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A Line in the Sand: Britain, France and the struggle that shaped the Middle East
Unavailable
A Line in the Sand: Britain, France and the struggle that shaped the Middle East
Unavailable
A Line in the Sand: Britain, France and the struggle that shaped the Middle East
Audiobook15 hours

A Line in the Sand: Britain, France and the struggle that shaped the Middle East

Written by James Barr

Narrated by Peter Noble

Rating: 4.5 out of 5 stars

4.5/5

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About this audiobook

A Simon & Schuster audiobook. Simon & Schuster has a great book for every listener.
LanguageEnglish
Release dateSep 6, 2018
ISBN9781471178856
Unavailable
A Line in the Sand: Britain, France and the struggle that shaped the Middle East
Author

James Barr

James Barr has worked in politics, at the Daily Telegraph, in the City, at the British Embassy in Paris, and is currently a visiting fellow at King's College, London. He read modern history at Oxford has travelled widely in the Middle East. His previous book, A Line in the Sand, is also available from Simon & Schuster. He lives with his wife and two children in south London. 

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Reviews for A Line in the Sand

Rating: 4.345360841237113 out of 5 stars
4.5/5

97 ratings13 reviews

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  • Rating: 4 out of 5 stars
    4/5
    This story should really be standard history.
    The timeframe of the book and the focus on colonial policy is good, but this comes at the expense of the Turkish, Arab, Druze and Zionist perspective. The Kurds aren't even mentioned.
    Fascinating to learn to what extend these supposed 'allies' France and Britain were trying to kill each other.
  • Rating: 3 out of 5 stars
    3/5
    An interesting look into anglo-french relationships in the middle east up to 1950. Reasonably detailed without being dreary.
  • Rating: 5 out of 5 stars
    5/5
    This really put my understanding of modern middle eastern history into perspective.
  • Rating: 5 out of 5 stars
    5/5
    A fantastic piece of research, intrigue and lessons learnt. Hopefully.
  • Rating: 5 out of 5 stars
    5/5
    Fascinating, gripping, still relevant story of imperial iniquity - British and French.
  • Rating: 5 out of 5 stars
    5/5
    Fascinating! Well documented and compiled! Looking forward to reading Lords of the Desert!
  • Rating: 5 out of 5 stars
    5/5
    Very enlightening. So turns out not much has changed since then. U.S. presidential elections are the lines in the sand.
  • Rating: 5 out of 5 stars
    5/5
    The level of research that gas gone into this book is truly astounding. It seems no detail is too small to be omitted, and the failed imperialism and political skullduggery is entirely revealed.
  • Rating: 4 out of 5 stars
    4/5
    A well researched book that reveals the complexities of the Anglo-French relationship in the middle east. Covering the years 1915-1949, this narrative brings out all of the conflicts, large and small, between these "Mandate" holders., that eventually culminate in a hasty retreat from the region by both powers. Looking forward to reading "Lords of the desert', Barr's follow up book documenting the rivalry between Britain and the United states for the same region.
  • Rating: 4 out of 5 stars
    4/5
    This is one of those books that seem to have been written in reverse: Barr started out from what was apparently a chance discovery in "a newly-declassified document" he was looking at, that showed that France had been sponsoring Zionist terrorists operating in the British mandate of Palestine in the 1940s, and decided to go back over the history of Anglo-French relations in the Middle East to work out how things had got to that point. He identifies as starting point the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement of January 1916, in which Britain and France, faced with the disintegration of Ottoman power in the Middle East, assigned themselves spheres of influence divided along an arbitrary line on the map "from the 'e' in Acre to the last 'k' in Kirkuk". Making, of course, no allowances for the way the world had moved on since the "race for Africa" of the 1870s, or for the complex religious and political history of the region, and laying the foundations for no end of trouble in the century to come. Barr charts the continued distrust and jockeying for strategic advantage between the two countries, complicated no end by a succession of mavericks on both sides determined to pursue their private agendas in the Middle East by "unconventional methods" — T.E. Lawrence was only the most famous of many semi-official troublemakers. Not to mention an equally impressive succession of incompetent administrators and overconfident military