DRAFT August 31, 2009

This is not yet a completed paper. As it stands, there are repetitions and omissions, the
sporadic comments made on C. P. Snow’s The Two Cultures need to be integrated more
adequately, the last couple of sections were pieced together (not too elegantly) with
selections from recent writings, and many references need to be added.
I look forward to receiving critical comments.
The argument of the paper is reasonably self contained, but frequently I indicate where I
developed aspects of it elsewhere.
I have attempted to put all comments, which are not central to the main line of argument,
in the Endnotes – including some quite long ones; and also all references, so that the
main text has not become too cluttered.

The Many Cultures and the Practices of Science1

Hugh Lacey
Swarthmore / Universidade de São Paulo

1. Culture, human agency and human well-being

Despite the current cult of individualism, what a person is cannot be dissociated from the social fabric in which he or
she is enmeshed. Human beings are agents, beings that interact with nature, artifacts and other human beings in
ways that reflect their values, their beliefs about what is possible and desirable, and their bodily capacities. Agency
can be cultivated (it can be strengthened and diminished); and so a person can be held responsible for the values he
holds, the decisions he makes, the understanding that informs them, the practical judgments he affirms, and the
outcomes of his actions. Whether and how a person’s agency is cultivated (or diminished) – and thus the ways in
which he interacts (and can interact) with nature, artifacts and other people – is linked dialectically with the social
fabric, with the values that its institutions and practices embody, the possibilities that it enables and forecloses, and
the worldview that it nurtures (expressing the presuppositions of the predominant value outlooks and providing the
categories for gaining understanding and for circumscribing his or her sense of what is possible). 2 Agents are bodily,
conscious/intentional and social beings. The cultivation and exercise of agency has material conditions – agency
cannot be well exercised without adequate food, nourishment, housing etc and security of its provision. But the
exercise of agency also requires the conditions (material, psychological, epistemic, social, economic) for acting in
the light of one’s own personally endorsed values informed by one’s reasonably held beliefs about what is possible
(where the values and beliefs are tested in the course of dialogue with others – taking into account issues about what
is possible especially for the sake of enabling everyone to live according to his own reflexively endorsed values).
Human well-being has integrally bodily, agentive and social dimensions. Social practices should be appraised in
terms of their potential contribution to the well-being of everyone everywhere – and, in view of well known current
environmental realities, also to that of the members of future generations.
I will refer to the variations (historical, geographical, class, etc) of the social fabric in which people may be
located as cultural variations, most notably variations in the predominant value outlooks held and their
accompanying worldviews, which express views of nature and its possibilities and ideals of human nature, human
well-being and human flourishing. How agency is cultivated varies with culture, and so does how its relationship to
human well being is conceived. There are many cultures, 3 that shape distinctive ways of life – distinctive ways of
interacting among people, with natural objects and the environment and (in some cultures) with other kinds of
beings (spirits, gods, God) – in which distinctive human attributes are valued and cultivated because of how they are

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seen as expressing human nature and contributing to human well-being. The objective of contributing to the well-
being of everyone everywhere needs to be sensitive to this – and be pursued with appropriate social conditions in
place so that one can be aware of the diversity of cultural values, and who the bearers of the various values are. In
view of the agentive dimension of agency, people’s well-being cannot be separated from being able to express in
their lives the values that they have reflexively endorsed in their particular cultural settings.

2. Science and culture; science as a universal value

The tradition of modern science – its explanatory ideals, the kinds of phenomena that it considers significant (and so
of high priority for investigation), its links with technology, its privileged methodologies, the epistemic standards
that it highlights – reflects a particular cultural background. Its own interpreters (e.g., Snow), however, have
downplayed this fact, regarding scientifically established results as rationally requiring universal allegiance, and
engagement in the practices of gaining scientific knowledge as a necessity for ‘development’, for producing a state
of affairs in which the basic material necessities of all human beings would be satisfied – modern science, regardless
of its culturally-specific origins, represents a universal value; science serves (or could serve) the interest of all
humankind. Thus, Snow speaks of a ‘moral current right in the grain of science itself’. It needs to be channeled
properly, of course, so that the destructive potential that is also in its grain (its alliance with military developments)
does not overwhelm it. But Snow is confident of the basic moral virtues of scientists; they ‘have the future [a better
future!] in their bones’4 – their practices make them sensitive to meeting the needs of the world’s impoverished and
acting against totalitarian forces.

2.1 Objectivity and inclusivity

The idea that science represents a universal value has been put in many different ways, but there seem to be two
main components (each with a variety of competing formulations):5
1. Objectivity: Properly established scientific knowledge has a claim on everyone - so that, minimally, it is irrational
to act deliberately informed by beliefs that are refuted by scientific developments. The ground of objectivity lies
in testing knowledge claims in the light of available empirical data (meeting certain standards of adequacy) and
cognitive criteria (principally concerning relations between the theory in which the knowledge claim is
represented and the data) that include no commitments in the realm of ethical and social values. The criteria of
evaluation are free from specifically cultural factors, and so there are no sound culturally-based reasons to
question properly established scientific knowledge. 6
2. Inclusivity (evenhandedness, non-favoritism, neutrality) – scientific knowledge belongs to the shared patrimony
of humankind: In principle, scientific knowledge may be used (on application) – more or less evenhandedly – to
inform projects shaped by interests that embody any viable cultural values. This has been interpreted to mean: (a)
each item of established scientific knowledge may be so used; (b) from the stock of established knowledge, any
interests may pick some items that serve them; (c) the steady accumulation of scientific knowledge increasingly
enables more and more interests to be served by the application of scientific knowledge. [It seems quite clear that
interpretation (a) cannot be sustained!]
To the interpreters of the scientific tradition, objectivity and belonging to the shared patrimony of
humankind are values or ideals of the tradition; even so, they acknowledge that it is not a fact that all accepted

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scientific results accord with objectivity and, more obviously so, with inclusivity. They say, however, that the
trajectory of the tradition is towards more complete manifestation of these ideals in scientific institutions and
practices; and insofar as the actual trajectory is not in this direction, it may appropriately be criticized. 7 It is open to
empirical investigation to determine whether or not the trajectory of the scientific tradition is in the direction of
closer accord with these ideals; and, if not, whether or not it is possible to re-direct current scientific practices so that
it does so [see § 4]. If it is not possible, then the claim that science represents a universal value would have to be
revised. Today, such revision might not be very contentious, for it has become common for science policy making to
be framed by the presupposition that scientific investigation is for the sake of gaining reliable knowledge that can
inform the technoscientific innovation that is indispensable for economic growth. Only if economic growth, based
on technoscientific innovation, is a condition for the well-being of everyone everywhere, can investigation, framed
by this presupposition, produce closer accord with inclusivity. (That, too, is a matter for empirical inquiry.)
Throughout the tradition the two ideals generally seemed compelling to both empiricist and rationalist
interpreters, 8 and it was assumed that scientists generally endorsed these ideals and cultivated the virtues needed for
the sake of acting in closer accord with them. 9 The modern scientific ideal of objectivity – scientific knowledge (and
understanding) as the outcome of systematic empirical inquiry, subject to appraisal by cognitive criteria that reflect
no specific cultural values – came to be seen as expressing what we could expect of the most reliable knowledge
(embodying the highest epistemic standards); when used to inform human action, it enhances its efficacy or utility,
specifically it enhances our capacity to ‘control’ natural objects and phenomena, 10 opening up the possibility to
improve the lives of everyone by controlling the causes of (e.g.) the causes of illness and disease, and utilizing
sources of energy to lighten the burdens of labor. Of course, enhancing our capacity to control also created the
potential to produce weapons of great destruction. (That is the downside of inclusivity.) But, the tradition maintained
that the progressive accumulation of scientific knowledge would produce knowledge of service to everyone – ‘the
moral current in the grain of science itself’ could be temporally channeled in the wrong direction, but not put aside.
The frontiers of scientific inquiry are always expanding – in principle, the tradition held, all phenomena could be
grasped in the course of systematic inquiry 11 – hence the promise of progressively expanding the realm of
efficacious human intervention into nature into more and more domains of human life, and providing reliable
knowledge to deal with more and more of the sources of human ills.

2.2 Characterizing ‘scientific’ practices: systematic empirical inquiry (without further qualification) or systematic
empirical inquiry that utilizes strategies of the decontextualized-reductionist [D-R] methodological approach.

