e-ecuted crossing of t)e canal and t)eir +ictory o+er Israeli counterattacks3 )ad t)e %orale as (ell as t)e %aterial %eans to resist.

'sraeli )ounteratta($ and Turning Mo%ement Back

Since &ot) t)e Israeli turning force and t)e 0)ird r%y )ad sufficient su//lies3 t)e situation rese%&led a siege %ore t)an a turning %o+e%ent. nd t)e t(o Israeli di+isions t)at )eld t)e lines &e)ind t)e 0)ird r%y on t)e (est &ank faced a relie+ing force of fi+e 2gy/tian di+isions. But t)e cease#fire /recluded a re#enact%ent of any fa%ous sieges or of t)e great frontal &attles t)at /itted t)e co+ering force against t)e relie+ing ar%y. Back

(he (actical Mi$ture of 0ld and New

ided &y t)e distraction of its a//arent effort to attack t)e sout)ern flank of t)e 2gy/tian Second r%y3 t)e Israeli offensi+e )ad attained strategic sur/rise. By skilfully a//lying *ui&erts offensi+e for%ula of distraction to induce t)e ene%y to create a (eak /oint and &y using a concentration to e-/loit it3 t)e Israelis )ad gained a +ictory o+er a ca/a&le3 (ell#led ene%y3 larger in nu%&ers. But 2gy/tian /re/arations3 tenacity3 and i%/ertur&a&le leaders)i/ %ade Israeli success difficult and %itigated t)e effects of t)e (inning turning %o+e%ent. s in $aesars +ictory at Ilerda3 /olitical factors %ingled (it) %ilitary in t)e outco%e t)at3 like Marengo3 s)o(ed t)at t)e defeated )ad not lost t)eir /o(ers of resistance.

4C>

2gy/tian tactics dis/layed a %astery of t)e e%/loy%ent of fully re+i+ed infantry (ea/on syste%s of t)e /ast. ,ike t)e generals of t)e se+enteent) century ()o dis/layed t)eir confidence in t)e defensi+e /o(er of /ike and %usket ()en t)ey )ad secure flanks3 t)e 2gy/tians also took a /osition (it) a (ater o&stacle at t)eir rear. 0)eir infantry%en3 (it) antitank and antiaircraft (ea/ons3 Dustified t)eir fait) in t)e traditional /ri%acy of t)e defence as it /itted t)e dis%ounted %an against t)e %ounted ()en t)e infantry%an )ad t)e a//ro/riate (ea/on syste% to defend against )is %ounted o//onent. In addition3 t)e 2gy/tians strengt)ened t)eir infantry defence (it) tanks. 0)ese not only /layed t)e role of dis%ounted ca+alry &y taking /ositions (it) good fields of fire t)at e-/osed only t)eir turrets &ut also %ounted local counterattacks. 0)e e-cellent articulation of t)e 2gy/tian infantry3 i%/ro+ed &y radios and co%/le%ented &y a defence in de/t)3 s)ielded it fro% t)e disru/tion and defeat t)at /ike%en (ould )a+e suffered if ca+alry )ad /enetrated t)eir ranks. 0)e Sue6 $anal /rotected t)e 2gy/tian flanks3 e+en t)oug) t)is (as not literally true3 &ecause t)e 2gy/tians )ad anc)ored t)eir flanks on a s(a%/ in t)e nort) and t)e *ulf of Sue6 in t)e sout). But s)ould an Israeli assault /ierce t)e 2gy/tian front3 t)e attackers (ould face t)e canal rat)er t)an )a+e an o//ortunity to &reak t)roug) and t)en attack t)e rear of t)e 2gy/tian defenders on eit)er side. 0)is &arrier failed t)e 2gy/tians3 in /art &ecause t)e Israelis )ad /re/ared crossing sites in ad+ance3 including t)e /lace%ent of &ridging %aterial near&y. Israeli defensi+e tactics3 &ased /ri%arily on t)e old conce/t of dis%ounting ca+alry3 used t)e de/t) a+aila&le to t)e%. 0)eir /rotected tanks could use t)eir guns effecti+ely against t)e attacking 2gy/tian tanks as (ell as e%/loy t)eir %o&ility to counterattack any +ulnera&le flank of a force of 2gy/tian assaulting tanks. But t)e 2gy/tians could )a+e e%/loyed infantry to attack t)e tanks and could )a+e attained a tactical su/re%acy &ased on t)e accuracy of a %issile t)at t)e o/erator could guide to )it t)e turret of t)e Israeli tank. Israeli %ac)ine guns3 )o(e+er3 in)i&ited suc) use of 2gy/tian antitank %issiles &ecause of t)e +ulnera&ility of t)e o/erator. 0)is e%/loy%ent of s%all ar%s fire3 /lus t)e use of field artillery3 e-)i&its t)e coe-istence of t)e single3 lig)t infantry (ea/on syste% (arfare of t)e late nineteent) and early t(entiet) centuries (it) t)e (arfare &ased on t)e custo%ary four (ea/on syste%s t)at )ad again &eco%e do%inant since t)e last years of !orld !ar I. s t)e successful use of Israeli artillery against 2gy/tian antiaircraft %issile sites e-)i&ited3 late nineteent)#century (arfare /resented t)e sa%e %enace to antiaircraft (ea/ons as it did to antitank (ea/ons. gainst t)e stationary antiaircraft %issiles3 as against t)e /orta&le %issile carried &y a soldier3 rifle and %ac)ine gun fire (ould )a+e )ad a disastrous i%/act on t)e /ersonnel using t)e (ea/ons. 0)e ne( antiaircraft lig)t infantry%an3 like t)e )ea+y infantry (it) antitank gun and %issile3 re.uired /rotection against t)e a//arently o&solete rifle#ar%ed lig)t infantry. nd t)e %ost effecti+e safeguard could only co%e &y reinforcing t)e antiaircraft and antitank infantry (it) nineteent)#century rifle%en and t)eir %ac)ineguns and artillery. By t)us %i-ing t)e old and t)e ne(3 t)e antiaircraft and antitank (ea/ons could )a+e a defence &ased on e-/loiting t)e su/eriority on t)e defence of t)e rifle%an and %ac)ine gunner against si%ilarly ar%ed soldiers. In t)e traditional relations3 largely restored &y t)e introduction of tank3 aircraft3 and antitank and antiaircraft (ea/ons Gsc)e%atic &elo(H3 M stands for t)e a&ility to attack in t)e direction of t)e arro( and M1 for t)e a&ility to defend in t)e direction of t)e arro(.

Traditional 7>BC"s Wea on Systems )a a-ilities Back

4C1

But t)e infantry and artillery3 ()ic) do%inated (arfare in t)e si-ty years &efore 1@1B also &elong on t)is sc)e%atic. 0y/ically t)e artillery (ould no( )a+e only )o(it6ers3 and t)e infantry (ould )a+e recoilless rifles as (ell as %ac)ine guns and lig)t %ortars. :et3 for si%/licity3 t)e ne( sc)e%atic (ill attri&ute to t)e% no antitank ca/a&ility. 0)e sc)e%atic &elo( is transitional3 introduced only to clarify t)e /rocess of adding infantry and artillery. In order to %ake a /lace on t)e ne( sc)e%atic G&elo(H it does not s)o( t)e tanks attack relations)i/ to t)e antiaircraft (ea/ons nor t)e aircrafts a&ility to assail antitank (ea/ons.

Transitional 7>BC"s Wea on Systems )a a-ilities Back

0)e ne( sc)e%atic G&elo(H3 )as added to t)e one a&o+e3 t)e infantry and artillery3 a&&re+iated Jinf. Y arty.3L and t)eir relations)i/s (it) t)e %ore %odern (ea/on syste%s. 0)us3 t)e !orld !ar I infantry re%ains +ulnera&le to t)e tank and aircraft &ut can attack t)e antitank and antiaircraft (ea/ons. If t)e antiaircraft (ea/ons are self#/ro/elled3 t)e old infantry can only defend against t)e% &ecause it cannot o+ertake and attack t)e% unless t)ey )alt and de/loy to engage aircraft. 'ro% t)e stand/oint of !orld !ar I infantry3 antiaircraft guns on an ar%oured carrier3 like antitank guns si%ilarly %ounted3 do not differ in kind fro% a tank.

,elation of World War ' 'nfantry and Artillery to 7>BC"s Wea on Systems Back

So t)e inter%ingling of t)e old and t)e ne(3 /ossi&le only ()ere terrain /er%its t)e e%/loy%ent of t)e ne(3 )as /resented co%%anders (it) %ore and3 t)erefore3 %ore co%/le-3 interrelations)i/s a%ong t)e (ea/on syste%s3 creating essentially un/recedented /ro&le%s of co%&ination for %utual su//ort and furt)er co%/licating t)e offensi+e task of e-/loiting t)e +ulnera&ilities of t)e o//onents synt)esis of )is (ea/on syste%s.

4C2

5t)er conflicts in t)e /eriod since 1@4< took /lace outside t)e !estern (orld3 t)oug) !estern /o(ers /artici/ated. 0)e 4nited States carried t)e &urden in 9orea of struggle %uc) like !orld !ar II. 0)e Britis) in Malaya and 'rance and t)en t)e 4nited States in Indo#$)ina3 a%ong ot)er instances3 foug)t against t)e raiding strategy of guerrillas rat)er t)an engaging in t)e /ersisting kind of conflict c)aracteristic of t)e for%al ra&#Israeli (ars and t)at of %ost 2uro/ean (ars for t)e /receding t)ree centuries. In t)ese and ot)er conflicts terrain li%ited t)e use of t)e ne( %ounted (ea/on syste%s and often %ade t)e o/erations rese%&le t)ose of t)e %ore re%ote /ast. Back

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

0)e t)e%es in (arfare in t)e !estern (orld reca/itulated in t)is c)a/ter focus on t)e nature of %ilitary o/erations and )el/ e-/lain ()y (ars )a+e &een ty/ically /rotracted and so often indecisi+e. So %any different o/erational ele%ents affect t)e outco%e of a &attle3 ca%/aign3 or series of ca%/aigns t)at rarely can all fa+our a .uick result. nd ()en e+en (ise co%%anders &lunder and t)e ine/t often do not understand t)eir situation at all3 t)e )u%an ele%ent of co%%and3 as (ell as %any ot)er &e)a+ioural as/ects of (arfare o%itted in t)is treat%ent3 (ill3 like $lause(it6s friction3 in)i&it t)e attain%ent of an early %ilitary decision. 0)ese intrinsic attri&utes of (arfare often so se+erely tried t)e /olitical /atience and so de/leted t)e econo%ic and %oral resources of t)e co%&atants t)at (ars fell s)ort of /roducing significant /olitical conse.uences. 5ften failing to gras/ t)e in)erent %ilitary o&stacles to +ictory3 co%&atants fre.uently o+eresti%ated t)e contri&utions of non#%ilitary +aria&les. 0)e follo(ing su%%ary s)ould assist in descri&ing %any of t)e %ilitary factors t)at )el/ed to e-tend %any conflicts. 0)is su%%ary c)a/ter &egins &y s)o(ing t)e consistencies a%ong land3 sea3 and air (arfare in ter%s of t)e strategic distinctions used t)roug)out. Since t)is &ook )as /ri%arily to do (it) ar%ed strife on land3 t)is c)a/ter concentrates on t)is %ost /re+alent for% of (arfare &y de+oting sections to tactics3 logistics3 and strategy # essentially t)e sa%e organisation as $)a/ter 1 G ncient !arfareH. 2ac) section &egins (it) a c)ronological o+er+ie( and su%%arises t)e %ain t)e%es. 0)e section on strategy concludes (it) a reca/itulation of alternati+es confronting co%%anders. Back

SEA AND AIR WARFARE

Chronological Survey
Na+al (arfare )as e-)i&ited far fe(er c)anges t)an t)at on land3 t)oug) t)is is t)e &ranc) of (ar t)at gun/o(der influenced first and %ost /rofoundly. 5n land cannon forced only a redesign of fortifications and )andguns &egan to su&stitute for &o(s7 at sea gun/o(der (roug)t a re+olution. In t)e si-teent) century %issile action &egan to su//lant t)e s)ock action of co%&at &y soldiers on adDacent decks and ra%%ing galleys. By t)e end of t)at century na+al (arfare )ad &eco%e one of co%&at (it) %issiles7 large3 lu%&ering s)i/s (it) t)e greatest nu%&er of t)e )ea+iest guns &eca%e t)e do%inant co%&at s)i/. S)i/s )ad to fig)t in line a)ead to use t)eir &roadside#%ounted guns rat)er t)an in line a&reast to facilitate ra%%ing. s t)e tactics of &attles de+elo/ed3 ad%irals learned to concentrate against a s%aller /ortion of t)e ene%y line. 'ig)ting took /lace at close range and nu%erical su/eriority /layed a %aDor role &ecause3 a%ong t)e s)i/s engaged3 all could fire at an ene%y. t t)e Battle of t)e Nile3 for e-a%/le3 Nelsons concentration of t(o s)i/s against one at t)e )ead of t)e 'renc) line assured t)e Britis) a .uick and o+er()el%ing +ictory. But gun/o(der affected only tactics. 0)e reliance on sailing s)i/s (it) &etter ca/a&ilities for sailing and na+igating co%/letely re+olutionised na+al logistics. :et t)oug) t)is alteration 4C?

facilitated t)e &lockade3 na+al strategy did not c)ange. 0)e stronger /o(er still soug)t &y t)e /ersisting strategy of t)e &lockade to interdict ene%y co%%erce and ensure safe troo/ %o+e%ents &y s)i/7 t)e (eaker /o(er )ad to rely on t)e raiding strategy of sending s%all fast s)i/s against t)e do%inant /o(ers co%%erce. Na+ies continued to guard and attack sea co%%unications and carry on o+erseas e-/editions3 &ot) e-e%/lified in t)e early Persian ca%/aigns against *reece. 0)e Marat)on ca%/aign s)o(ed t)e strategic ad+antage conferred on an ar%y &y co%%and of t)e sea3 ena&ling t)e ar%y co%%ander to concentrate fully against (eakness (it)out any concern t)at )is ene%y3 (eaker at sea3 could attack )i%. 0)e introduction of t)e iron stea%s)i/ and %ore /o(erful and longer#range guns in t)e nineteent) century did not %odify tactics or strategy in any funda%ental (ay. But t)e increase in t)e s/eed and relia&ility of s)i/ %o+e%ents &roug)t a&out &y stea%3 toget)er (it) t)e en)anced /o(er of ra/id concentration conferred &y t)e (ireless3 raised t)e ratio of force to s/ace3 t)us &enefiting t)e stronger /o(er. 5n t)e ot)er )and3 t)e de/endence of stea%ers on coal and later oil fuel decreased t)e ratio of force to s/ace for na+ies o/erating far fro% a &ase &ecause of t)e fre.uent need of stea%ers to return for fuel. 0)e na+al age of stea%3 steel3 and t)e (ireless also /rofoundly affected t)e (eaker /o(ers raiding strategy against co%%erce. 0)e (ireless in)i&ited co%%erce raiding &ecause it /er%itted instant re/orting of t)e ()erea&outs of a raider. nd t)e logistic tet)er of fuel for stea%ers tra%%elled t)e raiders %o+e%ents3 furt)er di%inis)ing its /o(er. In addition3 t)e distant &lockade %aintained fro% adDacent &ases &y t)e Britis) in !orld !ar I also )urt t)e co%%erce raider &ecause t)e (ireless and t)e inde/endence of stea%ers fro% (inds ena&led t)e &lockading /o(er to %o+e /ro%/tly to interce/t any raider /utting to sea. 0)e gro(t) in t)e si6e of s)i/s re%o+ed %any s)allo( estuaries as &ases for s%all raiders and t)e increase in t)e e-/ense of t)e stea%ers %eant t)at t)e cost of raiding s.uee6ed out %any s%all entre/reneurs. 5nly t)e go+ern%ent re%ained in t)e &usiness3 ()ic) furt)er si%/lified t)e task of /rotecting co%%erce fro% raiders. But in !orld !ar I t)e su&%arine e%/loyed anot)er di%ension of t)e sea for te%/orary conceal%ent and fig)ting3 and re+i+ed t)e raiding strategy at a ti%e ()en t)e na+ys funda%ental logistic strategy assu%ed greater significance3 for (ar )ad co%e to de/end so %uc) on industrial /roduction and critical su//lies &roug)t fro% o+erseas. 1irected against t)e 4nited 9ingdo%3 t)e raiding strategy (it) su&%arines /ro%ised +ictory to t)e *er%ans until t)e strategic concentration of force of t)e con+oy and t)e tactical strengt) conferred &y t)e de+elo/%ent of t)e )ydro/)one and t)e de/t) c)arge defeated t)e raiders. 0)e sa%e strategy failed again in !orld !ar II for essentially t)e sa%e reasons. In !orld !ar II t)e air/lane affected na+al tactics &y outranging guns and causing t)e +ulnera&le aircraft carrier to s)are (it) t)e &attles)i/ t)e role of ca/ital s)i/ in t)e Mediterranean and t)e tlantic and su/ersede t)e &attles)i/ in t)e Pacific. 0)e range of land#&ased aircraft so e-ceeded t)at of coastal defence guns t)at3 (it)out air su/eriority fro% carriers Gor adDacent land &asesH3 fleets could no longer )o+er %enacingly off a )ostile s)ore. But t)e aircraft3 &ased on land as (ell as at sea3 furt)er aug%ented t)e ratio of force to s/ace t)at t)e (ireless#e.ui//ed stea%er )ad already increased3 in s/ite of t)e fe(er nu%&er of s)i/s a+aila&le3 at least as co%/ared (it) t)e days of sailing na+ies. 0)e Battle of Britain /resented an o//ortunity for land#&ased aircraft to de%onstrate t)at t)ey could co%%and t)e 2nglis) $)annel3 &ut t)e si6e and efficiency of Britains air force /re+ented t)at trial &et(een aircraft fro% t)e land and t)e na+y. ircraft also /ro+ed t)eir (ort) as raiders against co%%erce3 /articularly ()en t)e *er%ans used /lanes in an atte%/t to interdict sea co%%unication &et(een t)e 4nited 9ingdo% and Russia. :et t)eir greater s/eed ga+e t)e% a %ore significant function in acting against su&%arine co%%erce raiders.

4C4

0)e /o(er of s%all ine-/ensi+e aircraft against t)e surfaced su&%arine /resented an a//arent ano%aly unless one re%e%&ers t)e danger a )orse arc)er /osed for t)e /o(erfully ar%oured and %ounted By6antine and $rusader )ea+y ca+alry. 1ifficult to )it &ecause of its s/eed3 t)e aircraft /ro+ed dangerous to t)e su&%arine t)at on t)e surface co%&ined t)e disad+antages of lo( s/eed3 s%all defensi+e fire/o(er3 and considera&le fragility. s long as t)e su&%arine )ad to use t)e surface3 it suffered t)e sa%e disad+antage of any raider ()en confronted (it) a &etter (ea/on syste% (it) greater s/eed. None of t)is c)anged na+al strategy3 t)e do%inant /o(er continuing to rely on t)e /ersisting logistic strategy of &lockade3 and &ecause of t)e su&%arine and t)e aircraft3 t)e (eaker could continue its raiding logistic strategy. ,ike(ise3 co%%and of t)e sea as &efore /er%itted t)e su//ly and %o+e%ent of ar%ies o+er t)e sea and still3 as t)e nglo# %erican Nor%andy landing de%onstrated3 ga+e t)e ad+antage of t)e initiati+e as de%onstrated in t)e Marat)on ca%/aign. 0)e Britis) also e%/loyed raids against t)e *er%an#)eld coast3 suc) as t)e one at 1ie//e on t)e 'renc) coast in 1@413 to distract t)e *er%ans &y arousing a//re)ensions a&out t)e security of t)e coast. 4nlike t)e 'renc) ()en t)ey lacked co%%and of t)e sea in t)e "undred :ears !ar3 t)e *er%ans atte%/ted no sea&orne raids on t)e Britis) coast3 lea+ing retaliation to t)eir aircraft and t)eir flying and rocket &o%&s. ircraft %ade t)eir %ilitary de&ut in !orld !ar I3 %aking t)eir /rinci/al contri&ution as often t)e only a+aila&le %eans of reconnaissance in co%&at along a continuous3 fortified front. 0)ey also carried out raids against co%%unications3 t)oug) li%ited &o%& loads and /oor accuracy restricted t)eir effecti+eness in t)is strategic role. //ro/riately3 one of t)e aircrafts greatest tactical successes occurred in Palestine3 ()ere $rusaders )ad faced Mosle% lig)t ca+alry. In 1@1B Britis) /lanes )ad caug)t 0urkis) infantry on t)e %arc)3 Dust as 0urkis) )orse arc)ers )ad assailed early $rusaders on t)e %arc) in natolia. 0)e Britis) lig)t ca+alry of t)e air )ad ke/t t)eir distance and s)ot and &o%&ed t)e )el/less %en and ani%als of t)e %arc)ing 0urks ()o3 like t)e $rusaders3 lacked any (ea/on syste% to re/ly to t)eir ra/idly %o+ing3 deadly3 and inaccessi&le assailants. 1uring !orld !ar II t)e co%&atants integrated t)eir i%/ro+ed air/lanes into land o/erations &y confir%ing t)e% in t)e traditional tactical and strategic functions of lig)t ca+alry. n effort to e-tend air/o(er &eyond t)is role3 t)e e-/ensi+e nglo# %erican e-/eri%ent of trying to (in t)e (ar in 2uro/e (it) a logistic and /olitical strategy of &o%&ing industries and cities3 failed to )a+e a decisi+e effect on t)e outco%e of t)e (ar. 0)e nuclear &o%&3 co%&ined (it) t)e long#range aircraft and cruise and &allistic %issiles3 )as gi+en a /ara%ount /lace to air /o(ers strategic &o%&ing and its logistic and /olitical o&Decti+es. 5t)er(ise3 t)e %ission and t)e ca/a&ilities of aircraft )a+e re%ained t)e sa%e. *uided %issiles affected air (ar as t)ey did t)at on land and sea3 and aircraft (ould /artici/ate in t)e use of tactical nuclear (ea/ons on land. t sea t)e %issile gained ground at t)e e-/ense of t)e carrier#&orne aircraft3 if only &ecause it /ro+ided a less e-/ensi+e %eans of outranging t)e gun3 &ut t)is %erely continued t)e trend to(ard greater range and accuracy t)at3 along (it) e-/ansion in /o(er3 )ad continued since t)e si-teent) century. Back

)eca'itulation of the Characteristics of Naval Warfare

!riters on strategy often distinguis) s)ar/ly &et(een (arfare at sea and (arfare on land and so%eti%es )a+e clai%ed /ri%acy for t)e do%ination of one ele%ent or t)e ot)er. But t)e si%ilarities see% to )a+e out(eig)ed t)e differences. Bot) e%/loyed raiding as (ell as /ersisting strategy in an effort to do%inate a gi+en area. !arfare at sea )ad as its strategic o&Decti+e t)e essentially logistic goal of de/ri+ing t)e ene%y of t)e &enefits of sea co%%unications and of assuring t)e% to friendly forces. $ontrol of t)e sea &esto(ed t)e ad+antage of t)e a&ility to %o+e and su//ly land forces. 0)is conferred a s/ecial &enefit &ecause e+en after t)e re+olution in

4C<

logistics in t)e nineteent) and t(entiet) centuries3 (ater co%%unications re%ained t)e least e-/ensi+e %ode of su//ly. In addition3 t)e na+y could effecti+ely colla&orate (it) t)e ar%y &y landing troo/s at &ot) une-/ected and strategically i%/ortant /oints. :et t)e %ore ela&orate e.ui/%ent of ar%ies co%/licated t)e task of carrying out suc) an o+erseas in+asion in t)at con+eying a %otorised ar%y %agnified t)e nu%&er of s)i/s needed for t)e landing. !orld !ar II again de%onstrated t)e traditional effect of t)e %o&ility /ro+ided &y sea /o(er on t)e strategy of (arfare on land. !)en 'ield Mars)al Montgo%erys Britis)3 $anadian3 and 4.S. ar%ies landed in 'rance in 1@443 t)ey again s)o(ed t)e sea as a )ig)(ay for t)e do%inant sea/o(er7 &ut as in 1@4>3 an i%/assa&le %oat for t)e (eaker. If3 in 1@443 t)e *er%ans could )a+e gained %astery of t)e sea3 as )ad t)e *reeks after defeating t)e Persian fleet3 Montgo%erys forces (ould )a+e )ad to %ake a )astier and %ore co%/lete retreat t)an did t)e Persians after t)ey lost co%%and of t)e sea. In &uilding a na+y to resist Viking3 raiders3 t)e 2nglis) )ad s)o(n t)e +alue to o/erations on land of contesting %astery of t)e seas. "istory tee%s (it) e-a%/les of t)e use of t)e strategic %o&ility /ro+ided &y lo(#cost sea trans/ortation7 t)e Britis)3 for e-a%/le used t)e sea to send troo/s to t)e I&erian Peninsula to fig)t Na/oleon and to (it)dra( t)e% ()en defeated. In !orld !ar II in Italy3 for instance3 t)e allied forces /us)ing nort) against t)e *er%ans integrated sea&orne %o+e%ents closely (it) t)ose on land ()en t)ey atte%/ted a turning %o+e%ent. But t)e *er%ans concentrated against t)e %en landing at n6io3 t)us /rotecting t)eir co%%unications and &ottling u/ t)e landing force3 Dust as t)e 0urks in 1@1< )ad contained allied landing forces t)at )ad e-/loited t)e interior lines %ade /ossi&le &y sea /o(er. In %odern ti%es3 sea /o(er )as &eco%e increasingly i%/ortant in is a&ility to /ursue t)e logistic o&Decti+e of taking a(ay t)e ene%ys econo%ic ad+antages of o+erseas trade and i%/ortant i%/orts. 0o illustrate3 in t)e Na/oleonic !ars3 Britis) do%ination of t)e sea not only /rotected t)e 4nited 9ingdo% fro% in+asion &y t)e su/erior 'renc) ar%ies &ut also ena&led it to &lockade 'rance and3 to a degree3 t)e entire continent of 2uro/e to de/ri+e 'rance of t)e /roducts as (ell as t)e econo%ic &enefits of o+erseas &usiness. 'urt)er3 t)e co%%and of t)e sea allo(ed Britain to a//ro/riate t)e trade of 'renc) and 1utc) colonies as (ell as use its strategic %o&ility on (ater to concentrate against and con.uer %any of t)ese +alua&le /ossessions. 0)e Britis) could carry out t)is /ersisting strategy of &lockade3 ()ic) included &ottling u/ s.uadrons of 'renc) (ars)i/s as (ell as interdicting co%%erce3 &ecause t)ey )ad an ade.uate ratio of force to s/ace. 0)e /ro-i%ity of t)eir &ases to t)e &lockaded /orts and t)eir )uge fleet )el/ed t)e% to reduce to a trickle o+erseas trade fro% 'renc) /orts. s%aller fleet3 or one %ore distant fro% its &ases of su//ly and re/air3 (ould )a+e %arkedly di%inis)ed t)e effect of t)e &lockade. nd if &ot) t)e Britis) and 'renc) )ad )ad far s%aller fleets3 t)e Britis) could )a+e done little %ore t)an raid 'renc) co%%erce e+en t)oug) t)ey could )a+e &lockaded t)e fe( /orts )ar&ouring t)e /rinci/al s.uadrons of 'renc) (ars)i/s. 0)us3 t)e ratio of force to s/ace conditions (arfare at sea Dust as it does on land and so /ro+ides one re.uisite for t)e /ursuit of a /ersisting strategy. In co%&ating t)e Britis) &lockade3 t)e 'renc) also used a /ersisting logistic strategy ()en t)ey closed t)e /orts of 2uro/e to Britis) i%/orts as (ell as continued t)eir traditional logistic strategy of sending raiders against Britis) %erc)ant s)i/s. 0)e 'renc) left a great deal of t)eir raiding to /ri+ate enter/rise3 (it) t)e ca/ture of Britis) s)i/s and cargoes as an incenti+e to induce entre/reneurs to (age (ar on &e)alf of 'rance. 2-ce/t for official sanction3 t)is sea (arfare differed little fro% /iracy and3 in t)e econo%ic %oti+ation of its e-ecutants3 /aralleled t)e raids of Vikings into !estern 2uro/e and of &ar&arians into t)e Ro%an and ra&s into t)e By6antine 2%/ire. gainst t)e 'renc) raiders t)e Britis) ar%ed t)eir %erc)ant s)i/s and escorted grou/s of t)e% (it) (ars)i/s. 0)e delay i%/osed on so%e s)i/s &y (aiting for t)e de/arture of t)e con+oy raised costs3 &ut t)e e-/ense dou&tless /ro+ed less t)an t)e losses t)at (ere /re+ented. 0)e efficiency of sea 4C=

co%%erce %ade sailing in /rotected flotillas /ossi&le &ecause a fe( s)i/s co+ered only a s%all sea area and3 co%/ared to a con+oy on land3 carried %uc) %erc)andise in a little s/ace. So a /rocedure t)at concentrated too %uc) force for raiders to co/e (it)3 difficult to e%/loy on land3 /ro+ed effecti+e at sea against raiders t)at rarely o/erated in s.uadrons of for%ida&le si6e. But neit)er Britis) nor 'renc) logistic strategies )ad a serious effect on t)e a&ility of eit)er co%&atant to %aintain its ar%y and na+y. nd t)e strategies differed only slig)tly fro% t)ose e%/loyed on land &ecause t)e stronger na+al /o(er used a /ersisting co%&at strategy to control t)e seas so as to follo( a logistic strategy of &lockade. 0)e (eaker 'renc) )ad %ost often resorted /ri%arily to raids against %erc)ant s)i/s to i%/le%ent a logistic strategy. fter t)e Industrial Re+olution %ade econo%ies %ore de/endent on i%/orts3 sea /o(ers logistic strategy &eca%e %ore i%/ortant. Petroleu% and co//er3 for e-a%/le3 %inerals t)at 2uro/e could not su//ly in t)e .uantities needed for large#scale (arfare3 /layed a %aDor role in t(entiet)#century conflicts. gainst island nations suc) as t)e 4nited 9ingdo% and 8a/an3 a logistic strategy3 i%/le%ented &y a total &lockade3 could +irtually (in a (ar &y cri//ling industrial /roduction and di+erting resources to agriculture as &lockaded nations soug)t self#sufficiency in t)eir food su//ly. 0)e air/lane and t)e su&%arine ga+e t)e (eaker /o(er ne( tools for its raiding strategy against t)e do%inant /o(ers co%%erce3 a task %ade difficult for surface raiders de/endent on fuel for t)eir &oilers and lia&le to )a+e t)eir location re/orted &y (ireless. But t)e ne( air and su&%arine %eans of raiding3 like t)e ne( %odes of attack and defence at sea3 did not &asically c)ange t)e funda%ental o&Decti+es of na+al strategy3 nor t)e %anner in ()ic) t)e &elligerents follo(ed t)e%. 0)us na+al strategy )as re%ained essentially unc)anged3 as )a+e tactics since t)e si-teent)#century transition fro% s)ock to %issile action. 0)e sa%e strategy %atri- used for land (arfare a//lies to %uc) of na+al strategy3 (it) /ersisting and raiding co%&at strategies and t)e sa%e di+isions for logistic strategy. 0)ese categories &etter suit t)e na+ys action against t)e )ostile /o(er and its ar%y t)an against t)e o//osing fleet. 'or e-a%/le3 t)e uses of a logistic strategy against t)e )ostile fleet t)at )ad i%/ressi+e success G le-anders ca%/aign to ca/ture t)e &ases of t)e Persian fleet and t)e siege and ca/ture of t)e Port rt)ur fleetH &ot) de/ended on t)e ar%y. In assailing t)e )ostile country and ar%y3 )o(e+er3 t)e Nor%andy landing3 like t)at of !illia% t)e $on.ueror3 e-e%/lified co%&at /ersisting strategy Dust as %any Britis) &lockades s)o( a logistic /ersisting strategy and 'renc) co%%erce raiders and *er%an su&%arines de%onstrate t)e use of a logistic raiding strategy. $o%&at raiding strategies against t)e ene%y country and ar%y are rarer3 t)e 1ie//e raid constituting a recent e-a%/le. But t)e Persian landing at Marat)on could readily fit into t)e class of co%&at raids &ecause3 as a distraction3 t)e Persian co%%ander )ad no ai% to /ersist at t)at /oint any %ore t)an did t)e Britis) ()o landed at 1ie//e or 'renc) raiders on t)e 2nglis) coast in t)e "undred :ears !ar. Back

Summary of the #ttributes of #ircraft in Warfare

!riters on strategy often distinguis) &et(een (arfare in t)e air and (arfare on t)e land and sea. fter t)e %ilitary air/lane )ad Dust co%e into use3 %any (riters and t)eorists t)oug)t t)at t)is (ea/on syste% alone could dri+e s)i/s fro% t)e surface of t)e sea and (in land (ars unaided. In its tactical role of restoring lig)t ca+alry to t)e ar%ies3 it /ro+ed .uite effecti+e3 &ut it did not render ot)er (ea/on syste%s o&solete any %ore t)an )ad 0urkis) lig)t ca+alry ()en /itted against By6antine and $rusader co%&ined#ar%s ar%ies. 'or t)e strategic role of lig)t ca+alry for reconnaissance and for interdicting co%%unications3 t)e air/lane is in+alua&le. It can fly o+er terrain o&stacles and o//osing forces. !it)out t)e lig)t ca+alry of t)e air3 t)e continuous fronts of !orld !ar I (ould )a+e /recluded any reconnaissance or raiding of co%%unications. 0)is a&ility to fly o+er t)e deadlocked front )el/ed con+ince

4CC

*eneral 1ou)et3 an early e-/onent of +ictory t)roug) air/o(er t)at a raiding strategy e-ecuted &y aircraft /ro+ided t)e %eans to carry out an effecti+e offensi+e in t)e /resence of too )ig) a ratio of force to s/ace to /er%it a decisi+e a//lication of a /ersisting strategy on t)e ground. ccordingly3 Dust as co%%anders )ad to resort to raids ()en t)ey )ad too lo( a ratio of force to s/ace to as/ire to a /ersisting strategy of do%inating t)e ground3 so t)ey could use air raids as an antidote to too %uc) force to s/ace. 4sing air/lanes to /erfor% t)e lig)t ca+alrys traditional role of e-ecuting a raiding logistic strategy against ar%ies co%%unications /ro+ed i%/ortant. But air raiders against co%%unications lacked t)e /recision and3 conse.uently3 t)e effecti+eness of surface raiders. Bridges3 for e-a%/le3 ()ic) traditional raiders could )a+e destroyed (it) a s%all a%ount of (ell#/laced e-/losi+es3 /ro+ed e-tre%ely )ard targets for aircraft to )it and often (ere resistant to &o%&s. 'or instance3 t)e destruction of eac) of t)e %aDor &ridges &o%&ed &y t)e nglo# %erican air forces in 1@44 /rior to t)e landing in Nor%andy re.uired an a+erage of 22> tons of &o%&s. In carrying out its raids3 %ost &o%&ing aircraft lacked t)e /re/onderance in s/eed usually /ossessed &y %ounted raiders on land. ircraft carrying &o%&s traditionally )ad %ore &ulk and lo(er s/eed t)an o&ser+ation or fig)ter aircraft3 and3 in t)e latter3 t)e larger &o%&er faced an aircraft greater in s/eed3 one designed as a (ea/on syste% to &e do%inant o+er t)e &o%&er. 0)oug) not (it)out defences and often %o+ing in con+oys acco%/anied &y fig)ter aircraft3 &o%&ers lacked t)e elusi+eness custo%ary for raiders. 0)e situation of t)e &o%&ers is analogous to3 &ut not e-actly /arallel to3 t)at of )ea+y ca+alry assailed &y lig)t ca+alry. 0)is disad+antage %ade air forces /articularly an-ious to defeat t)e o//osing air force so its &o%&ers could raid (it)out danger. So alt)oug) in its strategic role t)e air ar% relied e-clusi+ely on t)e raid3 in its co%&at (it) ot)er aircraft it3 like na+ies3 ad)ered to a /ersisting strategy to attain suc) a %astery of t)e air t)at its aircraft %ig)t fly un%olested &y t)e ene%y. In addition to facilitating air raids and reducing t)eir cost3 su&stantial control of t)e air %ade easy its use for logistic /ur/oses &y unar%ed aircraft. 0)is ca/a&ility )ad li%ited logistic +alue &ecause t)e e-/ense of air trans/ortation far e-ceeded t)at of ot)er %eans. 0o illustrate3 in t)e 1@=>s rail tra+el /er ton#%ile generally cost four ti%es as %uc) as (ater3 truck tra+el fi+e ti%es as %uc) as rail3 and con+eyance &y air o+er t)ree ti%es as %uc) as truck. But %o+e%ent of %en and goods &y air )ad t)e ad+antage of s/eed as (ell as t)e a&ility to fly o+er ene%y#)eld terrain. ircraft could function in t)e a&sence of rail3 road3 or (ater routes of co%%unication. 0)us t)e *er%ans soug)t to su//ly t)eir ar%y at Stalingrad &y air3 an atte%/t defeated3 (it) )ea+y loss of aircraft3 &y t)e Russian co%%and of t)e skies. But under %ore fa+oura&le circu%stances3 ot)er3 less a%&itious efforts &y air succeeded. 5n occasion3 &o%&ing /lanes te%/orarily di+erted to trans/ort ser+ice could )a+e )el/ed to alle+iate critical s)ortages for all of t)e &elligerents. $o%%and of t)e air not only /er%itted t)e dro//ing of grou/s of /arac)ute raiders &ut also %ade /ossi&le t)e carrying out of a su&stantial ca%/aign. In 1@413 after t)e *er%ans )ad con.uered %ainland *reece3 t)ey used t)eir air force to carry /aratroo/ers to t)e island of $rete. In s/ite of t)eir disad+antage of &eing essentially !orld !ar I infantry%en facing soldiers su//orted &y tanks and artillery3 t)ese troo/s3 reinforced &y sea#&orne forces3 ca/tured t)e island. later nglo# %erican effort in t)e autu%n of 1@44 to use /arac)ute troo/s to create a corridor for an ar%oured ad+ance3 )o(e+er3 did fail in s/ite of co%/lete air su/re%acy and t)e su&stantial nu%&er of /arac)ute troo/s used. In co%&ating t)e *er%an ar%oured forces t)e lig)tly ar%ed /aratroo/ers )ad %any of t)e disad+antages of lig)t infantry defending against )ea+y ca+alry. In its larger strategic role3 t)e aircraft in !orld !ar II ad)ered to a logistic raiding strategy against *er%anys econo%y and3 in attacking /o/ulation centres3 also a /olitical strategy of terror. 0)is

4CB

use of &o%&ers )ad so%et)ing in co%%on (it) t)at used earlier &y t)e 0urks in sia Minor and t)e Mongols in 9)(ari6%. In +ie( of its cost in ter%s of resources and its failure for %ost of t)e (ar to do decisi+e da%age eit)er to t)e ene%y econo%y or %orale3 t)is logistic strategy s)ould )a+e caused %uc) contro+ersy after t)e (ar as to t)e +alue of its future use. But t)e ato%ic &o%& o&+iated t)is dis/ute3 and it3 and t)e &allistic %issile to carry it3 c)anged strategy dra%atically. Since only a fe( /lanes (it) nuclear &o%&s need to get t)roug) t)e defences to do tre%endous da%age3 a 0urko#Mongolian strategy /ro%ises to &e as effecti+e as of old. 0)e &allistic %issile3 against ()ic) no defence see%s /resently feasi&le3 )as increased t)e a&ility of t)e raiders to )a+e t)e assurance of inflicting ruinous da%age3 and its range )as guaranteed t)at e+ery country is +ulnera&le to t)is de+astating attack. In fact3 t)e /olitical result of t)e dread ins/ired &y t)is kind of (ar )as /er)a/s /re+ented a (ar &et(een t)e /o(ers so ar%ed. 0)us3 t)e t)reat of suc) a logistic raiding strategy3 one ai%ed at /eo/le as (ell as t)ings and e%&odying t)e ele%ent of terror3 )as /ro+en as /otent in /re+enting (ar as its a//lication )ad &een in gi+ing +ictory to t)e 0urks and Mongols. 0)e difference &et(een t)is strategy3 &ased on nuclear &o%&s deli+ered t)roug) t)e air3 and t)e destruction (reaked &y 0urkis) and Mongolian ca+alry lies in t)e ca/a&ility of &ot) sides to follo( t)e sa%e strategy si%ultaneously. It di+erges fro% t)e na+ys a//lication of a logistic strategy in t)at its effect (ill &e %ore ra/id and far %ore )orri&le t)an a &lockade against e+en t)e %ost +ulnera&le island /o(er. 0)us3 in t)e age of t)e air#deli+ered nuclear &o%&s3 not Dust t)e counter#raid &ut also t)e %ere t)reat of suc) raids )as /ro+en for %ore t)an t)ree decades t)e %ost telling defence against raids yet de+ised. s lig)t ca+alry3 t)e air forces foug)t as /art of t)e ar%y3 as )ad na+ies ()en t)ey ser+ed t)e land forces &y controlling t)e sea and %o+ing and su//lying ar%ies. In addition3 air forces and na+ies )ad larger3 inde/endent strategic roles3 as did ar%ies. Suc) actions in t)e air and on t)e sea carried out a logistic strategy of disa&ling t)e ene%ys econo%y e-actly as ar%ies did t)roug) territorial ac.uisitions or3 usually less effecti+ely3 &y raids. Na+ies /ursued t)eir inde/endent %ission first using a co%&at strategy against t)e o//osing fleets to gain do%inance and t)en resorting to t)e /ersisting strategy of &lockade7 (it) less results3 t)ey )ad to rely on raids against )ostile co%%erce alone7 air forces ad)ered to a /ersisting co%&at strategy to gain air %astery to allo( t)eir raiders to o/erate un%olested7 also less effecti+ely3 t)ey de/ended solely on contested raids. 'ollo(ing a co%/ara&le se.uence3 ar%ies also oriented on t)e ene%y ar%ies3 using co%&at or logistic /ersisting strategy3 or a co%&ination of t)e t(o7 if t)ey succeeded3 t)ey (on t)e (ar directly &y occu/ying t)e ene%y country. If t)ey lacked t)e %eans to i%/le%ent a /ersisting strategy3 t)ey too e%/loyed raids3 e+en to (eaken t)e ene%ys econo%y. ll t)ree &ranc)es of t)e ser+ice )a+e also used raids3 and ar%ies and na+ies )a+e access to a /ersisting strategy as (ell3 to /ursue /olitical o&Decti+es directly. 0)e sea )as e-/erienced econo%ic raiders in t)e for% of /irates and /ri+ateers. In ca/turing ene%y %erc)ant s)i/s na+ies )a+e3 like ar%ies3 tried to li+e at t)e ene%ys e-/ense and %ake (ar su//ort (ar. So3 air forces )ad to count on t)e strategy of raids in carrying out t)eir o&Decti+es3 ()ereas na+ies and ar%ies )ad a c)oice of %et)ods3 t)e raid on co%%erce or t)e /ersisting strategy of &lockade. 0)us3 it %ay /ro+e )el/ful in strategy to a&andon any e-clusi+e reliance on treating land3 sea3 and air (arfare as different. Instead3 strategic %eans and strategic ends %ay &e as useful and as enlig)tening as t)ose distinctions &ased u/on t)e ele%ent in ()ic) (arfare takes /lace. But t)ere )as &een a relations)i/ &et(een t)e larger strategic goals of (arfare on t)e land3 sea3 and air. 0)e na+ies &lockades3 like t)e air forces raids against econo%ic targets3 usually )ad as t)eir %ilitary effect t)e (eakening of t)e ene%y ar%ies and facilitating t)e task of t)e friendly ar%ies.

