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The Battles and Campaigns of Confederate General Nathan Bedford Forrest, 1861-1865
Por John R. Scales
Acciones del libro
Comenzar a leer- Editorial:
- Savas Beatie
- Publicado:
- Feb 15, 2017
- ISBN:
- 9781611212983
- Formato:
- Libro
Descripción
The Tennessean was one of the most intriguing and controversial characters to emerge during the Civil War. Books and articles on the man span the gamut from hero worship because of his remarkable battlefield victories, to condemnation for his involvement with the slaughter at Fort Pillow and later, his association with the Ku Klux Klan. Retired Special Forces brigadier general John R. Scales plows entirely new ground with The Battles and Campaigns of General Nathan Bedford Forrest, 1861–1865, a careful and unique examination of Forrest’s wartime activities and how his actions affected the war in the Western Theater.
Each chapter covers specific raids or campaigns, all arranged chronologically. After describing the environment within which Forrest operated, which helps readers understand the larger situation within which his movements were made and his battles were fought, Gen. Scales narrates the decisions Forrest and his opponents made and the actions they took. Firsthand sources, including heavy use of documents and reports from the Official Records, coupled with 109 original maps, make it easy to understand the often complex background, movements, and engagements involving Forrest and his command.
Scales’ study is also a meticulous guide to Forrest’s campaigns. For example, each action is augmented with detailed driving directions to allow readers to examine his battlefields and the routes his cavalry took during its famous raids. For the first time, students of Forrest’s campaigns can follow in his footsteps, experiencing the terrain much the same way he did. A detailed review and assessment of each raid or campaign follows the description of the actions and the associated driving instructions. Throughout, General Scales relies upon his own extensive military background to help evaluate and explain how and why Forrest grew in command ability and potential as a result of his experiences—or didn’t.
The late award-winning author Albert Castel asked two major questions about Nathan Bedford Forrest: “Exactly what impact did Forrest’s dazzling raids and victories have upon the overall course of the war?” and “Had Forrest been given a higher command and/or greater opportunities, what would have been the potential outcome as regards the fate of the Confederacy?” The Battles and Campaigns of General Nathan Bedford Forrest makes it much easier to answer both.
Acciones del libro
Comenzar a leerInformación sobre el libro
The Battles and Campaigns of Confederate General Nathan Bedford Forrest, 1861-1865
Por John R. Scales
Descripción
The Tennessean was one of the most intriguing and controversial characters to emerge during the Civil War. Books and articles on the man span the gamut from hero worship because of his remarkable battlefield victories, to condemnation for his involvement with the slaughter at Fort Pillow and later, his association with the Ku Klux Klan. Retired Special Forces brigadier general John R. Scales plows entirely new ground with The Battles and Campaigns of General Nathan Bedford Forrest, 1861–1865, a careful and unique examination of Forrest’s wartime activities and how his actions affected the war in the Western Theater.
Each chapter covers specific raids or campaigns, all arranged chronologically. After describing the environment within which Forrest operated, which helps readers understand the larger situation within which his movements were made and his battles were fought, Gen. Scales narrates the decisions Forrest and his opponents made and the actions they took. Firsthand sources, including heavy use of documents and reports from the Official Records, coupled with 109 original maps, make it easy to understand the often complex background, movements, and engagements involving Forrest and his command.
Scales’ study is also a meticulous guide to Forrest’s campaigns. For example, each action is augmented with detailed driving directions to allow readers to examine his battlefields and the routes his cavalry took during its famous raids. For the first time, students of Forrest’s campaigns can follow in his footsteps, experiencing the terrain much the same way he did. A detailed review and assessment of each raid or campaign follows the description of the actions and the associated driving instructions. Throughout, General Scales relies upon his own extensive military background to help evaluate and explain how and why Forrest grew in command ability and potential as a result of his experiences—or didn’t.
The late award-winning author Albert Castel asked two major questions about Nathan Bedford Forrest: “Exactly what impact did Forrest’s dazzling raids and victories have upon the overall course of the war?” and “Had Forrest been given a higher command and/or greater opportunities, what would have been the potential outcome as regards the fate of the Confederacy?” The Battles and Campaigns of General Nathan Bedford Forrest makes it much easier to answer both.
- Editorial:
- Savas Beatie
- Publicado:
- Feb 15, 2017
- ISBN:
- 9781611212983
- Formato:
- Libro
Acerca del autor
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The Battles and Campaigns of Confederate General Nathan Bedford Forrest, 1861-1865 - John R. Scales
www.johnrscales.com.
Chapter1
The Initial Days of the War: Tennessee and Kentucky
AFTER THE FIRING ON Fort Sumter and President Abraham Lincoln’s call for 75,000 volunteers to put down the rebellion,
four additional slave states quickly joined the seven who had already seceded from the Union: Virginia, Arkansas, North Carolina, and finally, in June, Tennessee. Nathan Bedford Forrest, a prominent citizen of Memphis, initially opposed secession, but with the inevitability of war apparent, he, like hundreds of thousands of other Southerners, chose to support his native state. Forrest enlisted in Captain Josiah S. White’s Tennessee Mounted Rifles in Memphis, Tennessee on June14, 1861, just six days after Tennessee’s secession. The command moved to Camp Randolph within a week to begin training and to assist in building fortifications. Forrest was at Camp Randolph less than a month before Governor Isham Harris of Tennessee commissioned him to form a mounted unit. ¹
About July 10, Forrest, warrant in hand from the governor to raise a battalion of cavalry, instantly returned to Memphis and advertised in the paper for recruits. With a structure and some personnel probably already in mind, he was able to depart almost immediately for Kentucky to procure weapons (at his own expense) while leaving the recruiting details to others. With the number of military units forming, weapons were scarce in Tennessee. Forrest thought he might have better luck in Kentucky, and his years of experience in slave and horse trading would have given him many trustworthy contacts there.²
Map 1: Locations of Significant Forces, Late 1861. The darker and lighter ovals represent, respectively, Union and Confederate positions
Fort Randolph (c. 70mi RT) From NBF’s prewar home in Memphis, intersection of Adams & 3rd Sts, E on Adams 0.2 mi to Danny Thomas/US51, turn L. Take US51N for 6.6 mi & turn L onto TN388. Go 5.2 mi & turn L on Locke Rd which becomes Bluff Rd in 1.9 mi. Follow it N for 2.1mi to intersection of Cuba-Millington Rd. Turn R & in 0.2 mi turn L on River Bluff Rd. Go 2.7 mi & turn L onto partially gravel Herring Hill Rd. After 4.9 mi the rd becomes Bluff Rd again. Go 2.8 mi & turn R on Richardson Landing Rd, then after 1 mi L on Cooper Rd. After 1.7 mi intersect TN59W & turn R. In 1.6 mi, turn L on Needham Rd. After 1.1 mi turn L on Ballard Slough; a historical marker for Randolph is on the L & a Historical Commission plaque just beyond. Reverse course to Needham Rd, turn L, then immediately L again on Randolph Rd. Go 0.3 mi: you are at Fort Wright (35 31 16 N 89 53 15 W), monument on the L. Return to Memphis the same way or go E to US51 & take it back.