The story just told is riddled with ambiguity. We see this clearly when we attempt to characterize what scientific
practices are.
The above remarks suggest an account somewhat like the following:

S: Scientific practices involve, first, systematic empirical investigation conducted for the sake of generating
and consolidating understanding (knowledge) of phenomena
(i) that is empirically based and represented in well confirmed theories, and
(ii) that permits the discovery of new phenomena and new ways of generating and eliminating phenomena,
and the anticipation of the causal consequences of phenomena (including those brought about by human
interventions) and the possibilities to which they may give rise.
The understanding that is sought for is

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 (iii) of ever expanding domains of phenomena, including phenomena produced or proposed in the course of
experimental and measurement operations (that are frequently performed with the aim of testing
theories or informing technoscientific innovations) – and such that
(iv) no phenomenon of significance in human life or social practice, and generally no claim about
phenomena, is (in principle) excluded from the compass of scientific investigation.
They include, secondly, efforts to use scientific knowledge to inform practical (technological) activities (to
apply scientific knowledge), and frequently scientific knowledge is sought having in view – and, at times,
directly to produce – the technological or other forms of practical application of the knowledge and
discoveries, and (sometimes) to inform anticipations of the possibilities produced by the applications,
including their side effects.

An account like this fits well with the Baconian understanding of science. However, what is perhaps the
dominant current in the tradition supplements it with a particular ideal of understanding. Consequently, it takes
scientific research to incorporate a particular kind of methodology, one that involves the utilization of strategies 12
that (1) constrain the theories investigated (the candidates under investigation for confirmation or disconfirmation)
to be able to represent the structures underlying phenomena, and the processes and interactions in which their
components are involved, and the laws (typically of mathematical form) that govern them [to represent underlying
molecular structure, physicochemical mechanisms, mathematical form and quantifiable properties]; and (2) select
quantitative data, more generally data obtained in the course of observing experimental and measurement
operations, as the relevant kind of data that are to be sought for and recorded (so that they can be brought into
interaction with theories for the sake of testing them). Phenomena are considered understood when, under
appropriate description,13 they are well represented in confirmed theories meeting these constraints. This kind of
representation involves dissociation of the phenomena from their sensory qualities, from their ecological, human and
social contexts and any possibilities that they may have in virtue of being in these contexts, and from any links the
phenomena may have with human experience, lives and values – ‘scientific‘ understanding involved grasping the
possibilities of phenomena only insofar as they are represented as generated, or generable, from underlying
structure, process, interaction and law. The methodologies that incorporate these strategies decontextualize the
phenomena by ignoring their ecological, human and social contexts, and (in the case of biological and human
phenomena) reduce them to underlying physicochemical and neural mechanisms. I call them methodologies of the
decontextualized-reductionist approach (D-R approach).
Should science be considered adequately characterized by S: consisting of the practices of systematic
empirical investigation aiming to gain understanding of phenomena, understanding that can inform useful
applications, where the research methodologies adopted are whatever is appropriate given the characteristics of the
object being investigated? Or by S1: consisting only of practices that utilize the D-R approach to gain understanding
of phenomena, understanding that enhances our capacity to control natural objects and to further technological
progress?
The answer is not settled by the fact – and I think that it is a fact! – that mainstream scientific practitioners
overwhelmingly explicitly opt for S1, and the fact that mainstream science is institutionalized in a way that reflects
S1. It is not settled, because most scientists and spokespersons of scientific institutions would also subscribe to the
two ideals stated above. The question I am interested in can be put this way: Can science, considered according to
S1, produce a closer accord with the ideals of objectivity and inclusivity? If it cannot, should we remain with S1,

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and give up these ideals? Or, should we maintain the ideals, and work out how to re-institutionalize science, in
accordance with S, so that they can be approached more closely?

2.3 The general adequacy of the D-R approach; methodology and ontology
There is no doubt that the D-R approach has been fruitful. Within it, numerous theories of many (and expanding)
domains of phenomena have been confirmed, which have led to the discovery of countless possibilities for the
exercise of technological control (and good reason to hold that it will continue to do so), many of which are
positively valued by almost everyone.14 Moreover, without the use of some D-R methodologies, no phenomena can
be fully understood.
Nevertheless, if only the R-D approach used, some phenomena cannot be adequately understood, including:
• risks: especially, what I call indirect risks, long-term ecological and social risks of technoscientific innovations15 –
and not only risks, harmful effects that have actually been produced (e.g.) on both ecological and cultural diversity,
e.g., environmental deterioration, global warming, and undermining of food security for many people.
• the causal networks in which problems facing the poor are located ,and the projects of application (and gaining) of
scientific knowledge are carried out16
• alternative practices (e.g., in agriculture, agroecology) that are not primarily based on using technoscientific
innovations (as, e.g., transgenics-based agriculture is)
• phenomena that cannot be reduced to their underlying physicochemical mechanisms: e.g., biological organisms,
ecological systems, human intentional action, and social structures.17
To investigate these phenomena – given the kind of phenomena that they are – one must use
methodological strategies, marginalized in mainstream science, that do not decontextualize or reduce.
Given S1, such investigation would not count as ‘scientific’. For S, however, ‘scientific‘ credentials come
from inquiry being empirical and being responsive to the ideal of objectivity – adoption of strategies that fit into the
D-R approach is not built into the characterization of science. It permits the adoption of other strategies; it allows
methodological pluralism and the possibility that different kinds of objects may require different strategies
(deploying different kinds of categories) if adequate understanding is to be obtained of them. S permits adapting
methodology to the features of the object of inquiry; it does not subordinate ontology to methodology. But it does
not guarantee that adopting non-D-R strategies will be fruitful, i.e., that it will actually lead to the confirmation of
theories (of specified domains of phenomena) in accordance with objectivity – that depends on the successful
outcome of empirical research. And the long-term failure of research to demonstrate the fruitfulness of non-D-R
strategies would, no doubt, constitute a reason to take S as effectively equivalent to S1. But, there is plenty of
evidence that there are fruitful non-D-R strategies – I have often used the case of agroecology to illustrate this; other
examples can be found in studies in environmental science and of social structures and human intentional action. 18

2.4 The cultural salience of phenomena that cannot be adequately grasped within the D-R approach
These strategies are deployed when the object of inquiry is such that adequate description of it requires categories
that have no place in theories that meet the constraints of the D-R approach, e.g., when this object of inquiry
concerns phenomena that – insofar as we encounter them in experience and practice – cannot be adequately
characterized using D-R categories. Examples include food security, sustainable agroecosystems, deteriorated

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environments, pollution, holding specified ethical/social values, risks occasioned by technoscientific innovations
(qua economic commodities, or bearers of intellectual property rights) including those that might diminish the
agency of relevant parties.
Clearly, ethical/social values are heavily involved when these phenomena come into play. Their salience as
objects for investigation is value-influenced and related to factors in practical social life, to culture. The categories
deployed in describing them have value connotations – soundly empirically grounded claims properly lead (ceteris
paribus) to making value judgments – e.g., food security and the conditions for generating and maintaining it are
significant ethically, and the causes of food insecurity (that may become known objectively as a consequence of
empirical inquiry) are (ceteris paribus) properly the focus of negative value judgments. 19 [Similar remarks can be
made about ‘risk’.] In a clear sense, then, such results are neither neutral nor in accord with inclusivity.
Although, at times, objectivity can be realized in these investigations, very frequently the exigencies of
practice do not allow sufficient time for the investigation that would be needed to produce results that are in accord
with objectivity [cf. § 4.1]. We must act (make a decision) – e.g., to use transgenics on a large scale or not – although
evidence is not now (yet?) available to support (in accordance with objectivity) key claims that provide legitimacy
for using transgenics, e.g., the absence of serious risks and of alternatives that occasion less serious risks; and it is
not available to disconfirm these claims either. 20 I doubt that anyone would outright deny that, if ‘there are serious
unmanageable risks’ were established in accordance with objectivity, then (ceteris paribus) it would be improper to
use transgenics on a large scale. 21 In its absence, however, the pertinent question becomes: Does the available
evidence support that it is sufficiently likely to be true (and so likely to be established in accordance with objectivity,
if adequate further investigation were conducted) – and if so, that it is improper to go ahead with using transgenics
on a large scale? Answers to this question cannot themselves be accepted in accordance with objectivity – but any
action or policy (to use or not to use) will be informed by the answer one endorses to it. [To endorse a proposition, P,
is to judge that it is proper (legitimate) to act in ways that are informed by P – that one may act (at least for now,
until such time as more evidence might become available) as if P were true.]
Values affect the answer one endorses. The precautionary principle (which incorporates a set of specific
values) proposes to delay such use, pending carrying out more adequate investigation of the risks/alternatives issue
(see § 3.1). Agribusiness (the bearer of different values) wants to go ahead - it is more influenced by the risks of
losing profit on its investments (which pretty clearly would happen if the PP were followed). But it (and scientists
associated with it) also tend to affirm that there is no ‘scientific‘ evidence that there are serious risks. They have
carried out risk analysis using the methodologies of S1 (see Note 15), and only introduced onto the market products
that have passed these tests; for them, sufficient ‘scientific‘ research has already been done. In this way, its
commitment to S1 has the function of disguising the fact that values are influencing its endorsement of ‘no risks‘ 22 –
the evidence that their opponents are citing is not ‘scientific‘ evidence, but ‘just a reflection of their ideology’.
Sustainable agroecosystems are the principal object of investigation in agroecology, which is the preferred
form of farming of many movements of small scale farmers and rural workers in impoverished sectors of the
world.23 Culture lies behind considering sustainable agroecosystems to have such salience. In agroecological
investigation, seeds are considered as components of agroecosystems that are investigated in terms of how well they
fare in light of the desiderata: productivity, sustainability (ecological integrity and preservation of biodiversity),
social health, and strengthening of local’s peoples agency,24 with a view to discovering the conditions under which

