Analysis
February 19, 2010
Summary: Nearly a year after Turk-
ish President Abdullah Gül declared
that “good things are going to hap-
pen concerning the Kurdish issue,”
the government’s attempts to solve
what remains the country’s knottiest
problem appear to have fizzled out.
Both sides are blaming the other for
this worsening state of affairs. The
government, fearful of a nationalist
backlash, seems unable to press
ahead with substantive reforms until
the separatist Kurdistan Workers’
Party (PKK) halts its attacks. The
PKK says it reserves the right to
pursue armed attacks until its own
conditions are met.
But the clock is ticking. If the Kurdish
opening is to succeed, the govern-
ment will need to bring Kurdish
leaders into the equation. The
sooner the government rouses the
courage to sit down with the Kurds,
the more likely it is that peace can
be achieved.
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Turkey’s Kurdish Opening: Shifting Into
Reverse Gear?
by Amberin Zaman*
“The mountain yielded a mouse.” This
old Turkish adage, used to depict a
situation where expectations are raised
only to be dashed, best describes
popular reaction to the ruling Justice
and Development Party’s (AKP) so-
called Kurdish opening. Nearly a year
after Turkey’s President Abdullah Gül
declared that “good things are going to
happen concerning the Kurdish issue,”
the government’s attempts to solve
what remains the country’s knottiest
problem appear to have fizzled out.
The big question now is: Is the Kurd-
ish opening irreversible? Or is the
Kurdish problem poised to escalate to
ever-riskier heights?
Tension is mounting as hundreds of
Kurdish activists, including five elect-
ed mayors, continue to be put behind
bars on often dubious charges of work-
ing on behalf of rebels of the outlawed
separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party
(PKK). More ominously still, a spate of
attempted mob lynchings of Kurds by
Turks has raised the spectre of ethnic
strife, unseen even at the height of the
PKK-led insurgency in the 1990s. Such
intolerance was on chilling display
when a member of the Special Forces
*
Amberin Zaman is the Turkey correspondent for The Economist and writes a weekly column for the Turkish daily Taraf. The views ex-
pressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF).
1
Amberin Zaman (2009). “Turkey’s Kurdish Gambit,” On Turkey series, November 13, 2009.
outside an Ankara bar gunned down
Emrah Gezer, 29, in January because
he was singing a Kurdish song. There
was further violence and mass arrests
on February 15, which marked the
anniversary of the capture of the PKK
leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999.
Yet, until recently the signs were
auspicious. Soon after Gül’s
comments, the interior minister Besir
Atalay met with Turkish writers and
intellectuals to build consensus around
a potential blueprint for fixing the
Kurdish problem.1 Restrictions on
Kurdish language broadcasting by
privately owned television channels
were eased. Kurdish inmates were
allowed finally to converse with
visitors in their mother tongue. And
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan upped the ante in a series of
bold and emotion laced speeches that
evoked the shared pain of Turkish and
Kurdish mothers whose sons fell in the
25-year long insurgency. By October
2009 peace seemed to be within reach
when a group of PKK fighters returned
voluntarily from their mountain base
in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq
just as Turkey’s foreign minister was
embarking on a groundbreaking
Analysis
trip in the opposite direction2 crucially perhaps, the army
seemed to be on board.
But the hopes of ordinary Turks swiftly turned to outrage as
the PKK fighters decked out in their guerrilla garb proceed-
ed to deliver “victory” speeches before crowds of jubilant
supporters in the predominantly Kurdish southeast region.
The final blow to the Kurdish opening seemed to come with
the PKK’s December attack in the north-western province
of Tokat. Seven Turkish soldiers were killed in the clash.
This all but clinched the Constitutional Court’s decision on
December 11, 2009, to ban the largest pro-Kurdish party,
the Democratic Society Party (DTP), on the ground that it
posed a threat to the country’s territorial integrity through
its “organic” links with the PKK. The party has reconsti-
tuted itself under the banner of the Peace and Democracy
Party (BDP). But a day after the BDP held its first conven-
tion on February 1, 2010, prosecutors launched an investi-
gation on claims that the new party’s members had glorified
“criminals.” They were referring to Öcalan who, after nearly
11 years of captivity, continues to be venerated by millions
of Kurds.
