From Bismarck to Hitler: The Background of Modern German Nationalism

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FROM BISMARCK TO HITLER:

THE BACKGROUND OF MODERN GERMAN NATIONALISM

BY

LOUIS L. SNYDER, PH.D.

Department of History,

College of the City of New York

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 3

DEDICATION 4

FOREWORD 6

PART I—THE APOSTLES 8

CHAPTER 1—THE TRADITIONAL NATIONALISM OF OTTO VON BISMARCK 8

CHAPTER 2—ADOLF STOECKER AND CHRISTIAN-SOCIAL NATIONALISM 19

CHAPTER 3—THE NATIONALIST HISTORIAN—HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE 31

CHAPTER 4—FRIEDRICH WILHELM NIETZSCHE 42

CHAPTER 5—RICHARD WAGNER AND NATIONAL ART 52

CHAPTER 6—THE SWASHBUCKLING NATIONALISM OF WILLIAM II 61

CHAPTER 7—FRIEDRICH VON BERNHARDI AND THE GLORIFICATION OF WAR 72

CHAPTER 8—THE INTEGRAL NATIONALISM OF ADOLF HITLER 79

PART II—THE FORCES 90

CHAPTER 1—THE DISSOLUTION OF LIBERAL NATIONALISM 90

CHAPTER 2—JUNKERDOM AND NATIONALISM 95

CHAPTER 3—MILITARISM 103

CHAPTER 4—THE RISE OF NATIONALISTIC SOCIETIES 110

CHAPTER 5—NATIONAL EDUCATION 124

CHAPTER 6—NATIONAL PRESS 130

CHAPTER 7—GERMAN COLONIZATION 137

CHAPTER 8—NATIONALISTIC ASPECTS OF GERMAN ANTI-SEMITISM 142

CHAPTER 9—NATIONALISM TRIUMPHANT 149

BIBLIOGRAPHY 157

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 163

DEDICATION

TO DR. CARLTON J. H. HAYES

"Omne vovemus

Hoc tibi; nec tanto careat

mihi nomine charta."

(POLITICAL NATIONALISM HAS BECOME, FOR THE EUROPEAN OF OUR AGE, THE MOST IMPORTANT THING IN THE WORLD, MORE IMPORTANT THAN CIVILIZATION, HUMANITY, DECENCY, KINDNESS, PITY; MORE IMPORTANT THAN LIFE ITSELF.)

SIR NORMAN ANGELL.

FOREWORD

There are no ulterior motives behind this treatment of modern German nationalism, no attempts to prove Germans to be either more warlike or more peaceful than other peoples. The various nationalistic utterances quoted throughout the following pages can be matched easily by statements of equally patriotic Frenchmen, Englishmen or Americans. The force we label nationalism, which is becoming apparently more and more important in modern civilization, is certainly no German monopoly. The object of this work is merely to consider nationalism impartially as a phenomenon in recent German history, not to censure it, praise it, or it to compare its intensity in Germany with that of other nations.

The observer of German affairs is often struck by the carelessness of some writers in attributing national characteristics and national instincts to the German people, and in discussing Germany’s national soul. It is a fallacy which ought to be avoided. The average German is no more sentimental than the average American, no more phlegmatic than the Englishman, no more warlike than the Frenchman. The belief generally held in the former allied countries that the Germans are an inherently warlike people is unwarranted and unjust. They are much like the subjects of other nations; they possess the same foibles and weaknesses and are affected in the same way as Frenchmen, Americans or Peruvians by forces of circumstance and personality. We must, therefore, consider the Germans as human beings and not as a nation whose national characteristics are rigid and unique.)