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they may or may not be actualized in appropriate balance. Context, including cultural context, is essential; the role
and potential of the seed in an agroecosystem cannot be reduced to what can be grasped from attending only to its
underlying (genomic and molecular) structures and mechanisms and their physicochemical interactions with other
(decontextualized) components of the agroecosystem. The results of molecular biology may inform agroecology in
many ways, but molecular biology simply lacks the conceptual resources to deal adequately with the agroecosystem.
Research in agroecology is essentially inter- and multidisciplinary, drawing not only on the mainstream biological
sciences, but also on (at least) ecology, sociology, anthropology, economics, history and political science. More, it
draws upon indigenous and local knowledge and traditional practices, with which it often manifests continuity. It
needs to utilize the farming, observational skills and knowledge of the farmers themselves, who characteristically
have a more complete knowledge of the ecosystems that they work in than formally trained scientists do, and also of
their histories and of the practices that can be sustained and that maintain biodiversity. Moreover, since they are the
ones whose values and cultures are to be strengthened by agroecological practices, agroecological research cannot
be conducted without their committed participation. In agroecological research, there is not a clear line between the
researcher and the farming practitioner, and between formally trained scientists and the bearers of traditional
knowledge. This adds credibility to the scientific credentials of agroecological research. This claim may appear odd,
but only where the methodologies of science have been reduced to those that explore the underlying mechanisms
and laws of phenomena in dissociation from their place in agroecosystems. Note that recognizing the epistemic role
of farmers is valued, not only because it is necessary for gaining the kind of knowledge sought, but also because it
strengthens their agency, enabling them to have a more significant role in the practices that shape the contours of
their lives.

3. Conducting research in accordance with objectivity and inclusivity

In the previous subsection, I argued that investigation appropriate to the four types of phenomena (listed in §2.3),
which requires using strategies that do not fit into the D-R approach, displays the following features:
1. Cultural factors influence what are considered salient objects for investigation.
2. Value judgments can be drawn (ceteris paribus) from empirically confirmed conclusions.
3. Frequently, conclusions that accord with objectivity cannot be reached prior to their pertinence for practical
decisions.25
4. Cultural factors are involved in judgments about who are the agents who must participate in making sound
epistemic judgments – so that a clear dividing line between science and indigenous knowledge is obliterated.
These features, the supporters of S1 maintain, would make science indistinguishable from mere opinion,
and introduce into science the same type of contestation and relativism that (they say) marks value discourse,26 in
contrast to the situation that prevails within ‘science’ (i.e., in inquiry conducted within the D-R approach) where,
when research is properly and adequately conducted, objectivity (not open to the charge of cultural relativism) is
achieved. Moreover, they would necessarily put science in conflict with inclusivity. Then, with objectivity rarely
achieved and inclusivity unrealizable, there would be no case for the autonomy of science.

I do not question that research conducted within the D-R approach is indeed the site of exemplary instances

of accepting theories and making scientific judgments that are in accordance with objectivity – and, I maintain, its
epistemic criteria properly transfer to research conducted under other strategies, 27 so that, where they are not met (in

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the light of the relevant available empirical data), objectivity has not been achieved, and it cannot be without
conducting further research. This may well be a good reason to attempt to extend the reach of the D-R approach as
far as possible, and not to rule out a priori that (when able to deal with very great complexity) it may be able to
encompass all phenomena. But it is not a reason to assume that the D-R approach can, in principle, encompass all
phenomena, and not a reason to reject out of hand the scientific credentials of attempts (using other strategies) to
understand phenomena that currently it cannot deal with.28 In any case, the kinds of phenomena listed above cannot
be investigated – now – within the D-R approach. Given this, is there a good reason to identify ‘science’ in the terms
of S1, rather than the more encompassing S? This question leads to far-reaching implications.

3.1 The decontextualized-reductionist approach and how well it accords with objectivity and inclusiveness
Holding S1 creates its own problems connected with the realization of objectivity and inclusiveness.
To begin to get at them, I will make some remarks about contemporary science and technoscience.29 First,
the principal tendencies of scientific research today are closely tied to technoscientific innovation, economic growth
and other commercial interests. Second, the application of scientific knowledge, in the socioeconomic conditions
characteristic of modernity, has contributed causally to the current environmental crisis, often accompanied by social
and cultural devastation, a crisis that threatens to provoke irreversible environmental and social damage. Third, it
has not been a priority for scientific research to produce knowledge that would be adequate to deal with this crisis,
or to anticipate further risks that the application of scientific knowledge might occasion; and, in addition, the
benefits of technoscientific progress have not been uniformly distributed among rich and poor.30
Part of the explanation of these three phenomena, I suggest, is that a great part of the conduct of
contemporary science, de facto, is informed by the ethical principle – that I call the principle of the legitimacy of
technoscientific innovation (PLTI) – ‘Ceteris paribus, i.e., unless there exists ‘scientific’ evidence that there are
serious risks [i.e., in the terminology that I have been using, unless it is confirmed by research conducted within the
D-R approach that there are serious risks], it is legitimate to implement without delay efficacious applications of
objectively confirmed scientific knowledge’. PLTI tends to be associated with the ethical imperative: ‘prioritize
technoscientific ‘solutions’ to the world’s great problems (e.g., malnutrition in impoverished sectors of the world)’,
and to imply that it is an ethical deficiency to cast doubt on the potential or legitimacy (and certainly the priority) of
research that is said might lead to such ‘solutions’. 31
If research is conducted informed by PLTI, then it does not accord with inclusivity – for the value of many
of its applications is contested by (among others) those who adopt the precautionary principle (PP): ‘It is obligatory
to practice caution concerning new technoscientific innovations because of their potential risks and, prior to their
implementation in social practices, to permit a reasonable period for conducting and evaluating ecological, social
and other investigations on risks, alternatives, and the causal context of proposed applications’.32 PP is linked with a
general ethical stance: ‘it is irresponsible to participate in the kind of research (e.g., in biotechnology or
nanotechnology) that leads to technoscientific innovation, unless rigorous and systematic research is conducted that
is appropriate and sufficient to identify and appraise the long-term ecological, human and social risks of anticipated
innovations, and unless adequate investigation is conducted on the social value (benefits) of implementing the
innovations taking into account the possible benefits of alternatives and the cultural factors that influence the
appraisal of benefits’.

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 From the perspective of S1, it is common to reject PP on the ground that it involves bringing ethical
considerations into science in a way that improperly interferes with the autonomy of science.33 I think that, rather,
they reject it because of the covert role being played by PLTI, and that PLTI and PP are incompatible. This is not an
casual proposal. It takes seriously that the legitimacy of an innovation does not follow from its confirmed efficacy
(for which D-R research is sufficient), but also needs backing from endorsing claims, such as ‘no serious risks’, ‘no
genuine alternatives’ and (in the case that the innovation is offered as a ‘solution’ to some problem) that the
socioeconomic conditions of implementing the innovation are adequate for the ‘solution’ to be effective when one
takes into account the socioeconomic causal context of the problem. But mainstream technoscientific research
attends to indirect risks (see Note 15) only when paying attention to them cannot be avoided, and then only in
fragmentary, haphazard, sporadic, ad hoc, post hoc, easily manipulated, opportunistic ways; and it hardly attends at
all to alternatives that are not fundamentally informed by technoscientific innovations, and to the socioeconomic
context of problems and the ‘solutions’ they offer except insofar as they relate to economic growth and other
commercial aims. Not attending seriously to matters pertaining to the legitimacy of application is best explained, I
think, by the proposal that they are taken for granted, and this amounts to the proposal that PLTI is taken for granted.
That PLTI is taken for granted fits easily with S1 – its calls for no research other than that conducted within the D-R
approach.