Kentucky. (800mi RT to Louisville) NBF rode the Memphis & Ohio, Memphis & Clarksville, & Louisville RRs via Humboldt, Paris, Dover, & Clarksville to Russellville, KY (roughly along US79) & then to Bowling Green, KY (roughly US68), where he took the Louisville & Nashville RR to Louisville (roughly US31W) & the Frankfort & Lexington RR to Lexington, KY (roughly I-64). Take US60 S from Louisville to Muldraugh, then KY 1638 to Brandenburg.
(From Brandenburg to the rendezvous at Nolin is c. 35mi) Approx route of the Boone Rangers: from intersection of KY228 & KY448 in Brandenburg, take KY 448E for 6.3 mi to KY144S to Flaherty, another 7.3mi. From Flaherty the route led along KY1600 for 14.2 mi to Elizabethtown. Join US31W here by taking a R & after 2.2 mi turn R on KY1136 past Glendale. KY1868 forks R 1.1 mi beyond Glendale. Follow it for 1.1 mi & turn L on Nolin Rd. At 35 33 39 N 85 54 07 W, 1.9 mi ahead, is Nolin, a station on the L & N RR, rendezvous point for the Boone Rangers & accompanying family members. Follow KY1407 E 2.1 mi out of Nolin to join US31W, turning R (S). NBF, Boone Rangers & families moved down US31W thru Munfordville to Bowling Green, where the families separated. From Bowling Green NBF moved to Russellville (approx route of US68) & then went to Clarksville, TN (approx route of US79). The company, less horses & wagons w/a small detail that continued by rd, boarded a train & arrived in Memphis by Aug 1. Louisville to Brandenburg & then on to Memphis, well over 300mi, was a difficult march w/horses & wagons in only 10 days.
Early Operations: Memphis to Donelson. Route to Kentucky again by car (220+mi), take US51 from Memphis to Clinton, KY (132 mi), then KY58 to Columbus (10mi). Reverse course, going thru Clinton on KY58 all the way to Holifield (12mi beyond Clinton) & turn R on KY339. Go 11 mi thru Sedalia & join KY97S (turn R as KY 339 goes straight). After 6 mi turn L at Tri City on KY94 & go 13 mi to Murray. In Murray take 4th St/KY121S (becomes TN119) to US79, 20mi. Turn L & go 14 mi to Fort Donelson National Battlefield, passing Fort Henry on the E bank of the Tennessee River.
Donelson to Canton to Hopkinsville. To approx NBF’s route from Donelson to Canton, follow US79E thru Dover and over the river. NBF used a ferry. Cross bridge, take the next L on Bumpus Mills Rd & stay for 7.5mi. Watch out at intersections; the correct rd may not always be clear. At Bumpus Mills turn L on TN120N into KY, where it changes to KY139. One mi after the state line, 2 options: a gravel rd (closer to the original path) or a paved rd. If a narrow rd gravel for part of the way is OK, take a L on Old Dover S Rd (36 38 57 N 87 49 12 W, no sign except one for McKinney Cemetery) & follow it 4.3 mi to where it joins KY164. Take a L & follow KY164 for 15.3 mi until it joins US68. Turn L on US68; Canton is 0.6 mi ahead. Alternately, to avoid the narrow gravel rd, instead of turning L at the cemetery keep going straight for another 5.3 mi to KY164 & turn L there. After 2.9 mi the Old Dover S Rd (unlabeled) joins from the L. From there follow instructions above. From Canton follow US68 E for 5.7mi, then turn R on KY272 & go c. 24 mi to Hopkinsville.