commanders. Barr is undoubtedly right that a lot of the past and present problems of the Middle East can be traced to the arrogance of both countries in the way they assumed they knew best for the area, and to Britain's selfish preoccupation with protecting the Suez Canal and the oil supplies for its Mediterranean fleet and France's concern to project its image as a successful colonial power despite the damage done by the two World Wars. And he tells a convincing and lively story, with a lot of detail I didn't know about in between the more familiar big events. I did wonder a bit, however, if he is giving Britain and France too much credit. Even with the best of management, Suez and the oil resources were clearly strategic problems that would lead to conflict (and still do) whichever powers established themselves in the region. Arab nationalism wasn't invented by T.E. Lawrence, it was always going to play an important part as Ottoman influence faded and self-determination became a norm for people all over the world to aspire to. And Zionism had its roots in the situation of Jews in the Russian Empire and Germany: even if the British and French had kept their fingers out of the pie, it would have found sponsors somewhere, in the US if not in Europe, and as soon as it did, there would have been emigration to Palestine, making conflict with the Arabs almost certain.
  • Rating: 5 out of 5 stars
    5/5
    This book charts the amazing story of Anglo-French rivalry in the Middle East, which was surprisingly virulent. Although both countries might have been officially allies, in the region there was no doubt who was the real enemy, and the age old colonial conflict between Britain and France was very much alive.Two things stand out for me from reading this book: one was the surprising lengths the French would go to to thwart British ambitions in the area, including helping zionists assassinate British officials. The other is the stunning callousness with which the British would make promises to various parties when it was convenient, and then go back on them, when these commitments would prove inconvenient. Neither country comes out very well.The story is told in a series of vignettes. This makes it more readable, but inevitably makes for gaps and shortcuts in the general narrative. If you want a full and systematic account, with detailed analysis, you'd have to do further reading.
  • Rating: 4 out of 5 stars
    4/5
    History of the struggle between the British and French for control of the Middle East after carving up the Ottoman Empire following WWI. Beginning with the Sykes-Picot agreement in 1915 and ending with the birth of the state of Israel in 1948 the author paints a picture of the British and French efforts to maintain empire with regard to future costs of Arab-Israeli conflicts.
  • Rating: 5 out of 5 stars
    5/5
    This book is an essential read for anyone trying to understand the modern middle east and the central conflict there between what is now the State of Israel and the Arabs of the region. For anyone familiar with the history of the relationship between the British Mandatory government and the Palestinian Jewish community – deteriorating from its high point following the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which promised a national homeland in Palestine for the Jewish people, to the open warfare of 1946/7 – this book provides a much broader context for understanding the shifts and turns in British policy over that period. Like many of the arbitrary borders established by colonial powers, the line in the book’s title - defining the unquiet border between Israel and Lebanon - is still very much relevant today. The author tells the story of two “Great Powers” – Britain and France – both of whom acted - in the grand tradition of 19th century colonialism - solely in the interest of perpetuating their own influence in the area. The problem was that, by the time that this story begins – toward the end of the World War 1 – the 19th century was history; there was a new spirit abroad, championed by the American President Woodrow Wilson, which demanded respect for the aspirations of local peoples to self-determination. Great Britain and France thus had to modify their imperialist goals – or at least cloak them – by seeking “mandates” from the newborn League of Nations, which authorised them to exercise so-called protective power over various parts of the now defunct Ottoman empire until such time as these territories were judged to be competent to rule themselves.France wished to control Syria (including modern Lebanon), in order to resume a supposed association with that area going back to the time of the crusades, and which had been interrupted by a mere seven hundred years of Moslem occupation. Britain was interested in acquiring control over Palestine (which then