3.2 The decontextualized-reductionist approach and the values of technological progress34

More than this, it is part of Snow’s ‘moral current in the grain of science itself’. Let me briefly explain what I have
in mind.
Scientific knowledge consolidated within the D-R approach tends to serve especially well the practical
interests that reflect value outlooks that incorporate what I call the values of technological progress (VTP). These
values include: according high ethical and social value to expanding the scope of the human capacity to exercise
control over natural objects, especially as embodied in technoscientific innovations, to innovations that increase the
penetration of technologies (objects, systems, solutions to problems) ever more intrusively into ever more domains
of modern (daily and domestic) lives, experiences and institutions, and to the definition of problems in terms that
permit technoscientific solutions. VTP also involves not subordinating the value of control of natural objects
systematically to any other ethical and social values but, on the contrary, according prima facie legitimacy to
implementing technoscientific innovations, even tolerating a considerable measure of social and environmental
disruption for its sake. VTP incorporates PLTI.
I have argued elsewhere (see Note 34) that S1 has been held in the mainstream of the modern scientific
tradition [that the strategies of the D-R approach are considered to be virtually exclusively the strategies of
‘scientific’ research], rather that the more encompassing S, because there are mutually reinforcing relations between
adopting these strategies and holding VTP; and it is a fact that VTP are held by vast numbers of people in
contemporary societies and highly embodied in hegemonic economic and political institutions. Indeed, for many
people today, holding these values does not seem to depend on much conscious reflection, for they are integral to the
self-understanding of our age, and their presuppositions (below) are widely taken to be truisms. Moreover, their high
embodiment in hegemonic institutions is strengthened today by the mutually reinforcing relations that also exist

9
between them and the values of capital and the market, for today institutions that embody the latter values are the
primary bearers of VTP.
Note that this is an explanation for the virtual exclusive adoption the strategies of the D-R approach in
scientific research. This would underlie a justification for it, if there were compelling reasons to hold VTP. Holding
them, like holding any set of values, is rendered coherent and rationally justified by appeal to certain
presuppositions, which (I suggest) include proposals like the following: 35 (a) On-going technoscientific innovation
expands human potential and provides benefits that can be made available to all human beings. [Current versions
tend to tie this to the contribution that technoscientific innovation makes to economic growth.] (b) Technoscientific
solutions can be found for virtually all practical problems (in medicine, agriculture, communications, transportation,
energy provision, etc), including those occasioned by the ‘side-effects’ of technoscientific implementations
themselves. (c) For most of these problems there are only technoscientific solutions. (d) The values of technological
progress represent a set of universal values that must be part of any viable value outlook today – there is no viable
alternative.
I identify these as presuppositions of VTP, because it would be practically inconsistent to hold the values of
VTP and deny the bulk of these proposals. All of them are open to empirical inquiry, however not within the D-R
approach, but in the historical/social sciences. Nevertheless, those who affirm them tend not to do so on the basis of
such research; they tend to consider them obviously justified by the historical record. Indeed, a remarkable certitude
is expressed about the presuppositions of VTP even by those who insist that scientific inquiry cannot produce
certainty [they have ‘the future in their bones’], so much so that those who question them tend to be dismissed as
‘anti-science’, ‘anti-progress’, or bearers of some ethically suspect agenda. But, since not subjected to investigation,
they are in fact held dogmatically – and certainly not in accordance with the standards of objectivity.

3.3 No non-dogmatic, culture-neutral grounds for granting privilege to the decontextualized-reductionist approach
Endorsing S1 provides a way to escape from inquiry that has the 4 features (summarized at the beginning of §3),
only if the presuppositions of VTP (and PLTI) are accepted dogmatically. But that would be at the expense of both
objectivity and inclusivity. But, if it becomes accepted that these presuppositions should be subjected to
investigation, then ‘science’ could no longer be articulated as it is in S1. The research that might lead to confirming
these presuppositions would, then, at most justify that the D-R approach had privilege for research on certain kinds
of phenomena. 36 However, the research has not been conducted, and in fact there is available evidence that at least
raises questions about the likelihood of their becoming confirmed. 37
S1 represents a way of thinking about and practicing science that reflects specific cultural values – and
following it poses threats to objectivity and offers little prospect of obtaining a fuller manifestation of inclusivity.
Following S1 involves giving up on the traditional values of the modern scientific tradition, and ties science more
tightly to serve VTP and the values connected with prioritizing economic growth. But the complaint of S1 against
entertaining multiple strategies (not all of which are reducible to those that fit into the D-R approach) is that this
runs counter to objectivity and inclusivity.
Yet, at the present time, I think that we should not give up objectivity and inclusivity as ideals of scientific
practices. It is true that exclusively following the D-R approach or adopting only one kind of strategy (e.g.,
agroecological strategies), because of the mutually reinforcing relations that they have with particular cultural value

10
outlooks, makes lapses from objectivity likely and does not permit inclusivity. I think that the best way to interpret
inclusivity is that interests shaped by any viable value outlook can be served by some items from the whole stock of
established scientific knowledge. 38 That is only possible if pluralism of strategies is accepted and acted upon, so that
phenomena of special salience for all viable value outlooks are properly investigated – e.g., technoscientific
innovation if one holds VTP, long-term ecological and social risks if one holds PP, sustainable agroecosystems if one
holds the value outlooks of popular rural social movements. Since mainstream science is dominated by and
institutionalized in the light of S1, in a context where VPT is increasingly manifested in conjunction with values
connected with economic growth, adopting PP or the value outlooks of the popular movements and pursuing
research under strategies that can adequately investigate phenomena of special salience for them – that need also to
be investigated for dealing with questions about the legitimacy of particular technoscientific innovations – actually
serve also to further the prospects of the fuller realization of the traditional ideals of modern science. They serve as
correctives or antidotes to the departures from these ideals that mark contemporary science. 39

4. Re-institutionalizing science
For this to happen science would have to be re-institutionalized. 40 The re-institutionalized science would have broad
democratic participation and oversight, in order to redirect the uses of scientific knowledge and the priorities of
research, to make use of important methodological strategies that are currently marginalized; and to create space
where researchers can (among other things) be responsive to PP, and where some of them can begin with the
aspirations, assessments of needs, and practices of the social movements and involve their participation in an
integral way. 41 Then, the ways in which scientific research is conducted – the kinds of questions that scientific
research addresses, the phenomena to be prioritized for investigation and hence the strategies to be adopted in
research – could be determined in collaboration with (among others) the social movements and reflect their values
and experiences. The proposal is not intended to deny space for research aiming for technoscientific innovation, but
to create institutional forms in which there can be democratic deliberation – involving the participation of
representatives of all who experience the impact of technoscientific innovation, and who have proposals for dealing
with the world’s serious problems – about appropriate priorities for research and allocations of resources. Above all,
it is to enable resources to become available for research that could test the potential of alternatives and inform their
conduct; and it would insist that questions concerning risks (including causal connection to global warming) and
alternatives be thoroughly investigated before technoscientific innovations are socially introduced. It would
highlight the question: How to pursue scientific investigation so that nature is respected, its regenerative powers not
further undermined and restored wherever possible, and the well-being of everyone everywhere furthered?

4.1 Imagining the re-institutionalized science

To re-institutionalize science requires both the ample use of our imaginations (fertilized by wide ranging dialogue
and argument), and creative collaborative practices. In this section I offer some initial thoughts for imaging the re-
institutionalized science.42
The judgment that a social implementation of a technoscientific innovation is legitimate (ethically justified)
depends on sound judgments being made about (at least) the absence of serious unmanageable risks and of better
alternatives. However, I wrote above (§3.1), reflecting the covert role being played by PLTI, that “mainstream