While in Kentucky he recruited in Paris, Lexington, Mount Sterling, Frankfort, in Shelby County east of Louisville, near Christianburg, and other places. About July 20, he returned to Louisville and purchased 500 Colt pistols and other items. He then went to Brandenburg to persuade a newly-formed cavalry troop of about 90 young men, the Boone Rangers,
commanded by Capt. Frank Overton, to join him. Back in Louisville he picked up the revolvers and some cavalry supplies such as saddles at a tan yard. Various Boone Rangers helped spirit the supplies away while Forrest himself ostentatiously rode another way out of town, then rejoined the equipment on the road back to Brandenburg.³
The entire operation was a bit shady. Government officials in Kentucky, which was attempting to remain neutral, opposed military activities by either side. While the supply wagons moved south, Forrest split the Boone Rangers into small groups and had them leave Brandenburg at different times to confuse anyone watching. The men converged at Nolin the second day after leaving Brandenburg. There, Forrest learned two companies of Home Guards forming in Munfordville on the road south intended to oppose his move. Forrest pulled off his first bluff of the war by forming his men and their relatives under a Confederate flag near the railroad so train passengers reported a large Rebel force. Most the Munfordville Home Guards dispersed before he arrived, and the rest bolted upon sighting the detachment.⁴
Forrest’s activities in the months from August to-October are not well documented, but his command, comprising four companies from Alabama, a pair from Kentucky, and one each from Texas and Tennessee, formed in Memphis and trained and were equipped there at the old fairgrounds. It was formally mustered in to the Confederate Army with Forrest as its lieutenant colonel in October and ordered to move to the vicinity of Dover, Tennessee.⁵
Early Operations
In early November the battalion broke into separate companies. Each traveled north on the Mississippi by riverboat to Columbus, Kentucky, where Major General Leonidas Polk ordered Forrest to the support of Col. Adolphus Heiman, commander of the 10th Tennessee, at Fort Donelson on the Cumberland River in Tennessee. The troops traveled overland via Fort Henry on the Tennessee River in order to reach Donelson.⁶
After a few days there, Forrest was sent to Canton, KY, to check on watercraft, particularly Union gunboats, plying the Cumberland River. Forrest had adjudged the area between the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers as ill-suited for cavalry operations, so he had requested General Albert Sidney Johnston, commander of Confederate forces in the West, to have his unit assigned to Brigadier General Lloyd Tilghman in Hopkinsville, Kentucky. While at Canton orders arrived for Forrest to report to Hopkinsville, which then became the base for his battalion until early February.⁷
While Forrest was assigned to Hopkinsville, Kentucky’s populace and government remained severely divided, with rival military forces sparring for control. The Confederacy, significantly outmanned and outgunned, maintained a series of sizeable units and fortifications in northern Tennessee and southern Kentucky, essentially forming a linear defense east to west. In the east, the Confederacy had about 5,000 men at Mill Springs, KY, protecting the Cumberland Gap, and farther west, about 15,000 men at Bowling Green. Forts Donelson (near Dover, Tennessee) and Henry (12 miles west) with some 4,000 men protected the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers. About 12,000 men anchored the line at Columbus. In contrast, by late September the Union had Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant at Cairo, IL, and Paducah, KY, with 20,000 men and Major General Don Carlos Buell near Louisville with 45,000 men. Hopkinsville stood as an outpost between Bowling Green and the river forts, charged with detecting and providing early warning of any advance south against either position—a textbook mission for cavalry.
Around November 17, Forrest patrolled north to Princeton, 30 miles northwest of Hopkinsville, sending a detachment all the way to the Ohio River. That detachment captured and plundered a riverboat carrying supplies for the Union Army.⁸
Forrest, meanwhile, heard of a Union naval vessel on the Cumberland supposedly intent on destroying supplies gathered at Canton, some 30 miles due west of Hopkinsville. On the 19th when the detachment returned, he moved his command (including a small four-pounder cannon) to Canton to attempt an ambush. The Yankee riverboat, under the command of Lt. Seth Ledyard Phelps, was the US gunboat Conestoga, a timber-clad
vessel (sides beefed up with heavy, thick wood) carrying at least four 32-pounder guns—probably pivoted to fire out either side—and at least one cannon astern.⁹
The U.S. gunboat Conestoga as she appeared during the Civil War. US Navy
Forrest saw the gunboat descending the river and laid his ambush immediately north (downstream) of Canton. His men, concealed by vegetation, were concentrated just behind the crest of some high ground on the banks of the river. Warned by a citizen of the impending ambush, the Conestoga’s commander stood off to prepare for action. Forrest’s small gun opened upon the Conestoga and fired two rounds, then promptly retreated, while Forrest’s men fired into the open ports of the gunboat with their small arms, principally Maynard rifles. The gunboat fired a broadside as she moved downstream, then turned back upstream, firing her stern gun as she turned. The gunboat’s broadsides were met by small arms fire again, and Forrest’s little cannon opened again from much farther away. After several hours of this back and forth, the Conestoga closed her gun ports and steamed away downriver. Each side reported the other as sustaining several casualties while admitting none to their own side. After the Conestoga left, Forrest marched to Hopkinsville via Cadiz, marching all night and arriving the next day.¹⁰
Two more companies from Alabama joined Forrest in Hopkinsville, bringing the total to 10 companies, or almost the official regimental strength of 12 companies. Forrest would eventually become a full colonel when the regiment, designated the 3rd Tennessee Cavalry Regiment, was formally organized, elections held—company and regimental officers were still elected by their own men at that time—and the results approved by higher headquarters. However, this would not take place until April 2, 1862.
Map 2: Current Map of Canton. Location A is the historical marker and Location B represents the position Forrest probably used for his cannon
Hopkinsville. A historical marker at 9th & Liberty Sts in town marks the First Presbyterian Church used as hospital by his men that winter. Local historical society is across the street. Another marker in Riverside Cemetery (36 52 32 N 87 28 59 W, from the church L on 9th St, R after one block following the US41N, & 0.8 mi to N entrance of cemetery) commemorates those who died of the epidemic & the house where NBF stayed w/wife & daughter. A different source has NBF staying at a cabin that is now part of the Homestead Restaurant (L on Glass Ave, 0.7mi, then L on North Dr & 0.3 mi on the L).¹¹ From restaurant, retrace steps & turn L on US41. From Glass Ave 0.5 mi on the R, historical marker (36 53 10 N 87 28 52 W) indicates location of his camp.
(RT c. 90 mi to engage the Conestoga) Go N on KY91 for 29.1 mi from Hopkinsville, to Princeton. From Princeton NBF’s approx path would have taken him S on KY139 to Cadiz, then W on BusinessUS68/US68 to Canton, c. 30 mi. He placed his men & his cannon N (downstream) of the landing, prob in area now flooded by Lake Barkley. Historical marker is on US68 just E of the bridge on the N side of the hwy at A
on Map 2, but prob NBF & his men were positioned around B
where they were sheltered against direct cannon fire. Take care here: narrow streets. B
is on private property. Return route would have been along present-day US68/US68 Business thru Cadiz— US68, c. 30 mi.