4C@

ll %ilitary strategy %ust ai% at t)e do%ination of /eo/le and t)e land ()ere t)ey d(ell. If %ilitary %eans %ust &e a//lied to %ilitary ends to ac)ie+e /olitical goals3 t)en t)e ar%ed forces %ust )a+e t)e land3 sea3 and air forces of t)e ene%y as t)eir o&Decti+e and %ay attack t)e% &y a /ersisting or raiding strategy (it) forces de/loyed in all t)ree ele%ents3 using eit)er a co%&at or logistic strategy or a co%&ination3 ()ic)e+er re.uires t)e least effort and /resents t)e greatest /ro%ise of +ictory. Back

TACTICS

Chronological Summary
In 23<>> years t)e tactics of co%&at in 2uro/e )a+e undergone nu%erous transfor%ations3 %any of ()ic) (ere %ore cyclical t)an linear in c)aracter. c)ronological su%%ary of so%e t)e%es in tactics &egins (it) t)e *reeks3 ()o used /ri%arily )o%ogeneous ar%ies of )ea+y infantry t)at3 lacking %uc) articulation3 foug)t frontal &attles. !)en t)ey occu/ied an u/)ill /osition3 t)e defenders enDoyed tactical /ri%acy on t)e defence and3 since neit)er side )ad &etter %o&ility and ar%ies (ere s%all in relation to t)e s/ace in ()ic) t)ey o/erated3 &attles occurred only &y %utual consent. 0)us3 &et(een )o%ogeneous ar%ies3 t)e tactical defence &enefited fro% a /redo%inance &ased on its a&ility to resist frontal attacks. 0)e /re/onderance of t)e defence in *reek (arfare recei+ed reinforce%ent fro% t)e su/re%acy of fortifications7 t)ese accentuated t)e strengt) of t)e defence against frontal attack and &roug)t %ore ca/ital to t)e aid of t)e soldiers la&our in co%&at. :et &y t)e ti%e of le-ander t)e *reat3 t)e *reeks )ad de+elo/ed a so/)isticated (ay of (ar &ased on a %utually su//orting use of t)e four &asic (ea/on syste%s. 0)e )ea+y ca+alry3 a (ea/on syste% essentially unkno(n to t)e Persians3 /ro+ided t)e tactically offensi+e troo/s: &y using t)eir greater %o&ility and a&ility to fig)t (it)out any significant delay to assu%e t)eir co%&at for%ation3 t)ey attacked t)e flanks and rear of t)e redou&ta&le *reek )ea+y infantry in Persian ser+ice. In doing t)is3 t)ey also e-/loited t)eir ca/a&ility to attack lig)t infantry and to o+erco%e Persian lig)t ca+alry in s)ock co%&at. 0)e le-andrian tactical sc)e%e of e%/loying all four (ea/on syste%s3 using )ea+y ca+alry to attack t)e flank and rear of t)e )ea+y infantry3 do%inated (arfare in t)e Mediterranean &asin until t)e ti%e of t)e Ro%ans3 ()o %odified it &y de/ending %ore on t)eir (ell#articulated3 s(ord#ar%ed infantry. rrayed in se+eral lines and incor/orating t)e conce/t of a reser+e3 Ro%an infantry could %anoeu+re and e+en co+er its flanks against ca+alry. Relying on allied ca+alry3 t)e Ro%ans defeated t)eir o//onents and3 (it) t)eir orderly syste% of (ar and e-cellent engineering and field fortifications3 controlled t)e lands &ordering on t)e Mediterranean. 'or se+eral centuries t)e tactical skill of t)e Ro%ans /rofessional infantry for%ations /ro+ided a funda%ental &asis for t)eir +ictories o+er +ariously ar%ed &ar&arians. But t)e i%/etuosity of t)e &ar&arian ca+alry c)arge %ade t)e Ro%ans ado/t t)e long s/ear or /ike and3 in /art to co/e (it) raiders3 steadily increase t)eir /ro/ortion of ca+alry. 0)e %odified Ro%an %et)ods %i-ed (it) t)e national for%ulas of +arious &ar&arian grou/s3 ()ic) all in+ol+ed so%e for% of foot and %ounted co%&at3 to create great tactical di+ersity as t)e age of t)e Ro%an 2%/ire gradually /assed into t)e Middle ges. 0)e so/)isticated (arfare of t)e 2astern Ro%an or By6antine 2%/ire )ad as its foundation e%/loying t)e tactical di+ersity of its ar%y to &ring t)e su/erior (ea/on syste% into action against t)e inferior. 0)us against %ounted o//onents3 By6antine ar%ies used infantry strengt)ened &y dis%ounted ca+alry3 and against )ea+y infantry3 t)ey de/ended on t)eir &o(%en3 &ot) on foot and %ounted3 to (eaken t)e &ar&arian )ost and /re/are t)e (ay for t)eir )ea+y ca+alrys c)arge in t)e flank. n early disaster at t)e )ands of t)e %ounted Part)ians and a long tradition of (ar against

4B>

%ounted siatic o//onents )ad taug)t t)ese Ro%ans t)e lessons of e-/loiting and defending against t)e /re/onderance of one (ea/on syste% o+er anot)er. In !estern 2uro/e t)e introduction of t)e stirru/ )el/ed gi+e )ea+y ca+alry a /ro%inence t)at t)e (eakness of its natural ene%ies accentuated. In fact3 t)e /o(er of t)e stirru/#sta&ilised )ea+y ca+alry%an ca%e near to nullifying t)e traditional ad+antage of t)e foot%an o+er t)e )orse%an3 one al%ost al(ays %agnified &y t)e foot soldiers usual /osture of defence against t)e %ounted (arrior. 5nly good infantry e.ui//ed (it) long s/ears could resist t)e ne( ca+alry. 0)e a&sence of lig)t ca+alry in t)e often t)ickly (ooded areas of t)e !est /rotected !estern 2uro/ean )ea+y ca+alry fro% a %enace to ()ic) By6antine ca+alry succu%&ed at Man6ikert3 and t)e lack of a regular infantry t)at trained toget)er to fig)t in t)e field %eant t)at t)e stirru/#sta&ilised )ea+y ca+alry )ad a dis/ro/ortionately /redo%inant role in t)e field ar%y. Since t)e defence relied %uc) on fortifications3 infantry )ad its a//ro/riate /lace in t)e attack and defence of castles and cities. But )ea+y ca+alry not(it)standing3 t)e defence do%inated &ecause of t)e strengt) and increasing so/)istication of fortifications3 t)e lo( ratio of force to s/ace3 and t)e lack of a go+ern%ent t)at could field /rofessional ar%ies or /ractice a /ersistent and syste%atic (ay of (ar. nd in s/ite of an e%erging feudal /olitical synt)esis3 !estern 2uro/e did not )a+e t)e tactical unifor%ity t)at )ad c)aracterised t)e Mediterranean area ()en le-andrian or Ro%an (arfare /re+ailed. Regional di+ersity c)aracterised 2uro/ean (arfare. S/aniards used lig)t ca+alry (it) Da+elins in raids against t)e Mosle%s in S/ain7 t)e 2nglis) e%/loyed lig)t infantry (it) long&o(s against t)e )ea+y infantry of t)e Scots7 $rusaders utilised lig)t infantry (it) cross&o(s to defeat 0urkis) lig)t ca+alry in Syria and Palestine7 and to(ns3 often )a+ing an i%%o&ile3 usually undrilled3 )ea+y infantry3 ar%ed t)e%sel+es (it) /ikes to resist )ea+y ca+alry. 0)e )ea+y ca+alry /ro+ided t)e only constant3 fig)ting eit)er %ounted or on foot as an elite &ut not (ell#articulated )ea+y infantry. !)en t)e S(iss e+ol+ed a t)oroug)ly drilled3 /ike#ar%ed )ea+y infantry t)at could %anoeu+re in large s.uares and also (it)stand t)e c)arge of )ea+y ca+alry3 !estern 2uro/e ac.uired a necessary ingredient to &ring fort) a ne( co%&ined#ar%s synt)esis. 8oining t)is +ariety of (ea/on syste%s (it) t)e de+elo/%ent of %ore /rofessional %ilitary forces in 'rance and Italy and t)e e%ergence in fifteent)#century Italian (ars of a sc)ool of leaders ()o consistently /ursued +ictory (it) t)e least effort (it)out de/ending solely on t)e defensi+e3 !estern 2uro/e )ad all of t)e re.uisites for field forces t)at3 like t)e By6antine3 (ould )a+e su/re%acy o+er any regional syste% of (arfare. 0)e )ea+y infantry lacked Ro%an articulation &ut safeguarded its flanks &y a+oiding a linear array3 eac) large s.uare )a+ing a ca/acity for all#around defence. 0)e lig)t infantry3 initially +alua&le for skir%is)ing3 )arassing t)e ca+alry3 and s)ooting )orses3 &eca%e an indis/ensa&le /art of t)e infantry tea% &y t)e late si-teent) century3 ()en t)e in+ention of t)e /istol introduced lig)t#ca+alry tactics to !estern 2uro/e and ga+e t)e lig)t#infantry ar.ue&usiers t)e %ission of /rotecting t)e )ea+y infantry fro% t)e /istoleers. 0)e i%%o&ility of t)e infantry and its conse.uent deficiencies in carrying out attacks accentuated )ea+y ca+alrys traditional role as t)e offensi+e troo/s. 0)e co%&ined#ar%s tactical synt)esis of t)e 1=>>s )ad t)e sa%e rationale as its /redecessors3 t)e le-andrian and Ro%an3 resting on t)e %utual su//ort of eac) ar% to /rotect anot)er against a stronger (ea/on syste%. nd3 Dust as in le-anders %et)od3 co%%anders relied on t)e )ig)er %o&ility of t)e )ea+y ca+alry to defeat t)e intrinsically stronger )ea+y infantry3 eit)er &y c)arging a dis/ersed and so +ulnera&le infantry3 or &y using t)e %o&ility of t)e )orse%en to attack a flank or rear unready to recei+e a c)arge. 0)e tec)ni.ue differed fro% t)e ancients only in t)at ca+alry%en (it) /istol and sa&re /ro+ided t)e %ost effecti+e dual#/ur/ose (ea/on syste% )istory )ad t)us far seen. :et t)e +ersatility of ca+alry did not alter co%&at conditions3 only forcing on t)e infantry closer and %ore so/)isticated %et)ods of %utual su//ort.

4B1

0)e se+enteent) century (itnessed t)e co%/lete restoration of t)e full ca/a&ilities of ancient (arfare3 o/erations le-andrian in t)eir reliance on ca+alry and Ro%an in t)eir /ersistence and de/endence on fortifications and siegecraft. ,inear tactics and e+en Ro%an (ords of co%%and e-e%/lified c)anges t)at created long#ser+ice /rofessional ar%ies t)at recei+ed fairly regular /ay and o&tained t)eir su//lies t)roug) a (ell#organised co%%issariat. Ne+ert)eless3 in s/ite of t)e /redo%inance of linear infantry for%ations3 t)e tactics +aried fro% Ro%es in one i%/ortant res/ect: t)e lig)t infantry %usketeers3 rat)er t)an dis/ersing a)ead of t)e )ea+y infantry as skir%is)ers3 )ad an i%/ortant /lace in t)e line. Instead of indi+idual fire3 +olleys on co%%and c)aracterised t)e actions of %usketeers3 and t)e lig)t infantry )ad a /lace in t)e &attle t)at )ad %ore in co%%on (it) Persian /ractice and t)e 2nglis) use of t)eir long&o(%en. 0)e strengt) of fortifications and t)e e+en %atc) of t)e contestants in nu%&ers3 skills3 tactics3 and resources ke/t suc) (arfare indecisi+e. :et ()en e%/loyed against non#2uro/ean o//onents (it) (eaker /olitical organisations3 t)ese %et)ods %et t)e sa%e success enDoyed &y t)e Ro%ans in t)eir (ars against &ar&arians or t)e Macedonians and Syrians. In India3 for e-a%/le3 t)e 2uro/eans in t)e eig)teent) century found t)eir tactical syste% (ell ada/ted &ot) to t)e terrain and to co/ing (it) t)e Indians ()o ga+e considera&le e%/)asis to ca+alry. Still3 no sooner )ad ancient (arfare returned in all of its essentials t)an a si%/le inno+ation Gt)e &ayonet attac)ed to t)e %usketH %erged lig)t and )ea+y infantry and conse.uently de+alued ca+alry as a (ea/on syste%. 0)e effecti+eness of t)e flintlock %usket %eant t)at in co%&at &et(een infantry3 %issile action su/erseded s)ock action3 and &attles increasingly consisted of infantry arrayed in t)inner3 linear for%ations to de+elo/ t)e %a-i%u% fire/o(er. Ne+ert)eless3 ca+alry re%ained i%/ortant: its tactically offensi+e c)aracteristics of greater %o&ility and ease of taking u/ co%&at for%ation still ena&led it to attack t)e flanks and rear of t)e infantry for%ations3 no( e+en %ore +ulnera&le &ecause of t)e ado/tion of a linear syste%. !it) ca+alry de/loyed on t)e flanks3 co%&at rese%&led t)at of t)e ancient Persians. But t)e su/re%acy of infantry and its continuance of t)e traditional do%inance of t)e defensi+e ()en si%ilar (ea/on syste%s foug)t3 aug%ented t)e tactical strengt)s of t)e defensi+e. r%ed only (it) sa&re and /istol3 dis%ounted ca+alry3 )o(e+er3 could no longer (it)stand t)e c)arge of %ounted )orse%en nor )a+e /arity (it) infantry. 5nly dragoons3 also ar%ed (it) %uskets3 could function effecti+ely as infantry. nd t)e /o(er of e+en %ore so/)isticated fortifications furt)er increased t)e tactical resistance of t)e defensi+e. But constant indecisi+e (ars and t)e scientific s/irit of t)e age )el/ed ani%ate and guide a successful searc) for a ne( (ay of (ar3 one ()ic) flo(ered during t)e 'renc) Re+olution. In tactics3 t)e colu%n3 ()ic) furnis)ed &ot) &attlefield %o&ility and t)e a&ility to de/loy ra/idly into t)e linear co%&at for%ation3 ga+e infantry a )it)erto unkno(n offensi+e /o(er. $o%/ared (it) o//onents in a linear array3 an ar%y (it) infantry in colu%ns /ossessed tactically offensi+e ca/a&ilities &ecause its colu%ns3 %arc)ing %ore .uickly t)an troo/s in line3 could %o+e fast enoug) to reac) t)e ene%y flank or rear and could de/loy )astily enoug) to attack &efore t)e ene%y could re#for% to resist t)e t)reat. 2.ually3 colu%ns could %anoeu+re on t)e &attlefield to ena&le co%%anders to concentrate infantry to e-/loit (eak /oints in t)e ene%y array. 0)is en)anced infantry articulation3 &ased on i%/ro+ed drill and (ell#concei+ed3 si%/le e+olutions3 also contri&uted to t)e defensi+e su/re%acy of t)e &ayonet#ar%ed %usketeer and %ade infantry on t)e %arc) %uc) less +ulnera&le to ca+alry. 0)is additional security )el/ed to %ake unnecessary cu%&erso%e syste% of %arc)ing in readiness for &attle ()en near t)e ene%y in order to )a+e defences against a sudden attack &y ca+alry. n ar%y ()ose infantry could for% .uickly3 eit)er to resist ca+alry or to dra( u/ for &attle if sur/rised &y ene%y infantry3 could %o+e %ore s(iftly &ecause it could retain t)e s/eedy /ace of t)e %arc) for%ation e+en in /ro-i%ity to t)e ene%y. Suc) %o&ility and ca/acity for ra/id concentration %ade it safe to dis/erse and3 &y using t)e fire of 4B2

t)e %usket to co+er s%all ga/s3 unnecessary to de/loy in a rigid line3 ()ic) (as difficult to for% /ro/erly and i%/ossi&le to %o+e .uickly. 0)e s)ift fro% t)e s)ock action of t)e linear de/loy%ent of t)e ancients to reliance on %issiles ga+e eig)teent)#century linear infantry a fle-i&ility denied to t)e *reek or Ro%an ()o )ad to a+oid ga/s so as not to e-/ose any flanks to )ostile s(ords # or s/ear%en. Suc) ne(ly constituted ar%ies )ad greater strategic %o&ility ()en t)ey (ere /itted against ar%ies t)at continued to %arc) in t)e old &attle array. In &ot) tactics and strategy t)e infantry of an ar%y for%ed on t)is ne( %odel )ad t)e offensi+e ca/a&ilities long a %ono/oly of ca+alry3 a (ea/on syste% no( inferior to &ayonet#ar%ed %usketeers. !)en3 )o(e+er3 t)is ty/e of infantry organisation &eca%e t)e arc)ety/e for nineteent)#century 2uro/e3 its u&i.uity de/ri+ed eit)er co%&atant of tactically offensi+e infantry and furt)er de+alued ca+alry. But ar%ies c)anged e+en %ore as t)e rifle and t)e &reec)loader eli%inated ca+alry as a tactically significant (ea/on syste%. 0actically3 ar%ies &eca%e truly co%/letely )o%ogeneous3 co%/osed of &ayonet#ar%ed rifle%en and t)eir slo(er#%o+ing %issile (ea/on co%/anion3 t)e artillery. 0)e &ayonet )ad &eco%e redundant &ecause t)e range and rate of fire of t)e rifle +irtually /recluded s)ock action &et(een infantries as (ell as ca+alry against infantry. Ne+ert)eless3 ar%ies retained ca+alry for its strategic +alue and c)eris)ed t)e illusion t)at it still )ad tactical i%/ortance. $a+alry )ad too long and glorious a )istory to ena&le officers fro% rural &ackgrounds3 ()ere t)e )orse still )ad a do%inant role in t)e culture as (ell as t)e econo%y3 to gi+e it u/ easily. Not since t)e early *reeks )ad all 2uro/ean ar%ies so e-clusi+ely utilised essentially a single (ea/on syste%. 0)ey did not &ase t)is usage on ignorance of alternati+es3 a conser+ati+e ad)erence to old %et)ods3 or t)e unsuita&ility to terrain of any ot)er. Rat)er3 late nineteent)#century (arfare no longer )ad any ot)er (ea/on syste% t)at )ad serious +alue in co%&at. Since ca+alry )ad no tactical use e+en for attacking t)e flanks of infantry3 ar%ies (it) only lig)t infantry lacked a (ea/on syste% (it) &etter %o&ility. nd (it) all forces e%/loying t)e .uick#%o+ing3 ra/id# de/loying 'renc) re+olutionary colu%n3 no ar%y )ad any &ody of infantry t)at )ad &etter %o&ility t)an any ot)er. So3 (it)out any differential %o&ility a%ong its troo/s3 no ar%y /ossessed any tactically offensi+e co%/onent. 0)e tactical defensi+e )ad attained un/recedented /redo%inance. !orld !ar I e-)i&ited t)is conclusi+e /ri%acy of t)e defensi+e ()en it /roduced casualties in un)eard#of total nu%&ers3 as generals struggled (it) a situation &ot) uni.ue and %uc) at +ariance (it) t)eir /reconce/tions. 0)e losses ca%e not so %uc) fro% t)e deadliness of t)e ne( (ea/ons or a )ig) /ro/ortion of losses in a fe( days7 rat)er3 like t)e siege (arfare of t)e /ast3 t)e entrenc)ed ar%ies suffered %oderate casualties t)at /ersisted day after day and %ont) after %ont). Because 1> /ercent of /o/ulations (ere under ar%s3 rat)er t)an t)e 2 or ? /ercent as in (ars in t)e /re+ious t(o centuries3 casualties as a /ercentage of /o/ulation rose to an e-traordinary le+el3 e+en ()en casualties as a /ercentage of t)ose engaged in a /articular &attle usually re%ained3 for /eriods of ti%e co%/ara&le to t)e &attles of old3 .uite lo(. 0)e /arado- of a declining ratio of losses acco%/anying gro(ing let)ality of (ea/ons Ge-/lained largely &y i%/ro+ed articulation3 increasing )o%ogeneity in res/ect to (ea/on syste%s3 and t)e lo(er density of t)e troo/s in co%&atH recei+ed reinforce%ent fro% t)e entrenc)ing t)at caused ar%ies .uite literally to disa//ear fro% +ie(. But fro% a situation in ()ic) si%ilarly constituted3 )o%ogeneous ar%ies struggled ineffecti+ely against one anot)er in /rolonged3 costly &attles ca%e a ne( so/)istication in tactics. 0)e conce/ts of %o&ility and concentration t)at in Na/oleonic ti%es co%%anders )ad e%/loyed for &attalion colu%ns %arc)ing erect on a s%oky &attlefield /ro+ed a//lica&le in trenc) (arfare to units as s%all as a do6en %en %o+ing fro% one co+ered /osition to anot)er as t)ey /ro&ed for and e-/loited a (eakness in t)e ene%ys defence. 0)ese infiltration tactics used on a %inute scale t)e /rinci/le of

4B?

concentration against (eakness3 and t)e s%all infantry grou/s3 &y t)eir successful /enetration3 created o/enings t)at /ro+ided t)e% (it) ene%y flanks and rear to attack. 0)e doctrine of a+oiding frontal assault and &y/assing o//osition /ro+ed funda%ental to t)ese tactics3 as t)e attacking forces concentrated against (eakness and reinforced success to /ierce a dee/ defence3 lea+ing to t)e reser+es follo(ing t)e lead for%ations t)e task of co%/leting t)e defeat of strong /oints a+oided &y t)e first grou/s of attackers. Infiltration tactics re.uired t)is /erse+erance in /us)ing to t)e rear &ecause t)e defence )ad organised in de/t)3 Dust as castles )ad a series of (alls3 (it) an array of /ositions t)at like t)e to(ers on t)e castles of old interdicted t)e inter+als &et(een t)e% and /rotected eac) ot)er &y t)eir fire. lt)oug) &ar&ed (ire /ro+ided t)e /)ysical &arrier offered &y (alls and ditc)es in for%er ti%es3 defenders relied /ri%arily on fire and %ore and %ore /laced de/endence on a succession of defences and counterattacks to dri+e &ack t)e infiltrating ene%y. 8ust as t)e attackers concentrated against (eakness3 t)e defenders soug)t to concentrate against strengt). rtillery /layed an aug%ented role in t)e offensi+e3 and not only &ecause initial tactical conce/ts )ad used t)e tec)ni.ues of siege (arfare as a %odel for t)e offensi+e against entrenc)%ents. 0)e accuracy /ossi&le (it) so/)isticated control of indirect fire fro% cali&rated (ea/ons s)ooting under kno(n conditions ena&led artillerys )ig)#e-/losi+e s)ells to su//ort an offensi+e in a (ay i%/ossi&le earlier. :et t)e +ery i%%o&ility of t)e artillery3 aggra+ated not only &y t)e destruction of roads and &ridges &ut also t)e o&struction of o/en fields &y trenc)es and t)e craters created &y its o(n fire3 li%ited t)e range of an offensi+e. 0)e attack )ad to a(ait t)e difficult for(ard %o+e%ent of t)e artillery. But no sooner )ad a ne( era in (arfare &egun t)an t)e air/lane and t)e tank re+ersed t)e trend to(ard )o%ogeneity and took (arfare &ack to t)e condition of four (ea/on syste%s3 a situation t)at )ad not /re+ailed since t)e early days of t)e /istol in t)e si-teent) century. r%ies soon )ad t)e sa%e )eterogeneity as in le-anders ti%es. 8ust as at t)e &eginning of t)e si-teent) century3 during and after t)e (ar3 co%%anders and %ilitary t)inkers soug)t to assess t)eir relati+e i%/ortance and de+ise t)e &est co%&inations for t)e use of t)ese ne( (ea/ons. In s/ite of t)eir relati+ely s%all nu%&ers3 tanks )ad %ade a %aDor i%/act. !it) t)e sa%e offensi+e c)aracteristics as t)e ar%oured )ea+y ca+alry of t)e stirru/ era3 t)ey enDoyed t)e ad+antage of t)e /rogress in disci/line and articulation t)at )ad occurred since t)e Middle ges. 0)e use of t)e radio aug%ented t)is trend to(ard en)anced articulation and )el/ed t)e tanks a//ly t)e conce/t of t)e infiltration tactics3 for t)e e-ecution of ()ic) t)ey )ad3 intrinsically3 ad%ira&le attri&utes. 0)e strategic dis/ersal t)at )ad ty/ified ar%ies since Na/oleons day also strengt)ened t)e effecti+eness of tanks &ecause3 unlike t)e situation in t)e contests of old3 %ost of t)e forces of eac) co%&atant did not necessarily /artici/ate in any gi+en &attle. 0anks could concentrate at one /oint and )a+e a tactical /redo%inance o+er t)e /ro/ortionately fe(er antitank guns asse%&led t)ere. In addition3 ()en co%/ared (it) t)e tank3 t)e first antitank guns3 as %o&ile rat)er t)an /orta&le (ea/ons3 )ad less tactical %o&ility t)an t)e /ike for%ations of earlier ti%es. 0)ey could not take t)e offensi+e3 as )ad t)e )ea+y infantry at P)arsalus and Bannock&urn. ircraft not only re/roduced t)e /ro/erties of lig)t ca+alry &ut also )ad t)e tanks ad+antage of radio co%%unication. lso t)e aircraft enDoyed3 e+en %ore t)an t)e tanks3 t)ose .ualities of t)e ca/acity for ra/id concentration and a co%/arati+e su/eriority in %o&ility o+er t)e antiaircraft gun greater t)an lig)t ca+alry )ad )ad o+er lig)t infantry. lt)oug) air/lanes )ad %ore /ro%inence in t)eir strategic lig)t ca+alry role3 t)ey could %ake serious tactical contri&utions. But %ost forces fig)ting in !orld !ar II consisted of !orld !ar I infantry and artillery su//orted &y antitank and antiaircraft guns. 0)e tank and %otorised forces constituted a s%all %inority of t)e total3 and t)e air forces so%eti%es a so%e()at larger /ro/ortion. fter !orld !ar II3 ar%ies

4B4

gradually added to t)eir %otorised forces until %arc)ing infantry +irtually disa//eared. t t)e sa%e ti%e ar%ies so increased t)e nu%&er of tanks t)at nearly e+ery di+ision )ad a significant nu%&er. $oncurrently3 artillery &eca%e self#/ro/elled as did all antiaircraft guns3 and t)e infantry &eca%e %ounted infantry3 or dragoons3 ()en it recei+ed tracked carriers (it) &ullet#/roof ar%our and (ea/ons of its o(n. "elico/ters (it) %ac)ine guns and rockets3 also a&le to trans/ort infantry3 co%/leted t)e all#%ounted di+ision. Infantry e.ui//ed (it) /orta&le antitank and antiaircraft %issiles ga+e t)ese (ea/on syste%s a %o&ility co%/ara&le to t)e /ike%en and cross&o(%en of old and3 t)roug) t)eir ar%oured carrier and )elico/ter trans/ort3 %ounted tactical as (ell as strategic celerity. !it) lig)t ca+alry in t)e for% of )elico/ters as (ell as aircraft fro% t)e air forces3 /ost#(ar 2uro/ean ar%ies )ad a certain Part)ian c)aracter3 &ut /resence of antiaircraft and antitank (ea/ons actually %ade t)e% %ore By6antine. r%ies s)runk in si6e as t)ey ado/ted t)e %ore e-/ensi+e %ounted (ay of (ar. In t)is res/ect t)ey also rese%&led t)e al%ost e-clusi+ely %ounted ar%ies of t)e By6antine 2%/ire and %edie+al !estern 2uro/e. nd tanks also follo(ed t)e !estern %edie+al %odel as ar%ies a//arently /lanned to rely on t)e c)arge of t)eir tanks. $onsistently3 t)e tank %ore and %ore follo(ed t)e !orld !ar II trend of t)e antitank tank (it) all its features directed to(ard co%&at (it) a si%ilar (ea/on syste%. !it) so %any tanks in t)e ar%ies and all de/ending on t)e% to contri&ute significantly to antitank defence3 tanks (ould )a+e little c)oice &ut to fig)t ot)er tanks. Back

(echnology and the Four 1asic Wea'on Systems

0)e foregoing su%%ary stresses t)e t)e%e of t)e four &asic (ea/on syste%s and )o( soldiers utilised t)ose at t)eir dis/osal. 0errain )ad %uc) to do (it) t)eir a//lica&ility as did t)eir cost and t)e society /ro+iding t)e ar%ed force. 5+er()el%ing tactical success re(arded t)e e%/loy%ent of a %ore /o(erful (ea/on syste% against an inferior3 as By6antine /ractice e-e%/lified. In )eterogeneous ar%ies co%%anders soug)t to %ake t)eir o(n different (ea/on syste%s %utually su//orting ()ile seeking to assail (it) a &etter one an o//onents isolated (eaker (ea/on syste%. Suc) )eterogeneity3 co%/ared (it) a )o%ogeneous ar%y3 co%/licated t)e tasks of a co%%ander3 /ro+iding %ore o//ortunities for &lunders and a greater sco/e for a&ility. But not all /eriods )ad e+ery (ea/on syste% a+aila&le to t)e%3 e+en ()en terrain suita&le for t)eir use e-isted. 0)e de+elo/%ent of t)e /istol eli%inated t)e distinction &et(een lig)t and )ea+y ca+alry3 and t)e introduction of t)e &ayonet at t)e end of t)e se+enteent) century %erged lig)t and )ea+y infantry. 0)is inaugurated an era of a century and a )alf in ()ic) 2uro/ean soldiers (arred (it) only dual#/ur/ose infantry and ca+alry. 0)en rifles and &reec)loaders ga+e infantry t)e /o(er to eli%inate ca+alrys role in co%&at. 0)e age of dual#/ur/ose infantry as t)e only (ea/on syste% lasted until !orld !ar I3 ()en t)e tank restored )ea+y ca+alry and t)e aircraft t)e lig)t ca+alry. 0)ese ga+e rise to t)e %odern e.ui+alents of t)e )ea+y and lig)t infantry3 t)e antitank and antiaircraft gun. So tec)nological c)ange %ade /ossi&le t)ese inno+ations3 ()ic) created a uni.ue /eriod in (arfare fro% 1C>> to 1@1= ()en soldiers )ad t(o3 and t)en only one3 (ea/on syste%s. 2arlier3 co%&at )ad undergone alterations t)roug) t)e i%/act of t)e stirru/ and3 in t)e %ore re%ote /ast3 t)roug) suc) funda%ental inno+ations as do%esticating t)e )orse for (ar3 using iron rat)er t)an &ron6e (ea/ons3 and i%/ro+ing t)e &o(. $learly tec)nology su//lies a %aDor t)e%e for understanding tactics &ecause of t)e )uge %odifications in co%&at t)at often rat)er si%/le conce/ts )a+e %ade. In %odern ti%es tec)nology first eli%inated and later restored t)e four (ea/on syste%s of ancient and %edie+al (arfare. 0)us t)e %ost dra%atic effects of tec)nology )a+e occurred in t)e for% of a fe( si%/le inno+ations3 suc) as t)e &ayonet3 ()ic) affected t)e conduct of co%&at and t)e role or continued

4B<

e-istence of a (ea/on syste%. Suc) i%/ortant in+entions as t)e flintlock c)anged tactics less &ecause3 like t)e )andgun in its early stages3 it only i%/ro+ed on an e-isting (ea/on or %et)od of co%&at3 a difference in degree rat)er t)an in kind. 0)e stirru/ (orked a c)ange of suc) great %agnitude in t)e ca/a&ility of t)e )ea+y ca+alry%an t)at t)is c)ange %ig)t (ell )a+e e.ualled a difference in kind7 one %ig)t say t)e sa%e a&out t)e cross&o( in ena&ling %en deficient in strengt) and skill to e%/loy a strong &o( ne+ert)eless to use one of great /o(er (it) considera&le accuracy. *un/o(der3 curiously enoug)3 (orked its re+olution in (arfare on land only gradually. 'ortifications .uickly acco%%odated to t)e siege cannon3 and )andguns long /erfor%ed no &etter t)an &o(s. But t)e facility (it) ()ic) t)e ca+alry could use t)e /istol3 a one#)anded (ea/on3 %ade it relati+ely easy3 since t)e )orse%an also )ad a sa&re3 to create a dual#/ur/ose ca+alry. 0)is %ade gun/o(ders first %aDor i%/act on co%&at on land. 0)e %uskets easy con+ersion to a s)ort /ike &y t)e addition of a &ayonet /ro&a&ly ga+e t)is (ea/on its first serious co%&at ad+antage o+er t)e &o(. rtillery %ore and %ore affected t)e &attlefield &ut not enoug) to see it as different in kind3 rat)er t)an degree3 fro% t)e %usket. study of t)e era of artillery in %icrocos% %ig)t (ell s)o( t)e need for an entirely ne( classification of (ea/on syste%s3 one using %ore so/)isticated distinctions. But t)e rifle3 de/ending on t)e si%/le conce/t e%&odied in t)e Mini; &ullet3 and t)e &reec)loader co%/leted t)e destruction of ca+alrys tactical +alue3 a difference in kind t)at constituted anot)er of gun/o(ders %aDor effects on (arfare. 0)e e-istence of +arious (ea/on syste%s /ro+ided o//ortunities to e%/loy t)e conce/t of econo%y of force # using no %ore resources t)an are necessary to carry out a task. Suc) frugality lea+es unco%%itted or une-/ended3 assets a+aila&le for ot)er /ur/oses. 0)is idea3 usually a//lied in t)e conte-t of )a+ing t)e largest /ossi&le concentration for t)e %ain offensi+e or defensi+e effort3 also )ad rele+ance in c)oosing a%ong (ea/on syste%s so as to )a+e t)e greatest co%&at /o(er t)roug) least cost co%&inations. Back

(he -conomics of Force Com'osition

5nly recently )a+e ela&orate cost calculations co%e to /lay an e-/licit role in t)e co%/osition of forces. But suc) considerations )a+e long &een i%/ortant. 0)e re/lace%ent of t)e cross&o( &y t)e initially less effecti+e &ut c)ea/er )andgun e-e%/lifies t)e influence of e-/ense3 as does t)e continued use of t)e %atc)lock %usket rat)er t)an t)e %ore effecti+e &ut %ore e-/ensi+e ()eel# lock. Still3 co%/aring /rices )as often in+ol+ed %ore so/)isticated tactical t)inking t)an a %ere e-a%ination of t)e c)arge for )and#gunners and cross&o(%en and t)e nu%&er of )andgunners needed to take t)e /lace of a gi+en nu%&er of cross&o(%en. 'or e-a%/le3 if in t)e fourteent) century3 an 2nglis) ar%y )ad as its only co%&at %ission t)e resistance of a %ounted c)arge &y 'renc) ca+alry3 t)e 2nglis) 9ing could )a+e used ine-/ensi+e !els) /ike%en. Su//ose t)ree of t)ese /ike%en could su&stitute3 as infantry3 for t(o dis%ounted knig)ts3 and a s/ear%an (it) a nag to ride for strategic %o&ility in+ol+ed only one#fourt) t)e e-/ense as a knig)t. If t)ese assu%/tions (ere true3 t)e 2nglis) 9ing could )a+e %et )is co%&at needs (it) s/ear%en at ?C.< /ercent of t)e /rice for knig)ts # t(o knig)ts cost eig)t units of %oney and t)e e.ui+alent co%&at ca/a&ility t)roug) t)ree s/ear%en incurred t)e e-/enditure of only t)ree units. But if t)e 2nglis) 9ing also )ad to face 'renc) cross&o(%en as (ell as 'renc) knig)ts3 t)e s/ear%en alone (ould not suffice: t)e 'renc) could e%/loy !illia%s %et)od at "astings of s)ooting t)e i%%o&ile s/ear%en (it) cross&o(s until ga/s a//eared in t)e forces into ()ic) t)e 'renc) knig)ts could c)arge. 0o co/e (it) t)is %enace t)e 9ing (ould need so%e 2nglis) knig)ts ()o could re%ain %ounted to ride out and dis/erse t)e 'renc) cross&o(%en Dust as3 at Bannock&urn3 Scottis) knig)ts )ad ridden o+er t)e 2nglis) long&o(%en.

4B=

!)en t)e 9ing %ade t)e decision as to t)e /ro/ortions of )ig)#/riced knig)ts and lo(#/riced s/ear%en3 e-/enditure and co%&at considerations (ould coo/erate. 9nig)ts and s/ear%en could re/lace one anot)er to resist a c)arge3 &ut s/ear%en could not do t)e knig)ts (ork of dri+ing off t)e cross&o(%en. In addition3 t)e 2nglis) 9ing (ould +alue knig)ts &ecause so%e on foot a%ong t)e s/ear%en (ould strengt)en t)eir defence3 and )e could also use t)e %ounted knig)ts for reconnaissance and for dealing (it) any rural %ilitia t)at %ig)t i%/ede /rogress. So )e %ig)t re/lace t(o knig)ts (it) t)ree s/ear%en3 if )e /lanned to use only a fe( s/ear%en. But ()en )e t)oug)t of su//lanting %ore knig)ts (it) s/ear%en3 ot)er considerations t)an %erely resisting a frontal c)arge (ould cause )i% to +alue knig)ts %ore )ig)ly3 and as t)e su&stitution /rocess continued3 t)e 9ing (ould a//roac)3 and e+en e-ceed3 )a+ing four and t)en %ore s/ear%en take t)e /lace of one knig)t. 'inally3 )e (ould )a+e an irreduci&le %ini%u% of3 say3 1> /ercent of t)e force t)at %ust &e knig)ts to deal (it) t)e cross&o(%en. Because of t)is c)anging esti%ate of t)e (ort) of s/ear%en as t)eir nu%&er increased Gan e-a%/le of t)e la( of di%inis)ing returnsH t)e gra/) &elo( of t)e 9ings )y/ot)etical rate of su&stitution &et(een s/ear%en and knig)ts is a cur+ed rat)er t)an a straig)t line. 0)is gra/) s)o(s t)at t)e 2nglis) 9ing &elie+ed t)at )e needed to kee/ so%e knig)ts %ounted to deal (it) t)e &o(%en and lea+e t)e re%aining dis%ounted knig)ts3 or t)eir e.ui+alent in s/ear%en3 to resist t)e c)arge of t)e 'renc) knig)ts. But &et(een t)e e-tre%es of @> /ercent s/ear%en and 1> /ercent knig)ts and all knig)ts3 t)e 2nglis) 9ing )ad a c)oice3 &ecause t)e cur+e gra/)s e.ual co%&at +alue3 eac) co%&ination of knig)ts and s/ear%en )a+ing3 in t)e 9ings esti%ation3 t)e sa%e effecti+eness for %eeting t)e 'renc) in &attle.

Marginal ,ate of Su-stitution -etween S earmen and +ismounted Dnights5 E*hi-iting a )ur%e of EEual )om-at Effe(ti%eness Under )ertain )onditions Back

In %aking t)e c)oice3 t)e 9ing could co%/are t)e /rice of knig)ts and s/ear%en3 trying +arious %i-tures until )e found one t)at in+ol+ed t)e least e-/enditure. In t)e follo(ing gra/) t)e tangential line e-)i&its t)e one#to#four ratio of t)e c)arge for a s/ear%an to t)at for a knig)t3 s)o(ing t)at t)e least cost co%&ination consists of a&out 1= /ercent knig)ts and B4 /ercent s/ear%en.

The ,ole of )ost in )hoosing the O timum )om-ination of S earmen and +ismounted Dnights Back

4BC

0)e 9ing also )ad anot)er alternati+e. "e could re/lace knig)ts (it) long&o(%en %ounted on nags for strategic %o&ility. In a good defensi+e /osition (it) so%e natural or artificial co+er3 t)e long&o(%en could defeat 'renc) cross&o(%en. In addition3 2nglis) e-/erience in Scotland )ad s)o(n t)at long&o(%en could )el/ significantly to defeat a ca+alry c)arge. 'urt)er3 since %any long&o(%en )ad s(ords or a-es and so%e /rotection for t)eir &odies3 t)ey could %ake so%e contri&ution as )ea+y infantry%en. 5n t)e ot)er )and3 if t)e 9ing de/ended on t)e long&o(%en for defence against cross&o(%en3 and t)e s/ear%en and dis%ounted ca+alry t)us )ad to (it)stand %issiles fro% t)e 'renc) cross&o( until t)e long&o(%en )ad dri+en t)e% off3 t)e &etter ar%our of t)e dis%ounted knig)ts (ould add to t)eir +alue co%/ared (it) t)e %ore +ulnera&le s/ear%en. si%ilar gra/) could e-)i&it t)e co%&at su&stitution relations)i/ &et(een knig)ts and long&o(%en and a c)oice &ased on t)e least cost co%&ination3 again s)o(n &y a line c)arting t)e e-/ense ratio &et(een t)e t(o (ea/on syste%s. 0o gra/) t)e relations)i/ a%ong knig)ts3 s/ear%en3 and long&o(%en (ould re.uire a t)ree#di%ensional figure (it) t)e /rice relations)i/s reflected &y a /lane rat)er t)an a line. 5f course3 ot)er considerations &esides costs3 and t)e needs of t)e entire ca%/aign rat)er t)an Dust t)e &attle3 (ould also )a+e (eig)t7 an a&solute s)ortage of one (ea/on syste% (ould constrain c)oices as (ould /olitical3 cultural3 and ot)er factors. In fact3 at t)e Battle of $r;cy t)e 2nglis) )ad al%ost t(o#t)irds of t)eir force in long&o(%en3 %ost of t)e re%ainder in knig)ts3 and only a fe( s/ear%en. 0o defeat t)e 'renc) cross&o(%en t)e 9ing de/ended e-clusi+ely on )is long&o(%en ()o3 fro% t)eir u/)ill /osition3 defeated t)e &rief attack of t)e cross&o(%en. 0)e long&o(%en t)en %ade a /o(erful contri&ution to t)e defeat of t)e 'renc) %ounted c)arge3 t)eir arro(s &ringing do(n %any )orses. In an actual e-a%/le of constructing a force to %eet a s/ecific o//onent3 *on6alo of $ordo&a landed in Italy (it) an ar%y suited to t)e kind of raiding (arfare t)at t)e S/aniards and t)e Mosle%s )ad long (aged against eac) ot)er in S/ain. But ()en t)is force of lig)t ca+alry genetours and )ea+y infantry (it) s(ord and s)ield %et t)e 'renc) )ea+y ca+alry and S(iss /ike%en3 t)ey /ro%/tly suffered defeat. *on6alo t)en reconstituted )is ar%y to %eet t)e 'renc). Retaining %any of )is Da+elin#ar%ed genetours to e-ecute t)e strategic %issions of lig)t ca+alry3 )e trained so%e of )is %en to use t)e /ike to /ro+ide essential )el/ to )is s(ords%en in resisting t)e 'renc) ca+alry3 and )e added ar.ue&usiers to )is )ea+y infantry to defend t)e entrenc)%ents )e used so /rudently to sty%ie t)e /o(erful 'renc) ca+alry. 0)us3 )e re&uilt )is forces to deal (it) a ne( ad+ersary3 co%&ining +arious (ea/on syste%s (it) different c)aracteristics to %eet tactical and strategic needs. 4na&le to /ay )is S/aniards3 %uc) less )ire %ercenaries &ecause of lack of funds3 )e certainly %ust )a+e taken scarcity and cost constraints into consideration as )e refas)ioned )is ar%y to o//ose 'renc) )ea+y ca+alry and t)eir for%ida&le S(iss /ike%en. recent e-a%/le of a c)oice si%ilar to t)at )y/ot)esised for t)e $r;cy ca%/aign in+ol+es t)e co%/ara&le /ro&le% of antitank defence. 0)e tank is clearly t)e &est antitank (ea/on. Not only does its ar%our and /o(erful gun %ake it e-ce/tional for t)is /ur/ose ()en defending in a co+ered /osition3 &ut its ar%our /rotects it fro% so%e of t)e effects of field artillery fire. Its %o&ility3 in

4BB

s/ite of t)e &attlefields s%all ar%s and artillery fire3 also %akes it t)e /redo%inant (ea/on syste% to o//ose t)e tank. But %odern ar%ies )a+e elected to )a+e a good /ro/ortion of infantry ar%ed (it) guided and unguided antitank rockets3 a c)oice e.ui+alent to t)e )y/ot)esis t)at 9ing 2d(ard could )a+e &roug)t !els) s/ear%en to t)e $r;cy &attlefield. In /re/aring for !orld !ar II t)e 'renc) and *er%ans &ot) )ad %ore antitank guns t)an t)ey did tanks3 t)e *er%ans )a+ing /ro/ortionately and a&solutely %any %ore t)an t)e 'renc). More recently3 in crossing of t)e Sue6 $anal3 t)e 2gy/tians e%/loyed so %any infantry (it) rocket launc)ers t)at (it) little aid fro% tanks t)ey re/elled t)e initial attack of t)e Israeli tank forces. 0)e effecti+eness of t)e infantry in antitank defence ca%e as no sur/rise to t)e 2gy/tians3 and t)e /reference for infantry3 rat)er t)an t)e %ore costly tanks3 resulted fro% t)e co%/arati+e costs of t)e t(o (ea/on syste%s. 0o &uy3 %aintain3 and %an a tank in+ol+ed +astly greater e-/ense t)an using enoug) infantry%en (it) rockets to /ro+ide t)e sa%e le+el of antitank defence. So a %i-ture of t)e less effecti+e &ut %ore efficient infantry and t)e %ore for%ida&le and %ore +ersatile tank /ro+ided an e.ually telling defence at a lo(er /rice t)an relying entirely on t)e tank. 0)ese considerations )a+e i%/licitly controlled force co%/osition t)roug)out 23<>> years of (arfare. 0)e elite $o%/anion ca+alry3 for e-a%/le3 for%ed a +ery s%all /ro/ortion of le-anders ar%y3 Dust enoug)3 &ut not %ore3 of t)ese (ell#trained3 e-/ensi+e )ea+y ca+alry to /erfor% t)eir essential tactical %ission. 5t)er less costly ca+alry co%/leted t)e necessary co%/le%ent of %ounted %en for duties ot)er t)an s)ock action. In t)e 1@?>s a 'renc) general %ade a si%ilar /oint ()en )e said t)at 'rance (ould %ake a %istake if it ga+e u/ ca+alry &ecause t)is (ould in+ol+e t)e sacrifice of a natural ad+antage in )ig)er .uality )orses. If )e e-/ressed anyt)ing %ore t)an a senti%ental regard for t)e )orse and nostalgia for t)e ca+alry3 )e indicated t)at a /lentiful su//ly of good )orses %ade it inefficient for 'rance to de/end entirely on tanks and %ec)anisation. nd in !orld !ar II t)e 'renc) ar%y3 like t)e *er%an and Russian3 did e%/loy a fe( )orse ca+alry as (ell as tanks and did use )orse#dra(n trans/ort as (ell as trucks. Back

(he )ole of #rticulation and 0ffensive (roo's in Concentrating against Weakness

lt)oug) soldiers long de+oted %uc) i%/licit t)oug)t to t)e least cost co%&ination of (ea/on syste%s3 t)ey often ga+e +ery e-/licit attention to t)e &est tactical array. 0)e S/artan and 0)e&an flank attacks e-)i&it t)e results of t)is (it) )o%ogeneous ar%ies as le-anders syste% does (it) a co%/letely )eterogeneous ar%y. !it) t)e understanding &y generals early in our era of t)e conce/t of t)e reser+e and of t)e role of t)e general as co%%ander instead of co%&at leader of )is %en3 t)ese /oints )a+e re.uired no ela&oration or s/ecial e%/)asis in t)is &ook ot)er t)an to /oint out t)at co%%anders )a+e )ad as reser+es troo/s ot)er t)an t)ose e-/licitly )eld out of co%&at for t)is /ur/ose. In addition to t)e su&tracted forces3 all %en not ine-trica&ly in+ol+ed (it) t)e ene%y constituted reser+es. le-ander de%onstrated t)is kind of reser+e at r&ela ()en )e led %en originally /osted on t)e rig)t to t)e aid of )is )ard#/ressed left. Because acti+e co%&at often %ade it difficult to e-tricate %en already co%%itted3 t)is conce/t )ad %ore a//lica&ility to strategy3 and Na/oleons use of suc) reser+es against !ur%ser and 8offres e%/loy%ent of t)e% in 1@14 illustrate t)e conce/t. 5n t)e ot)er )and3 t)e tactical /ro&le%s t)at co%%anders faced )a+e in+ol+ed se+eral of t)e t)e%es of t)is &ook. 0)e defence )ad /ri%acy not only ()en facing a (eaker (ea/on syste% &ut against a si%ilar one3 as long as eac) faced t)e ot)ers front in co%&at. 0)us3 one is te%/ted to define t)e /ro&le% of tactics as )o( &est to o+erco%e t)e do%inance of t)e defensi+e ()en lacking a su/erior (ea/on syste%. 0o attack (eakness /ro+ides t)e o&+ious ans(er.