11
technoscientific research attends to indirect risks only when paying attention to them cannot be avoided, and then
only in fragmentary, haphazard, sporadic, ad hoc, post hoc, easily manipulated, opportunistic ways; and it hardly
attends at all to alternatives that are not fundamentally informed by technoscientific innovations, and to the
socioeconomic context of problems and their ‘solutions’ except insofar as they relate to economic growth and other
commercial aims.”
Not attending to indirect risks, not attempting to anticipate them or even recognizing their possibility, is an
important factor in the explanation of how (e.g.) global warming and the deterioration of soils caused by ‘green
revolution’ technologies could come about, apparently without being widely anticipated. This fact gives significant
impulse towards adopting PP, and to adopting the general ethical outlook that I have associated with it. We know
that serious, irreversible, life-threatening, civilization-threatening effects occur and build up over time – but we
know very little of the actual details and mechanisms.
What has been lacking is a systematic and expanding body of knowledge concerning (1) risks, especially
indirect risks, (2) alternatives to practices based on technoscientific innovation, and (3) the full (including
socioeconomic) causal context of technoscientific innovation and (when it is implemented for the sake of dealing
with problems) the socioeconomic causal context of the problem. In the absence of such a systematic body of
knowledge, often only weakly supported claims about risks and alternatives are available [cf. §2.4], posing little
forceful opposition to the play of PLTI; and – when challenged – the proponents of innovations, such as transgenics,
are able to affirm ‘there is no scientific evidence that there are serious risks and viable alternatives’.43 When they say
this, they overstate the point; nevertheless, there may be little evidence – but this is of no significance when
sufficient adequate research has not been conducted on the matter.
A primary aim for research in the re-institutionalized science would be to obtain such a systematic body of
knowledge gained using a variety of methodological strategies (as appropriate to the objects being investigated). It
would recognize that one culture should not dominate science, while understanding that this does not mean ‘de-
culturing’ science (as if that were possible), but including constructive places for many cultures. It would have at
least the following broad focal points:
• Long-term tracking of environment/health related problems, and of the impact (short-term and cumulative) of
technological innovation on human beings/society/culture/environment – in all dimensions that are considered
important from the point of view of all currently held value outlooks – so that (among other things) risk analysis
can have available a large stock of examples from the past, and proposals for solving current social problems (e.g.,
disease) can take into account the full range of causal factors that have brought about and maintain the problem, so
that we can assess whether or not the proposed solution addresses the cause of the problem.
• What I call the ‘range of alternatives’ question. Prior to implementing any technoscientific innovation, conduct
investigation that addresses: “In the light of the proposed benefits of the innovation, what is the range of
alternatives which might offer comparable or ‘better’ benefits, not limited a priori to alternatives that essentially
are involved in technoscientific innovation; and which of them, all things considered, is the best alternative?” –
where the investigation takes into account that ‘best’ may be thought of differently in the context of different
locations, cultures and value perspectives. Applied to the case of transgenics, I considered the ‘range of
alternatives’ question in these terms: “What agricultural methods – ‘conventional’, transgenic and other
alternatives, such as organic, subsistence, biodynamic, agroecological, ecologically sustainable, permaculture, the

12
 ‘system of rice intensification’, and others adapted for use in urban settings – and in what combinations and with
what locally specific variations, could be sustainable, relatively free from risks (including those connected with
greenhouse gas emissions), and sufficiently productive, when accompanied by viable distribution methods, to meet
the food and nutrition needs of the whole world’s population in the foreseeable future?”
• Phenomena, little addressed in mainstream science, but of great salience from the perspective of certain value
outlooks – e.g., phenomena relevant to strengthening food sovereignty, programs of public health that are aimed at
the diseases to which the poor are especially prone, the social causes of sicknesses (and not just medical
technoscientific cures for them), and environmental maintenance and regeneration. Many of these would be
phenomena which would not be well grasped without making use of methods developed by (or in continuity with)
various forms of indigenous knowledge.
I imagine that there would be large-scale on-going research projects in these (and, no doubt, other) areas,
which would enable the accumulation of knowledge pertinent both to appraising the legitimacy of implementing
technoscientific innovations, and to informing alternative practices that are especially valued among groups
(cultures) that do not hold the values of unbridled economic growth. This would be a sort of counterpart to ‘basic
research’ conducted within the D-R approach, not driven by the immediate utilitarian goals, and much of it would
deal with issues of wide interest that are worth being curious about .44 It would be regulated by reference to
.

objectivity and – given its systematic, long-term, cumulative character – we might expect to have available much
more knowledge that actually meets the standards of objectivity45 about risks [cf. 2.4], alternatives, and actual
damage that needs to be worked on now, as well as generalizations that point towards what should be avoided in the
future. (The kind of research that is now being conducted on global warming and climate change is perhaps a partial
model for what would be typical in the re-institutionalized science.) However, unlike in basic science, research
conducted within the D-R approach, phenomena about human beings and their actions, characterized using the
common intentional categories of agency, are at the center of attention. This does not make them less interesting, or
less open to empirical investigation. Why shouldn’t it be a major social priority to gain the conditions necessary for
conducting this kind of research – on a scale (and with appropriate levels of funding) comparable to that of the
human genome project, or that being requested for stem-cell research?

4.2 Acting to bring about the re-institutionalized science

Imagining the re-institutionalized science is an indispensable task (and one that, as a philosopher of science, I feel
more at ease with). However, it is also essential to consider – practically, organizationally – how it might be brought
about. Remember, I have suggested that the need for the re-institutionalized science comes from two sources: (1)
interest in bringing scientific practices more into accord with the traditional values of objectivity and inclusivity, and
(2) interest in furthering scientific practices that respond to the question: How to pursue scientific investigation so
that nature is respected, its regenerative powers not further undermined and restored wherever possible, and the
well-being of everyone everywhere furthered.
As a starting point to what will have to be an extended discussion involving many parties, who are engaged
in efforts in their own spaces and practices, I tentatively suggest that it must involve a very complex dialectic, which

13
would require – cooperatively, simultaneously and in interaction – expanding successful achievements on each of
the following matters (and, no doubt, others):
1. Gaining space in current institutions (especially universities since they are not (yet!) totally dominated
by commercially related interests) in order to successfully conduct research in which these two interests can
be pursued, no doubt now on a small scale, but in as many areas as possible – aiming to get support for
large-scale research projects of the kinds described in the previous subsection. (Agroecology is an example;
other examples need to be identified for research in medicine, energy, computers and information,
communication, biotechnology, etc; and long-term research on environmental problems, global warming,
etc) .

2. Steps towards strengthening autonomy (in the traditional, not the individualist sense) in research
institutions.46 This means freeing them from the disproportionate influence of the values of capital and the
market in setting the priorities of scientific research and determining appropriate methodologies, and from
the interference derived from holding these values in the conduct of science (e.g., via legal imposition of
regimes of intellectual property rights). These steps are proposed in order that research be conducted not
only rigorously in the light of the ideal of objectivity, but also to strengthen inclusivity by greater inclusion
(and funding for the work) of investigators, whose horizon is not technoscientific innovation linked with
furthering economic growth, and who pursue investigation that can inform the interests nurtured by values
that compete with those of capital and the market (e.g., environmental sustainability and enhanced agency
for everyone). Taking the steps would contribute to making results of scientific research available to serve a
growing array of interests and, for the sake of moving towards inclusivity, it would give priority to the
interests of poor and marginalized peoples, and other interests (like redressing global warming) that pertain
to the viability of future human life.

3. More widespread adoption of the Precautionary Principle in research institutions, and incorporation of it
in public science policies, so that technoscientific innovation becomes more subordinated to the values
expressed in it; and the kinds of research on risks and alternatives, which its use shows to be needed,
become conducted more extensively.

4. The growth of – and active collaboration among – movements that aspire to democratic values, including
the protection of human rights (the full range of economic/social/cultural as well as civil/political rights
recognized in the UN Declaration of Human Rights) and to strengthening of local people’s agency, enabling
them to engage successfully in activities – including knowledge-gaining practices47 – they have devised to
embody these values more fully in their locales. (In this context I suggest paying special attention to the
value of local and national food sovereignty.)48

5. The expansion and improvement of practices that are informed by knowledge gained in the research
(referred to in items 1 and 4), so that interests from all value outlooks viably held in contemporary society
are able to benefit from the input of scientific knowledge.

6. The growth of movements, institutions and programs in which researchers, practitioners and citizens
collaborate, including programs for educating citizens to be able to be intelligent participants in
deliberations on science policy matters, and others for scientists to learn from citizens what they consider
the principal problems and interests that need to be addressed, how they experience the problems and
perceive the causal networks that bring about and maintain them. There is needed the participation of
scientists, industry and the public to work out how the re-institutionalized science would work, and to
create examples showing how democratic and multicultural participation might enhance science.

7. Universities (and other educational institutions) developing appropriate forms of scientific education,
and designing and implementing schedules and conditions of work for their personnel (teachers,
researchers, students), that are in tune with scientists acting on the two interests stated above, rather than
being caught up in the ‘rat-race’ towards more and hasty specialization.

8. Development and enactment of appropriate public policies that reflect democratic values. (Again,
importance of food sovereignty.)

14
 To some extent each of these matters can begin to be addressed relatively independently of the others, but
fuller development would depend on interaction among them and, in the long run, unless all of them are developed,
each one of them will be curtailed. The conditions for scientists to respond to the two interests cannot be put in place
without an extended struggle. I take these eight matters to define points of entry into that struggle that can be
pursued immediately. Unless they are pursued, the re-institutionalized science will remain a figment of the
imagination.

REFERENCES

Lacey, H. (1999) Is Science Value Free? Values and scientific understanding. London: Routledge.

–– (2005) Values and Objectivity in Science: Current controversy about transgenic crops. Lanham, MD: Lexington
Books.

–– (2006a) A Controvérsia sobre os Transgênicas: Questões científicas e éticas. Aparecida (São Paulo): Editora
Ideias e Letras.

