Bloody Angle: Hancock's Assault on the Mule Shoe Salient, May 12, 1864

CHAPTER 1

LEADERS AND ARMIES

SPOTSYLVANIA WAS A CROSSROADS both literally and figuratively. In 1864 it was a sleepy town where two important local roads joined, the Brock and Fredericksburg Roads; history most likely would have ignored it had the Civil War never been fought. But it also became a crossroads for armies: an objective of both the Army of the Potomac and Army of Northern Virginia as they battled each other on the fields and farms throughout central Virginia, struggling to achieve victory at the bidding of their commanders. More significantly, it was a crossroads for tactics as well: the stand up and shoot it out linear firing lines of the Napoleonic era were slowly being transformed into anachronisms by new weaponry that delivered more lead, more accurately, with more speed. New tactics had to be created to meet this transformation and at Spotsylvania such new methods were attempted. Spotsylvania was also a crossroads for two men, both straining to conquer the other and win final victory for their cause: Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee.

For Grant, victory was to be achieved in his Virginia campaigns by alternating between maintaining his army’s momentum and the continual application of force. These elements were the basic foundation of his strategy and tactics; the use of both had been honed to near perfection during the general’s progress throughout the war.

Grant arrived in Washington in March 1864 to take on the critical post of commander of all the Union armies. The western general found himself in charge of the massive military machine the Union was fielding to defeat the South: 745,000 troops spread out across the young republic in nineteen military districts. Managing this huge force was an incredible task for the day. It might have been prudent to undertake the task in the confines of Washington, D. C, as did his predecessor in the job, Henry W. Halleck. But Grant chose to conduct his affairs while traveling with the Army of the Potomac, which was to be Grant’s primary tool for campaigning in Virginia the coming spring. It was a force that had known sporadic victories and disappointing defeats throughout the three previous years of war. Its victory at Gettysburg, fought from 1–3 July 1863, still loomed large. But the composition of the force had changed significantly from its appearance at Gettysburg before the beginning of Grant’s eventual movement south, even from its earlier historic battles in 1862 and 1863. At Gettysburg, the army fielded seven corps, but now several of these had been shed: two had been sent west and two more were disbanded—to the dismay of their troops who strongly identified with their old units—and were used to strengthen the remaining forces, the II, V, and VI Corps.

General Ulysses S. Grant

By the time the Army of the Potomac got on the move, it had almost 100,000 men. The II Corps under the command of Winfield Scott Hancock was four divisions strong, the V Corps was also composed of four divisions, and the VI had three divisions. However, the numbers sported by this huge force were somewhat deceptive. Actually, it was leaking strength like water through a sieve as time passed. Its power was decreased not only through casualties in coming battles, but from units that had signed up for three years of fighting back in 1861 whose terms of service were now almost up. Some of these troops’ fighting capabilities were lost even before they left the army—needless to say, not a few of the men in these commands were not eager to fall victim to shot and shell just before the time came to be sent home.

Despite this loss of troops, the Army of the Potomac could count on several leaders of superior quality. At the army’s helm was the victor of Gettysburg, Major General George Gordon Meade. Meade was certainly capable and had seen some of the Army of the Potomac’s greatest battles.

Serving under Meade and leading the Army of the Potomac’s three corps were also three dedicated, experienced, and solid fighting generals. Winfield Scott Hancock, in charge of the II Corps was perhaps the best Union corps commander of the war. The other two corps commanders were not as distinguished, but had commendable records. Gouverneur Warren had some experience leading troops, but was a staff officer by the time of Gettysburg. Even though that position might have been an inglorious one, it was Warren who had organized the defense of Little Round Top and helped secure that position from heavy enemy attacks. John Sedgwick with the VI Corps was beloved by his men and by the Army of the Potomac’s leadership; unfortunately fate and a Rebel bullet combined to make his service in the coming campaigns for Richmond a short one. In command of the Army of the Potomac’s cavalry was the firebrand, Philip Sheridan, one of Grant’s western comrades.

Overall, the Army of the Potomac was subject to two odd command anomalies. The first stemmed from Grant’s decision to accompany the Army of the Potomac on its move south. He claimed Meade was given a free hand to direct the force; perhaps an unrealistic claim, for inevitably, Grant often saw fit to issue orders over the force’s movements and campaigns. This interference effectively gave the army two commanders unequal in power: Grant the superior and Meade the subordinate in the very army he was supposed to be leading. The second anomaly in the command structure of Grant’s army was the IX Corps, commanded by Major General Ambrose E. Burnside, which was being attached to the army for the offensive. This force contained twenty thousand soldiers in four divisions, including one of African American troops. Because of Burnside’s rank—he had commanded the Army of the Potomac in late 1862 and early 1863 until dismissed for his failures—the IX Corps operated under Grant’s command instead of Meade’s; this odd arrangement basically led to an independent corps attached to the rest of the army.

But the greatest question about command centered on Grant himself. Despite his distinguished record, there remained some skepticism about Grant’s ability to translate his success in organizing great victories in the Western theater of the war into a campaign that could defeat the South’s formidable mastermind of the battlefield: General Robert E. Lee.

Lee, of course had destroyed the careers of several Northern generals. To be sure, Grant had met no foe the likes of Robert E. Lee in all his campaigns and battles out west. The Southern general now had the reputation as the most formidable tactician on either side, North or South.

General Robert E. Lee

Lee no doubt hoped that an opportunity to take the offensive would once again arise during the Union’s thrust into Virginia. The impressive force under Lee’s command, the Army of Northern Virginia, emerged prepared to meet the next Federal campaign even after facing a winter of severe uncertainty, not so much from wondering what the enemy might do, but from command decisions from Richmond and a scarcity of men and supplies.