4B@

0)e flank and rear of t)e for%ation of )ostile soldiers furnis)ed t)e %ost o&+ious /oints of (eakness and3 realising t)is3 t)e S/artans and t)e 0)e&ans directed t)eir assault at t)eir o//onents flank. 0o carry it out3 t)ey i%/ro+ed t)e articulation of t)eir ar%ies and3 &y su&di+iding t)eir /)alan-3 t)ey articulated it3 e-e%/lifying anot)er t)e%e3 and so created a /o(er to %anoeu+re and strike t)e ene%y flank. 0)e Ro%ans )ad &etter articulation3 ()ic) facilitated t)e /ro+ision of a reser+e t)at t)ey could also use to defend &y concentrating against strengt)3 as Sci/io did to defeat "anni&als outflanking %o+es at Pa%a. rticulation3 /articularly i%/ortant for s)ock infantry t)at )ad to /re+ent ga/s in its line3 d(indled in t)e Middle ges3 ()en %ilitia often lacked t)e drill of t)e *reeks and Ro%ans and ()en /rofessionals did not ser+e in /er%anently e%&odied units. :et3 t)oug) %edie+al infantry usually lacked enoug) articulation to conduct a flank attack3 ca+alry (it) its %ore %odest reliance on a careful array3 suffered less t)an infantry fro% t)is decline. 0)e S(iss )ad good articulation &ut needed it less &ecause t)ey did not use t)e a(k(ard linear de/loy%ent. Still3 t)ey so%eti%es used t)e %o&ility of t)eir s.uares to attack an ene%ys flank. 0)eir i%itators did not ade.uately e%ulate t)eir articulation3 only ado/ting t)eir solid for%ation. Better#articulated linear arrays returned ()en t)e 1utc) and S(edes ado/ted t)e Ro%an %odel. 0)is /laced a /re%iu% on articulation3 if only &ecause of t)e far greater difficulty of arranging and %anoeu+ring a line of infantry co%/ared (it) a solid3 rectangular %ass. But articulation into &attalions of <>> did not reac) t)e Ro%an le+el (it) its centuries &ecause tacticians did not use t)e co%/anies (it)in t)e &attalion to %anoeu+re se/arately. 0)e ar%ies of t)e 'renc) Re+olution and Na/oleon3 di+ided into di+isions and cor/s a&le to act inde/endently3 also /ro+ided i%/ro+ed tactical articulation t)roug) organisation in &rigades3 de%i# &rigades3 and &attalions. 0)us a&le to %anoeu+re inde/endently on t)e &attlefield3 rat)er t)an to kee/ its /lace in a rigid linear array on a field of &attle3 t)e &attalion as /art of t)e articulated di+ision &eca%e a funda%ental unit for %anoeu+re3 ()ic) readily de/loyed into line and so %arkedly facilitated concentration and assailing t)e ene%y in flank and rear. But useful articulation still did not e-tend &elo( t)e &attalion le+el. In t)e nineteent) century3 (it) t)e %erging of t)e roles of skir%is)er and t)e line3 t)e co%/any assu%ed tactical i%/ortance3 and a trend &egan to /us) (orka&le tactical articulation do(n &elo( t)e &attalion le+el. 0)is line of de+elo/%ent nearly reac)ed its a/ogee in t)e last year of !orld !ar I3 ()en a co%/anys /latoons and a /latoons sections and t)eir s.uads all &eca%e se/arate units in e-ecuting t)e concentration against (eakness t)at ani%ated t)e infiltration tactics. 0)e ne( organisation dis/ersed soldiers and decentralised co%&at co%%and under conditions in ()ic) all %en soug)t co+er#or at least crouc)ed to a+oid t)e u&i.uitous rifle and %ac)ine gun &ullets. 0)is scattering did3 )o(e+er3 de/ri+e )ig)er co%%anders of %uc) of t)eir control o+er t)eir units7 t)e initiati+e of su&ordinates taking its /lace. In !orld !ar II a /orta&le &attery#/o(ered radio3 so%eti%es a+aila&le e+en in s.uads3 restored a considera&le %easure of central co%%and and /ro+ided ar%ies (it) an undrea%ed#of le+el of articulation. In ar%oured units usually e+ery tank )ad a radio. I%/ro+ed articulation and its e-tension to e+er#s%aller units also often en)anced indi+idual /erfor%ance &ecause of t)e i%/act of t)e /er%anently constituted tactical grou/. Suc) su&di+ision facilitated t)e creation of social &onds a%ong t)e soldiers3 /ro+ided reinforce%ent of %orale3 and enforced standards of effecti+e soldierly &e)a+iour. 0)e ad+ance of articulation increased t)e a&ility of infantry to attack t)e (eakness of an o//onent3 e-e%/lified in t)e infiltration tactics of co%/letely articulated &attalions in )a+ing t)e ca/acity to %o+e %en /ast t)e flanks of )ostile strong /oints3 and3 in turn3 to %anoeu+re (it) agility to /rotect its o(n flanks and rear against a )ostile assault. $a+alry3 relying on t)e c)arge and needing a less

4@>

careful array t)an infantry3 )ad )ad3 e+en after t)e caracole %et)od of firing introduced %ore drill3 fe(er re.uire%ents for articulation. But t)e radio ga+e tanks and aircraft a degree of articulation t)at ca+alry )ad ne+er )ad. $oncentration of a stronger force at one /oint on a &attle front /ro+ided anot)er %et)od of assailing (eakness3 &ut it did not a+ail %uc) in s)ock action &ecause greater de/t) in a for%ation added little to t)e strengt) of its attack. :et Marl&oroug)s &attles e-)i&it success in concentrating against a (eak s/ot in a front. "e ac)ie+ed t)is &ecause )e co%&ined (it) concentration3 an often essential conco%itant t)e%e3 distraction to cause t)e ene%y to create a /oint of (eakness. t t)e Battle of Blen)ei%3 for e-a%/le3 )is strikes at t)e ene%y flanks lured t)e 'renc) into (eakening t)eir centre3 already lacking so%e defensi+e strengt) &ecause a%ong t)e troo/s /osted t)ere3 t)e 'renc) )ad a relati+ely )ig) /ro/ortion of /istol and sa&re#ar%ed ca+alry3 a (ea/on syste% t)at (as una&le to fig)t effecti+ely dis%ounted and so )ad no ad+antage on t)e defensi+e. "e t)en asse%&led troo/s strong in ca+alry and conducted a de+astating &reakt)roug) of t)e 'renc) centre. Suc) a success3 ()ic) did not re.uire %anoeu+ring against t)e ad+ersarys flank3 de/ended little on so/)isticated articulation &ut %uc) on t)e ca+alrys %o&ility and a&ility to attack ra/idly. 0)e 'renc) re+olutionary syste% of using colu%ns for &attlefield %anoeu+re &efore .uickly de/loying into line for co%&at3 facilitated suc) frontal concentration against (eakness3 again s)o(ing t)e interde/endence of articulation and tactical concentration. t t)e Battle of usterlit63 for instance3 Na/oleon3 )a+ing distracted t)e allies and induced t)e% to concentrate on )is rig)t3 &roke t)eir centre (it) an assault strong in )is readily concentrated and %ore ra/idly %arc)ing infantry dis/laying its en)anced %o&ility and articulation. ,ate in !orld !ar I infantry reac)ed an un/recedented /eak of articulation and3 in its a&ility to e-/loit frontal (eakness t)roug) infiltration tactics3 created +ulnera&le flanks and o//ortunities to reac) t)e rear. 5n t)e defence t)e *er%ans )ad learned to e%/loy essentially co%/ara&le %o&ility as (ell as to use counterattacks to resist t)e attackers larger force. In t)e a&sence of flanks3 infiltration tactics /ro+ided t)e only %eans of assailing (eakness. But ne-t to i%/licitly e%ulating t)e Part)ian triu%/) (it) a su/erior (ea/on syste%3 t)e &est co%%anders )ad traditionally fa+oured an attack against a (eak flank or rear. "ere t)e conce/t of offensi+e troo/s )el/s to understand t)is t)e%e and is really a /art of it. le-anders s)ock ca+alry e-e%/lified offensi+e troo/s ()en t)ey c)arged t)e flank of t)e Persian )o/lites at t)e Battle of *ranicus. 0o carry out t)is successful assault le-anders $o%/anion ca+alry )ad t(o re.uisites3 greater %o&ility t)an t)e )o/lites to ena&le t)e% to reac) t)eir flank and t)e a&ility to conduct t)eir assault (it)out a ti%e#consu%ing rearrange%ent into a co%&at for%ation. 0)e )ea+y ca+alry3 )o(e+er3 did not )a+e /ri%acy as a (ea/on syste% o+er )ea+y infantry7 it only ac.uired /redo%inance ()en it assailed t)e )o/lites +ulnera&le flank and rear. "ea+y ca+alrys attri&utes of %ounted %o&ility and %odest re.uire%ents for a &attle array3 ()ic) ena&led it to fig)t as it %arc)ed3 %ade it t)e /re%ier offensi+e (ea/on syste% for t)e succeeding 23>>> years. 2+en in t)e centuries ()en )ea+y ca+alry faced infantry using t)e S(iss s.uare (it) its all#around defensi+e ca/a&ility3 t)e )orse%en still re%ained t)e decisi+e ar% &ecause only t)ey )ad t)e %o&ility and a&ility to go into action .uickly3 traits co%%anders needed to e-/loit any (eakness in t)e )ostile ar%ys dis/ositions or any disorder a%ong t)e )ea+y infantry. Ne+ert)eless3 infantry could /lay t)e role of offensi+e troo/s. 0)e S/artans /ioneered t)is (it) t)eir stylised %arc) of /art of t)eir line3 ()ic) &roug)t it to rig)t angles against t)e o//onents flank. 0)ey used drill and articulation to e-ecute a %anoeu+re t)at /laced t)e% against t)e )ostile flank already arrayed for &attle. 0)ey t)us su&stituted a /lanned3 /racticed %o+e%ent for &etter %o&ility. It succeeded ()en it attained sur/rise. 0)e 0)e&ans Sacred Band used t)e sa%e

4@1

ingredients also to con+ert so%e of t)eir infantry into offensi+e troo/s. "anni&al at $annae and Pa%a used drilled and articulated infantry in /lace of greater %o&ility to attack t)e Ro%an flank3 and )e conducted t)e %anoeu+re so as to &ring t)e infantry against t)e )ostile flank in &attle array. It succeeded ()en t)e ene%y did not e-/ect it. 0)e %edie+al decline of trained articulated infantry used to (orking toget)er again /laced on ca+alry +irtually t)e entire offensi+e &urden. In t)e eig)teent) century t)e /erfected Prussian drill /er%itted t)e o&li.ue attack3 ()ic) ena&led an ar%y in a rigid linear array to assail a )ostile flank. 1rill3 %ore t)an articulation3 su&stituted for &etter %o&ility3 and t)e de+ice of turning eac) /latoon allo(ed t)e Prussian infantry to fig)t +irtually as it %arc)ed. 'redericks %et)od )ad %uc) in co%%on (it) t)ose of t)e S/artans3 0)e&ans3 and $art)aginians in s/irit and results. 0)e 'renc) re+olutionary infantry colu%n3 ()ic) could ra/idly de/loy into line3 su//lied an infantry for%ation (it) t)e attri&utes of offensi+e troo/s. !)en for%ed in de%i#&rigades and t)ese into t)e &rigades t)at co%/osed t)e di+isions3 t)e articulated di+ision could concentrate against (eakness and s/read to reac) e-/osed flanks. 4ntra%%elled &y t)e constraints of a linear for%ation3 t)e colu%ns could s)o( greater celerity on t)e &attlefield and yet al%ost instantly for% into t)e line essential for co%&at (it) %uskets. nd e+en (it)out de/loying into line3 t)ey )ad so%e fire/o(er and a&ility to resist t)e c)arge of ca+alry. 0roo/s t)us %arc)ing and so arranged )ad an ad%ira&le ca/acity for /assing around ene%y lines and assaulting t)eir flanks. ccordingly3 articulation co%/letely attained t)roug) entire su&di+ision and controlled &y a full c)ain of co%%and3 toget)er (it) drill and training3 endo(ed ar%ies and t)eir /arts (it) an en)anced ca/acity to %anoeu+re. *ood leaders used t)is ca/a&ility to concentrate against frontal (eakness and3 /articularly3 to assail +ulnera&le flanks and rear. t t)e Battle of Breitenfeld3 for instance3 0illy soug)t to use )is infantry to e-/loit t)e o//ortunity /resented &y t)e flig)t of t)e Sa-ons to fall u/on *usta+uss +ulnera&le flank. But t)e I%/erial generals un(ieldy and inade.uately drilled for%ations /ro+ed una&le to %o+e fast enoug) to /re+ent t)e &etter trained and articulated S(edes fro% facing to(ard t)eir flank and (inning t)e &attle. 0)us articulation facilitated concentration against (eakness7 and if an ar%y )ad a distinct ad+antage in t)is attri&ute3 as did t)e Prussians t)roug) t)eir intensi+ely /erfected drill or3 later3 t)e 'renc) (it) t)eir articulated di+isions and se/arately %anoeu+ring3 .uick %arc)ing &attalions3 its infantry could )a+e enoug) of t)e offensi+e attri&utes intrinsic to ca+alry to ena&le t)e foot for%ations to function as offensi+e troo/s in reac)ing an ad+ersarys flank or rear. In t)e nineteent) century t)e uni+ersal ado/tion of t)e 'renc) tactics and organisation %eant t)at all ar%ies again reac)ed t)e sa%e le+el of facility of e%/loy%ent3 ()ic) %eant t)at defenders could %o+e t)eir %en (it) e.ual dis/atc) to /rotect t)eir flanks. 0)us infantry again lost its offensi+e .uality3 Dust as earlier t)e Sacred Band and Sci/ios articulated reser+es )ad countered t)e S/artans and "anni&als atte%/ted en+elo/%ents. !it) t)e rea//earance of t)e )ea+y ca+alry in t)e for% of t)e tank3 offensi+e troo/s returned to (arfare &ecause a tank could use its )ig) %o&ility and a&ility to fig)t +irtually in %arc) for%ation to reac) t)e flank and rear of o//osing forces ca/a&le of (it)standing t)e tanks frontal attack. ircraft also functioned as offensi+e troo/s3 t)oug) like t)e lig)t ca+alry of old3 /lanes )ad difficulty /ro+iding t)e decisi+e ele%ent3 e-ce/t against an o//onent in o/en terrain (it)out antiaircraft (ea/ons. Back

1attles and Casualties

Battles )a+e figured cons/icuously in all %ilitary )istory3 if only &ecause of t)e dra%a t)ey /ro+ided. :et t)ey usually contri&uted less to t)e outco%e of a gi+en (ar t)an t)e /ro%inence accorded t)e% (ould suggest. 0)ey deri+ed t)eir intrinsic or /urely tactical significance fro% t)eir

4@2

attrition Gt)e casualties sufferedH. Victors traditionally e-/erienced less attrition3 and t)e seriously disorganised +an.uis)ed %ore. :et t)e strategic effect of &attles often de/ended on t)eir /syc)ological i%/act and t)e /olitical situation. $aesars +ictory o+er Po%/ey at P)arsalus3 far less de+astating t)an t)at of "anni&al o+er t)e Ro%ans at $annae3 e-)i&its t)is de/endence of &attles on t)eir non#tactical conse.uences as does a co%/arison of t)e results of $annae (it) t)ose of le-anders t(o +ictories o+er 1arius III. Britis) &attles (on in t)e "undred :ears !ar3 like t)ree of Marl&oroug)s against t)e 'renc) and %ost of t)ose of t)e ustrians and Prussians against one anot)er in t)e Se+en :ears !ar3 s)o( t)e li%ited effect of fa%ous +ictories on t)e course of a (ar. In %odern ti%es3 in t)e ne( strategic en+iron%ent of t)e turning %o+e%ent3 %ore &attles3 suc) as Marengo and t)e *er%an crossing of t)e Meuse in 1@4>3 )a+e )ad %aDor strategic i%/ortance. 2+en t)oug) &attles under(ent no funda%ental c)ange in t)eir nature and t)ey continued to rely for t)eir significance on t)e strategic3 /olitical3 /syc)ological3 and ot)er ele%ents of t)eir conte-t3 t)ey )a+e gro(n in fre.uency in t)e last 2>> years3 in /art fro% t)e greater ease of &ringing t)e% a&out and t)eir often en)anced strategic i%/ortance. 0)e s%aller /ro/ortion of casualties suffered &y t)e defeated )as dou&tless %ade generals %ore (illing to risk conflicts. 0)at &attles increase in nu%&er as t)eir tactical %eaning )as declined does not /resent an ano%aly in +ie( of altered strategic conditions &ut does contradict t)e o&+ious influence of t(o factors t)at s)ould )a+e caused an ele+ation in casualty rates. c)ange in t)e last t(o centuries to al%ost total reliance on /o(erful %issile (ea/ons used &y essentially unar%oured co%&atants s)ould )a+e raised t)e defeateds losses Dust as s)ould t)e steady increase in t)e deadliness of t)e (ea/ons used. :et since t)e early se+enteent) century3 t)e nu%&er of casualties of t)e +an.uis)ed )as fallen %ore ra/idly t)an t)ose of t)e +ictor3 and on occasion +ictory in ter%s of ground gained or ()o retreated )as %eant defeat ()en %easured &y attrition. But (it) steadily %ore let)al %issile (ea/ons3 casualties s)ould )a+e %ulti/lied3 and t)e nu%erically stronger ad+ersary s)ould )a+e (on %ore readily (it) greater losses for t)e defeated &ecause %ore and %ore co%&at ca%e to confor% to t)e assu%/tions of '. !. ,anc)esters N#s.uare la(. ,onger range (ea/ons and dis/ersed ar%ies3 ()ic) often allo(ed a larger force to utilise %ore of its %en3 s)ould )a+e &roug)t co%&at closer to a situation in ()ic) eac) soldier could s)oot at e+ery ot)er o//onent. !)en e+ery soldier could fire at e+ery ot)er3 t)e co%&at /o(er of ar%ies (ould +ary3 not directly3 &ut as t)e s.uare of t)eir nu%erical strengt). nota&ly larger force (ould under t)ese conditions /ro%/tly e-ter%inate a s%aller. 0)oug)3 of course3 all %en or (ea/on syste%s in eac) ar%y could not s)oot at e+ery ot)er3 t)ey could do so to an increasing degree7 for e-a%/le3 indirect fire &y artillery e-/osed %ore of t)e o//osing ar%y to danger. :et %any factors %ilitated against t)e influence of conditions suita&le to ,anc)esters )y/ot)esis. 0)e aug%ented +alue of a /re/onderance of nu%&ers and t)e gro(t) in fire/o(er did not alter t)e strengt) of t)e tactical defence. 0)e defender continued to enDoy t)e ad+antage of selected defensi+e ground3 t)e use of natural and created defensi+e co+er3 and t)e ca/a&ility to concentrate on using )is (ea/ons (it)out t)e distraction and difficulty of also %o+ing. 0)e /redo%inance of %issile (ea/ons in one (ay /ro&a&ly enlarged t)e &enefit of t)e defence &ecause3 co%/ared (it) s)ock action3 t)e defender using %issiles )ad e+en greater do%inance3 deri+ing %ore of an ad+antage fro% taking co+er and a+ailing )i%self of t)e o//ortunity to s)oot %ore ra/idly or accurately t)an t)e attacker. 0)e artillery concentrations of !orld !ar I )o(e+er did e-)i&it ,anc)esters la( at (ork3 es/ecially ()en t)e *er%ans3 o&stinately refusing to risk yielding any ground3 re%ained under fire of %uc) stronger ene%y concentrations of artillery. But ()en t)e *er%ans e-/loited t)eir fine articulation to ado/t t)e syste% of elastic defence3 ()ic) incor/orated on t)e tactical le+el t)e defenders traditional strategic alternati+e of retreat3 t)ey restored t)e defences /re/onderance and inflicted %uc) )ig)er casualties on t)e attackers. 4@?

In &attles in ancient and %edie+al ti%es t)e defeated usually suffered far greater casualties t)an t)e +ictor &ecause t)e (inner could often %assacre t)e inade.uately disci/lined and /oorly articulated troo/s of t)e +an.uis)ed ar%y3 use )ea+y ca+alry to o+errun lig)t infantry3 or e%/loy lig)t ca+alry to attack +ulnera&le s)ock#action forces in retreat. 0)e return of t)e four &asic (ea/on syste%s in t)e t(entiet) century )as restored so%e of t)e old o//ortunities for t)e (inner to inflict )ea+y casualties3 a%/ly illustrated &y t)e success of Italian &o%&ers against fleeing 2t)io/ians. Ne+ert)eless3 t)e influence of /rogressi+ely i%/ro+ed articulation see%s to )a+e /layed a %aDor role in counter+ailing t)e factors %aking for far greater casualties a%ong t)e defeated. Ins/ired /ri%arily &y a desire to increase tactical %o&ility3 en)anced articulation )ad t(o significant &y#/roducts. 'irst3 t)e s%aller grou/s )el/ed t)e ar%ys co)esi+eness and unit es/rit. Second3 t)e i%/ro+ed articulation /er%itted an ar%y to co/e &etter (it) t)e disorganisation inse/ara&le fro% defeat and retreat. co%/arison of se+enteent)#century &attles offers e+idence for t)e significant effect of t)ese t(o additional results. In t)e second )alf of t)e se+enteent) century3 go+ern%ents ado/ted /er%anently esta&lis)ed ar%ies3 ()ic) in /eaceti%e ke/t under ar%s %ost of t)eir units at a )ig) /ro/ortion of t)eir (arti%e %an/o(er strengt). 0)is c)ange /ro+ided &ot) &etter drill3 training3 and3 conse.uently3 articulation as (ell as en)ancing unit identity3 %orale3 and co)esion. 0)is c)ange goes far to e-/lain t)e decline in t)e casualties of t)e losers in t)e &attles in t)e latter /art of t)e century as co%/ared (it) t)e earlier era. In t)e 0)irty :ears !ar defeated ar%ies suffered a loss3 on t)e a+erage3 of ?C.4 /ercent of t)eir strengt). In t)e later &attles &et(een standing ar%ies (it) greater articulation and sense of co%%unity t)e casualties of t)e defeated dro//ed to 2C.= /ercent. 0)ese figures argue strongly for t)ese factors as causes for t)e decline in loss of %en. In t)e ne-t si-ty#t)ree years3 a /eriod sy%&olised &y t)e ado/tion of t)e &ayonet3 ()ic) rendered foot soldiers less +ulnera&le3 casualties for t)e defeated decreased to 21.@ /ercent3 a reduction for ()ic) t)e flintlock3 unifor%ity of drill3 and t)e /erfection of t)e standing ar%y %ust s)are (it) t)e &ayonet t)e res/onsi&ility. :et articulation )ad &arely gro(n out of its infancy in 1C>>. Its steady /rogress during t)e ne-t t(o and a )alf centuries3 cou/led (it) %ore t)oroug) and unifor% training and disci/line3 /aralleled t)e gro(t) in de/endence on firear%s and t)e e-/ansion of t)eir range3 /o(er3 and rate of fire. Instead of confusion and disorganisation in defeat3 increasingly &etter articulated ar%ies could continue fig)ting effecti+ely and carry out retreats %ore readily and (it) fe(er casualties. *rou/s of soldiers3 fostered &y t)e %ore %inute su&di+ision occasioned &y &etter articulation and /er%anently e%&odied units3 often /ro+ided for &etter coo/eration a%ong indi+iduals and sustained eac) soldiers %oti+ation and /erfor%ance &ecause of )is kno(ledge of t)e su//ort of )is fello(s and )is loyalty to t)e% and to t)e grou/ and its standards. Suc) an ar%y &ore defeat in &attle &etter t)an %any earlier ones3 ()ic) readily disintegrated into an aggregation of indi+iduals &ecause t)ey lacked &ot) t)e %anoeu+ra&ility of t)e &etter#articulated force and t)e co)esion su//lied &y suc) grou/s. 0)ey could do t)is e+en ()en deluged &y t)e +astly greater fire/o(er of t)e attackers in !orld !ar I and t)ese conditions in t)e Second3 aggra+ated &y )a+ing to co/e (it) an assailants /re/onderance in tanks and aircraft. 0)is trend to lo(er casualties for t)e defeated also recei+ed reinforce%ent fro% t)e ado/tion of t)e &reec)loader t)at3 ()ile aug%enting t)e rate of fire3 ena&led t)e rifle%an to fire fro% a /rone /osition. 0)is3 like t)e seeking#co+er res/onse to %ore &ullets on t)e &attlefield3 )el/s e-/lain t)e a//arent ano%aly of declining casualties see%ing to correlate (it) en)anced (ea/on effecti+eness. 0)e increase in fire/o(er toget)er (it) t)e earlier ado/tion of t)e linear syste% /er%itted3 /articularly in t)e t(entiet) century3 %ore e-tended fronts (it)out %en t)ickly /acked at e+ery /oint. 0)is reduced density %eant t)at a tactical defeat at one /oint in t)e front )ad a %ore localised effect and in+ol+ed a s%aller /ercentage of t)e defeated ar%y. 4@4

5ne +ariation in t)e trend to(ard reduced casualties see%s to )a+e occurred in t)e ar%oured co%&ats in Nort) frica in !orld !ar II and in t)e recent (ars &et(een t)e Israel and t)e ra& states. 0)e co%&atants3 es/ecially t)e defeated3 sustained )ea+y casualties in ter%s of (ea/on syste%s3 /rinci/ally tanks. In t)e 1@C? (ar of Syria and 2gy/t against Israel3 t)e co%&atants lost o+er a .uarter of t)eir 13?>>3 aircraft and nearly )alf of t)eir al%ost =3>>> tanks in a (ar lasting only a little o+er t(o (eeks. lt)oug) t)ese casualties see% )ig) for suc) a s)ort (ar3 t)ey did not a//ear e-or&itant ()en one realises t)at a &attle (as in /rogress on al%ost e+ery day of t)e (ar and so%eti%es %ore t)an one &attle (as foug)t eac) day. 0)is a%ounts to any a+erage daily loss of less t)an < /ercent of t)e total a+aila&le tank forces and a casualty rate of 1> /ercent if co%%anders succeeded in co%%itting )alf to &attle and 2> /ercent if only a .uarter engaged t)e ene%y. 0)is &rief (ar did3 )o(e+er3 in+ol+e relati+ely %inor losses in ter%s of /ersonnel3 less t)an 2>3>>> fatalities3 or a&out se+en for e+ery tank lost. 0)us t)e losses do not see% /articularly )ea+y in +ie( of t)e nu%&er of &attles foug)t3 a situation )a+ing so%et)ing in co%%on (it) t)e /rolonged offensi+es of !orld !ar I and t)eir large daily casualties. 0)e fre.uency of t)e &attles )ad %uc) to do (it) t)e )ig) ratio of force to s/ace3 one %agnified &y t)e great %o&ility of t)e all#%ounted forces engaged. !it) t)e &orders of t)e s%all state of Israel and key /oints3 suc) as t)e Sue6 $anal and t)e Syrian ca/ital3 near t)e t)eatre of o/erations3 t)e &elligerents acutely felt t)e danger of retreat in a (ar (it) ar%ies )a+ing suc) ra/idity of %o+e%ent. 0)is )el/s e-/lain t)e tenacity (it) ()ic) dedicated soldiers on eac) side foug)t3 t)e co%%anders3 like so %any of t)eir %en3 dis/laying a reluctance to ad%it defeat and retreat. 0)at t)e co%%ander could s)o( suc) /ersistence in t)e face of ad+ersity testified also to t)e e-cellence of t)e disci/line and t)e articulation of t)ese t)oroug)ly %odern ar%ies. 0)e disinclination of co%&atants to (it)dra( also reflected t)e /olitical conte-t of t)e &attles in ()ic) t)e o//onents sa( so %uc) at stake. Still it is not clear ()et)er t)ese )ig) casualties3 also e-/erienced in t)e %ounted (arfare in Nort) frica in !orld !ar II3 are a necessary result of %ounted (ar (it) for%ida&le fire/o(er and &ulky (ea/on syste%s t)at3 like t)e line infantry %usketeer of t)e eig)teent) century3 %ay )a+e a /articular +ulnera&ility &ecause t)ey cannot take co+er as readily as %en ar%ed (it) &reec)loading rifles. 0)e /olitical and geogra/)ical circu%stances3 also found in 2uro/e3 %ay clai% %uc) of t)e res/onsi&ility for casualties3 ()ic)3 t)oug) t)ey do not a//roac) as a /ercentage t)e one#day &attles of t)e eig)teent) century and earlier3 are +ery )ig) &ecause of sustained co%&at. Inde/endent of t)e le+el of casualties /re+ailing in a /articular era or &et(een indi+idual ar%ies or co%&inations of (ea/on syste%s3 t)e significance of attrition +aries. fter catastro/)ic losses at t)e Battle of $annae3 t)e Ro%ans a+oided %ore &attles &ut also reco+ered fro% t)eir losses &y dra(ing on t)e large reser+es of %ilitia a+aila&le fro% t)e %any to(ns under t)eir s(ay. Si%ilarly3 after t)e )ea+y losses during so%e &attles of t)e 0)irty :ears !ar3 co%%anders3 like 0illy after Breitenfeld3 )ired %ore %ercenaries. 5n t)e ot)er )and3 after t)e a//alling disaster at Man6ikert3 t)e By6antines could not readily re/lenis) t)eir ar%y3 )a+ing lost +irtually all of t)eir /rofessional and )ig)ly skilled )ea+y ca+alry%en3 t)eir e-/ensi+e ar%our and fine )orses3 and3 /artly as a conse.uence3 %uc) of t)eir %ain recruiting area of natolia. In !orld !ars I and II3 on t)e ot)er )and3 ()en ar%ies could con+ert ci+ilians into soldiers fairly readily3 so%e countries suffered suc) )ea+y casualties in t)e steady co%&at of t)e )uge ar%ies along continuous fronts t)at t)ey &egan3 .uite literally3 to run out of %en suita&le for %ilitary ser+ice. 0)us3 t)e a+aila&ility of suita&le re/lace%ents )as3 like t)e esti%ate of /otential losses in defeat3 conditioned t)e (illingness of co%%anders and go+ern%ents to risk &attle. Still3 &attles of tactical anni)ilation in+ol+ing significant forces still see% to )a+e &eco%e increasingly rare in %odern ti%es. 0)is decline in t)e likeli)ood of +alua&le tactical results %eans t)at it is %ore t)an e+er necessary to look to logistics3 strategy3 /olitics3 and ot)er conte-ts of t)e oft#recurring &attles. Back 4@<

LOGISTICS

Chronological 0verview
0)e su//ly and %o+e%ent of ar%ies c)anged little during %ost of t)e /eriod of t)is study. r%ies and t)eir ani%als usually li+ed on t)e country in ()ic) t)ey ca%/aigned. "ence t)e /o/ulation3 conco%itant /roducti+ity of t)e country3 and t)e season of t)e year /o(erfully influenced t)e ti%ing and direction of o/erations. In )is con.uest of t)e Persian 2%/ire3 )ad le-ander3 for e-a%/le3 dis/layed less care and so/)istication in )is su//ly arrange%ents3 )e could )a+e lost e+en (it)out t)e Persians e-/licitly resorting to a logistic strategy. By %ini%ising t)e &aggage and non#co%&at /ersonnel3 using su//ly lines for sieges3 carefully /re/aring in ad+ance3 and su&ordinating )is routes and o&Decti+es to t)e need of )is ar%y to li+e on t)e country3 le-ander e-e%/lified t)e &est logistic syste% of t)e day3 one t)at (ould endure into t)e t(entiet) century. "e also s)o(ed )is kno(ledge of t)e i%/ortance of logistics &y )is use of a logistic strategy to defeat t)e Persian fleet &y utilising )is ar%y to ca/ture its &ases. 1uring t)e /ast 23<>> years t)e %et)od of o&taining food and fodder )as ranged fro% /lunder to /urc)ase. 0)e (aste of su//lies3 t)e loss of %en to desertion3 and3 often3 t)e )ostile reaction of t)e nati+es reinforced /olitical considerations t)at fre.uently argued in fa+our of an orderly (ay of %eeting an ar%ys needs fro% ene%y as (ell as friendly territory. 5ften ar%ies le+ied /olitical aut)orities for food and fodder or for t)e %oney to &uy t)e% fro% /roducers or %erc)ants. In %odern ti%es ar%ies )a+e called t)is arrange%ent contri&utions and re.uisitions. In friendly areas and fre.uently in neutral lands ar%ies /aid for t)eir su//lies fro% t)eir o(n resources and e+en did so in an ad+ersarys territory ()ere t)ey (is)ed to %ake a /articular /oint of conciliating t)e /u&lic. Regardless of t)e %et)od3 t)e ar%y could usually find %ost of ()at it needed for a ca%/aign. Infre.uent &attles rarely e-)austed t)e stock of %issiles an ar%y could carry. 1ra(ing su//lies fro% a distance occurred largely during sieges and so%eti%es early in a ca%/aign ()en (inter consu%/tion )ad de/leted t)e resources at t)e scene of t)e /ros/ecti+e ca%/aign. 0)e efficiency of (ater trans/ort &y sea3 lake3 and ri+er %ade su//ly fro% a &ase /ossi&le3 e+en to %eeting t)e needs of t)e ani%als. $arrying /ro+isions o+er land could3 (it) difficulty3 feed only t)e %en. 0)e .uality of t)e roads as (ell as t)e /roduce of t)e surrounding country )ad %uc) to do (it) t)e /racticality of conducting a siege. 0)at ca+alry /layed little /art in a siege facilitated su//ly. I%/ro+e%ents in roads and in agricultural /roducti+ity )el/ed t)e %o+e%ent and %aintenance of ar%ies3 as did t)e s)oeing and %ore effecti+e )arnessing of t)e )orse and &etter s)i/s and na+igation. In t)e nineteent) century t)e stea%er increased t)e ra/idity and econo%y of ri+er and ocean con+eyance3 and t)e railroad %ade a %aDor c)ange in land tra+el. 0)oug) %ore e-/ensi+e t)an (ater trans/ort3 railroads (ere s(ifter. 0)e /roliferation of rail(ays in t)e late nineteent) century /ro&a&ly )ad %ore i%/act on logistics t)an &etter (ater trans/ort3 &ecause so %any railroad lines %eant t)at al%ost any ar%y could dra( su//lies fro% a &ase3 one fed in turn &y an e-tensi+e road3 rail3 and (ater trans/ortation syste% t)at ta//ed a (ide agricultural region. 0)e )ig) ca/acity and ra/id /ace of rail(ays conferred a ne( strategic %o&ility on ar%ies. 'irst fully de%onstrated in t)e %erican $i+il !ar3 rail(ay con+eyance of large forces for concentration of troo/s o+er great distances &roadened t)e sco/e of strategic %o+e%ent &y t)e difference &et(een t)e rate of foot#%arc)ing loco%otion and t)at &y rail. Because retreating ar%ies routinely disa&led t)e railroads3 t)e defender often )ad &etter strategic %o&ility t)an t)e in+ader. 0)e 1@14 ca%/aigns in 'rance and 2ast Prussia de%onstrated t)e +alue to t)e defender of strategically offensi+e troo/s3 as did t)e ra/id rail concentration of allied reser+es against t)e *er%an offensi+es of 1@1B. 4@=

0ec)nological c)ange3 ()ic) )ad already often res/onded to t)e ci+il de%and for &etter trans/ortation3 again3 (it) t)e %otor truck3 affected logistics /rofoundly. More costly t)an t)e railroad3 t)e truck could carry su//lies and %en ()ere t)e railroad did not run3 e+en rig)t to t)e firing line. 0rucks and rail(ays %ade /ossi&le !orld !ar I co%&at &et(een )uge stationary ar%ies t)at consu%ed enor%ous .uantities of a%%unition. In 1@4> trucks furnis)ed an essential ingredient in t)e *er%an reci/e for t)eir stu/endous strategic +ictory. Pro+iding strategically offensi+e troo/s for t)e attacker3 trucks )ad a +ersatility t)at o+er%atc)ed t)e rail(ays. ircraft trans/ortation3 %ore costly t)an t)e truck3 )as %ore and %ore /ro+en a +alua&le su//le%ent to t)e slo(er &ut less e-/ensi+e (ater and ground trans/ort. !)en ra/idity in carrying %en or su//lies )as )ad crucial i%/ortance or ()en forces are isolated3 aircraft /ro+ided an essential %ode of con+eyance. 0)us tec)nological c)ange )as )ad a /rofound effect on logistics and its i%/act )as accelerated o+er t)e /eriod of a )undred years. 4nlike %ost (ea/on c)anges &ut si%ilar to t)e a//lication to (arfare of t)e telegra/)3 tele/)one3 (ireless3 radio3 and data /rocessing3 %ost in+entions t)at altered logistics ca%e fro% ci+ilian life. "ere ci+il and %ilitary re.uire%ents differed little3 and econo%ic de%and long successfully called fort) i%/ro+e%ents in trans/ortation and co%%unication of infor%ation. nd3 unlike t)e so%e()at cyclical effect of tec)nological c)ange on tactics3 ne( (ays )a+e %odified t)e su//ly3 %o+e%ent3 and %anage%ent of ar%ies in an al%ost e-clusi+ely linear (ay (it) constantly increasing facility and falling costs. Back

#lternative Man'ower Systems

0)e significance of logistics3 its de%ands al(ays urgent ()et)er t)e ene%y (as near or far3 and t)e co%/le-ity in)erent in t)e %o+e%ent as (ell as t)e su//ly of ar%ies %eant t)at it /layed a /re%ier role in t)e e+olution of t)e %odern ar%y staff. *radually de+elo/ed o+er t)e years3 t)e staff under(ent a dra%atic i%/ro+e%ent in t)e nineteent) century3 e%erging as a funda%ental /lanning and %anage%ent instru%ent. 0)roug) t)e staff3 co%%anders not only arranged to %eet t)e logistic re.uire%ents of t)e )uge ar%ies &ut also coordinated intelligence and o/erational acti+ities. 0)e %ore co%/le- %an/o(er syste% introduced in t)e nineteent) century re.uired t)e &etter %anage%ent t)at t)e staff could su//ly. 0)e /ro+ision and training of %an/o(er affects t)e outco%e of &attles3 ca%/aigns3 and (ars. Man/o(er syste%s )a+e dis/layed great consistency t)roug)out t)ese 23<>> years of 2uro/es (arfare. 0)e *reeks used a %ilitia3 ()ic)3 engaging in so%e /ractice toget)er3 )ad a %easure of tactical /roficiency and3 &ecause of its &ase in s%all cities3 also )ad so%e co)esion and unit s/irit. 0)e Persians3 on t)e ot)er )and3 e%/loyed a /rofessional ar%y of soldiers ()o )ad t)e greater /roficiency resulting fro% continuous3 essentially full#ti%e ser+ice year after year. $onstant (arfare ulti%ately forced t)e *reeks to ado/t a syste% of /rofessional soldiers3 too. 0)e Ro%ans3 starting like t)e *reeks (it) a %ilitia3 like(ise &egan utilising a long#ser+ice career ar%y3 one e-e%/lary in its organisation and disci/line. 0)ese t(o %odels3 %ilitia and regulars3 consistently rea//ear in succeeding centuries. 0)e %ilitia3 ine-/ensi+e co%/ared to a standing ar%y3 )ad t)e &enefits of large nu%&ers and /otential reser+es t)at stood t)e Ro%ans in suc) good stead in resisting "anni&als in+asion of Italy. 0)e career soldiers )ad greater indi+idual skill3 and additional tactical /re/onderance3 /ro+ided &y t)eir a%/le e-/erience in (orking toget)er in units3 ()ic) also ga+e t)e %en greater %utual confidence and en)anced eac) units sense of co%%unity. Militia could not fig)t long (ars3 es/ecially t)ose far fro% )o%e3 ()ic) e-/lains ()y t)e *reeks and Ro%ans ulti%ately ado/ted /rofessionals. But %ilitia e-celled in transitory o/erations. large nu%&er of raiders3 suc) as ra&s and Magyars3 %any of ()o% ca%e fro% ci+il life3 did not really constitute a /rofessional force. Militia )ad e+en greater ad+antages in defence against raids3

4@C

&ecause acting on t)e defensi+e3 often (it) t)e aid of fortifications3 /laced fe(er de%ands on t)e %ilitias li%ited tactical skill. 0)e %ilitary forces of t)e Middle ges only su/erficially confor%ed to t)e %ilitia or /rofessional %odels. lt)oug) an ur&an %ilitia )ad a &asic si%ilarity to t)e *reek /attern and3 like it3 de/ended tactically on dense %asses of /ike%en3 t)e rural %ilitia )ardly deser+ed t)e na%e. !it)out drill and often (it) agricultural i%/le%ents instead of (ea/ons3 it lacked e+en t)e co)esion of an ur&an force &ecause of its dis/ersal in %any tiny +illages. So%e rural %ilitia3 )o(e+er3 )ad &etter c)aracteristics. 0)e S(iss3 for e-a%/le3 (it) t)eir %ore co%/act +alley co%%unities /ossessed an ar%ed and trained force3 one )ardly distinguis)a&le fro% regular soldiers. Medie+al /rofessionals differed %arkedly fro% t)e *reek and Ro%an %odel. Rat)er t)an )a+ing a /er%anently e%&odied and /artially concentrated force3 %edie+al ar%ies decentralised t)eir regulars into s%all garrisons and e+en indi+iduals scattered o+er t)e countryside. 0)is syste% /roduced soldiers (it) ade.uate3 and often greater3 skill &ut rarely furnis)ed units accusto%ed to disci/line and su&ordination3 e-/erienced in (orking toget)er or /ossessed of %uc) sense of co%%unity. 0)e %ore fre.uent e%/loy%ent of indi+idual /rofessionals for a years ca%/aign3 eit)er directly or t)roug) %ilitary contractors3 did little to %itigate t)e deficiencies of t)e %edie+al syste% of %ercenaries3 e+en t)oug) grou/s of %en (ould re%ain toget)er o+er t)e (inter in antici/ation of a contract for t)e co%ing year. Not until t)e latter /art of t)e se+enteent) century did 2uro/ean /rofessional ar%ies take t)e far %ore effecti+e Ro%an for% of regulars ()o li+ed and trained toget)er year after year (it) t)e su//ort of an organised and ade.uately funded co%%issariat. So3 Dust as in t)e later )istory of *reece and Ro%e3 %ilitias )ad lost %ost of t)eir significance &y t)e se+enteent) century and only again assu%ed i%/ortance during t)e (ars of t)e 'renc) Re+olution and Na/oleon. 0)oug) nations strengt)ened or recruited %ilitias3 t)e )urried conscri/tion of %en into t)e ar%ies /layed a %ore conse.uential role3 filling 'renc) ranks at t)e &eginning of t)ese conflicts and Prussian at t)e end. 0)e i%/ro+e%ent in de/loy%ent fro% colu%n to line3 ()ic) /er%itted &attlefield %anoeu+re in colu%ns3 o+erca%e %any of t)e disad+antages of t)e linear syste% &ecause t)e colu%ns )ad a %o&ility ty/ical of t)e earlier dense for%ation of t)e S(iss. 0)is c)ange fro% an e-clusi+ely linear syste% si%/lified t)e task of ra/idly con+erting ci+ilians into soldiers. ,ess de/endence on t)e rigid fire disci/line needed for frontal co%&at &et(een infantry lines also facilitated t)e task of using )astily trained ci+ilians in co%&at roles. In t)e nineteent) century t)e Prussians consistently a//lied to t)eir ar%ed forces a /lan t)at %erged t)e %ilitia (it) /rofessionals and secured +irtually all of t)e ad+antages of &ot). By using ci+ilian reser+es to &ring t)eir full#ti%e units u/ to strengt)3 t)ey co%&ined %ilitia and regulars in a %eaningful (ay. 0)e acti+e units trained t)eir reser+ists3 ()o (ould ot)er(ise )a+e ser+ed in a %ilitia3 for t)ree years3 t)us /ro+iding a uni.uely (ell#trained grou/ of ci+ilians3 and t)e acti+es could t)en call t)e% &ack for &rief /eriods of furt)er duty as (ell as for (arti%e %o&ilisation. Because eac) regular unit )ad a &ase in a /articular territory3 recruits (it) a co%%on &ackground and3 often#/re+ious ac.uaintance or ties Doined t)e local unit. By training t)e% (it) t)e officers and non#co%%issioned officers under ()o% t)ey (ould ser+e in (ar3 t)e ar%y created co%%unities of soldiers and leaders &ased u/on t)e foundation /ro+ided &y t)e local syste% of recruit%ent. 0)e annual %o&ilisation &roug)t e+eryone toget)er for e-ercises si%ulating (ar conditions as (ell as nineteent)#century training and (arfare /er%itted. 0)us3 t)e Prussians de+elo/ed a%ong t)e ci+ilians in t)eir units a strong sense of kins)i/ and ga+e t)e% training conditions t)at a//ro-i%ated t)ose re/resentati+e of a long#ser+ice regular force. Still3 &y using a +irtually co%/lete cadre of career soldiers for t)eir acti+e ar%y and its reser+es3 t)e Prussians )ad an ar%y /rofessional in co%/etence &ut (it) t)e great si6e and lo( cost t)at )ad

4@B

long co%%ended a large %ilitia. !)en t)e reser+es Doined t)eir units3 t)ey %ore t)an dou&led t)eir si6e &ut )ardly diluted t)eir .uality at all. Professionally led3 t)oroug)ly trained3 and accusto%ed to (orking toget)er3 t)e %o&ilised Prussian acti+e ar%y )ad al%ost all of t)e attri&utes of a long# ser+ice force. 2+en t)e real %ilitia3 t)e ,and(e)r3 co%/osed of %en all (it) su&stantial acti+e#duty training and led in /art &y regulars3 e-ceeded in /roficiency %ost of t)e %ilitias t)at 2uro/e )ad seen. 0)is %et)od /ro+ed its co%&at effecti+eness in Prussias %id#century (ars ()en its cadre of /rofessionals and its ci+ilian reser+es defeated ustrian regulars. gainst 'rance in 1BC> t)e fully e-/anded Prussian syste% s)o(ed its full /otential ()en it ena&led Prussia to field an ar%y t(ice t)e si6e of 'rances and in .uality little &elo( t)at of t)e 'renc) /rofessionals. !it)out t)is )uge 'renc) nu%erical inferiority3 e+en Ba6aines egregious inco%/etence %ig)t )a+e failed to defeat t)e 'renc). Most 2uro/ean nations used t)e Prussian syste% in t)e t(o (orld (ars3 and t)e lack of it in t)e 4nited 9ingdo% and t)e 4nited States delayed t)eir full /artici/ation in t)ese (ars and caused t)eir ar%ies to suffer fro% a deficiency of t)oroug)ly trained %an/o(er. 5ne of 'rances disad+antages in !orld !ar II ste%%ed fro% training %en in one for%ation solely to ser+e in anot)er t)at e-isted only u/on %o&ilisation for (ar. By o+erlooking t)e &enefits of )a+ing t)e (ar units e-ist in /eaceti%e3 t)e 'renc) re/roduced so%e of t)e difficulties in)erent in t)e %edie+al ty/e of decentralised /rofessionals and t)at of t)e %ilitary contractors7 again3 trained %en did not assure effecti+e units until t)ey )ad su&stantial e-/erience (orking toget)er in t)e grou/s (it) ()ic) t)ey (ould ser+e in co%&at. Since !orld !ar II3 t)e reliance on large ar%ies t)roug) a regular cadre and trained reser+es )as declined3 only Russia /ro+iding3 on t)e usual &asis of a cadre of /rofessionals and a large nu%&er of trained reser+es3 an ar%y si%ilar in nu%&ers to t)ose ty/ical of t)e first )alf of t)e century. 0o furnis) an ar%y co%/ara&le in si6e3 in relation to t)eir /o/ulations3 Israel and S(it6erland use an essentially %ilitia syste% t)at de/ends on trained %an/o(er t)at undergoes re/eated su&se.uent /eriods of ser+ice to conser+e and i%/ro+e t)eir /roficiency. 0)e transition to a largely %ounted force and t)e conse.uent reduction in t)e si6e of ar%ies )as )ad %uc) to do (it) t)is c)ange a%ong !estern /o(ers. 0)e acti+e forces no( constitute a far )ig)er /ro/ortion of t)e %uc) s%aller %o&ilised strengt) en+isioned at t)e out&reak of (ar3 t)oug) %ost 2uro/ean states still conscri/t %en of %ilitary age and so create large reser+es of trained %an/o(er. But t)e regulars again are co%ing to t)e forefront3 as )as often )a//ened in t)e /ast. 0raining )as re%ained difficult3 influenced &y one factor t)at )as si%/lified t)e task and anot)er t)at )as co%/licated it. !)ereas %astery of t)e &o( could re.uire years to ac.uire t)e strengt) to /ull and skill to ai% accurately3 t)e %u66le#loading %usket de%anded only /ractice in t)e drill needed to load .uickly and relia&ly. 0)e %odern auto%atic rifle3 (it) e-cellent sig)ts and a flat traDectory3 de%ands little ti%e or talent to learn its use. 0)e utilisation of t)e auto%atic features of artillery (ea/ons also needs less training t)an t)e )and#o/erated and ai%ed guns of old3 and %astering t)e o/eration of a tank3 t)e task of a cre(3 is less daunting t)an learning to ride a )orse ()ile %ani/ulating a lance and s(ord. 2+en flying an air/lane %ay not call for %ore /ractice t)an gaining t)e skills to ride (it)out stirru/s ()ile using t(o )ands to s)oot a strong &o( (it) s/eed and accuracy. ll of t)ese c)anges )a+e facilitated t)e task of turning ci+ilians into acco%/lis)ed soldiers. 5n t)e ot)er )and3 it is %uc) )arder for %any (ea/on syste%s to si%ulate &attle. !)ereas t)e )ea+y infantry of old could fence and t)e )ea+y ca+alry could Doust3 %odern soldiers3 t)oug) t)ey can /ractice and use si%ulators3 %iss %uc) t)at t)e old training offered ()en it )ad so%e of t)e attri&utes of t)e scri%%age of an at)letic tea%. 2+en eig)teent)#century soldiers could re/eatedly re/licate t)eir drill and kno( t)at t)ey (ould use t)eir la&oriously attained /roficiency on t)e 4@@