–– (2006b) ‘O Princípio de Precaução e a autonomia da ciência’. Scientia Studia 4: 373–392.

–– (2007) ‘Explanatory Critique’. In Mervyn Hartwig (ed.), Dictionary of Critical Realism, pp. 196-201. London:
Routledge.

–– (2008a) Valores e Atividade Científica 1. São Paulo: Associação Filosófica Scientiae Studia & Editora 34.

–– (2008b) ‘Crescimento econômico, meio-ambiente e sustentabilidade social: a responsabilidade dos cientistas e a

questão dos transgênicos’. In G. Dupas (ed.), Meio-ambiente e Cresimento Econômico: Tensões estruturais, pp. 91–
130. São Paulo: Editora UNESP.

–– (2008c) ‘Ciência, respeito à natureza e bem-estar humano’. Scientiae Studia 8: 297–327.

–– (2009a) Valores e Atividade Científica 2. São Paulo: Associação Filosófica Scientiae Studia & Editora 34 (in
press).

–– (2009b) ‘Science and democracy: What are the problems?‘ Website of FSM– Science & Democracy: http://fm-
sciences.org/spip.php?article436&lang=en, posted April 21, 2009.

–– (2009c) ‘The interplay of scientific activity, worldviews and value outlooks’. Science & Education 18: 839–860.

Lacey, H. & Lacey, M.I. (2009) ‘Food crises and global warming: Critical Realism and the need to re-institutionalize
science’. In Bhaskar, R., Frank, C., Høyer, K.G., Naess, P. & Parker, J. (eds), Interdisciplinarity and Climate
Change. London: Routledge (in press).

Altieri, M. A. (1955) Agroecology: The science of sustainable development. Bolder, CO: Westview.

Buckley, V. (1962) ‘C. P. Snow: How many cultures?’ The Melbourne Critical Review 5: 102–107.

Funtowicz, S. O. & Ravetz, J.R. (1992) ‘Three types of risk assessment and the emergence of post-normal science’.
In Krimsky, S., and D. Golding (eds), Social Theories of Risk, pp. 251-274. Westport, CT: Praeger.

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Pimbert, M. (2009) Towards Food Sovereignty: Reclaiming autonomous food systems. London: International
Institute for Environment and Development. Available at <http://www.iied.org/pubs/display.php?O=G02493>.

Rudner, R. (1953) ‘The scientist qua scientist makes value judgments’. Philosophy of Science 20: 1–6.

Santos, B. de S. (2007) Another Knowledge is Possible: Beyond northern epistemologies. London: Verso.

Snow, C. P. (1959) The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution: The Rede lecture. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.

ENDNOTES

1Several details in the paper were clarified in the course of seminars, “Sobre a interação entre ciência e valores:
autonomia, neutralidade, precação e democracia,’ that I gave at USP during April 3 – June 15, 2009, as part of the
activities of Projeto Temático FAPESP (2007/53867-0) da equipe de pesquisa da Associação Filosófica Scientiæ
Studia, ‘Gênese e significado da tecnociência: Das relações entre ciência, tecnologia e sociedade’. I acknowledge the
help I gained from criticisms and comments made by members of the PT.

2 Cultivating agency has to do with cultivating individuality, present most notably in persons who reflectively (in the
course of critical dialogue) endorse the values they hold and who act to transform the values embodied in their social
fabrics that impede the fuller manifestation of their endorsed values. (Coming to personally endorse one’s values
involves reflection, articulation, dialogue, manifesting them in one’s actions, reflecting on the consequences of
doing so, and re-articulation, etc.) But persons with cultivated individuality are not to be identified with the
‘individuals’ of ‘rational decision theory’, who act following calculations involving their preferences (utilities) and
probabilities of outcomes, or the healthy, contented consumers, whom modern advertising would have us emulate.
Creating temporary approximations of such ‘individuals’ requires a particular kind of social fabric, apparently one
structured by the institutions and practices of neoliberalism, which inherently do not provide the conditions for
everyone to be able to cultivate their agency (act in the light of their own personally endorsed values informed by
their reasonably held beliefs about what is possible). For more on my views on values, see Lacey (1999, ch. 2;
2008: ch. 2), and on values and worldviews (Lacey, 2009c).
3 My use of ‘culture’ is clearly somewhat skew to Snow’s, but I don’t wish to enter into polemics on this matter. My
interest is in identifying the cultural influence on modern science – not on whether or not scientists constitute a
culture – and on what may be open to science if this influence were countered.
4 ‘Future in their bones’ is an ambiguous metaphor. It was mocked by Vincent Buckley (an Australian poet and
literary critic): ‘[Snow’s claim about scientists] makes things hard for the rest of us; for, at the best ..., we merely
have it in our heads and hearts’ (Buckley 1962, p. 107). If it’s ‘in their bones’ scientists don’t have to think and feel
about the future, or discuss their plans and outcomes with those for whom they are making a better future, to check
whether or not they like what is proposed. The ‘bones’ metaphor nicely captures the certitude that Snow expresses –
unbending, not responsive to dialogue with or consideration of the cultural values of those whose lives are to be
‘improved’ by the outcomes of science. Snow apparently didn’t need dialogical contact with poor people to know
what they desire – certainly in his writings, although he describes the sufferings of his ancestors with considerable
feeling, he showed no evidence of actual involvement with people in the impoverished nations, and no awareness
that science and technology has served imperial powers well in their suppression of these peoples and the
decimation of their cultures. Snow was very comfortable roaming ‘the corridors of power’, but one doesn’t
encounter poor people there.
5 I discuss these and related ideas at length in Lacey (1999; 2005; 2008a; 2009a)
6This view is strengthened when one also accepts the well known (‘Humean’) argument that value judgments
cannot be deduced from items of knowledge. If they could be, then holding a value judgment that was contradicted
by the implications of an item of scientific knowledge might be proposed as a ground to reject the item. The
Humean argument, if accepted, removes that temptation.

16
7This is usually key to the argument for the autonomy of scientific practices [see Note 46], and the idea that science
unfolds following its own dynamic that is not, except contingently and temporarily, responsive to any particular
cultural values.
8 Not, of course, to romantic critics; and recent post-modern critics have diagnosed these ideals as simply
ideological.
9 Snow is quite eloquent about this. In various places, he lists among the virtues of scientists: curiosity,
attentiveness, perseverance, veracity, skepticism, courageous humility, community.
10 This was important to both Bacon and Descartes. For Bacon, control (‘domination’) served as both the decisive
criterion of scientific knowledge and the goal of scientific inquiry. For Descartes, enhanced capacity for control is a
consequence of gaining reliable scientific knowledge.
11 Discussed more fully in Lacey (2009c).
12 I have argued in detail (in Lacey 1999; 2005; 2008a; 2009a) that scientific research is always conducted under a
strategy, whose principal functions are to constrain the class of acceptable theories and to select the kinds of
empirical data that are pertinent for cognitively appraising theories that are being entertained.
13 Appropriate description – and also the linguistic resources of theories – involves deployment only of terms that
refer to the so-called ‘primary qualities’, and so to no terms that have evaluative connotations. Thus, scientific
knowledge cannot have value judgments among its logical implications.
14 There are no ‘culture-based’ reasons to question the confirmation of a very large number of theories that have
been investigated within the D-R approach. However, what is confirmed is that the theory provides understanding of
a particular domain of phenomena, or of phenomena under ‘decontextualized’ description. Although many items of
knowledge (e.g., of viral and bacterial causes of diseases and their treatments) represented in such theories are
highly valued positively by virtually everyone, that a theory is confirmed in this way does not imply generally that it
is significant (of ethical and social value) for all cultures. Moreover, the on-going expansion of the domains of
which D-R understanding is (and is expected to become) available does not provide a good reason to hold that all
phenomena may be well understood within the D-R approach. Perhaps, in important cases, culturally-significant
descriptions are a prerequisite for obtaining adequate understanding! The success of the D-R approach implies
nothing about the potential success of investigation conducted under strategies that are not reducible to those that fit
into it. (See Lacey 2005: part 1; 2009a: part 1; 2009c).
15 I contrast direct risks to human health and the environment connected with chemical, biochemical and physical
mechanisms (that may be reasonably well investigated within the D-R approach), and indirect ones that arise
because of socioeconomic mechanisms: e.g., in the case of the widespread use of transgenics, long-term
environmental risks (e.g., decline of biodiversity of crop plants, new pest problems connected with planting
monocultures) that arise because most transgenics are not only biological objects, but also commodities, bought and
sold on the market, integrated into capitalist relations, enmeshed in issues of intellectual property rights, or risks to
social arrangements that arise from the actual context of their use, including risks of undermining alternative forms
of farming, and (hence) risks occasioned because extensively using transgenics may serve to bring the world’s food
supply increasingly under the control of a few corporations. (See references in Note 17.)
16 The tradition tends to see the ground for inclusivity in the expansion of human capacity to control natural objects
and processes that, in turn, may be used to address human ills (e.g., health problems). But, whether or not expanding
that capacity actually does this depends on the causal networks of the problems and the agents who control the
exercise of the capacity. Whether or not inclusivity can be more fully realized is an empirical matter, requiring
investigation of these networks – investigation that cannot be conducted within the D-R approach.
17 The detailed arguments to back these assertions can be found elsewhere: on risks (Lacey 2005: ch. 9; 2006a: ch.
4; 2009a: ch. 10); on alternatives (Lacey 1999: chs. 8, 9; 2005: chs. 5, 10; 2006a: ch. 5; 2009a: chs. 2, 7–9; Lacey &
Lacey 2009); on causal context of applications (Lacey 2005: chs. 5, 8, 11; 2006a: chs. 3, 6); on human action (Lacey
1999: chs 2, 9; 2005: ch. 11; 2008a: ch. 8; 2009c).
18See references on alternatives and human action in previous Note. Agroecology is discussed in great detail in
Lacey (2005: chs. 5, 10; 2006a, ch. 5; 2009a: ch. 8). On environmental science, see Lacey & Lacey (2009).