In the meantime, Brigadier General Charles Clark, now in charge at Hopkinsville after Tilghman was assigned to command the river forts, had Forrest send his men on several small patrols throughout western Kentucky to show the flag and to provide early warning of any Union advance. On the first of these patrols, Forrest made a wide circuit through the countryside north of Hopkinsville. Forrest with around 300 of his men left Hopkinsville on November 24, heading northeast to Greenville. The 25-mile trip took all day, but Forrest was able to seize some equipment and one prisoner there. The next day he turned west to Madisonville and used it as a base to send out smaller patrols and scouts. Reports confirmed the presence of a large number of Union troops on the opposite bank of the Green River at Calhoun, Kentucky. Union cavalry only reacted to Forrest’s presence after he had left, and there was no contact between the two forces.
Forrest next rode his troopers on a leisurely trip west and north through Providence, Claysville (now Clay), and Morganfield before hitting the Ohio River at Caseyville. The general reported that the citizens in all these places welcomed him. Turning southeast, he traveled along the Tradewater River (which fed into the Ohio River at Caseyville) before crossing the smaller stream and heading south to Marion, where Unionists had jailed a prominent pro-Southern sympathizer. Forrest arrested one of the Union sympathizers, but when he approached the house of the second, the man fired through the door. Forrest’s surgeon, the unlucky Dr. Samuel Maverick Van Wyck, had been wearing a rather ornate uniform and had been mistaken as the unit commander. The round struck and killed him. The killer escaped in the ensuing confusion, but during Forrest’s stay at Marion he captured another Union soldier and killed the leader of the local Unionist guerrillas. He also freed a number of Southern sympathizers who had been taken north of the Ohio by the simple expedient of taking hostages and demanding a trade.
Map 3: Major Patrols: November 1861 – January 1862
Long Patrol. (RT covering first patrol slightly over 200 mi.) From NBF’s encampment site in Hopkinsville, go N on US41 0.9 mi to KY1682 & turn R. Go 1.6 mi & turn L on KY107. After 8.7 mi, turn slightly L to join KY189 N to US62. Turn R on US62 & go into Greenville. Historical marker is on US62 at the Muhlenburg County Courthouse commemorating NBF’s patrols; library & its historical section across the street. Spent evening of November 24 in Greenville.
Beyond Greenville many rds & countryside itself have changed drastically since Civil War. Continue N on US62 in Greenville to KY181; turn L there. After 0.8 mi turn L onto KY601 for 6.9 miles, turn R on KY175 for 3.6 miles, then join KY 70W. NBF prob spent the nights of Nov 25 & 26 in Madisonville. In Madisonville turn R on US41, pass a historical marker commemorating NBF on the L just before Hanson St, then turn L on US41A. Go W for 14.6mi, turning L on KY120 into Providence. Historical marker commemorating the patrol at intersection of US41A & KY120 on the L. NBF prob spent night of November 27 near Providence. From Providence take KY109 N for 7.2 mi to Clay (Claysville
in NBF’s report). Go straight on KY132 for 0.7mi, then L on KY270 for 5.4 mi into Hearin. Turn R on the Hearin-Bordley Rd for 1.3mi, then L on KY758 (many R-angle turns) for 5.6 mi to 37 35 03 N 87 54 05 W, where KY758 makes an unlabeled R turn. Follow KY758 another 5.2 mi N to the intersection w/KY56. Turn L, it is 2.9 mi to Morganfield. The historical marker is on US60 2 blocks S of KY130 at 37 40 55 N 87 55 09 W. NBF prob spent the night of November 28 here. From Morganfield take KY130 SW for 10.2 mi to KY109, turn L & go S for 2mi, then R on KY1508 for 4.3 mi to Caseyville. Waterfront park here; NBF prob spent night of November 30 in Caseyville. Continue on KY1508 for 3.5mi, then turn R on KY109. It joins US60 S in 1.6 mi at 37 32 43 N 87 59 01 W. After 18 mi on US60 there is a marker on the L (37 21 12 N 88 03 10 W) Dr. Van Wyck incident in Chapter 1. It is another 1.6 mi to US641S in Marion. NBF prob stayed in the vicinity until the morning of Dec 3.
From Marion take US641S to KY70 (6.4mi); turn R there. Follow KY70W for 9.6 mi to Dycusburg (village & a boat ramp there); the hwy changes to KY295 w/o a sign. NBF prob spent the night of 3rd there. From Dycusburg to US62 just short of Eddyville is 9.6 mi on KY295. Turn L on US62 & go E thru Eddyville to Princeton (13.2mi). Take KY91 back to Hopkinsville. NBF spent the night of Dec 4 prob around Princeton, returning to Hopkinsville on the 5th.
From Marion Forrest then moved south to Dycusburg on the Cumberland, then to Eddyville before turning east towards Hopkinsville. During his patrol he induced some of the local farmers to drive livestock into Confederate lines to sell them to the army. The Federal 8th Missouri Infantry recaptured some of the hogs at Caseyville before they could leave—along with some salt—a critical supply for the South. According to Forrest, the Missouri boys confiscated and consumed more than a fair amount of whiskey as well. Forrest’s patrol finally returned to Hopkinsville on December 5.¹²
Battle at Sacramento, Kentucky
For most of December, nothing important other than a measles outbreak happened to Forrest’s unit, but on the 26th Forrest led about 300 men on patrol, first east then north towards Greenville. Muddy roads slowed progress, and the entire unit didn’t reach Greenville until the morning of the 28th. There to meet them was Lt. Col. James Welborn Starnes with a company of Tennessee cavalry that had clashed with some Union troopers the day before. Forrest decided to move north towards Calhoun to probe the Union lines, and accordingly sent some scouts in that direction.¹³
As Forrest got closer to Calhoun two of his scouts, Robert Martin and Adam Johnson (later a Confederate brigadier general nicknamed Stovepipe
Johnson), reported a Union cavalry patrol on the road ahead. Forrest increased his pace, unfortunately stringing out the column behind him because the less well-mounted fell behind. As Forrest approached the village of Sacramento, an 18-year old girl riding bareback stopped to warn them of Union forces ahead and urged them forward. Forrest, and presumably others, was impressed: A beautiful young lady, smiling, with untied tresses floating in the breeze, on horseback, met the column just before our advance guard came up with the rear of the enemy,
he reported, infusing nerve into my arm and kindling knightly chivalry within my heart.
