SAVIOR OF THE WEST?
ON SEPTEMBER 14, 1861, Confederate General Albert Sidney Johnston, the newly appointed commander of an expanded Department No. 2, arrived in Nashville. He faced an immediate decision. Since Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk’s Corps was already in Columbus, Ky., he either had to withdraw Polk or advance his center into Kentucky. Believing that Kentuckians would rally to the cause, Johnston chose the latter, but the ultimate failure of Kentucky’s response (71 percent of military-age men sat out the war) particularly damaged the Army of Tennessee. ¶ By January 1862, Johnston’s 400-mile-long cordon defense was held by 57,500 troops: 22,000 at Columbus under Polk; 5,000 at Forts Henry and Donelson at the convergence of the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers; 24,500 at Bowling Green under Maj. Gen. William J. Hardee; and 6,000 in East Tennessee under Maj. Gen. George Crittenden. The Confederate line thus had length but not depth. Hardee alone faced an estimated 75,000-man Union army under Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell. Johnston’s only advantage was unified command, a benefit squandered by his obsession with the center of the line, where he thought the Union offensive would come. He placed a naive trust in Polk to take care of the Henry-Donelson sector, a position that could not be lost under any circumstances. Polk ignored his orders and became involved in his own obsession—Columbus.
Grant and other Union generals recognized what Johnston clearly failed to see—the yawning gap between Columbus and Bowling Green. Grant always viewed Henry as the prime target, since it was the only fortification between Paducah, Ky., and Florence, Ala. The loss of Henry would impact virtually all