17
19 See Lacey (2007; 2008: ch. 8) Lacey & Lacey (2009).
20 See references on risks in Note 17.
21In private, those with sufficient interest might suppress evidence that they might have that supports this claim.
Claims made by businesses in advertising are not held to the canons of scientific integrity.
22 The judgment that standard risk analysis (conducted in accord with S1 – see Note 15) is adequate, although it
does not consider indirect risks (risks that may be occasioned by variables fixed in the context), involves a value
judgment. In addition, standard risk analysis necessarily involves value judgments at a number of levels. ‘Risk’ is a
value-laden (and value-contested) term that has no place in theories developed within the D-R approach. What are
investigated in paradigmatic risk assessments are potential effects (described in terms deployed in strategies of the
D-R approach) that have previously been labelled ‘risks’ because (from the point of view of some value outlook)
they are considered harmful. (Similar remarks apply to ‘benefit.)
Value judgments are involved, in the first place, in this labeling process.
Second, in deciding which of these (possibly very numerous) potential effects should be submitted empirically to
risk assessments – [the most serious ones (that may not be easy to regulate and manage), or the ones where the
benefits might not be sufficient to warrant taking the risks?]
Third, in determining what stance to adopt towards (and who should bear the burden of proof in the face of) possibly
unforeseen, unforeseeable or currently unquantifiable, and possibly irreversible effects.
Fourth, since risk analysis always involves uncertainties, in defining what standards should be adopted in error
analysis, and what counts as sufficient evidence.
Fifth, when one endorses ‘no risk’, one also endorses “the evidence supporting ‘there is risk’ is sufficiently weak
that one need not take into account the consequences that would follow if it were true”. But making that
endorsement involves evaluating the ethical seriousness of the potential consequences. (If, e.g., undermining food
security for millions of poor people would be a consequence, then the evidence supporting ‘there is risk’ should be
very weak indeed, compared (e.g.) to a consequence like that the color of grain produced would be different.) So, the
point is not just that, in the absence of compelling evidence, one tends to allow one’s values to settle the matter (so
far as immediate action is concerned). This point was made forcefully years ago in a famous paper by Richard
Rudner (Rudner 1953). It is also a central concern of so-called ‘post-normal’ science (Funtowicz & Ravetz 1992). S
needs to be somewhat modified in the light of these considerations (but that is another task!).
23Agroecology is considered by these movements to be a better option than transgenics-based forms of farming.
(See Note 18.) For purposes of illustration I am using the transgenics/agroecology case here, the case that I have
considered in most detail (Lacey 2005: part 2; 2006a). Much of my argument can be generalized to technoscientific
innovation and alternative practices that are not based on technoscientific innovation (Lacey 2008b).
24 Based on Altieri (1995).
25 This does not necessarily indicate lack of responsiveness to the ideal of objectivity, but simply recognition that,
because of the exigencies of action, decisions have to be made in the absence of accord with objectivity. The
precautionary principle recommends delays in implementing technoscientific innovations, pending the conduct of
research that might produce results that accord with objectivity [see §4].
26 Snow repeatedly talks (in a positive light) about people thinking alike within the ‘scientific culture’, based on
their shared norms and values.
27 This is a controversial matter, and I acknowledge that I don’t have what I consider a decisive argument in support
of it (but see Lacey 2009a: ch. 11). Several members of the seminars, referred to in Note 1, are not convinced.
28 See Lacey (2009c).

18
29 By way of summary: ‘Technoscience refers to the complex intertwining of science and technology common today
that, where it occurs, renders any distinction of the two largely arbitrary. It incorporates research practices conducted
within the D-R approach that either directly aim for innovative applications or keep the horizon of technological
innovation in view and often produce results that inform innovations and explain their efficacy, and/or whose
conduct is dependent on deploying advanced technoscientific products (instruments, experimental apparatus). In the
latter case, while the research may aim to gain understanding of certain phenomena (usually products of
experimental interventions) without heed to potential applications, fulfilling its aim depends on the successful
pursuit of technoscientific aims. Technoscience often advances by innovating (creating new instruments and modes
of interacting with objects that hitherto had eluded our capacity to act upon or even to observe) for the sake of
conducting more technoscientific research and, in doing so, it may come to investigate phenomena or objects that
are brought into being by the operation of technoscientific products. Technoscience aims to augment our power to
observe (measure) and intervene in the world – expanding our powers into more domains, the very small, the
molecular biological, to overcome communication barriers, to go to new places; it seeks to understand
simultaneously what is intervened upon and the instruments of intervention’ (from Lacey 2008c).
30 Elsewhere: “Commoditized science subverts the historical ideals of science. Scientific knowledge is being used
today primarily for the benefit of commercial and military interests, rather than for the common interests of
humankind and to address the needs of the poor. And the priorities of research are being shaped increasingly by
these special interests, in order to further technoscientific innovation that is integral to economic growth, without
adequate attention being paid to its environmental, human and social consequences – to pollution and global
warming; to the untreated sicknesses of the poor, genetic abnormalities, psychological pathologies and spiritual
malaise; to undermining the human rights of poor peoples” (Lacey 2009a).
31 I have never seen this principle and its associated attitudes explicitly stated, but they seem to pervade Snow’s
‘scientific culture’; perhaps they express the outlook of those who ‘have the future in their bones’!
32 PP does not have a settled formulation. I will not defend my version of it here. (See Lacey 2006b). In all its
formulations, it incorporates commitment to various ethical values concerning human rights (in the broad sense of
the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights), intra- and inter-generational equity, environmental
responsibility, sustainable development, and deliberative democracy.
33 See Lacey (2006b).
34In this subsection, I introduce terminology and conclusions of arguments that I have elaborated in detail elsewhere
(Lacey 1999; 2005a; 2008a; 2009a). Summaries can be found in the Introductions to Lacey (2005a; 2009a).
35 Lacey (2005a: ch. 1; 2009a: ch. 1). Variations on such proposals are integral to the rhetoric of advocating that
public support be made available for technoscientific advances. We find them in advertisements, news programs,
editorial comments, political campaign rhetoric, and in the statements of spokespersons of scientific institutions
when they seek funds for their on-going projects: e.g., stem-cell research, the human genome project,
nanotechnology, and research and development of transgenics. More and subtle social scientific research on these
matters would be welcome. See Lacey (2005, part 2) for documentation of the rhetoric in the transgenics case (see
also Note 18), and also for all other matters in the text referring to transgenics and to forms of agriculture that do not
use them, especially agroecology.
36 One could restrict the use of the term ‘science’ for that research, if one wanted to - but that would not suggest that
its epistemic credentials were superior to that of the research that justified the privilege for this kind of research.
37 Re (d), e.g., the proponents of PP and the social movements that favor agroecology do not hold VTP; to the latter,
the value of technological progress is subordinate to the value of enhancing human agency in its diverse cultural
expressions.
38 Version (b) in statement of inclusivity (§2.1).