As Forrest and a few of his men crested a small hill about a mile south of Sacramento, they spotted the rear guard of a Union cavalry formation just ahead watering their horses at Gantt’s Pond. The Yankees had seen them also. Forrest grabbed a Maynard rifle from one of his men and opened fire; why he did so he never explained but perhaps it was out of a sense of fair play of the sort that soon falls out of favor in wartime. The Union main body was just climbing a hill to the north, and the rear guard scampered to join their companions. The Yankees quickly formed a battle line. Forrest moved forward another 120 yards and his men commenced firing, but so few had kept up that he saw he was grossly outnumbered. After three rounds Forrest and his men retreated to the top of the hill behind them. The Union cavalry was moving forward with an evident intent to charge, the majority of them in the fields to west of the road and the pond. However, they could not see that Forrest’s stragglers were coming up behind the hill. Forrest dismounted some of his men and took the Union line under fire, then ordered Major David C. Kelley to take a detachment of 60 men to the right to flank the oncoming Union line and Starnes to take a detachment of 30 to the left to flank the Union line from the west.¹⁴
With his sharpshooters slowing the Union cavalry, Forrest formed his mounted men behind the ridge and then ordered a charge. This halted the Union cavalry. The appearance of many more Confederates, coupled with the flanking movements, turned the Federal withdrawal quickly into panic. The fight became a running one, extending through Sacramento and two miles beyond before Forrest, his horses blown and his men strung out, called off the chase. The Union cavalry reported an initial strength of 168 men while Forrest reported his strength as about 300.
Forrest reported losing two killed and three wounded while stating the Union casualties as 65 dead and about 35 prisoners. The Union commander reported eight or nine killed and at least eight captured, possibly more as his men had scattered in multiple directions. Forrest policed up the battlefield, moved back to Greenville that night, and then returned to Hopkinsville, arriving around dark on December 30.¹⁵
Map 4: The Sacramento Battlefield
Battle at Sacramento, Kentucky. (c. 110 mi RT) Initially, this patrol follows earlier route to Greenville from NBF’s camp: US41N, R on KY1682 & L on KY107. Stay on KY107 all the way to KY181 (the Russellville-Greenville Rd), total 22 mi on KY107. NBF prob spent Thursday night somewhere short of this intersection. Turning L (N) on KY181, go 17.1 mi to join US62 in Greenville. Notice next to the historical marker mentioned in the text is a round marker for Battle of Sacramento Driving Tour 1. Here NBF sent scouts out while his soldiers spent the night. Take US62N to KY181 in Greenville & turn L. Turn after 0.8 mi (still KY181 as it diverges from KY601) & go 12.5 mi to join KY81. (Near here the next day he met scouts Adam Johnson & Robert Martin, who warned him Union troops were ahead. (Battle of Sacramento Driving Tour 3). http://campus. murraystate.edu/academic/faculty/Bill.Mulligan/sacbatour.htm, accessed Dec 2012.]
Map 4 shows the battle area just S of Sacramento. The ridge where NBF was when the enemy was sighted is A
, the pond is B
. The Union main body formed up about at C
, just beyond the military crest of the hill. Moving past the pond, NBF would have been c. 200 yards from Union cavalry when they opened fire, near intersection w/State Hwy 85. Significantly outnumbered, NBF, after an exchange of fire, withdrew S beyond the pond back to A
& dismounted some men. Bulk of Union cavalry would have would have moved S from W of rd , perhaps shaking out
in a line for a charge. Much more Confederate cavalry was coming up behind the ridge, & NBF sent detachments out both L & R as shown to flank the enemy, using the small ridges c. 500 yards on either side for concealment. In this reading main battle ground would have extended from just N of the pond (B
) to crest of the hill (C
), mostly W of present rd. NBF’s pursuit of broken Union formation continued thru Sacramento as far as site of Station Baptist Church. Last action took place almost 2 mi N of Sacramento. Monument is on the N end of the battlefield near C
& W of the hwy. An annual reenactment is staged in May (not Dec). Return to Hopkinsville by the same path.
Bridge Burning. (Hopkinsville to Calhoun RT c.120mi). NBF followed the direct rd to Greenville (as on Nov 24), then moved N thru Sacramento to Rumsey, just across the Green River from substantial Union forces in Calhoun. From Rumsey turn W on KY138 & take an immediate L on KY1155. After 5.3mi, turn R on Branch School Rd. In another 2.5mi, at a T
intersection (37 26 35 N 87 20 21 W), go R on KY254.
The modern bridge, same location as one he burned over the Pond River, is 0.7 mi ahead. Another bridge he prob burned is c. 5 mi S of here, but no longer a rd there, just a RR bridge. Proceed 11.5 mi farther on KY254 to KY70 & turn L. Approx 7 mi ahead another bridge across the Pond River, prob corresponds to the third bridge that NBF burned. The circled X
on Map 3 show the approx locations of burned bridges. From last bridge NBF seemingly went SW along rds no longer there, joining today’s US41 towards Hopkinsville.
The last patrol of consequence Forrest took from this position started on January 10, 1862, and lasted just under a week over essentially his previous routes. He satisfied himself that a strong Union army at Calhoun was preparing to advance and remained there long enough for a courier to relay this news to Brig. Gen. Clark at Hopkinsville and to return with orders for Forrest to burn the bridges over the Pond River as he retired. Forrest arrived back in Hopkinsville around January 16.¹⁶
It had been a fruitful formative nine months for Forrest, a man with no prior military experience. However, his innate courage and commanding presence combined with a personal energy and extensive experience in horse- and slave-trading more than compensated. He already understood the logistics and methods of moving groups of people, and how fast and far men on foot, on horseback, or animal-drawn wagons could move. He had grown up in a rough environment, no stranger to violence. He understood how fear worked in men and how to use it for deception and intimidation. All of these factors were at play for Forrest during the opening chapters of a war neither side could have possibly imagined. Like one his magnificent thoroughbred horses, Forrest was just getting broken in.