Both sides are blaming the other for this worsening state
of affairs. It’s a bit of a Catch 22. Fearful of a nationalist
backlash, the government seems unable to press ahead with
substantive reforms until the PKK halts its attacks. The PKK
says it reserves the right to pursue its armed attacks until
its own conditions are met. These include: an immediate
end to the army’s operations, the prompt release of Kurdish
politicians who have been rounded up since April 14, 2009,
assigning Öcalan a role in the peace process, and the start of
negotiations between the government and the PKK.
Although nobody is talking about either a federation or
autonomy for the Kurds, it is hard to imagine that the
government could ever talk to the PKK let alone meet its
demands. For one, it would run into fierce resistance from
both the army and the opposition. Second, it would doom
its chances of winning a third consecutive term of single
rule in nationwide parliamentary elections that are expected
to be held next year.
The government’s earlier attempts to disarm the rebels with
the help of the Iraqi Kurds failed, most likely because it
2
Amberin Zaman (2009). “Turkey’s Kurdish Gambit,” On Turkey series, November 13, 2009.
2
sought to do so by sidelining Öcalan. He responded by un-
leashing his supporters in mass demonstrations across the
southeast. It was as much of a message to the government as
it was to his own men holed up in the mountains: “I may be
in prison but I remain in charge.”
The recent unrest has fuelled opposition claims that
Erdoğan’s Kurdish initiative is nothing more than a fiasco.
He insists that it is very much alive. Atalay, the interior
minister, recently unveiled a set of measures heralded as
part of the opening, but they were disappointingly limp.
These include establishment of a body that is supposed to
process and monitor human rights abuses. It’s a tired idea.
“Human Rights” portfolios have been created before only to
die unnoticed. The government is also talking about passing
legislation that would reduce penalties for teenagers ac-
cused of acting on behalf of the PKK and pave the way for
them to be tried in juvenile courts.
Over one thousand minors have been either prosecuted or
jailed under this law, usually for taking part in pro-PKK
demonstrations. But the amendments fall short of shielding
children from arrest and prosecution for throwing stones
at members of the security forces or chanting nationalist
slogans, both considered “terrorist offenses.” Many emerge
even further radicalized by their experience. Reports of
torture under police detention are on the rise. Uneducated,
unemployed and alienated, this new generation of Kurds
offers prime recruiting material for the PKK.
The trouble is that even if the constitutional amendments
were adequate the Constitutional Court, which is increas-
ingly putting itself in the place of the executive, could still
overturn them. The most recent example of this was when
it threw out the government’s amendment to article 250 of
the constitution that would have paved the way for military
officials to be tried in civilian courts. Indeed, many AKP
officials complain privately that their hands are so full fend-
ing off the army and the judiciary that they cannot focus on
the grievances of the Kurds. Rather than endlessly tweaking
the constitution they should rewrite it from scratch.
But the clock is ticking. If the Kurdish opening is to suc-
ceed, the government will need to bring Kurdish leaders
into the equation. Its most obvious interlocutors are the
BDP. They are the elected representatives of nationalist
Analysis
Kurds who sympathise with the PKK. No matter how many
reforms Erdoğan pushes through, the PKK will simply keep
raising the bar until it is allowed to claim at least some suc-
cess in bringing about a solution. Preparing public opinion
for this is the biggest challenge facing the AKP.
But Erdoğan does not seem interested in reaching out to his
Kurdish peers. If anything the clampdown on them is con-
tinuing. By one BDP official’s reckoning, some 800 Kurdish
politicians have been arrested over the past year. Now there
is talk of a big cross border operation against the PKK’s
Iraqi Kurdish strongholds once the snow begins to melt in
the spring. Real time intelligence provided by the United
States has boosted the army’s effectiveness against the PKK.
But if the PKK were to resort to urban terrorism, there is
little the army can do. That scenario cannot be ruled out,
for Öcalan might some day lose his grip or simply die. The
PKK would then likely disintegrate into unruly factions.
That is why the sooner the government rouses the courage
to sit down with the Kurds the more likely it is that peace
can be achieved.
Amberin Zaman, Correspondent, The Economist
Amberin Zaman is the Turkey correspondent for The Economist and
writes a weekly column for the Turkish daily Taraf.
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