Encuentra tu próximo/a libro favorito/a

Conviértase en miembro hoy y lea gratis durante 30 días
How America’s Political Parties Change (and How They Don’t)

How America’s Political Parties Change (and How They Don’t)

Leer la vista previa

How America’s Political Parties Change (and How They Don’t)

5/5 (1 clasificación)
168 página
3 horas
Oct 15, 2019


The election of 2016 prompted journalists and political scientists to write obituaries for the Republican Party—or prophecies of a new dominance. But it was all rather familiar. Whenever one of our two great parties has a setback, we’ve heard: “This is the end of the Democratic Party,” or, “The Republican Party is going out of existence.” Yet both survive, and thrive.

We have the oldest and third oldest political parties in the world—the Democratic Party founded in 1832 to reelect Andrew Jackson, the Republican Party founded in 1854 to oppose slavery in the territories. They are older than almost every American business, most American colleges, and many American churches. Both have seemed to face extinction in the past, and have rebounded to be competitive again. How have they managed it?

Michael Barone, longtime co-author of The Almanac of American Politics, brings a deep understanding of our electoral history to the question and finds a compelling answer. He illuminates how both parties have adapted, swiftly or haltingly, to shifting opinion and emerging issues, to economic change and cultural currents, to demographic flux. At the same time, each has maintained a constant character. The Republican Party appeals to “typical Americans” as understood at a given time, and the Democratic Party represents a coalition of “out-groups.” They are the yin and yang of American political life, together providing vehicles for expressing most citizens’ views in a nation that has always been culturally, religiously, economically, and ethnically diverse.

The election that put Donald Trump in the White House may have appeared to signal a dramatic realignment, but in fact it involved less change in political allegiances than many before, and it does not portend doom for either party. How America’s Political Parties Change (and How They Don’t) astutely explains why these two oft-scorned institutions have been so resilient.
Oct 15, 2019

Sobre el autor

Relacionado con How America’s Political Parties Change (and How They Don’t)

Libros relacionados
Artículos relacionados

Vista previa del libro

How America’s Political Parties Change (and How They Don’t) - Michael Barone



Panic is a poor guide to reality. In the nine o’clock hour on the evening of November 8, 2016, as it became clear that Hillary Clinton was not going to win the electoral votes of Florida and Pennsylvania and that Donald Trump was going to be the 45th president of the United States, something like panic set in for millions of Americans and foreigners who had not until that point imagined that such an outcome was possible. Panicky predictions were made about what President Trump might do and about how our entire political system might be destabilized. Panicky predictions were made that huge shifts in voting behavior meant either that Republicans had gained forever a monopoly of white working-class voters—or that Republicans were doomed to be the minority party for the rest of history, if they were to remain an active political party at all.

For those of us with some years of experience observing postelection commentary, all this had a certain familiarity. I am old enough to have observed the predictions of the death of the Republican Party after the election of 1964 and of the permanent minority status of the Democratic Party after its electoral reverses in the 1980s and 1990s. I have read enough history to know how plausible such predictions were after the 60 to 34 percent defeat of the Democratic Party in 1920 and the 57 to 40 percent defeat of the Republican Party just twelve years later, in 1932.

In fact the change in party percentages between 2012 and 2016—or between any presidential election since 1996 and that of 2016—was minimal by historical standards. Donald Trump’s percentage of the popular vote was 1 percent lower than Mitt Romney’s in 2012, while Hillary Clinton’s share was 3 percent lower than Barack Obama’s that year. The most recent generation of our politics has been characterized by what I have called polarized partisan parity, to an extent that is arguably unprecedented in American history. There were far greater oscillations in party percentages between the elections of 1976 and 1980, for example, or between those of 1988 and 1992.

It’s true that there were bigger shifts in the levels of support for each party’s nominee by certain segments of the electorate—shifts that produced, to almost everyone’s surprise, an Electoral College majority for Donald Trump—but these were not of unprecedented magnitude either. Trump, as compared with Romney or other recent Republican nominees, won fewer votes from white college graduates and additional votes—just a little more—from white non-college-graduates. But his losses among the former group cost him no electoral votes, while his gains among the latter netted him the 100 electoral votes of Florida, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, and the 2nd congressional district of Maine. His margins were small and arguably tenuous, as indicated by the net loss of 40 or 41 House seats by the Republican Party in 2018, as Republican House candidates failed to match Trump levels of support from non-college whites and, more significantly, suffered further losses among white college graduates.

The panicky responses are in need of perspective. In my commentary at public forums at the American Enterprise Institute and in my columns in the Washington Examiner, I have argued that we are not in the midst of a gigantic electoral upheaval but something more in the nature of a course correction and that our political parties have persisted and adapted through more daunting challenges. Americans seem to be placidly unaware that we have the oldest and third oldest political parties in the world, with the Democratic Party dating from the 1832 national convention that nominated Andrew Jackson for a second term and the Republican Party dating from 1854 protests against the Kansas-Nebraska Act allowing slavery in the territories. Their only competitor in longevity is the British Conservative Party (itself in a period of turmoil today), which its leading historian, Robert Blake, dates to reaction against the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. Parties as long-lasting as these, I submit, even as they shift positions in response to events and elections, represent something basic in the character of the nations they have governed with considerable and recurring success.

These arguments are hard to convey in short-form journalism and rapid-fire commentary. It is especially difficult to make reference to historic persons and events that are not immediately familiar even to generally well-informed citizens. Fortunately I have had the opportunity over the past two years to address them at greater length, in what I hope is an accessible manner however unfamiliar the material. One of my great pleasures in life is what I call my vagrant reading—prowling through books with no direct or immediate connection to my work— and among my favorite types of books are the slim volumes consisting of a few lectures by eminent historians like H. R. Trevor-Roper and J. H. Elliott, Bernard Bailyn and Edmund Morgan. There are few more delightful ways to spend an evening than settling into a comfortable chair and reading in one sitting a brilliant scholar’s distillation of a lifetime of learning, enlivened by a gift for the arresting example. Such books are the models I had in mind when preparing these essays, versions of which were delivered as lectures.