More, and more bitter, lessons lay just over the horizon, back in Tennessee where the Union was attacking the major fortifications guarding the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, Forts Henry and Donelson.
Fort Donelson
Fort Henry on the Tennessee had already fallen to the forces of Brig. Gen. Grant and the river flotilla of Flag Officer Foote on February 6. An attack on Donelson was expected at any time. Moreover, the Confederate cavalry already there, Lt. Col. George Gantt’s 9th Tennessee Battalion, had performed miserably in protecting the Confederate withdrawal from Fort Henry. Accordingly, about February 7, 1862, Confederate units at Hopkinsville were ordered to fall back to Clarksville, TN, south about 20 miles. Forrest’s cavalry served as rear guard, following the Confederate infantry, and once the main force was safely in Clarksville, Forrest was ordered to Fort Donelson.¹⁷
And into a critical situation. The loss of the forts would open up both rivers and expose both Nashville and northern Mississippi and Alabama to Union forces. The Federal naval superiority enabled their armies to be moved and supplied by riverboat, a compelling consideration in an area where the population was so sparse the armies could not live off the land. And the rudimentary muddy country roads also stymied rapid movement. These enemy advantages would make it difficult to maintain a Confederate army in western or northern Tennessee given the Federals’ broad ability to maneuver. Loss of both forts would be a crippling blow to the Confederate war effort entailing both the loss of the city of Nashville, an important manufacturing hub and population center as well as the Nashville basin, a key source of horses, mules, and other agricultural products. These losses would in turn also isolate the Confederate garrisons on the Mississippi at Columbus, Kentucky, and at Island Number 10, mandating their withdrawal and making Memphis much more vulnerable.
On the morning of February 11, Forrest’s regiment was ferried across the river. At Fort Donelson Forrest received command of all the Confederate cavalry present, including Gantt’s battalion of six companies (four Kentucky and two Tennessee). He now had approximately 1,400 men. He established his camp behind the entrenchments east of Dover. As his men settled in, Brig. Gen. Gideon Pillow, the ranking officer present, ordered Forrest to reconnoiter towards Fort Henry to determine where the Union forces were and what they were up to. Taking about 300 men, Forrest rode northwest and, within three miles, ran into a party of enemy cavalry, staff officers with a cavalry escort on a similar mission as his own. After a brief skirmish the Union force fled and the Rebels pursued them for several miles. Forrest reported capturing a prisoner and wounding an unknown number of others.¹⁸
Map 5: Fort Donelson Area
Movement to Fort Donelson (c. 55 mi.) From Hopkinsville follow US41A S to Clarksville. After c. 27 mi, reach the intersection of US41A & US79 NW of Clarksville. Go W on US79 for 9.8 mi, turning L on Oakwood Rd & following it to the R. After 1 mi turn L on Indian Mound Rd. It dead ends into TN46 after 6.2mi. Turn L on TN46 (Red Top Rd). After 1 mi, turn R at the Indian Mound Methodist Church sign, then L 0.2 mi later, just before the church. Go 2.4 mi & turn L on Rose Valley Rd. After 3.8 mi, turn L on Old State Rd 76. Just 2.6 mi later, turn L on US79 & approach Lake Barkley (Cumberland River). NBF arrived here evening of Feb 10 & arranged to ferry his men across the river. Take TN46 SE out of Dover, passing the Surrender House
after 0.1mi. NBF’s camp was across the bottomland (usually flooded now by Lake Barkley) another 0.2 mi, on the L, near where the Manor House of Dover is now. The camp is A
on Map 5.
Union Reconnaissance. No thru rd any more exactly follows path taken by NBF chasing Union reconnaissance, but it is c. 5 mi to where the engagement occurred. For closest approach from the camp, return to US79 in Dover (0.3mi), turn L & go a total 3.2 mi to TN461 (The Trace). Turn R & go 1.4mi. The intersection on R is Hickman Ferry Rd, on L is Pumpkin Ridge. This high ground is the approx location of the Union recon party when they spotted NBF approaching (B
on Map 5). NBF pursued the Union force W along Telegraph Rd. Go N along TN461 until reaching the historical marker on the L side & turn L on one-lane rd. Telegraph Rd is washed out about a mile farther on. But a Telegraph Trail hiking route leaves from the S Welcome Station for Land between the Lakes (farther N on TN461) & joins the path of Telegraph Rd c. 1.3 mi W from welcome station. C. 3.6 mi from the welcome station (for hikers, Trail Marker 9, 36 30 04 N 87 57 36 W) is where NBF encountered Union main body moving forward & broke off pursuit. The Blue Springs/Fort Henry Rd (TN230) that goes W from welcome station is roughly 1 mi N of and parallel to the trail. Telegraph Rd followed the ridgeline S of TN230 most of the way. NBF returned to camp after this encounter.
