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Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programmes are key
to reducing the effects of the economic crisis among the
poor in Latin America. Their implementation, however,
entails two risks: an increase in political clientelism (exchange of votes for favours) and the widening of the power gap between the poor population and local authorities. In order to gain access to the programme and receive financial aid, families rely on the authorities in charge of registering beneficiaries and checking compliance with conditionalities. As a result, government actors enjoy a better power position at the local level and/or are able to ask for political support in return.
Título original
Hevia 2010 Direct or Mediate Relationships in Bolsa Familia Brazil program
Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programmes are key
to reducing the effects of the economic crisis among the
poor in Latin America. Their implementation, however,
entails two risks: an increase in political clientelism (exchange of votes for favours) and the widening of the power gap between the poor population and local authorities. In order to gain access to the programme and receive financial aid, families rely on the authorities in charge of registering beneficiaries and checking compliance with conditionalities. As a result, government actors enjoy a better power position at the local level and/or are able to ask for political support in return.
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Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programmes are key
to reducing the effects of the economic crisis among the
poor in Latin America. Their implementation, however,
entails two risks: an increase in political clientelism (exchange of votes for favours) and the widening of the power gap between the poor population and local authorities. In order to gain access to the programme and receive financial aid, families rely on the authorities in charge of registering beneficiaries and checking compliance with conditionalities. As a result, government actors enjoy a better power position at the local level and/or are able to ask for political support in return.
Copyright:
Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
Formatos disponibles
Descargue como PDF, TXT o lea en línea desde Scribd
The International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth is jointly supported
by the Poverty Practice, Bureau for Development Policy, UNDP
and the Government of Brazil. No. 106 March , 2010
Direct or Mediated Relationships?
by Felipe Hevia, Centro de Investigaciones y Civic Involvement and Social Accountability Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, Mexico
in the Bolsa Família Programme
Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programmes are key low-income districts of São Paulo and Salvador showed that to reducing the effects of the economic crisis among the 84 per cent of respondents thought that local leaders were not poor in Latin America. Their implementation, however, trying to take advantage of the programme for political and entails two risks: an increase in political clientelism (exchange of electoral purposes. Only 2.4 per cent stated that they had heard votes for favours) and the widening of the power gap between threats about the programme being phased out if a particular the poor population and local authorities. In order to gain access candidate did not win the election. Nonetheless, this does not to the programme and receive financial aid, families rely on the imply a lack of political intent in the use and distribution of authorities in charge of registering beneficiaries and checking Bolsa Família at the national level, particularly as regards the compliance with conditionalities. As a result, government increase in the number of beneficiaries depending on actors enjoy a better power position at the local level the electoral calendar. and/or are able to ask for political support in return. The avoidance of intermediation, however, had at least Brazil’s Bolsa Família designed preventive procedures to reduce two unintended consequences. First, beneficiaries found it these risks: the eligibility criteria for beneficiary families are clear; difficult to receive information, and to oversee and monitor beneficiary databases are public; municipalities are involved the programme from the bottom. Because the beneficiaries in identifying poor families and validating conditionalities; lacked channels for communication and organisation, it was benefits are paid through banking institutions; and there are not possible to solve common problems collectively or to gain Social Accountability Boards to oversee and monitor the authorities access to more information about other social programmes. responsible for these activities. Local authorities and civil society Second, individual beneficiaries and public authorities continued are equally represented on these boards, following the to yield asymmetric power: to confront a family on its own participatory management model that Brazil has applied with the governmental machinery of bureaucracy results in a to its social protection policy. growing power disparity that collective action tries to level out. Incorporating interests makes their representation more Apart from these measures, Bolsa Família strengthened direct feasible and allows their voice to be heard, especially among relationships and inhibited the mediation of leaders and the poor who lack other ways to access the public sphere. organisations in order to prevent political clientelism at the But Bolsa Família’s beneficiaries face problems in being local level. Its designers sought to prevent the programme “represented” on the Social Accountability Boards because from being used for clientelistic purposes by eliminating any of the shortage of local groups and leaders that can type of social intermediation (through social organisations) and perform that task. political intermediation (through the participation of political parties or other political actors) in the process of selection into This circumstance contributes to the depoliticisation of the the programme, in the renewal of beneficiary status, in the organisations that formally exist for the purposes of social control payment of the benefit, and in the graduation processes. and civic involvement: without effective representation and power Information on how to register for Bolsa Família was disseminated resources, Bolsa Família’s social control organisations have become through television and radio, as well as in schools. Communication “decorative” rather than participatory decision-making bodies. with beneficiary families was established through letters and welfare services offices. Hence, for the positive effects of CCTs to reach the poorest population in Latin American countries, there is a need to The decision to prevent intermediation had positive intended strengthen and promote channels for civic involvement consequences. The most important outcome was the beneficiaries’ and social accountability, wherein the poor are no longer awareness of the limited clientelistic use of Bolsa Família at the local considered part of the problem but rather become engaged level. A survey conducted among programme beneficiaries in two actors who are part of the solution.
International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC - IG)
Poverty Practice, Bureau for Development Policy, UNDP The views expressed in this page are the authors’ and not Esplanada dos Ministérios, Bloco O, 7º andar E-mail: ipc@ipc-undp.org URL: www.ipc-undp.org necessarily those of the United Nations Development 70052-900 Brasilia, DF - Brazil Telephone: +55 61 2105 5000 Programme or the Government of Brazil.