The Southern army was lacking in manpower: all told there were approximately 63,000 men on hand to fend off the offensive the Northerners were sure to launch. Nor could Lee count on many more. The South was drawing on its last manpower reserves: the draft age had been widened to between boys of seventeen and men of up to fifty, conscription measures were strengthened, and the practice of substitution had been abolished. For the men in the field whose enlistments were supposed to be up in 1864, they were to serve for the duration of the conflict. Even still, the South was hardpressed to put men on the front lines to meet all the points of the Federal advances east and west. Many of the scant numbers of new recruits who did come into the Army of Northern Virginia made good soldiers; others were either of poor health or naturally inclined to avoiding strenuous duties.

Lee’s army was divided into a three corps structure that had been created shortly before Gettysburg: the I, II, and III Corps. Two of these were under unsteady leadership. Without question, James Longstreet could be relied upon in his command of the I Corps. Old Pete as he was called had proved his worth from the Peninsular campaign (though he has been criticized for not doing his utmost at Gettysburg). But the commanders of the other corps provided need for some concern. II Corps commander Richard Ewell had been seriously wounded nearly two years before at Groveton; it was an injury that required amputation of a leg, a wound that pained him long afterwards. Before Gettysburg, many in the army had been impressed with his vigor, but by 1864 Lee was writing that the general was enfeebled and fatigued. The commander of the III Corps, the hard-fighting Ambrose P. Hill suffered from prostatitus resulting from venereal disease. After being promoted to corps command, illness seemed to continually plague him. Moreover, he had suffered setbacks as a corps commander during the later campaigns of 1863.

With these strengths and weaknesses, Grant and Meade with the Army of the Potomac and Lee with the Army of Northern Virginia would strive to obtain and control the offensive as the May 1864 campaign got under way. These bids would lead to fierce and bloody contests, some of the most formidable fighting of the entire Civil War. Of these fights, the most frightful combat was waged at Spotsylvania’s Bloody Angle.

CHAPTER 2

TO THE BLOODY ANGLE

THE TENOR OF GRANT’S FIRST CAMPAIGN in the East was set shortly after his troops were on the move. No longer would the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia engage in occasional set piece battles after which one or the other would leave the field in defeat. Now both armies were to be engaged in gripping struggles or long marches as their commanders strove to acquire strategic and tactical advantages and deliver the deathblow that would undo their adversary.

The inaugural battle came when the Army of the Potomac pounded Lee’s army in the Wilderness, a thick, cheerless woodland located some ten miles west of Fredericksburg, Virginia. Originally, Grant’s intention was to steal through the Wilderness, before his adversary learned his army was on the move, and seek a confrontation on more advantageous ground farther south. The Army of the Potomac moved out from its camps north of the Rapidan River in the early morning hours of 4 May 1864. The force’s task was to march thirty miles clear through the Wilderness by the next day. The Army of Northern Virginia soon detected the move and Lee’s forces headed east toward the Federal columns.

On 5 May 1864, the battle of the Wilderness began in earnest. Confederate troops began to tap Warren’s V Corps column advancing south down the Germanna Plank Road. The news soon brought a halt to the attempt to break through the Wilderness; Grant was game for a fight and Meade ordered Warren to attack. Warren’s troops, soon to be joined by Sedgwick’s VI Corps, engaged Ewell’s II Corps in a bloody battle near the intersection of the Germanna Plank Road and Orange Turnpike. The costly affair led to a stalemate.

This photo shows the Orange Plank Road as it looked in 1864—this was one of the better roads in northern Virginia.

(Library of Congress)

The news soon brought a halt to the attempt to break through the Wilderness; Grant was game for a fight and Meade ordered Warren to attack. Warren’s troops, soon to be joined by Sedgwick’s VI Corps, engaged Ewell’s II Corps in a bloody battle near the intersection of the Germanna Plank Road and Orange Turnpike. The costly affair led to a stalemate.

Next, Hancock’s II Corps went into action south of Warren against Hill’s III Corps along the Orange Plank Road and gave the Confederates there a harsh handling though no decisive victory could be won before darkness fell. The battle continued the next day, 6 May; with the major scene of the action being the Orange Plank Road. Initially, Hancock’s men scored a breakthrough against Hill’s position, but were repulsed by the timely arrival of Longstreet’s I Corps. Longstreet added insult to the II Corps’s injury by launching a surprise attack against the unsecured Federal left via an old railroad bed, which was concealed from the enemy’s view. The blow fell on Brigadier General Gershom Mott’s 4th Division, which almost disintegrated.

Finding their position untenable, the rest of the II Corps fell back to Brock Road where they withstood further Confederate attacks. A Confederate attack was also made on the Federal right held by Sedgwick’s VI Corps; while initially successful this was turned back. With evening, the battle once again came to an end.

Throughout the two days of fighting, the combat had been intense, the casualties heavy, but the result was inconsequential. Charge and countercharge were stalemated, thrusts were parried by regiments, brigades, divisions, and corps. The battlefield itself was left a grisly inferno, choked by smoke from fires that indiscriminately consumed brush and the flesh of the dead and wounded. The toll of Grant’s offensive may have been as high as 17,666 men killed, wounded, captured, and missing. Warren’s V Corps had taken the heaviest beating, losing over 5,100 men during the two days. The II Corps also suffered heavy losses during the confrontation: over 5,000 men including one of its crack commanders, Brigadier General Alexander Hays, were killed, and some eight regimental commanders had fallen. Sedgwick’s VI Corps also suffered around 5,000 men as casualties with one brigade commander, Brigadier General George W. Getty, wounded, and two others, Brigadier Generals Alexander Shaler and Truman Seymour, captured. Burnside’s IX Corps had been lightly engaged, its duty primarily linking the right and left of