Understanding, Truthmakers, and the Aboutness Relation The Truthmaker Thesis is, simply put, that T is the truthmaker

of sentence S iff "T exists" entails "S is true." So, if "a is F" there has to be an "a" that has some relation to an "F" that makes the sentence true. But what is this mysterious predicate "entails?" One way forward is to treat it as necessitation, so T is the truthmaker of sentence S iff "T exists" necessitates "S is true." However, that won't work either since the view of truthmakers as necessitators implies that every contingently existing entity is a truthmaker for every necessary truth. So some defenders of Truthmaker add a second relation: "aboutness." So a more convoluted statement of the Truthmaker Thesis would be "T is the truthmaker of sentence S iff "T exists" necessitates "S is true" and iff S is about T." Moreover, Truthmaker then requires that there be states of affairs as a list of objects does not form propositions which are subject to truth conditions; so the sentence S must be about a state of affairs, T, that exists and necessitates S is true. An exploration of impossible properties, such as the property of not being identical with one's self or "the property of being an even, prime number greater than 2" raises problems for Truthmaker in that we understand truth conditions of sentences using impossible properties without reference to an existing states of affairs or even possible states of affairs. There seems to be nothing these sentences then stand in an aboutness relation to. These suggest that an understanding of truth and falsity is not dependent on the existence of Truthmakers (unless we want to accept that every contingently existing entity is a truthmaker for every necessary truth) and gives us good reason to also reject Truthmakers' related theory that Truth Supervenes on Being. This suggests an understanding of truth goes beyond just an understanding of the existing states of affairs of the world and even the totality of the world that is, beyond existence.