In tracing the background of contemporary nationalism in Germany, it is necessary for us to remember the rôle which individuals have played in the recent history of Germany. The Germany of 1862-1890 mirrored the traditional nationalism of the Iron Chancellor; the Germany of 1890-1918 reflected the pathological nationalism of William II; the Germany of 1935 seethes with the integral nationalism of Hitler. It is important to consider in some detail the careers and writings of the leading exponents of German nationalism since the middle of the 19th century, if we wish to obtain a true picture of the genesis of contemporary German nationalism. We shall fail completely to grasp the significance of the various movements of the era—the completion of national unification, the rise of nationalistic societies, anti-Semitism, Junkerdom, colonial activity, etc., unless we consider carefully the key figures connected with these movements besides concentrating upon the movements themselves.

Insofar as possible an attempt has been made to make these apostles of German nationalism speak for themselves. Critical analyses of what nationalists have to say is of relatively little importance; for our purposes it is necessary to mirror their sentiments and attempt to understand how these moulded public opinion. It will be seen that most of the elements of present-day nationalism in Germany (as well as in other nations) existed during the preceding century, and that which came as an aftermath of the World War, sometimes considered as something essentially new in history, is really the result of a gradual but natural evolution.

It is a most unusual picture that meets our eyes, varying in color from the black and white of ultra-conservative, traditional nationalism to the red of radicalism and the black and red of national socialism. The Germany of 1862-1935 has known every array of nationalism, from the Jacobin variety through humanitarian nationalism and passionate Hitlerite super-nationalism. It is our purpose to clarify this background, to show on what foundation modern integral nationalism rests. The task of selecting the most important elements from this distorted picture is an extremely difficult one, but the attempt, at least, must be made.

The present work was largely inspired by Professor Carlton J. H. Hayes of Columbia University, whose works, France, a Nation of Patriots, Essays on Nationalism, and The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism are well-known to those interested in this phase of modern civilization. For years Columbia students have greeted Professor Hayes’ extraordinary lectures on nationalism as a welcome relief from those of dry-as-dust pedants; and some of them, affected by his contagious enthusiasm, have determined to continue on in this field. Whatever value might be found in the present effort is due to him; its faults are my own.

I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to Dr. Ira M. Freeman, Mr. Avner Schiller of the College of the City of New York and Miss Ida Mae Brown for their encouragement and editorial aid in the production of this book.

L. L. S.

The College of the City of New York,

New York City,

March, 1935.

PART I—THE APOSTLES

CHAPTER 1—THE TRADITIONAL NATIONALISM OF OTTO VON BISMARCK

The period from 1862 to 1890 is overshadowed by the towering figure of Otto von Bismarck, whose dynamic personality is associated closely with all that we understand by the words, traditional nationalism. In the person of Bismarck appeared an ideal champion for those Germans who resented talk about fundamental rights of the German people, about liberty, equality and fraternity, freedom of speech, press and meeting, the words which had been uttered so recklessly at the Frankfurt Assembly in December, 1848. The most conservative of conservatives and a most militant member of the Junker class, Bismarck started where Metternich had left off. Like Metternich, Bismarck soon became the reactionary genius of Europe. He defended all that was traditional in German history, its feudal, aristocratic, monarchical features, with the same utter fearlessness and zest for conflict that had distinguished his entire life. But, unlike Metternich, he did not ignore the force of nationalism that existed among the people about him. He saw that unification of Germany with a simultaneous strengthening of the Hohenzollern dynasty could be accomplished by using this force of nationalism, and he took full advantage of the opportunity offered him.

So powerful was the Bismarckian personality that the traditional nationalism he represented impressed itself indelibly upon the era, 1862-1890, to the exclusion of that liberal nationalism which had left its strong imprint in England through the teachings of Jeremy Bentham, in France through François Guizot and in Italy through Giuseppe Mazzini. Any stirrings of liberal nationalists in Germany after the unsuccessful revolution in 1848 were completely stamped out under the leadership of Bismarck, and blood-and-iron became the accepted watchword of German progress.