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39 Note that this is an argument addressed to those who take the traditional ideals seriously. It will have no interest
for those who have rejected these ideals – either those who readily accept that science is for the sake of furthering
VTP or generating technoscientific innovation that serves the interests of economic growth, or those (influenced by
certain postmodern currents of thought) who see the ideals as simply reflections of ideology. The argument does not
presuppose that those who adopt alternative strategies (consciously aware of their links with particular cultural
values) do so for the sake of furthering the ideals. My point is that, in the current context of science, appeal to the
ideals does not produce a case against pursuing alternative strategies; on the contrary, pursuing them may also de
facto enable fuller realization of these ideals. I am inclined myself to endorse these ideals (certainly objectivity – and
also inclusivity), but the present argument is not offered as an argument for endorsing them. It is an argument for
gaining space now in which to pursue seriously (and with adequate funding) scientific research conducted under a
variety of strategies. Research conducted in that space would serve a range of important value outlooks and the
traditional ideals of science; that range today would include VTP and even neoliberal values, but not insofar as these
value outlooks claim exclusivity for themselves.
40 For a shorter statement, see Lacey (2009b).
41 By way of illustration, consider the following passage taken from a recent paper (Lacey 2009b): “Via Campesina
has emphasized the right to food security for poor peoples, and argued that food sovereignty – not corporate
dominance of agriculture – is the best way to ensure and safeguard it.
This raises a wide range of issues for scientific investigation:
1. What is the evidence supporting this claim about food sovereignty?
Crucial evidence needed here can only come from the experience of farmers themselves – for their experience
speaks to the many-dimensional obstacles posed by industrial agriculture, and to the time-tested successes of non-
industrial alternatives. Note that claims, often made by scientific spokespersons in their arguments for legitimating
the use of transgenics, about technoscientific innovation being the principal source for maintaining food security, are
not objectively confirmed, since they do not contend with this evidence.
2. What forms of agricultural production better serve to consolidate food sovereignty? E.g., not industrial farming
using transgenics, but agroecology used by family and small communal farms, – but, not necessarily one method,
perhaps a multiplicity of complementary methods, each adaptable to its social-ecological environment.
3. What is the role of indigenous and traditional knowledge in informing these practices? Note: the empirical
credentials of ‘the test of time’ should not be ignored. The laboratory is not the only source of scientific evidence.
4. How is food sovereignty linked with other current concerns: biofuels, global warming, the destruction of the
Amazon forest, the financial crisis?
Questions like these are downplayed when science, as in technoscience, is conducted only within the D-R approach.
[But], technoscience is just one – albeit an important and indispensable – approach to science; and indigenous
knowledge does not stand opposed to scientific knowledge, but can be interpreted as scientific knowledge gained
using different (but appropriate) methodologies from mainstream science [see Note 47]. In principle, it – as well as
knowledge gained from feminist, deep ecological and other perspectives – lacks nothing compared to them in its
epistemic credentials.
In the proposed re-institutionalization, social movements will be part of some of the practices of scientific research,
and not only of its oversight – and in a way that embodies both objectivity and inclusiveness (belonging to the
common patrimony of humankind).
42What follow are some thoughts intended to stimulate imaginations and collaborative activities. However, I am
acutely aware that they are only initial ideas, to be worked with, criticized, surpassed, and vastly transformed as a
consequence of wide-ranging dialogue involving a range of cultural visions.
43And they often count on their audience to infer from this fallaciously ‘There is scientific evidence that there are
no serious risks and viable alternatives’.
44Snow makes much of the ‘curiosity’ of scientists. They (he says) are curious about the laws underlying
phenomena and the evolution of species, quite apart from anything useful that might come from their discoveries.
Curiosity will be a motivating factor in the re-institutionalized science, including with the foci highlighted by Snow,
but also (e.g.) about the principles deployed in maintaining biodiversity and in regenerating destroyed and
contaminated ecosystems. Curiosity about the latter phenomena need not be directly linked with the immediacies of
action – it can lead to gaining the objective body of knowledge needed to deal eventually with practical matters.

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45 Having the ideal of objectivity in mind, re-institutionalized science would aim to build into regulatory practices
that the corporations that introduce technoscientific innovations be required to make available (to critical scrutiny by
qualified scientists who have no conflicts of interest) all studies about risks that currently they hold ‘confidential’ –
so that all available relevant data can be considered publicly. In other ways, too, for the sake of objectivity current
uses of intellectual property rights in ways that inhibit inquiry would need to be significantly modified; and, more
generally, ‘science in the private interest’ would be challenged.
46 Re ‘autonomy’: I adapt the following remarks from Lacey (2008c).
Autonomy, in its traditional sense, is held to be a value of scientific practices and institutions for the sake
of furthering objectivity and inclusivity: scientific practices and institutions are (should be) free from external
interference and the disproportionate influence of any particular value (ethical, political, ideological, religious,
economic, metaphysical, etc) outlook. Specifically: (1) Issues concerning proper scientific methodology and the
(objective) criteria for the evaluation of scientific knowledge lie outside of the purview of ethical (political, religious
etc) judgments, personal interests (for wealth, fame, etc) and preferences, and considerations pertaining to
applicability and commerce. They should be resolved in the course of deliberation on the aims of scientific activity
and the characteristics of the objects of investigation – and scientists themselves should have the ‘final say’. (2)
Individual scientists should have autonomy to choose their own research agendas – from a set of options framed by
priorities determined by scientific institutions, but within a context where the priorities of research, for the scientific
enterprise as a whole, are not shaped disproportionately by a particular value outlook. (3) Scientific institutions
should be constituted so as to resist external interference with pursuing the aims of science, in particular the aim of
consolidating more theories, of more domains of phenomena, that enable objectivity and inclusivity to be more fully
expressed. This includes interference from governments or corporations to limit public access to scientific results in
certain areas. (See also Lacey 2009a, ch. 12.)
Modern individualist autonomy is different; it is understood to be the absence of external constraints on the
choices of scientists to do whatever research (within the D-R approach) they want to do, under whatever auspices
they choose and under whatever conditions they choose to accept (consistent with the law). Scientific institutions
should be constituted so as to enhance funding resources for (D-R) research, for strengthening the influence of
science in society (e.g., finding more places for the employment of highly trained scientists), and to resist external
interference to scientists being able to conduct research (and teach) autonomously in this way. It legitimates
individual choices to engage in research under corporate auspices, even if this involves corporate-determined
research priorities and other restrictions (e.g., agreements about ‘confidentiality’ of empirical data), i.e., extra-
scientific interference with research. This autonomy, thus, is not for the sake of inclusivity, but for the self interest of
scientists, allied with the interests that prioritize economic growth. Science ‘in the private interest’ expects this
autonomy to be recognized in scientific institutions and universities that educate scientists, as well as by public
funding bodies – so that scientists are free to do just as they would like, if funding is available (competitively) for
them to do so. The desired autonomy, however, is to do whatever ‘scientific’ (D-R) research one wants to do, free
from (unwanted) ethical constraints from society; it does not extend to doing research under strategies that do not fit
into the D-R approach (for that is ‘not science’), or even to some research on topics of ‘public interest’ (e.g., effects
of pollution of specific industrial sites) that could be researched within the D-R approach. Autonomous individuals
(in this sense of ‘autonomy’) can bring it about that scientific practices become subject to external interference; they
are not autonomous in the traditional sense, since the general agenda that frames research is shaped by outside
values, those of capital and the market. This conclusion remains intact, even if it is true that today funding for
scientific research would be seriously affected negatively if the science-commerce alliance were not cultivated.
Linked with this, we increasingly find the mentality coming to the fore, not of humility in face of the vast unknown
combined with confident resolve to encroach into it, but the arrogance associated with wealth and power, going
breathlessly ahead unimpeded by precaution and modesty, and preparedness to do research wherever the money and
influence may be.

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47 There is a growing literature showing the richness, variability, versatility, sensitivity to sustainability issues, and
empirical soundness (that is not undermined by being reflective of the interests and values of particular cultural
groups) of much traditional and indigenous knowledge (e.g., Pimbert 2009; Santos 2007). As ‘science’ is being used
in this paper, it can incorporate all these forms of knowledge, while retaining their specific features and not forcing
them into a shape that supposedly fits all scientific research; and they become indispensable resources for addressing
– scientifically – the range-of-alternatives question. The authors cited here prefer to talk of these forms of
knowledge, not as ‘scientific’, but as ‘other knowledges’ (‘decolonialized knowledges’), terminology that they
intend to have relativist connotations. Whether or not these other forms of knowledge are to be called ‘scientific’ is
not very important; the important things are their sound empirical credentials and that having these credentials does
not depend on using D-R methodologies. The connoted relativism is unnecessary (and unfounded). What is present
here is not knowledge relative to particular cultures, but approaches to investigation that are properly reflective of
the character or aspects of the object being investigated – aspects that may be considered important because
culturally specific values are held. This does not make the knowledge, as distinct from its significance, relative to
these cultural values. In any case, regardless of what it’s called, the recovery and development of this kind of
knowledge has an important place in the re-institutionalized science.
48 See Lacey (2009b); Lacey & Lacey (2009).

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