My subject is the long history—and the striking resilience—of our two political parties. When I first started reading history as a child, I wondered why other sorts of parties—a socialist party, a progressive party, a traditionalist party, a religious party—had not developed in the United States. One answer is that our electoral system—the Electoral College, the single-member congressional (and senatorial) district— works powerfully against the emergence of such alternatives. This is one reason why this country did not spawn a major socialist party in the early twentieth century, as most European democracies did, and why the Progressive Party, led by America’s leading vote-getter up to that point, Theodore Roosevelt, vanished less than half a dozen years after its second-place finish in the election of 1912.

But there is something more basic about our American parties, I came to think as I mulled their history, something fundamental to how the two of them together have for many years provided voters with a yin-and-yang alternative in what has always been a diverse nation—diverse regionally, economically, religiously, racially and ethnically, culturally— from its colonial beginnings. The Republican Party has always been formed around a core of people who are considered, by themselves and others, to be typical Americans, although they are never by themselves a majority: northern Protestants in the nineteenth century, married white people in the twenty-first. The Democratic Party has always been a combination, a coalition, of people who are not thought of, by themselves or others, as typical Americans, but who together often form a majority: southern slaveholders and big-city Catholics in the nineteenth century, churchgoing and urban blacks and affluent urban and suburban liberals in the twenty-first.

Both parties have changed their policies, adapting to economic and demographic circumstances and to signals in the political marketplace. And both parties, in the process, have tended to provide a congenial (though sometimes very temporary) political home for the large majority of Americans over many years. The fact that they have been performing those functions for so long, under stress and despite massive setbacks, provides some basis for thinking that they will pass through the stress test being administered by Donald Trump, his Republican fans and critics, and his Democratic opponents, as they have passed through others even more stringent many times before. Perspective is a better guide to reality than panic.


The Parties in History


Lessons from the Early Republic

The Democratic and Republican parties have persisted in unbroken chains extending now 187 and 165 years, respectively. This is despite predictions after every unfavorable election cycle of the extinction of one or the other, or of their replacement by some unnamed third party. How this unusual thing has come to happen is an interesting story, and may serve to calm some of the jangled nerves of those involved in and observing American politics today. It is a story of the parties’ enduring character and pliable policies, of their adherence to principle and adaptation to circumstance, of successive challenge and response.

Let me illustrate by describing the first time I found myself in a quarrel with an eminent historian. I was a college freshman, and the historian was Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. The dispute concerned his first major work, The Age of Jackson, which was awarded a Pulitzer Prize in 1945 when Schlesinger was not yet thirty years old. The Age of Jackson is a beautifully written book, one that wanders beguilingly over the intellectual landscape and the demographic developments of the 1830s and 1840s. My quarrel was with Schlesinger’s portrait of Andrew Jackson as a harbinger, a forerunner of that Democratic president who would come a century later, Franklin Roosevelt. Schlesinger of course was a strong New Dealer and on multiple occasions a political propagandist, a spirited young man with a vested intellectual interest in establishing continuity between the slaveholder of the Hermitage and the squire of Hyde Park.

But as I knew from previous reading, Franklin Roosevelt stood for big government, deficit financing, and inflationary currency—while Jackson, as Schlesinger had to concede when he came to the specifics of policy—stood for pretty much the opposite. Government was an oppressor of the ordinary American, Jackson thought. He boasted of running budget surpluses that, briefly, eliminated the national debt. His mistrust of paper money amounted to hatred, and he triggered a financial panic by requiring buyers of federal lands to pay in gold (which Franklin Roosevelt banned).

Schlesinger glided over these contradictions, asserting that both of those Democratic presidents, a century apart, stood for the little guy. Both, he pointed out with fair accuracy, were opposed and belittled by sophisticated operators in the great financial centers of their day, Philadelphia’s Chestnut Street, New York’s Wall Street—in the same supercilious way that Schlesinger was treated as a Harvard student at a time when most undergraduates were Republicans. Which led me, as a Harvard student at a time when most undergraduates were Democrats, to dismiss as partisan special pleading his argument that Jackson and Roosevelt stood for the same things.



What I have come to believe, after many years of reading and reflection, is that America’s two political parties have maintained, over their astonishingly long lifespans, their basic character, their political DNA. But each has done so only by adapting its policies and adjusting its personnel when faced with political circumstances threatening its viability. This is the process of challenge and response (to adopt the terms of the pseudo-historian Arnold Toynbee) that I will describe here, as it evolved over the first half of the history of the Republic.

Let me start by describing again what I believe to be the enduring character, the political DNA, of the two major American parties. The Democratic Party, from its beginnings in the 1830s, has always been a collection of out-groups, of demographic groups that have not been regarded by themselves or others as typically American but which, taken together—and it is almost always a problem holding them together—make up a majority of the nation. The Republican Party has always been formed around a core group considered to be typical Americans, but which by itself has never been a majority of the electorate and must attract others to the party’s banner in order to win.

So if these parties have maintained their

Has llegado al final de esta vista previa. ¡Regístrate para leer más!
Página 1 de 1


Lo que piensa la gente sobre How America’s Political Parties Change (and How They Don’t)

1 valoraciones / 1 Reseñas
¿Qué te pareció?
Calificación: 0 de 5 estrellas

Reseñas de lectores

  • (5/5)
    Excellent coverage and interpretation of the geographic cleavages in American politics from one of the brightest students of elections.