Bismarck, a thoroughgoing aristocrat in the deepest meaning of the word, was opposed to revolution if it meant upsetting the traditional monarchy and class system in the aristocratic Germany he knew. He ignored the real feelings of a majority of his countrymen, who yearned for political health through liberty, equality and fraternity. They received from him constant doses of autocratic treatment, and they were forced to be content. In the final analysis, the structure he had built so laboriously rested on a very weak foundation and had many elements of artificiality. The backbone of his empire, the middle and lower classes, supported his system only so long as it was affected by the stimulant of blood-and-iron which he had injected into it. As soon as its effects wore off, the danger that liberal opinion would revert to the revolutionary attitude which had been effectively smothered in 1848 was imminent. And that is precisely what happened in 1918.

As a traditional nationalist, Bismarck was a strong defender of religion on national grounds. German historians, unable to believe that the great Bismarck could be anything but a Protestant Christian, have written comprehensive volumes fortified with liberal quotations to prove that Bismarck was devoted to God and Christianity. To the more impartial student of Bismarck’s life it is evident, however, that the skepticism which existed in his nature as a youth scarcely seemed to have left him throughout his life, although he cleverly exploited an apparently interne belief in God on various diplomatic occasions. Pertinent examples appear in his wooing of the pious Johanna von Puttkamer, in his study of the Bible in order to obtain material for his contacts with the pietistic (and influential) von Gerlach brothers, in his efforts to impress the impressionable and God-fearing German people, and in his tactics when forcing the realization upon his stubborn master, William I, that his own actions mirrored the will of God. I am content, he had said, to leave it to Almighty God to guide your Majesty’s heart for the welfare of the Fatherland, and I am more inclined to pray than to advise. Loyalty to Christianity was, at least outwardly, an essential part of his own nationalism, in spite of the fact that he was often inclined to mock at the Christian conception of brotherly love and that he at times accused Almighty God of being capricious.

There was nothing rabid or fanatical about the nationalism of Bismarck. He was an outstanding Realpolitiker, a reactionary, conservative, monarchical patriot who honestly convinced that Germany could continue to exist only if it were guided by the firm hand of the Hohenzollern dynasty. Situated in the centre of Europe, constantly divided by domestic rivalries and again and again overrun by outside enemies, Germany, as a matter of self-preservation, must unite under the firmest leadership in sight—the Prussian—, or be doomed to destruction. Bismarck kept this end always in view. He did not believe much in continental democracy; a democratic form of government appeared to him a good thing for America perhaps, but Germany required something more substantial and more traditional.

The development of Bismarck’s Germanification is enlightening because it mirrors the general sentiment of his era. As will be seen in a later section, Bismarck understood the affection of the average German for his own corner of land. He, himself, was in early manhood a Pomeranian patriot; his concern for Prussia gravitated about his personal loyalty to the King of Prussia. As a realist he soon saw that Prussia was destined for leadership in a unified Germany, hence his local Pomeranian patriotism developed naturally into a broader Prussian loyalty. Keeping only attainable ends in view, he led Prussia towards its new, powerful position, and the man who once thought exclusively in terms of Prussia soon welded the Germans into a nation.

By inclination and preference a royalist, Bismarck remained consistently faithful to the Hohenzollern dynasty throughout his life, even though his patience was sorely tried after his dismissal in 1890 by William II This self-denial, he once said, this self-sacrifice on behalf of duty to State and King is, among us, a vestige of the faith of our fathers and grandfathers, a faith that has been transformed, so that it is obscure and nevertheless effective, no longer a faith and yet a faith after all....Why, except under divine command, should I subjugate myself to these Hohenzollern? They come of a Swabian family which is no better than my own, and whose welfare is no special concern of mine. This example of typical Bismarckian sophistry, evidences of which are by no means rare, does not deceive us. Bismarck’s loyalty to his sovereign, especially as long as he himself guided the affairs of State, went unquestioned. And along with this faith in royalty went a firm conviction that royalty plus the active co-operation of the upper classes, to which he belonged, made up the iron foundation of the State. Anyone working against this combination, anyone attempting to undermine its power, was simply working for the destruction of the only form of government which was suitable to the Germanic nature. He reasoned that only a monarchical State founded on blood-and-iron could survive in a hostile Europe; therefore, as a matter of self-preservation the entire will of the German people must be turned towards strengthening and maintaining the monarchy.