&attlefield. 0)e a%&iguity of infiltration tactics re%o+es t)e /ossi&ility of gi+ing all of t)e necessary skills to infantry3 and co%&at (it) tanks in %otion offers little &etter o//ortunity to )a+e dri+ers or co%%anders learn %otions t)at t)ey (ill re/eat in co%&at. 2+en t)e artillery /ersonnel3 ()o can do in /eace ()at t)ey (ill do in (ar3 encounter difficulties if t)eir ela&orate co%%unications fall to function in &attle as t)ey do in /eace. 0)us3 t)e i%/arting of indi+idual /roficiency )as &eco%e si%/ler3 &ut relating t)at and t)e action of t)e grou/ to actual fig)ting )as &eco%e )arder as (ea/ons and tactics )a+e c)anged. nd as ar%ies )a+e &eco%e de/endent on ela&orate e.ui/%ent3 anot)er co%/le-ity occurs: t)e /ro+ision of re/air for (ea/ons t)at lack t)e relia&ility of %any of t)e unso/)isticated (ea/ons of old. "ere3 le+els of co%/etence e.ual and e-ceed t)ose re.uired of soldiers of old3 &ut /eaceti%e training for and e-/erience in %ending (ea/ons do3 as (it) %any of t)e old co%&at skills3 /re/are t)e re/air%an for )is (arti%e tasks reasona&ly (ell. 5nly t)e %orale and %oti+ation of t)e soldiers and t)e i%/ortance of t)e grou/3 a su&ordinate t)e%e in t)is &ook3 )a+e c)anged little o+er t)e centuries. Back

STRATEGY

Chronological Summary
0)e defences tactical su/eriority lay in its /ri%acy in frontal co%&at &et(een analogous (ea/on syste%s. In strategy t)e defence relied on t)is tactical ascendancy and found its /redo%inance in /ersisting strategy in t)e su/re%acy of retreat o+er /ursuit ()en si%ilarly constituted ar%ies faced one anot)er. !)en an ad+ersary used a raiding against a /ersisting strategy3 t)e ad+antage of retreat o+er /ursuit %ade t)e offensi+e stronger &ecause t)e attacking raiders3 as a /art of t)eir transitory /resence3 used retreat. Raiding is t)e strategic analog of t)e tactic of e%/loying lig)t troo/s against )ea+y3 illustrated &y 0urkis) )orse arc)ers defeating By6antine )ea+y ca+alry. 0)e )it#and#run a//roac) in)eres in &ot) t)e tactics and t)e strategy3 e-ce/t t)at in strategy t)e raiders3 &ecause of t)e /ri%acy of retreat3 need not )a+e a %ore %o&ile (ea/on syste%. So in &ot) /ersisting and raiding strategy &et(een ar%ies of like co%/osition t)e custo%ary ina&ility of t)e stronger to force &attle on t)e (eaker conditioned strategy during %ost of t)e /eriod under study. 0)at agile3 s/ear#t)ro(ing /eltasts could co%/el an ar%y of )o/lites to acce/t co%&at on t)eir ter%s (as an e-ce/tion to t)e usual situation of &attles &y %utual consent3 as (as t)e e-traordinary fate at $arr)ae of t)e largely foot#%arc)ing Ro%an ar%y at t)e )ands of t)e %ounted Part)ians. Since3 for t)e %ost /art3 ar%ies )ad a sufficiently co%/ara&le %ake#u/ to gi+e eac) side t)e sa%e strategic %o&ility3 t)e side (it)dra(ing usually e-ercised its do%inance. 0)e nor%ally lo( ratio of force to s/ace confronting %ost ar%ies ga+e t)e ina&ility to &ring on &attle s/ecial i%/ortance3 &ecause t)e %ore /o(erful ar%y often lacked enoug) %en to follo( a /ersisting strategy of do%inating a significant area and t)us co%/elling its %ilitarily (eaker &ut /olitically strong o//onent to fig)t or gi+e u/ its country. 2+en if /o(erful enoug) to carry out a syste%atic con.uest and t)e garrisoning of a country and its strong /oints3 t)e aggressor %ig)t lack t)e financial resources or /olitical /atience or constancy t)at suc) a /rotracted ca%/aign re.uired. 0)e lack of ca/acity to coerce an ene%y into fig)ting and t)e un(illingness or ina&ility to atte%/t slo(ly to engross t)e ene%ys territory led t)e %ore for%ida&le ar%y in (arfare in ancient *reece to resort to t)e /olitical strategy of using destructi+e raids to force /olitical concessions fro% t)e (eaker. 0)is raiding strategy also )ad t)e %ilitary co%/onent of gi+ing t)e defending ar%y t)e alternati+e of suffering t)e desolation of its agricultural resources or fig)ting t)e in+ader on at least e.ual ter%s (it) res/ect to tactical conditions. So only ()en eac) contestant &elie+ed it )ad t)e &etter c)ance of +ictory (ould a co%&at likely occur3 unless /olitical factors dictated a &attle as3 for e-a%/le3 it did ()en Po%/ey and $aesar <>>

foug)t at P)arsalus and "arold faced !illia% at "astings. :et t)e e+asi+eness t)at t)e do%inance of /ursuit o+er retreat i%/arted to eac) ar%y )el/ed to gi+e t)e offensi+e of a raiding strategy su/eriority o+er t)e defence. Ironically3 t)e (eaker contestant usually )ad recourse to a raiding strategy3 ()ic) relied on retreat after assailing a (eak /ortion of t)e stronger o//onents forces. 0)e resistance against le-ander t)e *reat in Bactria and Sogdiana used t)is raiding strategy3 attacking a s%all detac)%ent and t)en3 too (eak to face a %aDor force of Macedonians3 retreating to a+oid furt)er co%&at. &ility to a+oid &attle (it) )ostile forces /ro+ided one of t)e ele%ents t)at %ade t)is offensi+e strategy &y t)e (eaker %ore /o(erful t)an t)e defensi+e &y t)e stronger ad+ersary. In addition to turning t)e /ri%acy of retreat o+er /ursuit to t)e ad+antage of t)e attacker3 t)is raiding strategy could counter+ail %uc) of t)e do%inance of t)e tactical defensi+e3 t)e ot)er source of t)e /redo%inance of t)e strategic defensi+e. Since %arauders soug)t only an accu%ulation of s%all tactical successes3 t)ey could select t)eir o&Decti+e solely on t)e criterion of its (eakness in co%/arison (it) t)eir o(n forces. Suc) (ide c)oice and al%ost co%/lete a%&iguity of goal confronted t)eir o//onents (it) t)e insu/era&le task of %aking t)e%sel+es strong e+ery()ere. Ine+ita&ly t)ey failed3 and t)e raiders3 usually (it) a great /re/onderance of force in t)eir assaults3 fre.uently enDoyed a good %easure of success in o+er%atc)ing t)e /ri%acy of t)e tactical defensi+e. le-ander soug)t to i%/ede t)e guerrillas %o&ility t)roug) garrisoning co%%unications focal /oints. 0)us )e )a%/ered t)e retreat as (ell as t)e ad+ance /)ase of t)e raids. 0)is /ersisting defence later rea//eared often as did guerrillas ()o used t)is kind of raiding strategy against o//onents ()o so o+er%atc)ed t)e% t)at t)ey could not use t)e /ersisting strategys tactical defensi+e. 0)e Ro%ans3 in t)eir con.uests against t)e deter%ined resistance of &ar&arian tri&es3 a//lied a /ersisting strategy &ut cou/led it (it) e-tensi+e use of fortifications and al%ost endless /erse+erance. $aesar e-e%/lified Ro%an reliance on least effort3 fortification3 and /atience ()en )e defied t)e Belgae fro% )is entrenc)ed ca%/ and so used a logistic strategy to dis/erse t)e%3 %erely (aiting until t)eir su//lies ga+e out. 'aced &y Vercingetori-s s)re(d scorc)ed#eart) logistic strategy and t)e 'a&ian de/endence on raids to strike at foragers3 $aesar retreated3 acce/ting te%/orary defeat and ad)ering to )is /rinci/le: JIt (as &etter to sacrifice an o//ortunity to inDure t)e ene%y if t)e inDury (ould in+ol+e a loss on our /art.L But Vercingetori-3 realising t)e /erse+erance of t)e Ro%ans and t)at t)ey J(ould ne+er /ut an end to t)e (ar3L risked &attle3 lost3 and took refuge in t)e to(n of lesia. "ere3 (it) ela&orately fortified lines of contra+allation and circu%+allation3 t)e Ro%ans successfully resisted t)e sorties of t)e &esieged and t)e assaults of t)e relie+ing forces. 5f course3 t)is +ictory %arked only one ste/ in t)e Ro%an con.uest3 ()ic) in+ol+ed garrisoning t)e country3 esta&lis)ing fortified /osts3 and su//ressing su&se.uent insurrections and guerrilla (arfare. 0)e final Ro%an con.uests o(ed as %uc) to t)e e-cellence of t)eir /olitical institutions and t)e i%/erialis% of t)eir culture as to t)eir /o(erful and /atient /ersisting strategy. Military o/erations t)e%sel+es %i-ed raiding and /ersisting as (ell as co%&at and logistic strategies. 0)e Middle ges s)o(ed t)e role of fortifications3 as castles su//le%ented cities3 defending forces taking refuge in (ell#stocked cities or castles and defying %ore for%ida&le o//onents ()ose often#/ri%iti+e logistic arrange%ents /recluded a /rolonged siege. 0)e "undred :ears !ar e-e%/lified %any as/ects of %edie+al (arfare ()en in t)e fourteent) century t)e 2nglis) de/ended on a /olitical raiding strategy3 ulti%ately e-acting concessions fro% t)e 'renc). Bot) also a//lied a /ersisting strategy in sout)#(estern 'rance3 ()ic) re+ol+ed around taking castles and cities t)at do%inated t)e country. 0)e 'renc) successfully e%/loyed t)e sa%e %et)ods Ro%es 'a&ius )ad used against "anni&al7 relying on t)e /olitical sy%/at)ies of t)e local

<>1

/o/ulation3 t)ey a+oided co%&at (it) t)e 2nglis) ar%y3 an easy task &ecause t)e 2nglis) tactical doctrine de/ended on fig)ting on t)e defensi+e3 and &esieged t)e 2nglis)#)eld castles and to(ns. In t)e fifteent) century t)e 2nglis)3 finding /olitical su//ort in 'rance3 c)anged to a /ersisting strategy of syste%atic con.uest of to(ns and castles. But t)ey found 'rance too large and too %any of its to(ns%en and gentry o//osed to t)eir rule to con.uer all of t)e country. *radually t)e 2nglis) forces &eca%e so attenuated t)at t)ey could not resist a re+i+ed 'renc) effort3 ()ic) also %ade use of a si%ilar /ersisting strategy to dri+e t)e% out. 2-ce/t in t)e o&+ious case of star+ing out t)e defenders of a castle or to(n3 logistic strategy usually did not /lay a %aDor role in (ars. 0)e defensi+e logistic strategy of scorc)ing t)e eart) /ro+ided t)e %aDor tec)ni.ue and (as used &y t)e 'renc) and t)e Scots against t)e 2nglis). 0)is destruction of cro/s3 food3 and fodder su//lies cost little3 if t)e defenders kne( t)e raiders route3 for raiders and e+en in+aders usually destroyed ()at t)ey did not consu%e since all ar%ies custo%arily used t)e a//roac) of t)e raiding strategy3 as )ad t)e *reeks3 to attain &ot) t)eir /olitical and %ilitary o&Decti+es. 0)e c)anges in (arfare during t)e Middle ges little affected t)e conduct of an offensi+e raiding strategy against a stronger ad+ersary. ,ike t)e Ro%ans3 %edie+al %onarc)ies faced %arauders3 suc) as t)e Vikings3 ()o ca%e seeking &ooty3 and defended t)e%sel+es (it) a /ersisting strategy of fortification and control of co%%unication routes. 0)e 2nglis) used t)e sa%e %et)od on t)e offensi+e in t)eir /rolonged struggle to control !ales. ,acking t)e strengt) initially to garrison t)e ()ole country si%ultaneously3 t)e 2nglis) con.uered !ales in s%all incre%ents3 eac) of ()ic) t)ey t)en fortified. By )a+ing3 t)roug) a co%&ination of %en and castles3 a )ig) ratio of force to s/ace3 t)ey could )a+e ade.uate defensi+e strengt) in t)e s%all3 ne(ly su&dued regions. 0)us t)eir offensi+e /ersisting strategy defeated t)e guerrillas &y de/ri+ing t)e% of one of t)e ele%ents t)at ga+e t)e raid offensi+e /redo%inance. 0)e consistency (it) t)e /ast3 ()ic) t)e %edie+al e-/erience (it) t)is kind of (arfare e-)i&ited3 forecast t)e future ()en c)anges in (ea/ons3 tactics3 logistics3 and e+en strategy failed to alter t)e /attern of t)is raiding (arfare. 0)e 2nglis) reliance on castles3 a /ractice t)e !els) e+entually e%ulated3 naturally in+ol+ed so%e sieges. But t)ese lacked t)e i%/ortance t)at t)ese o/erations ca%e to )a+e in ca%/aigning (it) a co%&at /ersisting strategy. 'or /ursuing suc) a co%&at strategy a siege )ad a s/ecial significance &ecause it could co%/el t)e relie+ing ar%y to fig)t. 0)is accounts for t)e large nu%&er of conflicts t)at acco%/anied t)e 'renc) efforts to con.uer nort)ern Italy in t)e early si-teent) century. 0)e i%/ortance of t)e fall of a to(n to &esiegers3 ()o increasingly )ad t)e %onetary and organisational resources to continue long enoug) to take t)e to(n3 often co%/elled generals3 in order to sa+e t)e to(n3 to fig)t &attles t)at t)ey kne( (ould )a+e a +ery dou&tful outco%e. 0)e 0)irty :ears !ar clearly e-)i&ited t)e conditions of (arfare ()en ca/a&le3 dedicated o//onents foug)t (it) a ratio of force to s/ace inade.uate for an ar%y readily to control a %aDor /art of t)e large area of *er%any under conditions in ()ic) neit)er could co%/el t)e ot)er to fig)t. *usta+us dol/)us &egan in /rotestant nort)ern *er%any3 %o+ing for(ard syste%atically (it) a /ersisting strategy. :et t)e raid to li+e at t)e ene%ys e-/ense and de+astate )is country re%ained an i%/ortant /art of )is strategy. Suc) a raid (ould )a+e a /o(erful /olitical i%/act3 discrediting t)e o//osing ruler and )is cause and /ossi&ly securing t)e su&%ission or at least neutrality of t)e area. 'urt)er3 it could i%/le%ent t)e logistic strategy of de/ri+ing t)e )ostile ar%y of t)e resources of a region in ()ic) )e could ot)er(ise )a+e su&sisted )is ar%y. 0)us3 *usta+us co%&ined t)e /ersisting co%&at strategy of sieges (it) a logistic strategy of raids as (ell as (it) )is slo( ac.uisition of )ostile territory in t)e nort) and t)e con+ersion of its resources to )is o(n use. In s/ite of t)e co%%it%ent of &ot) *usta+us and )is seasoned ad+ersary3 $ount 0illy3 to a co%&at strategy3 for a long ti%e no &attle occurred. 2ac)3 instead3 largely used t)e raid into )is ad+ersarys

<>2

&ase area to /rotect )i%self &y distracting )is o//onent. 0)us3 in 1=?1 *usta+us t(ice %enaced 'rankfort on t)e 5der and follo(ed t)is (it) t)e t)reat of a raid into Silesia3 in eac) case distracting 0illy fro% a dangerous ad+ance against Magde&urg. 0)e ne-t year3 ()en *usta+us t)reatened a raid into Ba+aria3 t)e ne( I%/erial co%%ander3 !allenstein3 distracted t)e S(edis) 9ing &y %o+ing nort) to %enace t)e 9ings +acillating Sa-on ally and t)e S(edis) &ase area in t)e nort). 0)us3 raid and counter#raid )ad an i%/ortant function in strategy ()en &ot) contestants )ad +ulnera&le &ase areas and s%all3 si%ilarly constituted ar%ies confronted one anot)er in a relati+ely large area. Battles occurred rarely &ecause neit)er side (ould fig)t on t)e antagonists ter%s. 0)is )a//ened ()en *usta+us defied 0illy fro% a /o(erful /osition at !er&en and like(ise c)allenged !allenstein at Nure%&erg. !allenstein3 &affled &y t)e for%ida&le S(edis) /osition3 resorted to t)e logistic strategy of interru/ting *usta+uss su//lies3 to ()ic) t)e reinforced 9ing re/lied in kind3 eac) ar%y suffering serious attrition &efore t)ey /arted. 0)e 0)irty :ears !ar also e-)i&ited t)e degree to ()ic) strategy de/ended on logistics. 0)oug) for%ed of career soldiers3 t)e annually recruited ar%ies largely consisted of aggregations of /rofessionals rat)er t)an units t)at )ad t)e co)esion3 articulation3 and %orale of /ersonnel (it) long ser+ice toget)er. 0)is gre( out of t)e residue of feudal %et)ods of raising ar%ies and of rulers counting on inde/endent contractors to su//ly t)eir forces. Nor did t)ey )a+e an le-andrian or Ro%an syste% of logistics since t)e contractors and t)eir usually i%/ecunious e%/loyers relied on (ar su//orting (ar. !)ereas le-anders attention to logistics su//lied and conser+ed )is ar%y ()ile )e /ersistently /ursued )is strategic o&Decti+es3 t)e nouris)%ent of %en and )orses e-ercised a tyranny o+er t)e ar%ies of t)e early se+enteent) century &ecause t)eir co%%anders often )ad to follo( t)e i%%ediate logistical needs of feeding and /aying t)eir soldiers rat)er t)an /ursuing t)e ai%s dictated &y t)e /olitical and %ilitary o&Decti+es of t)e ca%/aign. 5ften logistical re.uire%ents su&+erted /olitical goals and )andica//ed %ilitary o/erations &y alienating t)e ci+ilian +icti%s of logistical de/redations. 0)e gro(t) of t)e 2uro/ean /o/ulation and t)e increase of /roduction and t)e re+enues of t)e go+ern%ents /er%itted t)e larger ar%ies %ore often to )a+e a ratio of force to s/ace sufficient to /ursue /ersisting strategies. 0)oug) t)ese conditions a//lied in t)e Net)erlands3 t)e i%%ense nu%&er of fortified cities t)ere %eant t)at co%&atants found t)e ratio of force to s/ace so )ig) t)at3 (it)out t)e su//ort of t)e in)a&itants of t)e ene%y territory3 t)e contending ar%ies found /rogress slo(3 often consisting of a se.uence of sieges. In nort)ern Italy t)e ratio of force to s/ace fa+oured %ore decisi+e (arfare &ut t)e continued a&ility of t)e ar%ies to refuse &attle )a%/ered co%&at strategy. In crossing t)e ri+ers3 ()ic) constituted defensi+e &arriers3 ar%ies used sur/rise3 facilitated &y distraction3 to concentrate against (eakness and acco%/lis) t)eir o&Decti+e. n ar%y on t)e offensi+e3 ()en crossing a ri+er3 could often force &ack t)e ene%y &y taking u/ a strong /osition t)at controlled a foraging area3 ()ic) )ad su//lied t)e defender and no( /ro+ided for t)e in+aders. 0)us3 rat)er t)an raiding a foes &ase area3 suc) co%%anders as 2ugene and VendU%e con.uered it3 con+erted it to t)eir o(n use3 and dro+e &ack t)e ene%y. 0)eir strategy3 (it) its large logistic co%/onent3 /aralleled *usta+uss earlier in nort) *er%any as it did t)e 2nglis) con.uest of !ales. $a%/aigns in t)e %id#eig)teent) century &et(een t)e Prussians and ustrians in Bo)e%ia3 Sa-ony3 and Silesia also &enefited fro% a ratio of force to s/ace t)at allo(ed t)e in+ading ar%ies to /ursue a /ersisting strategy of do%inating t)e /roducti+e country. In t)ese areas3 crucial to 'redericks sur+i+al3 t)e logistic ele%ent of a /ersisting strategy recei+ed a%/le illustration. 0o /rotect or reco+er t)ese sources of re+enues and recruits3 'rederick foug)t offensi+e &attles for %oti+es )a+ing so%e /arallel to t)at of an ar%y atte%/ting to raise a siege.

<>?

0)e ustrians3 on t)e ot)er )and3 (it) strong ca+alry and /redo%inant lig)t infantry t(ice used a logistic strategy to defeat Prussian in+asions3 once ()en 'ield Mars)al 0raun dro+e out a Prussian ar%y &y raiding its con+oys and circu%scri&ing its foragers and on anot)er occasion ()en 'ield Mars)al 1aun raised t)e siege of 5l%ut6 &y destroying a )uge con+oy &ringing t)e &esiegers t)eir su//lies. 0)e (ars of t)e 'renc) Re+olution and Na/oleon transfor%ed (arfare. 0)e 'renc) tactical syste% of %anoeu+ring in colu%n &ut for%ing in line to fig)t c)anged t)e situation in ()ic) an ar%y could %arc) a(ay ()ile its o//onent slo(ly de/loyed3 t)us frustrating an aggressi+e co%%anders desire for &attle. 0)is i%/ro+ed articulation and a&ility to go .uickly fro% %arc) to co%&at order %eant t)at ar%ies no longer )ad to %arc) slo(ly in cu%&erso%e &attle for%ation to /rotect t)e%sel+es fro% sur/rise attacks &y infantry or ca+alry. 0)is accelerated t)e %o+e%ents of 'renc) ar%ies ()en near t)e )ostile force. 0)e 'renc) ar%ies3 scattered in di+isions and often united into cor/s co%/ara&le to an ar%y3 used t)eir fa+oura&le ratio of force to s/ace to s/read out3 not Dust to do%inate t)e country &ut to i%/ede an ene%y on %any routes of ad+ance or to t)reaten a defender at %any /oints. By kee/ing t)ese (idely dis/ersed forces conce/tually a unit3 t)ey could .uickly concentrate to a+ail t)e%sel+es of a (eak s/ot in t)e )ostile dis/ositions or to resist an ad+ersarys concentration. 0)e ne( &road distri&ution of t)e ar%ies distracted t)e ene%y &y creating a%&iguity as to t)e direction fro% ()ic) t)e %ain ad+ance (ould co%e3 t)us fully co%/le%enting t)e attacking ar%ys a&ility and intent to concentrate against (eakness. dis/ersed ar%y3 strategically offensi+e &ecause of its &etter %o&ility on t)e %arc) and co%/osed of tactically offensi+e infantry as (ell as ca+alry3 )ad t)e ca/acity to force &attle on its un(illing o//onent. Ne+er &efore could ar%ies (it) t)e sa%e (ea/on syste%s do t)is &ecause of t)e )ig)er %o&ility of retreat co%/ared (it) t)at of /ursuit and t)e ina&ility of one concentrated ar%y to engage anot)er. But (it) an ade.uate ratio of force to s/ace t)e dis/ersed troo/s of t)e ne( ar%ies could co%/el t)e ene%y to fig)t /artial engage%ents3 t)us )alting )is %o+e%ent until t)e ()ole of t)e ar%y (anting &attle could arri+e. So ar%ies could coerce an ad+ersary eit)er into fig)ting or ado/ting t)e only alternati+e # retreating directly to t)e rear. No longer could a defending ar%y3 concentrated and .uite s%all in relation to t)e t)eatre of o/erations3 a+oid &attle &y %o+ing Dust out of reac) of an o//onent. 1efenders e+en lost t)e resource of defying an ene%y fro% an i%/regna&le /osition3 for t)e (idely s/read 'renc) ar%ies could en+elo/ or turn suc) a /osition. But a dis/ersed ar%y risked a )ostile concentration against one of its /arts. In e-/laining t)e tactical and strategic /ossi&ilities of t)e ne(ly organised ar%y of t)e late eig)teent) century3 *ui&ert %ade e-/licit t)eories long i%/licit in t)e conduct of ca%/aigns and &attles. By e-tolling t)e +irtues of dis/ersion as a %eans to distract t)e defender so t)at )e created a (eak /oint t)at t)e attacker could take ad+antage of &y ra/id concentration3 *ui&ert generalised t)e idea of (inning (it) t)e least effort t)roug) concentrating against (eakness. 0)is conce/t3 ()ic) )ad long /er+aded tactics3 underlay &ot) t)e use of a su/erior (ea/on syste% and attacks against flanks and rear7 it also found e-e%/lification in Marl&oroug)s +ictories in ()ic) )e relied on ca+alry to deli+er t)e attack against t)e (eak /oint created &y an earlier distracting assault. 0)e a&ility to engage3 %ade /ossi&le &y dis/ersed ar%ies of strategically offensi+e infantry3 ga+e t)ese t)eories %ore rele+ance t)an t)ey )ad /ossessed in eras of &attle &y %utual consent. 2.ually3 tactically offensi+e infantry3 ()ic) could concentrate against a (eak centre or reac) t)e ene%ys flank or rear and so &ring infantry into co%&at (it) ot)er infantry on ad+antageous ter%s3 /ro%ised %ore tactical success t)an )ad t)e frontal &attles of t)e /ast &et(een ar%ies (it) secure flanks.

<>4

0)ese dis/ersed forces3 ()en co%&ined (it) an ade.uate ratio of force to s/ace3 not only &roug)t a&out %uc) %ore decisi+e (arfare &ut also %ade /ossi&le t)e use of interior lines of o/erations to concentrate against first one ene%y ar%y and t)en anot)er. 'or%erly3 ()en a )ostile ar%y could refuse &attle3 suc) concentrations (ould )a+e little /oint and occurred rarely. !)en $onsul Nero e%/loyed t)is strategy to &ring a %ore for%ida&le force against "asdru&al3 its success )ad rested on "asdru&als &lunder3 ()ic) co%/elled )i% to gi+e &attle. Prince 2d(ard )ad concentrated first against t)e younger and t)en t)e elder de Montfort3 &ut )is +ictories de/ended on sur/rising one early in t)e %orning and tra//ing t)e ot)er against a ri+er. 'rederick t)e *reat )ad also used interior lines &ut )ad to acce/t &attle on t)e ene%ys ter%s to use )is concentration of force. $onse.uently3 under nor%al circu%stances3 t)e a&ility of t)e ene%y to refuse &attle )ad usually de/ri+ed suc) concentrations of a large force of any consistent significance. Since t)e dis/ersed3 easily de/loyed ar%ies of t)e 'renc) Re+olution could readily co%/el t)e ene%y to fig)t or engage in a disastrous retreat3 using interior lines to concentrate in s/ace &eca%e a %aDor strategic resource3 e.ually a//lica&le on t)e defensi+e and offensi+e. So generals could con+ert t)e /ossession of greater nu%&ers into eit)er &attles (it) a )ig) likeli)ood of +ictory3 or a da%aging retreat &y t)eir ene%y. 0)at Na/oleon &egan )is career as a general &y deli&erately %arc)ing &et(een t(o o//osing ar%ies so t)at )e could fig)t t)e% alternately de%onstrated t)e )ig) +alue t)at interior lines )ad suddenly ac.uired. 1isse%inated ar%ies3 ()ic) concentrated ra/idly against a t)reat3 ena&led Na/oleon to &lock an ene%ys retreat ()en )e reac)ed )is rear. !)en3 at t)e &eginning of )is Marengo ca%/aign3 Na/oleon )ad reac)ed t)e ustrian rear and occu/ied Milan and t)e surrounding country3 )e )ad ac.uired a &ase area in Italy t)at /er%itted )i% to %aintain )is /osition. :et Na/oleon )ad ac)ie+ed no %ore t)an )ad Mars)al VendU%e a century earlier ()en )e )ad /assed a ri+er and esta&lis)ed )i%self in an ustrian &ase area. But t)e situation differed in t)at3 unlike VendU%es3 Na/oleons dis/ersed ar%y )ad t)e a&ility to &lock t)e ustrian retreat3 ()ic) )e did in )is +ictory at Marengo. So t)e ne( strategic as (ell tactical ca/a&ilities of ar%ies transfor%ed t)e significance of reac)ing t)e )ostile rear. No longer could one co%/act ar%y %arc) /ast anot)er. nd alt)oug) ar%ies still li+ed on t)e country and rarely needed su//ly lines e-ce/t ()en concentrated for a siege3 t)e /osition of Na/oleons ar%y after )is +ictory at Marengo /ro+ed so disconcerting for t)e ustrians3 in s/ite of t)eir a%/le &ase area and sea co%%unications3 t)at t)ey agreed to e+acuate nort)ern Italy. In anot)er turning %o+e%ent in t)e 4l% ca%/aign3 t)e inferior ustrian forces )ad to fig)t or retreat directly to(ard t)e R)ine and 'rance. Strategy o/ened a road to a +ictory far %ore decisi+e t)an &attles alone could /ro+ide. 0)e Battle of Blen)ei%3 in ()ic) t)e 'renc) forfeited t(o#t)irds of t)eir ar%y to Marl&oroug)s skilful co%&ination of distraction and concentration3 stands out as t)e only &attle of its era in ()ic) t)e casualties and t)e tactical results a//ro-i%ated t)ose at $annae. But strategy redee%ed &attles3 ()ic) )ad steadily lost tactical significance. 0urning %o+e%ents could /roduce decisi+e strategic conse.uences in ()ic) t)e %anoeu+re insured an i%/ressi+e +ictory if t)e attackers could &lock t)e ene%ys retreat in a defensi+e &attle de+oid of tactical i%/ortance. 0)e ne( ca/a&ilities of t)e ar%ies Doined to t)e ade.uate ratio of force to s/ace %ade for decisi+e ca%/aigns. !)en 'rance united t)ese (it) an a//ealing /olitical /rogra%3 un/recedented con.uests follo(ed. Political factors )ad long e-ercised an influence o+er %ilitary o/erations3 often dictating t)e a%ount of %ilitary effort re.uired and gi+ing significance to triu%/)s in &attles and successful ca%/aigns. 0)e /olitical (eakness of 1arius III )ad forced )i% to %eet le-ander in &attle and )ad %ade t)e in+aders +ictories decisi+e in gi+ing )i% control of %ost of t)e Persian 2%/ire. 5n t)e ot)er )and3 le-anders %arriage to Ro-ana so conciliated o//osition in Bactria and Sogdiana <><

as to %ake )is )it)erto inade.uate %ilitary %easures e.ual to t)e task of controlling t)e country. "anni&als anni)ilation of t)e Ro%ans at $annae led to no strategic result &ecause of t)e /olitical as (ell as t)e %ilitary strengt) of t)e Ro%an o//osition to )i%. Suc) factors also influenced %ilitary decisions3 as ()en t)e Satra/s of 1arius III declined to i%/ose on t)eir su&Dects t)e &urden of a scorc)ed#eart) logistic strategy3 ()ic) %ig)t (ell )a+e defeated le-ander. 0)e 0)irty :ears !ar s)o(ed )o( %uc) o//osition soldiers could engender &y securing t)eir food3 fodder3 and3 so%eti%es3 /ay directly fro% t)e /u&lic3 an e+il aggra+ated &y t)e (aste as (ell as t)e destruction and /illage incident to t)is logistic %et)od. 0)e /ro&le% of /olitical o//osition fostered &y t)e &e)a+iour of occu/ying troo/s did not originate in t)e 0)irty :ears !ar3 )o(e+er7 t)e fate of t)e in+asion of Meso/ota%ia &y ntioc)us VII of Syria )ad a%/ly illustrated t)is ()en in a (inter of occu/ation3 )is %en )ad turned a (elco%ing /o/ulation of *reeks3 kindred in culture3 into o//onents ()o t)en sided (it) t)e Part)ians to kill ntioc)us and )is %en. 0)e +icti%ised /easants of t)e 0)irty :ears !ar e-ercised no suc) decisi+e effect &ut often a%&us)ed and killed soldiers ()en t)ey )ad t)e o//ortunity and usually %ade e+ery effort to a+oid (illingly /ro+iding su//lies to %arauding ar%ies. 1uring t)eir re+olution t)e 'renc) o+erran t)e usually uncon.uera&le Net)erlands &ecause t)eir /rinci/les of li&erty and e.uality a//ealed to t)e regions %iddle class. "a+ing a co%/ara&le /olitical (elco%e in nort)ern Italy and *er%any3 t)e 'renc) readily con+erted %ilitary success into con.uest &ecause of a /olitical a//eal to t)e influential ur&an &ourgeoisie. But &y allo(ing t)eir soldiers to su//ly t)e%sel+es &y /reying on ci+ilians after t)e %anner of t)e 0)irty :ears !ar3 t)ey soon s.uandered %uc) of t)eir /olitical ca/ital3 t)oug) (it)out t)e i%%ediate and disastrous conse.uences t)at )ad follo(ed ntioc)uss si%ilar &lunder. In t)eir in+asion of S/ain t)e 'renc) /ossessed t)e %ilitary %eans and t)e re.uisite ratio of force to s/ace to (age decisi+e ca%/aigns and do%inate t)e country. But t)ey failed to con.uer &ecause t)ey lacked a /olitical &ase. 0)e S/aniards reDected Na/oleons &rot)er as 9ing and o//osed t)e 'renc) /olitical /rogra%3 ()ic) t)ey /ercei+ed as )ostile to religion. 0)e &e)a+iour of 'renc) soldiers intensified difficulties (it) t)e /u&lic. !it) only t(o of t)e t)ree /rinci/al co%/onents of 'renc) Re+olutionary success3 t)ey could defeat t)e )ostile ar%ies &ut not control t)e country. 0)e 'renc) confronted t)e (eaker effecti+ely using t)e raiding strategy of guerrilla (arfare3 a situation not unlike le-anders in )is initial occu/ation of Bactria and Sogdiana3 &ut found no /olitical %eans to reconcile t)e country. In Russia t)e 'renc) )ad only t)eir do%inant %ilitary syste%. 0)ey faced an ada%ant 0sar and a /o/ulation for ()ic) t)ey )ad no /olitical attraction and )ad a ratio of force to s/ace totally inade.uate to co%/el t)e ene%y to fig)t and insufficient to control %uc) of t)e country. 0)is a&sence of t(o of t)e t)ree %ain re.uisites for success reduced t)e 'renc) to raiders trying to e-tract /olitical concessions. 0)eir /ri%iti+e %et)od of su&sisting t)eir ar%ies aggra+ated t)e %iseries of t)eir retreat ()en t)ey %arc)ed &ack o+er t)eir route of ad+ance and soug)t su//lies fro% /easants ()o )ad learned to fear and )ate t)e% on t)eir (ay into t)e country. 0)e transfor%ation of (arfare t)at occurred during t)e era of t)e 'renc) Re+olution and Na/oleon &eca%e t)e nor% for nineteent)#century 2uro/e. Radet6kys ustrians and Moltkes Prussians ac)ie+ed Na/oleonic +ictories &ased on successful e-ecution of strategic turning %o+e%ents. 0)eir ar%ies3 organised on t)e 'renc) %odel (it) force ade.uate to t)e s/ace3 could (age .uick (ars &ecause of t)e li%ited /olitical o&Decti+es3 ()ic) t)e +ictors soug)t. 0)is a&ility to co%/el &attle &ut )a+e t)e tactical defensi+e /ara%ount )el/ed to create t)e conditions in ()ic) t)e defensi+e reac)ed its a/ogee in !orld !ar I. 0)en ar%ies3 on t)e a+erage ade.uately co%%anded3 li&erally sustained &y t)e ne( rail(ay3 ()ic) %ade /ossi&le t)e %aintenance of )uge stationary forces3 and s(elled &y t)e effecti+e %an/o(er syste% ()ic)

<>=

aug%ented regular troo/s (it) trained reser+ists3 /ro+ided so %uc) force to s/ace t)at t)e ar%ies co+ered t)e t)eatre of o/erations and eli%inated t)eir flanks. 'ro% indecisi+e o/erations attri&uta&le in /art to a lo( ratio of force to s/ace &efore Na/oleon3 a )ig) ratio contri&uted to t)e sa%e result on t)e (estern front in 1@14#1B. !it) eac) ar%y entrenc)ed and its flanks secure3 ar%ies faced a situation in ()ic) a )ig) ratio of force to s/ace )ad allo(ed t)e tactical su/re%acy of t)e defence to nullify all of t)e strategic /ossi&ilities t)e offensi+e )ad gained in Na/oleons ti%e. 5n t)e eastern front3 )o(e+er3 ()ere t)e Russians )ad too little strengt) to /re+ent &reakt)roug)s of t)eir front3 t)e *er%ans and t)e ustrians )ad too little force in relation to t)e +ast s/ace of Russia. 5nly Russian /olitical colla/se &roug)t +ictory in t)e east3 an outco%e in t)e (est to ()ic) *er%an /olitical (eakness and loss of %orale also contri&uted significantly. 0)e siege (arfare t)at resulted3 e+en on t)e eastern front3 ga+e artillery an unusual /ro%inence3 &ased on its traditional role in sieges. But t)is de/endence on artillery3 necessary to )el/ co/e (it) t)e fire/o(er of %aga6ine rifles and a +ariety of %ac)ine guns3 constituted only one of t)e ne( (eaknesses of t)e strategic offensi+e ()en confronted &y t)e distinctly )ig)er le+el of %o&ility conferred on t)e defence &y t)e railroad. !)et)er in t)e (ar of %o+e%ent in 1@14 or t)e trenc) (arfare and occasional &reakt)roug)s of 1@1B3 t)e defenders railroad#&ased %o&ility ena&led )i% not only to su//ly )is troo/s %ore readily &ut also to concentrate t)e% %ore ra/idly. 'or counterattack or for defensi+e concentration against ene%y strengt)3 t)e railroad ga+e t)e defenders strategically offensi+e troo/s3 %en ()o could %ake a strategic %o+e%ent %ore .uickly t)an t)eir o//onents ()o %o+ed on foot. lt)oug) i%/ro+ed tactics %ade a &reakt)roug) /ossi&le3 if not easy or likely3 inferior strategic %o&ility took a(ay fro% t)e offensi+e t)e o//ortunity t)at tactical creati+ity )ad gi+en it. 0)e funda%ental alteration in logistics3 &roug)t a&out in /art &y t)e %otor truck3 and t)e re+olution in tactics3 caused &y t)e return to t)e four &asic (ea/on syste%s3 /ro+ided t)e foundation for a transfor%ation of (arfare in %any (ays as /rofound as t)at of t)e 'renc) Re+olution and Na/oleon. 1ecisi+e ca%/aigns &eca%e /ossi&le again in s/ite of a )ig) ratio of force to s/ace. 0)is great c)ange took /lace suddenly in t)e *er%an ca%/aign against 'rance and its allies in May and 8une of 1@4>. 0)e strategic use of t)e tank in !orld !ar II /ro+ided a significant c)ange fro% !orld !ar I3 and t)is inno+ation de/ended as %uc) or %ore on t)e %otor truck t)an it did on t)e tank. By e%anci/ating t)e large3 relati+ely (ell#concentrated ar%ies and t)eir )uge re.uire%ents for a%%unition fro% t)e railroads3 t)e %otor truck3 t)oug) its fuel created a ne( logistic de%and3 (orked a re+olution in su//ly. But %otor trucks3 and analogous +e)icles (it) tracks3 could %o+e soldiers and t)eir artillery in nu%&ers and at a rate of s/eed co%/ara&le to t)e railroad. 'urt)er3 t)e use of roads and t)e %o+e%ent of %en in tactical units (it) t)eir (ea/ons ena&led soldiers to go into action %ore .uickly t)an troo/s trans/orted &y rail. !it) t)e tanks aided &y aircraft contri&uting t)e /rinci/al offensi+e ele%ent and t)e truck#&orne infantry (it) %ac)ine guns3 artillery3 and antitank and antiaircraft guns furnis)ing t)e /ri%ary defensi+e /o(er3 suc) a force3 su//lied &y %otor truck3 )ad all of t)e ele%ents to carry out a strategic turning %o+e%ent on t)e Na/oleonic %odel. !)en )e )ad treated )is ca+alry as %ounted infantry and used t)e &etter %o&ility conferred &y )orses to carry %en and %ac)ine guns to t)e 0urkis) rear in 1@1B3 *eneral llen&y )ad relied on t)e +ulnera&le )orse to carry a force (it) only t)e %ini%u% defensi+e /o(er. !)en3 in Morocco in 1@?43 t)e 'renc) e%/loyed trucks for %o+ing artillery3 %en3 and %ac)ine guns3 t)ey increased t)eir %o&ility and t)e defensi+e strengt) of t)e turning force as (ell. But neit)er )ad any tactically offensi+e a&ility &ecause infantry could easily )a+e )alted t)e )orses and trucks3 /lacing t)e (ould#&e turning force in t)e /osition of atte%/ting to o+erco%e t)e tactical /ri%acy of t)e defence. !it) tanks3 )o(e+er3 t)e turning force )ad tactically offensi+e ca/a&ilities t)at (ould ena&le it to o+erco%e t)e o//osition of infantry and all

<>C

&ut large forces of antitank guns until it reac)ed t)e ene%ys rear ()ere it could t)en go o+er to t)e defensi+e. Mean()ile3 aircraft attacked t)e ene%ys su//lies3 )a%/ered %o&ility3 and /ro+ided inter%ittent tactical su//ort. 0)is strategic re+olution3 &ased on co%&ining t)e %ec)anised tactical and logistical inno+ations of !orld !ar I3 t)e *er%ans &roug)t into e-istence in May 1@4>. Si%/le3 e+en elegant3 in conce/tion and as o&+ious as t)e stirru/ or &ayonet once acco%/lis)ed and its creation and i%/le%entation only t)e result of a )a//y %i-ture in ()ic) luck3 ent)usias%3 co%/etence3 and +ision o+erca%e conser+atis%3 t)e e-ecution of t)is ca%/aign de/ended u/on +irtually e+ery significant t)e%e found in t)e (estern art of (ar in t)e /re+ious 23<>> years. 0)is ca%/aign %arked one of t)e %aDor transfor%ations of (arfare. !orld !ar I )ad introduced t(o ne( (ea/on syste%s3 t)e lig)t ca+alry of t)e air and t)e ar%oured )ea+y ca+alry3 &ut in !orld !ar II t)ese (ea/on syste%s3 no longer in /ri%iti+e for%3 reac)ed t)eir o/erational %aturity. 0)e *er%ans %ade significant use of t)e tactical facility of /lanes ()en t)eir aircraft3 little i%/eded &y (eak 'renc) antiaircraft defences3 &o%&ed t)e defenders of t)e Meuse and /layed a key role in t)e %aking of one of t)e i%/ortant crossings of t)is ri+er. 0)e *er%ans also used t)eir /lanes effecti+ely in raiding3 t)e ene%ies co%%unications and3 like t)e Britis) against t)e 0urks in 1@1B3 in attacking 'renc) and Britis) troo/s in retreat along t)e roads. *er%ans tanks3 t)oug) deficient in ar%our and fire/o(er3 /erfor%ed ad%ira&ly in articulated units connected &y radio3 ()ic) ena&led t)e% to en+elo/ strong /oints or readily concentrate against a (eakness in a continuous front. 0)e tanks /layed e-/ertly t)eir )ea+y ca+alry role of o+er()el%ing lig)t infantry and attacking )ea+y infantry in t)e flank and rear. !)en t)e *er%ans )ad /ro+ided t)e%sel+es (it) e+en %ore antitank guns t)an t)e 'renc)3 t)ey e-)i&ited t)eir gras/ of t)e c)aracter of all of t)e (ea/on syste%s. 'renc) tank#led counterattacks al%ost ine+ita&ly %et a strong resistance fro% t)e nu%erous t)oug) inade.uate *er%an antitank guns. ,ike t)e /ike%en of old3 t)e courageously and skilfully %anned *er%an antitank guns %ade a crucial contri&ution to sto//ing t)ese attacks. Si%ilarly3 t)e *er%ans did not neglect defence against t)e (eaker &ut still dangerous nglo#'renc) air forces. !)en t)e *er%an colu%ns on t)e road encountered strikes &y ene%y aircraft3 t)ey recei+ed t)e% as t)e $rusaders )ad t)e 0urkis) lig)t ca+alry. Instead of cross&o(s3 t)e *er%ans )ad antiaircraft %ac)ine guns and auto%atic cannon3 so%e self#/ro/elled so t)ey could go into action i%%ediately. But t)e intelligent e%/loy%ent of t)e ca/a&ilities of t)e four (ea/on syste%s only re/resented t)e fruition of t)e c)anges &egun during t)e 'irst !orld !ar. In strategy t)e *er%ans )arnessed t)e ne( logistics %ade /ossi&le &y t)e truck to t)e strategic ac)ie+e%ents of Na/oleon3 Radet6ky3 and Moltke. In 1@?@ in Mongolia3 t)e Russians )ad de%onstrated t)e /o(er of t)e ne( logistics in using 43>>> trucks to su//ly an ar%y of <C3>>> %en and o+er S>> tanks and ar%oured cars <>> %iles fro% a railroad. 0)e *er%ans3 &y %otorising antitank and antiaircraft guns as (ell as so%e infantry and artillery and su//lying all using trucks3 re/roduced Na/oleons 4l% ca%/aign. !)en t)e *er%ans )ad atte%/ted an 4l% %anoeu+re on a +ast scale in 1@143 t)e &etter %o&ility of t)e 'renc)3 ()o /ossessed functioning railroads3 ()ic) ga+e t)e% strategically offensi+e troo/s3 (ould )a+e defeated t)e *er%ans e+en )ad t)eir /lan lacked any ot)er defects. But in 1@4> t)e Pan6er di+isions and t)e acco%/anying %otorised infantry di+isions could kee/ a)ead of t)e reser+es t)e 'renc) deli+ered &y rail. 0)e 'renc) also /ossessed t)ese %ore effecti+e strategically offensi+e ar%oured and %otorised troo/s3 &ut t)e *er%ans )ad concentrated t)eirs for a strategic turning %o+e%ent. 0)e increase in t)e /o(er of t)e offence3 caused &y t)e rea//earance of lig)t and )ea+y ca+alry3 contri&uted to *er%an +ictories7 a fe( %en (it) rifles and %ac)ine guns could no longer delay %any ti%es t)eir nu%&er &ecause tanks could o+errun t)e% if t)ey lacked ade.uate antitank guns. 0)e (ide dis/ersal of ar%ies3 c)aracteristic of Na/oleonic (arfare3 /er%itted t)e concentration of <>B

tanks in o+er()el%ing nu%&ers. *er%an aircraft )el/ed on occasion &y attacking 'renc) forces t)at i%/eded t)e ground ad+ance. It /ro+ed i%/ossi&le for t)e 'renc) to use t)e rail(ays to reconstitute t)e front as t)ey )ad in 1@1B. No longer did inade.uate logistics /re+ent t)e *er%ans fro% e-erting t)eir full force against defending troo/s t)at in I@4> did not )a+e t)e relati+e defensi+e /o(er of t)ose in 1@14#1B. 0)e *er%ans also o(ed %uc) of t)eir success to t)e rut)lessness (it) ()ic) t)ey concentrated. In for%ing ar%oured and %otorised di+isions t)ey )ad an organisation t)at e%&odied concentration7 &y co%%itting t)ose /o(erful for%ations in only t(o o/erations3 and t)e &ulk of t)e% in only one3 t)ey again concentrated. 0)eir aircraft )ad suc) great %o&ility and range in relation to t)e si6e of t)e t)eatre of (ar t)at t)ey3 too3 /ro+ided anot)er force t)at t)e *er%ans could and did readily concentrate. 'inally3 in t)eir strategy t)e *er%ans concentrated against t)e (eakness of t)e rdennes front and insured its +ulnera&ility &y t)eir con+incing distraction in Belgiu%. "ere t)ey co%&ined dis/ersion along an e-tended front (it) a sur/rise concentration. 0)e *er%ans co%&ined t)ese tactical3 logistic3 and strategic ele%ents to e-ecute a +ast strategic turning %o+e%ent3 used in ancient ti%es &y $aesar and introduced in %odern ti%es &y Na/oleon. 0)ey daringly3 and not (it)out %isgi+ings3 utilised t)e s/lendid strategic %o&ility t)ey o(ed to t)e %otor truck to /lunge dee/ into t)eir ad+ersaries rear. 5nce &e)ind t)e ene%y3 t)e *er%ans could e-/loit t)e tactical /o(er of t)e defence to )old t)eir /osition and ensure a disastrous e+acuation &y t)e ene%y3 i%%ense &ooty in %ateriel3 and %any /risoners. !it) t)e co%/letion of t)is ca%/aign3 t)e 'renc) and Britis) )ad too little strengt) re%aining to /re+ent t)e *er%ans fro% o+errunning 'rance3 a task for ()ic) t)ey )ad an ade.uate ratio of force to s/ace and little /o/ular o//osition fro% t)e stunned 'renc). 0)e *er%ans con.uered 'rance in s/ite of a co%/etent ad+ersary3 e.ual in nu%&ers and3 on t)e ()ole3 in %ateriel. 0)eir ac)ie+e%ent rested on t)e )ar%onising of t)e ne( (ea/on syste%s %uc) as t)e old %asters of t)e art of (ar )ad united t)e earlier counter/arts of t)e tank3 /lane3 and antitank and antiaircraft guns. $o%&ining t)is (it) t)e re+olution in logistics and a t)oroug)ly Na/oleonic strategy3 t)ey defeated t)eir o//onents /o(erful defence. nd only in t)is (ay could t)ey )a+e o+er%atc)ed t)e /re/onderance of t)e defence in a t)eatre of (ar (it) a )ig) ratio of force to s/ace. 0)us3 t)is ca%/aign transfor%ed (arfare3 and %ilitary o/erations entered a ne( era t)at endures to t)is day. 1uring t)e re%ainder of !orld !ar II3 all t)e &elligerents a//lied t)ese tactical3 logistical3 and strategic /rinci/les. But none e.ualled t)e *er%ans ()o3 )a+ing %ade suc) a Dust %i-ture of t)e (ea/on syste%s and /ioneered t)e doctrines and t)e strategy3 )ad also t)e ad+antage of t)e e-/erience gained in t)eir Polis) and 'renc) ca%/aigns &efore t)ey furt)er )oned t)eir skills against t)e Russians3 anot)er unseasoned o//onent. In su&se.uent 2uro/ean ca%/aigns t)e co%&atants used t)e re+i+ed Na/oleonic strategy3 usually )a+ing a ratio of force to s/ace large enoug) to (age a decisi+e ca%/aign. If an attacker attained sur/rise3 a &reakt)roug) of t)e front /ro+ed difficult to /re+ent &ecause of t)e concentrated tank and %otorised forces a+aila&le for e-/loitation. 0)e counterattack on t)e flank /ro+ided t)e only antidote to t)is strategic /rescri/tion &ut e+en t)is defence ine+ita&ly in+ol+ed t)e loss of significant a%ounts of territory and su//lies. 0)e Russian counterattack at Stalingrad e-e%/lified t)is counter%easure3 one a//lied also &y t)e nglo# %erican forces against a *er%an offensi+e in 1ece%&er 1@44. 0o use t)e counterattack to defeat a strategic /enetration re.uired %otorised forces in reser+e in so%e co%&ination of a su&tracted reser+e of unco%%itted units and of t)ose near or in touc) (it) t)e ene%y3 ()ic) t)e co%%ander could still (it)dra( and use to carry out t)is counterattack. 0o )a+e t)e %a-i%u% effect3 t)e counterattacking forces %ust use t)e sa%e %et)od of &reakt)roug) and ra/id ad+ance t)at t)e ene%y )ad initially e%/loyed. In

<>@

t)is res/ect t)e Russian res/onse to t)e *er%an dri+e to Stalingrad and to(ard t)e oil fields s)o(ed t)e %aDor ac)ie+e%ent /ossi&le for counteraction of t)is ty/e. $once/tually it )ad so%et)ing in co%%on (it) Mars)al 8offres effort to turn t)e *er%an turning %o+e%ent of 1@14 for3 in ca/turing t)e *er%ans in Stalingrad3 t)e Russians e-ecuted a turning %o+e%ent3 e+en t)oug) t(o ar%ies /artici/ated to %ake it a strategic en+elo/%ent. 0)e &asic strategy of t)e 1@C? ca%/aign of t)e 2gy/tians and Israelis confor%s to t)at ()ic) )as c)aracterised (arfare since t)e 1C@>s3 e-ce/t for t)e siege (arfare deadlock of 1@14#1B. Still3 in s/ite of t)e Israeli success in turning t)e 2gy/tian 0)ird r%y in 1@C?3 t)is e+ent see%s less likely to occur t)an in !orld !ar III if t)e ar%ies in 2uro/e s)ould engage. 0)ese all#%ounted ar%ies3 )eterogeneous in t)eir (ea/on syste%s3 are )o%ogeneous in t)e sense t)at al%ost e+ery di+ision3 cor/s3 and ar%y )as a si%ilar co%/osition. In t)is (ay t)ey differ %arkedly fro% t)e ar%ies of !orld !ar II. 0)us3 co%%anders can no longer as readily %ake a strategic concentration of tanks3 ()ic) could o+erco%e antitank defences3 as often )a//ened in t)e 1@4>s. 'urt)er3 (it) all troo/s )a+ing e.ual %o&ility3 co%%anders cannot rely on differential %o&ility3 ()ic) ena&led %otor# %arc)ing forces to turn t)e foot %arc)ing in !orld !ar II. So t)e (ars of t)e 'renc) Re+olution and Na/oleon inaugurated an era in ()ic) co%&at /ersisting strategy do%inated (arfare. !it) so %uc) force in relation to s/ace3 raiders could find fe( +ulnera&le ene%ies to attack and e+en )ad difficulty reac)ing )ostile co%%unications to /ractice a raiding logistic strategy. r%ies in retreat did /ractice so%e scorc)ed#eart) logistic strategy &y destroying &ridges3 rail(ays3 and su//lies t)ey could not carry a(ay. 0)e ad+ent of t)e air/lane3 )o(e+er3 )ad returned &ot) raiding and logistic strategies to /ro%inence &y t)e Second !orld !ar t)roug) air raids on co%%unications and against )ostile cities3 a trend t)at )as continued since t)en. Back

(he Classifications of Military Strategy

0)e conce/ts underlying %ilitary strategy )a+e re%ained fairly constant for 23<>> years3 t)oug) tactical and logistical conditions3 a%ong ot)ers3 )a+e conditioned ()at co%%anders could acco%/lis). Still3 t)roug) t)is long s/an of (arfare %ost contestants )ad t)e alternati+e of ai%ing at eac) ot)er directly t)roug) e%/loying a co%&at strategy or indirectly &y attacking t)e ot)ers su//lies. 2.ually3 and (it)out e-cluding a c)oice &et(een t)ese alternati+es3 t)ey )ad t)e /ossi&ility of defending or /ursuing t)e offensi+e &y raids or &y risking &attle and follo(ing a /ersisting strategy to /rotect t)eir o(n or engross t)eir ad+ersarys territory. 0)e %atri- &elo( clearly re/resents t)e classifications of strategy used in t)is (ork. lt)oug) t)is s)o(s only %ilitary strategy3 ()ic) ai%s at t)e )ostile ar%ed forces3 it can3 as t)e sc)e%atic follo(ing e-)i&its3 t)us e%&race %ilitary action not directed at strictly %ilitary ends.