The next day, on another reconnaissance, this time due west, Forrest took all of the fort’s cavalry forward and ran into Union troops advancing from Fort Henry. The first skirmish occurred about two miles west of Donelson’s entrenchments. Forrest deployed three dismounted companies armed with Maynard rifles into line against elements of the 4th US and 2nd Illinois Cavalry. These horsemen were the advance guard of Col. Richard J. Oglesby’s First Brigade of Brig. Gen. John A. McClernand’s advancing division. Forrest moved part of his force, three squadrons (probably six companies) under Maj. Kelley, to his left (south) to extend the line and threaten the right flank of the Union force. The skirmish stalled the advance until McClernand came forward and directed that his brigade simply bypass Forrest’s position by another route, Wynn’s Ferry Road, a parallel road further south.¹⁹
Map 6. Possible Positions during the Skirmish on 12 February
Forrest Delays McClernand. Exactly where this occurred is uncertain, but the RT to the approx locations is c. 5 mi. Historical marker concerning the engagement is at 36 28 53 N 87 51 12 W. My reconstruction, based on conflicting reports in OR: again leave camp site for Dover, turning L on US79. After 0.9 mi, turn L on Sandy Rd (Pinery Rd then). Continue straight on Indian Creek Rd when Sandy Rd turns L. Indian Creek Rd dead-ends at a wooded ridge, first contact area, where NBF w/3 companies drove in the Union advance. Map 6 shows the terrain w/the upper position labeled Forrest,
the point of initial contact. Retrace the Indian Creek Rd back to Miller Hill Rd 0.2 mi & turn R up the hill. At top of ridge (another 0.2mi) is Wynn’s Ferry Rd going L back towards Dover, & going R as a path on private property. At intersection of Miller Hill & Wynn’s Ferry, stop & look to SW along dirt path. Ridge ahead is the area where NBF’s final position prob was. For NBF’s retreat back to the fort, follow Wynn’s Ferry Rd to Nactor Dr., L on Nactor, & incline R after 0.2 mi, still on Nactor. Follow Nactor until it dead-ends into TN49 then turn L back into camp. Area NBF traversed during attack that was called off was between his camp & Lick Creek, W of TN49.
Snipers & Gunboats. From NBF’s camp, return to Dover & take US79W. Go 1.6 mi & turn R into Fort Donelson National Military Park. Park HQ is c. 0.1 mi on R. The action vs. sharpshooters happened around C
on Map 5, near & N of the Confederate monument & only c. 0.1 mi past the Park Visitor’s Center. From here NBF sent his men back to camp but he went on to observe gunboat’s attack. To find NBF’s position while he did this, leave the park Visitor’s Center on the tour rd. After 0.9 mi are some parking places & a small hut on R w/the tour number 3 (D
on Map 5), area where NBF observed engagement. Original parapets (earthen mounds) obscure view here. Please don’t climb on them! Climbing original fortifications causes erosion. Batteries & river can be seen by moving back up road a short way or following it down to the water battery.
Once warned by his scouts on the ridge south of Indian Creek Road of the Union movement towards the parallel road, Forrest left a squadron of two companies there to check any advance down that road and moved with two squadrons to block Wynn’s Ferry Road. As the Union advance appeared, Forrest attacked and brought it to a standstill. However, the Union force was building up across the front, with the 30th Illinois moving into line and a wing of the 8th Illinois reinforcing the cavalry, with Lieutenant George C. Gumbart’s battery of four guns emplaced on the ridge behind as well. Under increasing pressure, Forrest ordered a charge on his right by the still mounted second squadron to allow the dismounted rifle companies to disengage. Kelley charged his three squadrons in the center as well. The buffeted Union cavalry retreated around the flank of the 8th Illinois, which, augmented by Gumbart’s artillery, rose and fired a volley at the charging men. The 8th Illinois stood fast, but in the meantime Forrest’s dismounted companies, contending with the 30th Illinois and some cavalry, were able to disengage and regain their horses. Forrest pulled all his forces back and then, having received word from Brig. Gen. Simon B. Buckner in the fort to withdraw, moved his men into the fort. Forrest probably had around 1,200 men involved, while Oglesby had over 3,700 and seven artillery pieces, not all of which were engaged. The fighting started around 9 a.m. and continued for almost five hours.²⁰
By the next morning, February 13, the Union army had completely invested Fort Donelson. Union soldiers had mounted artillery batteries and were pushing skirmishers and sharpshooters forward. The weather, until then unseasonably warm, turned bitter cold with sleet, snow, and strong north winds late that night. The soldiers on both sides suffered acutely. Some ineffectual small-scale attacks took place with the cavalry little engaged. Early the next morning, Friday the 14th, the Confederate generals met and decided to attack the enemy lines on Wynn’s Ferry Road, the Union right, to attempt breaking out of the encirclement. Forrest rode out with his cavalry to protect the left of the attack. However, Brig. Gen. Pillow decided the attack had been discovered and that it was too late in the day, so he cancelled preparations and drew everyone back inside the entrenchments.²¹
That day also presented a new threat to the fort. Midafternoon four ironclad and two timber-clad river boats steamed up the Cumberland to take the fort under fire, the same craft that had reduced Fort Henry the week before. They were heavily armed, having many more guns than did the fort. Forrest rode over to watch the battle. Observing from the hill above, he thought the day was lost so heavy was the storm of shot and shell sweeping the fort. He didn’t then understand the advantages that the fort’s guns had. Mounted well above the water and protected by heavy earthworks, they were able to penetrate the ironclads, crippling each in turn, while suffering little damage from hostile fire. The Union naval force—in sad shape after a little over an hour—had to withdraw. Forrest absorbed another lesson for use in the future.
Friday night Forrest, as cavalry commander, was called to a meeting of other senior officers in Dover in the fort. There, they decided to bring on the attack the next morning by again passing our entrenchments and attacking the enemy’s right.
The overall plan was to attack the Union right where it sealed off the roads leading to Nashville. Pillow would make the main attack to open the way. The rest of the infantry, under Buckner, would assist the attack in the center, and upon its success form the rear guard of the army. Forrest was assigned to support Pillow’s attack and guard his left. After the withdrawal began he would reinforce the rear guard.