If we are to take Bismarck at his word, his intense belief in the principles of monarchy was an acquired characteristic. The very first sentence of his memoirs suggests that his preference in youth was republicanism: "I left school at Easter 1832, a normal product of our State system of education; a Pantheist, and if not a Republican, at least with the persuasion that the Republic was the most rational form of government; reflecting too upon the causes which could decide millions of men permanently to obey one man, when all the while I was hearing from grownup people much bitter or contemptuous criticism of their rulers."{1} At various stages of his life, Bismarck was fond of telling friends, especially such American friends as John Lothrop Motley, George Bancroft, Andrew D. White, General Philip Sheridan and others, that his tendency in youth was all towards republicanism.

But, in March 1848, when the very existence of the monarchy was threatened by revolution at Berlin, the newly married Junker comfortably settled at Schӧnhausen gathered fowling pieces, gunpowder and peasants and rushed off to offer his services to the King, Frederick William IV. Filled with contempt for the weak monarch, he, nevertheless, considered his allegiance to the Prussian dynasty of first importance, and, characteristically, he offered his life at once for its protection. This attitude of reverence for the kingly office remained uppermost throughout most of a lifetime devoted to unselfish service for the Hohenzollern. Bismarck, it is true, distinguished carefully between the person of the monarch and the monarchial principle which was represented by the ruler. Kings and emperors of Germany were for him but symbolic of the greatness of his native land. He who had seen three emperors naked was too well acquainted with the weaknesses and foibles of mere men thrust on the monarch’s throne to worship blindly the person occupying it. He devoted the best years of his life attempting to strengthen the monarchical sentiment of his people. Junkerdom and monarchy in alliance seemed to him to guarantee the solidity of German national development; his constant efforts were directed towards weakening parliament and bolstering royal authority.

After his quarrel with William II, Bismarck, who bitterly resented his dismissal, admitted that he had contributed unwittingly to the lowering of the influence of parliament. The old man hurling invective at his monarch from Friedrichsruhe now warned his people that the essence of constitutional monarchy should be a collaboration of the monarchical will with the conviction of those who were ruled. Yet, when he held the reins of power firmly, he ruled under a virtual dictatorship of emperor and chancellor, and he conveniently forgot everything concerned with the convictions of those who were ruled.

The first monarch with whom Bismarck came into contact, Frederick William IV, was a weak, vacillating, vain, would-be-autocrat, whose outbursts gave unmistakable signs of an impending mental collapse. He was scarcely the sort of person who could arouse the admiration of Bismarck, at that time distinguished as a brilliant member of the Prussian Landtag. But this soft, uncertain, erratic individual, who paraded pompously through his palaces listening carefully to all the staircase gossip, was the King. As such, he represented to the Pomeranian Junker a symbol for deep-rooted respect, and, if his admiration could be obtained, a convenient ladder for his own rapidly increasing ambition. Bismarck admonished his young wife not to speak lightly of the King. We both have the tendency to err in this respect. We ought not to speak irreverently of him any more than of our own parents. We must never forget that we have sworn him fealty and we must pay homage to his flesh and blood. Even then the future chancellor possessed a keen sensitiveness for the prestige of the Prussian crown; a prospective madman was worthy of his homage as long as he held the title of King of Prussia. And during the years 1851 to 1858, Bismarck, then envoy to the Bundestag at Frankfurt, advanced to the position of court favorite.