Strategy Matri* Back

0)is organisation /ro&a&ly (ould not /ro+ide t)e &est a//roac) to a %ore general consideration of strategy. Ne+ert)eless3 it does e%&race t)e ot)er instances of t)e use of %ilitary force noted in t)is &ook. Raiding to e-tract /olitical concessions directly3 rat)er t)an &y engaging t)e )ostile ar%ed forces3 )as a//eared /ro%inently ()en /urely %ilitary %easures /ro%ised less success. 0)e

<1>

fre.uently used strategy of t)e *reek city#states and t)at e%/loyed &y t)e 2nglis) in t)e "undred :ears !ar /ro+ided t)e %ost cons/icuous illustrations of a /olitical raiding strategy.

More General Strategy Matri* Back

Suc) a strategy also a//eared in t)e 0urkis) raids in natolia after t)e Battle of Man6ikert and t)ose of Mars)al Bugeaud in lgeria in t)e nineteent) century. In &ot) of t)ese e-a%/les %any ci+ilians died3 t)e direct3 rat)er t)an t)e incidental3 result of forays t)at a//ro/riated and destroyed /ro/erty3 and t)e terror ins/ired &y t)is loss of life )el/ed significantly in su&duing t)ese territories. lt)oug) raids directed /ri%arily against /ro/erty3 like t)ose of t)e *reeks and 2nglis)3 dou&tless killed or inDured /eo/le3 t)ese incursions ai%ed at /ro/erty rat)er t)an at in)a&itants. So alt)oug) t)e /olitical o&Decti+e and %ilitary %eans did not differ3 raids t)at include killing ci+ilians a%ong t)eir o&Decti+es3 like t)e Mongols killing ur&an /o/ulations in t)e 9)(ari6%ian 2%/ire3 )a+e often recei+ed a distinct categorisation &ecause t)ey rely on terror. ctually3 conte%/orary /olitical terroris%3 in e-ecution often analogous to a %ilitary raid3 does not differ in its essence fro% a /olitical raiding strategy3 ()ic) de/ends /ri%arily on inti%idating ci+ilians &y killing rat)er t)an destroying /ro/erty. /ersisting strategy t)at ac.uired territory could not .ualify as an instance of using %ilitary action to secure /olitical o&Decti+es directly &ecause a /ersisting strategy al%ost al(ays necessarily includes facing t)e %aDor ene%ys ar%ed forces and %ust in+ol+e %ilitary strategy. In fact3 %ilitary and /olitical o&Decti+es often co%&ined in a (ay t)at %ade t)e distinction irrele+ant. In t)e 0)irty :ears !ar3 for e-a%/le3 raids %et su//ly needs &y feeding t)e raiding ar%y3 i%/le%ented a logistic strategy &y de/leting t)e ad+ersarys resources3 o+er()el%ed t)e garrisons of s%all cities to carry out a co%&at strategy3 and3 t)roug) all of t)is da%age3 directly e-erted intense /olitical /ressure. 0)e 4nion raids in t)e last year of t)e %erican $i+il !ar3 carried out in /ursuit of a logistic strategy3 )ad as an i%/ortant &y#/roduct and3 /er)a/s3 t)eir %ost i%/ortant result3 a /olitical effect Gt)e Sout)erners /erce/tion of t)e cost of continuing t)e (arH and a /syc)ological effect # altering t)e Sout)erners esti%ate of t)e c)ances for +ictory. 0)e strategic &o%&ing in !orld !ar II deli&erately %i-ed si%ilar /olitical o&Decti+es3 along (it) t)e use of terror3 (it) t)e e-ecution of a logistic raiding %ilitary strategy. /ersisting strategy3 in t)e a&sence of t)e tactical or strategic %eans of destroying t)e ene%y ar%y3 )ad to ai% at t)e ac.uisition of )ostile territory3 ()ic)3 if it did not constitute t)e /olitical o&Decti+e of t)e (ar3 %ig)t /ro+ide so%et)ing of +alue to t)e defender t)at t)e attacker could e-c)ange for a goal of t)e (ar. If t)e attacker )ad a%&itious /olitical ai%s3 )e could )a+e to occu/y all of t)e ene%ys territory3 as (as t)e case in !orld !ar II to secure unconditional surrender of *er%any. In t)is instance *er%anys nu%erous and /o(erfully ar%ed ene%ies )ad &ot) t)e /re/onderance of %ilitary /o(er and t)e ratio of force to s/ace to attain t)eir unli%ited o&Decti+e as (ell as t)e %oti+ation to rise t)e needed %ilitary %eans for t)e ti%e re.uisite to (in suc) a total +ictory. 0)e e-/erience of suc) a triu%/)3 largely attained t)roug) %ilitary %eans3 a rare

<11

occurrence in (ar3 )as coloured %ilitary and /olitical t)inking since t)at (ar &y %aking unli%ited /olitical and %ilitary +ictory see% %ore attaina&le t)an a longer +ie( of )istory (ould suggest. More restricted goals and3 t)erefore3 +ictories )a+e usually c)aracterised conflicts in t)e /ast3 t)oug) le-anders (ar against 1arius III of Persia and Ro%es in )er con.uest of *aul offer t(o i%/ortant e-ce/tions. In general3 t)e strengt) of t)e %oti+e &e)ind /olitical goals )as affected t)e /ro/ortion of a countrys resources de+oted to t)e conflict and t)e e-tent of t)e defeat re.uired to accede to t)e ene%ys de%ands. n analogy (it) t)e econo%ic conce/t of su//ly and de%and (ould e.uate t)e /olitical %oti+e (it) a consu%ers desire for a /roduct and t)e %ilitary and ot)er costs of a (ar (it) t)e cost of t)e econo%ic good. :et eac) of t)e t(o contestants functions as seller as (ell as &uyer. 0)us a triu%/)ant attacker %ig)t attain i%/ressi+e successes &ut find t)at t)e ene%y still (ould not ado/t )is definition of defeat and t)at )e )ad already e-/ended all of t)e effort )e &elie+ed )is o&Decti+es (ere (ort). In t)is case3 %ilitary e+ents (ould not )a+e altered t)e /olitical as/irations of eit)er. But if t)is led to co%/ro%ise3 t)e degree of deter%ination of eac) side (ould influence t)e outco%e3 ()ic) (ould fit t)e %arket /arallel only +ery roug)ly as an instance of &uying a s%aller .uantity &ut at a )ig)er unit cost. Surely3 only a coincidence (ould )a+e %ade t)e degree of %ilitary ac)ie+e%ent t)e +ictor (as (illing to /urc)ase in e-c)ange for )is /olitical goal e.ual t)e le+el of effort and %ilitary failure t)e loser (ould endure to concede defeat and accede to t)e strongers re.uire%ents. But understanding t)e interaction a%ong %oti+es and o&Decti+es and %ilitary costs3 outco%es3 and /ros/ects is not /art of t)is &ook. So%eti%es /olitical deter%ination )as not see%ed /ro/ortionate to t)e stakes in a (ar. !)ereas )o( %uc) %oral and co%&at su//ort eac) co%&atant (ould contri&ute to t)e (ar (ould usually de/end on /olitical o&Decti+es3 t)e intensity and lengt) of t)e (ar effort tended to )a+e a direct relation to t)e /olitical costs of defeat. In t)e 0)irty :ears !ar3 for e-a%/le3 ()en t)e "oly Ro%an 2%/eror and t)e $at)olic forces )ad defeated 1en%ark3 t)ey see%ed to )a+e inti%idated t)eir ene%ies and reconciled t)e% to defeat. But t)e 2%/erors 2dict of Restitution3 sei6ing estates long Protestant3 raised t)e stakes in t)e (ar and insured a continued struggle. In ot)er (ays3 too3 t)e lengt) and intensity of t)e struggle %ay also affect /olitical ai%s3 a case of t)e %eans contri&uting to t)e deter%ination of t)e end. 0)is only roug)ly fits t)e econo%ic analogy as t)e instance of a &uyer3 )a+ing already /aid %ore t)an e-/ected3 de%ands %ore of t)e /roduct as reco%/ense for t)e enlarged outlay. 0)e cost of !orld !ar I3 in ()ic) t)e &elligerents escalated t)eir (ar ai%s3 /ro+ides an e-cellent e-a%/le. So%eti%es t)ere )as see%ed little correlation &et(een t)e o&Decti+e and t)e intensity or duration of t)e struggle3 as t)e !ar of t)e 0ri/le lliance gra/)ically illustrates. In 1B=<3 a (ar3 ostensi&ly a dis/ute o+er territory3 /itted Paraguay against Bra6il3 rgentina3 and 4ruguay. Paraguay dis/layed a%a6ing /olitical as (ell as %ilitary fortitude. In a struggle lasting o+er fi+e years t)e tri/le allies totally defeated Paraguay3 so o+er%atc)ed t)at t)e nu%&ers enrolled in t)e I%/erial Bra6ilian %ilitia e-ceeded t)e entire /o/ulation of Paraguay. If t)e ti%e re.uired for an allied +ictory a//ears e-or&itant3 t)e endea+ours of Paraguay see% e-traordinary: its go+ern%ent reduced t)e draft age to t(el+e3 conscri/ted (o%en3 at first to su&stitute for scarce )orses in /ulling artillery and (agons3 and follo(ed a rut)less logistic strategy of destroying e+ery +illage in t)e in+aders /at) and killing e+ery ani%al. By t)e end of t)e (ar t)e /o/ulation of Paraguay )ad declined &y << /ercent3 lea+ing less t)an 2@3>>> %en3 1>C3>>> (o%en3 and BC3>>> c)ildren. 0)e Paraguayan co%%it%ent to (ar &ore little relation to t)e original /olitical goals or t)e outco%e. "istory a&ounds (it) ot)er e-a%/les of /olitical goals li%ited &y t)e inade.uacy of t)e %ilitary %eans to reac) t)e%3 Dust as it does of instances of t)e /otentiality of %ilitary successes t)at lay &eyond t)e sco/e of t)e a+aila&le econo%ic resources to sustain t)e %ilitary endea+our or e-ceeded t)e /olitical (illingness to e-/end t)e effort to ac)ie+e goals for t)e attain%ent of ()ic) t)e

<12

econo%ic resources and %ilitary %eans e-isted. So3 on t)e &oundary &et(een (arfare and /olitics one %ay readily find3 t)e Paraguayan e-a%/le not(it)standing3 analogous (it) consu%er c)oice co%/ara&le to t)ose alternati+es in t)e selection of t)e co%&ination of (ea/on syste%s to acco%/lis) a gi+en %ilitary task. In seeking econo%ic rat)er t)an /olitical &enefits3 raiding c)aracterised t)e strategy of &ar&arians3 ra&s3 Magyars3 and Vikings. 5f course3 t)e sa%e %oti+e and conce/t underlies t)e ro&&ery of a store or a &ank. lt)oug) t)ose seeking econo%ic goals &y %ilitary %eans usually /laced al%ost e-clusi+e reliance on raids3 as did t)ose using t)e% to /ursue /olitical ends directly3 t)e nineteent) century contains e-a%/les of %aDor /o(ers using a /ersisting strategy to for(ard econo%ic ends ()en t)eir ar%ed forces sei6ed a foreign nations /ort and a//ro/riated t)e /roceeds of t)e custo%s#)ouse to /ay on a defaulted de&t. Since t)e /ro&le%s of conducting and defending against suc) o/erations (it) /olitical3 econo%ic3 or ot)er o&Decti+es differed little3 if any3 fro% t)ose (it) %ilitary o&Decti+es3 t)e treat%ent of %ilitary strategy alone usually ade.uately deals (it) t)ese in t)eir %ilitary as/ects3 e+en t)oug) t)ey fall outside t)e /ro+ince of t)is &ook. Back

(he nfluence of the )atio of Force to S'ace

So%e t)e%es3 suc) as t)e ratio of force to s/ace3 )a+e an influence t)at /er+ades all four ty/es of strategy. 4nless attackers )a+e an ade.uate ratio of force to t)e s/ace of t)e t)eatre of (ar so as to )a+e t)e a&ility to %ake t)e defender fig)t or retreat directly to t)e rear3 t)e ar%y on t)e offensi+e is unlikely to )a+e effecti+e strategic %eans of co%/elling t)e ene%y to fig)t3 e-ce/t under t)e circu%stance of t)e defenders o(n c)oosing. )ig) ratio of force to s/ace can3 on t)e ot)er )and3 confront t)e attacker (it) t)e continuous fortified front3 ()ic) )as c)aracterised %uc) of t)e (orld (ars. si%/le sc)e%atic %ay )el/ clarify t)e relations)i/ &et(een t)ese t(o +aria&les. If t)e +ertical a-is in t)e sc)e%atic &elo( %easures t)e a%ount of s/ace and t)e )ori6ontal t)e .uantity of force3 t)e 6one near t)e line at forty#fi+e degrees re/resents t)e strategically decisi+e ratio (it) ()ic) ar%ies organised in t)e %anner of t)ose of t)e 'renc) Re+olution and Na/oleon could /ursue a /ersisting strategy and co%/el &attle or t)e ene%ys retreat to t)e rear. If t)e contending forces o/erated in %ore s/ace3 re/resented &y t)e area (ell a&o+e t)e forty#fi+e# degree line3 t)ey could not co%/el a decision. Na/oleon faced t)is situation in Russia3 and it rese%&led ca%/aigning (it) t)e concentrated3 unitary ar%ies of earlier ti%es. 8ust as Montecuccoli could a+oid 0urenne and neit)er 0illy nor *usta+us could coerce t)e ot)er to fig)t3 so Na/oleon could not close (it) t)e Russian ar%y e-ce/t (it) its ac.uiescence. 0)is lo( ratio not only fa+oured raiding3 if often left no alternati+e.

The 'nfluen(e of the ,atio of #or(e to S a(e Back

<1?

0)e ratio of force to s/ace in t)e ca%/aign of 1@14 in 'rance and Belgiu% &elongs (ell &elo( t)e forty#fi+e#degree line. "ere t)e contending ar%ies )ad suc) a )ig) ratio of force to s/ace t)at an entrenc)ed deadlock resulted. !it)out any flanks and no alternati+e to frontal attacks against an entrenc)ed ene%y3 siege (arfare ensued. But rat)er t)an t)e grid of fortified to(ns3 ()ic) )ad ty/ified t)e t(o centuries of siege (arfare in t)e Net)erlands3 t)e co%&atants )ad so %uc) strengt) t)at continuous siege lines co+ered t)e ()ole front. 2arlier3 t)e need to relie+e &esieged cities )ad gi+en t)e attacker an o//ortunity to %ake t)e defender assu%e t)e offensi+e against t)e co+ering ar%y3 &ut (it) continuous lines t)e attacker )ad no alternati+e &ut to take t)e tactical offensi+e. 5f course3 sieges t)e%sel+es e-e%/lify o/erations (it) t)is )ig) ratio. 0)is /otent influence of t)e ratio of force to s/ace only )olds true ()en ar%ies )a+e like co%/osition (it) res/ect to t)eir (ea/on syste%s. !)en3 for e-a%/le3 t)e Ro%ans ca%/aigned against t)e Part)ians in t)e relati+ely uno&structed terrain of Meso/ota%ia3 t)e ratio of force to s/ace %attered little. 0)e %ounted Part)ians could use t)eir greater %o&ility to refuse to fig)t or to co%/el t)e Ro%an infantry to acce/t &attle regardless of t)e nu%&ers on eac) side. But ()en ar%ies )a+e si%ilar %o&ility3 t)e ratio of force to s/ace )as a %aDor influence. !)en ar%ies )a+e co%/ara&le constitutions and %o&ility3 t)e defence )as t(o ca/a&ilities: it can resist frontal attacks3 and it can take strategic ad+antage of t)e /ri%acy of retreat o+er /ursuit. !)en t)e ar%ies /ursuing /ersisting strategies re/resent a )ig) ratio of force to s/ace3 as in 1@143 t)e ca/acity to (it)stand a frontal assault &eco%es t)e defences /rinci/al %eans of forcing a deadlock. !)en t)e ratio is lo(3 as in %ost of t)e ca%/aigns in t)e /ast3 t)e defence uses its a&ility to a+oid &attle to frustrate t)e attackers. $o%%anders did not need to %ake t)is c)oice &et(een tactical and strategic %eans3 as t)e Ro%ans s)o(ed ()en t)ey defeated "anni&al &y a+oiding &attle and &y relying on t)eir fortified cities. s "anni&als e-/erience e-)i&its3 t)e ratio of force to s/ace affects ()at a +ictorious ar%y %ay ac)ie+e. If s%all in relation to a /olitically anti/at)etic country3 it cannot control it3 e+en if it can al(ays defeat t)e )ostile forces. 0)e e-/erience of t)e 2nglis) in t)e "undred :ears !ar s)o(s )o( t)e +ast si6e of 'rance s(allo(ed u/ t)e 2nglis) in+aders. 0)e lengt) of ti%e t)e syste%atic Ro%ans re.uired to consolidate t)eir con.uests offers anot)er illustration of t)e effect of t)e ratio of force to s/ace on a +ictorious ar%y gaining a /olitical result fro% its %ilitary su/re%acy. 0)e foregoing a//lies only to a /ersisting strategy7 t)e situation (it) res/ect to a raiding strategy )as no suc) co%/le-ity. Raiders can only function in t)e area (ell a&o+e t)e forty#fi+e#degree line. !it)out a lo( ratio of )ostile force in t)e t)eatre of o/erations3 t)e raiders (ould find t)eir %o+e%ents i%/eded and t)eir /ersisting ene%y strong e+ery()ere. 0)us raiding )as greater strengt) on t)e offensi+e t)an /ersisting on t)e defensi+e &ut only (it) a lo( ratio of force to s/ace. Back

<14

(he Su'remacy of )etreat 0ver !ursuit

0)e /ri%acy of retreat o+er /ursuit )as usually dictated strategy (it) %ore or less aut)ority since t)e ti%e of t)e ancient *reeks 0)is generalisation3 a %aDor t)e%e3 a//lies only to t)e sa%e (ea/on syste%s or3 of course3 ()en t)e /ursuers )a+e less %o&ility. ,ig)t infantry could3 for e-a%/le3 out%arc) )ea+y infantry3 Dust as lig)t ca+alry could outdistance )ea+y ca+alry. Mounted %en )ad an e+en greater %argin o+er dis%ounted. In (it)dra(al3 %en (it) t)e sa%e (ea/on syste% could outrun t)eir /ursuers3 if only &ecause t)ey could /lace o&stacles3 suc) as &roken &ridges and fallen trees3 in t)e /at) of t)ose follo(ing. In addition3 t)e retreating force could lea+e a rear guard to delay t)e /ursuers. 0)e rear guard often %ig)t not need to fig)t %uc)3 for3 &y %aking t)e ene%y c)ange fro% %arc) to co%&at for%ation and t)en resu%ing its retreat3 t)e fleeing ar%y (ould )a+e gained ground in its %arc). !)en ar%ies )ad co%/ara&le co%/osition3 t)e (eaker could retire3 if it lacked t)e strengt)3 inclination3 or o//ortunity to use t)e tactical resource of resisting a frontal attack. 5ften3 ()en fa+oured &y a lo( or %oderate ratio of force to s/ace3 t)e (it)dra(ing ar%y could %o+e in any direction3 confident3 until t)e end of t)e eig)teent) century3 t)at its o//onent )ad no %eans of &ringing it to &attle &ecause t)e (eaker could %arc) a(ay ()ile t)e stronger arrayed for co%&at. 0)is elusi+eness3 ()ic) often %ade t)e stronger /o(erless to force a contest on t)e (eaker3 fostered a resort to a raiding strategy and /ro+ided one of t)e funda%ental conditions t)at %ade raids /ossi&le and assured t)eir e%inence on t)e offensi+e against a /ersisting o//onent. !it)out t)e strategic /ri%acy of retreat3 raiders could often %eet (it) disaster ()en trying to esca/e and on occasion3 e+en fail to reac) t)eir o&Decti+e. 5f course3 t)e sa%e conditions a//lied to raiders as go+erned t)e su/re%acy of (it)dra(al o+er /ursuit3 a lo( ratio of force to s/ace and t)e /ossession of a (ea/on syste% e.ual or su/erior in %o&ility to t)at of t)e defenders against t)e raid. Back

Concentration against Weakness. +istraction. and the !rinci'les of War

Na/oleon once stated a salient t)e%e in (arfare: J0)e nature of strategy consists of al(ays )a+ing3 e+en (it) a (eaker ar%y3 %ore forces at t)e /oint of attack or at t)e /oint one is &eing attacked t)an t)e ene%y )as.L 0)is /rinci/le3 also a//lica&le to tactics3 )as go+erned co%&at3 logistic3 /ersisting3 and raiding strategies. 8ust as in &attles ()ere t)e co%&atants soug)t to attack or defend t)eir (eak flanks and rear3 and (atc) for a +ulnera&le /oint in t)eir o(n or t)eir ad+ersarys front3 so also in strategy did co%%anders look for (eakness to e-/loit on t)e offensi+e and for )ostile strengt) as a source of danger against ()ic) to concentrate t)eir forces on t)e defensi+e. 0)e ene%ys logistic resources3 usually %ore +ulnera&le t)an )is co%&at forces3 %ade t)e &est target3 and &ecause a logistic strategy necessarily i%/lied so%e co%&at Ge-ce/t for a scorc)ed#eart) /olicy on t)e defenceH3 t)e rele+ance of t)e conce/t of attacking (eakness differed little for a logistic strategy. In e-ecuting t)eir %ission3 ()et)er directed at t)e ene%ys forces or )is logistic resources3 raiders soug)t to assail (eakness. 1efenders tried to confront or tra/ raiders (it) t)e strongest force /ossi&le. But forces e%/loying a raiding strategy to (in t)roug) t)e accu%ulation of %any s%all co%&at or logistic +ictories )ad a facility for concentration against (eakness su/erior to t)at of t)ose using a /ersisting strategy. Suc) raiders3 often (eaker and using t)e /ri%acy of retreat to a+oid strong defending forces3 could concentrate against any co%&at or logistic o&Decti+e &ecause t)ey )ad to )a+e no strategic ai% ot)er t)an t)e i%%ediate results of t)e raid. !it) suc) a%&iguity as to o&Decti+e3 a raiding strategy so distracted a defender and ga+e so %any o//ortunities to t)e attacker t)at )e could so readily concentrate against (eakness as to %ake a raiding strategy stronger on t)e offensi+e t)an a defending /ersisting strategy. Since all for%s of strategy usually

<1<

in+ol+ed at least t)e /ossi&ility of co%&at3 t)e conce/t of )a+ing t)e greatest /re/onderance of force /ossi&le or )a+ing t)e %ost fa+oura&le strategic /osition )ad a uni+ersal a//lica&ility. 0)e idea of distracting t)e ene%y al%ost constitutes a corollary to t)e offensi+e conce/t of assailing (eakness and could aid t)e defender as (ell if )e decei+ed t)e attacker into %istaking strengt) for (eakness. 1istraction ser+ed *usta+us (ell in )is initial ca%/aign against 0illy and later %ade /ossi&le t)e 9ings crossing of t)e difficult &arrier of t)e ,ec) Ri+er7 and 2ugene used it to confuse Mars)al $atinat and cross t)e dige and t)en t(o %ore ri+ers. Recently strategic distraction )as contri&uted to a %ore decisi+e o/eration. In May 1@4> t)e *er%an offensi+e o+er t)e %ost fa+oura&le terrain into "olland and Belgiu% dre( 'renc) reser+es into Belgiu% ()ile t)e *er%ans t)e%sel+es %o+ed to attack t)roug) t)e rdennes. llen&ys distraction of t)e 0urks to(ard t)e east &efore )is 1@1B Megiddo offensi+e on t)e (est and Montgo%erys strong dri+e on t)e east of t)e Nor%andy &eac))ead &efore t)e &reakout on t)e (est in 1@44 also t)reatened t)e o&+ious3 t)us reinforcing t)e /reconce/tions of t)e )ostile co%%anders. lt)oug) not a re.uire%ent for a successful distraction3 it did facilitate it and argued for an a+oidance of t)e o&+ious in t)e searc) for a (eak o&Decti+e. Because of t)e /redo%inance of t)e tactical defensi+e3 t)e offensi+e +ersion of t)is rule Gconcentrate against (eaknessH )as recei+ed %ore fre.uent state%ent t)an t)e defensi+e for%ulation # concentrate against strengt). But often t)e conce/t )as a//eared in a general state%ent in t)e si%/le inDunction to concentrate. 0)is affir%ation )as t)e +irtue of general a//lica&ility &ut falls to s/ecify against ()at3 and so%eti%es co%%anders )a+e taken it to %ean t)e ene%ys %ain force ()en suc) a concentration (ould +iolate t)e doctrine to attack (eakness ()en on t)e offensi+e. 0)e /rinci/les of (ar used today in %any ar%ies /ro+ide an e-a%/le of t)is %ore general rule to concentrate. Ne+ert)eless3 e.ually a//ro/riate for tactics and strategy3 t)ey do lend t)e%sel+es to e-)i&iting t)e /ro/erties a %ilitary o/eration %ust )a+e to ac)ie+e an offensi+e concentration against (eakness or to &ring t)e %a-i%u% defensi+e force against t)e %ain )ostile offensi+e effort. 0)e 4.S. ar%y currently ad)eres to t)e follo(ing nine /rinci/les for success in (arfare. 0)e /rinci/le of t)e o-Fe(ti%e states t)at t)e co%%ander %ust )a+e a clear idea of ()at )e (is)es to acco%/lis). 0)at of t)e offensi%e )olds3 t)at t)e defensi+e3 no %atter )o( strong cannot ac)ie+e +ictory &y itself. 5nly t)e offensi+e can do%inate t)e ene%y and attain +ictory. Sim li(ity /oints out t)at co%/le- /lans and o/erations /resent too %any difficulties in e-ecution3 and t)at si%/ler /lans (ill %ore likely ac)ie+e +ictory. Manoeu%re stresses %o&ility in co%&at and strategy. Unity of (ommand e%/)asises t)at di+ided co%%ands risk failure &ecause of a lack of coordination of effort and agree%ent as to t)e o&Decti+e. Sur rise )as its +alue &ecause a sur/rised ene%y is /syc)ologically as (ell as /)ysically unready to %ake )is &est effort. Se(urity states t)at a co%%ander %ust a+oid &eing caug)t una(are )i%self as (ell as kee/ )is /lans and )is %o+e%ents secret fro% t)e ene%y. 0o do t)is in+ol+es good intelligence of t)e ene%ys ca/a&ilities. E(onomy of for(e enDoins using no %ore force t)an needed to acco%/lis) t)e %ission. Mass or (on(entration co%/le%ents econo%y of force: a co%%ander %ust use t)e forces econo%ised else()ere to concentrate for t)e %ain offensi+e or defensi+e effort. 5ne %ay +ie( all of t)ese /rinci/les as t)e %eans to secure an a//ro/riate concentration. clear idea of t)e o&Decti+e re.uires unity of co%%and to e-ecute a si%/le /lan to concentrate econo%ised forces against a defenders (eakness or an attackers strengt). Suc) a concentration re.uires %anoeu+re and cannot ac)ie+e sur/rise (it)out security. !it)out sur/rise3 t)e offensi+e effort (ill not find t)e ene%y (eak3 nor (ill an ene%y not caug)t una(are carry out an offensi+e against a defender ()o )ad concentrated to recei+e t)e attack. 2it)er t)e attack itself or t)e su&se.uent ado/tion of t)e offensi+e to e-/loit t)e do%inance /roduced &y a successful defensi+e s)o(s t)e rele+ance of t)e /rinci/le of t)e offensi+e. <1=

0)e foregoing also includes &y i%/lication t)e conce/t of t)e initiati+e3 an i%/ortant idea3 t)oug) not one of t)ese /rinci/les of (ar. $oncentration de%ands t)e a&ility to initiate action3 to act as (ell as react. 0)is .uality3 ()ic) usually &elongs to t)e offensi+e and to t)e stronger force3 nor%ally de/ends on a good kno(ledge of t)e ene%y3 and (it)out initiati+e co%%anders usually find sur/rise %ore difficult to attain. 0)us3 like t)e nine /rinci/les3 initiati+e is i%/lied in t)e conce/t of concentration3 and all of t)ese not only lend t)e%sel+es to t)e acco%/lis)%ent of t)e o&Decti+e of concentration against (eakness on t)e offensi+e and o//osition against strengt) on t)e defensi+e3 &ut also descri&e t)e %eans needed to attain success in al%ost any %ilitary o/eration. Back

Com'elling the -nemy to Fight. (urning Movements. and Concentration in S'ace and (ime
Se+eral t)e%es )a+e t)eir /rinci/al a//lications in a /ersisting co%&at strategy. 0)is kind of (arfare3 c)aracteristic in 2uro/e for t)e /ast 2>> years3 )as recei+ed t)e %ost study fro% %ilitary t)eorists and )istorians3 &ut )as also encountered great difficulties in e-ecution. 0)e ar%y on t)e offensi+e (it) a /ersisting strategy3 su/erior in co%&at strengt) &ut lacking a do%inant (ea/on syste%3 t)roug)out )istory )as %ost often lacked enoug) force in relation to t)e si6e of t)e t)eatre of o/erations to co%/el &attle3 e-ce/t on t)e o//onents ter%s ()en t)e attacker )as usually )ad to %eet t)e defender in a strong3 often entrenc)ed3 /osition (it) secure flanks. 0)us 0illy3 eager for &attle3 found *usta+us dol/)us (ell /re/ared at !er&en and conse.uently a&andoned t)e assault. Very often t)e defender )as s)ut )i%self u/ in a castle or fortified city. 0)at for centuries t)e attacker )ad fe( resources for forcing a &attle )as constituted a %aDor t)e%e of t)is &ook. "e could3 like t)e ancient *reeks or "anni&al in Italy3 de+astate t)e countryside in an effort to coerce )is o//onent to fig)t. But since in+ading ar%ies consu%ed and destroyed %uc) in t)e ordinary course of o/erations3 t)is %et)od rarely /ro+ed effecti+e3 es/ecially as defending ar%ies could often )o+er near&y and interfere (it) t)ese foraging and destructi+e acti+ities. 5r t)e intruder could3 as t)e 'renc) did se+eral ti%es in t)eir early si-teent)#century Italian ca%/aigns3 use a siege to %ake t)e ene%y fig)t. 0)is )ad t)e ad+antage of %aking t)e relie+ing ar%y assu%e t)e tactical offensi+e. $o%%anders also soug)t to acco%/lis) t)e )arder task of entra//ing an o//osing force against an o&stacle3 t)us co%/elling ca/itulation or an attack against t)e ene%y ar%y &locking t)e (ay. Prince 2d(ard attained t)is ()en )e caug)t de Montfort in 2+es)a% and 9ing "enry IV of 'rance t)oug)t )e )ad ac)ie+ed it against t)e (ily 1uke of Par%a until t)e resourceful 1uke esca/ed &y &uilding a &ridge o+er t)e ri+er. 0)e )ig)er /otential in t)is strategy of %aking an o//onent take t)e offensi+e (it) )is &ack against an i%/assa&le &arrier %atc)ed t)e greater difficulty of catc)ing e+en a %oderately alert ad+ersary. 0)e lo( ratio of force to s/ace3 ()ic) so often /re+ailed3 (ould )a+e caused %any of t)ese frustrations for t)e attacker e+en )ad ar%ies &etter %eans for ensnaring t)eir o//onent and forcing &attle. 'or t)is reason strategy often relied on destructi+e raids to e-tract /olitical concessions rat)er t)an to attain a %ilitary o&Decti+e. Strategists found an alternati+e for a successful offensi+e in a /ersisting strategy t)at de/ended on t)e ac.uisition of territory &y syste%atic con.uest of t)e cities and fortified /oints in t)e country. 0)e Ro%ans used t)is a//roac) to circu%scri&e "anni&als area of control. But t)e %et)od (orked slo(ly and3 in t)e a&sence of /olitical su//ort in t)e country3 could re.uire i%/ossi&ly large ar%ies to garrison t)e occu/ied territory. *usta+us used t)is for% of t)e /ersisting strategy ()en )e &egan )is ca%/aign in a /rotestant area of *er%any &ut t)en soug)t to do%inate %ore territory t)an )e could control and3 in conse.uence3 fell &ack on a raiding strategy e%&odying logistic and /olitical o&Decti+es as (ell as t)e goal of co%/elling t)e ene%y to fig)t.

<1C

0)e standard /rocedure of slo(ly gaining territory &y taking cities and fortifying t)e country3 ()ic) also e%&raced a logistic strategy3 dro+e t)e ene%y ar%y fro% t)e region &y in)i&iting its %o&ility and3 for t)e sa%e reason3 /rotected t)e ne(ly ac.uired areas fro% incursions if t)e ene%y ado/ted a raiding strategy. 0)is a//roac) also c)aracterised o/erations in t)e Net)erlands3 ()ere co%%anders faced t)e different /ro&le% of so %uc) force3 in t)e for% of fortifications as (ell as soldiers3 as to create a stale%ate. !)en3 as in nort)ern Italy3 Bo)e%ia3 Sa-ony3 and Silesia in t)e eig)teent) century3 generals )ad enoug) force to control t)e t)eatre &ut not enoug) to /roduce a stale%ate3 t)ey could %ake .uick /rogress (it) a /ersisting strategy in s/ite of t)eir ina&ility to coerce t)eir (eaker o//onent to fig)t. 0o do t)is suc) co%%anders as 2ugene and VendU%e a+oided t)e defenders strong /osition and in+aded and do%inated t)e area fro% ()ic) )e dre( )is su//lies3 %aking t)e defender (it)dra( to find food and fodder3 or3 as 'rederick t)e *reat felt co%/elled to do to sa+e Sa-ony ()en )e attacked t)e (ell#/re/ared 1aun at 0orgau3 fig)t a &attle on unfa+oura&le ter%s. 0)is strategy e-)i&ited t)e logistic ele%ent al%ost al(ays i%/licit in /ersisting strategy. Battles t)us nor%ally occurred &y %utual consent &ecause of t)e elusi+eness of t)e defender and usually de/ended eit)er on a difference of o/inion as to t)e likely outco%e or on /ressing /olitical necessity. nd so3 in s/ite of t)e usual /ri%acy of t)e defensi+e3 co%%anders ne+er a&andoned )o/e of a tactically decisi+e &attle t)at could gi+e t)e%3 t)roug) attrition and /syc)ological ascendancy3 /eace on t)eir ter%s or at least t)e o//ortunity to do%inate a large area a&andoned &y a (eakened and discouraged o//onent. 0)us3 generals al(ays ke/t in %ind t)e /ossi&ility of a tactical solution and la&oured to constrain t)eir ad+ersary to fig)t under disad+antageous circu%stances ()ile t)ey soug)t to engross critical /ortions of )is territory. 0)e de+elo/%ent3 during t)e (ars of t)e 'renc) Re+olution and Na/oleon3 of t)e strategy of dis/ersing ar%ies and t)e %eans of ra/id de/loy%ent fro% colu%n to line di%inis)ed t)e /ara%ount /osition of t)e strategic defensi+e &y %arkedly increasing t)e difficulties of a+oiding &attle &y ot)er %eans t)an a retreat directly to t)e rear. 0)is funda%ental c)ange also /laced in t)e )ands of t)e attacker t)e turning %o+e%ent3 ()ic)3 like entra/%ent against an o&stacle and t)e relief of a siege3 ga+e )i% t)e ad+antages of t)e tactical defensi+e. :et3 t)e strategic turning %o+e%ent offered %uc) %ore t)an t)e attrition of a (inning defensi+e &attle foug)t to co+er a siege. It )ad t)e /otential to anni)ilate t)e ene%y ar%y &y co%/elling its ca/itulation after it failed in its effort to dri+e t)e turning force fro% its /at). 0)e strategic turning %o+e%ent3 a t)e%e since t)e Na/oleonic /eriod3 e%ulates tactics3 for3 Dust as in tactics ()ere a %o+e%ent /ast an ar%ys flank to assault its rear /ro%ised great tactical re(ards3 so also did a strategic %o+e%ent to t)e ene%ys rear. Na/oleon in )is Marengo and 4l% ca%/aigns ac)ie+ed success (it) t)is turning %o+e%ent and &locked t)e defenders retreat. 0)e ustrian losses at 4l% in /risoners and stragglers ena&led t)is +ictory to rank (it) t)e %ost decisi+e of &attles. nd in t)e sa%e (ay t)e greater %o&ility of tactically offensi+e troo/s aided an attack on flank and rear3 t)e greater %o&ility of strategically offensi+e troo/s en)anced t)e c)ances of a successful turning %o+e%ent. 0)e *er%ans in t)eir 1@14 0annen&erg ca%/aign against t)e Russians used t)e railroad to carry out a strategic s)ift of troo/s to turn Sa%sono+s ar%y3 and *eneral llen&y used t)e differential %o&ility /ro+ided &y )orses to acco%/lis) t)e %o+e%ent in 1@1B and3 &y dis%ounting )is ca+alry3 ga+e t)e% t)e tactical defensi+e strengt) of infantry. But in 1@4> t)e do%inant strategic %o&ility of *er%an Pan6er and %otorised di+isions inaugurated an era of turning %o+e%ents &ased on t)e &etter strategic %o&ility of %otorised o+er foot#%arc)ing ar%ies. !it)out strategically offensi+e troo/s3 co%%anders )ad to &ase t)eir successful turning %o+e%ents on strategic sur/rise. 0)is Na/oleon ac)ie+ed in )is Marengo ca%/aign &y )is une-/ected direction of a//roac) and in t)e 4l% ca%/aign &y t)e &readt) of )is ad+ance and t)e strategic /ossi&ilities

<1B

t)is o/ened to )i%. 0)e sa%e ad+ance on a &road front ga+e Moltke )is o//ortunity to turn Ba6aine in 1BC>. $learly3 strategic sur/rise )ad %ore i%/ortance t)an tactical sur/rise and3 if only &ecause it dealt (it) greater forces3 (as likely to yield far larger re(ards. Strategic turning %o+e%ents also )ad great utility for defence against a /ersisting strategy. 0)ey could attain t)eir effect not &y t)e difficult task of actually reac)ing t)e ene%ys rear &ut %erely &y t)reatening suc) a %o+e%ent. 'aced (it) t)is %enace3 t)e ad+ancing ene%y (ould fall &ack to /rotect )i%self3 t)us &ringing on a retreat as significant in distance3 if not in ot)er results3 as if i%/osed &y a serious defeat in &attle. 0)e outstanding /ractitioner of t)is use of t)e turning %o+e%ent (as t)e $onfederate general3 R. 2. ,ee. 'or concentration against (eakness3 interior lines of o/erations3 anot)er t)e%e of t)is &ook3 offered o//ortunities &ot) to ar%ies on t)e offensi+e and to defenders for counterattacks. 0)e utility of interior lines de/ended on t)e a&ility of one side to co%/el &attle or retreat to t)e rear3 t)oug) t)e successes of $onsul Nero against "asdru&al3 of Prince 2d(ard against t)e de Montforts3 and 'rederick against Sou&ise and $)arles indicated t)at luck could su&stitute. 0o counteract t)e ene%ys /ossession of interior lines3 ()ic) ga+e )i% t)e ca/acity to concentrate in s/ace3 co%%anders soug)t to e%/loy si%ultaneous actions on e-terior lines # concentration in ti%e. 0)ese /resented difficulties3 es/ecially ()en t)e lack of a $)a//e or electric telegra/) /recluded ra/id co%%unication. Si%ultaneous actions &y distant ar%ies /ro+ed easier on t)e offensi+e ()en t)e forces could arrange t)e% &y /rior agree%ent rat)er t)an i%/ro+ising t)e ad+ances in res/onse to an ene%ys e-/loitation of interior lines. 2+en so3 distant ar%ies rarely found it con+enient to act at t)e sa%e ti%e3 and t(o forces dou&led t)e c)ances of delay. 1es/ite t)is3 9ing 8o)n of 2ngland and t)e 2%/eror 5tto acco%/lis)ed a %odest result on e-terior lines in t)eir ca%/aign against 9ing P)illi/ of 'rance3 in s/ite of t)e dilatoriness of t)e 2%/eror. 'redericks ene%ies seriously %enaced )i% in 1C<C and 1C<B3 and Na/oleons o//onents gained an i%/ressi+e and i%/ortant +ictory ()en t)ey /lanned effecti+ely and used concentration in ti%e against )i% as t)ey ulti%ately united t)eir forces at ,ei/6ig after a concentric ca%/aign. In t)e strategy to coordinate %any ca%/aigns interior lines %ay offer an i%/ortant ad+antage. In !orld !ar I3 for e-a%/le3 t)e *er%ans used t)e co%/arati+e isolation of t)eir eastern and (estern ad+ersaries to concentrate against 'rance in 1@143 Russia and Ser&ia in 1@1<3 and 'rance in 1@1=3 i%/ro+ise a concentration against Ro%ania later in 1@1=3 and strike against Italy in 1@1C. 0)e allies could )a+e used t)eir sea /o(er and t)e se/aration of *er%any and ustria#"ungary fro% t)e 5tto%an 2%/ire to %ake a %ore /o(erful and efficacious attack to dri+e t)e latter fro% t)e (ar. In !orld !ar II t)e allies took ad+antage of t)e isolation of t)eir 2uro/ean and siatic ene%ies to concentrate consistently against *er%any. Ne+ert)eless3 concentration in ti%e )as an intrinsic ad+antage o+er concentration in s/ace if terrain and ot)er conditions (ere co%/ara&le on t)e t(o fronts in+ol+ed. If3 for e-a%/le3 an ar%y of 1>>3>>> %en on interior lines o//osed t(o forces 5f <>3>>> on e-terior lines3 t)e interior ar%y could concentrate C<3>>> against one of t)e units of <>3>>>3 lea+ing 2<3>>> to )old in c)eck t)e ot)er <>3>>>. 0)is (ould gi+e t)e attacker an ad+antage of 1.< to 1. But if t)e ar%ies on e-terior lines res/onded (it) a concentration in ti%e3 one e-terior ar%y 5f <>3>>> could take t)e offensi+e against t)e )olding force of 2<3>>>3 enDoying a /redo%inance of 2 to 1 ()ile its co%/anion )ad to contend (it) a nu%erical disad+antage of only 1 to 1.<. Still3 if t)e troo/s seeking to )old )ad good fortifications or terrain es/ecially ada/ted to t)e defence3 t)ese could nullify t)e greater ratio of su/eriority. nd t)e %ore effecti+e unity of co%%and3 an i%/ortant /rinci/le of (ar and one an interior ar%y (ould &e %ore likely to )a+e3 usually confers an ad+antage on t)e interior force. 5n t)e ot)er )and3 'rederick t)e *reat3 a successful /ractitioner of concentration on interior lines3 noted anot)er disad+antage of concentration in s/ace3 a//lica&le to t)e logistics of )is day3 ()en )e