The attack was scheduled for dawn. Unfortunately, the coordination details were not clear to all participants. Buckner thought the withdrawal plan was firm and had his men carry their knapsacks and food for three days, while Pillow did not have his men pack and seemed to assume the decision to withdraw towards Nashville after a successful breakout depended on circumstances. From words in his official report, Forrest also apparently believed that a final decision wouldn’t be made until after the results of the attack were clear. Brigadier General John B. Floyd, the senior Confederate general in overall command, was a political appointee and probably did not understand the situation well enough to make his orders clear.²²
The first shot of the battle killed a horse in Capt. Overton’s company of Forrest’s regiment. The Confederate left wing attack moved forward, pressing the two brigades stationed on the Federal right. A quarter-mile gap between this Union flank and Lick Creek allowed some Confederate units, including the cavalry, to bypass the Union defense, and after about two hours of stiff resistance the Federals had to retreat. Although protecting the left of the Confederate line and threatening the Union flank, Forrest was unable to deploy properly because of the marshy ground. He used part of his command during this time to bring ammunition forward for the infantry. Apparently leaving Gantt to guard the flank, Forrest moved the balance of his force north toward the center of the attack.²³
Map 7. Forrest during the Battle of Fort Donelson
Attack. Map 7 shows movements of NBF & his men during main attack, from the camp at A
, along arrow to marshy ground at B
. Union forces had first occupied entire ridge almost to G
, but retreated high ground W of B
after stiff 2-hr fight. Map 7 is my approximation of NBF’s movements. Historical marker for NBF is at 36 28 49 N 87 50 27 W. NBF paced retreating Union forces, moving to C
on the map. Then, essentially being pinched out
by the creek, he moved N & W to the attack’s center. He charged battery at D
. NBF then swept along the line of Confederate infantry to E
, moving up a ravine & assisting the 2nd (CSA) KY Inf in overrunning enemy position. Final charge was against McAllister’s howitzers, occupying F
on Wynn’s Ferry Rd. McAllister lost 3 guns here. The 45th IL supported the guns but retreated quickly down side of ridge to the S. Historical marker about NBF’s role at corner of Nactor & Main St.
Escape. Generals’ council took place at the Surrender House,
only short distance from NBF’s camp. NBF’s escape path approx on current route of TN49 out of Dover. NBF personally reconned in front of his column of less than 1,000 soldiers.
Crossing point was near the current bridge. To follow NBF’s route of c. 90 mi, take TN49E out of Dover (historical marker on L before creek) for 9.9 mi & turn L on TN233. Lick Creek now a major barrier due to Lake Barkley. Go 8.9 mi to Cumberland City. Take TN46S for 7.7 mi to rejoin TN49. Turn L on TN46/49 & follow for 5.2 mi. Here turn L w/TN49 & go 6.8 mi to Vanleer. NBF’s men spent the night of Feb 16 around here. Continue on TN49 for 7.7 mi to Charlotte. Turn R on Spencer St & follow it across TN48 to Spring St. Turn L. After 0.2 mi, turn R on Old Hwy47. Join TN47E in one mi & turn L. Near here is where NBF’s men, discharging their weapons to reload fresh, caused a nearby CSA unit to panic & run away. After 8.5 mi from Charlotte, turn L on US70 at White Bluff. 8.1 mi beyond White Bluff, cross the Harpeth River. NBF’s men spent the night of the 17th around here. On morning of 18th they went to Nashville, following approx route of US70.
Furlough. From Nashville NBF moved to Murfreesboro, c. 30 mi along US41S & arrived Feb 23. Next morning he left for Huntsville, c. 75 mi S along rd close to the present US231S. Arriving late on the 25th, he & men went on leave until Mar 10. NBF took Memphis & Charleston RR over 200 mi from Huntsville to Memphis, following approx route of I-565 to AL20/Alt72 in Decatur, west on Alt72 to Tuscumbia, & then west on US72 to Memphis.
In the center. Forrest found a Union battery (Gumbart’s) that had been holding up the Confederate advance, but which was now preparing to withdraw. Taking advantage of some concealment, Forrest had his men charge the battery and overrun it. Forrest claimed that he captured six guns here and Oglesby admitting losing three.
Forrest moved farther to his right and charged some Union infantry that had been holding up the advance. He later reported:
I found a regiment of our infantry in confusion, which I relieved by charging the enemy to their front. Here 64 of the enemy were found in 40 yards square. General Pillow, coming up, ordered me to charge the enemy in a ravine. I charged by squadrons, filing the first company of each squadron to the right, and the second to the left, on reaching the ravine, firing and falling in the rear of the third squadron until the three squadrons had charged. We here completely routed the enemy, leaving some 200 dead in the hollow, accomplishing what three different regiments had failed to do.
Along with the 2nd Kentucky (CSA), Forrest also attacked another battery, Capt. Edward McAllister’s, and overran it, capturing three more guns (one already disabled). The Rebel troopers also drove off the battery’s supporting infantry.²⁴
About this time, having accomplished the objective of opening the roads to the south, the Confederate attack ceased. Forrest sent scouts forward to maintain contact with the Union forces and spotted reinforcements coming in, which he promptly reported to Pillow, in charge on this portion of the field. According to Forrest, about 2:30 p.m. the fighting stopped, and his men were employed gathering up discarded weapons and assisting the wounded. Confederate forces were almost as disorganized in victory as the Union forces were in defeat, but the Yankees were getting fresh troops. As Pillow ordered the attacking forces back into the entrenchments to consider their next move, the Yankees moved forward to reoccupy part of the ground they had lost.²⁵
Although the Confederate soldiers brimmed with confidence, the climate among the top commanders was decidedly mixed. Brashly confident of beating the rest of the Union army the next day, Pillow saw no need to leave the fort. Buckner had prepared his men to leave for Nashville immediately and was angry they did not. While the Confederates had attacked the Union right, the enemy had attacked the Confederate right and had put the position in peril by seizing some of the entrenchments. Floyd could not make up his mind initially, but finally decided that in the morning the fort would be abandoned and the retreat begun. Orders to such effect were passed to subordinate commanders, and Forrest reported at 9 p.m. that the road was still open. However, suddenly things changed.²⁶
About midnight Forrest was called back to meet with the generals, and there he learned of reports of 11,000 Union reinforcements and that the escape routes were now blocked. Union pickets were reported across the road, and surrender was now under discussion. Forrest immediately sent out scouts (Anderson and Martin, who had served
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