When at last the monarch’s mind gave way in 1861, his brother, Prince William, ascended the throne. A year later, when Bismarck was appointed premier and minister of foreign affairs, a remarkable friendship of twenty-six years between master and servant began. William I was one of the few men whom Bismarck honestly admired.{2} His seriousness, conscientiousness, sense of duty and justice, and his courage, all convinced the skeptical servant that here, at last, was the sort of individual who embodied his own idealistic conception of a monarch. The history of the relations between William I and Bismarck, between the solid, benevolent Prussian king and his explosive, irritable, severe minister, is a story of constant conflicts in temperament and judgment. The king, simple and benevolent, recognized the genius of his servant, and, though of an extremely obstinate nature, invariably gave way to Bismarck’s emphatic demands. Constant quarrels between the two and threats of resignation were but superficial and had no real meaning; underneath, master and servant grew to admire each other more and more as the years went by. So great had grown Bismarck’s respect for the emperor that the man of blood and iron broke into tears when informing the Reichstag in 1888 of the ruler’s death. Bismarck’s life-work, the successful completion of German unification, would have been a vastly different task had he been forced to work so long without the co-operation of a monarch embodying his ideal of the perfect ruler.

The successor to William I, Frederick, had, as Crown Prince, detested his father’s able minister, and he had made no secret of his contempt. Continued controversies took place between the two men, apparently because Bismarck believed Frederick to be under the sway of his English wife, Victoria. At Nikolsburg in 1866, however, Frederick had supported Bismarck in his insistence upon mild terms of peace. At Versailles in 1871 he noted in his diary that Bismarck, our great statesman, had never bad a genuine enthusiasm for the German question; he was but a Prussian official in the royal service. Frederick wished to be the liberal ruler, the democratic monarch who wanted to make moral conquests without blood and Iron. He conceded that Bismarck had made Germany great and powerful, but the nation had been robbed of its friends and the sympathy of the world. Bismarck considered the son of William I a weakling. Frederick III reigned but 100 days; he died in 1888 of throat cancer.

In the third volume of his memoirs, which was not published until after his death, Bismarck devoted the first and tenth chapters to discussions of William II, first as prince and then as emperor. It is filled with classic invective. Bismarck, wounded to the heart by his dismissal at the hands of the young Hohenzollern, made entirely clear the difference in his feeling for the person of the monarch and the position he occupied. He tells of his efforts to prepare the young prince for his future rôle, how he obtained permission of the Emperor to allow Prince William to be trained in handling official documents at the Foreign Office, and how he endeavored to prevent the liberal tendencies than rampant in Berlin from affecting the future ruler. The prince, an eager, impulsive, extravagant, but able young man, perhaps the most gifted of the Hohenzollern since the great Frederick, had started his political career in alliance with Adolf Stoecker and others who sought to influence him in the direction of toleration for socialism. Bismarck remonstrated, and the prince replied that he would rather let himself be chopped into little pieces than make matters more difficult for the chancellor. The phrasing annoyed Bismarck, who commenced to see visions of future discord.

Upon his accession to the throne, the young emperor found himself controlled by the iron hand of Bismarck. He understood that it was quite too early to dismiss the chancellor who had founded the empire almost alone; moreover, he admitted a certain forced admiration for the veteran statesman. Soon, however, he began to assert himself by attempting to take a more active part in the affairs of state, and he made it clear to Bismarck that he meant in the future to give up his indifference and discuss public matters with his chancellor. Favoring amelioration of conditions of the working classes, he incurred the enmity of Bismarck, who, like Danton, never dreamed that anyone would dare to remove him. William II, convinced that Bismarck had outgrown his usefulness, summarily dropped the pilot, who retired to Friedrichsruhe. The young monarch attempted to guide the ship of state alone. Empty gestures at reconciliation meant nothing. Bismarck, like a wounded lion, growled unceasingly from his retreat and adopted methods of criticism which bordered on high treason. That young man at Berlin became the object of bitter and caustic criticism. The Junker, who had