<1@

(rote: J0)ese kinds of (ars ruin t)e ar%ies &y fatigue and t)e %arc)es t)at one %ust )a+e )is %en %ake.L Not only did t)e a&ility to co%/el &attle or to force retreat directly to t)e rear gi+e %eaning to strategic concentration3 &ut t)e al%ost e-clusi+e de/endence on %issile (ea/ons of increasing range added greatly to t)e conse.uence of nu%erical /re/onderance. 0)e assu%/tion underlying ,anc)esters N#s.uare la(3 t)at e+ery soldier could co%&at e+ery ot)er3 lacked reality ()en t)e *reeks foug)t eac) ot)er )and#to#)and in dee/ for%ations. 2+en eig)teent)#century lines of %usketeers firing +olleys often failed to confor% to )is necessary su//osition. But dis/ersed ar%ies (it) long#range3 ra/id#firing (ea/ons and artillery using indirect fire ga+e aut)enticity to ,anc)esters assu%/tion and great /oint to )is conclusion t)at ()en e+ery o//osing soldier could fig)t e+ery ot)er3 t)e co%&at /o(er of ar%ies (ould +ary3 not directly3 &ut as t)e s.uare of t)eir nu%erical strengt). ccordingly3 in recent ti%es nu%erical su/eriority )as taken on greater significance and )as gi+en3 es/ecially in t)e case of dis/ersed ar%ies3 %ore i%/ort to strategic concentration3 eit)er in s/ace t)roug) e-/loitation of interior lines or in ti%e t)roug) coordinated or si%ultaneous ad+ances or attacks. 0)ese for%s of concentration of dis/ersed ar%ies )a+e offered defenders as (ell as attackers ne( o//ortunities. !it) a strategically decisi+e ratio of force to s/ace and ar%ies (it) t)e tactical ca/a&ilities and t)e dis/ersion to ensnare an o//onent ()o did not retreat directly to t)e rear3 strategic concentration in s/ace or ti%e and t)e turning %o+e%ent )a+e +irtually su/erseded t)e older %et)ods of co%&at /ersisting strategy: co%/elling t)e ene%y to fig)t &y de+astating )is territory3 forcing )i% to raise a siege3 or entra//ing )i% against an o&stacle. Back

(he Nature and 0bCectives of a )aiding Strategy

2-ce/t t)roug) aircraft3 co%&at or logistic raiding strategies )a+e )ad little /lace in 2uro/ean (arfare after its transfor%ation &y Na/oleon. But t)roug)out its long s/an &efore Na/oleon3 co%&at and logistical raids /layed a /ro%inent role and /ro+ided a %aDor t)e%e in (ar. 4sually ai%ing at ene%y econo%ic or logistic resources or at (eak3 +ulnera&le &odies of troo/s3 %ost raiders /lanned to a+oid contact (it) t)e %ain ar%y of t)eir ad+ersary and to (it)dra( once t)ey )ad done t)eir da%age. 0)ey generally retreated ()en %enaced &y t)e %ain )ostile force and3 (it) alternati+e o&Decti+es3 directed t)eir %arc)es into areas ()ere t)ey could a+oid t)e %aDor o//osing ar%y. 0)e uncertainty of t)eir goal and route of ad+ance usually /re+ented interce/tion3 and &y )a+ing ot)er lines of (it)dra(al3 t)e %arauders /ro+ed e.ually elusi+e after reac)ing t)eir target. 5n t)e offensi+e3 t)is strategy differed %uc) fro% a /ersisting strategy and its con.uest of territory as a nor%al result. 5n t)e defensi+e3 t)e raids offensi+e c)aracter contrasted (it) t)e defenders custo%ary defensi+e reliance on fortifications and (illingness to gi+e &attle only in a strong /osition as (ell as t)e (eaker defenders concern to co+er )is o(n territory rat)er t)an enter t)at controlled &y t)e ad+ersary. Many raids )ad logistic o&Decti+es3 &ut fre.uently in t)e /rocess of de+astation or carrying off &ooty t)e raiders )ad to engage in co%&at (it) ci+ilians or s%all &elligerent forces3 and3 in any case3 not)ing a&out raids confined t)en solely to logistical targets. Raiders %ig)t ai% at ene%y forces rat)er t)an t)eir su//lies. Suc) raids e-e%/lified t)e a//lication of t)e conce/t of concentration against (eakness3 and ci+ilians and3 often3 an ar%ys su//ly installations (ere (eak. 0)e Persian ca+alry strike against t)e *reek su//ly con+oy during t)e Plataea ca%/aign e-)i&ited concentration against (eakness as (ell as t)e deli&erate /ursuit of a logistic strategy. Raiders t)us e%/loyed an offensi+e strategy of concentration against (eakness. So%eti%es t)ey %arc)ed a(ay fro% t)eir ad+ersary to raid )is territory to distract )i%3 as in t)e 0)irty :ears !ar3 and stronger ar%ies used incursions as a %eans to co%/el &attle3 attacking cro/s3 /ro/erty3 or (eak

<2>

o//onents &ecause t)e ene%ys %ain force (ould not fig)t. 0)e destructi+e %arc)es of t)e *reeks and of "anni&al to coerce t)e Ro%ans to &attle also illustrated t)is o&Decti+e. But in t)e re/resentati+e cases3 ()en raiders )ad less strengt) t)an t)e ene%y3 t)ey used t)e defensi+es attri&ute of retreat to a+oid t)e ene%ys stronger forces ()ile at t)e sa%e ti%e t)ey soug)t to concentrate against t)e ene%ys (eakness. 0)e Poitiers ca%/aign e-)i&ited t)e success of a (eaker 2nglis) ar%y in eluding t)e 'renc) ()ile carrying out a ruinous foray. 0)e 'renc) only o+ertook t)e 2nglis) at Poitiers &ecause t)e 2nglis) Prince3 encu%&ered &y &ooty3 sacrificed t)e a&ility of t)e retreating force to kee/ a)ead of t)e /ursuers. t Poitiers t)e 2nglis) c)anged fro% retreat to t)e defensi+es ot)er resource3 t)e tactical defensi+e3 (on t)e &attle3 and continued t)e (it)dra(al3 triu%/)antly &ringing a(ay t)eir s/oils. "ad )e ai%ed at only destruction or at o+er()el%ing isolated 'renc) co%&at forces3 t)e 2nglis) Prince could )a+e carried out )is raid (it)out &attle. Intrinsically &etter %o&ility3 suc) as t)e Magyar lig)t ca+alry enDoyed3 facilitated a raiding strategy &ut3 as t)e Poitiers ca%/aign s)o(ed3 incursions (it) a fa+oura&le outco%e did not de/end on t)is. Ne+ert)eless3 since suc) %arauders usually lacked t)e strengt) or inclination to fig)t e+en a defensi+e &attle (it) t)e /rinci/al )ostile force3 t)ey %ore ty/ically defended t)e%sel+es (it) strategic retreat rat)er t)an t)e tactical defensi+e. So raids /ro+ided a tactically and strategically offensi+e %eans for a (eaker ad+ersary to use against a stronger. 0)e (eaker did not need to )a+e an offensi+e goal3 as did t)e 2nglis) raids in t)e "undred :ears !ar. 0)e ustrians e%/loyed t)is %et)od defensi+ely3 largely &y lig)t infantry3 to attack detac)%ents of t)e ar%y of 'rederick t)e *reat and to o+er()el% su//ly con+oy guards and destroy t)eir (agons. In t)is (ay t)e (eaker ustrians utilised raids to defeat t(o Prussian in+asions. nd t)e ustrians ado/ted raids to acco%/lis) t)is (inning logistic strategy3 e+en t)oug) t)ey defended in t)eir o(n territory and so )ad to li%it t)eir o&Decti+es to t)e Prussian ar%y rat)er t)an take t)e o//ortunity to assail far %ore +ulnera&le ci+ilians. 0)e ustrian lig)t infantrys so%e()at &etter %o&ility3 as co%/ared (it) t)e Prussian )ea+y infantry3 did /ro%ote t)eir +ictory3 e+en t)oug) t)e t(o ty/es of infantry differed little in e.ui/%ent and none in intrinsic %o&ility. 0)ese kinds of raiders3 t)erefore3 used offensi+e tactical %eans &ut co%&ined t)e% (it) t)e defensi+es strategic a&ility to retreat to engage only less /o(erful )ostile forces. Because t)e raiders %ig)t )a+e t)e c)oice of co%ing &y a nu%&er of routes and )ad a +irtually untra%%elled selection of o&Decti+es3 as long as t)e o&Decti+e )ad co%/arati+ely little co%&at strengt)3 t)e raiders usually )ad &etter ca/a&ilities for concentrating against (eakness t)an did a force /ursuing a /ersisting strategy. So its intrinsic strengt) %eant t)at eit)er attackers or defenders e%/loyed raiding as eit)er a logistic or co%&at strategy. Because of t)e co%/arati+e co%&at (eakness of t)e %eans of su//ly3 raids lent t)e%sel+es to t)e /ursuit of a logistic strategy. But3 as t)e 'renc) learned in S/ain3 raiders could concentrate against (eak co%&at forces and o+er()el% t)e% &efore reinforce%ents arri+ed. raiding strategy t)us s)ared so%e goals (it) a /ersisting strategy. s a co%&at strategy3 raiding stro+e for attrition t)roug) t)e accu%ulation of %any s%all tactical successes. 5n t)e ot)er )and3 a co%&at /ersisting strategy /lanned to acco%/lis) its attrition t)roug) (inning one or %ore i%/ortant &attles. 2ac) strategy also ai%ed to discourage t)e ene%y and con+ince )i% )e )ad slender /ros/ects for (inning t)e (ar. So ()ereas t)e +ictor in &attle often tried to follo( u/ )is success (it) a /ursuit to co%/lete t)e ruin of t)e defeated3 t)e raider i%%ediately resorted to retreat. 0)us3 instead of e-tensi+e da%age to ene%y forces and t)e usual conco%itant control of %uc) territory3 t)e raider counted only on t)e destruction of )ostile co%&at and logistic resources t)at occurred i%%ediately and de/ended on %any suc) ac)ie+e%ents for t)e %aterial and /syc)ological gains necessary to strategic success.

<21

/ersisting strategy t)at ai%ed at t)e ad+ersarys %ain force also )ad3 as a &y#/roduct3 a logistic o&Decti+e3 since t)e occu/ation of )ostile territory t)us de/ri+ed t)e ene%y of its /roduce and di+erted t)ese resources to t)e su//ort of t)e attacker. Raids could also follo( suc) an offensi+e logistic strategy &ut )a+e %uc) less effect &ecause t)ey could not deny all of t)e assets of t)e region to t)e ene%y and could3 as t)e 2nglis) difficulties (it) t)eir &ooty illustrated in t)e Poitiers ca%/aign3 turn little of t)e /roduce of t)e )ostile territory to t)e use of t)e raiding /o(er. 5n t)e defensi+e3 raids could su&stitute for a defensi+e /ersisting logistic strategy of scorc)ing t)e eart)3 as t)e $onfederates )ad s)o(n 4nion raiders. 0)is resort to logistic raids )ad /olitical as (ell as econo%ic ad+antages3 as t)e refusal of t)e Persian satra/s to de+astate t)eir country illustrated. 5f course3 t)e t(o %et)ods did not e-clude one anot)er3 and an ene%y atte%/ting to su&sist in a scorc)ed country (ould find )i%self e+en %ore +ulnera&le to forays ai%ed at t)e re%aining su//lies7 &ut raiders ()o reckoned on li+ing on t)e country (ould )a+e found t)e%sel+es seriously )andica//ed &y a /re+ious a//lication of a scorc)ed#eart) defensi+e3 logistic3 /ersisting strategy. $onse.uently3 raids )ad %uc) in co%%on (it) t)e co%&at and logistic /ersisting strategies of )a+ing t)e ene%ys %ain ar%y and territory as o&Decti+es. Still3 e-clusi+e reliance on raids3 rat)er t)an as a %eans to i%/le%ent so%e or all of a logistic ele%ent in a /ersisting strategy3 differed %arkedly fro% a /ersisting a//roac). It %eant +ictory accu%ulated t)roug) %any s%all co%&at and logistic successes3 ()ic) %ust consu%e %ore ti%e t)an one t)at (ins t)roug) decisi+e %anoeu+res3 or a fe( %aDor &attles. 0)e added ti%e and t)e resulting increase in cost %eant t)at rarely did a stronger /o(er de/end /ri%arily on raids unless it )ad suc) a lo( ratio of force to s/ace as to render i%/ractical ai%ing at t)e ene%ys %ain force and territorial con.uest. But raids did /ro+ide an offensi+e co%&at strategy for t)e (eaker3 ()ic) )e could e%/loy on t)e strategic offensi+e or defensi+e. So raids /ro+ided a less effecti+e %et)od t)an a /ersisting logistic strategy of de/ri+ing t)e ene%y of t)e &enefits of )is territory and /ro+ed +irtually ineffectual in turning t)e o//onents land and resources to t)e ad+antage of t)e raiding /o(er. :et t)ey did /ro+ide a (ay to acco%/lis) t)is o&Decti+e for a (eaker /arty3 and raids in /ursuit of a logistic strategy )ad t)e sa%e rele+ance for a stronger /o(er as (ell7 t)ey could co%/le%ent and %arkedly facilitate a /ersisting strategy &y adding a logistic ele%ent to a /ri%arily co%&at strategy. ccordingly3 raids functioned for t)e (eaker ad+ersary as a su&stitute for t)e %ore effecti+e and less costly /ersisting strategies t)at (ere &eyond t)eir strengt)3 and t)e stronger e%/loyed t)e% not only to i%/le%ent a logistic strategy &ut also to /ro+ide attrition in su//le%enting t)eir %ain strategy and to furnis) a for% of distraction as (ell. s a %aDor instru%ent for carrying out a logistic strategy3 raids )ad e.ual a//lica&ility for t)e stronger and t)e (eaker and on t)e offensi+e and t)e defensi+e. !)ereas a /ersisting defence )ad greater strengt) ()en resisting an offensi+e /ersisting strategy3 it )ad less in o//osing raiders3 e+en ()en raiders (ere (eaker t)an t)e defenders. 0)e raiders deri+ed so%e of t)eir do%inance fro% de/ri+ing t)e defenders of t)e utility of retreat3 one of t)e t(o /rinci/al resources of t)e defence. Instead3 to engage raiders (it) a co%&at /ersisting strategy3 t)e defenders )ad to resort to t)e (eaker /ursuit3 t)e raiders )a+ing a//ro/riated t)e stronger retreat. 'urt)er3 &ecause of t)e raiders &roader c)oice of o&Decti+e3 t)ey )ad &etter o//ortunities t)an a /ersisting force to concentrate against (eakness and so o+erco%e t)e /o(er of t)e tactical defence3 t)e defenders ot)er %ain resource and one t)at )e continued to retain. So in e%/loying t)eir /redo%inance on t)e offensi+e3 raiders used t)e tactical offensi+e and de/ended on concentration against (eakness3 a conce/t t)ey could readily a//ly &ecause t)ey )ad no settled o&Decti+e. 0)ey o&tained %ore of t)eir strengt) fro% t)eir ca/acity to use t)e defences

<22

strategic a&ility to retreat and3 ty/ically3 a+oided in+ol+ing t)e%sel+es in co%&at so dee/ly t)at t)ey fre.uently also enDoyed t)e tactical a&ility to retreat. :et raiders could only act on t)e strategic offensi+e: on t)e defensi+e3 t)ey (ould cease to &e raiders if t)ey /ursued ot)er raiders or atte%/ted directly to )alt a /ersisting in+asion. So t)e raiders %et)ods did not +ary &et(een t)e offensi+e and t)e defensi+e. In eit)er case t)ey acted on t)e offensi+e3 raiding t)eir ad+ersarys &ase area3 t)e source of )is strengt) and )is /lace of greatest +ulnera&ility. 2+en ()en t)ey could not reac) an o//onents source of su//ort or found t)eir o(n so t)reatened t)at t)ey felt t)ey %ust act to defend it3 raiders continued on t)e offensi+e3 directing t)eir raids against a /ersisting in+aders ar%y. In fact3 if t)ey did ot)er(ise3 t)ey (ould deny t)eir essence and cease to &e raiders &ecause (it)out attack t)ey could not e-ecute a raid. If t(o ad+ersaries eac) e%/loyed a raiding strategy against t)e origin of t)e ot)ers sustenance3 t)e outco%e (ould de/end on t)eir relati+e strengt)s and t)e co%/arati+e +ulnera&ilities of t)eir &ase areas as (ell as /olitical and ot)er factors. If one of t)e o//onents )ad an e-/osed source of %aintenance and t)e ot)er did not3 t)en t)e +ulnera&le contestant could not /ursue a raiding strategy against )is /rotected o//onent. 0)e /ersisting defensi+e (ould offer t)e only alternati+e for% of (arfare against suc) raids. 0)e Viking incursions o+er t)e seas into !estern 2uro/e illustrated t)is3 as did t)ose of t)e Magyars3 issuing fro% re%ote "ungary. Raids traditionally )ad /olitical and econo%ic as (ell as %ilitary o&Decti+es. 0)e *reeks ado/ted raids as a (ay to destroy cro/s to e-tract /olitical concessions7 t)e Vikings used t)e% for econo%ic ends3 and t)e 2nglis) in t)e "undred :ears !ar for &ot) reasons. r%ies )a+e utilised t)e% (it) little else in %ind t)an to li+e at t)e ene%ys e-/ense. Raids )ad a /articular +alue in /ro+iding a %eans of defence to a contestant ()o (as too (eak in nu%&ers or (ea/on syste%s e+en to e%/loy t)e tactical ad+antage of t)e defence against frontal attacks in resisting )is o//onents %ain force. So3 ironically3 too (eak to use t)e tactical defensi+e3 t)is defender ado/ted t)e tactical offensi+e in raids against a +astly stronger ene%y3 ()o% )e lacked t)e /o(er to resist in &attle3 to attain )is strategically defensi+e ai%. 5f course3 t)e (eaker could do t)is &ecause t)e offensi+ely stronger raid )ad3 as a /art of its essence as a transitory o/eration3 t)e a&ility to reckon on strategic retreat. But a (eaker contestant (ould ne+er )a+e reasona&ly a+ailed )i%self of raids for defence (ere )e strong enoug) to %eet t)e ene%y in &attle and trust to t)e /ri%acy of t)e defence in (it)standing frontal attacks. 5nly if too (eak to face t)e ene%y in defensi+e &attle (ould )e )a+e used raids3 &ecause3 &y not resisting t)e ene%y directly3 )e e-/osed )is country to )ostile incursions3 encroac)%ent3 and e+en /artial or co%/lete occu/ation. 0)is c)oice +ery likely in+ol+ed a longer and %ore costly (ar. In su%%ary3 t)e stronger contestant resorted to raids for t)e follo(ing /ur/oses: to gain econo%ically7 to e-tract /olitical concessions7 to de/lete or destroy ene%y su//lies7 to li+e at t)e ene%ys e-/ense7 and to co%/el &attle. 0)e (eaker turned to raids for t)e follo(ing /ur/oses: to gain econo%ically7 to e-tract /olitical concessions7 to de/lete or destroy ene%y su//lies7 to li+e at t)e ene%ys e-/ense7 and to su&stitute for &attle. Back

<2?

Guerrilla Warfare as an #''lication of )aiding Strategy

!)en t)e (eaker e%/loyed raids as a %eans of co%&at strategy3 )e often utilised t)e% to e-ert /olitical /ressure3 attack ene%y su//lies3 and li+e at )is ad+ersarys e-/ense. 0)e (eaker could also co%&ine t)e essentially logistic ty/es of raids (it) a co%&at /ersisting strategy in ()ic) )e counted on using t)e tactical /o(er of t)e defence. !)en t)e inferior &elligerent did not rely /ri%arily on t)e tactical /o(er of t)e defence and ado/ted so%e or all of t)e classes of raids3 )e engaged in guerrilla (arfare3 ()ic) constitutes anot)er t)e%e of t)is &ook. Suc) (arfare could include eit)er or &ot) co%&at and logistic strategies3 &ut3 to %eet t)e definition3 it could not e%&race a /rinci/al de/endence on t)e tactical /o(er of t)e defence in resisting t)e strongers attacks. Instead3 t)e (eaker reckoned on t)e defences /o(er to retreat. nd t)e raiders did not need to retreat &y (it)dra(al or dis/ersal7 t)ey could discard t)eir unifor%s3 &lend in (it) t)e /eo/le around t)e%3 and &eco%e indistinguis)a&le fro% ci+ilians. In action3 t)e guerrilla (arfare raiding strategy utilised t)e offensi+e /rinci/le of concentration against (eakness. 2-e%/lified in %odern ti%es in t)e S/anis) resistance to Na/oleon3 guerrillas3 %arkedly inferior in force to t)eir o//onents3 a+oided t)e )ostile %ain ar%ies and t)eir strong detac)%ents and directed t)eir efforts to(ard s%all3 isolated garrisons and (eakly guarded su//ly de/ots and con+oys. 0)ese t)ey attacked and soug)t to o+er()el%3 and t)en t)ey retreated /ro%/tly to a+oid contact (it) ene%y reinforce%ents. 0)ey also destroyed un/rotected logistic installations3 suc) as &ridges. In an assault on a s%all garrison3 t)ey /ursued an e-clusi+ely co%&at strategy. !)en t)ey c)ose a (agon train and its guards3 t)ey )ad &ot) a logistic and a co%&at o&Decti+e. In (recking an undefended &ridge t)ey )ad only a logistic /ur/ose. *uerrillas )ad great o//ortunities for sur/rise3 &ot) strategically and tactically. raiding strategy o&+iously facilitated sur/rise3 as raiders )ad no settled line of o/erations7 nor o&+ious o&Decti+e. 2ne%y troo/s on t)e %arc) /resented a +ulnera&le target for une-/ected attacks. But guerrilla (arfare de/ended on t)e ene%ys )a+ing a s%all ratio of force to s/ace. If t)e )ostile ar%y )ad enoug) strengt) to de/loy its troo/s in a continuous line3 it +irtually sealed its front against any &ut a %aDor attack and /rotected its e-/osed rear against raiders. !it) ade.uate security to defend its line against attacks &y t)e ene%ys /rinci/al force3 t)e continuous front offered no %ore +ulnera&ility to t)e forays of %arauders t)an to any attacks &y a s%all force. n ar%y strong enoug) to fortify and garrison %ost routes of co%%unication in a 6one of occu/ation also seriously )andica//ed a raiding strategy &y li%iting t)e guerrillas routes of ad+ance and e+asion and e-/osed t)e guerrillas to t)e danger of &eing o+ertaken on one of t)eir incursions. 0errain /layed a +ital role in t)e conduct of guerrilla (arfare. 4n%ounted guerrillas facing %ounted (ea/on syste%s still o/erated effecti+ely in %ountainous or (ooded country &ecause of its in)os/itality to %en on )orse&ack. Because of t)e co+er and conceal%ent and t)e usually less (ell#de+elo/ed roads in t)ese areas3 guerrillas often found suc) terrain a %ore ad+antageous /lace to o/erate against %ore /o(erful o//onents ()ose greater nu%&ers %ig)t in)i&it t)e ra/idity of t)eir %o+e%ents. 0)e success of t)e !els) against t)e 2nglis)3 like t)at of t)e S/anis) against t)e 'renc)3 e-)i&ited t)e +alue of terrain to guerrillas. *uerrillas re.uired a &ase. lt)oug) t)ey traditionally li+ed /artially at t)eir ene%ys e-/ense # &ecause of t)eir raids against su//ly de/ots and con+oys3 guerrillas still needed a /lace t)at /ro+ided t)e% an assured source of su//lies3 suc) as Minas secluded area and /o(der factory. !it)out suc) a &ase3 t)e need for food3 fuel3 e.ui/%ent3 and a%%unition (ould do%inate t)eir o/erations3 /lace a se+ere constraint &ot) on t)eir %o+e%ents and t)eir c)oice of o&Decti+es for t)eir raids3 and could dri+e t)e% fro% one raid to anot)er in searc) of su//lies until t)ey )ad e-)austed t)eir /)ysical and /syc)ological resources. In addition3 a &ase /ro+ided a /lace for rest and recu/eration and a /oint to ()ic) t)ey could retreat. 0)us3 t)e &ase )ad to &e reasona&ly secure

<24

fro% ene%y attack. 0)e )ig)er and %ore rugged /art of !ales su//lied suc) a location to t)e defenders against 2nglis) in+asions. *uerrillas needed to conduct t)eir o/erations a%ong a /eo/le ()o (ere not o+ertly )ostile to t)e%. /o/ulace anti/at)etic to t)e raiders increased t)e ratio of t)e strongers force to s/ace. 2+en "anni&al failed under suc) conditions. So3 like %any ot)er %ilitary situations3 guerrilla (arfare )ad an i%/ortant /olitical re.uisite. *uerrilla (arfare )ad as its o&Decti+e t)e defeat of t)e ene%y3 eit)er /)ysically or /syc)ologically3 t)roug) t)e accu%ulation of %any s%all co%&at +ictories of attrition and logistical successes against )is su//lies. Victory could take t)e for% of t)e ene%ys a&andoning )is efforts entirely or )is decreasing t)e a%ount of land )e soug)t to do%inate. 0)is reduction (ould gi+e t)e guerrillas co%/lete control of a ne( area3 ena&ling t)e%3 as it did t)e S/anis) guerrillas3 to e-/and t)eir &ase and t)e region fro% ()ic) t)ey could dra( recruits for t)eir forces. !it) t)ese additional %en t)ey %ig)t )a+e gained t)e necessary strengt) to o+erco%e t)at ()ic) t)e ene%y could )a+e added &y increasing )is ratio of a+aila&le nu%&ers to t)e s/ace of t)e contracted area. *uerrillas t)us /ursued a distincti+e kind of logistic strategy in t)at t)e do%ination of additional3 /olitically sy%/at)etic territory aug%ented t)eir su//lies and forces. But suc) success need not )a+e di%inis)ed t)e ene%ys co%&at ca/a&ilities /ro/ortionately3 &ecause3 like t)e 'renc) in Morocco3 )e often dre(3 or could dra( t)e &ulk of )is re+enues3 su//lies3 and recruits fro% a &ase area &eyond t)e contested region. "y/ot)etically3 t)is /rocess of strengt)ening t)e guerrillas could )a+e continued until t)e guerrillas )ad t)e %ore /o(erful force and could a&andon raids in fa+our of an offensi+e /ersisting strategy3 ()ic) (ould yield a .uicker decision. Suc) an outco%e (ould )a+e de/ended on /olitical su//ort for t)e guerrillas in t)e areas a&andoned &y t)e ene%y. 'or t)e sa%e reason3 t)e ene%y could not )a+e defended (it) guerrilla (arfare against a /ersisting strategy &ecause )e (ould lack t)e /olitical &ase necessary for t)e i%/le%entation of t)is strategy. Back

+efence and 0ffence against Guerrilla Warfare

1efenders )a+e often relied on t)e co%&at strategy of ai%ing at t)e raiders &y /itting /ursuit against uni%/eded retreat. Ne+ert)eless3 a co%&at strategy offered %ore /ro%ise t)an a logistic strategy &ecause raiders lacked co%%unications to attack and a scorc)ed#eart) defensi+e logistic strategy often (as difficult to a//ly against raiders &ecause of t)e a%&iguity of t)eir o&Decti+e. 'or t)(arting raids (it) econo%ic o&Decti+es3 t)e Ro%ans and By6antines soug)t to ca/ture t)e raiders &y in)i&iting t)eir %o+e%ent t)roug) t)e control of t)e focal /oints of co%%unications and &y trying to interce/t t)eir (it)dra(al. 0)e frontier (alls t)at t)e Ro%ans &uilt )el/ed &ar a retreat after t)e &ar&arians )ad crossed t)e% on t)e in(ard /art of t)eir foray3 and t)e %ountain /asses of By6antine natolia facilitated t)is strategy. 0)e fortification of t)e frontier and t)e co%%unication )u&s as (ell as suc) %easures for a defence in de/t) as t)e Ro%ans (alling t)eir interior cities added t)e ca/ital of strong)olds and (alls to t)e la&our of soldiers and %ilitia and increased t)e ratio of force to s/ace3 ()ic) furt)er )a%/ered raiders. 0)e large resources e%/loyed to defend against raiders often s%all in nu%&ers illustrated t)e do%inance of raiding o+er a /ersisting defensi+e strategy. 'ortifying co%%unication focal /oints and (alling cities in a sense &arricaded t)e ()ole country and constrained t)e raiders in a %anner co%/ara&le to t)e (ay defensi+e (orks of t)e si-teent)3 se+enteent)3 and eig)teent) centuries in "olland and Belgiu% &locked t)e %o+e%ent of ar%ies. 5f course3 t)ey did not restrict raiders to t)e degree to ()ic) t)ese fortifications in t)is t)ickly settled area usually sto//ed in+ading ar%ies and reduced t)eir o/erations to a series of sieges3 &ut t)e conce/t and t)e effect )as o&+ious /arallels.

<2<

Victi%s of Viking and Magyar incursions used si%ilar strategies3 e-ce/t in 'rance after t)e Vikings settled in Nor%andy. By doing t)is t)e Vikings %o+ed t)eir &ase area fro% o+erseas to a location i%%ediately accessi&le to t)e )ea+y ca+alry of t)e 'ranks. 0)e 'ranks t)en attacked t)e Vikings &ase area (it) counter#raids and3 &ecause t)e Vikings )ad /ri%arily an econo%ic %oti+ation3 t)ese raised t)e cost of furt)er Viking raids a&o+e t)e &enefits t)ey /roduced. 0)is )alted any furt)er aggressi+e acti+ity &y t)e Vikings and /roduced a /olitical acco%%odation &et(een t)e ad+ersaries. Because guerrilla (arfare usually )ad a /olitical %oti+ation3 it often /resented to t)e defender a %ore serious /ro&le%3 as /olitical goals fre.uently /ro+ided a stronger induce%ent t)an econo%ic ones. In addition3 guerrillas usually functioned in areas /olitically sy%/at)etic to t)e%3 ()ereas %ost econo%ically ins/ired raids occurred in )ostile regions. Instead of trying to co%&at t)e elusi+eness of raiders &y /ursuing t)e% as t)ey retreated3 t)e defenders follo(ed t)e sa%e %odel as t)ose ()o resisted econo%ically %oti+ated raiders &y attacking t)e guerrillas re.uisites3 a /lan t)at offered t)e &est %eans of dealing (it) t)e incursions of raiders. In Bactria and Sogdiana le-ander t)e *reat relied /ri%arily on in)i&iting t)e %o&ility of guerrillas &y controlling t)e focal /oints of co%%unications and under%ining t)eir /olitical su//ort &y )is %arriage to Ro-ana. 0)ese t(o %easures sufficed to defeat t)e %ain guerrilla resistance in t(o years. !it)out t)is /olitical co%/onent3 t)e 'renc) failed in S/ain. le-anders situation differed fro% t)at of t)e defenders against econo%ic raiders in t)at )e )ad taken t)e offensi+e in )is initial in+asion of Bactria and Sogdiana. :et in occu/ying &ut not su&duing t)e country nor in de/ri+ing t)e guerrillas of t)eir &ase area3 )e t)en found )i%self on t)e defensi+e and suffering fro% t)e (eakness of a /ersisting defence against a raiding strategy. :et t)e defensi+e did gi+e )i% control of co%%unication )u&s along +alleys or ri+er +erges and t)e conse.uent a&ility to in)i&it t)e %o+e%ents of t)e guerrillas. "is %et)od differed little in conce/t fro% t)e Britis) in Sout) frica3 ()o found t)e%sel+es o/erating on a largely le+el and treeless terrain. 0)e Britis) used t)eir a%/le resources to erect <3>>> %iles of &ar&ed (ire studded (it) @3>>> &lock)ouses3 ()ic) effecti+ely in)i&ited t)e %o+e%ent of t)e Boer raiders and rendered t)e% +ulnera&le to /ursuit. 5t)er e-a%/les of an in+asion resisted &y guerrilla (arfare follo(ed a different %odel3 and3 t)oug) initially lacking t)e defences o//ortunity to facilitate /ursuit &y i%/eding t)e guerrillas %o&ility3 )ad t)e ad+antage of )a+ing far %ore affinity (it) a logistic strategy. nd3 against a defender using raids and its /o(erful ele%ent3 retreat3 an attacker could not e-/ect a co%&at strategy3 necessarily relying on /ursuit3 to )a+e as %uc) /ro%ise of success as a logistic strategy. 0o a//ly a logistic strategy against raiders in+ol+ed eit)er t)e use of raids against t)eir &ase area or t)e /ersistent occu/ation of territory. But to take t)e offensi+e against raiders re.uired access to t)eir &ase area3 ()ic) %edie+al defenders against Viking and Magyar raiders lacked until t)e Vikings settled in Nor%andy. "ere3 &ecause of t)e strengt) of t)e Vikings in co%&at and t)e /o(er of t)e %edie+al defence3 t)e 'renc) (isely used a raiding strategy to e-tract /olitical concessions rat)er t)an atte%/ting a /ersisting strategy. 0)e 2nglis) con.uest of !ales e-e%/lified t)e strengt) of a /ersisting3 in)erently logistic strategy directed into t)e defenders &ase area3 as (ell as t)e difficulties t)e stronger /o(er could encounter in co/ing (it) t)is kind of o//osition. Rat)er t)an fig)ting a fe( %aDor &attles3 losing to t)e 2nglis)3 and t)en su&%itting3 as %uc) of t)e Persian 2%/ire )ad done ()en le-ander in+aded3 t)e !els) foug)t t)eir in+ader in t)e sa%e (ay as )ad t)e Bactrians and Sogdianians. But t)e 2nglis) situation differed fro% le-anders in t)at t)ey used t)eir /ersisting strategy on t)e offensi+e rat)er t)an t)e defensi+e.

<2=

!it)out t)e force needed to atte%/t t)e occu/ation of t)e country at one stroke3 as )ad le-ander3 t)e 2nglis) (ent a)ead slo(ly3 follo(ing a /ersisting strategy and using a %et)od t)at )ad %any analogies (it) t)at of t)e guerrillas on t)e offensi+e. !)ereas guerrillas on t)e offensi+e stro+e to (in &y accu%ulating %any s%all co%&at and logistical acco%/lis)%ents3 t)e 2nglis)3 dis/laying of necessity t)e sa%e /atience3 (on &y t)e gradual accretion of s%all &its of territory. In t)eir deli&erate and t)oroug) /rocedures t)e 2nglis) )ad %uc) in co%%on (it) t)e Ro%ans (ay of con.uest. But no ot)er tec)ni.ue (ould likely )a+e (orked as (ell in +ie( of t)e +irulence of t)e o//osition and t)e in)os/ita&leness of t)e %ountainous terrain to t)e )ea+y ca+alry (ea/on syste%3 one t)at /layed so /ro%inent a /art in t)e 2nglis) forces. Nor did t)e 2nglis) )a+e any suc) ready /olitical resource3 like le-anders %arriage3 for %itigating t)e 6eal of t)eir ene%ies. raiding3 or counter#raiding3 strategy offered little /ro%ise to t)e 2nglis)3 not only &ecause raids (ould )a+e failed to o+erco%e t)e /olitical )ostility of t)e !els) &ut also &ecause of t)eir difficult e-ecution. ll of t)e unsu&dued3 %ountainous country constituted t)e !els) &ase area3 and its rugged3 often o&structed3 terrain %ade raids difficult. 'urt)er3 t)e 2nglis) raiders (ould )a+e trou&le striking at t)e !els) &ecause t)eir elusi+e o//onent (ould dri+e off t)eir flocks and lea+e fe( settled +illages for t)e 2nglis) to &urn. ,ong &efore3 t)e Persian 9ing3 1arius I )ad faced a si%ilar /ro&le% ()en )e soug)t to %ake no%adic ad+ersaries fig)t )i%. 'inally3 t)e e-as/erated 9ing sent a %essenger to t)e% asking ()y t)ey (ould not fig)t. 0)e no%adic leader re/lied3 %y /eo/le )a+e Jneit)er to(ns nor culti+ated lands3 ()ic) %ig)t induce us t)roug) fear of t)eir &eing taken or ra+aged3 to &e in any )urry to fig)t you.L So t)e 2nglis) )ad to rely on t)e /ersisting strategy of i%/eding t)e %o&ility of t)eir ad+ersaries and increasing t)e ratio of force to s/ace. 0)ey acco%/lis)ed t)e latter &y concentrating in a single3 s%all area t)at t)ey could co%%and. 0)ey aug%ented t)eir strengt) &y &uilding castles3 and &y /lacing t)e% ()ere t)ey controlled t)e easiest route of co%%unication3 t)ey used t)e% to )inder t)e %o+e%ents of t)e !els). 4sually t)ey )ad li%ited t)eir efforts to t)e le+el terrain ()ere t)eir ca+alry could function3 &ut in do%inating t)e %ost fertile agricultural regions3 t)ey e%/loyed a logistic strategy against t)e !els) &y confining t)e% to t)e less /roducti+e %ountains. Sustained and a//arently irre+ersi&le control of a +alley gradually reconciled its in)a&itants to 2nglis) rule3 as t)e castle and t)e strong forces t)e 2nglis) /laced t)ere restrained !els) raiders. 0)is de+elo/%ent3 in %any res/ects /olitical and to a degree econo%ic and cultural3 ena&led t)e 2nglis) to e-tend t)eir %ilitary control to anot)er s%all /art of !ales and t)en re/eat t)e /rocess. 'urt)er3 t)e success of t)e 2nglis) in one +alley aug%ented t)eir strengt) for t)eir ca%/aign in t)e ne-t &ecause t)ey )ad added t)e re+enues and resources of t)e con.uered territory to t)ose t)ey already /ossessed. lso t)ey reinforced t)eir ar%y &y t)e addition of t)e indigenous !els) s/ear%en and long&o(%en3 useful in &attle as (ell as in t)e defence of castles. 0)is a//roac) also e-e%/lified t)e logistic ele%ent in a /ersisting strategy. !it) t)e i%/licit total /olitical o&Decti+e of a co%/lete con.uest of !ales /itted against t)e !els)s strong co%%it%ent against suc) su&Dugation3 ac.uisition of so%e territory could not co%/el a concession of /olitical de%ands nor a//arently de%oralise t)e ene%y and di% )is )o/es for +ictory enoug) to secure )is .uick su&Dection. But territory taken fro% t)e !els) di%inis)ed t)eir resources of %ilitary %an/o(er and ulti%ately ga+e t)e 2nglis) %an/o(er as (ell as %aterial resources. 0)us3 e-ce/t in t)e initial con.uest and in t)eir defence against raids3 t)e 2nglis) follo(ed an in)erently logistic strategy in /itting t)eir incre%ental /ersisting strategy against t)e !els)3 ()o could only co%&at t)e 2nglis) (it) raids.

<2C

So t)e 2nglis) attained t)eir goal in s/ite of t)eir a//arent +ulnera&ility to t)e guerrilla (arfare of t)e !els)3 ()ic) did not differ in essence fro% t)e raids of t)e Vikings. :et3 unlike t)e Vikings3 t)e !els) suffered defeat &ecause of t)e +ulnera&ility of t)eir &ase area to t)e 2nglis) offensi+e /ersisting strategy. 0)us t)e ad+ersaries eac) assu%ed t)e offensi+e &ut (it) different strategies. 0)e !els) suffered a se+ere )andica/3 des/ite t)eir a+oidance of t)e 2nglis) co%&ined#ar%s ar%ies and t)eir a//lication of raids3 &ecause t)e raiders a&ility to concentrate against (eakness de/ended on t)eir al%ost co%/letely untra%%elled c)oice of o&Decti+e. :et to resist t)e intrusion of t)e 2nglis) into a s%all /art of !ales i%%ediately circu%scri&ed t)e !els) c)oice of o&Dect7 unless t)ey resorted to raids into already carefully defended 2ngland or t)e /arts of !ales ()ere t)e con.uerors )ad already consolidated t)eir rule3 t)e !els) )ad to direct t)eir raids against t)e s%all area t)e ene%y )ad recently occu/ied and fortified (it) one or %ore castles. In a country ()ere researc)ers )a+e identified ?>> castle sites3 one for e+ery t(enty#fi+e s.uare %iles3 t)e ne(ly o+errun region offered t)e %ost /ro%ise for raids unless t)e 2nglis)3 in %o+ing too fast and atte%/ting to engross %ore territory t)an t)ey could readily do%inate3 )ad left +ulnera&le areas &e)ind t)eir ad+ance. But in t)e ne(ly lost territory3 (it) t)eir target o&+ious3 t)e ratio of force to s/ace +ery )ig)3 t)e tactical defence /o(erful in its castles3 and t)e easy co%%unication routes do%inated &y t)e 2nglis)3 t)e !els) )ad lost %any of t)e attri&utes t)at %ade raiding stronger t)an a /ersisting defence. By using an offensi+e /ersisting strategy and concentrating in successi+e s%all areas3 t)e 2nglis) could defend &ecause t)ey )ad a )ig) ratio of force to s/ace in t)e ne(ly con.uered locality. 'urt)er3 t)e ()ole strategy attacked t(o ot)er guerrilla re.uisites3 a &ase area and /olitical su//ort3 &ecause t)e 2nglis) not only gradually encroac)ed u/on t)e !els) &ase &ut also in t)e /rocess (on t)e ac.uiescence3 if not t)e allegiance3 of t)e in)a&itants &roug)t under t)eir s(ay. 0)us t)e offensi+e3 &y its concentration3 o+erca%e t)e disad+antages of defending o+er a &roader3 %ore t)inly )eld front ()ere t)e raiders )ad a (ide c)oice of ai%s. 'urt)er3 concentration decisi+ely de/ri+ed t)e !els) of t)e con.uered region as a &ase3 and t)e strong 2nglis) /resence furt)ered t)eir /olitical3 econo%ic3 and cultural i%/erialis% in a (ay t)at less control o+er %ore territory could not. 0)e defenders against Vikings3 on t)e ot)er )and3 ne+er )ad t)e certainty of t)e raiders goals nor t)e ratio of force to s/ace t)at t)e 2nglis) enDoyed. 'urt)er3 t)e in+aders of !ales )ad t)e ad+antage of t)e strategic offensi+e into t)e )ostile &ase area (it) eac) ad+ance of t)eir /ersisting logistic strategy (eakening t)e !els) and strengt)ening t)e 2nglis). By conducting t)eir offensi+e so as to nullify t)e ad+antages of raiding3 "ug) t)e 'at of $)ester and t)e ot)er &order 2arls )ad success3 ()ile t)e kings ()o ad+anced into !ales (it) &ig ar%ies3 atte%/ting a co%&at strategy3 si%/ly de%onstrated t)e /ri%acy of retreat o+er /ursuit. !)en t)e astute 9ing 2d(ard I used t)e great /o(er of )is %onarc)y to i%/le%ent t)e logistic strategy long e%/loyed &y t)e local 2arls3 )e .uickly o+er()el%ed t)e re%aining !els) resistance. 0o su%%arise t)e ca/a&ilities and +ulnera&ilities of raiders3 raiders are stronger on t)e offence3 ()en t)e ratio of force to s/ace is lo(3 against an ad+ersary /ursuing a /ersisting strategy and3 ()en raiders o//ose one anot)er3 neit)er )as an ad+antage unless one can reac) t)e ad+ersarys &ase area and t)e ot)er cannot. 0)us3 t)e c)aracteristics of a raiding strategy de/ri+e t)e defence of t)e /redo%inance it enDoys &et(een o//onents using /ersisting strategies. 0)e do%inance of raiders )inged3 )o(e+er3 on certain conditions. !)en t)ey )ad a &ase area secure fro% eit)er raids or a /ersisting strategy3 t)ey used t)e defences resource of retreat to a+oid t)e ene%y and took ad+antage of )is lo( ratio of force to s/ace and t)e a%&iguity of t)e raiders o&Decti+e to concentrate against (eakness. 0)is co%/elled t)e defenders to &ank on a co%&at strategy of /itting /ursuit against retreat and atte%/ting to /rotect t)e%sel+es e+ery()ere3 &ot) /articularly difficult (it) a lo( ratio of force to s/ace. !it) a )ig) ratio of force to s/ace3 )o(e+er3 <2B

t)e raiders found t)eir %o+e%ents in)i&ited and t)e defenders in great nu%&ers at %any strong /oints. !)en t)e raiders )ad a +ulnera&le &ase area3 )o(e+er3 t)e defenders could assu%e t)e offensi+e eit)er &y counter#raids3 ()ic) (ould offset t)ose of t)e raiders3 or &y a /ersisting in+asion. !it) a sufficiently )ig) ratio of force to s/ace3 t)e co%&at /ersisting strategy could count on defeating t)e raiders &ecause t)ey (ould find fe( +ulnera&le o&Decti+es and face a serious )a6ard fro% /ursuit cou/led (it) i%/edi%ents to retreat. 'urt)er3 (it) t)eir &ase engulfed3 t)e raiders (ould soon /eris) fro% lack of su//lies and res/ite fro% %o+e%ent. If t)e in+ader of t)e raiders &ase area lacked sufficient force to occu/y it (it) an ade.uate ratio of force to s/ace to e-ecute suc) a ca%/aign3 )e could acco%/lis) t)e sa%e goal &y taking %ore ti%e. In t)is3 )e relied on an incre%ental a//roac) of creating a )ig) ratio of force to s/ace in t)e successi+e areas selected for con.uest. In defending eac) suc) area3 t)e )ig) ratio of force to s/ace (ould confront t)e raiders e+ery()ere (it) strengt) and i%/ede t)eir retreat. 'urt)er3 it usually re%o+ed a%&iguity a&out t)e raiders o&Decti+e &ecause t)e /ros/ecti+e loss of a /ortion of t)eir &ase area nor%ally induced t)e raiders to attack t)e area of recent con.uest rat)er t)an continue raids into t)e in+aders o(n &ase area. 0)us3 after t)e 2nglis) &egan t)eir /enetration of !ales3 t)e !els) concentrated on defending t)eir &ase area and rarely raided t)e strongly defended 2nglis) &order areas. 0)us t)e strengt) of a raiding strategy de/ended in /art on t)e +ulnera&ility of t)e region used as a &ase. 0)is re.uires di+iding raiders into t(o classes3 as s)o(n in t)e sc)e%atic &elo(3 ()ic) e-)i&its t)e co%/arati+e strengt)s of raiding and /ersisting strategies3 using M to %ean do%inance on t)e attack and M1 to stand for greater strengt) on t)e defence. 0)e relations in t)e sc)e%atic assu%e a ratio of force to s/ace lo( enoug) for raiders to function3 Dust as t)ese relations also deri+e fro% t)e assu%/tions of t)e tactical /ri%acy of t)e defensi+e and t)e ascendancy of strategic retreat o+er /ursuit.