included what is now the Kingdom of Jordan) and Mesopotamia (modern Iraq). Before the war was over, a deal had been done and the two spheres of interest had been defined and delineated by the line, the “Sykes-Picot Line”. France’s motivations seemed more to do with “La Gloire” and reinforcing its self perception – somewhat dented by its poor showing in the war – as a world power. Britain on the other hand had much more practical reasons; it had already made a strategic decision to change the fuel of the British navy from coal to oil, so control over the oil fields of Iraq was a priority. Palestine would serve an entirely different purpose; it would provide a cordon sanitaire between the zone of French interest in Syria and the British-controlled Suez Canal. This may not have been – as the author maintains – the sole motivation behind the Balfour Declaration. However, in the context of the bitter rivalry between Britain and France, it certainly would have furnished another persuasive reinforcer.In 1916, during the course of the war, Sir Henry McMahon the British High Comissioner in Egypt had already secretly floated an offer to the the local ruler of Mecca, Sherif Husein, of an “independent” Arab state covering most of the area, including greater Syria. (As always the devil is in the details; the rather vaguely worded exclusions to this area were meant to define Palestine, which the British government – or some of its actors evidently had in mind for another purpose –which may or may not have been a Jewish Homeland. The impression of right and left hands acting totally independently is certainly evident.) The purpose of this offer was part of a strategy – of which T.E. Lawrence’s actions on the ground were the other part - to encourage the Arabs to revolt against the Ottoman Turks, hence accelerating the demise of the latter and also establishing Britain as the new “protecting” Great Power in the region. In the negotiations that led up to the Sykes-Picot carve-up later the same year, the French insisted on their rights to Syria, putting Britain in the situation where they effectively reneged on McMahon’s offer. In the event, the 1917 Ottoman defeat in Syria was very much an Arab achievement – organized and assisted by T.E. Lawrence – which made France’s claims to a mandate there particularly unsavory to the Arabs.Once the two countries’ spheres of influence were agreed and established, each set about trying to undermine the other. The British tried to install one of Sherif Husein’s sons, who was favorable towards them, as the future ruler of Syria; he was run out of the country by the French; the British promptly made him the king of Iraq. In the 1920’s, the Druze of Syria revolted against the French; they were given material support from Palestine by the British. The French repaid the compliment a decade later, when the Arabs of Palestine were in revolt against the British. At the end of the second world war, French rule in Syria and Lebanon was increasingly resented, and British operatives there did their best to speed the departure of the colonial power. In 1946/7, when the British were faced with a full-scale Jewish insurgency in Palestine, Ezel, the most militant of the Jewish groups was allowed to recruit and buy arms in France itself, as well as taking refuge from the British in French-controlled Lebanon. The echoes of this struggle and the scars that it left can be traced right down to 1963, when De Gaulle, once again in power in France, effectively vetoed Harold Macmillan’s application for Britain to enter the European Common Market.In most history books dealing with the first half of the 20th century, the second world war would have to play a major role. In this book it is almost incidental, a sideshow to the bitter struggle between these two “allies” for enduring influence in the middle east. There are really only two points at which the war intrudes; once the Germans had been defeated at the battle of El Alamein in 1943, the British could feel relaxed about the security of Egypt and the Suez canal, and focus once more on screwing France. The Free French under De Gaulle very reluctantly agreed to “allow” the British to assist in the liberation of Syria and Lebanon from the Vichy government’s control. Although this relieved the - by then remote – risk of a German invasion of Palestine from the north, it left most of the previous Vichy officials – now professing loyalty to the Free French - in place. Plus ca change…The author tells the story with great clarity and liveliness; there is a very full cast of characters – some familiar, like T.E. Lawrence, Lloyd George, Churchill and Charles De Gaulle, and others less so – the analysis of whose personalities and backgrounds adds much to one’s appreciation of this account of, double-dealing, mutual distrust, manipulation and outright treachery .