)om arison of the Strengths of ,aiding and Persisting Strategies Back

0)is co%/arison &et(een /ersisting and raiding strategies )as analogies in o/erations not e-/licitly related to guerrilla (arfare3 &ut t)at in+ol+e raiding or %erely e+asi+e o//onents. 0)e /ersisting strategy used in !ales )ad %uc) in co%%on (it) t)at introduced &y "enry V in t)e latter stages of t)e "undred :ears !ar ()en t)e 2nglis) slo(ly and syste%atically con.uered3 garrisoned3 and su&dued territory in nort)ern 'rance. 0)e 2nglis) %et)od also found /arallels (it) *usta+us dol/)uss /ersisting strategy in nort) *er%any. $onfronted (it) an ad+ersary ()o could %o+e at (ill o+er %uc) of *er%any and ()o raided to de/lete t)e resources of )ostile Princes and to su&sist at t)e e-/ense of )is o//onents3 *usta+us used a %et)od of con.uering and fortifying t)e cities and trans/ortation )u&s t)at )ad %uc) in co%%on (it) t)at of t)e 2nglis) in !ales. 'aced (it) a /ro&le% t)at )ad analogies (it) t)at of t)e 2nglis)3 )e used a co%/ara&le a//roac). 0)oug) it dealt (it) a different issue3 a si%ilar incre%ental /ersisting strategy c)aracterised %uc) (arfare in t)e region of Belgiu% and "olland. 0)e offensi+e /ersisting strategy of gradually occu/ying and

<2@

fortifying t)e country /ro+ided a certain antidote to an elusi+e ene%y t)at t)e co%/act3 slo(# de/loying ar%ies of an earlier day could not &ring to &attle. lt)oug) /ossessing t)e greater financial and %ilitary resources of t)eir (ealt)y and /o(erfully ar%ed re/u&lic as (ell as t)e /olitical strengt) of re/resenting t)e Sultan3 t)e 'renc) deli&erately e%/loyed in t)eir con.uest of Morocco in t)e t(entiet) century a /ersisting strategy identical to t)at t)e 2nglis) )ad used in !ales. Slo(ly occu/ying successi+e lo(land areas first3 t)ey /ursued t)e sa%e /atient strategy and often e-erted t)e sa%e logistic /ressures against t)eir o//onents in t)e %ountains. 0)ey also follo(ed a calculated /rogra% of reconciling t)e Moroccans to t)eir rule &y su//lying free %edical ser+ice and selling goods at su&sidised /rices. 0)ey recruited Moroccans into t)eir ar%y3 and Moroccan troo/s under 'renc) co%%and soon co%/rised t)e &ulk of t)e forces used to e-tend 'renc) do%ination o+er ot)er areas. !it) a unified3 sustained ca%/aign t)e 'renc)3 at considera&le financial cost3 t)us s/read t)eir control o+er t)e +ast e-tent of Morocco in t(enty# si- years3 co%/ared (it) t)e t(o centuries t)e s/oradic3 /artial3 and occasionally %isdirected 2nglis) effort re.uired to con.uer t)e far s%aller area of !ales. 0)e 'renc) did not use t)e 2nglis) strategy as a conscious %odel3 &ut t)ey )ad disco+ered earlier in lgeria t)e difficulty of seeking a .uick decision t)roug) a co%&at /ersisting strategy against t)eir o//onents. lgerian guerrillas )ad al%ost al(ays eluded 'renc) forces sent to defeat t)e% in &attle. But t)e lgerians e+entually succu%&ed to a logistic raiding strategy and its conco%itant terror3 t)oug) t)e 'renc) /u&lic found suc) a %et)od re/ugnant. 0)e slo( /rocedure of using successi+e )ig) ratios of force to s/ace3 cou/led (it) /olitical induce%ents3 /ro+ed far %ore effecti+e and )ad &eco%e t)e standard 'renc) a//roac) &y t)e ti%e t)ey undertook t)e con.uest of Morocco. 0)e strategy of t)e 'renc) included t)e sa%e logistic ele%ent found in t)at of t)e 2nglis) ()en t)ey di%inis)ed t)e ene%ys strengt) &y occu/ying )is territory and t)en )arnessed )is )u%an and %aterial resources to t)e 'renc) %ilitary effort. It dis/layed t)e sa%e /atience and )ad %uc) in co%%on (it) t)e results of a successful guerrilla ad+ance. s guerrillas added to t)eir territory ()en t)ey )ad co%/elled t)eir o//onent to contract )is area of o/eration3 so t)e 'renc) in Morocco and t)e 2nglis) in !ales gradually aug%ented t)eir strengt) and attenuated t)at of t)eir o//onents. *uerrilla (arfare necessarily constituted a /rotracted (ay of (ar and t)ose o//osing it also /roceeded slo(ly. 8ust as guerrilla (arfare (as costly3 &ecause it took a long ti%e and %ig)t e-/ose so%e or all of t)e defending country to )ostile occu/ation3 so too (as t)e tec)ni.ue of co%&ating it e-/ensi+e3 in ter%s of ti%e and t)erefore of %an/o(er as calculated &y t)e nu%&er of %en %ulti/lied &y t)e nu%&er of years t)ey %ust ca%/aign. *uerrillas (ould not use t)at %et)od (ere t)ey strong enoug) to face t)e in+aders in &attle3 and t)ose con.uering t)e% (ould not de/end on suc) a necessarily /atient strategy if t)ey )ad t)e ratio of force to s/ace to %o+e %ore ra/idly and t)erefore %ore econo%ically. 1efence against guerrilla (arfare in+ol+ed using a /ersisting co%&at strategy &ased on directing %ilitary efforts at t)e re.uisites of guerrilla success. By &locking routes of co%%unications and of retreat3 t)e defenders in)i&ited t)e raiders3 and3 in t)e defence in de/t)3 &y adding t)e ca/ital of fortifications to t)eir %o&ile forces defenders restrained raiders &y increasing t)e ratio of force to s/ace. 0)us t)ey also contracted t)e )ostile &ase area and usually3 as )ad t)e Ro%ans3 facilitated t)e acco%/lis)%ent of t)e /olitical reconciliation of eac) grou/ of t)e +an.uis)ed. 5n t)e offensi+e3 rat)er t)an relying /ri%arily on t)e co%&at strategy of /itting /ursuit against retreat3 t)e o//onents of guerrillas successfully e%/loyed an e-/licitly co%&at &ut i%/licitly logistic /ersisting strategy of con.uering t)e territory fro% ()ic) t)e guerrillas dre( t)eir su//lies. In t)e e-a%/les of t)e 2nglis) in !ales and t)e 'renc) in Morocco3 t)is con.uest of t)e su//ly region did not differ fro% t)e /olitical o&Decti+e of t)e (ar. 0)e +ulnera&ility of t)e guerrillas &ase

<?>

area did3 of course3 %ake t)is strategy /ossi&le and (ould often %ake t)is t)e &est defence against any sort of raiders. raiding strategy against t)e raiders +ulnera&le &ase area did also )a+e /ro%ise3 )o(e+er3 de/ending3 of course3 on3 a%ong ot)er factors3 t)e strengt) of t)e guerrillas %oti+ation. Bot) attack and defence against guerrillas ty/ically )a+e )ad a /olitical co%/onent. 2ac) contestant soug)t to retain )is /olitical strengt) ()ile at t)e sa%e ti%e su&+erting )is o//onents. *uerrillas are /articularly de/endent on /o/ular su//ort3 against ()ic) t)e 'renc) in Morocco3 for e-a%/le3 e-/licitly directed a ca%/aign to (in t)e allegiance of t)e /u&lic to 'rance and t)e Sultan ()o% t)e 'renc) controlled.

Summary of Alternati%es for )om-ating a ,aiding Strategy or Guerrilla Warfare Back

0)e offensi+e routine of gradual con.uest of t)e &ase area t)roug) consecuti+e concentrations3 fortification3 and /acification did )a+e an essentially /olitical alternati+e3 not s)o(n in t)e diagra%3 ()ic) could /roduce .uicker results. 0)e 0urks su&dued t)e natolian /ro+inces of t)e By6antine 2%/ire &y raids t)at created suc) dread t)at t)ey co(ed t)e /o/ulation in %uc) of t)is large area in a %atter of only fi+e years. 0error su//lied t)e /olitical ingredient in t)e /lan3 &ut t)e 0urks killed so %any /eo/le and destroyed so %uc) /ro/erty t)at one %ay fairly say t)at t)ey cou/led (it) t)eir /olitical /rogra% a %ilitary logistic strategy ai%ed at )u%an as (ell as /)ysical resources. 0)is strategy did3 )o(e+er3 de/ri+e t)eir con.uest of %uc) of its i%%ediate econo%ic +alue. ,ater3 ()en )e )ad o+errun t)e 9)(ari6%ian 2%/ire3 8eng)i6 9)an used %uc) t)e sa%e logistic strategy3 e-ce/t t)at3 in killing t)e /o/ulation of large cities3 )e ai%ed )is logistic strategy at t)e )u%an resources3 acco%/lis)ing at t)e sa%e ti%e )is /olitical /ur/ose of frig)tening into su&%ission t)e <?1

in)a&itants of t)e e%/ire. Mars)al Bugeaud )ad used t)is a//roac) in lgeria and found t)at it (orked3 t)oug) not as .uickly on t)e scale )e a//lied it. 5n t)e ot)er )and3 t)e terror co%/onent of t)e strategic &o%&ing of *er%any in t)e Second !orld !ar failed to )a+e a sufficient /olitical effect to )asten t)e end of t)e (ar. 5n at least t(o occasions t)e Ro%ans de%onstrated an e+en %ore e-tre%e %et)od of dealing (it) o//onents. !)en t)ey defeated $art)age3 t)ey re%o+ed t)e in)a&itants3 de%olis)ed t)e city3 and /loug)ed t)e ground (it) salt. In dealing (it) t)e re&ellious Nasa%ones3 t)e 2%/eror 1o%itian killed t)e% all3 )a+ing Jfor&idden t)e Nasa%ones to e-ist.L Back

Summary of #lternatives Confronting Commanders

,and (arfare in t)e !estern (orld contrasted an al%ost cyclical /attern in its tactical de+elo/%ent7 one affected i%/ortantly &ut not e-clusi+ely &y tec)nological factors3 (it) a sta&ility in logistical %et)ods until t)e Industrial Re+olution and its associated c)anges in t)e nineteent) and t(entiet) centuries altered logistics /rofoundly. Strategy dis/layed significant constants ()ile undergoing +ariations .uite )ar%onious (it) t)e ele%ents i%/ortant in ancient ti%es. Se+eral %et)ods of organising and inter/reting 23<>> years (ar offer t)e%sel+es. 'or e-a%/le3 t)e /rinci/les of (ar introduced into t)e Britis) and 4.S. ar%ies in t)e 1@2>s could /ro+ide a %eans of su//lying continuity and unifor%ity for e-/laining t)ese eras of (arfare and could lend t)e%sel+es to teac)ing soldiers of t)e future ()at to a+oid and ()at to do. %ong %any ot)er different a//roac)es3 geogra/)y can account for %uc) t)at )as )a//ened. 'or instance3 instead of saying t)at t)e terrain of Meso/ota%ia /er%itted t)e Part)ians to fig)t %ounted3 one could say t)at an ar%y t)at did not fig)t %ounted in suc) terrain (ould al%ost necessarily lose3 if not to a co%&at strategy3 certainly to a logistic strategy. "u%an factors3 including t)e c)aracteristics of successful co%%anders3 could /ro+ide an entirely different and at least as /o(erful a//roac) as any ot)er. 0)e t)eses used in t)is &ook to e-/lain land (arfare since a&out <>> B.$. do not3 like t)e /rinci/les of (ar3 lend t)e%sel+es readily to /ro+iding enduring generalisations a//lica&le to t)e conduct of %ilitary o/erations and rules for generals. Ne+ert)eless3 to e-tract fro% t)is )istory so%e consistency is (ort)()ile3 e+en t)oug) only %odest success can /ossi&ly re(ard t)e effort and t)e %ost t)at one could induce (ould &e %et)ods &y ()ic) good co%%anders e-/loited tendencies and /ro&a&ilities ()ose /ro%inence and relia&ility t)is &ook )as already %uc) o+erstated &y /ro/osing t)e% as +irtual la(s of (arfare. 'our of t)ese assu%ed a /ro%inent /lace as constants o+er t)e ()ole /eriod treated. 0(o of t)ese fa%iliar ideas are t)e /ri%acy of t)e tactical defensi+e3 .ualified &y t)e su/eriority of so%e (ea/on syste%s o+er ot)ers. not)er is t)e su/re%acy of retreat o+er /ursuit3 ()ic) contri&uted to gi+ing /re/onderance to t)e strategic defensi+e ()en ad+ersaries used /ersisting strategies and to raiders on t)e offensi+e against a /ersisting defence. 'inally3 t)e ratio of force to s/ace conditioned all strategic situations. In facing t)ese constraints3 soldiers learned )o( to o+erco%e t)e i%/edi%ents t)ey /resented and )o( to turn t)e% to t)eir ad+antage. Since t)is a//roac) )as underlain t)e /resentation of t)e su&Dect3 it is a//ro/riate to conclude (it) a su%%ary of t)e alternati+es facing co%%anders and )o( t)ey could %atc) t)eir strategy to t)e o&stacles and o//ortunities /resented &y t)e nature of (arfare as re+ealed &y t)ese factors. Back

Choice of Strategic 0bCective

Military strategy3 e+en as narro(ly defined in t)is &ook3 %ust &egin (it) t)e o&Decti+es of %ilitary o/erations. 0)ese did not )a+e to ai% at t)e ene%y ar%y to acco%/lis) t)e %ission. 0)e strategy of raids to e-tort /olitical concessions3 used &y t)e 2nglis) in t)e "undred :ears !ar3 de%onstrated t)is3 as did t)e econo%ically %oti+ated raids used &y t)e Magyars3 Vikings3 and ot)ers. Many ot)er less easily classified %oti+es dou&tless also caused %ilitary actions in /ursuit of not#strictly

<?2

%ilitary o&Decti+es. 0)ose seeking non#%ilitary goals )a+e tended to e%/loy a raiding strategy3 not only &ecause of its offensi+e /ri%acy &ut &ecause raiders usually a+oided ene%y ar%ed forces3 ()ereas a /ersisting strategy nor%ally in+ol+ed %ilitary strategy &ecause of t)e need to %eet t)e ene%y ar%ed forces. 0)us strategy t)at used %ilitary %eans &egan (it) a dic)oto%y illustrated in t)e follo(ing sc)e%atic. Military strategy stro+e to gain /olitical or ot)er non#%ilitary o&Decti+es &y (arlike %eans directed at t)e ene%y ar%ed forces. But one could a//ly ar%ed force directly to attain non# %ilitary goals3 as t)e sc)e%atic dis/lays. 0)e /rinci/le of (inning (it) t)e least effort usually go+erned t)is selection3 Dust as it did in t)e su&se.uent c)oices in %ilitary strategy ()ere /olitical and ot)er non#%ilitary factors rarely lacked rele+ance.

)hoi(e .etween Military Strategy and Military Means to Attain 4on/military ,esults Back

But a strategy in /ursuit of non#%ilitary results3 like t)at of raids for &ooty3 (as not /ri%arily %ilitary3 for %ilitary strategy3 as defined )ere3 )ad to ai% at t)e ene%y ar%y. Ne+ert)eless3 in dealing (it) %ilitary strategy only3 t)e follo(ing su%%ary also treats %any of t)e /ro&le%s of e-ecuting and defending against (arlike actions for non#%ilitary /ur/oses. Back

(he Choice between a Combat and "ogistic Strategy

0o attack t)e ene%y ar%y3 t)e co%%ander )ad t(o alternati+es3 co%&at or logistic strategy3 and t)e a&lest co%%anders usually decided &y follo(ing ()at t)ey &elie+ed (ould &e t)e /at) of least resistance3 t)us trying to (in (it) %ini%u% effort. Saladin3 for e-a%/le3 used a logistic strategy of scorc)ing t)e eart) to t)(art t)e ad+ance against 8erusale% of 9ing Ric)ards $rusaders3 ado/ting t)e strategy of )unger rat)er t)an steel as t)e least costly and %ost efficacious alternati+e against Ric)ard3 a s)re(d (arrior co%%anding a for%ida&le )ost. 0)e *er%ans tried to defeat t)e Russians (it) a logistic strategy in 1@42 &ut did not )a+e t)e co%&at ca/a&ility to take and )old t)e Russian oil regions. But t)is failure tends to su//ort t)eir c)oice3 for if t)e *er%ans lacked t)e /o(er to take and )old significant territory3 t)ey also did not )a+e t)e a&ility to destroy t)e Russian ar%ies in t)e /ursuit of a co%&at strategy. In ad)ering to t)e /rinci/le of least effort in %aking %ilitary decisions3 a co%%ander custo%arily c)ose t)at of %a-i%ising )is c)ances for (inning &ecause using t)e least effort created t)e greatest difference &et(een t)e /o(er needed for success and t)at a+aila&le. 0)is idea )ad close kins)i/ to a traditional /rinci/le of (ar3 econo%y of force. 0)e conce/t of utilising t)e %ini%u% of resources included not Dust a+oiding (aste &ut e%/loying t)e %a-i%u% in ()at t)e co%%ander &elie+ed to &e t)e %ost i%/ortant action. 2cono%y of force i%/lied no )ostility to an a%/le %argin3 for3 as Ieno/)on (rote3 Ja sur/lus of +ictory ne+er caused any con.ueror one /ang of re%orse.L

)hoi(e -etween the Two Most .asi( Means of Atta($ing the Enemy Armed #or(es Back

<??

0)e /ast a&ounds (it) e-a%/les of logistic strategy3 and t)oug) $aesar said )e fa+oured )unger o+er steel3 co%%anders did not necessarily find it easier to (in (it) a logistic strategy3 e+en if t)ere e-isted a (ay of effecti+ely attacking t)e ene%ys %eans of su//orting )is ar%y. 0)us a second dic)oto%y /resents itself Gsc)e%atic a&o+eH. 0)e /rinci/le of least effort generally go+erned a %ilitary c)oice &et(een t)ese t(o alternati+e %eans of o/erating against t)e ene%y ar%ed forces. Back

m'lementing a "ogistic Strategy by a !ersisting or )aiding Strategy

In carrying out a logistic strategy t)e attacker could e%/loy eit)er a /ersisting or a raiding strategy. /ersisting strategy nor%ally in+ol+ed t)e occu/ation of logistically +alua&le territory. lt)oug) often t)is ca%e as t)e significant &y#/roduct of a co%&at strategy3 a co%&atant could3 as t)e *er%ans did in 1@41 ()en t)ey tried to ca/ture t)e Russian oil fields3 incline )is o/erations to(ard a territory of logistical i%/ortance rat)er t)an3 say3 t)at of /olitical or di/lo%atic conse.uence. Suc) a /ersisting strategy )a&itually entailed a %aDor a//lication of co%&at strategy to attain it &ut /resu%a&ly re.uired less effort t)an ai%ing at t)e ene%y ar%ed forces directly t)roug) an e-clusi+e reliance on co%&at strategy. 'or t)e defender3 resistance against suc) a /ersisting logistic strategy rarely differed fro% a defence against a /urely co%&at strategy. 5n t)e le+el of addressing a logistic strategy to an indi+idual ar%y3 !allenstein and *usta+us3 in t)eir /rotracted stay at Nure%&erg3 s)o(ed t)e /o(er of controlling t)e foraging areas adDacent to t)e )ostile force. Since neit)er (ould retreat3 &ot) lost a large nu%&er of )orses to )unger and %any %en to desertion. 0)e result3 in fact3 (as t)e e.ui+alent of a &attle3 (it) )unger rat)er t)an steel t)e (ea/on of c)oice.

Alternati%es in the Em loyment of a &ogisti( Strategy against Enemy Armed #or(es Back

'or attacking (it) a logistic strategy3 raiding offered a +alua&le alternati+e to t)e occu/ation of territory. 0)e success of a Persian ca+alry raid against a su//ly con+oy in co%/elling t)e *reeks to retire during t)e Plataea ca%/aign3 like t)e si%ilar ac)ie+e%ents of t)e ustrians on t(o occasions against t)e Prussians3 e-)i&its t)e /o(er of suc) a logistic raiding strategy3 as do %any instances of t)e use of aircraft. 0)e 4nion raids against $onfederate railroads and industrial /lants in t)e last year of t)e $i+il !ar de%onstrated a strategy le+elled against t)e resources to su//ort all of t)e )ostile ar%ies3 as did t)e 'renc) strategic &o%&ing of t)e Briey Basin in !orld !ar I and %ost of t)e strategic &o%&ing in !orld !ar II. Back

<?4

Combat +efence #gainst a )aiding Strategy

1efenders could use eit)er a co%&at or a logistic strategy against a raiding strategy. In cou/ling co%&at and /ersisting strategies to resist raiders3 t)e defender co%&ined /ursuit (it) t)e &locking of routes of co%%unications and retreat. 0)e Ro%ans fortified t)e country in de/t) to in)i&it t)e %o+e%ent of raiders and counted on t)eir frontier defences and (alls to )inder t)e raiders retreat. 0)ese i%/edi%ents often ga+e /ursuit an ad+antage o+er (it)dra(al and /er%itted t)e defenders to o+ertake and defeat t)e raiders. 0)e By6antines used t)e sa%e %et)od3 and *usta+us dol/)us3 &y )is offensi+e /ersisting strategy in nort)ern *er%any3 in ()ic) )e con.uered and fortified t)e to(ns3 )el/ed to close t)is territory to %arauding )ostile forces t)at (ould )a+e )ad a%ong t)eir o&Decti+es t)e su//lying of t)eir ar%ies ()ile denying to t)e S(edis) 9ing t)e resources consu%ed or destroyed. Not only fortified cities &ut castles and e%&attled +illages and estates )a+e /layed a %aDor role in a//lying a /ersisting strategy against raids. In t)is as/ect of t)e resistance3 a %ilitia ga+e t)e defender a /o(erful %eans of econo%ising force. 4sed in lieu of /rofessionals to %an garrisons3 %ilitia soldiers could continue t)eir ci+ilian occu/ations e-ce/t ()en faced (it) an actual t)reat3 t)us econo%ising on %ore e-/ensi+e /rofessionals. Bot) fortifications and %ilitia raised t)e ratio of force to s/ace3 t)us eli%inating one of t)e essential conditions for t)e successful e-ecution of a raiding strategy. 0o /rotect t)eir e%/ire against &ar&arian raiders3 t)e Ro%ans e+en /aid t)eir /rofessionals &y gi+ing t)e% land in t)reatened areas and allocating to t)e% no ot)er duties t)an t)e safekee/ing of t)e region ()ere t)ey li+ed. 0)us t)e Ro%ans3 in a sense3 con+erted t)eir /rofessionals into a s/ecies of %ilitia3 re+ersing t)e usual direction of t)e e+olution of soldiery in ancient ti%es. Militia could /erfor% /articularly effecti+ely &ecause t)ey only needed to undertake t)e si%/ler task of t)e defence and often did so (it) t)e aid of fortifications. So t)ese ine-/ensi+e fig)ters e-/anded t)e nu%&er of defenders ()ile reducing t)eir cost. nd3 for t)e Ro%ans3 ric)er t)an t)e &ar&arian raiders3 t)e &uilding of (alls and forts3 ()ic) also constituted a sa+ing &y su&stituting ca/ital for la&our3 and t)e using of %ilitia to %an t)e &attle%ents /ro+ided &ot) an econo%y and a useful %ilitary co%/le%ent &ecause of t)e effecti+eness of %ilitia ser+ing (it) t)e aid of t)ese /er%anent defences.

Alternati%es for a )om-at +efen(e against a &ogisti( ,aiding Strategy Back

0o defend (it) a raiding strategy in+ol+ed counter#raids3 ()ic) (ere /otentially /o(erful if t)e raiders )ad an accessi&le &ase area. In !orld !ar II air raids in retaliation for si%ilar raids c)aracterised &ot) t)e %utual attacks of t)e *er%an and t)e Britis)3 and t)e *er%an use of un%anned Det /lanes and rockets against t)e 4nited 9ingdo% to(ard t)e end of t)e (ar. 0)e failure of all t)ese efforts as deterrents suggests t)ese ideas on t)e utility of counter#raids: t)ey %ay %oti+ate %ore raids &y eac) side for re+enge7 t)e t)reat3 as3 for e-a%/le3 in !orld !ar II in ()ic)

<?<

all antagonists (ere ready to use /oison gas &ut none e%/loyed it3 %ay )a+e %ore effect t)an t)e e-ecution7 and %uc) of t)is .uestion lies in t)e affecti+e3 or &e)a+ioural3 do%ain of (arfare and also &elongs to t)e /olitical s/)ere. Back

"ogistic +efence #gainst a )aiding Strategy

$ounter#raids directed at t)e attackers logistic resources for carrying out )is raids constituted a %eans of e-ecuting a logistic raiding strategy to defend against t)e sa%e strategy. So%e of t)e Britis) and %erican &o%&ing of *er%an aircraft factories in !orld !ar II included t)is as an o&Decti+e3 and t)eir attacks against *er%an facilities for /re/aring t)e rockets used against t)e 4nited 9ingdo% )ad as t)eir only /ur/ose t)e cri//ling of t)ese (ea/ons &y %eans of logistic raids &y air/lanes.

Alternati%e Means of Using a &ogisti( Strategy to +efend against a &ogisti( ,aiding Strategy Back

1efenders %ay e%/loy a /ersisting logistic strategy &y scorc)ing t)e eart) to destroy t)e resources u/on ()ic) t)e raider %ust de/end. 'or e-a%/le3 t)e 'renc) used t)is against 2nglis) raiders in t)e "undred :ears !ar. But suc) a strategy )ad a s/ecial difficulty ()en used against raiders. Since raiders fre.uently )ad unkno(n o&Decti+es and often %any c)oices as to t)eir route3 scorc)ing t)e /ro/er /iece of eart) often /resented an insu/era&le o&stacle e+en if t)e defenders kne( t)e s/ecific o&Decti+e. 0)e alternati+e3 destroying resources on all /ossi&le routes3 (ould likely %ake t)e defence cost %ore t)an t)e da%age t)e raiders (ould inflict. gainst aircraft raiders3 defenders )ad no suc) defence3 nor (ould suc) a /ersisting logistic strategy a+ail against %odern raiders (it) %otor +e)icles ()o (ould not rely on t)e country for su//lies3 t)oug) t)e destruction of &ridges3 for e-a%/le3 (ould )a+e an effect. Back

#lternatives in !ursuit of a Combat Strategy

If co%%anders ado/ted a co%&at instead of a logistic strategy for t)e offensi+e3 t)ey )a+e soug)t first to use t)e tactical %eans of o//osing a su/erior (ea/on syste% to an inferior. 0)e 0urks used t)eir )orse arc)ers against t)e By6antine and $rusader )ea+y ca+alry3 and3 e%/loying tactics t)at a//eared to deri+e fro% ti%idity3 t)ey a+oided t)e c)arges of t)e )ea+y ca+alry and (on (it) t)e least effort. 0)e By6antines3 consistent in /ursuing t)eir ai%s (it) a %ini%u% of cost and risk of failure3 acce/ted &attle gladly ()en t)ey could /it &o(%en against )ea+y infantry3 or )ea+y infantry and dis%ounted ca+alry against t)e c)arge of &ar&arian )ea+y ca+alry. gainst t)e %ore /o(erful !estern 2uro/ean ca+alry fro% 'rance t)ey found t)at t)e strategic %eans of a logistic strategy re.uired less effort and incurred less risk t)an t)e tactical %eans of co%&at. !)en a co%%ander )ad a (ea/on syste% (it) )ig)er %o&ility3 )e )ad a si%/le task3 as ()en *reek /eltasts (it) Da+elins defeated *reek )ea+y infantry7 t)e %ounted Part)ians easily forced &attle on Ro%an )ea+y infantry in le+el3 uno&structed terrain7 or Italian &o%&ers caug)t 2t)io/ian rifle%en in 1@?<. :et3 (it) (ea/on syste%s ()ose /redo%inance could only dis/lay itself on t)e defensi+e3 t)is %et)od /ro+ed %ore difficult to a//ly. t t)e Battle of $r;cy3 for e-a%/le3 t)e dis%ounted 2nglis) ca+alry )ad to count on t)e %edie+al knig)ts /ro/ensity for t)e i%/etuous

<?=

c)arge. In !orld !ar II &attles in frica3 t)e *er%ans (on suc) +ictories &y /itting antitank (ea/ons and tanks situated defensi+ely against assaults &y Britis) tanks. But only occasionally did co%%anders )a+e t)e o//ortunity for /itting a stronger (ea/on syste% against an inferior. 5ften t)e contestants )ad si%ilar )o%ogeneous ar%ies. 0)e %ore usual situation found )eterogeneous ar%ies co%/osed of %ore t)an one (ea/on syste% in ()ic) tactics in+ol+ed an effort to e-/loit a fla( in t)e %utual su//ort &et(een t)e (ea/on syste%s in t)e o//osing ar%y. Si-teent)# and se+enteent)#century (arfare a&ounded (it) &attles in ()ic) t)e ca+alry soug)t to ride do(n t)e ar.ue&usiers or use t)eir /istols against unaided /ike%en3 ()ile t)e ar.ue&usiers tried to fire on t)e ca+alry or /ike%en fro% /ositions /rotected &y t)e terrain or t)eir o(n /ike%en. !orld !ar II tee%ed (it) cases of tanks caug)t in t)e o/en &y cannon or rocket# ar%ed aircraft3 and tanks o+er()el%ing infantry inade.uately /ro+ided (it) anti#tank (ea/ons. But3 i%/ortant t)oug) so%e cases )a+e &een3 only infre.uently )a+e any of t)ese instances of t)e use of t)e su/erior (ea/on syste% against t)e inferior )ad a %aDor effect on a &attle3 %uc) less a ca%/aign. In %odern ti%es3 (it) t)e declining /ossi&ilities of significant tactical success3 t)is key tactical +aria&le rarely %ade an i%/ortant difference. In 1@C?3 for e-a%/le3 ()en t)e 2gy/tian infantry used sur/rise to take t)e east &ank of t)e Sue6 $anal3 of )ig) /olitical i%/ort for Israel as (ell as 2gy/t3 t)e 2gy/tians could count on Israeli tanks and aircraft /ro%/tly attacking t)e infantry3 e+en t)oug) t)e 2gy/tian ar%y )ad ela&orately e.ui//ed t)eir %en (it) antitank and antiaircraft guns and %issiles. s a result of t)ese (eak3 i%/ro+ised assaults3 t)e Israelis lost a&out 2<> tanks &ut suffered no loss of strategic /osition. !)en3 a fe( days later3 2gy/tian tanks assailed Israeli tank forces de/loyed defensi+ely and su//orted &y aircraft3 t)e defenders easily re/ulsed t)e assault of t)e 2gy/tians3 ()ic) /laced t)eir tanks at a serious disad+antage (it)out gi+ing t)e% t)e aid of concentration of force. But once %ore t)e action )ad only a tactical result3 t)e loss of 2<> tanks3 ()ic) again did not seriously alter t)e &alance of forces nor cause any c)ange in t)e strategic situation. Ne+ert)eless3 co%&ats &et(een )eterogeneous ar%ies )ad greater co%/le-ity and o//ortunities for tactical success and defeat t)an (arfare (it) essentially )o%ogeneous ar%ies of rifle#ar%ed infantry3 ()ic) c)aracterised t)e /eriod fro% t)e %iddle of t)e nineteent) century until al%ost t)e end of !orld !ar I. 0)e tactical conditions of t)ose years )a+e )ad fe( /arallels3 one co%/ara&le ti%e &eing t)e early (arfare of t)e *reeks ()en )ea+y infantry do%inated t)e &attlefield. !it) t)ese )o%ogeneous ar%ies3 e-ce/t in t)ose %edie+al &attles in ()ic) ca+alry /redo%inated and did not dis%ount3 t)e tactical defensi+e usually )ad /ri%acy &ecause in co%&at &et(een t)e sa%e (ea/on syste%s t)e defensi+e )ad t)e ad+antage of &eing a&le to resist frontal attacks. 5nly after t)e 'renc) )ad de+elo/ed t)e colu%n3 and t)e %et)od of .uickly de/loying it3 did t)e offensi+e )a+e a /re/onderance &et(een si%ilar )o%ogeneous ar%ies3 and t)en only until t)eir o//onents ado/ted t)e sa%e tactical %et)ods. 2+en t)en t)e tactical defensi+e retained its do%inance in resisting frontal attacks3 and in strategy retreat continued its /ri%acy o+er /ursuit. 0)e ne( syste% of tactical de/loy%ent3 introduced &y t)e 'renc) and uni+ersally ado/ted in t)e nineteent) century3 %ay )a+e added slig)tly to t)e tactical strengt) of t)e offensi+e &y conferring on infantry t)e a&ility to turn or en+elo/ strong /ositions and to i%/ro+e t)e c)ances of a frontal attack &y ra/id concentration of infantry on t)e &attlefield.

The Two #undamental Offensi%e Possi-ilities in )om-at Strategy Back

<?C

0)e illustration in t)e sc)e%atic a&o+e su%%arises t)e /oints of t)is section. 0)e c)oice &et(een t)ese /ossi&ilities )inged on t)e a+aila&ility of t)e &etter alternati+e3 a su/erior (ea/on syste%3 ()ic)3 in turn3 de/ended on t)e co%/osition of t)e ar%ies and3 %ore re%otely3 on suc) factors as t)e state of %ilitary tec)nology and t)e terrain u/on ()ic) t)e ar%ies custo%arily foug)t. Back

(he !ersisting and )aiding #lternatives for an 0ffensive Combat Strategy

In seeking to use a co%&at strategy to o+erco%e t)e tactical strengt) of t)e defence3 attackers used eit)er a /ersisting or raiding strategy. In c)oosing &et(een a /ersisting and raiding strategy a co%%ander (ould not necessarily find t)e offensi+ely /redo%inant raids /refera&le to a /ersisting offensi+e. 0)oug) stronger on t)e offensi+e3 raids often could not /roduce a decisi+e outco%e .uickly and3 if t)is /rotracted t)e (ar3 it could result in a )ig)er cost. :et3 alt)oug) (inning (it) t)e least effort ordinarily go+erned t)e c)oice &et(een t)e t(o strategies3 t)e attacker )ad to resort to a raiding strategy ()en )e lacked an ade.uate ratio of force to s/ace to control t)e country &ecause of its si6e andSor /olitical o//osition. In e%/loying raids3 t)e attacker necessarily follo(ed t)e /rinci/le of ai%ing at (eakness3 for a raid )as as /art of its essence a+oiding )ostile strengt) and striking (eak forces and +ulnera&le o&Decti+es. 'or e-a%/le3 su//ly con+oys often /resented &ot) a (eak and a (ort)()ile o&Decti+e. So a strategy of raids against t)e% nor%ally e%&raced a logistic as (ell as a co%&at ele%ent. 0)is strategy (ould earn its +ictory t)oug) t)e attrition of t)e %any s%all successes a%assed in %any raids. :et3 &ecause t)e killing of ci+ilians and t)e destruction of t)eir /ro/erty in a )ostile country could fre.uently )urt t)e ene%y as %uc) as co%/ara&le da%age to %ilitary resources3 t)is strategy of (inning t)roug) t)e accu%ulation of t)e results of %any raids could include t)e /olitical strategy of e-tracting concessions. 0)e follo(ing sc)e%atic s)o(s t)e c)oices o/en to a co%%ander /ursuing a co%&at strategy. 0)e e-ecutant of t)e /ersisting strategy )as usually soug)t to destroy t)e ene%y ar%y3 a %ore direct a//roac)3 if only &y its /syc)ological i%/act3 to (inning t)e (ar3 or occu/ying %uc) territory in a &rief ti%e. But in t)e re/resentati+e case3 (ise co%%anders using a /ersisting strategy counted only on ac.uiring territory. Suc) cri//ling +ictories of anni)ilation as t)e Prussians gained at t)e outset of t)eir 1BC>#C1 (ar (it) t)e 'renc) )a+e rarely occurred in t)e a&sence of su/re%acy in (ea/on syste%s or doctrine suc) as t)ose enDoyed3 for instance3 &y le-ander o+er 1arius3 "anni&al o+er t)e Ro%ans3 t)e Part)ians o+er t)e Ro%ans3 Na/oleon o+er )is ad+ersaries early in )is career3 and t)e *er%ans o+er t)eir o//onents in 1@4>.

Alternati%es in Pursuing an Offensi%e )om-at Strategy Back

<?B

2+en (it) t)e realistic o&Decti+e of only taking ene%y territory3 t)e attacker using a co%&at /ersisting strategy )as traditionally faced a daunting task. Because of t)e tactical /o(er of t)e defence to resist frontal attacks3 t)e often greater difficulty t)e in+ader )ad in su//lying )is ar%y3 and t)e defenders strategic a&ility to a+oid &attle &y retreat3 %ost %ilitary )istory and t)oug)t )a+e d(elt on t)e tactical and strategic %eans of conducting a co%&at /ersisting offensi+e. 0)e defender )ad t)e c)oice of using a co%&at or logistic strategy3 one eit)er of a /ersisting in+asion or of raiding3 and often )e &lended so%e or all of t)ese. Back

*arieties of +efence against a Combat !ersisting Strategy

Scorc)ing t)e eart) could offer a /o(erful resistance to i%/le%enting a /ersisting logistic strategy3 as ()en Vercingetori- &urned &arns to kee/ t)eir contents fro% $aesars ar%y or ()en t)e 'renc) destroyed su//lies in t)e /at) of t)e ar%y of 2%/eror $)arles V to resist an in+asion of sout)ern 'rance. raiding defensi+e logistic strategy could take t)e sa%e for% a//lied on t)e offensi+e &y raiding an ene%ys su//lies3 as t)e ustrians did against t)e Prussians. *uerrilla (arfare3 anot)er ty/e of raiding strategy3 )ad its +alue ()en t)e defender )ad no ca/a&ility for o//osing t)e in+ader3 e+en against frontal attacks3 and ()en )e found t)e resources of retreat inade.uate unless )e dis/ersed )is ar%y. guerrilla resistance3 ()ic) i%/lies t)at t)e ene%y controls %uc) of t)e defenders country3 (as e-/ensi+e and G&ecause of its tedious3 incre%ental a//roac) of attrition t)roug) raidsH long and e-)austing. So in s/ite of t)e strategic do%inance of raids3 guerrilla (arfare re.uired %uc) /olitical strengt). s a %eans of defence Grelying on strategic retreat instead of t)e tactical defensi+eH guerrilla (arfare used t)e tactical offensi+e to i%/le%ent t)e strategic defensi+e. 2%/loying raids to concentrate against (eak co%&at or logistic o&Decti+es and a+ailing t)e%sel+es of t)e strategic and tactical sur/rise %ade /ossi&le &y t)e a%&iguity of a raids o&Decti+es3 guerrillas syste%atically concentrated against (eakness. 0)e guerrillas re.uired a lo( ratio of force to s/ace3 &ut3 as t)eir ac)ie+e%ents against t)e 'renc) in S/ain de%onstrated3 t)ey could succeed in s/ite of a ratio )ig) enoug) to /er%it strategically decisi+e o/erations on t)e Na/oleonic %odel. *uerrilla (arfare re.uired eit)er (ea/on syste%s (it) t)e sa%e %o&ility as t)ose of t)e in+ader or terrain t)at reduced t)e &etter %o&ility of t)e ad+ersaries3 as t)e o&structed countryside s)ielded t)e Iris) fro% t)e %ounted 2nglis) %en at ar%s and t)e %ountains /rotected t)e Moroccans fro% t)e 'renc) in t)eir tanks and %otor trucks. 'inally3 guerrillas %ust control so%e country to )a+e a &ase for su//ly and for recu/eration. !it) all of t)ese re.uisites and a /olitical deter%ination greater t)an t)at of t)eir o//onent3 guerrillas could (in a costly +ictory t)roug) t)e attrition inflicted &y t)e aggregation of %any s%all logistic and co%&at successes.

+efender"s Alternati%es for ,esisting a )om-at Persisting Strategy Back

<?@

0)e a&o+e sc)e%atic su%%arises t)e foregoing alternati+es. 0)e raiding strategy of guerrilla (arfare )ad an a//lica&ility for defence against a logistic3 strategy Dust as it did against a co%&at strategy. But defenders usually found t)at a /ersisting co%&at strategy ga+e +ictory (it) t)e least effort3 a+oiding t)e /rotracted3 costly resistance of guerrilla (arfare or t)e lesser sacrifices of a /ersisting logistic strategy. 0)e Scots3 for e-a%/le3 a+oided co%&at and scorc)ed t)eir eart) only after &eco%ing discouraged at t)eir c)ances of /re+ailing o+er t)e 2nglis) in &attle. Back

(he Combat !ersisting +efence

0o i%/le%ent a /ersisting co%&at strategy3 a defender )ad to )a+e only enoug) strengt) to face t)e in+ader in frontal co%&at in a /osition )e c)ose. 0)us3 )e could /resent )is front to t)e ene%y or retreat3 eit)er ()en )e feared t)e conse.uences of a &attle or ()en )e could not fig)t in a sufficiently fa+oura&le situation. "is ado/tion of t)e co%&at /ersisting strategy utilised t)e defenders strong tactical and strategic alternati+es3 as t)e sc)e%atic &elo( su%%arises. !it)out a%/le /olitical strengt)3 a defender %ust e%ulate 1arius III and risk all on &attle rat)er t)an (it)dra(. !it) sufficient /olitical /o(er3 t)e defender could i%itate eit)er t)e Ro%ans under 'a&ius co%&ating "anni&al or t)e Russian tsar resisting Na/oleon in 1B12.

+efender"s )om-at Persisting Alternati%es against the Same Dind of Atta($ Back

But generally t)e defender )ad ade.uate forces to a+oid t)e disad+antages of (it)dra(ing too far. "e often &anked on a co%&ination of t)e /o(er of t)e tactical defence in frontal co%&at and t)e a&ility to a+oid &attle t)roug) e-ercising t)e su/re%acy of retreat o+er /ursuit. gainst suc) a defence3 e+en if )e )ad enoug) /o(er to utilise a co%&at /ersisting strategy3 t)e attacker )a&itually faced o&stacles as inti%idating as t)ose encountered in co%&ating t)e raiding strategy of guerrilla (arfare. Back

(he 0ffensive #gainst a Guerrilla +efence

In using a /ersisting strategy against a guerrilla defence3 t)e attacker routinely inter%ingled co%&at and logistic strategies Dust as did )is ad+ersary. /ersisting strategy of controlling t)e country3 es/ecially its co%%unication routes3 in)i&ited t)e raiders %o&ility3 t)us gi+ing /ursuit a c)ance of o+er%atc)ing retreat. Si%ilarly3 in %atc)ing t)e guerrillas strategy of attrition (it) a co%/ara&le incre%ental /ersisting strategy of gradually do%inating t)e country &y taking one /iece at a ti%e3 t)e attacker de/ri+ed t)e guerrillas of a lo( ratio of force to s/ace. s t)e attacker3 using a /ersisting ad+ance3 in+aded3 fortified3 and controlled t)e guerrillas essential &ase area3 t)e <4>

funda%ental logistic ele%ent in t)e /ersisting strategy took a(ay anot)er of t)e guerrillas re.uire%ents for success. 0)e Ro%ans follo(ed t)is %et)od in Britain3 as did t)e 2nglis) in !ales. 0)is a//roac) also under%ined t)e guerrillas /olitical as (ell as logistic su//ort.

Alternati%es for Atta($ing against a Guerrilla ,esistan(e Back

s le-ander de%onstrated3 if t)e offensi+e e%&odied a /olitical co%/onent3 it could de/ri+e t)e guerrillas of t)eir essential /olitical su//ort. le-ander3 after trying terror (it)out success3 effecti+ely e%/loyed t)is a//roac) of /lacating t)e ene%y. If t)e attacker )ad tried counter#raids3 eit)er as a su&stitute for or a su//le%ent to a /ersisting strategy3 )e could )a+e3 i%/licitly at least3 decided against le-anders /olitical conciliation %odel &ecause of t)e )ostility suc) raids could arouse. Mars)al Bugeaud a//lied a raiding strategy in lgeria so rut)lessly t)at it incor/orated a /olitical /rogra% of terror t)at inti%idated t)e o//osition. $learly3 since t)e t(o /olitical a//roac)es tended to e-clude one anot)er3 t)e %i-ing of a /ersisting and a raiding strategy %ust )a+e re.uired %uc) /olitical discern%ent to succeed. 0)e a&o+e sc)e%atic illustrates t)e foregoing. 0)is sc)e%atic3 ()ic) e-)i&its t)e strategic ingredients of an offensi+e against guerrillas3 o+er# refines t)e distinctions as actually /racticed. 0)e co%&at and logistic ele%ents are ordinarily co%&ined3 and t)e difference &et(een /ersisting and raiding /ro+ide t)e &asic %ilitary distinction. 0)e /olitical co%/onent of t)e ca%/aign often dictates t)e %ilitary strategy e%/loyed and3 of course3 t)e guerrillas %ust )a+e an accessi&le &ase area. Back

Combat and !ersisting #ttack and +efence

In s/ite of defenders custo%arily offering &attle only ()en t)ey )ad an al%ost i%/regna&le /osition3 %any (ise3 in+ading co%%anders acce/ted &attle under suc) conditions3 e+en (it)out any ad+antage in doctrine or (ea/on syste% o+er t)eir o//onent or using offensi+e troo/s not a+aila&le to t)eir ene%y. 'rederick t)e *reat often acce/ted &attle on )is ad+ersarys ter%s3 &ut not al(ays +ictoriously3 t)oug) )e did rig)tly count on )is o&li.ue a//roac) and (ell#drilled infantry to gi+e )i% an a//ro-i%ation of offensi+e troo/s and a %eans to concentrate against (eakness. 0)e 1uke of Marl&oroug)3 on t)e ot)er )and3 in )is four (inning &attles o+er t)e 'renc)3 lacked any do%inance in nu%&ers3 (ea/on syste%s3 or organisation. 0)e 1uke (on offensi+e &attles3 foug)t under circu%stances /referred &y t)e )ostile co%%ander3 &ecause of )is skill and %astery of t)e a//lication of t)e conce/t of concentration against (eakness and )is gras/ of t)e i%/ortance of distraction in creating a (eak /oint. "is &attles e-e%/lify t)e role of t)ese enduring t)e%es as /racticed in tactics. :et only one of Marl&oroug)s +ictories yielded %aDor strategic gains. In recent ti%es strategy3 rat)er t)an tactics3 )as offered t)e s)orter road to a (inning co%&at /ersisting strategy against an o//onent e%/loying t)e sa%e strategy and constitutes t)e re/resentati+e case of 2uro/ean (arfare in t)e last t(o centuries. But in earlier ti%es follo(ing a /ersisting co%&at strategy /resented al%ost insu/era&le o&stacles &ecause t)e (eaker ar%y could easily elude t)e stronger3 and t)e <41

in+ader rarely )ad enoug) force to control a country )ostile to )is cause. Strong)olds and fortified cities generally furt)er co%/licated t)e attackers task. !)ile )o/ing for a &attle on fa+oura&le ter%s3 ()ic) (ould result in a fa%ous +ictory t)at %ig)t lead to a .uick attain%ent of t)e ai%s of t)e (ar3 co%%anders kne( t)at t)ey could not count on it. 0)ey soug)t to coerce t)e ene%y into fig)ting an offensi+e &attle under unfa+oura&le conditions t)roug) sieges3 ()ic) %ig)t co%/el t)e relie+ing ar%y to assu%e t)e tactical offensi+e3 &y tra//ing an ad+ersary against an o&stacle3 or &y inducing )i% to fig)t &y de+astating )is country. If t)e in+ader )ad t)e %oney and /atience3 )e could still follo( a /ersisting strategy3 e+en (it) a ratio of force to s/ace too lo( to occu/y a large /art of t)e country i%%ediately. "e could take cities one &y one and so garrison and fortify t)e con.uered country as to deny t)e area to t)e defenders ar%y as 6one in ()ic) it could %anoeu+re. If /ursued o+er a (ide area3 t)is gradual and necessarily slo( /ersisting strategy ne+ert)eless re.uired %uc) force3 in t)e for% of strong)olds as (ell as garrisons3 to )old t)e country3 unless t)e in+ader could secure su&stantial /olitical su//ort. 2nglands successful use of t)is strategy in t)e latter years of t)e "undred :ears !ar ulti%ately foundered on t)e large forces re.uired to )old e+en a s%all /art of 'rance ()en t)e 2nglis) could not consistently %uster %any ad)erents to t)eir cause. !it) a ratio of force to s/ace ade.uate to control t)e country (it)out ela&orate garrisoning3 ()ic) e-isted in %any /arts of 2uro/e in t)e eig)teent) century3 ar%ies could %ore readily ad)ere to a /ersisting strategy &y ad+ancing into and do%inating t)e area u/on ()ic) t)e defending ar%y de/ended for its su//lies and so forcing its retreat. nd3 of course3 suc) success for a /ersisting strategy could also t)reaten t)e defending /o(ers logistic resources or /olitical /osition and co%/el it to assu%e t)e offensi+e and attack t)e in+ading ar%y in a strong defensi+e /osition. 'rederick t)e *reat3 faced (it) t)e loss of Sa-ony and conse.uently nearly a t)ird of t)e re+enues (it) ()ic) )e su//orted t)e (ar3 reacted t)us ()en )e attacked 1aun at 0orgau. 'redericks res/onse and t)e significance of defeat )e (ould )a+e suffered )ad 1aun (on t)e &attle also clearly illustrate t)e logistic ele%ent i%/licit in a co%&at /ersisting strategy. 0)e c)ange in (arfare in t)e era of t)e 'renc) Re+olution and Na/oleon %ade a co%&at /ersisting strategy relati+ely easy. 1is/ersed ar%ies a&le to %anoeu+re tactically in colu%ns and de/loy .uickly into lines for co%&at readily t)reatened %any /oints in a t)eatre of (ar and forced t)eir o//onent eit)er to fig)t or %ake a /reci/itate retreat out of t)e 6one of o/erations. 0)is transfor%ation %ade a co%&at /ersisting strategy t)e s)ortest route to +ictory and t)e c)aracteristic strategy in +irtually all 2uro/ean (arfare to t)is day. 0)e a&ility to co%/el t)e ene%y to fig)t or conduct a disastrous retreat %ade /ossi&le t)e concentration in ti%e of si%ultaneous ad+ances on e-terior lines and t)e use of interior lines of o/erations to concentrate in s/ace strong forces for t)e defence or offence. 0)e dis/ersal3 ()ic)3 ()en co%&ined (it) .uick concentration3 ena&led an ar%y to /re+ent anot)er fro% /assing it (it)out a &attle3 %ade t)e strategic turning %o+e%ent /ossi&le. 0)oug) in t)e a&sence of strategically offensi+e troo/s3 t)e turning %o+e%ent (as difficult to e-ecute against an e+en %oderately attenti+e ene%y3 it ne+ert)eless offered anot)er %eans to force on t)e ene%y t)e disad+antage of assu%ing t)e tactical offensi+e as )e foug)t to reco+er contact (it) )is &ase area. :et &esides gi+ing strategy anot)er %et)od of co%/elling an ad+ersary to fig)t in unfa+oura&le circu%stances Gin addition to entra/%ent against a &arrier3 t)e siege3 and de+astation of territoryH3 t)e turning %o+e%ent /ro%ised %ore t)an t)e %ere tactical result of t)e attrition of a losing &attle3 for it could snare and anni)ilate an entire ar%y. It ac)ie+ed t)is t(ice in t)e 'ranco#Prussian !ar3 %ade /ossi&le &y incredi&le and unc)aracteristic 'renc) inco%/etence3 and again at t)e outset of !orld !ar II ()en t)e *er%an Pan6er and %otorised cor/s e-/loited t)eir strategically offensi+e

<42

%o&ility to tra/ t)eir o//onents against t)e coast. 5f course3 one %ay see in t)e turning %o+e%ent %ostly an enlarged instance of t)e old %et)od of )olding an ad+ersary against an o&stacle. 0)e sc)e%atic &elo( reca/itulates t)ese /ossi&ilities and co%/letes t)e array of c)oices facing co%%anders ()en t)ey analyse %ilitary o/erations.

Alternati%es A%aila-le When Atta($er and +efender .oth Em loy a )om-at Persisting Strategy Back

0)e idea of (inning (it) t)e least effort guided t)e &est co%%anders in c)oosing a%ong alternati+es and in co%&ining %ore t)an one %et)od. 0)e sc)e%atic a&o+e3 essentially a consolidation of t)e /receding ones3 su%%arises %any of t)e funda%ental ideas e-)i&ited o+er %ore t)an 23<>> years of (arfare in t)e (estern (orld. Back

Continuity and Change

0)e follo(ing sc)e%atic su%%arises t)e %eans of co/ing (it) t)e factors t)at )a+e conditioned strategy for 23<>> years in t)e !est. So3 to si%/lify3 one %ay say t)at it is /ossi&le to deduce t)e /ro&le%s and o//ortunities of strategy fro% only t)ree of t)e %aDor constants re+ealed in t)is s/an of (arfare. 0)us t)e do%inance of retreat and t)e usual su/eriority of t)e tactical defensi+e )a+e gi+en t)e defence /ri%acy ()en &ot) co%&atants use a /ersisting strategy3 a lo( ratio of force to s/ace fa+ouring t)e use of retreat and a )ig) ratio fostering reliance on t)e tactical defensi+e. 0(o of t)ese sa%e factors )a+e fa+oured t)e use of a raiding strategy t)at could e-/loit retreat ()en )ostile forces )ad a lo( ratio of force to s/ace and used t)e a%&iguity of t)e raiders o&Decti+e to )a+e %ore a&undant o//ortunities for concentrating against (eakness.

Strategi( Alternati%es2 A Summary Back

<4?

0)e relati+e inferiority of t)e /ersisting and t)e /o(er of t)e raiding offensi+e against a /ersisting defence goes far to account for t)e /o/ularity of raids o+er suc) a long s/an of (arfare. :et t)e i%/ortance of raids to )ar% t)e ene%y in any &ut s%all incre%ents or to con.uer any of its territory accounted for a continuing e-tensi+e reliance on a /ersisting strategy. In c)oosing &et(een t)ese t(o strategies co%%anders usually ai%ed at striking at t)eir ad+ersarys (eakness. In fact3 if t)e sc)e%atic a&o+e )as a t)e%e3 t)e (ord (eakness concisely su%%arises it. 0)e ar%y on t)e offensi+e3 follo(ing t)e /at) of least resistance3 tactically soug)t t)e ene%ys (eakness &y e%/loying t)e su/erior (ea/on syste%3 ai%ing at t)e ene%ys flank or rear3 or &ringing greater nu%&ers against lesser. 2+en in co%/elling an ad+ersary to fig)t to /rotect )is cro/s3 raise a siege3 or reco+er )is co%%unications3 t)e attacking ar%y (ould )a+e succeeded in forcing t)e defender to use t)e tactically (eaker for%3 t)e offensi+e. 5ften an attacker used t)e strategic resources of distraction or t)e turning %o+e%ent3 a%ong ot)er %et)ods3 to /us) an o//onent &ack ()en a territorial gain (ould satisfy t)e goal of a ca%/aign # t)oug) so%e )a+e seen t)is as an un%anly sort of (ar. But using t)e /at) of least resistance a+oided t)e ene%y altoget)er and %arred t)e t)e%e of (eakness3 unless one defines kee/ing a(ay fro% t)e ene%y ar%y as striking at (eakness. 5f course3 t)e %eans Gt)reatening t)e )ostile ar%ys rear or %enacing a +ulnera&le /ro+ince3 for e-a%/leH did ai% at (eakness. nd in c)oosing a strategic rat)er t)an a tactical %eans to +ictory3 t)e (ise co%%ander )ad /ercei+ed t)at )is ad+ersary )ad greater tactical t)an strategic strengt). !eakness also /ro+ided t)e t)e%e for t)e defender ()o (is)ed to s)un it ()en )e atte%/ted to recei+e attacks in front3 )ad t)e aid of fortifications3 or retreated to /rotect )is +ulnera&le flank or rear. In concentrating at an actual or e-/ected /oint of assault3 t)e defender also soug)t to a+oid (eakness3 as )e did ()en )e tried to e%/loy a &etter or3 e-/loiting t)e /ri%acy of t)e defensi+e3 an e.ual (ea/on syste% against t)at of )is o//onent.

<44

0)e ene%ys (eakness dictated t)e selection &et(een a co%&at and a logistic strategy. !)en $aesar /itted )is stronger co%%issariat against t)at of t)e Belgae &y (aiting in )is entrenc)ed ca%/ until t)ey dis/ersed to find su//lies3 )e ca/italised on t)eir (eakness3 as did t)e S/anis) general l&a ()en )e a+oided )is 1utc) ene%ies until t)ey a&andoned t)e ca%/aign for lack of %oney to /ay t)eir troo/s. So $aesar e+aded )is tactically dangerous o//onents ()en t)ey (ere concentrated3 and l&a a+oided fig)ting at all3 eac) acting against )is ad+ersarys logistic (eakness. Bot) follo(ed t)is logistic strategy in s/ite of t)eir o(n co%&at /redo%inance. $ost3 in t)at a lo(er /rice reflects a co%/arati+ely greater su//ly3 )as al(ays do%inated logistics3 &ut it also circu%scri&ed tactics and strategy3 Dust as it did t)e co%/osition of ar%ies. Victories suc) as t)ose of Pyrr)us o+er t)e Ro%ans and Marl&oroug)s o+er Villars at Mal/la.uet cost in casualties %ore t)an t)ey yielded in %ilitary or /olitical results. nd3 of course3 not Dust t)e /rice of +ictory or defeat &ut t)e a+aila&ility of re/lace%ents enter into tactical and strategic cost calculations. 0)e use of a raiding or guerrilla strategy offers an e-cellent e-a%/le of consideration of costs constraining t)e t)e%e of %aking use of t)e ad+ersarys (eakness and a+oiding e-/osing ones o(n. Strategically &etter on t)e offensi+e against a /ersisting strategy3 raiding or guerrilla (arfare /its t)e stronger strategy against t)e (eaker. But &ecause guerrilla (arfare de/ends on t)e accu%ulation of %any s%all successes and does not directly seek to con.uer territory3 it usually takes longer to attain +ictory t)an a /ersisting strategy. 0)is greater ti%e and t)e losses incurred &y t)e )ostile occu/ation of ones territory raise t)e econo%ic and /olitical /rice of +ictory a&o+e t)at of a /ersisting strategy. 0)is %eans t)at rat)er t)an face t)ese costs3 go+ern%ents )a+e often ga%&led on success (it) a /ersisting strategy and )a+e relied on guerrilla (arfare only as a last recourse. In fact3 t)ey so%eti%es acce/ted defeat rat)er t)an resort to it. 0)e conce/t of (inning (it) t)e least effort readily unites t)e t)e%es of (eakness and alternati+e routes to +ictory (it) t)e consideration of costs. lt)oug) co%/licated &y tension &et(een long# and s)ort#ter% considerations3 insufficient infor%ation3 and t)e effect of /olitical and ot)er non# o/erational +aria&les3 t)e conce/t of least effort does ade.uately unite t)e as/ects of %ilitary o/erations d(elt u/on )erein. Strategists )a+e argued a&out ()et)er a general s)ould ai% at t)e ene%ys territory or ar%y. 0)ey )a+e not often defined t)is as t)e alternati+e of a co%&at or a logistic /ersisting strategy nor )a+e t)ey al(ays seen it as a c)oice &et(een a /olitical and a %ilitary strategy. 0)is &ook )as not directly addressed t)is .uestion3 e%&racing &ot) a//roac)es (it)in t)e conce/t of co%&at /ersisting strategy. 5ne reason for t)is /rocedure (as t)e fre.uent lack of c)oice3 as3 for e-a%/le3 ()en an attacking ar%y faced an elusi+e o//onent (it) a%/le s/ace in ()ic) to a+oid &attle. In t)is instance t)e ar%y on t)e offensi+e3 if it )ad enoug) %en and resources3 could only ai% at occu/ying t)e defenders do%inions. 5f course3 t)e sieges3 so fre.uently inse/ara&le fro% a strategy directed at territorial ac.uisition3 could ser+e t)e dou&le /ur/ose of con.uering t)e country and /ossi&ly &ringing t)e ene%y co%%ander to &attle in )is effort to raise t)e in+aders siege. 5n occasion3 t)e o//ortunity to c)oose did not /resent itself for different reasons3 as in 'rederick t)e *reats initial in+asion of Silesia3 ()en t)e inade.uate garrison of t)e /ro+ince could offer no resistance to t)e 9ings occu/ation of )is /olitical o&Decti+e in t)e (ar. "a+ing attained )is goal3 'rederick ado/ted t)e defensi+e. So%eti%es an offensi+e ai%ed at t)e )ostile ar%y could result in o&taining so%e of t)e ene%ys country. 0)e strategic turning %o+e%ent of %odern (arfare /ro+ides an o&+ious instance3 &ecause3 ()en an ad+ersary )as t)(arted it &y retreat3 it can yield t)e attacker a su&stantial territorial gain. 0)e a&orti+e *er%an turning %o+e%ent of 1@14 illustrates t)is: it ga+e *er%any %uc) of 'rance3 including industrial areas and t)e iron ore of t)e Briey Basin3 an ad+antage of /otential /olitical as (ell as actual econo%ic +alue and one t)at for(arded a logistic strategy.

<4<

fter )is defeat of 1arius III in t)e Battle of Issus3 le-ander could )a+e /ursued t)e Persian 9ings ar%y east(ard into Meso/ota%ia. Instead )e decided to continue )is ca%/aign along t)e coast3 ending (it) t)e con.uest of 2gy/t. 2+en )ad )e not (is)ed still to follo( )is logistic strategy against t)e Persian na+y3 le-ander %ig)t (ell )a+e decided to e-/loit )is +ictory &y e-/anding )is do%ains along t)e Mediterranean coast. Suc) a course (ould )a+e i%%ediately increased t)e /olitical fruits of t)e (ar3 re%o+ed a /otential ene%y in )is rear ()en )e e+entually ca%/aigned in Meso/ota%ia3 and %ig)t (ell )a+e aug%ented )is resources for t)at su&se.uent ca%/aign. 'urt)er3 le-ander &elie+ed t)at )e could e-/ect difficulty in &ringing 1arius to &attle in t)e distant reac)es of )is +ast e%/ire. Surely le-ander (ould )a+e decided t)e .uestion not on t)e &asis of ()et)er )e s)ould direct )is ca%/aign against t)e )ostile ar%y or its land area &ut &y considering all of t)e +aria&les rele+ant to con.uering t)e Persian 2%/ire (it) t)e least effort. $ertainly $o%%anders ()o faced t)is c)oice in t)e /ast )a+e )ad to gauge t)e i%/ortance not Dust of logistical constraints3 &ut of econo%ic3 /olitical3 and ot)er non#%ilitary considerations. 'or t)is reason t)is &ook )as %ade no effort to deal e-/licitly (it) t)is .uestion3 lea+ing it instead for an a//eal to t)e t)e%e of least effort to go+ern t)is decision as (ell as so %any ot)ers. lt)oug) t)is idea (ould likely do%inate any organisation of t)e to/ic of %ilitary o/erations3 %any different a//roac)es ot)er t)an t)e classifications used in t)e t)e%es in t)is (ork suggest t)e%sel+es. 5ne %ay3 for instance3 stress tactics and di+ide co%&at strategy into tec)nical and o/erational a//roac)es. 0)e tec)nical (ould e%&race a (arfare oriented around ca/italisation on t)e .ualities of (ea/on syste%s suc) as t)e Part)ians used against t)e Ro%ans. 0)is a+enue )as %ore and %ore c)aracterised (arfare in t)e t(entiet) century as ar%ed forces )a+e de+elo/ed ne( or i%/ro+ed +ersions of (ea/ons. 0)e o/erational (ould include t)e ot)er as/ects of co%&at strategy and stress ot)er %eans of attacking or a+oiding (eakness. l%ost e-clusi+e e%/)asis on t)is latter category ty/ified t)e /eriod fro% t)e introduction of t)e &ayonet until t)e early stages of !orld !ar I3 an era of increasingly )o%ogeneous ar%ies. Many ot)er classifications and t)e%es (ill occur to readers ()o can t)en create t)eir o(n organisations. lso one %ay yet find a si%/le arrange%ent t)at (ill unite all ele%ents into t)e elegant sc)e%e soug)t &y t)e t)eorists of t(o centuries ago. Possi&ly suc) a co%/lete3 si%/le synt)esis (ould /er%it a confident lea/ into t)e future3 for e+en if t)e %any ele%ents of continuity found o+er 23<>> years do define t)e li%its of c)ange3 t)ey do not suffice to discern ()at lies a)ead. :et /er)a/s t)e %ost distincti+e feature of t)e array of alternati+es facing co%%anders is )o( little t)ey )a+e +aried since ancient ti%es. 5nly t)e strategic o//ortunities /resented &y t)e Na/oleonic re+olution really differentiate t)e /resent fro% t)e o/erational conditions of t)e /ast3 t)oug) tactical nuclear (ea/ons t)reaten t)e use of concentration3 de/ri+e %aDor /er%anent fortifications of t)e i%/ortance t)ey )a+e long )ad3 and3 if used3 (ould certainly )a+e %any unantici/ated conse.uences. Since t)e t)reat of /reci/itating a de+astating nuclear (ar in)i&its t)e e%/loy%ent not only of tactical nuclear (ea/ons &ut also of %ilitary o/erations in ()ic) t)ey %ig)t )a+e significant +alue3 t)ere are unusual constraints on %ilitary action in 2uro/e. 0)is a&sence of (arfare in 2uro/e )as accentuated t)e (orld(ide s)ift in t)e last decades a(ay fro% t)e conflict of co%&atants e%/loying /ersisting strategies3 ()ic) do%inated in 2uro/e for t)e last t(o centuries and ()ic) t)e o+erseas ca%/aigns of 2uro/eans during t)is sa%e /eriod often featured. So long )a+e 2uro/eans foug)t eac) ot)er in t)e co%&at /ersisting .uadrant of t)e strategy %atri- t)at t)ey )a+e co%e to call t)is con+entional (ar3 and seen a resort to t)e raiding strategies so ty/ical of t)e %ore re%ote /ast as uncon+entional. Per)a/s t)is e-/erience )as )el/ed t)e% +ie( t)e logistic and often raiding strategies of sea and air /o(er as /articularly distinct fro% t)ose on land.

<4=

:et t)e )istory of (ar in Dust t)e last <>> years /resents a +ast +ariety of tactical3 logistic3 and strategic situations to offer guidance for t)e /resent and t)e future. 'or e-a%/le3 in t)e future t)e +ariations in t)e nu%&er of (ea/on syste%s a+aila&le3 as a result of to/ogra/)ical3 cultural3 or resource constraints3 could also re/roduce tactical conditions &est e-e%/lified &y t)e era &et(een a&out 1<>> and 1BC>. 1uring t)is /eriod t)e nu%&er of (ea/on syste%s useful in co%&at declined fro% four to t)ree3 ()en t)e ado/tion of &ot) t)e /istol and sa&re united lig)t and )ea+y ca+alry in t)e sa%e )orse%an3 to t(o3 ()en t)e &ayonet Doined to t)e %usket co%&ined )ea+y and lig)t infantry into one soldier3 to one3 ()en t)e rifle +irtually dro+e t)e )orse%an fro% t)e &attlefield. In 2uro/e t)e conco%itant steady increase in t)e ratio of force to s/ace and t)e Na/oleonic re+olution in strategy and tactics so%e()at o&scured t)e effect of t)is c)ange fro% four to one (ea/on syste%s. t first t)e +ersatility of t)e dual#/ur/ose ca+alry%an /ro&a&ly aug%ented t)e /o(er of t)e offence and (eakened t)e defence &ecause dis%ounted ca+alry3 (it) /istols and sa&res rat)er t)an ar.ue&uses and lances3 could no longer function effecti+ely as lig)t or )ea+y infantry. But t)e ad+ent of t)e &ayonet and t)e a//earance of a )o%ogeneous &ody of infantry su/erior to ca+alry turned t)e ta&les in fa+our of t)e defence. 0)e ado/tion of t)e rifles and t)e resulting ecli/se of %ounted troo/s %ade ar%ies co%/letely )o%ogeneous3 de/ri+ed co%%anders of tactically offensi+e troo/s3 and &roug)t t)e tactical defensi+e to an a/ogee so e+ident in !orld !ar I. !arfare around t)e (orld3 (it) t)e +ariety of terrain and di+erse co%&inations of (ea/on syste%s likely to a//ear3 (ill certainly re/roduce %any of t)e tactical conditions t)at /re+ailed in t)e /eriod fro% 1<>> until 1@14 as (ell as t)ose c)aracteristic of earlier /eriods ()en rarely did co%&atants use all four (ea/on syste%s. 0)us3 if one contestant )ad on suita&le terrain (ea/on syste%s not a+aila&le to t)e ot)er3 t)e tactical offensi+e %ay )a+e a su/eriority of t)e kind e-e%/lified in t)e Part)ian triu%/) at $arr)ae or t)e By6antine +ictories o+er &ar&arians at 0aginae and $asilinu%. But if geogra/)y s)ould constrain &ot) co%&atants to a use of fe(er t)an t)e four (ea/on syste%s a+aila&le today3 t)e tactical defence %ay (ell &enefit. nd s)ould to/ogra/)y so in)i&it %ounted (arfare as to eli%inate t)e use of aircraft and tanks3 t)e defence (ould reco+er t)at /ri%acy it )ad in t)e /eriod fro% 1BC> to 1@14. Strategic conditions (ill likely re/roduce t)e conditions of t)e re%ote /ast3 (it) t)e a%ount of force in relation to t)e s/ace in ()ic) o/erations occur +arying %arkedly fro% t)e strategically decisi+e ratio. In early ti%es sieges re/resented +irtually t)e only instance of so )ig) a ratio of force to s/ace as to gi+e t)e defence a decided ad+antage. :et co%&at in t)e e-tensi+e ur&an areas c)aracteristic of t)is century )as added to t)e siege anot)er situation in ()ic) t)e co%&atants (ould )a+e so )ig) a ratio of force to s/ace as to %ake a decisi+e ca%/aign .uite difficult. 5n t)e ot)er )and3 t)e o//osite situation Ga +ery lo( ratio of force to s/ace3 so ty/ical of (arfare in t)e !estern (orld fro% t)e earliest ti%es until t)e last 2>> or ?>> yearsH could fre.uently recur. !it) ar%ies again una&le to do%inate %uc) territory &eyond t)eir i%%ediate area and o//onents a&le to retreat in any of se+eral directions3 o/erational conditions (ould not de+iate %uc) fro% t)ose t)at in recent years soldiers )a+e co%e to associate e-clusi+ely (it) guerrilla (arfare. But suc) strategic circu%stances actually differ little fro% t)ose t)at faced co%%anders for t)ousands of years ()en t)e ratio of force to s/ace (as so lo( as to lea+e no alternati+e &ut a raiding strategy. 0)ese conditions %ay3 as in t)e /ast3 significantly reduce t)e decisi+eness of %ilitary o/erations fro% t)e e-traordinary le+el t)at t)ey reac)ed in t)e Na/oleonic (ars and !orld !ar II. !it) a return to t)e %ore usual condition of %ilitary %eans una&le to render a /ro%/t decision3 /olitical factors %ay assu%e e+en greater i%/ortance. 0)e contrast &et(een t)e di+ergent /olitical outco%es of le-anders and "anni&als +ictories could )a+e rele+ance as could co%/le-ities of suc) e+ents as t)e 0)irty :ears !ar and t)e e-/eriences of t)e con.uests of t)e Ro%ans3 !illia% t)e $on.ueror3 t)e 0urks in sia Minor3 and 8eng)i6 9)an in 9)(ari6%. But /olitical conditions could <4C

&e %ore co%/licated t)an in t)e /ast. ,iteracy co%&ined (it) t)e a+aila&ility of &ooks and ne(s/a/ers and t)e electronic %edia )a+e )el/ed %ake all /eo/le %ore res/onsi+e to national and ideological %oti+ations Dust as in t)e /ast t)ey often res/onded to religious feeling and co%%it%ent. 0)us soldiers and /olitical leaders3 ()o )ad learned to dra( t)eir lessons if not fro% t)eir o(n generation at least fro% t)e recent /ast3 %ig)t )a+e to consult %ore re%ote eras for guidance3 /articularly since t)e su&siding of t)e intensi+e /ersisting struggles of t)e 2uro/ean /o(ers3 ()ic) c)aracterised t)e first )alf of t)e t(entiet) century3 )as gi+en co%/arati+ely %ore /ro%inence to t)e raiding strategy still re/resentati+e of %uc) of t)e rest of t)e (orld. So%e of t)ese conflicts )a+e rese%&led t)e guerrilla (arfare t)at ty/ified %uc) of t)e resistance to 2uro/ean e-/ansion in t)e nineteent) century or t)ose struggles (aged against t)e /ersistent gro(t) of t)e Ro%an 2%/ire. 5t)ers see%ed to )a+e %ore in co%%on (it) t)e raids of &ar&arians against ()o% t)e Ro%ans de+elo/ed a syste%atic defence. ccordingly3 strategy recently )as c)anged its e%/)asis &ut )as still re%ained (it)in t)e four co%/art%ents of t)e traditional %atri-. 'urt)er3 raiding strategy in a slig)tly different for% )as gained /ro%inence. 0odays terroris% uses a ty/e of raid to take )ostages3 kill /eo/le3 or e-/lode &o%&s3 usually in an effort to e-tort /olitical concessions. 0)ese terrorists e-)i&it t)e /ri%acy of raiding on t)e offensi+e &ecause t)ey often )a+e no identifia&le &ase against ()ic) to conduct counter#raids or a /ersisting offensi+e strategy. 0)ese terrorist raids )a+e a different setting fro% si%ilar occurrences in t)e /ast in t)at t)ey often occur in cities. But cities3 like forests3 offer co+er and conceal%ent facilitating t)e (it)dra(al of t)e terrorists and gi+ing t)e% t)e ready a&ility to retreat &y rendering t)e%sel+es indistinguis)a&le fro% t)e citys /o/ulation. Strategy t)us a//ears largely i%%uta&le3 and t)ere see%s no discerni&le /ros/ect of a re+olution suc) as t)at of Na/oleons ti%e. Nor3 in s/ite of t)e /roliferation of t)e %eans of trans%itting and /rocessing infor%ation3 does t)e /resent state of logistics a//ear to augur any significant inno+ation in %an/o(er organisation or /rogress co%/ara&le to t)e nineteent)#century i%/ro+e%ent in t)e staff. 0)e ne( logistics of t)e %otor age and ar%ies de/endence on su//ly lines for fuel3 a%%unition3 and s/are /arts look as if t)ey (ill continue to do%inate %ost o/erations3 not(it)standing t)e constraints of geogra/)y. nd tactics3 ()ic) )as res/onded so %uc) to t)e influence of c)anges in articulation3 see%s to offer fe( /ros/ects for any %arked degree of alteration. Because strategy is largely t)e de/endent +aria&le of tactics and logistics3 and tec)nology )as )ad t)e greatest influence on tactics and logistics3 one s)ould naturally t)en e-a%ine tec)nology as t)e source of future %odifications in co%&at. Since t)e trend of t)e effect of tec)nology on ci+il life is fairly clear3 it %ay )el/ first to look t)ere for /arallels to aid in gauging t)e /ros/ecti+e i%/act of tec)nology on co%&at and logistics. 0)e agricultural3 co%%ercial3 and industrial re+olutions of t)e last t(o centuries )a+e recei+ed %uc) of t)eir s)a/e fro%3 as (ell as )el/ed foster3 tec)nological c)ange. 0)ese re+olutions )a+e in turn /rofoundly %odified t)e (ay /eo/le in t)e !estern (orld li+e. Inde/endent of t)e great ad+ance in t)e standard of li+ing %ade /ossi&le &y t)e fall in t)e /rices of food3 ser+ices3 and %anufactured /roducts and t)e &etter )ousing and education t)at t)is (ealt) )as &oug)t3 a co%%unication re+olution )as altered t)e o//ortunities a+aila&le to %ankind. s first t)e railroad and t)e stea%er and t)en t)e auto%o&ile and t)e air/lane ga+e /eo/le a %o&ility )it)erto unkno(n3 and t)e telegra/)3 tele/)one3 (ireless3 %otion /ictures3 radio3 tele+ision and co%/uters )a+e added to t)e ot)er di%ensions of co%%unication and en)anced ease3 con+enience3 and recreation. :et t)ese transfor%ations )a+e )ad a reduced effect on e+eryday life o+er ti%e. ll &ut t(o of t)ese3 tele+ision and co%/uters3 flouris)ed %ore t)an fifty years ago3 and clearly t)e i%/act of

<4B

tec)nology is s)o(ing t)e conse.uences of t)e o/eration of t)e la( of di%inis)ing returns. 0)e early /rogress in )o%e#cooling3 for e-a%/le3 fro% t)e )and#o/erated /al%#leaf fan to t)e electric fan ad+anced co%fort to a far greater degree t)an did t)e transition fro% t)e electric fan to air conditioning. 5ne %ay find a %ore dra%atic illustration of t)e decreasing i%/act of tec)nology &y co%/aring tra+el fro% ,ondon to Paris3 ()ic) used to re.uire t)e interru/tion of a c)ange to sea trans/ort and &ack again to land. In 1@?>3 t)irty#eig)t /assengers in an airliner tra+elled at 1>> %iles an )our ()ile dining on a su%/tuous lunc). 0)e Det aircraft )as added co%/arati+ely little to t)e s/eed or con+enience of suc) a Dourney ()en one reckons t)e ti%e consu%ed tra+elling to and fro% t)e air/orts. Not)ing %ore gra/)ically e-)i&its t)e di%inis)ing (ay tec)nology )as touc)ed us t)an to notice t)at a 1@B< tri/ taken in a 1@?< auto%o&ile on an interstate )ig)(ay or %otor(ay fatigues t)e dri+er less t)an a 1@?< tri/ on t)e t(o#lane roads of t)at /eriod taken in a 1@B< car. In 1@B< /eo/le dro+e on &etter roads in &etter auto%o&iles /laying &etter radios and (ere cooler in )ot (eat)er t)an in 1@?<3 &ut3 co%/ared to t)e circu%scri&ed access of (ater(ays and t)e railroad and t)e li%ited s/eed and lu-ury of )orse#dra(n trans/ort3 far greater c)anges took /lace &efore 1@?< t)an since. 2.ually3 t)e 1@B< d(elling (it) tele+ision3 dee/ free6ers3 and )o%e air conditioning differs less fro% t)e 1@?< ur&an )o%e (it) radio3 refrigerator3 co%/uter and cooling &y electric fans t)an t)e 1@?< )ouse +aries fro% t)at of t)e age &efore central )eating3 indoor /lu%&ing3 )o%e electrification3 and t)e tele/)one. So tec)nological c)ange continues to alter /roduction3 &ut ne( and i%/ro+ed /roducts )a+e a di%inis)ing effect on t)e %anner of life. Po(er generation3 including t)e use of nuclear /o(er3 for e-a%/le3 )as c)anged %arkedly3 &ut t)is )as not %odified use7 t)e sa%e 11> or 22> +olts $ enters t)e )o%e as &efore3 and t)e a//lication of t)is electric /o(er )as undergone /rogressi+ely fe(er alterations in t)e last fi+e decades. 0)ese sa%e econo%ic and tec)nological re+olutions affected (arfare3 c)anging logistics as t)ey did co%%ercial trans/ortation and increasing t)e si6e and cost of ar%ed forces &y a %easure /ro/ortional to t)e gro(t) in econo%ic /roducti+ity. But tec)nology )ad its i%/act on tactics in a cyclical rat)er t)an in t)e linear (ay in ()ic) it altered ci+il life and logistics. 'irst3 t)e %id# nineteent)#century inno+ations in firear%s a&olis)ed ca+alry as a tactically useful (ea/on syste%3 introducing a uni.ue era ()en soldiers could )a+e at t)eir dis/osal only one (ea/on syste%3 t)e rifle Gor %ac)ine gunH ar%ed infantry%en and t)eir si%ilar co%/anions (it) artillery. 0)en3 after a /eriod3 &rief in co%/arison (it) t)e long )istory of (arfare3 tec)nology restored &y 1@1C3 in ne( for%s3 t)e custo%ary four (ea/on syste%s. Since 1@1C tactics )a+e (orked (it)in t)e long tradition of )eterogeneity of (ea/on syste%s as logistics )as re%ained %odern in its use of &ases and %otor trans/ort on land and sea and in t)e air. 0)us3 t)oug) follo(ing a different course &ecause of t)e tactical cycle fro% 1B=1 to 1@1C3 t)e i%/act of tec)nology on (arfare also see%s to e-)i&it t)e effect of di%inis)ing returns3 &arring3 of course3 t)e use of strategic or tactical nuclear (ea/ons. So researc) and de+elo/%ent since t)e !orld !ar II )a+e altered aircraft and3 /articularly3 tanks less t)an t)ese (ea/ons )ad c)anged &et(een 1@1C and 1@4<. 0)e sa%e is /ro&a&ly true of t)e antitank and antiaircraft syste%s7 and artillery and s%all ar%s3 older (ea/on syste%s3 )a+e undergone e+en fe(er alterations. 0)e /orta&le +oice radio used in !orld !ar II /ro&a&ly )ad %ore effect on tactical co%%unications t)an any su&se.uent i%/ro+e%ents. 0)us %ilitary life in t)e last fe( decades see%s to follo( ci+il in t)e di%inis)ing effect of tec)nology and %akes it easy to Du%/ to t)e conclusion t)at it %ay not %odify (arfare in t)e future any %ore t)an it see%s /resently to &e altering lifestyles. 0ransistors3 for e-a%/le3 )a+e i%/ro+ed radios and tele+ision sets (it)out affecting t)e auditor or +ie(er +ery %uc)3 and co%/uters )a+e reduced t)e cost of office (ork and %anufacturing (it)out in any degree transfor%ing t)e /roduct. ccordingly3 one %ay conclude t)at (arfare %ay follo( t)e sa%e course3 (it) tactics and logistics as little influenced &y t)e transistor and co%/uter as ci+il life. Soldiers (ill )a+e to learn ne( tasks and

<4@

discard old skills3 as )a+e ci+ilians3 &ut t)e end /roduct (ill not differ %uc). Since not)ing co%/ara&le to t)e &reec)#loading rifle or t)e tank see%s on t)e )ori6on and t)e funda%entals of logistics )a+e not altered3 strategy3 al%ost i%%uta&le in any case and to a large degree t)e de/endent +aria&le of tactics and logistics3 also see%s unlikely to c)ange. 0)erefore t)e outlook for a %aDor %odification in t)e %anner of co%&at )as no %ore /ro%ise t)an t)at for ci+ilian life. If t)e /ast /ro+ides a relia&le guide3 t)e %ost dra%atic effect tec)nological c)ange could )a+e (ould &e to eli%inate or %erge one or %ore of t)e four classes of (ea/on syste%s. 0)e %ost likely /ros/ect3 a (ea/on syste% e.ually effecti+e against tanks and aircraft3 still eludes t)e (ea/ons de+elo/ers3 e+en t)oug)3 &ecause &ot) e%/loy /roDectiles3 t)e task see%s %ore feasi&le no( t)an it (ould )a+e in t)e Middle ges ()en t)e cross&o( and t)e long /ike differed so %uc). So tactics3 in s/ite of altoget)er different (ea/ons3 dis/lays a significant consistency (it) t)e /ast. !it) terrain still restraining t)e nature of co%&at and (it) (ea/on syste%s still )a+ing a di+ersity and ca/a&ilities relati+ely # co%/ara&le to t)ose in ancient and %edie+al ti%es3 continuity looks as if it o+er%atc)es c)ange. 0oday3 co%&ination of ar%s /ro+ides t)e %otif Dust as it did in t)e days of le-ander3 t)e By6antines3 !illia% t)e $on.ueror3 t)e $rusaders3 and *usta+us dol/)us. But anot)er for% of tec)nological influence on tactics see%s discerni&le in t)e continued ra/id ad+ance%ent in electronics and rockets. Since t)e %iddle of t)e nineteent) century3 t)e rate of fire )as increased %arkedly3 so%e()at o+ers)ado(ing t)e /rogress in t)e accuracy of s%all ar%s. In artillery3 )o(e+er3 t)e aug%entation in range and accuracy )ad %ore significance t)an t)e ad+ance in t)e rate of fire. 0)e steady i%/ro+e%ents in electronics since t)e introduction of radar and t)e co%/ara&le de+elo/%ent of t)e guided %issile )a+e continued t)e trend t)at artillery &egan %ore t)an a century ago. 0oget)er t)ese /ro%ise to alter tactics in a %o%entous (ay &y re+olutionising t)e a&ility to see targets and to /ro+ide )it)erto undrea%ed of accuracy of fire. 5&ser+ers of t)ese de+elo/%ents could readily3 and (it) good reason3 contend t)at t)e analogy of t)e di%inis)ing returns of t)e effect of tec)nology on ci+il life &reaks do(n )ere and t)at t)e c)anges in intelligence3 target ac.uisition3 range3 and accuracy toget)er a%ount to a difference in kind t)at (ill /rofoundly alter tactics ()et)er or not (ea/on syste%s re%ain in t)e traditional four categories. 0)e soldiers of today )a+e a +ision of co%&ining co%/lete electronic intelligence of t)e ene%y (it) (ea/ons guided (it) /erfect accuracy to create a re+olution in co%&at. 0)ey en+isage a &attle conducted at de/t)s si%ilar to t)ose introduced &y tactical a+iation in !orld !ar II and (it) an accuracy of fire against distant targets far e-ceeding t)at attained &y t)e &est fire of cali&rated guns in !orld !ar I. $o%&at at suc) great distances (ould tend to %ake flanks and rear3 t)e traditional (eak /oints3 irrele+ant. If soldiers are +isi&le &y %eans of sensing )eat radiated as (ell as &y sig)t and radar and are +ulnera&le fro% a&o+e3 and counter%easures do not defeat t)is +ariety of sensors3 traditional conceal%ent and co+er lose %uc) of t)eir %erit3 and co%&at %ay co%e closely to a//ro-i%ate ,anc)esters %odel of e+ery (ea/on syste% &eing a&le to fire at e+ery ot)er. 0)is kind of (arfare at a distance (ould de/ri+e t)e defender of %any of )is usual &enefits3 t)oug)3 in t)e a&sence of nuclear (ea/ons3 )e could )a+e useful assistance fro% %odern fortifications suc) as t)e Maginot line. 2+en tactical nuclear (ea/ons %ig)t lose %uc) of t)eir defensi+e +alue if t)e great range of (ea/ons %ade t)e con+entional concentration of force unnecessary. Ne+ert)eless3 eac) of t)e four (ea/on syste%s retains its distincti+e ca/a&ilities. But3 (it) so%e of t)e custo%ary ad+antages of t)e defence largely a&rogated3 t)e stronger ar%y %ig)t %ore easily attain /ri%acy instead of a deadlock. 0)oug) electronic intelligence and guided (ea/ons are still far fro% /erfected3 in t(o decades Gt)e sa%e /eriod of ti%e re.uired to /erfect t)e design and relia&ility of t)e tank and %ilitary aircraftH suc) (arfare %ig)t co%e close to reality.

<<>

:et Dust as electronic counter%easures and e+en so old#fas)ioned a deni6en of t)e %ilitary en+iron%ent as s%oke %ay t)(art intelligence gat)ering and %issile guidance and so cause a de/arture fro% t)e %odel of co%/lete intelligence and /erfect accuracy3 so also %ay t)e /rogress of t)e &attle defor% t)e %odel. $o%&at %ay /ossi&ly de/lete t)e ad+ersaries %issiles and da%age t)eir electronic e.ui/%ent and di%inis) its ca/a&ilities. nd like t)e elite3 largely %ounted forces of t)e By6antine 2%/ire3 t)ese ne( ar%ies in 2uro/e (ould )a+e fe( re/lace%ents in %en and e.ui/%ent. But unlike t)e e-/erience of t)e destruction of t)e By6antine ar%y at Man6ikert3 ()ic) left t)e e%/ire al%ost (it)out an ar%y3 t)e co%&at en+isioned could likely re+ert to an earlier /eriod in t)e )istory of (ea/on syste%s. s t)e &attle /rogressed3 t)e )ostile forces %ig)t (itness a transition &ack to !orld !ar II and e+en !orld !ar I co%&at conditions until re/lace%ent e.ui/%ent &egan to %ake /ossi&le a /artial return to t)e initial conditions of t)e &attle. 0)us so%e of t)e e/isodes in t)e recent )istory of tactics %ay (ell recur in co%&at &et(een t)ese s%all3 %ounted3 and ela&orately e.ui//ed ar%ies. !)at strategic conse.uences (ould suc) a tactical transfor%ation )a+eK $learly3 t)e trend to s%all ca/ital#intensi+e ar%ies (ould continue3 as co%/le- (ea/ons and e-/ensi+e a%%unition a&sor&ed t)e resources of t)e industrial /o(ers t)at early in t)is century sufficed to e.ui/ %illions of %en. !ould suc) ar%ies rese%&le t)e %ounted Part)ians3 su/re%e on t)eir le+el terrain3 &ut una&le to co/e (it) t)e %ountains of r%enia3 or t)e forests of SyriaK Rat)er3 in +ie( of t)e integration of surface and air (ea/on syste%s and t)eir use of co%/ara&le %issiles and electronic intelligence3 forests and %ountains (ould surely at least so%e()at less in)i&it suc) ar%ies t)an t)e %ounted forces of old. :et suc) ar%ies (ould e-ist /ri%arily to fig)t eac) ot)er. ccordingly3 against an ene%y ar%ed (it) (ea/ons c)aracteristic of t)e first )alf of t)e t(entiet) century3 t)ey %ig)t often find t)e%sel+es in t)e e%&arrassing and /ro&a&ly self#defeating situation of t)e %issile costing %ore t)an t)e target. 0)us3 %aDor /arts of t)ese ar%ies %ig)t rese%&le t)e elite )ea+y ca+alry of t)e Middle ges: t)ey could usually do%inate ()ere+er t)ey (ent &ut de/ended on infantry for t)e sieges and garrisons necessary to control t)e country. Per)a/s t)eir necessarily s%all si6e (ould eli%inate t)e continuous front so ty/ical of !orld !ars I and II and t)e conflicts &et(een t)e ra&s and Israelis. In t)is res/ect t)ese o/erations %ig)t also rese%&le Nort) fricas first %odern co%&at &et(een essentially %ounted forces. 'urt)er3 t)e reduction in t)e si6e of ar%ies %ig)t i%/ose an i%/ortant restriction on t)eir strategic significance3 for suc) forces3 (it) %uc) e.ui/%ent and co%/arati+ely fe( %en (ould )a+e a li%ited a&ility to control con.uered territory. !it) t)e s)rinking of ar%ies3 t)e traditional li%itations on strategic results i%/osed &y a lo( ratio of force to s/ace (ould return. nd t)e de/endence of suc) forces on lines of su//ly (ould %ake t)e% %ore +ulnera&le t)an t)e )orse#%ounted ar%ies of old3 ()ic) li+ed on t)e country and )ad no e-tra+agant re.uire%ents for a%%unition. 0rue3 suc) a /o(erful &ut s%all ar%y t)at found its su//ly lines interru/ted &y guerrillas could su//ly itself &y air3 &ut t)is (ould not re%edy its s%all si6e in relation to t)e country it soug)t to do%inate. In a large3 /olitically )ostile country its %o+e%ents %ig)t )a+e no %ore effect t)an "anni&als after )is +ictories against t)e Ro%ans in Italy. 5nly &y a Mongolian strategy of terror and e-ter%ination could suc) an ar%y su&due a deter%ined o//onent3 and for t)is task it (ould find its co%/le- %issile (ea/ons and t)eir e-/ensi+e a%%unition ill ada/ted. It see%s3 t)en3 t)at t)is e-/ensi+e3 /redo%inantly electronic and guided %issile (arfare could e-ist only as a s/ecial case a%ong %any instances of uni+ersal )u%an co%&at. Suc) di+ersity e-isted t)ree centuries ago ()en 2uro/eans &egan to accelerate t)eir glo&al e-/ansion. nd t)e /artial (orld(ide synt)esis found at t)e &eginning of t)is century )as already &egun to dissol+e in t)e face

<<1

of t)e geogra/)ical o&stacles to t)e ne( %ounted (ays of (ar. In forests3 %ountains3 and cities t)e nineteent)#century (arfare of rifles and artillery )as of necessity flouris)ed3 in s/ite of so%e infusion of tanks and aircraft. It see%s likely t)at econo%ic constraints (ill also li%it t)e use of t)e ne( electronic and %issile (ea/ons and t)e (arfare conte%/lated in 2uro/e (ill &eco%e %ore and %ore distinct fro% t)at /racticed or /lanned in %any ot)er regions. ccordingly3 t)e (orld see%s )eaded &ack to di+ersity3 (it) (arfare +arying to suit t)e econo%ic resources and t)e /olitical and geogra/)ical circu%stances of t)e co%&atants. 0)us3 t)e (orld %ilitary situation %ay (ell rese%&le t)at of %edie+al 2uro/e3 (it) eac) region )a+ing %et)ods t)at %eet its s/ecialised needs. Since t)is resurgence of )eterogeneity and regionalis% in (arfare )as t)e sa%e roots as t)at in t)e /ast3 t)ere see%s little reason to e-/ect t)at it (ill not c)aracterise (arfare yet to co%e. 0)e foregoing atte%/t to gli%/se ()at lies a)ead3 like %ost suc) efforts3 does no %ore t)an e-tra/olate fro% so%e +ery o&+ious3 recent trends. 0o do t)e sa%e for ot)er a//arent tendencies (ould dou&tless /resent ot)er +isions of to%orro(. No %ore t)an any ot)er disci/line can )istory /redict t)e future. It can e-tend t)e line of e-tra/olation fart)er &ack in t)e /ast in t)e )o/e t)at3 if done /ro/erly3 it (ill /lot a %ore accurate course a)ead. It can also atte%/t t)e sa%e task &y seeking in t)e /ast analogies of /otential +alue for understanding /resent c)anges and t)e /ossi&le course of e+ents. More i%/ortant3 )istory s)ould raise its o(n .uestions to ask of t)e /resent and to /ro+ide )y/ot)eses for su&se.uent de+elo/%ents. If t)e t)e%es in t)is (ork and t)e consistencies %any of t)e% e-)i&it aid readers in raising suc) .uestions and for%ing )y/ot)eses and selecting /arallels3 t)en t)is &ook (ill )a+e done its duty &y t)e future. Back THE END

<<2